Securitization Philippe Bourbeau Department of Politics and International Studies University of Cambridge

Abstract Securitization is one of the most dynamic fields of research in today’s security studies. This article (a) examine the various definitions developed by scholars to make sense of the phenomenon, (b) presents the two logics upon which most of the research is conducted (i.e. the logic of exception and the logic of routine), and (c) identifies avenues of research that will most likely drive future research in this field.

Securitization is one of the most dynamic fields of research in today’s security studies. Several sets of arguments, factors, rationales and explanations have been offered to better understand and explain mechanisms of securitization. Constructivists, postmodernists, political sociologists, neoliberalists, critical theorists, feminists, and normative theorists are all participating in the debate. This article is divided in three parts. First, I will examine the various definitions of securitization currently proposed by scholars. The second section will analyze the major line of cleavage between theorists of securitization, i.e., the logics of securitization. Finally, I will seek to identify future avenues of research that although by no mean exhausting the possibilities will most likely drive most of the research in years to come. Definitions of securitization If scholars find it hard to reach a consensus on a definition of security, scholars find it equally difficult to agree on a definition of securitization. A first definition was proposed by Ole Wæver (1995) in his seminal paper in which he argues that security is an intersubjective and socially constructed process and that security is about survival. Securitization seeks thus to understand the processes by which “an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object”. In that sense, securitization studies aims to gain a better understanding of “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 31).

This definition of securitization is contested. In the same year of the publication of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde important book, Didier Bigo proposed a different take (the paper was first published in French in 1998 and then translated into English in 2002). Focusing on the issue of migration, he argues that “the transformation of security […] is directly related to [security professionals] own immediate interests […] and to the transformation of technologies they use […]. The Europeanization and the Westernization of the logics of control and surveillance of people beyond national policies is driven by the creation of a transnational field of professionals in the management of unease. This process of securitization is now well known” (Bigo 2002: 64). Influenced by the work of Bigo, Thierry Balzacq (2005: 172) proposed another definition a few years later. In an important contribution to this field of research, he argues that securitization is “a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction”. Balzacq has recently slightly modified its definition of securitization in proposing a short and a long definition. For him, securitization is, respectively, “a set of interrelated practices, and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that brings threats into being” and “an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a

securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development” (Balzacq 2011: 3). Building on these definitions, I have proposed to understand securitization as the process of integrating discursively and institutionally an issue into security frameworks that emphasize policing, control, and defense (Bourbeau 2011). Whereas the discursive element of this definition refers not only to the use of language but also to practices associated with language, the institutional dimension refers to notions of acceptance and the mechanisms of endurance, path dependence, and continuity in socially constructing issues as security ones. Despite these disputes regarding definitions of securitization, the main objectives of securitization scholars remain to better understand and explain this particular social process. For that purpose, scholars have mainly proposed two logics of securitization. Logics of securitization As currently organized, the literature on the securitization process rests mainly on two logics: the logic of exception and the logic of routine. These logics should not be viewed as opposing ones as they are not competing views. In fact, it is not at all clear that they can compete, for it is not clear that they are mutually exclusive. Building primarily on the work of Carl Schmitt, the logic of exception postulates that security is about the fight against an existential threat that necessitates exceptional measures. It focuses on speech acts legitimizing exceptional policies and practices in the face of an existential security threat. The so-called Copenhagen model (or school) best illustrate the logic of exception and has become over the years the current benchmark in securitization research (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998, Wæver 1995). Bringing speech act theory into security studies, the Copenhagen model posits that labelling something as a security issue permeates it with a sense of importance that legitimizes the use of emergency measures outside

of the usual political processes to deal with it. It is by labeling a phenomenon a security issue that it becomes one. The model distinguishes two types of actors: a securitizing actor securitizing issues by declaring something existentially threatened, and a functional actor affecting the dynamics of a sector. Securitizing agents do not navigate freely toward successful securitization. In fact, “conditions for a successful speech-act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical – to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures); and (2) the external, contextual and social – to hold a position from which the act can be made” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 32). On top of these facilitating conditions, the Copenhagen model argues in a bold statement that “discourse that takes the form of presenting as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such... successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 25). In the past decades, the Copenhagen model has provoked heated debates and has captured the attention of an increasing number of scholars: articles analyzing the model’s strengths and weaknesses have been published as leading article in major International Relations journals and panels have been organized at several annual conventions of the International Studies Association. While most security studies theorists disagree with at least one aspect of the Copenhagen model, they nearly all recognize that this particular take on the securitization process is one of the most creative, rich and stimulating models in today’s security studies. Debates about the Copenhagen model have evolved through several interrelated phases and major lines of criticisms have touched on several elements of the model. Scholars have criticized the model for fixing collective identity and have questioned the responsibility of the analysts in studying security. Others have focused their criticism on the speech act theory and its applicability to security studies arguing that the model underestimates other powerful practices such as the production of image and the use of symbols (Hansen 2011, Williams 2003) or that the

model fails to include other categories or types of acts (Balzacq 2005, Huysmans 2006, Vuori 2008). Scholars attuned to post-structural and gender perspectives have underscored that the model failed to take into account the silenced voices (Hansen 2000). Others have argued that the model left the audience significantly under-theorized (Balzacq 2005, Salter 2008). Whether the model can include the issue of context in its framework has been analyzed (Bourbeau 2011, McDonald 2008, Stritzel 2007). Others have focused their criticisms on the lack of universal and transcultural understanding of “the established rules of the game” (Curley and Wong 2008). Still others have argued that the Copenhagen model, as currently organized and applied, cannot explain variation in levels of securitization and that it presents a thin understanding of the concept of power, particularly the power of contextual factors – which should be understood as the power to enable and/or constrain securitizing agents (Bourbeau 2011) In contrast, the logic of routine inspired by Michel Foucault’s and Pierre Bourdieu’s systems of thoughts sees securitization as a process of establishing and inscribing meaning through governmentality and practices. It understands the securitization process as routinized and patterned practices, particularly bureaucracies’ and security professionals’ practices, in which technology come to hold a prominent place. The logic of routine comprises a broader set of security scholars than for the logic of exception. Each scholar brings to the table his own focus and influences, and although the logic is far from consistent across scholars it cannot be ignored either. Bigo is a central figure of the logic of routine. He argues that security is not necessarily about survival nor is it about urgency and exceptional measures. Rather, security is largely defined by mundane bureaucratic decisions and practices that create a sense of insecurity and unease. Using Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus, Bigo contends that the field of insecurity while breaking the traditional internal-external understanding of security absorbs other fields, and in doing so produce a security continuum in which various agents come to interact under the umbrella of this field. Focusing on the case of migration, Bigo argues that the securitization of immigration emerges “from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security

professionals […] It also comes from a range of administrative practices […] and what may be termed a specific habitus of the ‘security professional’ with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease” (Bigo 2002: 67). Bigo’s work has been very influential and several scholars have developed and further expand his set of arguments. Following in these footsteps, Balzacq has recently argued that the securitization process is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) process occurring within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances in which context, audiences and power relations play an important role. For him, security performatives are situated actions mediated by agents’ habitus. Seeking to “reformulates the assumptions of securitization in a form appropriate to empirical studies and to the development of a comprehensive theory”, Balzacq (2011: 1) proposes three core assumptions: the audience is central in the securitization process; the agent and context are co-dependent; and the dispositif connects different practices. The logic of routine has so far been subjected to less critical engagements than the logic of exception (and particularly the Copenhagen model). Yet, friendly criticisms are starting to emerge. Michael C. Williams (2011a), for example, argues that if security is defined away from an explicit logic of extremity then there is a danger that it will become difficult to distinguish any number of policy changes from ones that specifically relate to security. He further points out that “while the language of emergency can appear an obstacle to more theoretically nuanced and empirically grounded understanding of concrete practices, it may at the same time provide an anchoring device through which ‘security’ dynamics can be discerned and distinguished from ‘normal’ change with the policy process” (Williams 2011a: 217). The logic of routine have also been criticized for its understanding of who can be a securitizing actor and for offering very little guiding principles in explaining variation in levels of securitization (Bourbeau 2014). Future avenues of research The nature, mechanisms, contours, and consequences of the securitization process are one of the most active and fast growing areas of research of global politics. Undoubtedly, there is substantial disagreement between scholars that this short review cannot fully engage with. Yet, future

avenues of research (or of disputes) can be divided into four broad categories: the politicization vs. the securitization process; the issue of methods in securitization research; the various strategies of contesting security, and varieties of issues under investigation. 1. The politicization vs. the securitization process. Distinguishing between the politicization process and the securitization process is an important step in our study of contemporary security politics. There is substantial disagreement as to whether the two processes are in fact distinct. Arguments on both side of the spectrum have been put forward: from the somewhat radical position that security is in fact placing an issue beyond normal politics to the equally radical position that security is the normal politics. Yet, highlighting the importance of distinguishing the two processes does not mean that there is no politics in the securitization process. To take international migration as example it is one thing to question the refugee determination process or the adequacy of immigrant settlement services or the overconcentration of immigrants in large cities. It is an all-together different one to argue that international migration is a national security threat to a given society or a state. In an effort to stimulate a richer dialogue between the literature on the politicization process and the literature on the securitization process, I have recently put forward the argument that the two processes are two distinct processes but they are not mutually exclusive for it is not clear that they are competing forces (Bourbeau 2013a). Several hypotheses could guide future research: Can a negative politicization of an issue induce the securitization process, idiosyncratically as well as over a longer time-period? Does a negative politicization necessarily lead to the securitization? Does the relationship between the two is a question of intensification: the more “intense” the politicization is better are the chances that it will become a security issue. If so, what is the threshold and how do we recognize it? Williams (2011b) has been one of the first to propose the intensification hypothesis. He argues that the concept of intensification may hold some promise as a means of moving beyond the division between scholar attuned to the logic of exception and advocates of a pragmatic-routine approach. Normal politics, unease, and thresholds could be seen as forms of intensification below extremity.

Yet, the idea of a fundamental breaking of rules remains central to security analysis, argues Williams, precisely because it provides a muchneeded limit condition. 2. Methods How do we know when an issue has been securitized? This seemingly simple question constitutes one of the thorniest issues in contemporary security studies. This is best exemplified with the case of international migration. Some almost take it for granted; others strive to explain the securitization of migration without first demonstrating whether migration is securitized or not – either globally or in the country/cases under investigation. As a result contradictory standpoints have been presented with little methodological consensus on which to build on. Indeed, whereas the majority of scholars have argued that migration has been successfully securitized in most OECD countries others, on the contrary, have found little evidence to the effect that migration was securitized in Europe. The literature is slowly making steps in correcting this situation, however. Two paths out of the wood can be identified. A first one is to better understand the phenomenon under study. In my comparative analysis of the securitization of migration in Canada and France I have offered two categories of indicators to gain a better understanding of whether migration is securitized (and to what extent) or not in Canada and France (Bourbeau 2011). Both sets of indicators offer nominal and ordinal measurements. The first category is institutional indicator, which includes whether immigration Acts mention in one way or another security provisions or not, and whether official policy statements that relate to security, foreign affairs, and defense discuss immigration in security terms or not. To illustrate, whereas the previous official statement entitled Competitiveness and Security: Direction for Canada’s International Relations published in 1985 was silent about the issue of international migration, the statement Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities issued in 1991 listed migration as a security threat to Canada. The inclusion of migration as a security concerns was reiterated in the White Paper on Defence of 1994, in Canada in the World statement of 1995, in Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy of 2004, and in Canada’s International Policy Statement of 2005. The second category of

indicators is security practices, which include interdiction policies and detention of immigrants. Using this broad range of indicators, I demonstrate that migration is securitized in both Canada and France and that significant variations exist between the two country-cases on the level of securitization; thereby opening up research possibilities to study the variation. Indeed, the question of variation in securitization is a rather underdeveloped and under-theorized one in the literature. This might be because most of the empirical studies are case study and not small-n or large-N comparative analysis. This fact remain that too few contributions try to make sense of the differences in levels of securitization (between for example a thick/strong/high securitization and a thin/weak/low securitization – regardless in fact of the exact vocabulary one uses). Is it a question of number and/or strength of securitizing moves or degrees of reception by audiences (broadly defined)? If we accept Bigo’s central argument that the habitus of the security professionals is the key driver of securitization then is a variation in “strength” of security professionals across cases explain a variation in levels of securitization? The more powerful security professionals are the ticker/harder/stronger securitization we observe? Extending Williams’ work (2011b), does a variation in securitization is a question of intensification? My comparative analysis offers guiding principles to account for the variation in the levels of securitization; I suggest that contextual factors, particularly when their power is understood as the capacity to enable and/or to constrain, offers a promising axiom of research into the issue of variation (Bourbeau 2011). A second option is to focus on methods of investigation of the securitization process. Attuned to comparative politics stress on the research design, I employ the logic of triangulation by which findings obtained with one research method are contrasted against findings obtained with another method (Bourbeau 2011). Using a broad range of methodologies (from content analysis, to statistical analysis, to interviews, to surveys, and polls) has proven successful in providing a high level of robustness to his study. Balzacq (2011) has also recently ventured into these method questions, albeit from a slightly different perspective and with a different set of questions in mind (and not necessarily in terms of international migration). He proposed to distinguish between four methodological techniques of securitization

research – discourse analysis, ethnographic research, process-tracing, and content analysis. Stefano Guzzini (2011) has also recently suggested a stimulating path: to use the idea of ‘securitization’ as a causal mechanism in processtracing and interpretivist methodology. Despite these contributions, the literature on the securitization process remains overly theoretical with few comprehensive empirical studies within case across time and/or across cases. To fully establish itself as a dynamic and important area of research, securitization research will have to make inroads in better understanding to what extent an issue has been (or not) securitized and it will have to diversified its methodological techniques from the already well covered content analysis and discourse analysis to small-n comparative analysis and even large-N statistical analysis. 3. Strategies of contesting securitization What are the options for those wanting to contest a successful securitization? For a long time, scholars focused almost exclusively on one strategy: desecuritization. Initially conceptualized as somewhat the opposite of securitization, desecuritization quickly became a subject of disputes in security studies. The Copenhagen model understands de-securitization as the process of taking an issue out of the security/emergency mode and bringing it into the political sphere. Huysmans (1998) has proposed to see it as the unmaking of securitization. By the mid-2000, several scholars focused their attention on this apparently twin concept of securitization. Claudia Aradau’s (2004) stimulating article has made important steps in debunking the meaning of desecuritization and has spurred an enriching dialogue on the question. She criticized the literature on de-securitization for tackling the issue analytically (and for doing so in vague terms); thereby eschewing that de-securitization is about politics and the type of politics we want. Rita Floyd (2011) has argued that de-securitization is not morally better than securitization. Paul Roe (2012) has recently revisited the normatively defined debate over securitization as a negative concept. In a superb contribution Lene Hansen (2012) has defined de-securitization as the move of an issue out of the sphere of security and has proposed to recover the political status of desecuritization through four readings of desecuritization: (a) as a Derridarian supplement to securitization, (b) as a way of “reworking” the friend/enemy distinction, (c) as an emphasis on

responsibility and choice, and (d) as an illustration of the particular historical context of Cold-War détente. Yet, another strategy of contesting successful securitization is resilience. In recent years, a great deal has been written about the role of resilience in our social world. This scholarship has sparked vivid theoretical debates in psychology, criminology, social work, and political geography about the nature of resilience and how scholars should go about studying it. Security studies are a late comer in the field and while the term is sometimes employed it is rarely debunked and theorized. Balzacq’s (forthcoming) edited book takes important steps in correcting this. Resilience is one of the four strategies of contesting security he identified (the others are de-securitization, resistance, and emancipation). In addition, I suggest a theorization of resilience as applied to the securitization process in which he argues that current definition of resilience (as the positive adaptation within the context of significant adversity) is problematic because it eschews that resilience has a dark side and that it is always a matter of degree (Bourbeau 2013b). 4. Going beyond migration, environment, and global health Although most of the conversation has been done in theoretical terms, extensive empirical studies of the securitization process have been conducted mostly in the field of migration, environment, and health. Scholars have in fact conduct research on the migration-security nexus within case across time, across cases, and on almost all continents. A large strand of this literature was part of migration studies’ focus on whether and to what extent the nation-state remains capable of regulating and controlling international migration. Other scholars have emphasized the effects (usually negative) of the securitization of migration on migrants themselves: some highlighting the interconnections of security practices and human rights considerations, others hypothesizing that the securitization of migration is the latest and most modern form of racism. Environmental and energy security has also attracted the attention of several scholars. For some, the case of environment underscores the limit of the logic of exception and illustrates the need to adopt alternatives approaches. Others have employed the environmental case to demonstrate the analytical strength of the Copenhagen model

and to propose a refined version of it (Floyd 2011). Global health issues have also recently a fair amount of attention by scholars of the securitization process. Key issues include HIV/AIDS, SARS outbreak, and Asian influenza. One of the central questions that have driven most of the analysis is whether (and to what extent) global health should be framed as security. Some have argued that although framing AIDS as an international security issue could raise international awareness and resources it also runs the risk of pushing responses away from the civil society toward military and intelligence organizations (Elbe 2006). Others have argued that domestic political and social context within states are the key drivers of responses to infectious disease in contrast with international discourse of health security; thereby making important step in understanding the policy challenges of implementing the global discourse of infectious disease securitization at the domestic level (Curley and Herington 2011). Other non-traditional security issues need to be further studied, and some scholars have started to make inroad in this regard. Although cybersecurity, critical infrastructures, and securitization as a mechanism of the democratic peace have received insufficient attention so far (Hayes 2012), they will most likely be at the centre of several debates in securitization research for years to come.

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