Russia and the Western Balkans. R. Meidani

Introduction Russian Foreign Policy in the Balkans: a) is founded on “soft power” components such as: Pan-Slavism (a doctrine of common identity and integrity of different Slavic peoples), language, education, religion; a) is using the economic difficulties in fields such as: energy, infrastructure and tourism to increase its domination; b) is considering the ideological affiliation and political interaction in regional or international level; c) is empowering its influence by exploiting the corruption, bribes and embezzlement.

European countries where a Slavic language is the official one on the entire territory

-2► Russia’s interests in the Balkans date back from the 19-th century.

● Serbia and Bulgaria, because of their geographic position, portrayed by same cultural ties and orthodox orientation, have been in the focus of Russia’s policy. ♦ During the post-communist transition, this policy has had its evolution. ▼During Yeltsin’s presidency, Russia was maintaining a delicate balance between domestic pressure of intervening in the Yugoslav crisis waving the flag of Orthodoxy, Slavic traditions and historical ties and keeping good relations with the West. Publication “The Warp of the Serbian Identity” (2016) is focused on Serbian- Russian relations. There, after the defeat of the panSerbian project at the end of the 20-th century, Serbia is seeking its identity by invoking its “authentic political identity”- the legacy of the Middle Ages, Eastern Orthodoxy, Byzantine heritage, the folklore of its culture and anti- Westernization. ▼ During Putin’s regime, the Balkans became again a benchmark of Russian foreign policy; using loans, energy projects, trade and other investments, interfering on the EU issues or trying to delay the European integration of the Western Balkans.

Economic Aspects The Russian presence in Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Republika Srpska and Macedonia is nowadays greater than it was at the beginning of their transition. Countries 2013 Albania B&H Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Romania Serbia Greece

Trade with Russia (% GDP) 2.0 6.3 11.2 5.7 0.9 0.4 3.6 8.5 9.4

Trade with EU (%GDP) 60.4 84.1 60.6 63.3 71.8 55.3 73.3 62.4 46.9

Exports to Russia (%GDP) 0.4 0.3 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.1 1.0 2.5 0.2

Exports to EU (%GDP) 8.0 21.7 33.4 12.2 27.4 3.8 24.3 21.9 6.7

-For example, in the energy sector, Russia is very dominant in Bulgaria. -Serbia, since 2000, has received billions of dollars in investment from the Russian oil - companies. - A similar situation is in Bosnia.

The economic situation in Russia has today inhibited its ability to compete with the EU influence. This crisis and the falling ruble has also limited exports from the Balkans and dampened the inflow of Russian investments.

-2►The EU is the main trade partner in the Balkans (first table). ● New players such as China (with its initiative 16 + 1) or Turkey are trying to strengthen their presence. ► The gas imports from Russia to the Balkan countries are not as significant in their overall energy consumption; different from Turkey - a huge user of Russian gas. ♣ Many Russian projects in the region have collapsed even though the Russian state is nowadays interfering more in decision-making of its companies. ♣The Russian energy firms enjoy a quasi-monopoly in Serbia, Bulgaria and Republika Srpska. Remarks: In terms of foreign policy, actually no country in the Western Balkans has abandoned its goal of joining the EU. ▼The case of Montenegro’s support for the Western sanctions to Russia clearly illustrates the point.

-3Albanian Case Albania-Exports Russia

2010 0,0

2011 0,0

2012 0,0

2013 2014 0,1 0,2

EU countries

70,2

73,0

75,6

76,7

77,4

WB countries

10,0

12,3

11,8

10,7

11,6

Rest of the world

19,7

14,7

12,5

12,6

11,0

The main trade partner remains Italy with around 40% of the total trade exchanges.

In the case of Albania, the trade exchanges with the EU (Member States countries) for 2014 are estimated to be about 65% of the total.

Albania-Imports

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Russia

2,2

1,9

2,5

2,0

2,1

EU countries

66,5

65,3

63,2

64,3

61,1

WB countries

7,1

7,3

7,9

6,8

7,9

Rest of the world

26,5

27,4

28,9

28,9

31,0

Russia and the EU, competing for political influence ► Last decade, Russia has staged a comeback to the Balkans. ● In the status process for Kosovo, Russia put its weight behind Serbia. ♦ In 2011, Russia suffered a serious setback after Belgrade and Pristine embarked on negotiations under the EU mediation. ● Russia used Kosovo as a precedent in the case of recognizing the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent status (in 2008) and, later on, for the annexation of Crimea. ►The “putinist” regime or Orban “illiberal democracy” became typical models for some countries in the Balkans. ♣ A typical illustration is the Macedonian case. ♦ Protestors in Skopje (April 2015) called for the resignation of Gruevski. ♦ Russian media accused the West for a new color revolution. ♦ Likewise, after the clashes in the city of Kumanovo (May 2015) the Russian Foreign Minister pointed the finger at two NATO members: Albania and Bulgaria. ● The Russia’s annexation of Crimea (March 2014), has inspired the Serbs in the Republika Srpska for a possible secession from Bosnia.

-2▼In Montenegro, Russia has sought to maintain its influence through investments; however, this country in the process of NATO and EU accession has openly supported the sanctions against Russia. ●The delays in the EU enlargement has created new opportunities for Russia to build better advantages across the Balkans. ● However, last years, low oil prices and Western sanctions have restricted Russia’s economy, contributing to the fall of its currency and hurting Russian investments in Serbia and Bulgaria and lowering the demand for their goods. In 2013: ♦ About 2.6% of Bulgarian exports went to Russia and more than 18% of Bulgaria's imports came from Russia that year. ♦ Serbia has a free trade agreement with Russia, with about 7% of its exports going to Russia and 9% of its imports came from Russia. In these conditions, it is difficult for Russia to compete with European investments in the Balkans.

The EU - Russia relationship and the crises in Ukraine ►The EU needs to reassess the relationship with Russia, particularly its role and behavior in the Western Balkans. ●This new geopolitical landscape is generating a new kind of Cold War. ► Russia with its internal political changes over the last decade was turning away from democratic Europe and the EU has been slow to reappraise its policies in response to the changes in Russia. ●The EU has also failed to build a framework that could have underpinned a more robust relationship with Russia. ♦Disagreements over the “shared neighborhood”, are nourishing tension, in some cases even confrontation, for political control. The creation of the Eurasian Union, (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and (ascending during 2015), Kyrgyzstan) as a new political and economic entity, could have significant consequences.

-2► The EU engagement with Russia should be united around a package of sanctions, including the financial sector. ♣A strong sanctions policy requires also a well-defined exit strategy. ●Whatever the Russian real intentions may be, abuses in the internal governance and its threat create geopolitical competition in the neighborhood. Moreover, the EU’s capacity to influence the internal politics of Russia is limited; however it must apply a proactive policy to manage competition with Russia in the shared neighborhood. In this regard, the accession of the Western Balkans into the EU is very important! ►The EU and Russia must learn to live with each other as neighbors and international powers. ●Dialogue between the EU and Russia has to be maintained, particularly on the issues of shared strategic interest, such as security. ●The EU should also apply a coherent policy approach towards the Eurasian Union in order to exploit it. ● Even while political relations Russia-EU are strained, links with the Russian people should be maintained through continuing cooperation in the fields of culture, education and science. (See the maps below)

The US in the Balkans ►Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was followed by severe diplomatic and political measures from the US and the EU. ●The US, which has reduced its role in the Balkans over the last years, must be back supporting the new efforts by Germany. ●Therefore, the EU will continue to take the lead in the Balkans, but the US (supported by the military base in Camp Bond-steel in Kosovo) could use military cooperation as leverage to ensure that various leaders remain committed to liberal democracy. It remains to be seen whether the Washington’s increased attention to Europe will reconsider this. A new strong US focus on the Western Balkans is welcome.

NATO vs Russia in the Balkans ►The Russian foreign policy in the Balkans was shifted from Yeltsin’s “liberal-internationalism” to a policy representing the autocratic and nationalist interest of the Putin’s time. ●In the last years, the antagonism and tension between NATO and Russia became more critical. ●NATO’s “victory” of the Soviet Union disintegration was followed by an enlargement in the countries – former members of Warsaw Pact. ♦NATO’s operations within the former Yugoslavia were joined by military intervention and troop deployments (in Bosnia and Kosovo). ►NATO has proceeded to “facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans.” Thus: ●Montenegro has received a formal invitation to join NATO (December 2015). ♦NATO enlargement in the region is therefore nearing completion (leaving Serbia still outside).

Montenegro’s accession and other neighbors ►Albania and Croatia joined NATO in 2009. A new member will be Montenegro, a country that was counted before as a Russian ally. ●The accession of Montenegro will fill a security vacuum, and reduce the Russia’s penetration in the region’s politics. ♦ Unlike Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia, Montenegro did join the EU sanctions regime against Russia and voted the UN General Assembly resolution on Crimea. ♦ Being under direct or indirect Russian pressure, Montenegro’s accession to NATO must be accelerated, to avoid any further risk to this small country. ► Macedonia’s accession to NATO, delayed by its dispute with Greece over the name, is another concern. ►Bosnia is still impaired by its internal divisions. ►The Kosovo’s security, since 1999, has been guaranteed by NATO troops. ●The new Kosovo army ► A new step for Serbia is its co-operation agreement with NATO.

Map of NATO countries chronological membership

Serbia - Kosovo negotiations are “melting” their frozen relations Some frozen conflicts unresolved yet: ♦India- Pakistan relations over Kashmir, ♦ Division of Korea ♦Palestinian-Israeli conflict, ♦ Western Sahara conflict, ♦ Cyprus dispute, In all these ●Transnistria “fracture” in Moldova, cases the ●Nagorno-Karabakh war, Moscow’s ●Abkhaz –Georgia and Ossetia-Georgia splits. negative influence is still ►After the Crimea annexation, the Ukraine very evident. Russia relation could be treated as frozen one. Resolved (entirely or partially): ♦Division of Germany a frozen conflict resolved successfully 25 years ago. ♦Peace agreement between Protestants and Catholics guarantying the peace in Northern Ireland. ♦ Belgrade–Pristine negotiations - significant for the stabilization of the Western Balkans and its integration to the EU.

-2►Kremlin is using its permanent membership in the UN Security Council, benefiting from multilateral initiatives and its role at the diplomatic decisions. ► Unlike the EU and the US, Moscow has, however, not been present during the reconstruction stages, failing to offer any assistance and having access to political solutions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. ●Russia has used Kosovo’s precedent (the declaration of independence, 17 February 2008) in justifying its intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (August 2008) or annexation of Crimea. ♦Quite strange is the behavior of the Russian government, which, on one side, opposed strongly Kosovo’s secession, as an illegal and unjust action, and on the other side Putin is using it to justify its “hard power “operations. The Russia’s involvement in the Balkans reflects its preferences found in the soft power approach, differently from the appeal to hard power as in the near neighborhood (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, etc.).

Russia’s Soft Power ►Russia is trying to apply a “soft power” scheme, founded on historical, cultural, political ties, in the Balkans. It is also stepping up its influence in Serbia, Bulgaria, North Kosovo, Republika Srpska, etc., through channels such as media, educational institutions, Orthodox Church, etc. ♦♦ In the case of Bulgaria, the theme of brotherhood has coexisted in Russia’s discourse on political relations with Bulgaria. A symbolic reference is the 1877 - War of Liberation, which is commemorated as a national holiday along with countless monuments, street names, etc. ♦Also, in its history, Russia borrowed the Cyrillic alphabet and Old Slavonic literature from medieval Bulgaria. ♣ The two countries (Bulgaria and Russia) have been both allies and enemies (their armies fought in the First World War, for instance) as well as very closely integrated during the communist period.

-2► Relations Serbia-Russia went through multiple changes in the 19th and 20th century. ♦ ♦ There were no diplomatic relations in 1917- 40 between Royal Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. ♦♦ Another split took place in 1948. ♣The Serbs high expectations in 1990s were discouraged by Russia in the UN. ►After 2001, Belgrade turned to the West and even joined Partnership for Peace, sending troops to Afghanistan. However, Serbia, with the Russian support, continues to “be obsessed” with Kosovo. ● Also, Russia, through political and economic links, is trying to slow down EU - reforms in Serbia (or the region), especially in the security sector or business regulations. ● The Russian soft power is not a threat while Belgrade sees ties with Moscow as a supplement to the strategic orientation to the West. ►Another “specimen” of Russian soft power is Gruevski’s government. ● Moscow, officially, has considered protests against the Macedonian government as a part of a Western plot.

Are Balkan countries “in the line of fire”? ► 12 -13 years ago Russian troops ceased serving in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. ♦ The withdrawal was taken as a sign that Kremlin had consigned the area to the Western sphere of influence. ♦ In the last decade, Moscow came back to the Balkans. ► Nobody knows today if President Putin would stop at Ukraine. In similar potential dangers are Moldova and Georgia. ●Merkel said: “if the situation continues, we’d have to ask about Serbia; we’d have to ask about the Western Balkan countries.” ● Also, for the State Secretary Kerry, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro are “in the line of fire” – much like Georgia or Moldova. ▼Last EU-Western Balkan summits (Brussels, Berlin, Vienna), on important issues (economic growth, infrastructure development, influx of refugees, etc.) are reinforcing further the region’s interest to the EU. ♦ Gruevski’s government steered away from Moscow, opting for the EU as an interlocutor and accepting early elections. ♦ Bulgaria has lately denied Russian jets access to its airspace. ♦ Deadlock over Turkish Stream diminishes Greece's incentives to work with Russia. Kremlin has shifted its attention to the Middle East.

-2► Corrupted politicians and oligarchs in the Balkans are playing in the “free space” between the EU and Russia. ●They continue to look to Kremlin for money and political benefits, but, the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in Eastern Ukraine have increased their worries. ► Russia is not only profiting from them, but also from the EU’s weakness and delayed (bureaucratic) decisions. ●The EU’s policy toward the Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) is toughening the accession conditions, which are delaying their integration. A clear commitment from the EU is, therefore, essential in keeping the region on track. (Not to have limited result similar to the Stability Pact ) Finally, the refugee crisis has already demonstrated that an accelerated accession process is very important for the European security.

Conclusions ►At beginning of transition, Russia had no interest in the Balkans and pulled out Russian troops; but later Putin used the Kosovo precedent in asserting power in the ex-Soviet space. The year 2008, when Kosovo people declared independence, marked a turning point. ● The next move was the invasion of Georgia by Russia. ► Years ago, the global financial crisis and rise of oil-prices provided opportunities for Russia to rebuild up influence across the Balkans. ● Conversely, the present circle of the politicians and specialists educated in the Soviet Union or in Russia recently is not as important as it used to be. ♦ In the case of Albania, they are today out of the political and economic game. ●Moscow has also exploited the economic difficulties in Greece and Cyprus. ► Lacking a grand strategic plan, Russia is, however, acting as a random player. ● Probably, Russia’s veto over Kosovo at the Security Council reflects its interests to be actor in the decision-making table, rather than to uphold Serbian priorities.

See Francisco de Borja Lasheras , etc.

-2For the Russian Foreign Policy in the Balkans, one can further add: - Kremlin is back to the Balkans to rebuild its influence, even during the last years, Putin has turned Kosovo into a key part of the narrative concerning the West’s humiliation of Russia. - With its soft power policy in the Balkans, Russia has not created a real trust, despite the rhetoric of brotherhood ties. ♦ With an exception of Bulgaria, the Russian language is not widely read or spoken in the region. - One of the weapons being exploited by Russian Policy in the Balkan region is the clientelism and state – capture; oligarchs and corrupted politicians are mainly supported by Russia. - Through the energy firms, Russia has made inroads into Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, increasing its economic interference. ● The gas in the energy consumption plays a minor role in the region, so energy dependence on Russia should not be over – estimated. (Particularly, with Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) which will transport Caspian gas through the Balkans to some of Europe’s largest markets). Russia is lacking a long - term vision, unlike its competitors- the EU and the US.