Project CLAIRE Overview ATM safety assurance of exercises: ATC Procedures
Simulation exercises Live flights planning Challenge of un-segregated integration Temporary Danger Areas Air Navigation Order Exemption Findings: ATM Safety Impact Findings: ATM Capacity Impact Recommendations Conclusions
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Project Overview CLAIRE: Civil Airspace Integration of RPAS in Europe Objective: fly RPAS in controlled and non-segregated airspace. Comparable treatment with manned aviation Vehicle: Watchkeeper WK450
› Mass: 450 Kg › Wingspan: 10 m › Endurance: 20 hours Incremental demonstrations:
ATM safety assurance of exercises: ATC Procedures Standard ATC procedures supplemented with Temporary Operating Instructions Developed during workshops Information provided: › Air vehicle performance › Not compliance with rules of the air › Contingency behaviour › Comms back-up by telephone › Air vehicle contingency behaviour › Lost Link Routes & Emergency Recovery Locations update as flight progresses
› Requirement to remain in controlled or segregated airspace
Tested in simulators Approved after ATC Procedures Safety Analysis 01.00.00
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Simulation exercises › Airport & TMA – NLR › En-route – NATS Inform ATC Procedures Normal operations Emergency and contingency
› Loss of link with RPAS › RPAS Comms failure › RPAS SSR transponder failure
› RPAS engine problems › RPAS control problems › Weather/Traffic related issues
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Live flights planning Test facility in West Wales run by NATS
› Military Test Area › Routine integration of RPAS and manned aircraft
Small incremental steps to safely push the boundary of RPAS operations
› Access into non-segregated airspace › Impact of workload on ATC › Assess the procedures and processes 3 flight scenarios: 1. En-route: Range Control to London ATC 2. Approach: As above plus Cardiff Approach 3. Aerodrome: As above plus Cardiff Tower
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Challenge of un-segregated airspace integration
To provide safety assurance To bridge lack of equivalency between RPAS and manned aviation
› Temporary Danger Areas to mitigate lack of Detect and Avoid function
› Exemption to Air Navigation Order due to navigation equipage
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Temporary Danger Areas CAA requirement due to no Detect & Avoid capability
Provision of deconfliction service in uncontrolled airspace
Link between bottom of the airway and existing Danger Areas
Allows flight trials in non-sterilised environment
Engine failure resulting in the platform descent into uncontrolled airspace
Published in AIC (Y011/2015)
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Air Navigation Order Exemption Exemption to Air Navigation Order, Schedule 5 “Radio Communication and Radio Navigation Equipment to be carried in Aircraft” Air Traffic Service Units in NATS assessed the vertical and horizontal navigation capability The air vehicle’s performance is acceptable for the intended flights
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Findings: ATM Safety Impact
Premise: safety shall not be compromised nor impacted in any way Temporary Danger Areas Slow speeds description in the Temporary Operating Instructions › Misjudgement of RPAS performance – Mitigated by ATC briefing
› More time to react › Increased workload › Vehicle spends more time in sectors
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Findings: ATM Capacity Impact
Additional traffic movements Increase in complexity and controller workload
› Differential performance characteristics and mission types
RPAS pilots entering CAS should be familiar with R/T phraseology › Avoid R/T channel overload › European-wide license Unusual Climb and Descent performance › Stepped climbs recommended › Clearance to level above current airspace base GCS-GCS transfers: › Transparent to ATC › Away from ATC sector boundaries 20 minutes comms check Check filtering rules of radar speed gates Additional safety layer in comms loss › Ground lines › Increased complexity for ATC
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Conclusions
› Temporary Danger Areas and exemptions to Air Navigation Order are not acceptable for routine operations
› No issues identified indicating an impact on safety
› Capacity issues should be further assessed
› Standard process to validate lost link routes
› Further work required to assess
Emergency Recovery Locations and Lost Link Routes sharing with ATC and commonality amongst them
