Long Range Planning 42 (2009) 6e22
http://www.elsevier.com/locate/lrp
Riding out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis: Contrasting Strategies and Outcomes John G. Knight, Bradley S. Mitchell and Hongzhi Gao
This article examines different approaches adopted by firms that were innocent bystanders embroiled in the 2005-06 Muhammad Cartoons controversy in Middle Eastern markets. The publication in Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad had international ramifications far beyond anything anticipated. Consumer boycotts in Middle Eastern markets of everything associated with Denmark caused massive losses for Arla Foods, the Danish dairy company, which attempted an active public relations campaign aimed at distancing itself from the inciting episode. Boycotts also threatened companies of other countries, including New Zealand. In contrast to Arla, some New Zealand companies adopted a different strategy e hiding from the storm and quietly seeking support from gatekeepers. This article examines options and likely outcomes from attempting to intervene in such a volatile and uncontrollable crisis. Implications for managers and academics are discussed. Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction Environmental turbulence is well-recognised as a major challenge facing modern organisations.1 Particularly in the domain of international business, crises appearing out of left field and rapidly crossing international borders have become a stark reality. Crises often appear to take on a life of their own and develop in directions that are difficult, if not impossible, to predict. According to Brews and Purohit,1 ‘‘when the going gets tough, the tough go planning’’; ‘‘transactive’’ (adaptable and flexible) and ‘‘generative’’ (innovative) types of planning are regarded as particularly important in conditions of environmental instability. Planning how to deal with environmental turbulence needs to be part of the overall corporate strategy of any company operating internationally, but what actions should such plans lead to? 0024-6301/$ - see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2008.11.002
Many of the human-induced crises considered in the crisis management literature can be seen to have been contributed to by the organisation’s own culture leading to crisis-proneness.2 However, in this article we consider the situation faced in Middle Eastern markets by firms which were innocent bystanders when the ‘‘Muhammad Cartoons’’ crisis struck and boycotts threatened. We study strategies that firms used and endeavour to draw inferences as to whether usual guidance from the crisis management literature is adequate for this type of crisis. How can firms best respond to such a crisis in future? Our chaotic times have seen several spectacular commercial crises over the past three decades.3 Environmental catastrophes such as the Union Carbide/Bhopal industrial accident and the Exxon Valdez oil spill had long-term ramifications for the companies involved. Criminal and terrorist acts such as the Tylenol poisonings, the Lockerbie/Pan American disaster and the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks have sensitised the public to a world of intense danger. Some crises, such as the Perrier water contamination crisis, seem largely of the company’s own making through quality control failure.4 Others, such as the Belgian Coca-Cola crisis, seem to have arisen out of nowhere, apparently attributable to mass hysteria triggered by the previous dioxin scare, but intensified by corporate mismanagement. According to Johnson & Peppas: ‘‘A senior Coca-Cola Enterprises official, Phillippe Lenfant, did state that the scare had been mishandled, that communication was inadequate, and that the company was unprepared for a crisis of this magnitude.’’5 The varying success with which firms have dealt with these crises has had major long-term implications for them. Johnson & Johnson enjoyed strong public support from its effective dealing with the Tylenol incident in 1982, whereas public perceptions of mishandling of the Bhopal disaster and the Exxon Valdez spill triggered long-standing negative public sentiment towards the corporations responsible.6 ‘‘Perception of indifference is the single largest contributor [of] harm in the aftermath of a crisis, especially when there are victims’’. An example is the reaction during the Coca-Cola ‘‘contamination’’ crisis of the then CEO, reported to have exclaimed: ‘‘Where the f*** is Belgium?’’7 Theoretical underpinning of crisis management Organisational crises have been investigated from diverse disciplinary perspectives.8 Pearson and Clair endeavoured to create a multidisciplinary framework for crisis management, drawing upon psychological, sociopolitical and technological-structural research perspectives.9 They defined an organisational crisis as ‘‘a low probability, high impact event that threatens the viability of the organisation and is characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly.’’ Crisis management consists of the design and implementation of key plans, procedures and mechanisms for preparing for crises, dealing with them effectively and enabling the organisation to learn from the experience.10 Organisations that are crisis-prepared pay considerable attention to anticipating potential crisis events and exploring ways in which they might be prevented or contained.11 Carmeli and Schaubroeck recently argued that ‘‘a culture of learning from failures’’ enhances an organisation’s crisis-preparedness perhaps more than learning from success. Public Relations (PR), the management of relationships between an organisation and the public on which it depends, is a crucial component of successful crisis management efforts.12 ‘‘Established PR doctrine suggests that a prompt, complete and precise response bolsters the organisation’s reputation and integrity’’.13 Persuasive messages need to establish the credibility of the party attempting to do the persuading, emphasising the common ground between them and the recipient, and reveal some benefit for those being persuaded.14 Emphasis on long-term relationships and reputation enables an organisation to draw on a reservoir of goodwill when times get tough. Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) aims to explain how perceptions of a crisis, and of an organisation’s role in that crisis, affect outcomes such as reputation, emotions and purchase intention.15 The central tenet of SCCT is that crisis managers need to begin by assessing the reputational threat attached to a given crisis and accept greater levels of responsibility as the reputational threat intensifies. Implicit in this perspective is that decisive action should be the norm and that clear and consistent messages to stakeholders should be provided as quickly as possible: ‘‘For those who have not acted in time, the world caves in.’’16 Long Range Planning, vol 42
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Aim of this study This study examines crisis management strategies that certain firms used during the Muhammad cartoons crisis in 2005-06, and the outcomes of different approaches. This crisis illustrates the essential elements of the Pearson & Clair definition of a crisis (see above), but was not caused by any kind of failing on the part of the companies that bore the brunt of the impact in Middle Eastern markets. Using a combination of interviews with key informants and media content analysis (see Appendix for methodology), we analyse the cartoons crisis and reflect on how managers might consider dealing with future crises caused by offending of religious sensibilities. Carmeli and Schaubroeck have recently emphasised how crisis events provide an opportunity to redesign and restructure a faulty system and turn it into a better one. Smith and Elliott have pointed out that much of the extant crisis management literature is grounded in a North American and western European context, and there is a pressing need to consider crises originating in cultures that have non-western individual and cultural beliefs. Analysis of the cartoons crisis aims to provide important guidance for companies facing such situations in future and also to contribute a new dimension to the crisis management literature.
Crisis events provide opportunity to redesign and restructure a faulty system and turn it into a better one Human-induced versus natural disasters A distinction has been drawn between how the public generally reacts to human-induced and natural disasters. According to Pearson and Mitroff:8 ‘‘It is conceded that organisations have little control over natural catastrophes. Human-induced crisis, on the other hand, can devastate the long-standing reputation of an organisation. In principle, this type of crisis is preventable .’’ However, the type of crisis considered in this article, although human-induced, was not in any way initiated by the companies that bore the brunt of it. Thus, this type of crisis is more similar in character to a natural disaster than to a crisis stemming from shortcomings on the part of the affected company. Therefore, implementing conventional PR strategies may not be the best way to proceed when dealing with this kind of uncontrollable and non-attributable event. The crisis management literature is largely silent regarding this type of crisis, which can envelop companies that are innocent bystanders, deemed guilty by association. Previous crises based on offending religious sensibilities Several episodes have resulted from companies failing to understand the extreme sensitivity that surrounds the use of the name of Allah or the prophet Muhammad. What is remarkable is that firms continue to commit blunders in this domain, in spite of plenty of precedents indicating the extreme hazard of doing so. As Baumard and Starbuck have pointed out: ‘‘Top managers are often rather out of touch with current customers, current suppliers and current technologies, and since they generally react to serious threats by centralising control, responses to crises frequently aggravate the crises.’’17 In 1994, the McDonald’s fast-food restaurant chain, during its promotion of the Soccer World Cup, printed the flags of participating nations on its disposable bags. Included was that of Saudi Arabia, which bears the Shahada (Islamic creed) including the name of Allah. Muslims were outraged that the name of God was printed on material to be crumpled up and thrown away.18 A similar situation arose when Amstel, the Dutch brewer, printed the flags under the caps of beer bottles, in contact with alcoholic beverage. In India, Reebok encountered huge controversy over its brand champion, Indian cricket captain Mohammed Azharuddin, autographing footwear e including on the sole e resulting in the name Mohammed being trampled in the dirt, which was seen by some as particularly offensive. 8
Riding out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis
Against this background of crises stemming from ignorant or thoughtless actions by firms or their representatives, the reaction to the 2005 Muhammad cartoons episode in Denmark ought to have been foreseeable by the instigators; however, the crisis was completely outside the control of Danish exporting companies that bore the brunt of the consequences. Origins of the Muhammad Cartoons crisis The crisis began when a Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, invited cartoonists to contribute cartoons that depicted the prophet Muhammad. Twelve editorial cartoons were published on September 30 2005. Perhaps the most inflammatory was a depiction of Muhammad with a bomb in his turban. Critics of the cartoons argued that they were blasphemous to people of Muslim faith and were designed to humiliate a Danish minority. Within Muslim communities, there have been varying views regarding depiction of Muhammad. Shi’ite Muslims have been generally tolerant of pictorial representations, whereas Sunni Muslims have generally forbidden any pictorial representation, believing that this constitutes blasphemy. However, in Muslim societies generally, insulting the prophet Muhammad is regarded as the gravest of all crimes, even warranting a death sentence in some communities. In response to petitions from Danish Imams, ambassadors from 11 Islamic countries complained to the Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, requesting a meeting with him and urging him to ‘‘take all those responsible to task under the law of the land’’. Rasmussen declined to meet them and replied that: ‘‘The freedom of expression has a wide scope and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press. However, Danish legislation prohibits acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature. The offended party may bring such acts or expressions to court, and it is for the courts to decide in individual cases.’’19 On January 10 2006, the Norwegian Christian newspaper Magazinet reprinted the cartoons, intensifying the controversy. In early February, major European newspapers in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and France reprinted them, and as the controversy spread, newspapers in other countries followed. On February 5 2006, the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Syria were set ablaze and the Danish embassy in Lebanon was set on fire, causing one death. Violent protests in Nigeria, Libya, Pakistan and Afghanistan resulted in approximately 140 deaths. Consumer boycotts of Danish products were introduced in many Middle Eastern countries and were to prove very costly, particularly for Arla Foods, the Danish dairy giant which had been operating in the Middle East for four decades and was in no way connected to Jyllands-Posten. Arla was losing V1.3m a day at the height of the boycott in early February 2006. By mid-February, the boycott had spread to include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Egypt and Sudan. Arla closed its factory in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (See Table 1 for timeline). Controversy spreads to New Zealand. On February 3 2006, the editor of a foreign-owned newspaper in New Zealand gave advance notice of intention to republish the cartoons e presumably to gauge the intensity of reaction within New Zealand. In spite of prime minister Helen Clark urging them to not do so, and outrage being expressed by exporting companies and organisations, the editors of three Australian-owned newspapers in New Zealand decided to publish the cartoons out of solidarity with editors elsewhere in the world. As rumblings of a boycott of New Zealand products emanated from the Middle East, New Zealand companies realised that potentially they had a major crisis on their hands. In 2006, New Zealand exports to the Middle East totalled approximately NZ$1.55bn (4.8 per cent of total New Zealand exports), made up mainly of dairy products (75 per cent) and meat (15 per cent). One company e Fonterra e accounted for approximately 70 per cent of the total New Zealand exports to this region. Formed in October 2001, Fonterra is one of the top six dairy companies in the world by turnover, according to Rabobank.20 It is New Zealand’s largest company, co-operatively owned by more than 11,600 New Zealand dairy farmers. Fonterra is the world’s leading international trader of dairy products, accounting for more than a third of all international dairy trade and supplying consumers in 140 countries. In the Middle East, Fonterra has developed important markets e particularly in Long Range Planning, vol 42
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Table 1. Timeline of the cartoons crisis and its spread to New Zealand
30 12 17 21
September 2005: Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten publishes editorial cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad. Oct: Eleven ambassadors from Islamic countries complain to Danish prime minister and request a meeting with him. Oct: Egyptian newspaper El Fagr reprints six of the cartoons together with an article strongly condemning them. Oct: Danish PM replies to the ambassadors, indicating that freedom of expression is the foundation of Danish democracy and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press. (Refusal to meet the ambassadors has been subsequently condemned by 22 Danish former ambassadors). 28 Oct: Coalition of Danish Muslim groups files criminal complaint. A regional prosecutor investigates but decides against prosecution. 10 January 2006: Norwegian Christian newspaper Magazinet reprints the cartoons, greatly inflaming the situation. 26 Jan: Saudi ambassador to Denmark recalled; retaliatory boycotts against Danish products initiated in Saudi Arabia with supermarkets displaying signs indicating that Danish products have been removed. Norwegian foreign minister condemns publication of the cartoons in a Norwegian newspaper, on the grounds that they incite hatred or hateful expressions. 30 Jan: Jyllands-Posten publishes open letters in Danish and Arabic: ‘‘In our opinion, the 12 drawings were sober. They were not intended to be offensive, nor were they at variance with Danish law, but they have indisputably offended many Muslims for which we apologise.’’ 31 Jan: Danish Muslim group says the apology is ‘‘ambiguous’’ and demands a clearer one. 1-2 Feb: Media in many European countries (France, Germany, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland etc) and in Jordan reprint the cartoons. 2 Feb: Boycott again mentioned in Friday prayers in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; in Qatar, the Grand Mufti calls for boycotts of Danish products; in Yemen, posters of Danish PM set alight; in Lebanon, the boycott situation ‘‘has worsened significantly’’; in Morocco, ‘‘the affair continues to run in the media’’; in Egypt, ‘‘the controversy is the main topic in the media and Danish products have been removed from all Egyptian supermarkets’’; in Sudan, ‘‘the president has issued a statement forbidding buying or trading in Danish products.’’ 3 Feb: Wellington NZ newspaper Dominion Post indicates an intention to republish the cartoons in spite of the outrage in the Middle East and the already-significant losses reported by Danish dairy giant Arla. 4 Feb: New Zealand ministers warn that the decision by New Zealand newspapers to publish the cartoons is irresponsible and could threaten NZ trade. Specific mention is made of Fonterra which ‘‘sells much of its product in Muslim countries’’. NZ meat industry officials lambast the media for placing trade at risk. Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus and Danish embassy in Beirut torched. 6 Feb: Supermarkets across the Middle East remove Danish products from their shelves. Arla is losing V1.3m a day in sales. 7 Feb: The Iranian government sets up a committee to look at possibly annulling trade deals with countries that have published the cartoons, threatening more than NZ$100m-worth of New Zealand exports. 8 Feb: Politicians in Jordan call for cancellation of trade worth NZ$70m. Prime minister Helen Clark condemns the publishing of the cartoons and refers to New Zealand’s reputation as a ‘‘peaceful and understanding nation’’. Arla e Fonterra’s partner in the UK butter market e closes its factory in Riyadh as the boycott bites. Fonterra publishes advertisements in Middle Eastern newspapers emphasising the NZ origins of its Anchor brand milk powders. NZ diplomatic posts are placed on high alert. By April 2006: retailers across the Middle East were beginning to restock Arla’s products, although uptake was slow, with only 20 per cent of pre-boycott sales being recorded by the end of May. Market recovery proved slow in spite of Arla investing heavily in advertising campaigns in selected markets such as Algeria. Dec 2006: The cost to Arla Foods of the boycott of Danish products in the Middle East amounts to approx. DKr400m for 2006. This equates to a loss of DKr40,000 for each of Arla’s 10,000 Danish and Swedish co-operative members. ‘‘It’s a relief that the boycott has come to an end . many products have been sold at discounted prices.’’ According to Finn Hansen (divisional director, Arla), ‘‘the boycott will have pushed back Arla’s development in the Middle East two years.’’ March 2007: Arla chairman Knud Erik Jensen was able to say: ‘‘We’re back in the Middle East and expect to return to previous levels of sales by the end of 2007.’’ Sources: www.ft.com; www.arlafoods.com.
10
www.nzherald.co.nz;
www.dairyreporter.com/news/ng.asp?n=74696-arla-foods-boycott;
Riding out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, the UAE, Iran, Jordan and Syria. By 2006, these Middle Eastern markets were accounting for more than NZ$1bn of its total turnover of approximately NZ$12.3bn, and were viewed by the company as a very significant and lucrative part of its global business. How quickly this could all be put at risk by events completely outside the control of the company. Response of New Zealand Exporters. After initial publication in Denmark, New Zealand meat exporters did not foresee events enveloping New Zealand companies, although they did monitor reaction in sectors in which they did business. Fonterra took greater interest in the early events associated with the publishing in Denmark because of the early involvement of an important competitor, customer and business partner, namely Arla Foods. For this reason, Fonterra was more closely connected to the crisis from the outset than were other New Zealand companies. However, its complex inter-relationships with Arla constrained how it felt able to react. Fonterra’s reaction demonstrates a compromise between short-term tactics and long-term strategy: ‘‘There was a backlash against one of our competitor companies. If our competitors are losing market share, then we take the opportunity to grab that market share. But in this case, the competitor is also a customer of ours and we had to be a little careful about our reaction. We didn’t want to be seen as leaping into the market place like a dog chewing away at a bone’’ (Fonterra).
Fonterra’s reaction demonstrates a compromise between short-term tactics and long-term strategy
Exporters in New Zealand were deeply worried by the stated intention of newspaper editors in New Zealand to republish the cartoons after it was already apparent what the strength of Muslim feeling was going to be. A meat industry trade association informant described the decision as ‘‘inflammatory, from the perspective of facilitation of good trade relations with countries’’. As soon as the cartoons were published in New Zealand, Fonterra and the other export participants each activated crisis management teams to deal with the situation. All of the informants reported that the intention of their organisation was to avoid making public statements in the news media, either in New Zealand or in Middle Eastern markets e at least in the early stages. Each believed that it was best to be seen to remain silent for fear of becoming unnecessarily embroiled in ideological arguments: ‘‘We didn’t want to do something that would potentially inflame reaction from either side. Ultimately you’re looking at what is likely to achieve the best damage control and sometimes it’s not about saying a whole lot’’ (Meat industry respondent). ‘‘We were not going to get involved in a media stoush’’ (Fonterra). In the meantime, the only external communications were to their business customers e distributors, manufacturers further down the distribution channel, and retailers: ‘‘We made statements available to sales staff saying that Fonterra is a company that is respectful of all religions, it does not support the position taken by an editor of one of New Zealand’s many newspapers’’ (Fonterra). ‘‘We wouldn’t look to communicate under the (company) name to the consumer; we would get our distributor, retailers and food service people to communicate if we needed a message read’’ (meat processor). High-level communication seemed preferable to communication with consumers: ‘‘It still was not appropriate to be making a widespread public response. It was more focused on diplomatic channels and relationships and business-to-business relationships. Long Range Planning, vol 42
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These were going to give you a less-inflammatory outcome at the end of the day’’ (meat processor). A meat industry informant explained the importance of prior reputation in this situation: ‘‘Our statement indicated that in no way do we condone what has been done; nevertheless, we practise halal slaughter, we are audited by certifiers who attest that we have complied in every sense with halal requirements and that it’s basically business as normal’’ (meat industry organisation). In addition to trust in processes used to produce those products, an important element is the reputation built up over many years by the people actually conducting business in the overseas market: ‘‘We’re recognised as being pretty straight people, dependable and trustworthy, and you build that reputation up over a large number of years. At times like this you call on it, and it works’’ (meat industry organisation). The personal relationships that companies had built up enabled New Zealand exporters to largely avoid negative reactions: ‘‘For the most part, the reaction from customers was come on, let’s get real, it’s a storm in a teacup; we’re intelligent people e let’s just fix the situation’’ (Fonterra). Another important consideration in deciding how to respond was the extent to which country of origin is relevant to end-consumers. Meat products often have further value added before consumers encounter them: ‘‘New Zealand is on all of our packaging. Quite often, though, the product does not reach the final consumer in that packaging’’ (meat processor). If country of origin is lost during transformation of the product, then quite obviously endconsumers would have great difficulty in identifying products from countries that they wished to boycott. This factor was important in steering the meat industry participants away from any kind of public relations activity at a consumer level, particularly as there seemed to be little reaction on the street against New Zealand meat. Fonterra was in a rather different position to the meat companies because many of its branded products were clearly identifiable as having New Zealand origin. To distance itself from the boycott of Danish dairy products, Fonterra published advertisements in Middle East newspapers in which it emphasised the New Zealand origins of its Anchor brand milk powders, without expressly commenting on the cartoons controversy. One exception to this policy of avoiding public comment about the cartoons occurred in Saudi Arabia, where a regional manager arranged a full-page newspaper advertisement; this emphasised that cultural sensitivity underlies Fonterra’s operations and products, that the products themselves are manufactured according to Muslim practices, and that Fonterra is a trustworthy company. According to a Fonterra informant: ‘‘We did lose control a little of the process. It was somebody doing their best to respond to what could have been a situation.’’ While New Zealand exporting companies were themselves largely avoiding direct comment in the media, politicians of various nationalities were vocal. On February 8 2006, politicians in Jordan called for trade with New Zealand, worth $60m a year, to be cancelled. Similar steps were threatened by Iran regarding NZ exports worth $75m annually. The New Zealand prime minister responded by stating publicly that New Zealand’s deliberate efforts to build relationships with Islamic countries were starting to bear fruit and reinforce New Zealand’s reputation as a peaceful 12
Riding out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis
and understanding nation. She stated unequivocally that the New Zealand government did not condone the publishing of the cartoons. New Zealand diplomatic posts in the Middle East were placed on high alert (NZ Herald, February 8 2006). According to a Fonterra informant, this high-level involvement was crucial: ‘‘I credit our prime minister with making a huge difference e I think she handled it brilliantly.’’ Also, in spite of the public posturing, it appears that certain Middle Eastern government officials were actively trying to smooth things over: ‘‘There was a lot of behind the scenes work by Middle Eastern governments to defuse the situation with respect to New Zealand because of the history that we’ve had’’ (MITA). ‘‘Diplomatic ties have been very, very successful in mediating or removing potential issues’’ (Fonterra). Another interesting role was played by New Zealand-based Muslim groups, who began sending letters to the governments of 52 Muslim countries urging them not to boycott New Zealand goods (reported in the NZ Herald, February 8 2006). Response of Arla Foods. As might be anticipated, our attempts to gain direct access to Arla informants were unsuccessful. According to Pearson and Clair, ‘‘organisations are reluctant to open current or past ‘wounds’ to external examination and speculation’’. However, careful examination of the Arla news archives on its website reveals how it reacted and why. It seems apparent that Arla saw a pressing need to ‘‘do something’’ to try to stem the crisis. On January 27 2006, Arla Foods published the Danish government’s press release in Saudi papers and made it clear that the advertisements were paid for by Arla Foods. This press release ‘‘reiterates that Denmark respects all religions’’ but, in addition, ‘‘underlined that freedom of expression is a vital and indispensable element of Danish society and that the Danish government cannot influence what an independent newspaper chooses to bring’’. The statement avoids condemning publication of the cartoons. According to Arla’s website: ‘‘This is what we can do’’ explained executive director Finn Hansen. ‘‘Based on our many years of experience in the Saudi market, however, we’re not particularly hopeful that it will achieve the desired effect. The only thing that can stop the current boycott of Danish products is a direct dialogue between the parties involved.’’ Faced with an uncontrollable situation, the company apparently felt compelled to do something e anything e rather than nothing. By mid-February 2006, Arla was indicating that it might have to withdraw completely from the Middle East e its second-largest regional market e in spite of having advertised widely in Middle Eastern newspapers that it disapproved of the publishing of the cartoons. Arla tried a new advertising campaign in 25 Arab newspapers in mid-March 2006, designed to distance it from the actions of newspaper editors. The advertisement outlined Arla’s 40-year history in the Middle East and explained that the company was well aware that justice and tolerance are basic Islamic values. The advertisement reiterated Arla’s dissociation from the cartoons and asked consumers to reconsider their attitude towards it. Losses thus far amounted to US$20m and if the boycott were to continue throughout the year, Denmark’s economy stood to lose US$2.6bn. Discussion In the crisis management literature, effective communication is widely regarded as a crucial element in almost all successful crisis management efforts. Organisations or individuals that communicate poorly during crises often make bad situations worse.21 The Muhammad cartoons crisis definitely appeared to worsen as a result of postures adopted by the Danish prime minister and the editorial staff of Jyllands-Posten. Standing on high moral ground regarding Danish perceptions of the sanctity of freedom of expression, while popular with the Danish public, turned out to be a stance that would cost certain Danish companies dearly. As pointed out in a recent analysis of the legal issues involved, ‘‘all that is legally permitted is not ethically advisable’’.22 If free speech is seen as central to preserving democracy, then clearly the Danish cartoons ought to be immune from legal censorship. However, there are three state interests that have been advanced as reasons why the cartoons should not have been published: the suppression of blasphemy, the protection of religious groups and the Long Range Planning, vol 42
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prevention of discrimination against minorities. In this article, our interest is in determining how companies can best deal pragmatically with the consequences of citizens exercising their freedom of speech, rather than in the legal rights and wrongs of such exercise.
Effective communication is widely regarded as a crucial element in almost all successful crisis management efforts Because the initial insult was seen to emanate from Denmark, it is apparent that companies and organisations associated with Denmark would inevitably fare worse than those associated with countries in which the insult was later repeated. However, an interesting contrast can be seen in the communication strategies adopted by the Danes on the one hand and countries such as New Zealand and Norway on the other. In contrast to the Danish prime minister’s refusal to castigate the Danish newspaper, and his reiteration of the right to freedom of expression, the prime minister of New Zealand and the foreign minister of Norway were forthright in communicating publicly that they condemned publication of the cartoons as deeply offensive and discriminatory. It was not a matter of interfering with ‘‘rights’’ of the media with legal restraints; rather, it was a matter of expedient use of rhetoric designed to be heard in foreign markets. The targeted companies from these countries also adopted contrasting communication strategies. Arla adopted an active public relations campaign in the Middle Eastern news media, initially prominently endorsing the Danish government position and then, seven weeks later, attempting to distance itself from the controversy. Whether these well-intentioned responses helped or inflamed the situation is a subject of debate; some public relations experts cautioned that biding time and riding out the storm was the only strategy likely to be successful.23 With the benefit of hindsight, the Danish government statement that Arla prominently published and associated itself with, can be seen as potentially highly inflammatory. Instead of condemning newspaper editors for behaving recklessly, Arla endorsed this statement upholding ‘‘freedom of expression’’. How did Arla consider that associating itself with this rather moralistic stance of the Danish government would help its situation? As pointed out by Ruff and Aziz21: ‘‘What the audience wants to hear is as important as what you want to say. You need to address the emotion behind the issue’’ (p.44). According to Ulmer et al16 (p. 38): ‘‘One of crisis communicators’ most common mistakes is attempting to engineer consent from their public by emphasising only the organisation’s side of the story. This strategy, known as ‘spin’,. creates resentment.’’ Did Arla’s audience really want to hear the Danish government’s message of self-justification for ‘‘failing’’ (in the eyes of Muslims) to condemn actions of newspaper editors? Arla could have taken a line quite separate from the Danish government and condemned the actions of Jyllands-Posten, particularly as few Danes would be likely to read an Arabic newspaper. It seems from the comments quoted above from the Arla website that it was most uncertain as to whether its PR strategy was likely to work. It appears Arla did it anyway because it wanted to be seen doing something expected of crisis managers. This appears to illustrate what McKinley et al call ‘‘cloning’’; in the face of extreme uncertainty, organisations have a strong tendency to mimic the behaviour of other organisations e not because they have hard evidence that it will work, but in order to show that they are ‘‘in step with the crowd’’, and are actively doing something to address problems.24 Responding to a crisis in a way that makes a situation worse has been well-documented, as has the tendency of companies to escalate commitment to a practiced but failing course of action in spite of warning signals.25 Fonterra and the New Zealand meat companies adopted a deliberate policy of avoiding direct public comment as far as possible, while reassuring gatekeepers in the distribution channel with messages about quality and adherence to halal methods. The consensus view of the New Zealand 14
Riding out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis
informants was that implicating oneself in a public debate by condemning the cartoons and highlighting that news media in New Zealand are a ‘‘law unto themselves’’ would only have drawn unwanted attention rather than exonerating the NZ companies. What is different about the Muhammad cartoons crisis, compared with many other crises that have been studied, is that the companies that bore the brunt of the crisis had no part in its instigation and were in no way responsible for the intensity of ill-feeling that developed into a ‘‘societal boycott’’.26 For this reason, the ‘‘relevant publics’’ to be communicating with in this situation may not have been the general population, as was attempted on a large scale by Arla. The strategy adopted by Fonterra and the New Zealand meat companies of drawing on their existing relationships with channel intermediaries, providing supportive statements and leaving it up to these intermediaries to reassure retailers, may well have been the better approach. A major advantage of this approach is that those doing the communicating are then seen by the audience as from their culture, rather than as foreigners trying to impose foreign values. According to Ruff and Aziz21 (p.80), a mistake Monsanto made in relation to the GM debate in Europe was having an American as the leading company spokesperson and therefore the public face of GM crops in Europe. Although it is difficult to gauge just how effective communication strategies were in mitigating the impact of the crisis for New Zealand exporters, the trade statistics shown in Table 2 indicate that New Zealand exports to the region improved, rather than deteriorated, during this period. Furthermore, in every one of the countries listed except for Jordan (which remained the same), dairy exports rose in value between 2005 and 2006. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 1, Danish dairy exports slumped heavily during this period. This suggests that Fonterra may indeed have benefited from Arla’s loss of market share, although the picture is complicated by world dairy prices having risen over this period. The news media frequently referred to the situation as a ‘‘clash of cultures’’, over and above the obvious clash of religious sensibilities. It is therefore worth exploring the role of national cultural dimensions that could underlie this episode and its handling. A possible explanation of why ill feelings spread from focusing on the instigating newspaper(s) to being diffusely targeted towards all things Danish (and potentially all things New Zealand) can be provided by considering Hofstede’s individualism/collectivism dimension.27 In the eyes of people from highly individualist cultures, such as Denmark (Individualism/Collectivism score: 74) and New Zealand (I/C score: 79), it is natural to compartmentalise actions and ascribe them to a discrete entity e namely the newspaper that published the cartoons. However, in the eyes of people from a collectivist culture, such as Table 2. New Zealand exports to Middle East in millions of NZ dollars. (Dairy exports e mainly attributable to Fonterra - indicated by figures in brackets)
2004 Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Algeria Iran Egypt Jordan Syria Oman Morocco Kuwait Yemen Total Middle East
326 136 109 97 91 21 12 89 15 34 28
2005 (247) (64) (93) (56) (77) (12) (12) (82) (14) (14) (28)
1,045 (699)
379 160 136 78 114 62 20 34 28 54 18
2006 (288) (82) (108) (49) (96) (55) (20) (29) (25) (35) (18)
1,186 (805)
411 222 214 123 160 61 56 56 45 71 29
2007 (302) (125) (199) (91) (137) (55) (53) (48) (43) (38) (28)
1,555 (1,119)
528 221 246 142 176 27 84 90 32 97 42
(396) (103) (226) (102) (153) (not available) (78) (76) (not available) (58) (42)
1,685 (1,234)
Statistics used in compiling this table sourced from www.stats.govt.nz. Long Range Planning, vol 42
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Table 3. Danish exports to Middle East in millions of DKK (Dairy exports e specified in the Danish statistics as butter, cheese, canned milk - mainly attributable to Arla Foods, indicated by figures in brackets)
2004
2005
Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Algeria Iran Egypt Jordan Syria Oman Morocco Kuwait Yemen
2139 1428 446 1274 720 259 167 248 310 530 230
(427) (180) (11) (11) (101) (36) (16) (128) (13) (57) (148)
Total Middle East
7751 (1128)
2230 1461 351 1267 713 236 204 244 200 527 240
2006 (446) (157) (6) (4) (116) (36) (20) (110) (3) (104) (117)
7673 (1119)
1698 1647 445 620 750 208 159 196 210 314 154
2007 (194) (118) (63) (1) (49) (13) (8) (79) (3) (17) (57)
6401 (602)
2169 1762 487 870 1027 263 184 426 254 396 217
(281) (159) (63) (4) (81) (23) (19) (207) (2) (21) (98)
8055 (958)
Statistics used in compiling this table sourced from www.statistikbanken.dk.
Middle Eastern countries (I/C score: 38), it is much more natural to perceive things as being interconnected and somehow reflecting a shared identity e in this case anything to do with Denmark. Although Arla belatedly made efforts to distance itself from the rest of the Danish community, in particular from Jyllands-Posten, Islamic consumers still held the perception that they were from one social group and sharing one common identity e ‘‘Danish’’. In its most extreme manifestation, this resulted in a boycott of the Kuwaiti-Danish Dairy Co., a Kuwaiti-based and Muslim-owned company that had had no formal connection with any Danish partners for more than 20 years. This company saw its sales drop 95 per cent in Middle East markets outside Kuwait (New York Times, February 27 2006). This suggests that no matter what Arla did, only time would heal the wound; perhaps the less it said publicly the sooner things would have healed. Implicit in much of the crisis management literature is a belief that ‘‘doing something’’ is necessarily preferable to ‘‘doing nothing’’. However, there could be situations where making a decision
Figure 1. Comparison of Danish and New Zealand dairy exports to Middle Eastern markets over the crisis period 16
Riding out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis
to batten down the hatches and wait for the storm to pass is in fact the best strategy, in spite of the natural tendency to believe in one’s ability to intervene. International crises such as that described here do sometimes seem reminiscent of violent weather systems and other turbulent events occurring in nature e unpredictable in course and outcome. This can be explained by chaos theory. Chaos Theory (CT) arose as a coherent body of theory in mathematics and physics, subsequently extended throughout the natural and social sciences, to address the issue of unpredictability. CT aims to explain the behaviour of systems that are particularly sensitive to initial conditions and behave in a manner that is so unpredictable that, while not random, give the appearance of being so. A pioneer of CT was Edward Lorenz who was working towards increasing the predictive accuracy of complex mathematical meteorological models.28 When he restarted a simulation in the middle, using a starting figure rounded to three decimal places instead of the six that the computer used, he discovered that the end result of the simulation was profoundly altered by this minuscule change in initial conditions. Sensitivity to initial conditions became popularised as the ‘‘butterfly effect’’ as a result of a paper given by Lorenz to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1972 titled ‘‘Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil set off a Tornado in Texas?’’ The small change instigated by the flapping wings was seen as potentially capable of causing a chain of events which resulted in a large-scale and potentially catastrophic phenomenon. The crisis management and post-crisis communication fields have been criticised as often disjointed and atheoretical.29 In contrast, chaos theory has been heralded as providing explanatory capacity in regard to crisis situations in general: ‘‘Typically a crisis forms as a sequence of events that seems, over time, to gather volume and complexity with increasing speed. Its dynamic therefore resembles that of a chaotic system as it iterates through increasingly complex phases towards a disordered state.’’30 In similar vein, Smith (p. 314) considers: ‘‘At the various points of inflection, the decisions and actions taken in response to the prevailing systems’ conditions may allow the problem to escalate further and move the organisation into what could be considered as a chaotic state.’’31 It is somewhat surprising that this theory has not been more widely applied in the crisis management field.32 Murphy pointed out the managerial implications of adopting this alternative way of thinking about crises: ‘‘Riding out storms is not the sort of advice most managements want to hear.’’ Conventional PR is all about trying to predict and manipulate public behaviour or achieving sufficient harmony with publics that they are unlikely to react in unexpected manners.33 In contrast, CT implies that events have a life and logic of their own. Attempts to intervene may be largely futile or even counter-productive, as indicated for certain types of ‘‘intractable’’ crisis identified in Gundel’s typology of crises.34 Figure 2, based on Smith’s Figure 4, illustrates how differing communication responses resulted in either placation or further inflammation of the crisis at a number of points of inflection, or what Gladwell terms ‘‘tipping points’’.35 As Figure 2 illustrates, we consider that attempts to intervene, but in ways that failed to tell the audience what they wanted to hear, probably worsened the intensity of this crisis. Managerial Implications Interpreting the trajectory of this crisis from a chaos theory viewpoint suggests certain caveats regarding attempts to intervene with highly unstable publics, particularly when the beleaguered company is not responsible for the triggering event. Arla adopted an approach broadly consistent with conventional western PR practice; Fonterra (and New Zealand meat companies) adopted an approach more in line with a Chaos Theory interpretation. Firms should be cautious of falling into the trap of ‘‘doing something’’ merely because action seems preferable to inaction e the risk of exacerbating a sensitive situation may be too high. If Arla was determined to undertake a PR campaign, then it should have delivered a message that its audience wanted to hear. Ideally, such a message is best delivered through local entities (‘‘gatekeepers’’), capable of presenting a sympathetic face to local audiences. If such an audience-focused approach still does not work, then it may be time to ‘‘batten down the hatches’’ and wait out the storm. In contrast to established public Long Range Planning, vol 42
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Figure 2. Crisis Management in the face of the Cartoon Controversy: Comparison of actions leading to escalation rather than soothing (Based on Smith 2006, p. 313)
relations doctrine, we conclude that a ‘‘least said, soonest mended’’ approach could be the most appropriate in dealing with similar crises in future. Our findings are important to managers because of the near-certainty that there will be future similar crises caused by offending of religious sensibilities.
Firms should be cautious of falling into the trap of ‘‘doing something’’ merely because action seems preferable to inaction
Conclusion The Muhammad cartoons crisis has all the hallmarks of a ‘‘chain of events which resulted in a largescale and potentially catastrophic phenomenon’’. The metaphor of a tornado seems apt in regard to the way this crisis developed and spread through many parts of the world. Just as erecting a billboard would seem a futile gesture in trying to alter the path of a tornado, it appears that Arla’s attempts to change the course of the boycott with full-page advertisements were at best futile and may well have worsened the impact for the company (but see Epilogue for Arla’s alternative 18
Riding out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis
view). Our findings indicate that Chaos Theory could well provide a useful framework for understanding this and related crises in international business, and for translating that understanding into ‘‘a format that will prove accessible and useful to practising managers’’.36 Future research on crises entangling innocent bystander companies through no fault of their own should further explore application of this concept. A clear limitation of this study has been asymmetry in regard to our ability to obtain first-hand information from key respondents of the two organisations. However, we consider that useful lessons can be learned from imperfect data, as expressed in a famous article by March and colleagues: ‘‘We believe that usable knowledge can be extracted from fragments of history and that intensive examinations of individual cases can be used imaginatively to construct meaningful hypothetical histories.’’37 Epilogue Both Fonterra and Arla were invited to comment on the manuscript before publication. Fonterra responded: ‘‘We have reviewed, found the paper insightful and have no further comments to add.’’ A telephone interview with Astrid Gade Nielsen, Arla’s corporate communications director, on September 23 2008 provided detailed insight into the cartoons episode and our interpretation of events. Extracts of Nielsen’s comments follow: ‘‘In hindsight, obviously there are things that could have been done differently. We are as eager to learn as anybody else about how can we go forward from what we learned at that point. This was something that had never happened before in Danish society, and everybody was stunned by what was happening. It became very much a black and white discussion. Either are you with us or you are against us. And we were caught in the middle. It’s obviously not a healthy cocktail that you have politics, religion, and business e a very unhealthy combination. But somehow we had to manoeuvre there. At first what we did was to focus on our 1bn Muslim consumers, communicating from a platform of our mission, which is that we are here to create inspiration and wellbeing for our consumers. And 1bn consumers were telling us ‘your products are not making us feel particularly well because we make the connection: Danish products e cartoons of our prophet. And you mock our prophet that way.’ We knew that it was absolutely important that exactly the same message came out in our part of the world and in the Middle East. So, Peter Tuborg, our CEO, gave an interview to one of the Danish newspapers, where he stated how we viewed thisdsince we did not believe in mocking the prophet Muhammad, we said that we did not support the cartoons. There were two advertisements. There was one in January 2006 where we reprinted the prime minister’s New Year’s speech, where he actually said something about not demonising minorities e it was a speech that if you read it correctly, it could perhaps try to mend some of the wounds that had been cut during the past months. We paid to run it as an advert. But at that particular moment it was like building a small fence against a tsunami. It didn’t have any effect. I agree with you that the first advert was futile. Now, there was a second advert at the beginning of March. And that second advert was restating what had already been presented by our CEO in an article printed in a Danish newspaper. That message was conveyed in Arabic. The way we expressed our position in that advert really caused Danes to become angry with Arla Foods. If you did not believe in making cartoons of the prophet Muhammad with a bomb in his urban, then you were against the freedom of speech! But there wasn’t room for manouvring. There wasn’t room for nuances. The more criticism we got in Denmark, the more we were loved in the Middle East. So, what happened, actually, was that we did get recognition in the Middle East for what we were trying to achieve. Now, whether that is longsighted or not, I don’t know. I think it is difficult to answer that question. We actually had a second wave at the beginning of 2008 where there was a death threat against one of the cartoonists in Denmark and three people were arrested. In covering that story, all the Danish media reprinted the cartoon with the lit bomb in the turban and that caused some people in the Middle East to boycott Danish products again. So we got a second round. Arla was as much a part of it as anybody else, so our advert and our position in 2006 did not pave any way for us in Long Range Planning, vol 42
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the second wave. We did not say anything publicly, but we talked to customers and we found that it was a bit different this time: all our products remained on the shelves. Some stores moved our product, but it stayed on the shelves. It was the individual consumer who chose not to buy Danish products. Our business customers were telling us: ‘‘We are there for you. This is troublesome, this is difficult, but we see that you have worked very well with us. You have done a lot of humanitarian work, or supported humanitarian work and done a lot of CSR (corporate social responsibility) in the Middle East. We believe that you are dedicated to working, or in doing business in this part of the world. So, we’ll leave you on the shelves.’’ So we never in a big way saw our products being removed off the shelves. What we hope is that we now have a better set-up with regard to stakeholders hopefully. I think that we did not have the right stakeholder relations that we should have had in such an important market for us.’’
Appendix Research Approach A comparative case study approach was adopted. The advantage of such an approach is that it enables study of a variety of factors that interact and relate to each other to reveal the distinctive nature of the phenomenon being investigated.38 In this instance, there are only a small number of companies available for study, and in fact a single company dominates New Zealand exports to the region. Additional material was gleaned from a content analysis of electronic and print media.39 The purpose was to supplement the information obtained in interviews and thus enhance the accuracy of inferences made. Six key informants provided the material reported here. These were from: Fonterra (three informants); a major meat processor/exporter (MP); a meat industry trade association (MITA); and a primary industry umbrella organisation (PIO). Other companies and organisations were approached but a great reluctance to participate was encountered e mainly because of the extreme sensitivity of the issue at the time (mid-late 2006), company policy regarding not revealing what they do, a lack of time and resources or a combination of all three. Requests to key personnel from Arla seeking interviews were largely unsuccessful e which is understandable given the extreme sensitivity of the issue for their company. However, material was gleaned from a systematic review of archived news releases on the Arla website to provide insight into what they did and why. Furthermore, two key personnel contacted by telephone, although unwilling to be drawn on the issue in any detail, did make comments that broadly confirm our interpretation of events. An interview template was used to guide the major areas of inquiry. The aim was to develop a ‘‘conversation-like dialogue rather than asking questions that impose categorical frameworks on informants’ understanding and experiences’’.40 Questions were open-ended in order to elicit information that was most salient to interviewees: ‘‘Once respondents have been brought within sight of the topic, they must be allowed to ‘go’ wherever they wish’’.41 Tape-recorded interviews were transcribed and coded in accordance with the three-step coding process recommended by Seidel & Kelle: noticing relevant phenomena; collecting examples of those phenomena; and analysing those phenomena in order to find commonalities, differences, structures and patterns.42
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3. Smith and Elliott (2006) (See above). 4. I. I. Mitroff, T. C. Pauchant and P. Shrivastava, The structure of man-made organizational crises: conceptual and empirical issues in the development of a general theory of crisis management, in D. Smith and D. Elliott (eds.), Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Routledge, London (2006). 5. V. Johnson and S. Peppas, Crisis management in Belgium: the case of Coca-Cola, Corporate Communications 8(1), 18e22 (2003). 6. J. Burnett, A strategic response to managing crises, Public Relations Review 24(4), 475e488 (1998); J. Burnett, Managing Business Crises, Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut (2002). 7. H. Garcia, Effective leadership response to crisis, Strategy & Leadership 34(1), 4e10 (2006); M. de Mooij, Consumer Behaviour and Culture: Consequences for Global Marketing and Advertising, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (2004). 8. C. M. Pearson and I. I. Mitroff, From crisis prone to crisis prepared: a framework for crisis management, Academy of Management Executive 7(1), 48e59 (1993); P. Shrivastava and I. I. Mitroff, Strategic management of corporate crises, Columbia Journal of World Business 22(Spring), 5e11 (1987); H. Schwartz, On the psychodynamics of organizational disaster: The case of the space shuttle Challenger, Columbia Journal of World Business 22, 59e68 (1987); I. I. Mitroff, Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable, John Wiley & Sons, New York (2004). 9. C. M. Pearson and J. A. Clair, Reframing crisis management, Academy of Management Review 23(1), 59e76 (1998) (See 8 above). 10. Mitroff (2004).; A. Carmeli and J. Schaubroeck, Organisational crisis-preparedness: the importance of learning from failures, Long Range Planning 41, 177e196 (2008). 11. K. E. Weick and K. M. Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco (2007); I. I. Mitroff and M. C. Alpaslan, Preparing for evil, Harvard Business Review 81(4), 109e115 (2003). 12. L. Barton, Crisis in Organisations: Managing and Communicating in the Heat of Chaos, South-Western Publishing Co, Cincinnati, Ohio (1993); J. Marconi, Public Relations: The Complete Guide, Thomson Learning, Mason, Ohio (2004). 13. M. Seeger, Chaos and crisis: propositions for a general theory of crisis communication, Public Relations Review 28, 329e337 (2002). 14. I. Varner and L. Beamer, Intercultural Communication in the Workplace (3rd ed), McGraw-Hill Irwin, New York (2005). 15. W. Coombs, Attribution theory as a guide for post-crisis communication research, Public Relations Review 33, 135e139 (2007). 16. R. R. Ulmer, T. L. Sellnow and M. W. Seeger, Effective Crisis Communication: Moving from Crisis to Opportunity, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA (2006); G. C. Meyers, When it Hits the Fan: Managing the Nine Crises of Business, Houghton Mifflin, Boston (1986). 17. P. Baumard and W. Starbuck, Learning from failures: why it may not happen, Long Range Planning 38, 281e298 (2005). 18. G. Starrett, The political economy of religious commodities in Cairo, American Anthropologist 97(1), 51e68 (1995). 19. A. Rasmussen http://gfx-master.tv2.dk/images/Nyhederne/Pdf/side3.pdf. (accessed Nov 2007). (2005). 20. Fonterra http://www.fonterra.com/ (accessed Nov 2007). (2007). 21. F. Marra, Crisis communication plans: poor predictors of excellent crisis public relations, Public Relations Review 24(4), 461e474 (1998); P. Ruff and K. Aziz, Managing communications in a crisis, Gower (2003). 22. R. Post, Religion and freedom of speech: portaits of Muhammed, Constellations 14(1), 72e90 (2007). 23. Editorial, US PR pros offer solutions for Denmark boycott crisis, PR News 62(8), 1e2 (2006). 24. W. McKinley, C. M. Sanchez and A. G. Schick, Organizational downsizing: constraining, cloning, learning, Academy of Management Executive 9(3), 32e42 (1995). 25. J. Brockner, The escalation of commitment to a failing course of action: towards theoretical progress, Academy of Management Review 17, 39e61 (1992); G. Whyte, A. M. Saks and S. Hook, When success breeds failure: the role of self-efficacy in escalating commitment to a losing course of action, Journal of Organizational Behavior 18, 415e432 (1997). 26. R. Ettenson, , et alRethinking consumer boycotts, MIT Sloan Management Review 47(4), 6e7 (2006). 27. G. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences (2nd ed), Sage, Thousand Oaks (2001). 28. Seeger (2002) (See 13 above). Long Range Planning, vol 42
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29. Coombs (2007); C. Roux-Dufort, Is crisis management (only) a management of exceptions?, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 15(2), 105e114 (2007). 30. P. Murphy, Chaos theory as a model for managing issues and crises, Public Relations Review 22(2), 95e113 (1996). 31. D. Smith, The crisis of management: managing ahead of the curve, in D. Smith and D. Elliott (eds), Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Routledge, London (2006). 32. A. Paraskevas, Crisis management or crisis response system? A complexity science approach to organizational crises, Management Decision 44(7), 892e907 (2006). 33. J. Grunig, Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management, Lawrence Erblbaum Associates, NJ (1992). 34. S. Gundel, Towards a new typology of crises, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 13(3), 106e115 (2005). 35. M. Gladwell, The Tipping Point. How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, Little Brown, Boston (2000). 36. Smith in Smith and Elliott (2006). 37. J. March, L. Sproull and M. Tamuz, Learning from samples of one or fewer, Organization Science 2(1), 1e13 (1991). 38. N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed), Sage, Thousand Oaks (2005). 39. K. Krippendorff, Content Analysis: an Introduction to its Methodology, Sage, Beverley Hills (1980). 40. E. Arnould and M. Wallendorf, Market-oriented ethnography: interpretation building and marketing strategy formulation, Journal of Marketing Research 31(4), 484e505 (1994). 41. G. McCracken, The Long Interview, Sage, Newbury Park, CA (1988). 42. J. Seidel and U. Kelle, Different functions of coding in the analysis of textual data, in U. Kelle (ed.), Computer-aided qualitative data analysis: theory, methods and practice, Sage, London (1995).
Biographies John G. Knight, PhD, is an Associate Professor in the marketing department, University of Otago. His research interests concern impacts of country image on perceptions of imported food products, adoption of innovation and public acceptance of biotechnology in international markets, and crisis management in international markets.
[email protected] Bradley S. Mitchell is Strategy Analyst with New Zealand Post Group. Hongzhi Gao is a Teaching Fellow and PhD candidate in the marketing department, University of Otago. His research interests are product-country images, marketing strategies, intercultural marketing relationships and guanxi networks.
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Riding out the Muhammad Cartoons Crisis
