Ruud Busker, februari CBRNe internationaal perspectief

Ruud Busker, februari 2012 CBRNe internationaal perspectief 1 CBRN has impact on Defense and Societal Security Defense: Considering the changing C...
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Ruud Busker, februari 2012

CBRNe internationaal perspectief

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CBRN has impact on Defense and Societal Security Defense: Considering the changing CBRN threat and the transforming operational tasks, Armed Forces need to be able to: operate if not maintain if not survive They currently lack a number of capabilities

Innovation remains necessary to achieve effective, affordable and proportional protection

Security: The threat of terrorism is significant; innovative prevention, response and

recovery from CBRN incidents are needed to ensure the protection of people and infrastructure

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‘Buiten’: Who is responsible (national, EU)… DG Enterprise DG Home DG Sanco DG JRC & RTD DG MOVE Industry

EDA NATO Industry

Intelligence

Dept(s) V&J; BZK; ELI; VWS; R&I BuZa

Civil

…TNO ambition…....

Dept(s) Defense

Military

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4 10 januari 2011

Trends in CBRN dreiging Voortgaande ontwapening dankzij uitvoering wapenverdrag; maar: ook landen die zich hieraan onttrekken Toegenomen instabiliteit in Midden Oosten en Noord Afrika Afname CBRN opzettelijke incidenten; maar dit geldt niet voor CBR ongelukken…(TIMs)

Jihad: Minder terreur trainingskampen maar meer Jihadistische oproepen tot geweld Toename Huis-Tuin-Keuken ‘do it yourself’ technologie Verkrijgbaarheid is lastig te beheersen

Snelle ontwikkelingen in wetenschap en technologie CBRN (bio, nano) Informatie en kennis is toegankelijker en voorziening ervan is sneller Zorg om ‘hogere orde’ effecten van CBRN

Security Research Conference Warsaw 2011

8 20 februari 2012

CBRNE Action Plan

LOTUS

SPIRIT

Threat Analysis

BIOPROTECT

SPIRIT BOOSTER

Medical Intervention

Situational Awareness

TWOBIAS

System

OPTIX SLAM IMPACT PRACTICE ASSRBCVUL FACT or EDEN

Hazard mgmt

Secur Eau

Physical Protection

AIRSECURE

FRESP

IF REACT

Example of EU vision on CBRNe: a complex Security problem

Preparedness

Prevention

Response

System of systems

Threat assessment

Recovery

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CBRN System-of-Systems

EU C4ISR First responders

Design and simulation operational laboratory

Secured communications

Mobile CBRNE protection

Experts / Forensics CBRNE protection of critical infrastructure

Funding FP 7 Security: 4 calls gesloten; 5e in selectie; 6e medio 2012 Totaal budget FP7 Security 750 MEURO > 20 CBRN projecten > 100 MEURO Horizon 2020 (FP 8) totaal alle thema’s:

87,7 miljard EUR 2014 – 2020 Societal challenges: inclusive innovative and secure societies

1,4 miljard voor Security

European Defence Agency Mission

EDA was established "to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future”.

Functions • developing Defence capabilities; • promoting Defence Research and Technology (R&T); • promoting armaments co-operation; • creating a competitive European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base.

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Funding concepts:

Projects

Programs

Cat A:

IBDSA

JIP CBRN >12 M €

EDA distributes funding delivered by MS

C-IDD containment

JIP Force Protection

EDA database

Bio EDEP

examples

ITT or CfP Cat B: Each participant brings own funding

Bio DIM T&E

EDA CBRN JIP: Systems approach

European Framework Collaboration

Considerations Dual use: potential benefits / cost savings but also risks to control Dual use: technology that both has military and commercial applications: SPIN-OFF and

SPIN-ON Dual use: refers to misuse by terrorists OR military use of technology developed in the civil world

Technology itself is not military or civil: application makes the differences JIP CBRN first pilot programme coordinated with EC and ESA within EFC Avoiding duplication implies spin-off and spin-on via “contractors” working for MIL and CIV

EFC CBRN targets Shortening time to response (after an event occurs) Improving mass gathering/events security Enhancing the protection of sensitive or critical infrastructures Achieving a European lead in CBRNE sampling, detection, proficiency

testing and forensics Boosting the EU civilian CBRNE market Reinforcing technological, societal and psychological resilience of the EU society

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Challenges on improvement of CBRN countermeasures Not popular on political agendas Many governmental stakeholders having only partial responsibility Low-incidence yet high-impact type of threat: little hands-on experience Industrial market is scattered

Find benefits from mutual concepts (Security vs Defence) Technology must be Generic, Modular and Multi-purpose Look for integration with/into adjacent domains

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As generic, modular, affordable and efficient as possible Dedicated, narrow-band and expensive solutions are not acceptable Hard technology and soft science need to go hand-in-hand The real innovation is at edges of domains and in multi-use and modularity

CBRN Defence

CBRN Security

Environment: Chemical emissions Generic monitoring of toxic compounds

Justice: Forensics Chemical profiling of suspected samples

Public health: Infectious diseases Targetless identification of micro-organisms

NATO NATO: Comprehensive approach: verschuiving naar de ‘voorkant’ = ‘voor de klap’:

Prevention (Preparedness) naast Protection and Recovery Meer aandacht voor voorkómen van verkrijgen van CBRN middelen

CIVILMILITARY COOPERATION

RECOVERING (CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT)

INTERNAL COOPERATION

PROTECTION

FIGHT AGAINST TERORISM

PROLIFERATION PREVENTION

RESPONSE TO THE CBRN THREATS

EDUCATION TRAINING EXERCISING

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION SHARING AND CBRN REACHBACK INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND PARTNER ACTIVITIES PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

months

Motivation

days

Intent

Development

hours

Capability

seconds hours

Deployment

Delivery

months

Immediate effects

Consequential effects

RED capabilities INCIDENT

Diplomacy Global trend analysis

Actor trend analysis

BLUE capabilities

Threat assessment

Counterproliferation

Interception of goods

Attack Counterforce

Response

Recovery

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