Safety Assessment Programme
Cornelia Spitzer Section Head, Safety Assessment Section Division of Nuclear Installation Safety Department of Safety and Security
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
Contents • • • •
Safety Assessment Section (SAS) IAEA Safety Standards Review Services Competency Building
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Who we are
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Programme Objectives • to provide Member States (MSs) with up to date safety assessment and design safety standards based on current technology and best practices • to support MSs with advice and review services in the implementation of safety assessment and design safety standards • to develop safety assessment knowledge requirements and provide support to MSs in safety assessment competency and capacity building IAEA
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Mission SAS’s mission is to support Member States in achieving a high level of safety in nuclear power plant design and excellence in safety assessment. IAEA
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Areas of Responsibility
Design Safety
Analysis and Assessment
Implementation and Training IAEA
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Design Safety Defence in depth in NPPs including aspects such as design provisions for design basis accidents, design extension conditions and demonstration of practical elimination of large or early releases Safety approach and requirements for advanced reactor designs Safety engineering of NPPs, including aspects such as fluid – structure interaction, safety classification and qualification of structures, systems and components, fuel safety, and design of plant systems Fire safety in NPP design and safety assessments
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Analysis and Assessment
Deterministic safety assessment methods, techniques and applications related to design basis accident analysis, design extension conditions, severe accidents, and accident management Probabilistic safety assessment methods, techniques and applications, reliability analysis, and risk management
Integration of deterministic, probabilistic and performance based approaches and applications, including integrated risk-informed decision-making processes; safety goals and performance indicators
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Implementation and Training Verification, validation and application of codes/methods related to thermal hydraulics, neutron physics, core design and management, fuel design, PSA codes Principle of backfitting of NPP designs Periodic Safety Reviews particularly regarding the factors of plant design, equipment qualification as well as deterministic and probabilistic safety reassessment
Conducting studies relating to incident and accident analysis Project and programme management Providing education and training in the areas of safety assessment
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IAEA Safety Standards
Safety Fundamentals
Safety Requirements
Safety Guides
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Global Reference Point for a High Level of Nuclear Safety
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Involvement of Stakeholders
Participation by the different stakeholders (for example, regulators, users and co-sponsors) during the drafting and review phase is a long established practice
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Safety Standards Related to SAS
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Requirements for Safety Assessment GSR Part 4
Safety Fundamentals
Safety Requirements Safety Guides
Safety objectives and safety principles
Functional conditions required for safety
Guidance on how to fulfil the requirements
Revised after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The changes relate mainly to • • •
• •
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Margins to withstand external events Margins to avoid cliff-edge effects Multiple facilities / activities at one site Cases where resources are shared Human factors in accident conditions
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Relevant Safety Guides for Safety Assessment Safety Fundamentals
Safety Requirements Safety Guides
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Safety objectives and safety principles
Functional conditions required for safety
Guidance on how to fulfil the requirements
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Requirements for Design of NPPs (SSR 2/1)
Safety Fundamentals
Safety Requirements Safety Guides
Safety objectives and Safety principles
Functional conditions required for safety
Guidance on how to fulfil the requirements
• to be implemented by the designer to fulfill the fundamental safety functions with the appropriate level of defence in depth • to be used by the reviewer of the design (e.g. Safety Authority) to assess the safety of the design
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Revision of Design SR (SSR 2/1) after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (1/3) Defence in Depth (DiD)
• Reinforcement of the independence of DiD provisions, in particular between levels 3 and 4
Margins
• Stressing the need for margins to avoid cliff edge effects. For items that ultimately prevent large or early releases, margins are required also for hazards more severe than those selected for the design basis IAEA
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Revision of Design SR (SSR 2/1) after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (2/3) Multi-unit site
• In a multi-unit site, each plant unit is required to have its own safety systems and safety features for DEC
Heat transfer to the UHS
• Reinforced capabilities for heat transfer to the UHS. Alternative heat sink or different access is required if heat transfer cannot be ensured in conditions generated by hazards more severe than those selected for the design basis IAEA
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Revision of Design SR (SSR 2/1) after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (3/3) Non permanent equipment
• Implementation of features (design, procedures, etc.) to enable the use of non permanent equipment
Power supply
• Reinforced capabilities for power supply in DECs Spent fuel pool
• Additional measures for spent fuel pool instrumentation, cooling and maintaining inventory IAEA
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Safety Standards for Design of NPPs Safety Fundamentals
Safety Requirements Safety Guides
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Safety objectives and Safety principles
Functional conditions required for safety
Guidance on how to fulfil the requirements
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Technical Safety Review (TSR) The TSR incorporates IAEA design safety and safety assessment technical review services to address the needs of Member States at all stages of development and implementation of the nuclear power programme. IAEA
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OBJECTIVES
SCOPE
TSR provides a tailored, independent evaluation of the plant design safety and safety assessment documentation and makes recommendations for enhancements and improvements to safety. The TSR services assist Member States in relation to the following topics: • Safety of operating and new nuclear plant designs • Specific sections of the safety analysis report • Safety Requirements developed by regulatory authorities • Safety assessments, also related to plant modifications • Action taken to address emerging safety issues • Countries’ Periodic Safety Review programme
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General Process 1. REQUEST: Member State (MS) sends a formal request to the IAEA Staff
2. PREPARATION: Staff plans review in consultation with MS, prepares and conducts evaluation with support of int’l experts
3. MISSION: Staff conducts mission at the site to discuss observations with support of int’l experts
4. REPORT: Staff finalizes the review report at its headquarter & sends the report to the MS
5. FOLLOW-UP: MS considers implementing recommendations and inviting a follow-up mission
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Competency Building • Safety Assessment Education and Training (SAET) Programme • Assistance in building competency within Member States BY PROVIDING • Training on the design safety and safety assessment of nuclear power plants BASED ON • The IAEA Safety Standards
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SAET Programme • Basic knowledge of safety assessment • Essential safety assessment education and training
• Specialized knowledge in technical areas • Detailed practical training
• Target audience • • • •
Staff of regulatory authorities Technical and scientific support organizations (TSOs) Owner/operators of nuclear power plants Organizations embarking on nuclear power programmes IAEA
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Thank you for your kind attention!
[email protected] IAEA
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Annex
Listing of Technical Safety Review (TSR) Services
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Generic Reactor Safety (GRS) Review •
DESCRIPTION •
•
OBJECTIVE •
•
To enable the requesting party to understand to which extent the safety case is complete and comprehensive in addressing the requirements of the safety standards
PROCESS •
•
Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the safety case of new reactor design against the requirements of IAEA Safety Standards on Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4) and Safety of NPPs: Design (SSR-2/1)
The process takes between 6-8 months to complete. Funded by the requesting party
OUTPUT •
A report summarizing the extent to which the safety case addresses the requirements and, if needed, recommendations for improvement of completeness and comprehensiveness are provided.
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Examples of GRS Reviews Russia
AES 2006/Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC
Completed January 2013
China
ACPR 1000+ (Conceptual Design)/China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Co., LTD
Completed May 2013
Russia
VVER-TOI/Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC
Completed December 2014
China
ACP1000/China National Nuclear Corporation
Completed January 2015
China
ACP100/China National Nuclear Corporation
Ongoing since July 2015
China
CAP1400/China Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI)
Ongoing since July 2015
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Design Safety (DS) Review •
DESCRIPTION •
•
OBJECTIVE •
•
To assist the requesting Member State to review the preliminary safety analysis report for nuclear power plants and to make recommendations in order to enhance safety
PROCESS •
•
Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the safety of designs of nuclear power plants against the IAEA Safety Standards. The review can be limited on specific technical areas
The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review missions that usually last two weeks. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
OUTPUT •
A report summarizing the findings of the review and, if needed, includes a set of recommendations to improve the compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards.
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Examples of DS Reviews Ukraine
Design safety reviews of 15 NPPs
Completed January 2010
Bulgaria
Follow up of design safety review of units 5 and 6 of Kozloduy NPP
Completed May 2013
Armenia
Follow up of design safety review of Metzamor NPP
Completed November 2009
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Safety Requirements (SR) Review •
DESCRIPTION •
•
OBJECTIVE •
•
To assist the requesting Member State in the process of issuing or revising national safety requirements for the design or safety assessment of nuclear power plants to enhance safety
PROCESS •
•
Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the national safety requirements for the design or safety assessment of nuclear power plants against the IAEA Safety Standards. The review can be limited to specific requirements of interest.
The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review missions that usually last two weeks. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
OUTPUT •
A report summarizing the findings of the review and, if needed, includes a set of recommendations or suggestions to improve the compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards
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Examples of SR Reviews The Netherlands
Review of the safety requirements for nuclear reactors
Completed June 2013
Lithuania
Review of the new regulatory documents for nuclear power plant design and PSA
Completed May 2014
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Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) Review •
DESCRIPTION •
•
OBJECTIVE • •
•
To assist for the assessment of the adequacy of the treatment of technological and methodological issues in the PSA To assist for the assessment whether the PSA applications and conclusions are adequately supported by the provided analysis
PROCESS •
•
Review conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts of Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) on the basis of Safety Guides SSG-3* and SSG-4** and TECDOC-832***
The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review missions that usually last two weeks. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
OUTPUT •
A report summarizing the findings of the review and, if needed, includes a set of recommendations to improve the PSA quality and applicability
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* Development and Application of Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment For Nuclear Power Plants ** Development and Application of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment For Nuclear Power Plants *** IPERS guidelines for the international peer review service 33
Examples of PSA Reviews The Netherlands
PSA Review for Level-1 through Level-3 PSA for internal IEs, internal and external hazards (excluding seismic) for Borssele NPP (power operation and shutdown modes)
Completed June 2010
Follow-up PSA Review
Completed April 2013
Bulgaria
PSA Review for Level-1 through Level-2 PSA for internal IEs, internal and external hazards for Kozloduy NPP (power operation and shutdown modes)
Completed June 2013
Armenia
PSA Review for Level-1 full power PSA for internal IEs, internal and external hazards for Medzamor NPP
Completed October 2014
Switzerland
PSA Review for Level-1 and Level-2 for Completed internal IEs, internal and external hazards for November 2014 Leibstadt NPP (power operation and shutdown modes)
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Accident Management (AM) Review •
DESCRIPTION • Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts of accident management (AM) programme in Member States on the basis of Safety Standards GSR Part 4* and NS-G-2.15** and guideline SVS-9***
•
OBJECTIVE • To advise and assist the regulatory body, utility or technical support organization in the development and implementation of accident management programme
•
PROCESS • The process includes preparatory work and the review of the AM and associated documentation. The review usually lasts two weeks. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
•
OUTPUT • A report describing the review performed, the review findings and, if needed, recommendations in developing the plant specific AM
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*Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities **Safety Guides Severe Accident Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants ***Guidelines for the review of accident management programmes in nuclear power plants
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Examples of AM Reviews Slovenia
AM review of the quality and completeness of the accident management programme (AMP) for Krisko NPP
Completed 2001
Lithuania
AM review of the quality and completeness of the accident management programme (AMP) for Ignalina NPP
Completed 2007
Pakistan
Pre-AM review of emergency control centre and post accident monitoring instrumentation to improve the AMP for KANUPP
Completed 2007
Mexico
Pre-AM review workshop on severe accident analysis and accident management programme for Laguna Verde NPP
Completed 2014
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Review of Periodic Safety Review (PSR) •
DESCRIPTION • Service conducted by IAEA staff and international experts to review the PSR programme against the IAEA Safety Standards on Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4) and the Safety Guide SSG-25 Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants
•
OBJECTIVE • To assist the requesting party in establishing and implementing PSR programmes according to the IAEA Safety Standards, to assure high level of safety throughout the nuclear power plant’s operating lifetime
•
PROCESS • The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review missions that usually last two weeks. It is funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
•
OUTPUT • A report summarizing findings and, if needed, recommendations to improve the compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards.
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Examples of Reviews of PSRs Slovenia
PSR review mission
Completed 2001
Ukraine
PSR requirements review mission
Completed 2008
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Advisory Programmes • Advisory Programmes support the IAEA statute in providing advice to MS in the application of the IAEA Safety Standards • Within the Safety Assessment Section, this advisory programme supports particularly embarking countries with an understanding of how to ensure successful application of standards for safety assessment, including capacity and competence building IAEA
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Safety Assessment Advisory Programme (SAAP) •
DESCRIPTION • Systematic identification of nuclear safety assessment competency and capacity needs for a Member State (MS) establishing a new nuclear power plant (NPP) programme
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OBJECTIVE • To assist the requesting MS to identify gaps and develop an action plan for competency and capacity building based on the IAEA Safety Assessment Education and Training (SAET) Programme
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PROCESS • The process may include a phase 1 workshop for senior managers of all stakeholders of the new NPP Programme and a two weeks mission in the MS to develop the action plan for safety assessment competency and capacity building within the MS. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
•
OUTPUT • A report summarizing the findings and an action plan based on SAET and the IAEA Safety Standards.
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Examples of SAAPs Malaysia
SAAP Phase 2
Completed October 2013
Jordan
SAAP Phase 1
Completed November 2013
Jordan
SAAP Phase 1 Follow-up
Completed November 2014
Bangladesh
SAAP Phase 1
Completed November 2014
Malaysia
SAAP Phase 2 Follow-up
Completed April 2015
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Thank you for your kind attention!
[email protected] IAEA
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