THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority National Nuclear Safety Department

Safety Regulations for Storage,

Transportation and Handling of Fresh Nuclear Fuel at a Nuclear Power Plant (Revision 1)

December 2004

Tehran-I. R. Iran

Doc. No. NNSD-R-0070-12/04

Introduction: The present Regulations contain requirements for safety assurance of fresh nuclear fuel handling in its storage, transportation and utilization at nuclear power plants . The Regulations are binding upon all departments, organizations and enterprises participating in development, manufacturing, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel handling systems.

National Nuclear Safety Dept. Under the Authority of Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority

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Table of contents List of abbreviations ................................................................................................. 3 Terms and Definitions:............................................................................................. 4 1. General .............................................................................................................. 8 2. General principles and requirements to safety assurance. ................................. 9 3. Requirements to safety assurance in fresh nuclear fuel handling ................... 13 3.1

Scope of application................................................................................... 13

3.2

Fresh nuclear fuel storage facility............................................................. 14

3.3

Equipment for fresh nuclear fuel handling ............................................... 16

3.4

Analysis of nuclear and radiation safety in fresh nuclear fuel handling... 18

4. Transfer Packing Casks for Nuclear fuel and transport operations with them 19 5. Nuclear fuel storage commissioning ................................................................ 20 6. Requirements to documentation on nuclear fuel storage and transport …...…21 7. Control of Regulation Compliance................................................................... 24 Attachment List of initiating events for analysis* of DBA and BDBA consequences................ 25

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List of abbreviations CPS

Control and Protection System

BDBA

Beyond Design Basis Accident

DBA

Design Basis Accident

NFHS

Nuclear Fuel Handling System

NPP

Nuclear Power Plant

PSAR

Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

FSAR

Final Safety Analysis Report

(Page 3 of 26) NNSD-R-0070-12-04

Terms and Definitions: ACCIDENT – violation of nuclear fuel handling system from normal NPP operation with release of radioactive substances and/or ionizing radiation beyond the design limits for normal operation in the amounts exceeding established limits for safe operation. An accident is characterized by an initiating event, ways of its development and consequences.

EMERGENCY (PRE ACCIDENT) SITUATION - nuclear fuel handling system state, which is characterized by a violation of limits and/or conditions of safe operation but does not develop into an accident.

NUCLEAR and RADIATION SAFETY - for the purpose of this document is a property of the nuclear fuel handling system under normal operation and during violations of normal operation including accidents to restrict radiation impact on the personnel, population and environment to the established limits.

SAFE GEOMETRY - geometric parameters of equipment (volume, diameter or layer thickness), preventing a possibility of self-sustained reaction origination during normal operation, operation occurrences, including design basis accidents in nuclear fuel handling. INTRAFACILITY TRANSFER PACKING CASK FOR NUCLEAR FUEL – range of tools providing nuclear fuel integrity, nuclear and radiation safety during nuclear fuel intra-facility transport or storage. GROUP OF PACKAGES – set of packages authorized for storage or transport without limitation to the packages mutual lay-out, except for the limitations caused by design elements of the packing cask.

BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT - accident caused by initiating events not taken into account for design basis accidents or accompanied by additional safety

(Page 4 of 26) NNSD-R-0070-12-04

system failures above the single failure assumed for design basis accidents, or by the erroneous personnel decisions implementation.

INITIATING EVENT- single failure in systems (elements), or an external event, or personnel error, which leads to violation of normal operation and may lead to a violation of the limits and/or conditions of safe operation. The initiating event includes all dependent failures which result therefrom.

LOCALIZING SAFETY SYSTEMS (ELEMENTS) - systems (elements), intended to prevent or restrict the spread of radioactive materials and ionizing radiation released during accidents beyond the limits envisaged by the design, and to prevent their discharge into the environment.

NORMAL OPERATION - operation under the conditions and within the limits specified by the design.

PERSONNEL ERROR -

single unintended incorrect action affecting control

mechanisms, a single omission of a correct action, or a single unintended incorrect action at maintenance of equipment and systems important to safety.

DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT - accident for which the design determines initiating events and final states, and for which safety systems are provided, that will keep the accident's consequences within the limits established for similar accident taking into account a single failure principle of safety systems or an unrelated to the initiating event single operator error. SELF-SUSTAINED CHAIN REACTION – chain nuclear reaction characterized by a neutrons multiplication effective factor exceeding or equal to 1. NUCLEAR FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM – range of systems, devices, elements intended for storage, loading, unloading, transport, control and other transportprocess operations with nuclear fuel, transfer packing casks and intrafacility transfer packing casks.

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TRANSFER PACKING CASK (PACKING CASK) for nuclear fuel – range of tools required for housing and retention of nuclear fuel providing its integrity, prevention of radioactive substances release to the environment, as well as nuclear and radiation safety during nuclear fuel transport and storage. PACKAGE – package cask with nuclear fuel placed inside. STACK OF PACKAGES OR FUEL ASSEMBLIES – set of packages or fuel assemblies, which is authorized for storage under condition of compliance with imposed limitations on mutual lay-out of packages or fuel assemblies. LATTICE SPACING – distance between the axes of adjacent fuel assemblies located in the nodes of a regular lattice. NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE – temporal storage of nuclear fuel in the storage facility. NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITY – storage facility intended for nuclear fuel storage. CLASS 1 STORAGE FACILITY – nuclear fuel storage facility, where a possibility of ingress of water or some other moderator is excluded. It is provided by a number of the following measures:  Storage facility location above zero level mark;  Absence of adjacent premises, from which the water can penetrate the storage;  Absence of pipelines with water, oil, hydrogen and other moderators in the storage;  Arrangement of storage facility in a flood-free area to avoid damage in flooding;  Availability of drainage. CLASS 2 STORAGE FACILITY - nuclear fuel storage facility, where a possibility of inundation by water or some other moderator is excluded. It is provided by a number of the following measures:

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 Storage facility location above zero level mark;  Absence of pipelines with water, oil, hydrogen and other moderators in the storage;  Availability water detection signal indicators and drainage systems or emergency water pumps connected to water detection indicators. OPERATING ORGANIZATION – an organization applying for authorization or authorized to operate a nuclear power plant and responsible for its safety.

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1. General 1.1. Safety regulations for storage, transportation and handling of fresh nuclear fuel at an NPP (hereinafter referred to as Regulations) refer to the I.R.Iran codes and standards in the field of nuclear energy utilization. 1.2. This Regulations establish main technical and organizational requirements to nuclear fuel handling systems aimed at safety assurance in handling nuclear fuel at NPP. 1.3. This Regulations cover NPP under design, construction, operation and decommissioning . 1.4. This Regulations do not establish reactor safety requirements in loading and rearrangement in the core, breeding blanket, core baffle, in unloading fuel assemblies from the reactor, CPS control rods and other elements. 1.5. Amendments and additions to this Regulations shall be introduced through the procedure established by the INRA for development and approval of the state codes and regulations in the field of nuclear energy utilization. 1.6. Failures, emergency situations and accidents with nuclear fuel handling systems should be investigated via the procedure established by the INRA.

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1.7. Responsibility for the Regulations violation. 1.7.1.

This Regulations are obligatory for compliance by all officials, engineering and technical staff and workers involved in designing, manufacture,

installation,

adjustment,

repair,

modernization,

operation and decommissioning of NPP and nuclear fuel handling systems. 1.7.2.

Officials at the enterprises, organizations, as well as engineering and technical

staff

of

scientific-research,

design

institutes

and

organizations, who are to blame for violation of the Regulations, bear personnel responsibility regardless of violation consequences (whether it leads to an accident or not). Depending on the violations nature and their consequences all persons, who are to blame for violation, bear responsibility in accordance with the INRA legislation in force.

2. General

principles

assurance

and

requirements

to

safety

2.1. Safety of nuclear fuel handling system is assured by NPP siting, establishment of a buffer area and controlled area around the NPP, high quality of design of NPP and nuclear fuel handling system, perfect and reliable equipment, monitoring of its state, personnel qualification and discipline, as well as by arrangement and implementation of work in accordance with requirements of operational documents. 2.2. Lists of Design-Basis and Beyond Design-Basis Accidents during nuclear fuel storage, transport and handling should be included in NPP Design. Safety Analysis Reports (PSAR and FSAR) of NPP should contain analysis of DBA and BDBA. 2.3. Radiation safety in nuclear fuel storage, transportation and handling operations is regulated by the INRA regulatory documents in force.

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2.4.

The following main requirements are to be complied with in design and operation of NPP. 2.4.1.

NPP design should provide for nuclear fuel handling systems (NFHS).

2.4.2.

Design, construction and operation of NPP and NFHS , as well as design and manufacturing of NPP and NFHS elements should be implemented with observance of requirements of regulatory documents in force.

2.4.3.

Change of equipment composition, design and/or characteristics of NFHS important to safety, as well as of operation parameters can not be made without introducing respective changes to the project.

2.4.4.

NFHS elements important to safety should be subject to inspection and testing in manufacture, installation and adjustment and periodic inspection during operation with the aim of maintaining and confirming the design characteristics.

2.4.5.

NPP design should contain a list of nuclear hazardous activities performed during nuclear fuel storage, handling and transportation.

2.4.6.

NPP design should contain a list of procedures and computer programs used for NPP/NFHS safety analysis and the fields of their application. Used computer programs should be verified and qualified as per established procedures.

2.4.7.

Storage and temporal placement of nuclear fuel is only permitted in storage facilities or specially intended locations, defined by the NPP design .

2.4.8.

To route the cargo movement to other operational areas through the places of nuclear fuel storage and temporal placement of nuclear fuel is prohibited (if nuclear fuel is present in such locations).

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2.4.9.

There should be provisions for control and accounting for of the layout, amount and movement of fuel assemblies in the process of reloading, storage and transportation of the nuclear fuel.

2.4.10. Movement of cargo (crane and trolley) over the stored nuclear fuel should be excluded, if the cargo is not a part of lifting and reloading devices. Reloading or placement of cargo is authorized over premises (storages) covered by removable or permanent structures, if the structures can withstand dynamic and static loads, which may arise in lifting, dropping and movement of the cargo. 2.4.11. Storage facility layout should provide fast evacuation of personnel from the premise in case of an accident. 2.4.12. Design of cans, packages and racks in storages, transportation means for nuclear fuel movement should provide their stability under normal operation conditions, during Safe Shutdown Earthquake and other natural calamities inherent for this area. 2.4.13. Design of NPP/NFHS equipment should provide for nuclear safety mainly by placing nuclear fuel with a certain lattice spacing. 2.4.14. Effective factor of neutrons multiplication in the storages and transfer packing casks (intra-facility transfer packing casks) should not exceed 0,95 under conditions of normal operation and during DBA. 2.4.15. Racks and cans made of structural materials with some additions absorbing neutrons should be designed and manufactured in such a way, so that unacceptable reduction of absorbing capability can be avoided during mechanical, chemical or radiation impact at normal operation and DBA. Periodic check of neutron absorbers efficiency should be carried out during operation if necessary.

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2.4.16.

There should be provisions for technical means preventing uncontrolled, spontaneous movement of equipment intended for nuclear fuel handling.

2.4.17.

Nuclear fuel handling equipment should prevent a possible drop of casks and fuel assemblies, which can lead to accidents at initiating events leading to the drop of casks and fuel assemblies.

2.4.18.

There should be provisions for testing and maintenance of NFHS designing its equipment.

2.4.19.

NPP design should provide for technical means for storage and handling faulty, leaking fuel assemblies.

2.4.20.

In designing nuclear fuel handling system there should be measures and devices in NPP, which exclude a possibility of temperature rise of fuel elements cladding beyond the values established for normal operation and DBA.

2.4.21.

Equipment being part of an NFHS should be connected to emergency power supply system providing completion of transport process operations in case of power supply loss.

2.4.22.

Design of load lifting mechanism and gripping devices should exclude a possibility of loads drops in case of power supply loss and spontaneous movement upon power restoration.

2.4.23.

NPP design should contain a decommissioning section.

2.4.24.

NPP safety analysis should cover initiating events of DBD and BDBA, whose tentative lists are given in the Attachment.

2.4.25. Procedure and organization of nuclear fuel transport on the territory of the NPP should conform to the requirements established by the regulations of safety and physical protection during nuclear fuel transport. (Page 12 of 26) NNSD-R-0070-12-04

2.4.26.

NPP/NFHS design should envisage localizing safety systems intended for prevention or limitation of radioactive substances and ionizing radiation (released at accidents) spreading inside the storage and discharging to the environment.

2.4.27. Complex of nuclear fuel handling and storage systems should be capable of performing its functions under special effects, substantiated in the NPP design.

3. Requirements for safety assurance in fresh nuclear fuel handling

3.1.

Scope of application 3.1.1

The present section establishes safety requirements for nuclear fuel storage facilities, as well as for fresh nuclear fuel handling equipment, which includes in particular: 

Cranes, grips, beams, bars



Platforms, carts



Refuelling devices and mechanisms



Rotating mechanisms (turn-over devices) for bringing fuel assemblies to a vertical position



Cans, packages, racks, cabinets for storage



Bench for fuel assemblies monitoring



Bench for fuel assemblies washing



Gauges for checking fuel assemblies geometrical dimensions



Devices for fuel assemblies mounting and dismounting



Fresh fuel assemblies drum

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3.2.

Fresh nuclear fuel storage facility 3.2.1.

Nuclear safety during fresh nuclear fuel storage should be assured by a range of measures including the following: 

limitations on fuel assemblies layout in packages, cans, racks



limitations on a number of packages, cans in a group



limitations on layout of groups of packages, cans, racks



application of heterogeneous absorbers



monitoring of layout of fuel assemblies, absorbers, packages, cans, racks

 3.2.2.

control of absorbers availability.

Position of packages or fuel assemblies in a stack should be fixed with the help of special racks, sockets, etc.

3.2.3.

While storing on the storage floor, the position of groups of packages should be marked. If transportation means (machines, electrocars) are used in the storage facilities, lanes of their movement should be marked. It is recommended that restriction elements should be used to prevent collision of the transportation means with racks, packages, etc.

3.2.4.

Spacing of fuel assemblies location in cans, racks, packages should be selected in such a way, that the effective factor of neutron multiplication does not exceed 0,95 during normal operation and at DBA.

3.2.5.

The NPP/NFHS design should determine a permissible number of packages and cans in a group or a stack as well as permissible distance between groups and stacks.

3.2.6.

Storages of fresh nuclear fuel should be equipped with automatic or primary fire fighting means. Fire extinguishing by means, which can increase the value of the effective factor of neutron multiplication, for example, by water or foam, is prohibited. Storage (including temporal (Page 14 of 26) NNSD-R-0070-12-04

one) in the storage facility of combustible materials, as well as materials having other dangerous properties in terms of fire (for example, chemical toxicity, corrosion activity, fire hazard), which are not parts of packing casks, is prohibited. Prohibited is the passage of cables, which are not directly connected to the power supply for nuclear fuel handling equipment, and of pipelines with combustible and explosion hazardous kinds of liquid, and explosion hazardous kinds of gas. The NPP/NFHS design should provide for automatic turning off the storage ventilation upon fire origination therein. 3.2.7.

Storage of other core components, which do not contain fissile material, is permitted in the fresh nuclear fuel storage facility. Prohibited is the storage of materials (which are not parts of packing casks) being an effective neutrons moderator (wood, graphite, beryllium, hydrogen containing materials) between or inside cans, racks, groups of packages.

3.2.8. There should be a justification for a possibility to store fuel assemblies with different fuel composition and different enrichment in the same storage. 3.2.9. Fresh nuclear fuel storage facilities should be equipped with fire alarm, working and emergency illumination, and, if necessary, with industrial telemonitors. 3.2.10. Mounting emergency alarm system for self-sustained chain reaction is not required in class 1 and 2 storages for fresh uranium fuel with enrichment less than 5%. 3.2.11. Radiation monitoring should be performed in fresh nuclear fuel storage facilities. There should be provisions for systems, that provide temperature and humidity maintenance in accordance with the Specification of the fuel assemblies plant manufacturer.

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3.2.12. Surfaces of structural materials of NFHS equipment should be easily decontaminated. 3.2.13. Drainage tubes in storage facilities should be selected of such a size, that they can provide removal without accumulation of water incoming with a maximal supposed flow rate. A possibility of the storage facility flooding due to return ingress of water through the drainage should be excluded.

3.3.

Equipment for fresh nuclear fuel handling 3.3.1. Process equipment for movement of fresh nuclear fuel should have a speed of movement preventing the damage of fuel assemblies and equipment. Availability of finishing speed and its limiting value in addition to regular speed is determined by requirements of the reactor plant designer and nuclear fuel manufacturer. 3.3.2. Design of cranes and other hoisting mechanisms for nuclear fuel handling should exclude the possibility of nuclear fuel drop and its uncontrolled movement in case of power supply loss. 3.3.3. Hoisting mechanisms grips should be designed in such a way, that they can reliably lift and move nuclear fuel, which should be provided for by the following measures: 

Before lifting starts, the hoisting mechanism grip should be placed over the gripper of the package, can, fuel assembly with a required precision;



The grip should be in a closed position in case of power supply loss;



It is necessary to assure that the grip with a suspended fuel assembly could not be unchained spontaneously or as a result of the personnel error.

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3.3.4. It is necessary that the equipment for nuclear fuel handling should not have sharp angles and edges, which may damage fuel assemblies. 3.3.5. Design of equipment for nuclear fuel handling at normal operation should exclude hits and other loading, which could cause damages or change of fuel assembly and fuel element dimensions. 3.3.6. In designing equipment for nuclear fuel handling systems one has to consider all loadings arising at normal operation and as a result of initiating events, including asymmetrical loadings and loadings during acceleration. It is necessary that the voltage arising as a result of loadings should not exceed permitted limits for different fixing elements (nuts, bolts, etc.) of equipment. 3.3.7. The NPP/NFHS design should establish permissible number of fuel assemblies located on the benches, tables for visual examination, fuel assembly mounting or dismounting, check of geometrical dimensions. 3.3.8. Only faultless devices and mechanisms provided for by the design and subjected to periodic examination, testing and control examination before operation are authorized for performing fuel operations. Compliance with these requirements should be confirmed in documents. 3.3.9. There should be provisions for inspection and control of radiation monitoring devices operability, control of process parameters and interlockings.

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3.4.

Analysis of nuclear and radiation safety in fresh nuclear fuel handling 3.4.1. It is necessary to consider a maximal design capacity of the storage facilities during analysis. 3.4.2. It is necessary to believe, that all fuel has a maximal enrichment, if nuclear fuel with different enrichment degree is stored in the storage. 3.4.3. There should be account of errors of the calculation methods, concentration and isotope composition of absorbers, allowances in their manufacture. 3.4.4. Availability of absorbing elements in fuel assemblies or racks design should be neglected, if they may be lost, or their efficiency is reduced as a result of initiating events. 3.4.5. It is necessary to consider the change of fuel assemblies geometry or their position as a result of initiating events. 3.4.6. It is necessary to consider such amount, distribution and density of a moderator (in particular, water) in the storage as a result of initiating events, which lead to a maximal effective factor of neutrons multiplication. 3.4.7. It is necessary to suppose the availability of a reflector in the storage. 3.4.8. If nuclear fuel with different isotope plutonium composition is present, and if the temperature in the storage change under normal operation conditions and at initiating events, it is necessary to consider such a composition and such state, which leads to a maximal factor of neutron multiplication.

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4. Transfer

Packing

Casks

for

transport operations with them

Nuclear

fuel

and

4.1. The present section establishes requirements to intrafacility transfer packing casks for nuclear fuel intrafacility transportation and transport operations with them, as well as to the transport operations with transfer packing casks intended for fresh nuclear fuel. 4.2. Requirements to transfer packing casks for nuclear fuel transportation by all kinds of land, sea and air transport and to transport operations with them are detailed in IAEA document “Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials” (ST-R-1, IAEA, Vienna, 1996 edition, as amended in 2000). The requirements should be completely complied with. 4.3. Prohibited is to transport intrafacility transfer packing casks (transfer packing casks) over the location of nuclear fuel. If this requirement is not met, the stored fuel assemblies should be protected against damages related to intrafacility transfer packing casks (transfer packing casks) drop. 4.4. The height of intrafacility transfer packing casks lifting should be as minimal as possible. Lifting intrafacility transfer packing casks to the height more than defined by NPP/NFHS design, is permitted, provided

that one of the following

requirements is met:  There are provisions for staged lifting, and technical measures exclude exceeding the height of stage more than defined in the design.  Lifting is performed over the shock absorber or with the application of a damping device, which reduce loads on intrafacility transfer packing casks (in case of drops) down to the loads, which arise in drops from the design height.  Availability of an independent (from the main) preventing system of lifting (lowering), with the independent system providing lifting (lowering) of fully loaded intrafacility transfer packing cask. (Page 19 of 26) NNSD-R-0070-12-04

During safety analysis it is necessary to take into account maximal permitted height in the process of lifting and movement. 4.5. In designing NPP, buildings and equipment should be provided for preparation of transfer packing cask with nuclear fuel for dispatching outside the facility boundaries. 4.6. Intrafacility transfer packing cask design should provide a possibility of decontamination, absence of stagnation areas of possible liquid accumulation (water, including precipitation, working media and decontamination solutions) and locations with difficult access for maintenance.

5. Nuclear fuel storage commissioning 5.1. Nuclear fuel storage facility inside the NPP may be commissioned only after the corresponding INRA License is obtained by the Operating organization. 5.2. Commissioning of nuclear fuel storage facility shall be carried out in accordance with documents on arrangement and performance of commissioning of buildings, structures, equipment and systems of NPP under construction, developed by the Operating organization. 5.3. Check-up of storage preparedness for commissioning shall be performed by:  NPP working committee  Acceptance committee of the Operating organization. 5.4. The NPP working committee shall be assigned by the enterprise Head order. NPP working committee shall inspect the issues, including but not limited to the following: 5.4.1. Conformity of performed work to the design 5.4.2. Equipment operability, availability of equipment testing protocols and reports on precommissioning activities completion.

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5.4.3. Availability of required documents in accordance with section 6 of the Regulations and its conformity to the design. 5.4.4. Personnel qualification, availability of personnel examination protocols and order for authorization of personnel admission to work. 5.5. The NPP working committee decision is registered as a Statement. 5.6. Based on the Act of the NPP working committee, the Acceptance committee shall adopt a decision on acceptance of nuclear fuel storage for operation and draw an acceptance Act. 5.7. The INRA carries out examination of the readiness of storage, personnel and documents and register the examination results via established procedure 5.8. The Operating organization shall allow operation of nuclear fuel storage facility based on the corresponding Act of the Acceptance committee and corresponding positive INRA Conclusion.

6. Requirements to documentation on nuclear fuel storage and transportation

6.1. The NPP, operating nuclear fuel storage and handling system , should have the following documents: 6.1.1. Materials of nuclear fuel storage and handling system design. 6.1.2. The present Regulations 6.1.3. “Guidelines for nuclear safety assurance in nuclear fuel storage, transportation and utilization at the nuclear facility”. The guidelines shall be developed by the NPP management based on requirements of the process manual of the facility operation, where the section

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“Nuclear fuel handling” with limits and conditions of safe handling should be present. The guidelines establish the following: 

personnel duties and responsibilities for compliance with nuclear safety requirements and conditions of storage, transport and reloading of nuclear fuel;



list of participants of nuclear fuel storage and equipment for storage, transport and reloading;



fresh nuclear fuel storage class and measures preventing a possibility of water ingress inside the storage



norms of storage, transport and reloading of nuclear fuel agreed upon with the general designer



initiating events, accident conditions in accordance with requirements of the present regulations, safety technical measures and organizational measures;



procedure of fires extinguishing



procedure of personnel notification about generation of selfsustained chain reaction



list of personnel actions at initiating events and for liquidation of DBA / BDBA consequences.

6.1.4. Documents on nuclear fuel accounting. 6.1.5. Plan of nuclear fuel layout in the storage. 6.1.6. Specification and certificate for fuel assemblies.

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6.1.7. List of design parameters and systems important to safety, the changes of which should be agreed upon with the NPP designer, nuclear facilities designer, Operating organization and INRA. The list should be included in the design of the concerned NPP. 6.1.8. Technical decisions on changes to the nuclear fuel storage and handling systems. 6.1.9. Technical documents and operation manuals for the equipment in use. 6.1.10. The guide for nuclear fuel incoming control. The guide is developed by the NPP together with the manufacturer, it should establish the following: 

procedure of packages incoming inspection before their placement in the storage.



procedure of nuclear fuel incoming inspection with indication of the main criteria established by the manufacturer.

6.1.11. Instructions for the accident consequences liquidation 6.1.12. Reports on acceptance of nuclear fuel storages for operation 6.1.13. Reports of committees about nuclear safety status 6.1.14. Log of directives and comments on nuclear safety for the nuclear fuel storage 6.1.15. Documents for personnel training and qualification:    

training program; protocols of examination; Director’s order on authorization of admission to work of personnel, who passed the exams; Job description.

6.1.16. Some other documents at the NPP managers discretion or as per the INRA’s request.

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7. Control of compliance with the (present) Regulations 7.1. Operating organizations are obliged to exercise control over the compliance with the present Regulations. 7.2. Operating organizations are obliged to arrange periodic (not less than once in two years) inspections for control of compliance with the present Regulations at the nuclear facility and to submit inspection results to the INRA. 7.3. INRA shall control observance of the present Regulations in accordance with its governing documents.

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Attachment List of initiating events for analysis* of DBA and BDBA consequences

1.

DBA initiating events: 1.1

Complete loss of NPP power supply

1.2

Natural or man-induced effects

1.3

Fire in the storages or on the transport means

1.4

Drop of objects, which can change the position of fuel assemblies and to break the integrity of fuel assemblies and fuel elements cladding.

1.5

Drop of separate fuel assemblies, storage tubes, cans with fuel assemblies, packages during transport-process operations.

1.6

Human errors.

1.7

Ingress of moderator (water) leading to maximal effective factor of multiplication (except for class 1 storage).

1.8

Accidents in nuclear facility having an impact on the safety of nuclear fuel handling systems complex.

1.9

Failures of equipment of nuclear fuel handling systems

1.10

Damage of packages fixing during transportation.

1.11

Aircraft crash upon the nuclear fuel storage.

1.12

Intrafacility transfer packing casks leaking.

(Page 25 of 26) NNSD-R-0070-12-04

2.

Initiating events of BDBA 2.1

Generation of self-sustained chain reaction for nuclear fuel handling systems

2.2

Drop of process equipment and civil engineering structures upon the ceilings of the storage compartments or stored nuclear fuel.

2.3

Ingress of moderator (water) leading to a maximal effective factor of multiplication (for class 1 storage).

2.4

Destruction of intrafacility transfer packing casks with a discharge of radioactive content to the environment.

*During analysis of initiating events the following should be considered: 

Rearrangement of fuel assemblies inside cans, racks, packages, leading to the increase of effective factor of neutrons multiplication



Change of fuel assemblies and fuel elements geometrical configuration (bending, flattening, etc.), as well as fuel elements spacing in the fuel assembly leading to the increase of effective factor of neutrons multiplication



Ingress of water or steam-water mixture inside a nuclear fuel package, can, drum.

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