SDA DISCUSSION PAPER

THE QUESTIONMARKS OVER EUROPE’S MARITIME SECURITY

SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

A Security & Defence Agenda Report Rapporteur: John Chapman Photos: David Plas

SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA Bibliothèque Solvay, Parc Léopold, 137 rue Belliard, B-1040, Brussels, Belgium T: +32 (0)2 737 91 48 F: +32 (0)2 736 32 16 E: [email protected] W: www.securitydefenceagenda.org SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

The Questionmarks over Europe’s Maritime Security

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

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FOREWORD

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DISCUSSION PAPER

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AUTHORS DENIS BRUCKERT, EUSC, MELANIE FOURNIER (EUSC) & XAVIER PASCO (FRS) CAPT. TEODORO E. LÓPEZ-CALDERÓN, SPANISH NAVY MARIUS MUELLER HENNIG, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG PAUL NEMITZ, EUROPEAN COMMISSION VICE ADMIRAL FERDINANDO SANFELICE DI MONTEFORTE, ITALY’S MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO & THE EU ASTRID THORS, INTERIOR MINISTER, FINLAND LEE WILLETT, ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE ENDNOTES

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ROUNDTABLE: “THE QUESTIONMARKS OVER EUROPE’S MARITIME SECURITY” •

PROGRAMME

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS

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REPORT

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PANELLISTS DENIS BRUCKERT, EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE MAURICE DE LANGLOIS, EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY VICE ADMIRAL ANTHONY DYMOCK, UK MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO & THE EU MARCUS HELLENTHAL, EADS CAPT. SEVERINO MARROCCO, ITALIAN NAVY CAPT. ISTO MATTILA, FINNISH BORDER GUARD PAUL NEMITZ, DG MARITIME AND FISHERIES, EUROPEAN COMMISSION BASAT ÖZTÜRK, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TURKEY VICE ADMIRAL FERDINANDO SANFELICE DI MONTEFORTE, ITALY’S MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO & THE EU LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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ABOUT THE SDA

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ABOUT EADS

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The Questionmarks over Europe’s Maritime Security

INTRODUCTION This Discussion Paper is intended to provide an overview of the current policy strategies and initiatives that both the EU and NATO are undertaking in order to ensure European Maritime Security. Furthermore it will shed light on the challenges of both creating a holistic European policy and predicting and addressing the key Maritime Security threats of the future. With Maritime Security now becoming one of Europe’s first lines of defence against contemporary global security threats, it seemed appropriate to the Security & Defence Agenda to ask a small group of acknowledged experts to share their perspective of a European Maritime Security Policy.

On 8 November 2007, the Security & Defence Agenda organised a Roundtable between speakers who had been closely involved in the development of an EU maritime security policy and those with experience of the realities and capabilities on the ground. A report of the Roundtable Questionmarks over Europe’s Maritime Security? is also annexed to this Discussion Paper. Some nine speakers, each involved in maritime security in different ways, gave their opinions on the coordination, development and improvement of a European Maritime Security Strategy and outlined their view of prospects for the future.

The discussion paper itself amounts to a written debate consisting of short essays by experts from a variety of backgrounds, and aims to assess the development and challenges of a Maritime Security Strategy to address the needs of the Common European Maritime Space (CEMS).

Giles Merritt Director Security & Defence Agenda

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SDA Discussion Paper

FOREWORD: EUROPE’S MARITIME SECURITY sation of cross-border activities in the maritime NEEDS ENHANCED COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SUPRANATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, NATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND REGIONAL NEEDS.

Denis Bruckert, Maritime Security Services Representative of the European Union Satellite Centre and Xavier Pasco, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, identify satellite surveillance of maritime traffic as an essential part of a European Maritime Security strategy. With the development of space technologies better adapted to the needs of maritime surveillance, initiatives at the EU level, such as the Maritime Policy Task Force, FRONTEX, EUROSUR, the European Maritime Safety Agency and EDA projects need to be integrated further to ensure a faultless unification of surveillance requirements with technological provisions.

area; and secondly, the gradual development of an integrated network of vessel tracking and enavigation systems for European coastal waters to enhance the union’s maritime surveillance systems already in place. Astrid Thors, Finnish Minister of Migration and European Affairs, shifts the focus away from traditional perspectives of maritime security to the threat of environmental disasters stemming from the extraction and transport of natural resources at sea. In this case, prevention is critical and if initiatives such as HELCOM and The Northern Dimension are to be enhanced, further coordination with EMSA, EBA and the CFCA will be necessary. This holistic approach to the security of the European maritime area is, according to Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, Military Representative of Italy to NATO, not without its problems. Piracy and the use of sea vessels by terrorist organisations remain key threats, however it would seem that the question of whether states will provide enough funding to ensure European maritime capabilities can respond to these new security threats remains the greatest security threat of all.

The call for increased cooperation between agencies was also emphasised by Captain Teodoro López-Calderón, the head of the Strategic Planning Branch of the Spanish Navy. He also addressed the question of the EU and NATO’s respective civil and defence allocation of duties in maritime security policy. This relationship requires a highly fluid exchange of information and operational capabilities, something that López- The question of funding is further discussed by Dr Calderon believes could be delivered by estab- Lee Willett, of the Royal United Services Institute lished structures within the EU’s naval forces. for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). Whilst, he believes that the “unifying nature of the mariRather than focusing upon interoperability con- time environment, coupled with the unstable and cerns, Marius Mueller-Hennig, international poli- trans-national nature of potential threats, encourtics analyst for the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, holds ages co-operation and collective responses,” that the key to developing an EU-wide Maritime there is a distinct lack of appreciation of the sigSecurity Policy is building EU Member States’ po- nificance and cost of the contribution made by litical will as well as an awareness of the strategic European navies. importance of such a policy in the global arena. The EU ought to build on the United States’ re- The overarching theme in this Discussion Paper cently published Maritime Strategy of the U.S. and in the Roundtable debate has been the need Navy and facilitate a truly global approach to for heightened integration of maritime security Maritime Security. policy, capabilities and technology. Enhanced efficiency would mean funding problems for a EuroIf the EU is to become a global leader in maritime pean Maritime Security Policy look a lot less security, its recent Blue Paper and accompanying daunting. Action Plan are a first step in creating a holistic EU Maritime Security Policy. Paul Nemitz of the Lorraine Wilkinson Maritime Policy Task Force, believes that if such a Editorial Coordinator of the Discussion Paper policy is to be enhanced two key elements are Security and Defence Agenda required: firstly, the need for enhanced rationali-

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FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS A EUROPEAN MARI- Setting the Scene TIME POLICY: THE CASE OF EARTH OBSERVA-

With the European Security Strategy endorsed by

TION FROM SPACE TO SUPPORT MARITIME SUR- the EU Council in 2003 “A Secure Europe in a BetVEILLANCE ter World”, the EU has identified global challenges

Denis Bruckert, Maritime Security Services Representative, European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC); Melanie Fournier, EUSC; Xavier Pasco, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

and key threats. Tackling threats such as organised crime and terrorism at sea is particularly difficult due to the permeable nature of the frontiers at sea as well as for legal (jurisdictional) reasons. At a time when more than 80% of world trade depends on safe maritime routes, surveillance of the maritime traffic is a great challenge. The EU needs to pool its global maritime surveillance capabilities.1

For decades, the EU has been aware of the crucial importance of maritime surveillance and has been involved in a number of important technical and political advances in this domain. Recently, maritime surveillance activities have been further developed in the first and second pillars of the EU with the objective of supporting EU Policies: - first and third pillars: maritime safety (e.g. search and rescue, safety of navigation, cargos and personnel, prevention of pollution, etc); maritime security (e.g. illegal immigration, piracy, counter illegal immigration, counter trafficking, etc); - second pillar: military operations at sea (including those in the context of ESDP maritime Denis Bruckert has been GMES Coordinator at the missions), exercise of sovereignty at sea, proliferaEuropean Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) since June tion of armament, etc. 2004. His work is currently focused on the devel- all pillars: combating terrorism. opment of services for security in the frame of Global Monitoring for Environment and Security. Technical solutions for maritime surveillance are Prior to this, Bruckert held the position of Head of converging. The EU stakeholders, EU Member States the Geomatics Section. He established and then and industries participating in the debate are conmanaged the Geographic Information Systems pro- vinced that “inter-pillar” and “inter-agency” coopduction chain at the EUSC. Mr. Denis Bruckert eration should take place. National assets such as holds a PhD in Remote Sensing obtained at Stras- coastal radars, Vessel Tracking Systems (VTS), and bourg University in 1996. Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) under the Melanie Fournier, (EUSC) has been GMES Project responsibility of the police, the coast guard, and the Officer at the EUSC since April 2007. Her work navy, need to be pooled so as to contribute to a focuses on Maritime Surveillance through projects more comprehensive and seamless maritime situasuch as MARISS and LIMES in the frame of the tion awareness. Such cooperation is sought out at Global Monitoring for Environment and Security the EU level in particular in the activities of the EC programme (GMES). Previously she worked as a Maritime Affairs Task Force who produced the cartographer and analyst for the French MoD and Green Paper (COM(2006) 275 final), FRONTEX as a Researcher for the CNRS. Fournier holds a (e.g. BORTEC: Technical surveillance of EU southMasters Degree in Management of Coasts and Seas ern maritime. borders), DG JLS (e.g. EUROSUR: from Montpellier University. Reinforcing European Union's Southern Maritime Dr. Xavier Pasco (Political Science- University of Borders), EMSA (SafeSeanet: an electronic network Paris-Sorbonne) is a Senior Research Fellow at the between the maritime administrations of the MemFondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) ber States) and EDA activities related to “Maritime based in Paris where he is in charge of the Depart- Surveillance” (e.g. Project Team MARSUR WG1). ment “Technology, Space and Security”. Before 1997, he was a researcher at CREST (Center for Among the official documents addressing maritime Research and Evaluation of the relationships be- surveillance many refer to the utility of monitoring tween Strategies and Technology) associated with from satellites: the Ecole Polytechnique. Page 6 SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

SDA Discussion Paper “The monitoring of EU waters involves considerable resources: surface, air and satellite surveillance and vessel tracking systems. It would benefit from further integration.” 2

maritime surveillance have become the remit of EU Agencies, notably EMSA, FRONTEX, CFCA and EUSC, the action will concentrate on R&D support for these customers.”

“The gradual achievement of an integrated network of vessel tracking and e-navigation systems for European coastal waters and the high seas, including satellite monitoring and long range identification and tracking (LRIT), would also provide an invaluable tool to public agencies.”3

As other stakeholders in maritime surveillance, both the JRC and the EUSC are contributing to the ongoing projects and to the debate on maritime surveillance in the GMES context.

Some Promising Steps Towards Operational Maritime Surveillance Services Using Earth Ob“Space applications can contribute significantly to servation

the surveillance of activities at sea, and a strategy under GMES-Security is currently being defined in In thinking about practical ways to improve the use cooperation with relevant Commission and Council of space technology in the maritime domain, it is services.”4 interesting to turn towards the recent experiences of GMES. They clearly demonstrate the unique con“EUROSUR (…) a cost-efficient solution, including tribution of space systems in the field of observation, e.g. a combination of radar and satellite surveillance localisation and communication for maritime safety at European level, taking into account on-going de- and security. velopments realised in the framework of GMES.”5 Between the 11th and the 28th September 2007 a “…national projects are currently being brought demonstration took place in the framework of forward for improving monitoring of maritime traffic GMES European Maritime Security Services.7 Differ(…) These tools cover harbour and coastal traffic ent actors had to find the best way to coordinate within radar limits. There is a need therefore also to their activities in order to provide technical and develop maritime situation monitoring capabilities strategic help to the Spanish Navy. The aim was to using European space-based means, by involving the support the navy in the detection and evaluation of EU Satellite Centre at Torrejón, Spain.”6 anomalies in maritime traffic in the Straits of Gibraltar. The actors had to provide AIS correlation with At the EU level, satellite earth observation can act as optical/SAR imagery, analysis of the optical/SAR ima valuable source of information in creating a soagery, and a final product based on the fusion of data called “Enhanced Maritime Recognized Picture.” This coming from different sources of information. This is a “core service” of a maritime surveillance capabildemonstration proved that the concept was not ity which is improved through the integration of the only successful but showed the interest of national results of satellite imagery analysis (human and autoactors such as the Spanish Navy too. matic). Well-known EU technological competencies and know-how in satellite earth observation sys- National actors have also shown interest in the Land tems, technologies and exploitation are directly and Sea Integrated Monitoring for European Security aimed at achieving the creation of an “Enhanced project 8. The French Navy is involved in a demonMaritime Recognized Picture.” It is widely recog- stration that will take place in the Caribbean next nised that the EU already has an instrument (the EU April with the objective of fighting drug smuggling. Satellite Centre) and a program (the Global Moni- Other navies (Spain, Italy, etc.) and FRONTEX are toring for Environment and Security - GMES) which involved in activities that will be demonstrated in the will contribute to this objective, thus providing the Atlantic, North and Mediterranean Seas. The service initial assets needed to develop a coordinated ap- providers have to produce intelligence and to proproach. vide vessel traffic monitoring with the aim of delivering final products to support the monitoring, detectFurthermore, promising R&D program have been ing and tracking of suspicious ships. These Earth undertaken under the auspices of the EC Joint ReObservation-based products are the result of data search Center as stated in the paper “Maritime Surfusion coming from different information sources. veillance at Joint Research Centre” by Guido Ferraro and Harm Greidanus: With regard to the Maritime Dimension in ESDP, “JRC has a leading position in satellite ship surveil- EU maritime forces in ESDP missions/operations will lance and oil spill detection; this knowledge need a Maritime Surveillance capacity, particularly in (algorithms, software, systems) will be further devel- the framework of rapid response for crisis oped (…) Since some operational tasks related to

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systems and their capacity to be replaced or augmanagement. The EUSC shall be ready to provide mented for operational purposes remains weak services resulting from the analysis of satellite imand hardly reactive. agery in accordance with ESDP missions. It has already taken the first step towards the development of such services within the context of GMES and at Better adapted space systems to maritime surveilthe EDA, which is the focal point for maritime sur- lance in terms of surveillance, detection, classification and tracking are presenting promising security veillance satellite earth observation issues. perspectives for Europe. Better shared resources Taking into account the current inter pillar approach between the member states and the EU can be enviand the EUSC mission statement that specifies that sioned to make this a reality. These European space EUSC can provide services to Member States, the systems will have to answer security needs, in coorCommission and International Organizations, ser- dination with more (national) military-oriented satelvices provided by EUSC within GMES context could lite programs directly derived from defence needs. be of use in wider maritime security and safety policies.

The Way Forward: Harmonising the Supply and Demand of Satellite Earth Observation Some tools using space technologies including satellite earth observation for maritime surveillance are emerging and they may help to respond to common operational needs. Satellite observation fits particularly well with the geographic and the thematic diversity of maritime activities as required by any monitoring and surveillance in this field; - The global aspect of monitoring from space makes space systems particularly useful for long term monitoring on a very large geographic scale; - Satellite observation systems are multipurpose and non intrusive. They can provide additional information that complements other existing coastal vessels monitoring systems (VTS, AIS, etc). These systems work in parallel and provide a unique capability for periodic ocean monitoring. The EU ambition for “Long Range Identification and Tracking” of ships heading towards Europe requires long-range detection over large maritime zones, which would not be feasible by other means than satellites; - Space has already proved to be particularly ready for data exchange inside Europe in a number of security or even military fields; -

However, a number of improvements are needed: - A better satellite revisit time will be required, implying, either a better coordination of the existing national programs, or the use of more satellites. Near real-time capabilities may be required for dynamic applications such as the fight against drug-trafficking for example. - Limits set on the volume of operations based on space assets are quickly reached under the current regime in Europe. The availability of space Page 8 SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

SDA Discussion Paper

AN APPROACH TO EU-NATO COOPERATIONS IN “MARITME SECURITY”

both navies and law enforcement agencies have been very busy lately trying to counter the growing illicit use of the oceans, but Maritime Security is calling for a more comprehensive approach and a more Captain Teodoro E. López-Calderón Head of Strategic Planning Branch, Plans & Policy Divi- “professional” management. sion, Spanish Navy Staff Maritime Security implies the ability to coordinate the efforts of the different national agencies with responsibilities in the maritime domain and to take this cooperation further into the international arena. The characteristics of the current security scenario, which is dominated by a combination of asymmetric threats of a different nature, suggests the need for a comprehensive approach rather that the traditional separation of civil and military capabilities. For this reason, coming up with an optimal solution in the field of Maritime Security is above all, an organizational problem. Of course there are other important questions to solve, such as the need for situational awareness or a legal framework but even those would be easier to sort out if national governments on the one side, and the international community on the other, could come up with some kind of unified action when it comes to dealing with Maritime Security. Teodoro E. López-Calderón joined the Naval Academy in 1973 and graduated in 1978 with the rank of Lieutenant JG. His current assignment is Head of Strategic Planning Branch in the Navy Staff. At sea, holding the rank of Commodore, he commanded the “Standing NATO Maritime Group 2” -the former STANAVFORMED-, the 41st Frigate Squadron (FFG class), the Frigate "Cataluña" (DEG Class), the 2nd Minesweeper Squadron and the Fast Patrol Boat "Villaamil". During his tour as COMSNMG2, he had under his tactical command 23 destroyers and frigates from eight NATO countries. For almost six months he also assumed the command of the Surface TG in the NATO Operation Active Endeavour, in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GOWT) and the Escort TG of the Maritime Component of the NATO Response Force 6. Ashore, he has been ACOS Operations in the Navy Staff and Military Advisor of the Minister of Defence. The last two years have seen a great deal of intellectual activity on the topic of Maritime Security. At this point, most nations with strong maritime interests have managed to develop conceptual and technical tools to prevent and counter the undesirable effects of the so-called “new threats” in the maritime domain.

It is hard to say which of the two dimensions, national or international, is more difficult to cope with, but one thing is clear: both are absolutely necessary to be able to counter the new threats in the maritime domain. Anyway we don’t need to save the world in just one try, so let’s instead focus on one problem at a time and concentrate on the specific characteristics of European Maritime Security. Europe has many reasons for concern when it comes to talk about Maritime Security. On the one hand the European economy heavily depends on maritime resources and transport. On the other hand, many of Europe’s most serious security threats emanate from the maritime environment; some of a regional nature (e.g. illegal immigration, drug trafficking), some of a global one (e.g. terrorism, proliferation of WMD). But who is going to do the job? Obviously member states but what about international coordination? Should EU take over this duty or is that a mission for NATO?

Well, at first glance it seems that the EU is a more appropriate organisation to design a comprehensive This is not to say that the international community Maritime Security policy. The three pillared was doing nothing about it before the fears of a European scheme fits very well within the intermaritime 9/11 started to spread; as a matter of fact agency requirements of such a complex activity and Page 9 SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

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the EU is therefore in a better position to launch overarching initiatives. It is very important to bear in mind that Maritime Security is not achieved by impressive law-enforcement operations at sea alone, but by the ability to coordinate activities and share information among the different actors with partial responsibilities in the maritime domain.

operational capability. On the other hand, if the EU is able to identify how important it is to produce such a policy, it will be in a very good position to create a permanent surveillance system to detect threats in the EU maritime area of interest and to act upon them using its own security and defence forces in a coordinated fashion.

The threat posed by a container loaded with chemical weapons can be neutralized by a boarding team at sea, but locating that container may well require the involvement and commitment of the ship owner and the port authorities of the last port of call, and even in that case such an operation must be preceded by months of coordinated investigation.

This system could easily integrate the existing plethora of surveillance sensors, such as coastal stations and satellite technology already in use for civil purposes, and all the “interagency intelligence” available so as to build some kind of permanent EU Maritime Situational Awareness structure, working 24/7 throughout the year. This structure should initially cover the “European homeland” area but could be expanded in The EU has got all the pieces of the jigsaw in its own order to protect European maritime interests wherbox and it is only a matter of determination to put ever they are under threat.

them together. The only thing that the EU has been lacking so far is a clear understanding of how important it is to develop a comprehensive Maritime Security policy. Some vague ideas have been introduced in the Blue Paper for a European Maritime Policy, but still the balance between economy and security seems to be leaning towards the economy side. We have to bear in mind that security is always a prerequisite condition for solid economic development.

EU-NATO cooperation, both in the immediate maritime spaces and further afield, is not only possible but necessary considering the number of nations that belong to both organisations. The EU would mostly find itself working on the civil side of the Maritime Security spectrum (illegal immigration, counter narcotics, etc.), which would leave the doors open for military operations as part of ESDP; whilst NATO would basically concentrate on the military side (international terrorism, proliferation, etc.), but there is no doubt about the On the other side of the road we have NATO. As a mutual benefit that could be obtained by a fluent exdefence organization, NATO seems to have a better change of information and operational capabilities.

understanding of the dangers and uncertainties of the global security scenario and it is therefore in a heightened state of readiness. After six years carrying out Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, NATO has developed state of the art information tools to determine threats at sea as well as a much clearer understanding of what the military contribution to Maritime Security should be. But Maritime Security cannot be made up of military contributions alone, which is the real limitation of NATO.

The European navies, either belonging to EU, NATO, both or none, must play a very important role – not leading but important – in this Maritime Security game. The navies are indeed very well prepared and experienced in most of the principal Maritime Security duties, from information management to surveillance and interception operations. There are indeed a great deal of information exchange networks already in place amongst European navies and also between navies and civil agencies that should be It basically seems that both, the EU and NATO, lack exploited. something that the other has got and this suggests that there is room for cooperation. NATO has got At this stage, it is probably too early to define the the experience, the determination and a fairly good boundaries, both physical and conceptual, of this EUset of information resources but lacks the non- NATO complementary collaboration and also to military tools. On the other hand, the EU has a com- define the involvement of the European navies, but prehensive civil-military organisation but it really there seems to be enough grounds for discussion. needs to find a way to approach Maritime Security Why don’t we give it a try? and so far only very hesitant initiatives have been developed. All in all, it seems that the EU should develop a comprehensive Maritime Security Policy to integrate the isolated programs in progress in each of the three pillars. Failing to do so will not only mean an undesired duplication of efforts but also a very limited Page 10 SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

SDA Discussion Paper

MARITIME SECURITY REQUIRES REGIONAL AND security interests of the EU are at stake in the Strait of Malacca or at the Somali coast as well as in the GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Strait of Gibraltar or in the British Channel. Within the EU a comparatively high level of maritime security is already provided and further enhancements will take their time. The current debate about a European Coast Guard – in the context of the Greenbook on Maritime Policy – illustrates this set of problems, exhibiting the usual highly emotional and difficult debate about competency distribution within the EU that is not conducive to fast progress. However, such discussions should be lead on and efforts to improve cooperation among European maritime services should be undertaken wherever possible. Positive results that strike a pragmatic balance between efficiency requirements for joint multinational maritime security operations and national sovereignty caveats, should be promoted as best practice for other regions, too. In addition the EU and its member states should put significant emphasis on the global dimension of maritime security for two reasons which will be presented subsequently.

Marius Mueller-Hennig International Politics Analyst International Policy Analysis Unit Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Marius Mueller Hennig has studied Political Science, Economics and Economic Geography at RWTH Aachen University and holds a M.A. (Magister Artium). The focus of his studies has been on international relations and political theory. He currently works for the International Policy Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Berlin and will join the FES office in Indonesia as a Junior Expert in mid-2008. Lately he has written a policy paper on the US “Global Maritime Partnerships” initiative, a concept which is embraced in the new maritime strategy of the maritime services of the US. The EU tends to focus on maritime security predominantly in its “own” spatial domain. Yet, maritime security is even more so an issue of global governance. Therefore the EU and its member states should take the lead for a global maritime security initiative. There is actually a window of opportunity for a global and multilateral maritime security initiative that would be capable of deterring criminal activity and terrorism in the maritime domain at reasonable costs while at the same time mitigating a naval arms race in the Indian and Pacific Ocean.

I – Current threats to maritime security Assaults in distant parts of the world frequently endanger and harm seafarers and present a permanent menace to vital Sea Lanes of Communication. Criminal acts and terrorist attacks in or from the maritime domain present major threats to maritime security. Among the criminal acts piracy poses a direct problem for international seaborne trade. It is still widely dispersed with hotspots in South East Asia and at the Horn of Africa. Even though it is a lethal threat for those seafarers navigating these hotspots it is perhaps not an existential threat to seaborne trade yet. The same most probably applies for maritime terrorism, which still has not materialized to a large extent, except from certain well known cases (e.g. USS Cole, French oil tanker Limburg). Nevertheless a global initiative for maritime security is in the immediate interest of the European Union for two key reasons: firstly, because, that which is a limited threat now has the potential to turn into a huge problem as long as these activities are not decisively cut off and discouraged; and secondly, each individual has the right to be protected from unlawful acts irrespective of his or her geographic location

The Current Debate about Maritime Security in Exactly because the threats to maritime security are still both geographically limited (piracy) and have not the EU Maritime security is a global issue with a European dimension. Seaborne trade originating from or flowing to the European Union (EU) is enmeshed in a global web of integrated transport systems and is the backbone of world trade. Therefore, maritime

materialized to a large extent yet (terrorism), there is a good chance to effectively provide security at manageable costs in the short term. Enhanced cooperation concerning maritime security is in the immediate interest of any state involved in maritime trade and capabilities are either already existent or can be

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built up in an international solidary manner. Criminal activities and terrorism could be deterred significantly by a concerted initiative that improves the presence of maritime security forces, enables the boarding of suspicious vessels according to internationally agreed legal rules and provides important situational data by integrated civil-military surveillance capacities. Therefore the EU and its member states need to encourage and enable other states to provide for such security – both within their adjacent sea spaces and on the high seas – more insistently and coherently.9

II – Avoiding a Naval Arms Race – a window of opportunity The recently published new maritime strategy of the US-Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard10, refers to a concept for global maritime security: the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative. It focuses on a pragmatic enhancement of cooperation among navy and coast guard forces as well as civilian actors from different countries to improve maritime security. The dialog on this concept has even spread to India and China and after all it is plausible that maritime security unites all the major blue water players. We are actually standing at the crossroads: these bluewater players who have a common interest in maritime security, especially for strategic Sea Lanes of Communication, might at the same time be on the brink of an accelerating naval arms race in the Indian and the Pacific Ocean11. Especially the Chinese naval build up arouses more or less open suspicion from the US and its allies, who in turn themselves command the most sophisticated and extensive naval capabilities. A common initiative for maritime security encompassing agreed standards of information exchange, joint interdiction operations and multinational exercises aimed at improving interoperability between all these states' navies would be a milestone for a stable great power peace in the 21st century. They could serve as confidence building measures between potential future rivals, thereby mitigating the extent and escalatory potential of such rivalries. Precisely because the EU is not enmeshed in the potential Indo-pacific arms race it is perfectly situated to facilitate such global approach to maritime security. A cut off naval arms race in the IndoPacific domain would be an invaluable contribution to maritime security and global peace, since the gravest threat to both would be a hot or cold military conflict between great powers.

US initiative, influence its development and promote it substantially. Where the European Security Strategy claims with regard to the US that “(…) no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own”12, the new US maritime strategy explicitly adopts such argument13. It seems that the ball is in Europe’s court now. There is not much apart from political will that is needed from the EU and its member states. Common exercises together with other maritime forces are already a tradition and could be expanded systematically. Additionally, the EU should engage in systematic programs to enhance the capabilities of other coastal states to provide for maritime security in their own domains. Such efforts should be made in accordance with the steps already taken under the umbrella of the IMO and in some regional contexts. There are significant maritime security related provisions in international law (e.g. SOLAS14, SUA15) that would have to be integrated, implemented and supplemented with some additional guidelines and the necessary capabilities and competencies. For a start, the political will and insight into the strategic importance of such a global maritime security initiative are crucial to eventually turn it into a first-rate global governance issue that obtains sufficient political attention and resources from the EU and its member states.

Seizing the global initiative The EU and its member states should seize on the

* The views expressed in this article are not neces-

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MARITIME POLICY AND MARITIME SECURITY

first step towards the implementation of a new, integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union.

Paul Nemitz Among others, an essential target for the Maritime Deputy Head and Policy Coordinator of the Maritime Policy is to safeguard Europeans' lives and interests Policy Task Force of the European Commission by enhancing maritime security through the integration of activities and systems associated with it. Security is also a key factor for ensuring quality of life in coastal regions, thus providing them with opportunities for social and economic prosperity. Improvement and optimisation of maritime surveillance activities is important for Europe to face the challenges and threats relating to safety of navigation and security. Although maritime surveillance is the responsibility of Member States, most of the activities and threats that it addresses are transnational in nature.

Paul Nemitz is currently Deputy Head and Policy Coordinator of the Maritime Policy Task Force of the European Commission. He has held positions in the European Commission since 1989 in DG Trade, DG Transport, the Legal Service, and was Member of Cabinet of Commissioner Poul Nielson (Development). In 2002 he became Head of Legal Affairs of DG Fisheries. Nemitz studied law in Hamburg, Washington D.C. and Strasburg. He has written many articles on European Integration and European Law and his latest book on the application of the European Community State Aid rules by Member States was been published by Kluwer law in 2007. As from 10 October 2007, the EU has entered a new era as regards the holistic way by which all matters related to the most vital resources - the oceans and seas - will be treated. The new Maritime Policy approaches all aspects of the oceans and seas in a holistic and dynamic manner: we will no longer look only at compartmentalised maritime activities, or at the marine environment, but we will tackle all economic and sustainable development aspects of oceans and seas affairs in an allembracing fashion. The Blue Paper with its overarching strategy provides an analytical framework and a selection of objectives, which allow us to define the actions needed to attain both such selected objectives and the ultimate aims of the new policy. It will be accompanied by an Action Plan, which enumerates a set of actions that the European Commission proposes to take as a

The Commission supports a higher degree of coordination on maritime surveillance through deeper cooperation among the Member States' coastguards and other appropriate agencies. This is instrumental to the sustainable use of Europe's oceans and seas and needs to be developed. Our plan for the achievement of this goal is two-folded. First, as regards the offshore activities, we believe that there is much room for the rationalisation of the cross-border and cross-sectoral functions which the Member States deploy on coastal waters. These include: search and rescue, fisheries inspection, activities to prevent accidents and pollution from shipping, prevention of illegal immigration, trafficking and terrorism, as well as any intentional act to put the marine environment and its natural resources in danger. These activities are seldom integrated within a single agency. Due to old and well-rooted traditions, they are organised differently in each country. One would highlight as an example that, according to the BORTEC study of FRONTEX, only in the Mediterranean Member States 50 authorities are responsible, one way or another, for illegal immigration issues. It is equally important to underline that in 20 out of 22 coastal Member States Ministries of Defence are involved in these functions, either through Coast Guard forces or through the Navies themselves. Indeed, nowadays the role of the Armed Forces has changed so as to adjust to the new, complex security environment. The Navies in particular have been engaged for a long time in the execution of tasks falling outside their narrow defence agenda, thus contributing to traditional civil tasks. Their activity is not only related to the broader area of maritime security. Page 13

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They also support boarder guard's activity, participate in search and rescue missions, even in fisheries control. It should be noted that the oldest squadron of the UK Royal Navy carries out fisheries inspections in sea zones of national jurisdiction. In this area, one of the questions raised in the Green Paper was whether or not a European Coast Guard service should be established. The majority of the contributors who commented upon this matter expressed preference to an enhanced cooperation between authorities responsible for executing maritime duties of all kinds rather than the setting-up of a centralised European Coast Guard. It is our objective to move towards this direction and eventually provide effective and cost-efficient services to Europe. Second, as far as maritime surveillance is concerned, the gradual achievement of an integrated network of vessel tracking and e-navigation systems for European coastal waters and the high seas, including satellite monitoring and long-range identification and tracking (LRIT), would provide an invaluable tool to public agencies. We shall need to find solutions on how to enrich it with sensitive information, e.g. from intelligence sources, while building in the necessary firewalls to ensure that security of such information is fully safeguarded. We will also need to ensure that systems leading to action as a result of surveillance make the necessary information available to all the appropriate government agencies, including our navies as appropriate, without any loss of speed on reaction.

various maritime surveillance systems and fusing them into a common operational picture creates advantages for all involved in the protection of European lives and interests at sea. In the 2nd half of 2008, the Commission will announce, in the form of a Communication, a detailed work plan for further steps towards the integration of European surveillance systems. This project will progress more rapidly the more Member States move towards more integration between their systems and agencies engaged in, or using maritime surveillance. The plan may consider the inclusion of new technologies and applications derived from Galileo and GMES-Security. Further important contributions to be considered will be the linkage with private sector work in this area, and the integration of systems developed or operating at regional level. Our vision is to infuse cohesion and commonality into offshore functions and provide interoperability in the surveillance systems. An essential element of our way forward towards the achievement of this goal -also a fundamental principle of the Maritime Policy- is the maintenance of contacts with stakeholders. This is especially valid for the communication platform already initiated with military services of the Council (EU Military Staff and Committee), the European Defence Agency as well as informal think-tank bodies such as CHENS with whom a workshop on the contribution of the Navies in carrying-out civilian tasks was organised last March. In our effort for the implementation of this integrative approach the contribution and assistance of all is invaluable.

Our efforts will be primarily based on the ongoing technical work by EMSA, FRONTEX, and the Communities Fisheries Control Agency, with the ultimate aim to provide a common maritime picture to all parties concerned. The Commission has already started working on these objectives by presenting in October 2007 a set of working documents, which described the organisation of offshore activities in each littoral Member State, the existing cooperation and coordination in each of the maritime areas surrounding Europe (Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean, North Sea, Baltic Sea) as well as the surveillance, monitoring and reporting systems which currently operate in the EU. These will be followed by certain preparatory actions that will validate and demonstrate that in practice bringing together information collected from Page 14 SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

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MARITIME SECURITY – A PROBLEM OF STATEMANSHIP

jority of the merchant vessels hoist flags of convenience, even changing periodically; the crews are multi-national and the vessels themselves are built where the costs are lowest. This radical change is Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte another legacy of the Cold War, when the Soviet Vice Admiral Military Representative of Italy to the Union waged an economic war against NATO counNATO & EU Military Committees tries, through steel dumping and the shipping trade fares. A great number of low-cost vessels were built requiring a small crew, thus attracting the largest part of international trade at very competitive prices. This revolution made the national merchant navies unprofitable, driving them out of the market, notwithstanding the heavy subsidies they enjoyed from their parent States. As a consequence, a massive deregulation took place: the Western countries stopped subsidising their ship-owners, the latter followed suit by reducing the costs, and the flags of convenience became the largest component of sea trade. Vice Admiral Sanfelice di Monteforte joined the Italian Naval Academy in 1962 and graduated as Ensign in July 1966. Promoted Vice Admiral on 1 January 2000 he assumed the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAPE on 24 January 2000. From 01 November 2002 he was appointed as Commander Naval Forces Southern Europe and renamed since 1 July 2004 as Commander Maritime Component Command Naples (MARCOM NAPLES). Since 11 July 2005 he has been the Italian Military Representative to the NATO and EU Military Committees. Amongst others, he has been awarded the distinctions of Knight Commander of the Order for Merit of Republic of Italy; Bronze Medal for Navy merit; Knight Commander of the Order of Merit of Saint John and NATO Meritorious Service Medal.

There are, however, three central problems which have recently come to the fore. The first has been piracy: to hijack a vessel registered with a flag of convenience, often belonging to a small state that is unable to retaliate, is practically a risk-free endeavour. Unfortunately, public opinion has only been roused enough to press European governments for action when ships carrying the flag of a Western country have been hijacked.

The second problem has been the exploitation of some merchant vessels, by terrorist organisations. So far, we have witnessed their use for logistic purposes, to carry weapons and explosives in large quantities and to smuggle terrorists into Western countries. However, it is also possible that such ships could be used to cause widespread havoc and destruction in a major harbour: Halifax and Texas It is not a secret that the United States has strongly City still carry the scars of similar, albeit accidental, advocated, since the inception of their life as a state, disasters. the unhindered freedom of trade at sea. Even after the Treaty of Paris in 1860, the most prominent These attacks, in coastal waters or in choke points strategists did not forget to recall that several against large vessels carrying passengers, oil or lique“elements of rational prosperity depend(ed) upon fied gas, are becoming a possibility of our times. free use of the sea”16. Almost one century later, all States cannot respond to these threats, first because western countries, USA included, are worrying there is a power vacuum at sea: apart from the USA, about the thriving illegality, in the ungoverned states invested mostly in the production of air and land heavy military instruments during the Cold War spaces, namely in international waters. years, which means that today no country has a navy As in all human activities, the need to fight illegality, able to react alone. Furthermore states can only crime and corruption arises when vital interests are legally protect vessels carrying their flag in internathreatened. Today, this is what is happening for sea tional waters. This is why President Reagan imposed trade, due to the increasing threats being posed to the re-flagging of tankers willing to be protected, whilst navigating the waters of the Persian Gulf.. EU interests. Until four decades ago, Western states had always The weakness of the Western Navies has attracted had their own merchant navy. Now, the great ma- not only the attention of some Asian states, eager to Page 15 SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

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acquire regional relevance – as Prof. Kaplan noted17– but is also of concern to the two most relevant Western-based international organisations, namely NATO and the EU, both of whom are working to find a collective response to these threats. Both organisations are being pressed by Member States to establish a degree of control, similar to that which is in place for air traffic control, at least in the waters along their coastlines. As Mahan said, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”18 and this is what the navies are built for, besides from ensuring access to lad forces from the sea. Operation Active Endeavour has shown that an albeit limited degree of control over international waters could act as a powerful disincentive, not only on terrorism, but also on all other forms of illegality and crime, thus simplifying the work of Western states’ police forces, the last defensive line against external threats. Unfortunately, the initiatives undertaken by both NATO and the EU are progressing amid too many difficulties and – what is worse – are following two paths that will put them on a collision course if corrective measures are not taken soon.

financial power is more than adequate for a maritime surveillance system? Or the ESDP, whose budget is extremely limited, but whose military structures, as EUMC, EUMS and EDA, are able to develop the military aspects of a comprehensive system? And, even more important, when both NATO and EU will have developed a maritime surveillance system, how will they agree on division of labour? It is not a trivial issue, in a situation of growing threats and when the states involved are particularly vulnerable at sea. This leads directly to the last, underlying problem: even if some states are developing types of blue water ships able to carry out operations and surveillance in the European maritime space, governments must still provide enough funding to allow these ships to be built in sufficient numbers. As Nelson said “only numbers can annihilate”19 and against these diverse and diffuse threats, only numerous units can control the ungoverned spaces, thus enabling the Police forces to tackle fewer attacks effectively.

Beginning with NATO, it was the first to implement practical measures of control, initially to protect the oil platforms in the North Sea and more recently by arranging a worldwide voluntary merchant shipping control system, similar to that carried out by the establishment of the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Control Centre in Italy, with the co-operation of most Mediterranean coastal states. Recently, the Maritime Situational Awareness System, was established at the Maritime Component Command Naples, controlling the ungoverned spaces of the Mediterranean Sea, hence mustering the scarce assets available to NATO Navies in the area to prevent and coerce when required. However, NATO is torn between the conflicting demands posed on one side by collective defence, with its new forms, and on the other by its expeditionary aspirations. The EU, on the other hand, started to tackle the emerging threats to its merchant sea trade through a non-military approach – FRONTEX is focused on police activities, whose competence cannot go much beyond the EU territorial waters. Therefore, the Chiefs of European Navies (CHENs) addressed the Council with a document on Maritime Security, to highlight their military’s views. Who, in the EU, will tackle this problem? The Council, whose military competence is limited, but whose

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MARITIME POLICY –

ONCE AGAIN A QUES- Conscious that the survival of the Baltic Sea is in

jeopardy, we cannot talk about sustainable use there. There are a number of serious threats facing this highly sensitive marine area. The majority of Astrid Thors Minister of Migration and European Affairs, Ministry threats are caused by human action, and through human action we must find solutions. of the Interior, Finland

TION OF SECURITY

Arctic maritime issues of importance include the use of natural resources, energy policy, maritime transport, and environmental protection, and they have a specific relevance to international law. It is no exaggeration to say that the problems related to the Arctic region constitute an important strategic challenge for the entire European Union.

Astrid Thors has been Minister of Immigration and European Affairs since April 2007, holds a Master of Laws with court training and has been a Member of Parliament for the Swedish People's Party since 2004. Previously, Thors was Swedish People’s Party, Deputy Party Leader between 1992 and 2000 and a Member of European Parliament from 1996 to 2004.Thors’ other current appointments include Chair of the Swedish Assembly of Finland (Folktinget), member of the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE), Administrative Council, Chair of the Finnish Refugee Advice Centre, Member of the Patria Industries Oyj, Consultative Committee, and Chair of the Victoria Foundation. It is becoming more and more evident that a broad definition of security is needed. That kind of definition was applied in the previous Finnish Government’s report to Parliament on security and defence policy – and the upcoming report due in 2008 will take the same direction. Security of supply of natural resources, both as regards access to them and safe transport routes for them, are key to the security of a country. Energy resources are of paramount importance. Finland's security perspective concentrates on two seas – the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Sea.

The Baltic Sea on the other hand is one of the most polluted marine areas in the world. Combating eutrophication, preserving biodiversity and increasing maritime safety require rapid action. The damaged eco-system is approaching the point of no return. That is why it is of utmost importance to tackle the problems and challenges with urgency and determination. The Baltic has been designated as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area by the International Maritime Organisation. This status is an important recognition of the singularity and vulnerability of this marine area. It enables the application of supplementary protective measures to control maritime transport. It was unfortunate that Russia did not join the other coastal states in endorsing these additional safety measures. The Baltic Sea is a key transport and energy route. There are worst case scenarios in the event of a major accident there. If one did occur, it would have catastrophic consequences for all coastal states in the region. With the EU enlargement of 2004, the Baltic became virtually an inland sea for the Union, of which the only non-member in the area is Russia. The EU has an efficient toolbox of both internal and external instruments at its disposal and it has developed a wide range of legislative and policy tools, such as the Common Agricultural Policy. These instruments should be applied more coherently and efficiently in the Baltic Sea area. However, there are actions which cannot be sufficient or effective without Russia’s involvement. Measures related to environmental protection or maritime safety need the involvement of all coastal states, including Russia. But this does not mean that the EU could not do more.

Environmental disasters lead to more human displacement and uncontrolled migration can place an The Northern Dimension has provided a good and unbearable strain on nature. In order to preserve comprehensive framework to enhance environstability we need to put more emphasis on the sus- mental cooperation in North-West Russia. tainable use of resources.

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The St Petersburg wastewater treatment plant has been one of the success stories of the Northern Dimension. The project brought together funding from the EU, bilateral donors, and international financing institutions. The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) works to protect the marine environment of the Baltic Sea through international cooperation among the coastal states. In November 2007, HELCOM is due to adopt a new Baltic Sea Action Plan. This new strategy will be an important instrument for more effective measures to combat continued deterioration of the marine environment. There are four main segments in the action plan: eutrophication, hazardous substances, biodiversity and maritime safety.

Oil and chemical transport: a serious risk factor The increase in transportation of oil and toxic chemicals poses a particular risk for the sensitive Baltic Sea. As new harbours have opened in Russia, oil transportation and other shipping is expected to increase immensely in the next few years. By 2010, the amount of cargo shipped through the Baltic Sea is forecast to rise to 250 million tonnes per year, compared with some 20 million tonnes a couple of years ago.

busy with passenger traffic. According to risk analyses, this system reduces the risk of two vessels colliding by 80%. Another system worth mentioning is the HELCOM Automatic Identification System launched in July 2005. This system enables the user to obtain an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of ship traffic in the Baltic Sea. These reporting systems could assist in combating crime, including human trafficking. There is no doubt that surveillance systems are needed even if onshore monitoring cannot eliminate human error or technical failures. Reporting systems of this kind should be part of the maritime policy of the EU. In addition to cooperation among national authorities of the Member States, and properly functioning regional arrangements, it is just as important to develop cooperation among various other authorities within the European Union. Here I refer to the enhancement of interaction involving the European Borders Agency (EBA), the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA).

As traffic grows, so do risks. That is another reason why we need to intensify our efforts to separate the growth in transport from the risk factors. The harsh ice conditions in the Baltic Sea place special requirements on the structure of vessels, especially their hulls. The key in maritime safety is to take preventive measures. We need to work together to raise safety standards and professional competence among our seafarers. This endeavour covers, among other matters, propulsion and hull requirements, and navigation systems. Important measures to enhance safety include landbased shipping traffic control systems, automatic vessel recognition systems, use of double-hulled vessels, pilotage for larger vessels in shipping lanes, and the need for special regulations for ships used in severe ice conditions. It was from a Finnish initiative that the European Commission included provisions on winter navigation in its third maritime package. There are several traffic management systems already in place in the Baltic Sea. These are necessary to minimise the risk of accidents, including collisions. The Gulf of Finland mandatory Ship Reporting System has been in place since 2004. This is a joint effort by Finland, Russia and Estonia. In addition to increasing oil shipments, the Helsinki-Tallinn route is Page 18 SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

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MARITIME SECURITY: A CHOICE OR OBLIGATION – AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION?

security is a core task, which naval forces habitually have practised and been responsible for, despite naval ships being acquired and configured principally for combat roles.

Dr. Lee Willett Head of the Maritime Studies Programme, Military The world’s reliance on the sea remains true today, Sciences Department, Royal United Services Institute with 90% of global trade by bulk moved by sea. In the era of globalization, arguably the Sea Lines of Comfor Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). munication (SLoCs) along which this trade flows represent the world-wide web in another format21. Some official assessments of future global flashpoints focus on the southern and eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and central and south-east Asia22. These areas encompass some of the busiest seas and SLoCs in the world. Nations which rely on the sea for trade, energy supply and other movement of resources will rely on the security of the world’s critical SLoCs.

Previously, Dr. Lee Willett was responsible for the Military Capabilities Programme at RUSI. Willett has lectured widely, to academic, military, and defenceindustrial audiences in the UK, the United States, the Netherlands, Norway and Australia, and has published extensively. His most recent paper on this issue is ‘Old Roles and New Capabilities for Maritime Coalitions in the New World Order’, published in Sea Power Challenges: Old and New (Forbes, A.,Ed., The Sea Power Centre – Australia and Halstead Press. 1997). Prior to joining RUSI, Willett was Leverhulme Research Fellow at the Centre for Security Studies, University of Hull and was seconded to the Naval Staff Directorate in the Ministry of Defence as a Research Associate. He holds a BA in International Relations, an MA in War Studies and a doctorate on Tomahawk’s role in USSoviet strategic arms control.

Security at sea is, today, an ever-more important issue, as the globalisation of trade, the enduring freedom of movement on the high seas, and the increasing use of the sea by potential opponents both as a means of moving people and material and as a target in its own right suggests that opponents will attempt to exploit the use of the sea as much as maritime coalitions will try to deny that use. Hostile action against maritime targets has the potential to significantly disrupt the way in which the world operates. While the world’s trading system may be robust enough to withstand limited attacks on its structure, the system’s interconnected nature may mean that any conflict between any of the major powers will affect all of them23. Thus, the traditional and enduring principles of employing maritime force - to exhibit presence and military force to control the sea and deny its use to potential opponents - remain fundamental for delivering security at sea.

The Politico-Military Utility of Maritime Forces

Maritime forces provide the ability to exploit access to the sea, to contribute to military operations, and to help sustain the order and security of the international system. These are not new tasks, but are enduring roles which have returned to greater prominence in defence strategy since the end of the Cold War as many nations seek to project influence on a Introduction: Future Global Challenges and global basis.

Maritime Security

Delivering maritime security involves the ability to execute a range of military operations and to protect all forms of lawful activity at sea to ensure the provision of a safe maritime environment20. Only naval forces can deliver security at sea. Given that, historically, the world has moved itself by sea, maritime

Forces based at sea can: exercise passive or active use of deterrence, coercion and sea control/denial; deliver effect over almost 100% of the earth’s surface; deploy forward to or near a region of perceived future crises to tackle problems at source; operate across a range of tasks and dealing with the

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regular blurring of distinctions between them; generate political and/or military effect tailored to the circumstances;adapt to new threats as they emerge; and do all of this from sovereign platforms, deployed at will in international waters, with no reliance on Access, Basing or Overflight (ABO) rights. The key enabler to all these activities is presence – arguably the unique selling point for maritime forces. Presence delivers diplomatic effect, military deterrence to potential threats, and the control and denial of the use of the sea. Delivering effective presence, however, requires a sufficient number of ships.

rent effect but also because of the capabilities provided by, for example, high-end surveillance and communications technologies. For maritime security, however, numbers of ships are as important – if not more so – than their capabilities.

Maritime Security: A Political Obligation for the European Union?

In the globalised world, there is an argument that international bodies should take greater responsibility for the protection of resources and trade routes vital to the international community as a whole. In the case Co-operating for Security at Sea of the United Nations, its efforts to act always are influenced by the interests of individual nations. In the Navies always have co-operated at operational and case of the European Union (EU) – where, arguably, tactical levels. However, today, navies – perhaps even greater common purpose is emerging – are prospects more so than Governments – are realising the better? broader importance of maritime coalitions in securing what Admiral Michael Mullen (the current United For nations that rely on the sea for the movement of States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, previresources, protection of these resources through ously, Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]) referred to maritime security is a matter of national – i.e., Govas ‘this vast commons’24. The unifying nature of the ernment - obligation27. Such obligation mandates, by maritime environment, coupled with the unstable and definition, political support and fiscal investment. trans-national nature of potential threats, encourages However, with this issue, as with any, the EU is facing 25 co-operation and collective responses . the challenges of political priorities and funding – and During his tenure as CNO, Admiral Mullen issued a the different national perspectives and priorities held call to arms for all users of the sea to come together by each member state. to form a ‘1,000-Ship Navy’ to tackle threats to security at sea. While the term became something of an Europe is developing a substantial mass of maritime intellectual albatross around the neck of the debate – power which could underpin desires for the EU to principally because it created (wrongly) perceptions of operate as a global super-state. The EU arguably is the the United States Navy seeking to rule the waves – its world’s leading sea power, accounting for 40% of the basic principles remain true. First, no one nation can world’s fleet. However, defence budgets are shrinking secure the use of the sea itself, and so doing is an across Europe in absolute and real terms. Of the 15 international imperative requiring an international nations with the highest global military expenditure in solution which exploits individual nations’ potential 2006, only five of these were EU member states: their contributions26. Second, while there exists an exten- combined spend - $US 191.5 billion – made up only sive, detailed and continually-evolving regulatory and 17% of the total global spend; moreover, France and legal framework at national, multi-national and inter- the UK alone weighed in28with $ US 112.3 billion benational levels for the use of the sea, enforcing such tween the two of them . Yet both France and the frameworks requires political commitment but also UK, despite both their significant defence expenditure and their positions as global navies which routinely something more simple: numbers of ships. carry out significant maritime security tasks on behalf of the international community, are under considerMaritime Security: Military Capability Issues able domestic and – in France’s case – European presNavies habitually face a trade-off between numbers sure to reduce defence spending29. and capabilities. However, to discharge their responsibilities across the spectrum of military tasks, from Navies arguably have felt the most pressure because high-end combat operations to maritime security, of the cost of major naval platforms, but also because of a considerable degree of ‘sea-blinkeredness’ renavies do need both. garding the importance of the use of the sea when the Forces configured for high intensity combat also have world is focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. Simply, the the capability to conduct lower-end operations, in- ‘free good’ delivered by navies in providing security at cluding maritime security. The ability to use high-end sea just by doing what they do every day has been combat capability is vital in executing effective maritime security, not least because of its simple deterPage 20 SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

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forgotten as the importance – and cost – of navies in delivering security at sea has become an inconvenient truth.

Conclusion Many of the major naval programmes being developed by EU nations will have significant relevance in future maritime security operations30. Moreover, a greater European naval capability and commitment could help to underscore on a global level the importance of navies. However, navies need to be able to show how critical their day-to-day work is to global security. Without making this case effectively, governments will remain focused elsewhere and political trade-offs will see navies down-sized further still. Without naval capability and numbers, question marks will remain over Europe’s maritime security.

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ENDNOTES 1

Maritime Surveillance: Ability to achieve continuity of knowledge on activities in the maritime domain in order to support a timely decision process. (EDA definition) 2 7.6.2006 COM(2006) 275 final : GREEN PAPER : Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union 3 10.10.2007 COM(2007) 575 final: An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union 4 10.10.2007 SEC(2007) 1278 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT accompanying COM(2007) 575 final 5 30.11.2006 COM(2006) 733 final “Reinforcing the management of the European Union's Southern Maritime Borders 6 WEU Assembly report « Surveillance of the maritime and coastal areas of European States » 7 MARISS (European Maritime Security Services): http://starlab.es/hosting/MARISS/index.html 8 LIMES (Land and Sea Integrated Monitoring for European Security): http://www.fp6-limes.eu/LIMES/jsp/ index.jsp 9 The EU already has announced and initiated some cooperation concerning maritime security far from its shores, e.g. with actors in the South-East-Asian region, which could and should be optimized. See Moeller, Kay (2006): „Maritime Sicherheit und die Suche nach politischem Einfluss in Suedostasien”, SWP-Studie 2006/S 35, Berlin, p.24-27; available from: http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3504 (retrieved from the Internet, October 29th 2007) 10 “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” presented by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandants of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard in Newport, R.I. on October 17th, 2007; available from: http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf 11 For the notion of a naval arms race in the Pacific Ocean see for example BBC (2007): “Perils of a new Pacific arms race”, available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6937293.stm (retrieved from the Internet, August 14th 2007). 12 “A Secure Europe in a better world - European Security Strategy”, Brussels, p.1. Approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana. Available from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (retrieved from the Internet, October 30th 2007) 13 The respective passage reads: “No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain”, see “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”, 2007, p.7. I4 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), available from: www.imo.org 15 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) available from: www.imo.org 16 A.T. MAHAN – “Armaments and Arbitration.” – Harper e Bros. NY 1912 – page 22 17 R. KAPLAN – Lost in the Pacific Ocean – International Herald Tribune – September 21st, 2007. 18 A.T. MAHAN. “Some neglected aspects of war” – Sampson, Low, Marston and Co. London 1907 – Page 92. 19 A.T. MAHAN – “Naval Strategy” – Sampson, Low, Marston and Co. London 1911 – page 267 20 Maritime security tasks include: high intensity combat; interdiction of commercial and military shipping; protection of interests in national and other waters; fishery and resource protection; maintaining free access; protection of shipping, SLoCs and the maritime infrastructure; homeland security; surveillance operations (including assisting civil authorities); enforcement of sanctions and embargos; anti-piracy and anti-arms smuggling; anti-proliferation; countering organized crime, people smuggling, and narcotics trafficking; migration control; human rights protection; humanitarian support (a role in which the significance of maritime forces arguably has never been so clear as in the wake of the Asian tsunami and Hurricane Katrina); peace building or enforcement and peace support; protection of the maritime environment; and support for international law. Future challenges in developing effective maritime security include: increasing the use of air traffic control style ‘shipping plans’ for commercial shipping; learning how to work with new partners, including other maritime, cross-government and trans-national agencies; and improving the use – and sharing - of information. 21 Willett, L. Report on Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Workshop on ‘The Importance of Sea Lines of Communication in British Defence and Security Policy’ (29th October 2007). Report forthcoming.

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See, for example: United States Navy (USN). (2005). Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan. pp.2, 3 & 5; Parry, Rear Admiral Chris (Director General, Development, Concepts & Doctrine Centre, UK Ministry of Defence). Address at ‘Creating Effect from the Joint Sea Base; The RUSI Future Maritime Warfare Conference 2005.’ 13-14 December 2005. 23 Willett. Op. Cit.. The UK Ministry of Defence’s Development, Doctrine & Concepts Centre (DCDC) predicts the occurrence of major state-on-state war within the next 15 years (see DCDC. Global Strategic Trends. The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036. Available on-line at: < http:// www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/DoctrineOperationsandDiplomacy/DCDC/ DcdcStrategicTrendsPublications.htm> ). 24 Mullen, Admiral Michael G., USN. ‘Remarks as Delivered for the 17th International Seapower Symposium’, Newport, RI: Naval War College. 21 September 2005. Available on-line at: . 25 See Geoffrey Till: (2004). Sea Power: a Guide for the Twenty-First Century. London: Frank Cass Publishers. p.298; ‘Naval Transformation and the Asia Pacific’. Paper presented at ‘Oceans of Opportunities’ workshop, Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, 10 February 2005. p.9. 26 See: Mullen. Addresses at: Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, United States. 28 August 2005; ‘Creating Effect from the Joint Sea Base: The RUSI Future Maritime Warfare Conference 2005’; Vice Admiral John G. Morgan USN (then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Plans and Policy, N3/N5, USN). Address at ‘Creating Effect from the Joint Sea Base; The RUSI Future Maritime Warfare Conference 2005’; Till. ‘Naval Transformation and the Asia Pacific’. pp.7, 9 & 18. 27 Interventions in the form of expeditionary land operations arguably are more a matter of choice. 28 See: ‘Worldwide Defense Spending Forecast’. Defense News, 24 September 2007. p.11. The other three EU member states amongst the 15 were Germany, Italy and Spain (in order of spend). 29 France is unlikely to increase defence spending as, according to one analyst, it is under considerable pressure from European ‘peers’ to cut public spending to bolster fragile domestic growth (see: Tran, Pierre. ‘France Balances Defensive Demands, Budgets’, Defense News, 24th September 2007. p.12). The article noted too that there is insufficient funding for programmes such as Galileo, arguably a definitive programme in the European security and defence policy agenda. 30 For example, although the UK’s future carrier programme has been much maligned, the US Nimitz-class carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt operated as a Command and Control (C2) platform to co-ordinate relief operations following the 2004 Asian tsunami.

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SDA Monthly Roundtable – November 8, 2007 Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels

The Questionmarks over Europe’s Maritime Security Are we taking the right steps towards a coordinated EU maritime security policy? Session I - 12:00-13:30 The EU is the world’s leading sea power, accounting for 40% of the world’s fleets, yet the many national and EU agencies with responsibility for aspects of maritime security means that today there is a lack of effective coordination and cooperation among Member States. But an integrated EU approach is slowly developing in areas like maritime safety, through the European Maritime Safety Agency, and a united institutional approach through the European Commission’s green paper consultation process. But how might coordination be improved within the EU? Are EU countries providing enough funding for cross-border research programmes to meet future needs? Moderator: Giles Merritt, Director, Security & Defence Agenda § Denis Bruckert, Maritime Security Services Representative, European Union Satellite Centre § Maurice de Langlois, Capability Manager - Engagement, European Defence Agency (EDA) § Captain Severino Marrocco, Interagency Policy Coordinator, Navy General Staff, Italian Ministry of Defence § Paul Nemitz, Deputy Head of Maritime Policy Task Force, DG Maritime and Fisheries, European Commission Lunch - 13:30-14:30

Are maritime security operations up to par? Session II - 14:30-16:00 In Brussels, things seem to be advancing in terms of consolidating maritime policy, but how do things currently look out at sea? Operationally, are authorities equipped to maintain optimal situational awareness? Is there hope for improved interoperability? What is needed to ensure that the thousands of kilometres of EU external borders are best protected through the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX)? Are ideas for a European coastguard, customs agency and surveillance system for the Mediterranean desirable, and would they fit in with NATO? Moderator: Giles Merritt, Director, Security & Defence Agenda § Vice Admiral Anthony Dymock, UK Military Representative to NATO and the EU § Marcus Hellenthal, Senior Vice President/Global Security, EADS § Captain Isto Mattila, Deputy Head of Border & Coast Guard Division, Finnish Border Guard § Basat Öztürk, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director General for Maritime and Aviation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey § Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, Italian Military Representative to the EU and NATO, Commander Maritime Component Command Naples Organised with the support of EADS

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Executive summary: Europe wants maritime security – but who is steering the policy? The latest SDA roundtable examined maritime security and found that the EU had much work to do. The sessions showed that ensuring maritime security necessitated the coordination of disparate bodies, including customs, navies, coastguard agencies, border police and more. Although many speakers called for more coordination, there was disagreement as to how this could be achieved. Taking a national tack, the UK MilRep’s Anthony Dymock insisted that inter-agency complications in capitals had to be resolved before there was any talk of multinational solutions. He also commented that most stakeholders were calling for increased awareness of maritime surveillance rather than increased actions leading from such detection. So coordination would have its limits. The Commission’s Paul Nemitz did see the need for cooperation to the extent that he wanted pilot projects, planned for 2008, to focus not on technology but on finding ways to improve such coordination. Nemitz, in fact, argued that there was already an increasing feeling of cooperation both across and within pillars (environment, shipping, home affairs, etc.). He argued that times – in maritime security terms – were changing. The EDA’s Maurice de Langlois described the agency’s pragmatic approach, which was to encourage an exchange of information between all stakeholders and to move towards a new generation of combined sensors and platforms, including satellite surveillance capabilities. Captain Severino Marrocco agreed, adding that no one could fight terrorists alone, and that national and international cooperation and integrated and inter-operable systems were the only way forward. Throughout the sessions, speakers talked of masses of information being available but there appeared to be no effective means of sharing such data. From the industrial side, EADS’ Marcus Hellenthal insisted that these capabilities are already being offered by specialised companies. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Basat Özturk argued strongly that the EU should not be looking inward but outward towards seas that stretched to third country’s borders. Surely solutions for, say, the Mediterranean had to be solved by all the concerned parties? That would mean even more information sharing and a greater level of coordination, but who would be in charge? Dymock noted that that the issue of maritime security covered civil-military aspects, with both international and national roles and that the EU, NATO and the UN were all involved. Merritt concluded that the session had shown that maritime threats did exist and that there would be significant costs. However, he had seen visions of a “legal, political and diplomatic nightmare”. He feared that without sufficient public awareness of the threats, nothing concrete would be happening in the near future.

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The Commission is ready to take stock and move forward towards a more holistic approach; more cross-sectoral cooperation is what is needed and cross-border cooperation is also insufficient. Paul Nemitz

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DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE • •

Integrated inter-pillar and inter-agency solutions to maritime security need to be enhanced. Increased exchange of information between the various security and defence organisations.

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The development of a coordination hub that would tie together the civil, military, national, international and regional initiatives.

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The creation of a common operational picture through advanced technologies and common procedures that transcend borders.

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Improved coordination of the multiple legal frameworks whose jurisdictions cover maritime security issues. Defining the key Maritime Security issues – where do the boundaries lie?

• •

The need for an information management system for Maritime Security equivalent to those existing in the airline industry.

• •

Increased discussion with third countries in order to ensure greater cooperation and stronger networks. Improved interoperability based on a set of common standards.

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Potential for the regionalisation of maritime security policy.

DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS •

In terms of creating a holistic Maritime Security Policy their remains a divide between those looking to address the coordination of the principles behind such a policy and those looking to launch common activities.

•

European Maritime Security initiatives should ensure both internal coordination and cooperation with neighbouring states or risk reinforcing the image of fortress Europe and undermining the potential for a more global approach to European maritime security.

• •

Practical cooperation needs to avoid being high-jacked by national industrial agendas. Whilst there was a clear willingness on behalf of member states to cooperate on maritime security future funding to combat security threats could prove to be a key stumbling block.

•

Some expressed the desire to use the national and supranational networks and capacities already available rather than create further centres and agencies to support a European Maritime Security policy.

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In the short term, we do not have to create a new generation of networks with specific national centres, regional centres and European centres; we need to use the existing networks and improve the levels of interface between them. Maurice de Langlois

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lance tools available. He also referred to the Satellite Centre’s ongoing work with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and their joint objective to support timely decision-making. Looking at the benefits of surveilBackground lance, he listed areas that included maritime safety, With the SDA Roundtable addressing Europe’s sea rescue, and defence against piracy and traffickmaritime security, there were two main questions ing. on the table: At the EU level, stakeholders are • Is the EU maritime security policy sufficiently coordinated? convinced that inter-pillar and inter• Are maritime security operations up to agency solutions are required. scratch? Denis Bruckert Despite the EU accounting for 40% of the world’s fleets, the number of different national and EU agencies with responsibility for aspects of maritime security means that coordination and coop- The EDA’s Capability Manager, Maurice de Laneration among Member States is difficult. How- glois’s main point was that the EU should work with its existing tools and increase the ever, with the emergence of the exchange of information between the European Maritime Safety Agency different security and defence organisa(EMSA) and a united institutional tions; this should be with the underapproach through the Commisstanding that the next objective was to sion’s Green Paper consultation move to a new generation of systems. process, there has been progress. But how could coordination within Opening his remarks with an examinathe EU be improved? tion of the diverse security threats, de Langlois stressed the need for the EU Looking further out to sea, the to cope with such dangers. The main roundtable also asked if the various purpose of Maritime Surveillance being authorities were operationally the support of timely decision-making, equipped to maintain optimal situde Langlois explained that the minisational awareness. Future options, tries of defence had tasked the EDA to such as a European coastguard, cusestablish facts especially on current toms agency and surveillance sysdefence assets and propose options tem for the Mediterranean were Denis Bruckert for future collaborations, focusing in also options for further examinaparticular on the interface with Eurotion. pean security and border control. However, he explained that the existence of a system that proThe Speakers vided permanent capabilities was global in nature and that encompassed all aspects of defence, secuThe EU Satellite Centre’s Denis Bruckert kicked rity and safety. For de Langlois, the conclusion was off the roundtable session by stating that all stake- obvious, an inter-pillar solution was essential. holders were convinced that inter-pillar and interagency solutions to maritime security were re- However, seeing the need for pragmatism, he dequired. In this regard, he was the first of several scribed the EDA’s approach, one that saw the speakers to argue for such an approach. Bruckert need for: reasoned that inter-agency solutions would ensure • information exchange between all playsystems connectivity, reduce duplication and save ers (as there was a huge amount of exmoney. He also saw the need for a firmer definiisting information that was not shared) tion of security requirements and he was con• a move towards a new generation of vinced that satellite observation could be complecombined sensors and platforms mentary to the existing methods of maritime sur- To this end, de Langlois said that new centres and veillance. Bruckert added that it was not necessary networks were not required, as it was possible to to start from scratch as the Agency had surveil- work with the capabilities of the Member States.

THE QUESTIONMARKS OVER EUROPE’S MARITIME SECURITY

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ies. He also reminded the roundtable participants that the Council took its decisions in sectoral groupings. He therefore wanted agencies to work more closely together, with common work proFrom the Italian Ministry of Defence, grammes relating to the seas and Captain Severino Marrocco was yet oceans. With these objectives in another speaker to call for an intesight, Nemitz said the Commission grated inter-pillar approach. His rewas ready to move forward with marks focussed on his navy’s efforts to the promotion of cross-sectoral bring maritime surveillance solutions cooperation. The focus could not to fruition, particularly in the MediterMarkus Hellenthal be left to cross-border cooperaranean region. Given the many threats tion alone. With activities, espeto maritime security, Marrocco echoed the need for a cooperative approach. He cially at sea being fragmented, Nemitz said there added that the Italian Navy had welcomed the was huge scope for improved governance in holistic approach of the EU’s Green Paper. How- terms of cost efficiencies on the seas. Looking ever, he felt the recently rolled out Blue Book ahead to 2008, he wanted the few million euros showed that there was an insufficient emphasis that were available for pilot projects to be spent on security and on the actual and potential con- on improving cross-sector cooperation, rather than simply on technology. tribution of maritime forces. Then, over a number of years, a mutually applicable system (of systems) could be developed. This would be a global answer to the global threat.

After looking at the various national contributions, e.g. participation within the implementation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), Marrocco focused on one of the Italian Navy’s strategic functions, aimed at the maritime contribution to Homeland Security. This had led to the concept of “Integrated Maritime Surveillance”(SIIMS), and the launch of a project for a system aimed at achieving integrated surveillance through inter-agency cooperation. This project would lead to a new infrastructure including the development of the SIIMS Integrated Surveillance Centre located in the Italian Fleet HQ. However, Marrocco also saw the need for a cooperative international approach and described the activities with the navies of several Mediterranean and Black Sea countries, aimed at improving mutual understanding (joint exercises, Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Centre, Navies Symposium in Venice). The Commission’s Deputy Head of Maritime Policy Task Force, DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Paul Nemitz, was open to new ideas. He wanted a change in thinking and pilot projects that would emphasise coordination rather then technology. Nemitz described the Commission’s view that many activities were uncoordinated across pillars and that there were a host of problems due to separate bodies of legislation being in place in relation to shipping surveillance and fisher-

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Europe needs a common operational picture, with seamless cooperation across national boundaries.

”

Markus Hellenthal

EADS Senior Vice President Business Development, Markus Hellenthal, wanted the various players to grasp the opportunities in the maritime security field. He noted that while Europe's vital economic interests were under threat, the security situation on the seas remained fragmented and interoperability limited. Hellenthal’s solution was to develop a common operational picture using advanced technology that emphasised harmonised procedures and cooperation across organisational and national boundaries. On behalf of EADS, Hellenthal introduced a film (Blue Planet 2010) that showed enhanced maritime security processes in action, backed – and this he pointed out to be absolutely essential - by the willingness of parties to collaborate and sufficient political will.

Paul Nemitz

The UK Military Representative to NATO and the EU, Anthony Dymock, wanted more principles to be agreed before any actions were taken. He wanted a process of coordination rather than control, national rather than international responsibilities, and a focus on improved understanding and data

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the EU was trying to solve tomorrow’s problems with yesterday’s thinking. He therefore called for cooperation between maritime networks and more involvement of bodies such as the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the EDA and FRONTEX. For Mattila, civilian and Dymock also asked who was in military organisations had to work charge, given that there were together and resources had to be civil-military aspects, internatailored dependent on threats, with tional and national roles and new networks being built based on a that the EU, NATO and the working groups (organisations and UN were all involved. In addiinstitutions) model – perhaps with a tion, would an EU regime be Isto Mattila permanent secretariat arranging advisory, consensual or enforcmeetings of the various working ing? He argued that most stakeholders were groups. This could be a first step towards longcalling for increased awareness of maritime sur- term multinational exchange of practices beveillance rather than increased actions leading tween naval units and law enforcement units. from such detection. Dymock added that there was still a need to decide who owned such surveillance data and to determine how accurate it would have to be for legal purposes. Finally, We are trying to solve tomorrow’s Dymock wanted clarification of the objectives problems with yesterday’s thinking. Isto Mattila (e.g. drugs detection, trafficking, WMDs, etc.) and who had the right to act in such cases. This led him to call for clarification of the many interagency complications prior to any coordination The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Deputy of multinational operations. He concluded by Director General for Maritime and Aviation, calling for the momentum of the EDA’s actions, Basat Özturk, was not happy with the EU’s inNATO’s activities, the Blue Book and the Euro- ternal focus and he wanted a more open appean navies’ work to be continued. proach. He agreed with Marrocco that maritime situational awareness was vital for safety and The Finnish Border Guard’s Deputy Head of security. However, Özturk called for greater Border & Coast Guard Division, Isto Mattila, willingness for stakeholders to spend money and described the current maritime cooperative to work together. That led him to cooperation situation in the Baltics, where all the regional and the need to see the bigger picture. Touching nations were involved along with Russia. The on immigration, he said such problems could not cooperation included a regular exchange of In- be solved by EU initiatives alone. formation and several coordination centres existed (24/7). Looking at possible recommenda- As an example of the international strategic imtions based on that experience, Mattila argued portance of maritime security, Özturk referred that inter-agency and interto the Straits of Istanbul (see map), organisational cooperation had where there is an annual passage of € to be improved (e.g. border 145 million worth of cargo, primarily checks, exchange of experts). He also wanted the EU to cooil. He stated that Turkey had spent € ordinate strategies for mari45 million on a system to improve time security but Mattila addisafety in the straits for purely internationally saw a role for regional tional reasons. Expressing a certain clusters. In addition, he argued amount of frustration with the EU’s that national bodies should be inward looking approach, Özturk said more willing to share tasks and Turkey was willing to cooperate but information. that it would consider other options, especially due to its proximity to Russia Mattila also made a plea for and the Ukraine. new thinking as he argued that Basat Öztürk sharing. Emphasising that responsibilities should be left in the hands of national bodies, Dymock argued that national inter-agency complications had to be solved before multinational actions were taken.

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were hard to resolve. The ComThe Italian Military Representative mission’s aim was the developto the EU and NATO, Vice Admiral ment of a solid surveillance system Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, (based on data being transmitted argued that there had been a big from vessels) for all players. Only shift in thinking. Now, all nations then would the Commission be had concluded that international thinking of moving on to see how waters required controlling and the addition of space surveillance policing, just like airspace. He also could help to detect anomalies, welcomed FRONTEX, “the last line e.g. ships in distress signals, ships of defence”, but noted that such a engaged in unlawful activity, vesprogramme had to be supplesels pretending to be somewhere mented – currently by NATO’s else etc.). “Operation Active Endeavour”. This showed a proven willingness to Ferdinando Sanfelice di Theologitis wanted the Blue cooperate between nations. HowMonteforte Book’s recommendations to be ever, he felt that industrial rivalries adopted and to form this solid and jealousies could hinder such maritime security surveillance base. In addition, willingness. regarding the protection of vessels, Theologitis said the ISPS (International Ship and Port Facility The Debate Security) code (in community legislation) would guarantee this as it allowed the Commission to The Maritime Security inspect ports, port facilities and ships.

Problem

SDA Director Giles Merritt was interested in knowing more about the nature of the security problem. He wanted more information about the actual threats faced and more about the bureaucratic issues that might be hindering the oft-mentioned need for cooperation. The Commission’s Head of Unit Security Policy & Maritime Security Dimitrios Theologitis reminded the roundtable that the Commission was simply receiving input from the Member States. However, he felt that there was “sufficient evidence” that a threat existed, especially in the ports and on the seas. To these ends, Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) systems were being developed for security and safety purposes. Furthermore, the Vessel Traffic Monitoring directive was being extended to long range tracking that would cover most of the world’s seas. Theologitis also looked at the Commission’s strategy of bundling existing systems rather than developing new ones, i.e. to use what they have. Theologitis argued that the legal framework was in place but that individual Member States had problems coordinating the various agencies, as was shown in the SAFESEANET project where even non-sensitive issues

Retd. Vice Admiral Jean-Marie van Huffel reasoned that it was hard to define the maritime security priorities. One major problem for van Huffel was the immigration issue, which was difficult to tackle due the different legal frameworks. He argued that this made it difficult for the Member States to generate sufficient political will.

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There are many inter-agency complications to sort out before any coordination of multinational operations. Anthony Dymock

”

The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies’ Dr Lee Willett provided a definition of maritime security, according to the Royal Navy: it consisted of:

Anthony Dymock

• homeland and coastal defence • the use of the high seas internationally • support of the infrastructure that allows navies to use the sea The UK MilRep’s Anthony Dymock suggested that it was more the scale of the maritime threats that had changed the security equation; due to globalisation, ships were now equivalent to floating warehouses (due to just-in-time philosophies and the reduced inventories). As an

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example, Dymock said that there was a semi-permanent chain of 20-30 tankers moving between Bahrain and Europe – shipping lanes had become main arteries and hence were vulnerable points in the world’s economic bloodstream. Dymock wanted an information management system to be put in place, the equivalent to those existing in the ex-

gration, by improving the situation on the ground, and efforts were also being directed as to how immigrants could be handled with dignity when they arrived in Europe.

Is wider cooperation really the goal?

isting in the airline industry.

Europe Defence Technology EdiAn issue that came to the table durtor Brooks Tigner was unsure ing the day was the estimated cost of Lee Willett whether the Member States were defending the EU against maritime trying to cooperate or if they security threats. ASD Deputy Director for Security Luigi Rebuffi put the estimate at were simply “defending their respective €20 billion over 10 years. This would be fresh patches”. As a follow-up, Tigner asked if there was more input from heads of state needed in money and hence it would be much harder to order to move forward. On a similar tack, Merfind. Dr. Lee Willett commented that it was ritt asked if solidarity did exist across the Memhard to make the (financial) political case for ber States and if they were interested in burden spending more money on ships and hence marisharing, especially the landlocked countries. time security (in the UK) as navies were seen to be successful if nothing happened. Eurisc’s Liviu From the outside, Europe is perceived as Muresan warned that there could be major disruptions to business continuity, which would a fortress; but we need multinational operations. have major economic consequences. Basat Öztürk

Is there a case of Fortress Europe? Basat Özturk argued that Europe was perceived as a “fortress”, e.g. in response to the immigration issues. However, he said that it was impossible to adequately guard all coastlines in order to make them safe – so multinational cooperation was essential. Özturk had heard much discussion during the day about EU-exclusive projects and he regarded this as a mistake. For the minister, AIS systems were not a total answer as they could simply be turned off. He did not like the ideas of borders at sea either, as they were imaginary – for example, one had to see the Mediterranean in total. His answer was “total cooperation”. Isto Mattila wanted more discussions with third countries, as successful strategies would be dependent on greater cooperation and better networks. Özturk agreed and, so far, he said he had only seen nations such as Finland and Italy that were willing to cooperate. He wanted security for all nations.

“

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Denis Bruckert felt that cooperation was the name of the game and he added that the EU Satellite Centre was giving its full support. For example, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) used by ships and Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), principally for identification and locating vessels, could be switched off and the agency’s capabilities in providing information from the analysis of satellite imagery would be complementary in such cases. Maurice de Langlois insisted that a capability-based approach was essential. In addition, he stressed the need for interoperability, which meant that one set of standards should exist to enable good interfaces to be built. Systems were needed for different purposes and they had to be able to talk to each other. Captain Severino Marrocco agreed, adding that no one could fight terrorists alone. He also recalled the importance of dialog and cooperation, and affirmed that a clear maritime picture could be achieved through data coming from different sensors. Here, Navy Operational Centres could have a central role due their ability to collect, fuse, correlate,

Theologitis disagreed that a “Fortress Europe” strategy had ever existed within the EU. It was certainly the intention to stop widespread immi- Severino Marrocco

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evaluate and disseminate relevant information to the appropriate users. Paul Nemitz was in a positive frame of mind as he felt that times were changing. He said that all stakeholders were willing to cooperate and that the last meeting between the Commission and Chiefs of European Navies (CHEN) had been very successful. Nemitz argued that there was an increasing feeling of cooperation both across and within pillars (environment, shipping, home affairs, etc.). He had seen political signals from the top and these were now filtering down. Commenting on Merritt’s point about solidarity between the Member States, Nemitz said everyone was involved, including landlocked nations, as all economies could feel the impact of terrorism and depended upon international trade. He did acknowledge, however, that within this common approach, “some aspects of maritime policy” might be handled within regional seas.

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There are many inter-agency complications to sort out before any coordination of multinational operations. Anthony Dymock

”

Tigner asked if NATO and the EU were actively cooperating on maritime security. Dymock saw no chance of NATO and the EU developing different standards. Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte argued that NATO and the EU were working closely together (informally) – NATO with its “blue waters” and FRONTEX with its coverage of territorial waters. NATO’s Jacques Vermorel acknowledged that threats had changed in recent years but that the technology of sensors had improved. Despite that, much could be learned (by the EU) from NATO’s efforts in, for example, Operation Active Endeavour.

In Conclusion Merritt concluded that the session had shown that maritime threats did exist and that there would be significant costs. However, he had seen visions of a “legal, political and diplomatic nightmare”. Merritt would have liked to have seen an overall picture of the how the various issues could be tackled but he feared that without sufficient public awareness of the threats, nothing concrete would happen.

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Discussion over Coffee

Preparing for the Debate

Roundtable Session I

Networking

New Insights over Lunch

The Bibliothèque Solvay

Q&A Session

Pondering the Big Questions

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List of Participants

Lucio Accardo Chief of the 5th Department of the Italian NAD Ministry of Defence, Italy

Francisco Acosta Diaz SNE European Border Management Agency (Frontex)

Lilouz Ibrahim Ahmed Counsellor Embassy of Iraq to Belgium

Nabeela Al-Mulla Ambassador Mission of Kuwait to the EU

Olivier Amrouche Action Officer Policy Branch European Union Military Staff

Giovanni Barontini Vice President, CTO Office Finmeccanica

Denis Bertrand Délégué (Capabilities) Permanent Representation of France to the EU

Yann Bied-Charreton Capitaine de Frégat Ministère de la Défense, France

Cindy Bouchard First Secretary, Border Services Mission of Canada to the EU

Denis Bruckert Maritime Security Services Representative European Union Satellite Centre

René Bullinga Expert C3 Systems - Sales Director Air Defence Systems European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

André Burstin Editor European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center (ESISC)

Stéphane Buvry General Manager, Aerospace Division Thales Airborne Systems

Agata Byczewska Journalist Agence Europe

Geert Cami Managing Director Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Ergam Camözü Adviser to the WEU and WEAG NADREP Mission of Turkey to the EU

John Chapman Journalist JC Ink

Patrick Chatard Moulin Official, Defence issues Council of the European Union

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Danijela Cubrilo Third Secretary Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the EU

Helmut Damke Director International Business Development ATLAS ELEKTRONIK GmbH

Maurice de Langlois Capability Manager Engagement European Defence Agency (EDA)

Sylvain de Mullenheim Public Affairs Manager, Strategy & Business Development Division DCNS

Alain De Neve Defence Analyst Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense

Nicolas Démétriadès Deputy Armaments Counsellor Permanent Representation of France to the EU

David Dolan Assistant Attaché U.S. Customs and Border Protection Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Robert Draper President AeroStrategies

Anthony Dymock Military Representative Delegation of the United Kingdom to NATO

Lena Eklöf Information Security Expert SAAB

Stefan Engdahl Military Representative Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU

Julien Feugier Key Account Manager EU European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Vladimir Forshenev First Secretary Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU

Francesco Frapiccini Assistant to Stefano Zappala MEP European Parliament

Eva Frech Legal Adivsor Ministry of Defence, the Netherlands

Martin Garvey Concept Integrator I EE/JM ICT Integrator Allied Command Transformation (ACT) NATO

Bill Giles Director General Europe BAE Systems

Tim Green EU Military Capabilities Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU

Andreas Hammer Vice President and Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Patrick Hardouin Deputy Assistant Secretary General North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

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Susanne Hartwein Media Relations Manager, Defence and Communication Systems EADS Deutschland GmbH

Veli-Pekka Heinonen Lieutenant Commander Operations and Exercises Division European Union Military Staff

Markus Hellenthal Senior Vice President, Global Security European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Rainer Hellmann Journalist, European Correspondent Fuchsbriefe

Jessica Henderson Senior Manager Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Samuel Henze Consultant LMI

Nathalie Hesketh Policy Advisor, Maritime Policy Task Force European Commission:

Arnauld Hibon Director, EU & NATO Affairs Eurocopter

Florian Hofer Manager Business Developments European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Kai Horten Member of the Management Board ATLAS ELEKTRONIK GmbH

Frank H. J. Hye SACT Representative in Europe Allied Command Transformation (ACT) NATO

Christine Jakob Officer for Security and Defence Affairs European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL)

Hartmut Jäschke Head of Business Development, Marketing & Sales Thales International Deutschland GmbH

Isabelle Julien Manager for Defence and Security, Institutional Relations ASTRIUM

Dieter Kellein Managing Director Thales International Deutschland GmbH

Knut Kirste Information Officer, Germany North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Pierre-Yves Le Bail Admiral European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Thierry Legendre Policy Adviser, Office of the Secretary General North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Arian Leonard Delegate, European Programmes Corporate Department Thales

Christine Leurquin Vice President, European Programs SES Global

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The Questionmarks over Europe’s Maritime Security

Jean-Marie Lhuissier Director, Marketing & Sales EU-NATO Thales

Diane Luquiser General Manager Top Strategies

Gilles Marcoin Vice President, European Union affairs Dassault Aviation

Silvia Maretti Officer North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Severino Marrocco Interagency Policy Coordinator, Italian Navy General Staff Ministry of Defence, Italy

Raphaël Mathieu Researcher Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense

Alexander Mattelaer Researcher Institute for European Studies (IES)

Isto Mattila Deputy Head of Border & Coast Guard Division Finnish Border Guard

Giles Merritt Director Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Pascal Meunier Senior Vice President, European Programmes Thales

Christian Michaudet Director Strategy and Business Development Thales Airborne Systems

Cécile-Liv Müller European Affairs Altran

Liviu Muresan Executive President Eurisc Foundation

Paul Nemitz Deputy Head Policy Coordinator, Maritime Policy Task Force European Commission

Cathy Noguez EU Representative Thales Alenia Space

Jan Otte Maritime Forces Planning and PARP Country Officer, Defence Policy and Planning Division North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Basat Öztürk Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director General for Maritime and Aviation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey

Antti Pajala Project Officer Maritime Surveillance European Defence Agency (EDA)

Umberto Pizzabiocca Military Policy Branch Chief, Italian Representative to the EUMC Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU

Olympios Raptis Defence Manager AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD)

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SDA Discussion Paper

Luigi Rebuffi Deputy Director for Security AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD)

Angelo Ricci Attaché Transport Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU

John Richardson Development Advisor Madariaga European Foundation

Jacques Rosiers Policy Director, Department for Strategic Affairs Ministry of Defence, Belgium

Patrick Rudloff Head of EU Affaires European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Paolo Salieri Principal Scientific Officer European Commission

Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte Military Representative to NATO & the EU Military Committee Delegation of Italy to NATO

Gordon Sarlet European Affairs Advisor Thales Airborne Systems

Kaija Schilde Ph.D. candidate University of Pennsylvania

Soenke Schmidt Adviser, Prevention of General Crime European Commission

Detlef Schultz Vice President Systems Engineering SES Astra

Stephanie Schulze European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Gavin Short Commander European Union Military Staff

Alessandro Signoriello SNE European Border Management Agency (Frontex)

Anca Sterie MEP Assistant European Parliament

Jerome Teisson Surveillance Systems Sales Manager Sagem Défense Sécurité

Dimitrios Theologitis Head of Unit, Security Policy & Maritime Security European Commission

Alex Tiersky Director, Defence and Security Committee NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Brooks Tigner Europe Defence Technology Editor Jane’s International Defence Review

Michel Troubetzkoy Senior Vice President, Director for the EU & NATO Affairs European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

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The Questionmarks over Europe’s Maritime Security

Aurélie Trur-Nicli Account Manager, Institutional Program SES Astra

Emil Valdelin Project Manager Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Cornelis Van Es Senior Officer Armaments European Defence Agency (EDA)

Jean-Marie Van Huffel Conseiller spécial «Présidence française UE 08» Ministère de la Défense, France

Henrik Vassallo Consultant SAAB

Jacques Vermorel NATO Agency Review Study Head North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Antonios Vidalis Maritime Policy Task Force European Commission

Ronald Vopel Policy Officer, Aerospace, Defence and Maritime Industries European Commission

Maja Wessels Senior Vice President, EMEA Honeywell Europe

Lorraine Wilkinson Project Assistant Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Karl Heinz Wocker Vice President Siemens European Union Affairs

Olivier Yvon Directeur Grands Comptes Naval France European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Lorenzo Zito International Affairs Department Finmeccanica

Lucia Zivec Policy Studies and Forward Planning Manager AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD)

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SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

The Questionmarks over Europe’s Maritime Security

About the Security & Defence Agenda

THE SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA (SDA) IS THE ONLY SPECIALIST BRUSSELS-BASED THINK-TANK WHERE EU INSTITUTIONS, NATO, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, INDUSTRY, SPECIALISED AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, THINK TANKS, ACADEMIA AND NGOS GATHER TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN AND TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICIES

Building on the combined expertise and authority of those involved in our meetings, the SDA gives greater prominence to the complex questions of how EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and how transatlantic challenges such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction can be met. By offering a high-level and neutral platform for debate, the SDA sets out to clarify policy positions, stimulate discussion and ensure a wider understanding of defence and security issues by the press and public opinion. SDA Activities: • Monthly Roundtables and Evening debates • Press Dinners and Lunches • International Conferences • Reporting Groups and special events

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SDA Discussion Paper THE SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA WOULD LIKE TO THANK ITS PARTNERS AND MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT IN MAKING THE SDA A SUCCESS

Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU

Mission of the US to NATO

French Ministry of Defence

Delegation of the Netherlands to NATO

Ministry of National Defence, Turkey

Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy (University of Birmingham)

Delegation of Romania to NATO

Interested in joining the SDA? Please contact us at Tel: +32 (0)2 737 9148

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Fax: +32 (0)2 736 3216 Email: [email protected] SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU

The Questionmarks over Europe’s Maritime Security

About EADS

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SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA

SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA (SDA) Bibliothèque Solvay, Park Léopold, 137 rue Belliard, B-1040, Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 (0)2 737 91 48 Fax: +32 (0)2 736 32 16 E-mail: [email protected] www.securitydefenceagenda.org

SECURITY & DEFENCE AG ENDA