Philosophie und Transkulturalität / Philosophie et transculturalité 6

Rorty’s Deconstruction of Philosophy and the Challenge of African Philosophy

Bearbeitet von Anthony Agwuele

1. Auflage 2009. Buch. 208 S. Hardcover ISBN 978 3 631 59492 6 Format (B x L): 14,8 x 21 cm Gewicht: 440 g

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Chapter 1. Introduction Philosophy is the quest for reality. This includes issues pertaining to human nature. As such philosophy is a comprehensive system of ideas. It reflects wonder and perplexity. And it is critical and skeptical in its pursuits. Because of these rational features and the process of inquiry, philosophy is available for use by all disciplines, religions and cultures. As a discipline, it has devolved into a number of branches such as: logic (study of rules of reasoning), metaphysics (study of reality), ethics (study of moral values), epistemology (study of knowledge), aesthetics (study of the nature of art and beauty), social and political philosophy (study governance) etc. In the course of history, philosophy not only became widespread but aporetic in nature. This circumstance led to the need for it to be properly defined. This is especially necessary so that it can be distinguished as a discipline from its deployment to articulate or express religious convictions. It is against this background, that the question “what is philosophy?” emerged. Since the emergence of this question, there have been all kinds of responses, particularly among the philosophers. Their responses have been as diverse and variant as there are philosophers. Each tries to offer a definition of philosophy from the perspective of a branch of philosophy he or she is a specialist in. But even so, philosophy is still far from having one meaning or definition. The efforts to streamline philosophy peaked with the Enlightenment project and the enterprise of modern philosophers. The preoccupation of the seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalist philosophers was to engender for the diverse peoples and cultures of the world, one rational way of seeing things. In other words, they wanted to uncover an axiomatic inquiry that is rationally controlled, and, at the same time, is universal. Thus, to create such a single but correct mode of representation that is valid for all, mathematics and science are patronized. This gave birth to scientific rationalism. Lyotard 1 calls this “metanarrative” or “grand discourse.” However, the failure of this “grand discourse” to show that everybody sees the same way, has raised questions about the notion of universality of philosophy. There are different worldviews and diverse cultures. We are now in a new age, the age that questions universality, the age that is willing to give every worldview a chance – the age that is willing to cope with multiple worldviews. This age is called postmodern. What a world, “a world that does not know how to de1

Jean-François Lyotard used the terms “metanarrative” and “grand discourse” to describe modern systems of knowledge. This is in the book 3RVWPRGHUQ&RQGLWLRQ (1979) which is essentially a report of his commission by the Quebec Council of Universities in the late 70s to investigate the state of knowledge in the Western world.

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fine itself by what it is, but only by what it has just – ceased to be.” 2 This world or age is that of deconstruction. 3 In this postmodern age, Richard Rorty is important. He has gained fame as a philosopher because of his iconoclastic philosophical strategy that has come to be associated to deconstructive orientations. Through his deconstruction of the notion of universal philosophy, the scope of philosophy has expanded beyond the limits of Western philosophy and has opened up a new possibility to link philosophy to cultural practices. It is now possible to talk about diverse philosophies rather than Philosophy. Among the possible diverse philosophies is African philosophy. The aim of this VWXG\ is to show the challenge that African philosophy poses for Western philosophy, that is traditionally honored as universal. It relies on the insights of Rorty’s deconstructive argument to undermine the position of some African philosophers who want African philosophy to be compliant to the standards of Western philosophy. The initial debate in African philosophy was about its existence. But after spending a lot of time debating about the existence and possibility of African philosophy, African philosophers became challenged to do African philosophy rather than continue to debate its existence. Consequently, they began to do African philosophy based on African cultural materials. This prompted the philosopher Oladipo, to appropriately observe that the problem of African philosophy is not the problem of its existence but how it ought to be pursued. What should be its methodology? What constitutes its problems? What should be the philosopher’s “tasks within the context of the African situation today?” 4 These questions, which are also in a certain sense, connected to the question of the definition of African philosophy have been discussed from two theoretical perspec-

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Walter Truett Anderson (ed.), 7KH)RQ WDQD3RVWPRGHUQLV P5HDGHU (London: Fontana Press, 1996) p. 6 The word deconstruction can be derived from Martin Heidegger who in his 1927 lecture on “Problems of Phenomenology” argues that for philosophy to be constructed, it necessarily has to be destroyed. He used the word destruction as a synonym of deconstruction, and he meant with it to “unbuild.” This usage signifies a method. However, Derrida on taking this word from Heidegger popularized it as an attitude, a critical attitude. He used deconstruction against Heidegger’s %HLQJDQG7LPH to show that it is inadequate and self-subverting. Subsequently, this word or term has acquired a wide range of negative uses that are unintended even by both Heidegger and Derrida. It now has uses such as “tear down”, “demolish”, “tear apart”, “do away with”, “defeat” etc. Thus, to deconstruct now can mean much more than to criticize a text and show that it is totally inadequate in terms of failing to achieve its objective. It can sometimes indeed mean the destruction of a text. Olusegun Oladipo, 3KLORVRSK\ DQGWKH$IULFDQ ([SHUL HQFH±7KH&RQWULEXWLRQ VRI .ZDVL:LGHGX (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 1996) p. 10

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tives: the universalist and the traditionalist. In each of these professional “African” philosophers are engaged. To the universalist (African) philosophers, philosophy is a theoretical discipline with a universal character like Physics, Algebra, Linguistics etc., having special criteria of investigation such as clarity in stating problems, rigorous inquiry, logical reasoning, and appraisal of arguments. Anything short of this form or structure is no “strict philosophy.” 5 From this perspective, African traditional systems of thought cannot be accorded the status of philosophy because they are marked by assertions that are un-argued for. In view of the quest for a general notion of philosophy, the major problem really with the universalists is how to come to terms with the specific roots of philosophy in cultures. In addition, the definition of the concept of universality seems to take for granted what is universal in terms of experiences. The traditionalists on the other hand find African philosophy in the peoples’ morality, oral tradition, ethics, religion and proverbs. Oladipo quoting Wiredu says: “The philosophy of a people is always a tradition and a tradition presupposes a certain minimum of organic relationship among (at least some of) its elements” 6 This sounds rather simplistic. It means that all the philosopher has to do to qualify as an African philosopher, is to probe into the cultural account of the African. The traditionalists describe African philosophy in terms of cultural history, because “philosophy is a cultural phenomenon” 7 and “does not take place or grow in a vacuum” 8 , as such “All philosophies are cultural philosophies” 9 , and no “philosophy is applicable to all cultures” 10 Seen from this perspective philosophy becomes a “reflective activity” 11 of a people over their experiences in their situation and environment. There is a history behind the traditionalists points of view which has to do with European anthropologists and their descriptions of the African mind. To 5

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P. O. Bodunrin, “The Question of African Philosophy” 3KLORVRSK\, vol. 56, 1981, p. 169 Olusegun Oladipo, op. cit., p. 12 Kwame Gyekye, $Q(VVD\RQ $IULFDQ3KLORVRSKLFDO7KRXJKW7K H$NDQ&RQFHSWXDO 6FKHPH (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) p. x Olusegun Oladipo, 7KH,GHDR I$IULFDQ 3KLORVRSK\ $&ULWLFDO6WXG\RI WKH0 DMRU 2ULHQWDWLRQVLQ&RQWHPSRUDU\$IULFDQ3K LORVRSK\ (Ibadan: Molecular Publishers, 1992) pp. 9-10 K. C. Anyanwu, 7KH$IULFDQ([SHULHQFHLQWKH$PHULFDQ0DUNHW3ODFH (New York: Exposition Press, 1983) p. 35 Olusegun Oladipo, op. cit., p. 4 J. I. Omoregbe, “African Philosophy: Yesterday and Today” in P. O. Bodunrin (ed.) 3KLORVRSK\LQ $IULFD7UHQGVDQG3HUVSHFWLYHV (Ife: University of Ife Press, 1985) p. 1

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categorize it as a “pre-logical mentality” 12 , like Levy-Bruhl 13 did, for example, was highly influential until late into the twentieth century. The anthropological comparative understanding became a widely circulated belief in Europe, but since has been shown to be a misconception by Evans-Pritchard. Also the positivist and empiricist views championed by Boas and Malinowski argued that each culture must be understood within its own history and culture. In addition, studies of some African thought systems have been able to show that there is no inner contradiction in the African world-view except when taken out of African cultural context. In a much too simple reversion of the older anthropological prejudices some traditionalists glorify the African past beyond the scope of historical exactitude. The history of African societies shows to a unprejudiced mind that “not everything about African past was glorious.” 14 On any intellectual level it is highly problematic to accept this romantic glorification, because it amounts to finding “non-historical conditions of […] historical development.” 15 Furthermore the traditionalist picture of African culture is mostly static, since no culture is devoid of dynamism. What is more, it stultifies dialogue between cultures. The main traditionalist argument difficult to disagree with is the suggestion that it is worthwhile for African philosophers to investigate African belief systems. Why should African culture not be part of the content of African Philosophy? Both the universalists and the traditionalists fail to answer this question satisfactorily. The failure of the universalists lie in their universal orientation which they could not even back up with undisputed universal criteria. Their effort to define philosophy and distinguish “strict” or “unique” philosophy from “loose” or “debased” philosophy turned out an endless enterprise. On the other hand, the traditionalists display of a strong sense of cultural nationalism which seem antithetical to the notion of philosophy is their great weakness. They see every tradi12

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E. Evans-Pritchard, the well known French sociologist in his book 1XHU5HOLJLRQ (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) p. 131 credited Levy-Bruhl with the term “pre-logical mentality.” He said Levy-Bruhl used it to refer to the mentality of the traditional man and it denotes an inferior mentality that is not at all in the precincts of canons of logical reasoning. In a book entitled 3ULPLWLYH0HQWDOLW\ (1923), Lucien Levy-Bruhl characterized Africans as mentally pre-logical. This has been criticized as a wrong anthropological categorization which can only occur when a culture is taken outside its context. However, in another book, published post-humously, with the title 1RWHERRNRQ3ULPLWLYH 0HQWDOLW\ (1975) the earlier pre-logical mentality remark was reviewed. But this book was not popular for obvious reasons. It was post-humous and it was perceived more as a damage control measure than a real recantation. P. O. Bodunrin, op. cit., p. 167 Richard Rorty, 3KLORVRSK\DQGWKH0LUURURI1DWXUH (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979) p. 9

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tional practice as philosophical and therefore over-glorify African traditional past. Also, they do not seem to think that alternative cultural systems can be compared to enable a people transform some or even all its beliefs. They refuse to see, for instance, that the historical (colonial) meeting between African and European cultures has been of mutual benefit. While the “great part of the scientific ideas operative in Africa today are Western” there are widely developed “techniques and principles that are not linked with Western forms.” 16 This conflation was no general disadvantage, it has rather helped a great deal to modify and transform the African social structure. I accept that there is African philosophy and that it is derived from African cultural heritage. However, I use this to direct attention to a major problem, namely, the challenge of African philosophy to Western philosophy. I use the philosophical work of Rorty and other recent thinkers like Davidson, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard etc. – wherever it is appropriate – in order to outline a nonuniversalist conception of philosophy that is open to the concept of African philosophy. The common point of view of these philosophers is brought into the context of African philosophy by Wright who writes that “there is no one method which is the method of philosophy today.” 17 I will not, as some traditionalists have done, accept as part of African philosophy all religious beliefs and all social or intellectual practices of African societies. Neither will I present an exhaustive overview of African culture (my task here excludes Islamic and Arabic aspects of African heritage). Rather, I want to use the philosophical status of Sub-Saharan African culture, that is, the world views which have enabled the Sub-Saharan African to subsist, to undercut the notion of universal philosophy. Such world views are explicit in the areas of healthcare and causal explanation. The Sub-Saharan African like any man elsewhere in the world operates a culture or “social forms which are of benefit to him and to his group” 18 under which he survives. That is to say that his existence is hinged on certain self-reflective principles formulated within the limitation of his culture. In the course of this study, I will respect the fact that “no philosophical tradition can grow in isolation of philosophies that flourish in other parts of the world.” 19 I will show that African culture and philosophy are not isolated from others. There has always been cultural meeting or even mixing which in turn determines the pace of globalization. This is a civilization that is formed by cultures having to emerge from their traditional spheres to meet with others. The 16

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Godwin Sogolo, )RXQGDWLRQVRI$IULFDQ 3KLORVRSK\ $'HILQLWLYH$QDO \VLVRI& RQ FHSWXDO,VVXHVLQ$IULFDQ7KRXJKt (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1993) p. 41 Richard A. Wright (ed.), $IULFDQ3KLORVRSK\ $Q,QWURGXFWLRQ (Washington D. C.: University Press of America, 1979) see pages 23-25 for the ideas expressed here. Godwin Sogolo, op. cit., p. ix Ibid., p. xiv

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civilization of globalization is essentially pluralistic. Certainly, the rationale for this research is to underscore the ethnocentrism of African philosophy, and furthermore, through a number of debates and discussions to establish not only the linkage between Africa and Europe but also between Africa and the rest of the world. Therefore, this study is significant because it is a philosophical contribution that will enrich the knowledge of the dynamics of globalization of cultures. The strategy used in this work is mainly discursive. It involves review of literatures and analysis of theoretical insights. Also the deconstructionist approach is deployed to show that philosophy may not be as universal as it is deemed to be. There are multi-cultures and multi-stories that are based on multi-worldviews or multi-realities. These multi-realities of the multi-cultures of the world cannot possibly be reduced to a single reality characterized as universal philosophy. The subsequent contents of this dissertation are: In chapter 2 I examine “Rorty’s Neo-Pragmatism.” I show that Rorty’s neopragmatism is hinged on what he calls “epistemological behaviorism.” This places emphasis on the primacy of social practices, i. e. it undermines any criteria of knowledge that does not emerge from within a society. In addition, I show that this is also the thrust of his “antirepresentationalism” and the basis of his opposition to “rationality, science, and truth.” On WKHwhole, the important point I try to make is that Rorty redefined the concept of pragmatism and used it to challenge modern epistemology which continues to seek for a foundation of knowledge that is universal. Chapter 3 deals with “Culture and Pragmatism.” Here I discuss topics like naturalism, liberalism and ethnocentrism through which Rorty continues his opposition of epistemology in order to further expound his pragmatism. I argue that Rorty’s aim on the whole is to usher in a post-epistemological culture of pragmatism. In chapter 4, I construe Rorty’s opposition to epistemology referred to in chapters 2 and 3 as a deconstruction of philosophy that hopes to show that philosophy is not able to mirror nature. I criticize Rorty’s deconstruction with arguments from Susan Haack’s reconstruction of epistemology. In chapter 5, I accomplish four tasks. First, I examine the definitions of African philosophy offered by both the traditionalists and the universalists. Second, I redefine African philosophy in a non-essentialist way to avoid the complex problem which philosophy as an essentialist discipline faced in the West. Third, I use the theoretical difference between the traditionalist and the universalist to determine what the task of the African philosopher should be today. Fourth, I highlight the challenge which African philosophy presents to Western philosophy. In chapter 6, I try to understand African philosophy as a product of ethnocentrism based on the argument of the traditionalists. In addition, I evaluate the extent to which Rorty’s ethnocentrism intersects with the ethnocentrism of the traditionalists.

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Chapter 7 conducts a universalist-ethnocentric dialogue between Hountondji and Gyekye. At the end of the dialogue, I argue that Gyekye is more pragmatically based on his objection to the primacy of the universal and his claim that philosophy is a cultural phenomenon. Chapter 8 does two things. On the one hand, it shows that despite the ethnocentrism of African philosophy (i. e. it being a product of African culture), it is not isolated from other cultures and their philosophical practices. On the other, it contains the conclusion of this entire work.