AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS RESEARCH PAPER:

SUMMARY

RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA Please note that material in these research papers ("Material") is intended to contain matters whích may be of interest. The Material is not, and is not intended to be, legal advice. The Material may be updated and amended from time to time. lle endeavour to take

care in compiling the Material; however the Material may not reflect the most recent developments.

Rwanda is a small, central African republic with a history of violence and ethnic tension. The conflict that plagued the nation peaked between April and June 1994, when political and ethnic violence between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority erupted. Throughout this period between 500,000 to a million Tutsi were killed, up to two million refugees fled to neighbouring countries and between 250,000 and 500,000 rapes were perpetrated against Tutsi women by Hutu militia, soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces and other civilians. Parallel investigations led by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Security Council empowered Commission of Experts revealed a pre-planned and systematically coordinated campaign of genocide. Each investigation advocated for the UN to establish an ad hoc international tribunal or alternatively extend the jurisdiction of the lnternational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. As the result of much debate, the Security Council voted to establish the International Tribunal for Rwanda as a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council on 8

November 1994. Amongst other things, the International Tribunal for Rwanda's empowering statute allows the Tribunal to prosecute persons for "crimes against humanity" and genocide.

In 1998 the International Tribunal for Rwanda became the first international war crimes tribunal to recognise that rape and sexual violence could constitute oocrimes against humanity" and genocide. In order to determine the extent to which acts of sexual violence constituted "crimes against humanity''and genocide, the Tribunal was required to define rape and sexual violence, as there was no commonly accepted definition in international law. The Tribunal found rape to be'oan act of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured by a mechanical description of objects and body parts". Despite challenges to this definition, which described only the physical elements of rape and shifted jurisprudential analyses away from the conceptual definition as articulated by the Tribunal in 1998, a recent judgment of the Tribunal has found that the mechanical and conceptual definitions are not mutually exclusive and are actually substantially aligned.

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AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS RESEARCH PAPER:

RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA Explain the background to the conflict in Rwanda and the circumstances leading to the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") 1.1

Background Rwanda is a small central African republic with a history of violence and ethnic tension. Its population is composed of primarily three groups: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Each share the same language and culture, but have recognisable differences.l

In1962 a Hutu-led revolution seized Rwandan independence from their Belgian colonial masters. Following the revolution, Rwandans witnessed the mass exodus of the Tutsi minority to neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Tanzania. 1.2

Rwandan Patriotic Front attack On I October 1990 militant refugees, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), attacked northern Rwanda from bases in Uganda. The incumbent one-party regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana (Habyarimana), established after a military coup in 1973, decided to exaggerate the RPF threat as a method of garnering dissident Hutu support.2 Habyarimana portrayed all Tutsi as RPF collaborators and for three and a half years used physical as well as verbal abuse to redefine the population of Rwanda in "Rwandans", meaning those who backed the President, and "ibyitso" or "accomplices of the enemy''meaning the Tutsi minority and Hutu opposed to him.r

1.3

End of the monopoly tn June 1991, as a result of internal political discord and intense pressure to allow political pluralism, the Rwandan Constitution was modified to allow multi-party democracy. Habyarimana delayed the establishment of a power sharing govemment for the next three years.a

1.4

Preparation for extermination Early in 1992,two political parties affiliated with Habyarimana formed militia which were trained and supplied by the Rwandan army (the "Interahamwe" known as Those who Stand Together or Those who Attack Together and the "Impuzamubambi"). During the next two years these militia were involved in the killing of more than 2000 civilians,

I

Karhilo Jaana (1995) "The Establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda" Nordic Journal of International Law Y ol 65, 683 -'l 13 at 684 2 Human Rights Watch (1999) Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda, viewed l0 January 2007 Ibid o

Orth Rick (2001) "Rwanda's Hutu Exhemist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspectiv€' Small l|lars

and Insurgencies

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Vol l2(l),76 - 109 at 83

mostly Tutsi. s These and other crimes w-ent unpunished, thus fostering a sense that political and ethnic violence was normal.6

During l993,Habyarimana loyalists prepared for an attack on the minority. Recruitment and training-of the Interhamwe expanded, whilst a'ocivilian self - defence force" tvas established.T Soldiers and political leaders distributed firearms to militia, and others armed most young men with weapons such as machetes. In response to these preparations, the RPF increased their number of supporters and troops.s 1.5

Arusha Accords Following months of negotiations on 4 August lgg3,Habyarimana and the RPF signed the Arusha Accords.e This agreement was to establish the rule of law, repatriate and resettle refugees and arrange power sharing under UN supervision. However the implementation of the agreement proceeded slowly and violence continued to intensiry, resulting in further casualties and displacement.

1.6

The Genocide Under intense intemational pressure, Habyarimana agreed to attend a one day summit in Dar es Salaam to discuss a regional approach to the Rwandan crisis. His aircraft was shot down upon its return to Kigali airport on 6 April 1994. Within hours of the crash, a small group of Hayarimana's close associates began to execute the planned extermination.l0 Government troops, the presidential guard and armed militias started attacking and killing Hutu government officials and leaders of the political opposition, thus creating a vacuum in which they could take control.rr Soldiers and militia äiso began systematicàily slaughtering Tutsi. Encouraged by radio propaganda, public authorities and tangible incentives many ordinary citizens were mobilised to take part in the massacre.t2-

In May and June, when the interim government was weakened by military losses and by the first signs of international disapproval, Hutu began refusing to participate in the genocide.r3 On 18 July the RPF däared victory. Tie next day it established a new government of national unity. Between April and June 500 000 to a million Tutsi had been killed.'o Up to two million refugees, mostly Hutu, are estimated to have fled to neighbouring countries in fear ofTutsi retaliation.rs The capital city was destroyed with no utilities or góvernment infrastructure. From a total of 700 judges and lawyers, only 40 remained.16

5 6

Human Rights Watch, supra

rbid T Ibid I tbid e

talk by Phillippe Gaillard, ICRC head of delegation in Rwanda from 1993 to 1994, Rwanda 1994: ,,La vraie vie est absente", 18 October 1994, International Museum of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva lo Human Rights Watch, supra r¡Ibid

'2lbid r3lbid la rs

Karhilo, supra 687

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1.7

Role of the UN In October 1993 the peacekeeping force UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed pursuant to the Arusha Accords. The mandate of UNAMIR was to assist 17 After 10 Belgian the parîies in implementing the transitional arrangements as agreed. peacekeepers were killed, the Security Council voted on 21 April 1994 to scale down the operation.ls However within a week, the UN Secretary General reported that massacres continued on a large scale and called for 'forceful action to restore law and order'.re On I7 May the Security Council approved the upgrading of UNAMIRs force level to 5,500 and gave the force an expanded mandate. Throughout the following months the Security Council authorised an arrns embargo on Rwanda20 and approved the mandate, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for a Frenchled multinational-force to embark on a humanitarian mission ('Operation Turquoise').21 Through the ground work of UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise the scale and speed of the conflict became more widely known. The Security Council mandated the Secretary General to report on the violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed in Rwanda.22 On 8 June in its authorisation of the continued deployment of UNAMIR the Security Council rated with the gravest concern reports indicating that acts of genocide had occurred in Rwanda and recalled that genocide constituted a crime punishable under international law.23 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Commission on Human Rights took up their own parallel investigations. The LJN High Commissioner for Human nightr appointed a Speciál Rapporteur on Rwanda2a whose reports revealed a pre-planned and systematically coordinated campaign of genocide and advocated for the UN to establish an ad hoc international tribunal or alternatively, extend the jurisdiction of the lnternational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.2s These reports were instrumental in establishing the need for intemational action to bring the perpetrators to justice.

1.8

The Commission of Experts On 1 July 1994 the Security Council empowered the Secretary General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts. In late July the Secretary General appointed three African jurists on the Commission.26 The Commission's terms of reference included an examination of the question of the appropriate venue for proceedings against perpetrators of human rights violations.

t7 tJN,

Security Council Resolution 872,UN Doc. S/Res/872, adapted unanimously 5 October 1993 UN, ^Secarity Council Resolution 9/2, UN Doc. S/Res/912, adopted unanimously 21 April 1994. The Security Council authorised the reduction of the force to 270, but the withdrawal halted at 450 troops te UN, Letter of the Secretary General to the Security Council, uN Doc. S/1994/518, 29 Apnl1994 18

20

SlRes/918, paragraphs 13-17 LIN, Security Council Resolution 929, UN Doc. S/Res/929, 27 June 1994 22 tIN Doc. S/Res/918, 17 May 1994, para l8 t3 LIN, Security Council Resolution 925,UN Doc. S/Res/925, 8 June 1994 to LrNI, Report of the Commßsion on Human Rights on its Third Special Session, UN Doc. E/C N. 415-311,30 2t

1994, pp.4-8 Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr R. Degrri Segui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN 4/1995 /7,28 June 1994

May 25

tÑ,

26

Mr Atsu-Koffi Amega of Togo

as Chairman, Mrs Mabi Dieng of Guinea and Professor Salifou Fomba of 29 Juty 1994 from the Secretary General Addressed to the President of the

as members. lJN, Letter Dated Security Council, UN Doc. Sl 19941906, 29

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luly 1994

Mali

In accordance with it's mandate,2T theRwanda Commission received and reviewed material from govemments, human rights organisations and aid agencies and conducted two visits to the region. It produced a preliminary report containing findings of violations of human rights, humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and specific euidence of the crime of genocide.2s The Commission u.gu.d strongly in fâvour óf extending the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia to include the international crimes committed in Rwanda. 1.9

Jurisdiction During the autumn of ß94 there was much debate over whether prosecution of those implicated in the Rwandan genocide should take place before an international tribunal or before Rwandan courts.2e Although keen to have the trials held in Rwanda, the Rwandan govemment pursued the setting up of an international tribunal, largely due to the enormity of the task and the near complete destruction of the local judiciary. In September the government requested the Security Council set up an international tribunal for Rwanda.3o As a member of the Security Council, it then participated in the drafting of an enabling resolution and Statute for the new Tribunal. The Security Council voted to establish an international tribunal for Rwanda as a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council on 8 November 1994. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council established the tribunal for the oosole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other such violations of internatiónal humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between I January 1994 and 3l December 1994.3r The Statute of the tribunal was adopted as an appendix to the resolution. The Security Council Resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and one abstention (China). In spite of having initially called for the Tribunal to be set up, Rwanda voted against the adoption of Resolution 955. The new govemment argued that amongst other things the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal was too limited and would not cõver the lengtþ period during which preparations were made for the genocide; and, that its composition, with only two trial chambers, would prevent it from functioning properly in view of the large number of prosecutions to be brought.32 Nevertheless, on tñã aáy following the adoption of the resolution Vice-President Paul Kagame announced his government's intention to cooperate with the new Tribunal.

Sscyity Council Resolution l]q*, '" UN, Preliminary

935,UN Doc. S/Res/935, adopted unanimously I July 1994 Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), UN Doc. S/1994/tt25,4 Oct t994

2e

Karhilo, supra 694

30

Lnl, Letter dated 28 September 1994from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda Addressed to the

President of the Security Council, UN Doc Sll9g4/ll15, 28 Sept. 1994 tlN, Security Council Resolution 955, UN Doc. S/Res/9SS, B Nov 1994 :l 32 Aptel, Cecile (lgg7) "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" The International Review of the Red Cross Vol 321,675 - 683

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The ICTR Akayesu Case (1998) was groundbreaking in the Trial Chamber's analysis of the crimes of genocide and sexual violence. Specilically the Chamber found that rape constituted an international crime. The Tribunal has since prosecuted for rape and sexual violence crimes in key cases including the Muhímøna Case (2005), and is responsible for developing important case law in this area. Focussing on the Akøyesu Case andthe Muhímana Case, discuss how the Tribunal has defined international crimes of rape and sexual violence. 2.1

Rape and sexual violence during the conflict Throughout the Rwandan genocide rape and sexual violence, including mutilation and sexual slavery were perpetrated against Tutsi women by Hutu militia, soldiers of the Rwandan Armed ForceJand other civilians.33 Military and political leaders at all levels instigated, directed, encouraged and engaged in this violence to further their systemic campaign to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi community. The rapes and sexual violence perpetrated were used as political and military tools to terrorise the minority group.34 The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Rwanda stated that "[a]ccording to^consistent and reliable testimony...rape was the rule and its absence was the exception."j)

2.2

Law Article 3(g), 3(i) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda gives the power to the Tribunal to prosecute persons for "rape" and "other inhumane acts" when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious ground. Artícle 4(e) allows prosecution for "outrages against human dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form ofindecent assault". These offences are broadly refened to as "crimes against humaniry". Article 6 (1) of the Statute deems that those who "planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided or abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime". Article 6(3) provides that "acts committed by a subordinate will not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such an act or has done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators".

2.3

Akøyesas6 - Facts

April

1993 until June 1994. As bourgmestre, Akayesu had exclusive control over the commune and the

Jean Paul Akayesu served as "bourgmsstre" of the Taba commune from

Although the exact number of women raped will never be known, it is estimated that between 250,000 and See Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights Report on the Situation of 500,000 *pes occut "d. Un Doc. Ê,1CN.411996168 (Jan 29,1996) Human Rights in Rwandø 3a Press Release, Human Rights Watch (1993) Human Rights l{atch Applauds Rwanda Rape Verdict: Sets international Precedentþr Punishing Sexual Violence as a W'ar Crime,2 September, viewed 7 February 2007, available at http://www.hrw.ordpress9S/sept/rrape902.htm 35 Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Un Doc. ElCN.4ll996l68 (Jan 29,1996') at paragraph l6 36 The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu Case No ICTR-1996-4-T, Judgment TC),2 September 1998 (ICTR Reports, 1998, pp 44 - 404) ('Akayesu") 33

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communal police. He was responsible for the territorial administration of the commune, along with maintaining laws and public order.

From April to June 1994 at least 2000 Tutsis were killed in the Taba commune while Akayesu was in power. The killings were so open and widespread that it was alleged that Akayesu must have known about them and had the authority and responsibility to prevent the killings, but failed to do so. Many civilians (mostly Tutsi) sought refuge at the Bureau Communal during this period. While seeking refuge it was alleged that female civilians were regularly taken by armed local militia or the communal police and subjected to rape and sexual violence. The prosecution claimed that Akayesu knew of the sexual violence, beatings and murder and facilitated them by allowing them to occur on or near the Bureau Communal premises. Akayesu - Decision of the Tribunal

2.4

The Tribunal found that Akayesu aided and abetted multiple acts of sexual violence by allowing them to take place on or near the premises of the Bureau Communal. He facilitated the commission of these acts through his words of encouragement, which sent a clear signal of official tolerance for sexual violence, without which the acts would not have taken place.37 He was found to be individually criminally responsible for the rapes and sexual violence and to have committed acts of genocide.3s The deJìnítíon of røpe

In order to determine the extent to which acts of sexual violence constituted "crimes against humanity", the Tribunal needed to define'orape" as there was no commonly accepted definition in international law.

The Tribunal recognised that rape has been historically defined in national jurisdictions as "non-consensual sexual intercourse". The Tribunal viewed this description too mechanical, insofar that variations on the form of rape may also include acts which involve the insertion^of objects and /or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be

intrinsically sexual.3e The Tribunal defïned rape as "an act of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured by a mechanical description of objects and body parts".a0 It found rape to be "a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive".4l The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment does not stipulate specific acts which constitute torture. This allowed the Tribunal to find that in certain circumstances rape may constitute a form of torture for the purposes of criminal liability. The Tribunal found rape to be akin to torture in that it is "used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person".a2 The Tribunal held that "[]ike torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted

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by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public ofÏicial or other pêrsott acting in ãn official capacity."a3 The definítíon of sexual øssaalt Sexual violence (which includes rape) was defìned as "any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive". The Tribunal found that the act must be committed:

(i)

as

(ii)

on a civilian population; and

(iiÐ

on certain catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial or religious grounds.aa

part of a wide spread or systematic attack;

The Tribunal held that sexual violence was not limited to physical invasion of the body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact,-such as the ordering of a girl to undress and do gymnastics naked in a public courtyard.as The Tribunal described three ways by which acts of sexual violence could be prosecuted under the Statute - sexual violence falls within the scope of "other inhumane acts" set forth in Article 3(i), "outrages upon human dignity" set forth in Article 4(e) and "serious bodily or mental hann" set forth in erticte 2(2)(b) of the Statute.46 The meøníng of coercíon The Tribunal found coercion to be a key requirement for the offences of rape and sexual violence. It held that coercion need not be evidenced by a show ofphysical force. "Threats, intimidation, exertion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion".aT The Tribunal went on to say that "coercion may.^ be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence..."48 Røpe ønd sexual víolence constítute genocíde The Tribunal found that sexual violence was an integral part of the genocide in Rwanda. In doing so, the ICTR became the first international war crimes tribunal to recognise that rape and sexual violence could, constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specifi.c intent to destroy, in the whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. [RJape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims [and isJ one of the worst [toJ tnfltct harrn on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm."

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The Tribunal found that: the acts of rape and sexual violence ...were committed solely agaínst Tutsí women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliqtion, mutilated and raped by more than one assailant. These rapes resulted in physícal and psychological destruction of the Tutsi women, theirfamilies and their communitíes. sexual violence was an integral part of the process of the destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destructíon of the Tutsi group as a whole."So

The acts of rape satisfied the systematic requirement which is the foundation of the crime of genocide. Rape was perpetrated against all Tutsi women and solely against them.sl Tutsi women were presented as sexual objects and Akayesu was a participant in this. The sexual violence committed against the Tutsi woman was a step in the destruction of the Tutsi group. It was a "destruction of the spirit, of the will to live and of life itself'.52

Challenging Akayesu

2.5

The definítíon of rape The concepn¡al definition of rape pronounced inAkayesu was first challenged in Kunarac".In Kunarac the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") Trial Chamber II referred to the Akayesu definition of.rape and tacitly accepted it, but then went on to articulate the elements of rape as follows:54 The actus reus of the crime of rape in international løw is constituted by the sexual penetration, however slight :

(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by object used by the perpetrator; or

the

penis of the perpetrator or any other

(b) of the mouth of the víctim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim, Consentþr this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim'sfree will, assessed ín the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, ønd the btowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.

The ICTY Appeals Chamber later affirmed this'odefinition".55 Although not binding on the ICTR trial or appeals chambers, this narrower Kunarac definition held persuasive authority with regards to the definition of rape and was adopted in subsequent jurisprudence of the ICTR Trial Chambers. In Semanzas6, Kajetíjelió7 and Kamuhandass 50

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Prosecutor v Dragoliub Kunarac et al CaseNo IT-96-23-T and96-23/1, Judgment (TC),22February 2001

('Kunarac")

54Id

¡4601, [437], approvedin Prosecutorv Dragoljub Kunarac et al, CaseNo IT-96-23-T and96-23/1, Judgement (AC), 12 June2002 at [l28] ("Kunarac Appeal") " Kunarac appeal at[127 -128] 'o The Prosecutor v Laurent semanza case No., IcrR-1997-20-T, Judgment (TC), 15 May 2003 s7 The Prosecutor v Juvenal Kajelijeti, Case Nó. ICTR-1998-444-T, JudgmeÀt un¿ S.nt"nce (TC), I December

2003

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the ICTR Trial Chamber described only the physical elements of rape and shifted jurisprudential analyses away from the conceptual definition of rape an enunciated in Akaeysu.se

However, in the recent judgment, Muhimana60, Trial Chamber III re-expanded the definition of rape under international criminal law. The Chamber considered that Kunarac was "ãctually substantially aligned"6l to the Akayseu definition and stated that: the Akayseu definition and the Kunarac elements are not incompatible or substantially dffirent in application.llhereas Aknyesu reþted broadly to a "physical invasion of a sexual nature", Kunarac went on to articulate the parameters of what would constitute a physical invasion of a sexual nature amounting to rapeo"

The Trial Chamber found the accused guilty of rape as both an act of genocide and a crime against humanity. The relationship between consent and coercion

In Kunarac the Appeals Chamber recognised, as articulated,in Akayesu, that coercion provides clear evidence of non-consent. The Appeals Chamber explained that whilst the Trial Chamber focused on the absence of consent as the essential element of rape, it did not "disavow the Tribunal's earlier jurisprudence , but instead sought to explain the evidence between force and consent"63. The Appeals Chamber opined that whilst force or the threat of force provides clear evidence of rape, it is not a constituent element. There are other factors which would render the act of sexual penetration non-consensual.

ln Muhimanø the Trial Chamber reinforced Aknyesu by stating that'ocoercion is an element that may obviate the relevance of consent as an evidentiary factor in the crime of rape".64 It further articulated that "most cases charged under international criminal law...will be almost universally coercive, thus vitiating true consent."65 Conclusion Muhimana is cunently on appeal in the ICTR. Whilst the Trial chamber has realigned jurisprudential analyses with the groundbreaking conceptual definition as articulated in Akayesu, it remains to be seen whether subsequent Chambers in both the ICTY and the ICTR adopt the reasoning of the Trial Chamber in Muhímana.

s8

The Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-1999-544-T, Judgment and Sentence (TC),22

January2004 See Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalíc et al, Case No IT-96-21-A', Judgement (TC), 16 November 1998 at Í478 - 4791 60 The Prosecutorv Mikaeli Muhimana, Case No ICTR-95-lB-T, 28 April2005 ("Muhimana") se

6trd ó2 63

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ra ¡sso1 Kunarac appeal, supra [129

e Muhimana, supra [546] ó5

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