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A Puzzle About the Rational Authority of Morality Author(s): David O. Brink Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics (1992), pp. 1-26 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214236 . Accessed: 01/01/2015 19:48 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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6, Ethics,1992 Philosophical Perspectives,

A PUZZLE ABOUT THE RATIONALAUTHORITY OF MORALITY David 0. Brink MassachusettsInstituteof Technology

variousother-regarding dutiesto help, Commonsense morality recognizes or forbear fromharming, others.Mostofus also regardmoralobligations thatgiveagentsreasonsforaction.But considerations as important practical ofhisowninterest theagent'spursuit mayconstrain heeding theseobligations withtheagent'sownpointofview,we or aims.Ifwe associaterationality maywonderwhethermoralconductand concernare alwaysrationally inordinary aboutmorality reveala tension thinking Thesethoughts justifiable. as betweenlivingrightand livingwell.Thattensionmightbe represented a puzzleabouttherationalauthority ofmorality thatconsistsofa quartet inconsistent. ofclaimsthatcanseemindividually plausiblebutare mutually I Moralrequirements-including obligations-apply other-regarding to agentsindependently oftheiraimsor interests. II. Moralrequirements necessarily provideagentswithreasonsfor action.

III. Reasonsforactionare dependent on theaimsor interests ofthe agentwho has them betweenother-regarding IV. Thereis no necessaryconnection oftheagent. actionand anyaim or interest a familiar andinitially plausibleidea. Eachelementofthepuzzlearticulates familiar from oftheobjectivity ofethics, Kant,according (I)is a statement are categorical to whichmoralrequirements norms,theyapplyto us inTheagent'sowninterests ofourantecedent desiresandinterests. dependently ofappliare not,intherelevant andinclinations way,amongtheconditions Thisis clearestinthecase ofother-regarding cationformoralrequirements. ofobligation tometo help I do notdefeatan ascription moralrequirements. thatI have outthatdoingso willservenogoalorpurpose another bypointing ofmorality and moraldeliberation. (II) capturesthepracticalcharacter inordertodecidewhattodo; engageinmoraldeliberation Agentstypically

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2 / David 0. Brink others'conduct;andmost peoplegivemoraladvicewiththeaimofguiding oftheseattitudes Oneexplanation tomoralcriticism. ofus arequitesensitive give agentsreasons requirements moral is thatwe think and expectations about as truths defended conceptual are sometimes claims foraction.Such do something to obligation moral under a to be say that Internalists morality. justare justis to havea reasonto do it;theyassumethatnormsofmorality normsofrationality.1 theagent thata factmustaffect thecommonassumption (III)articulates about assumption Call this to her. significance rational be of insomewayto in case just is agent-neutral rationality contrast, By agent-relative.2 rationality independently directly, for action an reasons agent interests give another's assumpAgent-relative ordesires.3 withherowninterests ofanyconnection individual of discussions and informal formal tionsseemto underliemany an agent-relative Moreover, andpolitics. economics, inphilosophy, rationality for action and motivation, reasons theoryprovidesa reliablelinkbetween to acton motivated to be action reasonsfor we expectone whorecognizes his about facts by them,and an agentseemsmorelikelyto be motivated others. of interest or desires owninterest or desiresthanbyfactsaboutthe certain to satisfy Also,whenwe explainan agent'sbehavioras an attempt This her behavior.4 we are to "rationalize" said desires,givenherbeliefs, the promote which would behavior is that rational thatgenuinely suggests certain if she met have would she desires that agent'sdesiresorat leastthose conditions. epistemic ofdifferent abouttheindependence a commonassumption (IV)reflects assumption. thatI willcalltheindependence andattitudes people'sinterests Ofcourse,agentsoftendo care aboutthewelfareofothersand desireto between and therewilloftenbe connections correctthing, do themorally holds connection and thoseofothers.Butneither an agent'sowninterests and be self-confined, ornecessarily. Myaimscould largely eitheruniversally to reference no intermsthatmake essential myowngoodcan be specified of thegoodofothers,say,in termsofmyownpleasureor thesatisfaction mydesires. appeal,notall fourclaimscan be true;we must Despitetheirindividual rejectat leastone elementofthepuzzleifwe are to avoidinconsistency. atthefoundations offamiliar positions Indeed,we canmakesenseofa number ofthepuzzle tothispuzzlethatrejectoneelement ofethicsas tacitresponses in orderto preserveothers. suchas ethicalegoism, moraltheories, and minimalist Moralrelativism in(I);theyclaimthat moralnormsasserted ofcategorical rejecttheexistence ordesiresinsomeway. theagent'sinterests mustfurther moralrequirements ofmorality abouttherationality assumption Externalists rejecttheinternalist andnormsofmorality betweennormsofrationality in(II).Theydistinguish suchthatfailureto act on themis not and recognizemoralrequirements

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/ 3 ofMorality A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority assumpnecessarilyirrational.Kantiansand othersrejectthe agent-relative tionsabout reasons foraction in (III); theyclaim thatthe interestsof other people can directlyand necessarilyprovidean agentwithreason foraction. Finally,metaphysicalegoistsrejecttheindependenceassumptionin (IV) and resolve the puzzle by arguingthat,properlyunderstood,people's interests moral are interdependentin ways such that acting on other-regarding requirementspromotesthe agent's own interests. and I'll sketchsome of these solutionsand theirresources,limitations, puzzle, to the solution goal is notdefenda particular interrelations. Myprimary frameworkwithinwhichto address but to show thatit providesa fruitful some foundationalissues about ethics.

1. Relativistand MinimalistSolutions Some writersbegin withassumptions(II)-(IV)in place and conclude that requirements.5 we mustrejectthe existenceof categorical,other-regarding For example,in his article"MoralRelativismDefended"GilbertHarman natureof rationality relieson Humean assumptionsabout the instrumental assumptionsabout the connectionbetweenmoralobligation and internalist and reasonsforactionin orderto defenda viewthathe callsmoralrelativism, accordingto whichan agent'smoralobligationsmustbe relativizedto her pro-attitudes. thisas a logicalthesis,I wantto treatthemoral"ought"as a Formulating "Ought(A,D, C, M),"whichrelatesan predicate(or "operator"), four-place attitudes M C, and motivating agentA, a typeofact D, considerations [1975 10] Harmanclaims,forinstance,thatHitleris someone to whom obligationsof fairness,decency,or respectforhumanlifecould not have appliedbecause he (Hitler)lackedtherelevantattitudesnecessaryforhimto have had reasons to be fair,to be decent,or to respecthumanlife(1975: 7-11). Harman'sargumenthas the followingform 1. Moral requirementsgeneratereasons foraction. 2. Reasons foraction are desire-dependent. 3. Hence moral requirementsare desire-dependent. This is a versionof relativism,because it relativizesmoral obligationsto because it holds the people's variable aims. It is a versionof minimalism, contentofone's obligationshostageto one's interestsand aimsand so seems dutiesthatcommonunlikelyto recognizethenormalrangeofother-regarding sense moralitydoes. ethicaltheory Moreover,thisview can be representedas an agent-relative as well ifitclaimsthatpromotingan agent'sinterestsor desiresis a sufficient

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4 / David 0. Brink as a necessaryconditionformoralobligation(1975: 11). An agent-relative ethicaltheoryclaimsthatan agentis obligatedto do somethingjustinsofar as it would promotehis own interestsor desires. ethical Anotherview thatcan be representedeitheras an agent-relative theoryor as a skepticalview is Callicles'positionin Plato'sGorgias.Callicles betweenthedemandsofjusticeand theagent's resolvestheapparentconflict own interestby arguingthat"real" or naturaljusticedoes not requirethe agentto helpothersor forbearfromharmingthem,as conventionalmorality supposes (482de, 483ab, 488b-490a).The naturallyjustpersonsatisfiesher own unrestraineddesires (488b). And, preciselybecause the revisionin ordinarymoral views that he makes is so drastic-his account of virtueis is usuallythoughtofas a moralskeptic,even though so minimalist-Callicles he accepts the rationalauthorityof real virtue. Libertarianviews mightbe motivatedin a similarway. They recognize obligationsto forbearfromharmingothersand negative other-regarding withtheirlibertybutno positiveobligationsofmutualaid. Robert interfering libertariansideNozick,forexample,defendsa moraltheoryincorporating by appeal to the separatenessofpersons. constraintsagainstutilitarianism He writes chooseto undergosomepainor sacrifice we each sometimes Individually, hold or to avoida greaterharm. Whynot,similarly, fora greaterbenefit otherpersonsmore? thatsomepersonshaveto bearsomecoststhatbenefit for somesacrifice Butthereis no socialentitywitha goodthatundergoes respect itsowngood To use a personin thiswaydoes notsufficiently and takeaccountofthefactthathe is a separateperson,thathisis theonly and goodfromhissacrifice, lifehe has He does notgetsomeoverbalancing to forcethisuponhim. [1974 32-3] no one is entitled Nozickconcludesthattheseparatenessofpersonsgroundslibertarianrights thatdemand moralrequirements fromother-regarding thatprotectindividuals uncompensatedsacrifices.His argumentseems to have the followingform. 1. It is unreasonableto demand uncompensatedsacrifices. 2. Moral requirementsmustbe reasonable. 3. There is no interpersonalcompensation;benefitsto anotherdo not compensateme formy losses. duties. 4. Hence moral requirementscan includeno other-regarding supHowever,we mightnotice thatlibertarianminimalismis imperfectly For,whileshe recognizesno positivedutiesofmutual portedbythisargument. aid that apply independentlyof the agent's own desires and choices, the libertariandoes recognize negativedutiesto refrainfromforceand fraud that apply independentlyof the agent's own aims or interests.Even the libertarianthinksthat negative duties of forbearanceare other-regarding categoricalnorms.

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A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority ofMorality / 5 Anyagent-relative ethicaltheory thatholdsan agent'sobligations hostage tothepromotion ofherimmediate orunreflective interests ordesiresseems committed toa highly revisionary form ofminimalism. Someagentsareconcernedaboutothers.Butsuchother-regarding attitudes are notuniversal. Moreover, benefiting othersconsumestimeand resources thatmighthave beenspentinmoreself-confined ways.As longas peoplearepsychologically malleable, we mayaskwhythosewhodo nothaveother-regarding attitudes shouldcultivate themandthosewhohappento havethemshouldmaintain them.Unlessthereare answersto thesequestionsagent-relative ethical theorieswillbe quiteminimal. A sophisticated agent-relative ethicaltheory might trytoavoidminimalism thatitis inthelong-term interest ofagentstodevelop,maintain, byarguing and act on other-regarding attitudes. Sucha theorywouldbe a versionof ethicalegoism;it wouldclaimthatan agentis morallyobligatedto do as thatcourseofactionwouldpromote hisowninterest something justinsofar The ethicalegoist'sexplanation ofother-regarding moralrequireoverall.6 isconcerned mentswouldexploittheideathatmorality withtheappropriate andsocialinteraction andcooperation andrequires terms forpersonal people theirpursuit oftheirownaimsand interests and accepta fair to restrain inthefruits division ofgoodsandresources. Eachindividual hasan interest andcooperation. from a selfofsuchinteraction it be desirable Though might interested pointof view to reap the benefits of others'forbearances and the burdens of one's the without cooperation incurring own, opportunities todo thisareinfrequent. is generally andothers Noncompliance detectable, won'tbe forbearing and cooperative towardsagentswhoare knownto be thatcompliance So noncompliance securesshort-term benefits noncompliant. benefitsthannondoes not,but compliancesecuresgreaterlong-term compliance. andrestrained Becauseofthegenerally character ofcooperative beneficial ofactingfrom withthecognitive andaffective behavior, together advantages fairly coarse-grained dispositions, peoplewillhavereasontodevelopandact willalso Theseattitudes on socialsentiments andother-regarding attitudes. inothers'cooperation receiveexternal Becauseeachhasan interest support. willtendto reinforce behaviorand and restraint, communities compliant willalso behavior. discourage noncompliant Community pressure, therefore, It's offairly fosterthedevelopment coarse-grained compliant dispositions. and otherno accident,therefore, thatpeoplewillhave socialsentiments reasonto actin andthesewillgivethemagent-relative regarding attitudes, other-regarding ways.Andwheretheydon'tyethavetheseattitudes, they reasonstoactinother-regarding willnonetheless haveagent-relative typically suchattitudes. ways(ifonly)as partofa processofdeveloping The strategic egoistreasonsas follows.

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6 / David0. Brink 1. It is in theagent'sinterest to receivethebenefits ofsystems of cooperation and restraint. and restraint are available 2. The benefits ofsystems ofcooperation and onlyto thosewho maintain theappearanceofcooperation restraint towardsstrategic partners. 3. The leastcostlymeansofmaintaining theappearanceof and restraint and restrained. cooperation is by beingcooperative to be cooperative and restrained 4. Henceit is in theagent'sinterest . towardsstrategic partners. dutiesthathave agent-relative 5. Hencethereare other-regarding foundations. Inthisway,thestrategic ethicalegoisttriesto explainwhyone shouldboth byappealtoone'slong-term cultivate andmaintain other-regarding attitudes to justify other-regarding interests. Thisformof ethicalegoismattempts conclusions whiledenying (I)'s morality andavoidunacceptably minimalist oftheir claimthatthesemoralrequirements applyto agentsindependently interests and desires.7 theindependence assumption, Butas longas ethicalegoismrecognizes inwhichan agentwouldbenefit itmustremainrevisionary. Incircumstances theethicalegoistcannot from actingonselectively noncompliant dispositions, First, (2) is notalwaystrue.Inthe ascribeother-regarding moralobligations. theappearanceofcompliance case ofpublicgoodsthatare nonexcludable, compliance, though fairness isnotnecessary toreceivethebenefits ofothers' ifthestakesaresufficiently Moreover, typically seemstorequirecompliance. partners havealreadycomplied, highina particular case,andone'sstrategic eventheappearanceofcompliance. one mayhaveno reasonto maintain insucha case can outweigh thecostsof Forthebenefits ofnoncompliance Second,(3) is sometimesfalse. beingexcludedfromfutureinteraction. whereitis difficult to monitor Selectivenoncompliance maygo undetected Butsurelythemoralobligation tocomply anddetectdeception. compliance ispossible. doesnotceasejustbecausesuccessful deception Third, (4)doesn't of(5).Noncompliance towards thosewith a sufficiently version support strong in will be interest. So ifthe not interact one's whomone does strategically to stand so as and talented have strength and resources wealthy sufficient in and a the weak togainbyparticipating with handicapped system nothing andforbearance, thenthestrategic ofmutual egoistcanrecognize cooperation even former towards the latter. nodutiesofmutualaidthatthe have Finally, were ifthestrategic conduct of extensionally justificationother-regarding ensuresthattherearepossiblecases adequate,theindependence assumption ifonly forcompliant inwhichan agenthasnostrategic behavior, justification are so finebecausethestakesare so high,herdiscriminatory capacities our While other-regarding deceiver. obligagrained, orsheissucha successful ofotherthestrategic tionsarepresumably stable, justification counterfactually

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ofMorality / 7 A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority ethicalegoismare regarding conductis not.8Theselimitations in strategic in all limitations in thescope ofmorality itself, and notsimplylimitations therationality ofother-regarding conductand concern.9 tacit,solutions Oneaspectofviewing minimalist moraltheories as,perhaps to thispuzzleabouttherationalauthority ofmorality is thatitestablishes the a linkbetweenmetaethical and normative issuesand so undermines commonclaimthatmetaethics and normative ethicsare completely independentofeach other.The linkis simplythatifone acceptscertainmetaassumptions aboutreasonsfor ethicalclaims-viz.internalism, agent-relative is one committed to a action,and the independence assumption-then kindofmoraltheory, viz.some particular, indeed,extremely controversial ifone is to avoidthesenormative formofminimalism. views, Conversely, claims. one mustrejectat leastone ofthreemetaethical 2. ExternalistSolutions Some acceptthe existenceof categoricalmoralnorms,agent-relative andso reject aboutrationality, andtheindependence assumption assumptions in (II). This of morality the internalist assumption aboutthe rationality oftheapplication deniesthatitis a condition ofa moral externalist solution thatitprovidetheagentto whomitapplieswitha reasonfor requirement action.Whilemoralrequirements ofourantecedent applytousindependently on their desiresand interests, theygiveus reasonsforactionconditional promoting ourinterests or desires. an ambiguity within We might motivate thisexternalist position bynoting betweenhypothetical Kantianrationalism.10 Kant,ofcourse,distinguishes arecondiandcategorical imperatives imperatives (1785:414).Hypothetical tionalon whethertheconductenjoinedpromotestheagent'santecedent are not.Kantclaimsthat interests or desires,whilecategorical imperatives thanhypothetical, rather moralrequirements imperatives expresscategorical, twodistinguishable claimsherecorrespond(1785:416).Butwe might identify In one can be categorical. ingto twodistinct sensesinwhichan imperative are categorical sense,imperatives justin case theyapplyto peopleindeinthissense oftheiraimsorinterests. arecategorical pendently Imperatives norms.(I) assertsthatmoralrequireinsofaras theygeneratecategorical norms. moralrequirements-are categorical ments-including other-regarding inanothersensejustincase theyprovidethose are categorical Imperatives oftheirdesires, to whomtheyapplywithreasonsforactionindependently inthissensejustincase they are categorical aims,or interests. Imperatives reasonsareagent-neutral reasons.Categorical reasons, generate categorical reasons and other-regarding moralrequirements couldprovidecategorical reasonsforaction. onlyifthereare agent-neutral

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8 / David0. Brink themequally thesetwoKantian theseswe maynotfind Oncewe distinguish arecategorical inthefirst plausible. Wemight agreethatmoralrequirements inthe norms-but denythattheyarecategorical sense-theyarecategorical reasons. secondsense-theydo notgeneratecategorical might arguethatwe cannotseparatecategorical However, theinternalist reasons. normsand categorical (i.e. applyto peoplecategorically 1. Moralrequirements oftheircontingent desiresand interests). independently (categorically) tellsme to do x, thenI 2. Ifa moralrequirement moralreasonto do x. have a (categorical) moralreasonto do x, thenI have a 3. IfI have a (categorical) reasonto do x. (categorical) reasonsfor 4. Hencemoralrequirements generate(categorical) action. ofme to failto act on 5. Henceit wouldbe protantoirrational ofmyinterests or desires). moralrequirements (regardless tradeson an equivocation Buttheexternalist can replythattheargument betweendifferent sensesof'reason'.Inonesense(a) fortheretobe a reason is simplyforthereto existthe relevantsortof forme to do something behavioral standard ornorm.Inthissense,thereareas manykindsofreasons ofnorms;therearemoralreasons,reasonsofetiquette, as therearesystems moralnorms reasonsofstate,etc.Inthissense,theexistenceofcategorical does implytheexistenceofmoralreasonsand,hence,reasons. obviously we arejustgiving another reasons, Butwhenwe callthesereasonscategorical norms.The othersense calledcategorical nameto whatwe hadpreviously ofa certain sortofbehavioral of'reason'(b)signifies morethantheexistence thatthereis a reasonto behaveinaccordancewithsuch norm;itindicates a normsuchthatfailure tobehaveinthatwayis ceterisparibusorprotanto irrational. Ifthereis reason,in thissense,to act on a norm,thenpractical that reasonendorsesthisnorm.Anditis thissenseofreasonandrationality ofmorality andthedebateaboutwhether authority is atstakeintherational the all reasonsare agent-relative. Reasons,inthissense,do notfollowfrom seemsto mereexistenceofcertainsortsofnorms,as thecase ofetiquette ofmy demonstrate. Normsofetiquette applytomybehaviorindependently or attitudes, butfailureto observethemdoes notseemirrational interests oraims.So theexternalist unlessthisinsomewayundermines myinterests between tradesonan equivocation inconcluding thattheargument isjustified for(4) is soundjustin case it is thesetwosensesofreason:theargument as (4a),while(5) followsfrom(4) onlyif(4) is readas (4b). understood Ina similar mayappealtothesetwosensesof'reason' way,theexternalist of'reason',theexternalist to dissolvethepuzzle.On a univocal(b)-reading from(I) and is not of(II),(II) followstrivially denies(II).On an (a)-reading

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/ 9 ofMorality A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority won'tdeny(Ila). But(III)clearly premise.The externalist an independent of'reason'.But,ofcourse,thefourclaimsdo notform the(b)reading requires a genuineparadoxifwe read (II) as (Ila) and (III)as (IlIb). by considering We can bettersee thischallengeto Kantianrationalism (Foot1972). and etiquette morality between analogy PhilippaFoot'suseful and rules etiquette rules of distinguish to be difficult Atsomepointsitmay consideration sort of enjoinsthesame often etiquette ofmorality; forinstance, does. Becausewe wantto examine and respectforothersthatmorality thefocus unimportant, agreedto be fairly to something relation morality's moral with overlap thatdo not onetiquette mustbe onthoserulesofetiquette in the addressed invitations that requiring rules forinstance, requirements, morality thirdpersonbe answeredinthethirdperson.So we mustcompare thatare notalso moralrules). (thoserulesofetiquette and mereetiquette norms. arecategorical requirements, moral like Rulesof(mere)etiquette, cost at little do so whenyoucan The moraldutyto helpothersindistress, ourascription doesnotfailtoapplytoyou-we do notwithdraw toyourself, to yourneighbor's to you-justbecauseyou are indifferent of obligation to readyourmail,as wouldbe thecase ifitwas and in a hurry suffering toa third-person norm.Inthesameway,rulesagainstreplying a hypothetical inthefirst persondon'tfailto applyto you-we don'ttakeback invitation toyou-justbecauseyouthink etiquette ofdutiesofetiquette ourascriptions is sillyoryouhavea desiretoannoyyourhost,as wouldbe thecase ifrules norms. statedhypothetical ofetiquette theygenerate But rulesof etiquetteseem to lack rationalauthority; maystatecategorical reasons.Rulesofetiquette notcategorical hypothetical, unless norms,butfailureto observethesenormsdoes notseemirrational or aims.Heretoo moral theagent'sinterests thisinsomewayundermines of etiquette.If the mayseem on a par withrequirements requirements mutualaid, offorbearance, obligations is correct, assumption independence oftheagent.Though no aimsorinterests further andjusticewillsometimes insuchcases,perhapswe ofobligation theascription we neednotwithdraw We can conductin sucha case is notirrational. shouldallowthatimmoral reproachsucha personforimmoralbehavior,butnotforirrationality. Buttheanalogybetweenmoralsand mannersprovidesno explanation Nowtheexternalist hasa specialauthority. belief thatmorality ofthecommon is justan illusion-an ofmorality mightconcludethatthespecialauthority ofmoralnorms(as Foot ofmoraleducationand theinternalization artifact areimperfectly andetiquette claimthatmorality mayseemto).Buthemight is normswhoserationality categorical analogous.Whilealikeingenerating systems notcategorical, theyneednotbe equallyauthoritative hypothetical, ofthetwotypesofnorms.Different ofnorms.Thisis becauseofthecontent and havedifferent sortsofrequirements ofnormsmakedifferent systems The externalist mightclaimthatthemoral principles. pointsor organizing

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10 / David0. Brink to people's pointof view has a moreintimateand regularrelationship does. and aimsthanthepointofviewofetiquette interests important claimsaboutwhatthemoralpointofview Thebasicidearestsonfamiliar is).Oneversionappealsto claims is (andwhatthepointofviewofetiquette equality,and imconcernswithfairness, other-regarding aboutmorality's thatwe saw an ethicalegoist reasoning and thesortofstrategic partiality herewithin figures reasoning mightinvoke.However,thissortofstrategic moral ofother-regarding to defendtherationality a rationalegoistattempt ofmorality. an ethicalegoistaccountofthecontent notwithin considerations, as itwould Rationalegoismis theviewthatan actionisrationaljustinsofar whereasethicalegoismis theviewthat theagent'sowninterests, promote as itwouldpromotetheagent's justinsofar obligatory an actionis morally The rationalegoist,whois notan ethicalegoist,allowsthat owninterests. of the independently the contentof moralrequirements we can identify canbe shown thatmoralrequirements andthenthinks agent'sowninterest theagent'sowninterest. to be rational justto theextentthattheypromote ofconducthostageto theagent's The rationalegoistholdstherationality and desires;but,unliketheethicalegoist,he does nothold owninterests thesamesortof ofconducthostagein thisway.Nonetheless, themorality ethicalegoistemployscan be reasoningthatthe sophisticated strategic toexplainwhyagents purports egoist.Thatreasoning invoked bytherational and act on fairly coarsereasonto develop,maintain, have agent-relative The rationalegoistcan and attitudes. dispositions grainedother-regarding reliablecontingent justification employtheseclaimsto providea generally We sawthatthereare orother-regarding morality. oftherational authority ofotherlimitations tothestrategic justification actualoratleastcounterfactual egoistneednot conduct. But,unliketheethicalegoist,therational regarding itselfThey in thescope of morality as limitations view theselimitations ofmorality. thelimitsoftherationalauthority represent I assume,the pointof view of mereetiquette-whatever By contrast, to people's exactlyit is-has no such intimateand regularrelationship is notonly ofetiquette interests andaims.Therationalauthority important butweak and unreliable. contingent inhumaninterests implicated Ifso,themoralpointofviewismorecentrally claims Theseconstructive anddesiresthanis thepointofviewofetiquette. has a special can tryto show thatmorality suggesthow an externalist toagent-relative herself whilerestricting notenjoyedbyetiquette, authority, reasons. Solutions 3. Agent-Neutral assumptions tothepuzzleistogiveuptheagent-relative solution Another ofcourse, claims.Thetrick, in(III)infavorofagent-neutral aboutrationality

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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 11

We aboutreasonsforactionplausible. assumptions is tomakeagent-neutral simplybecauseit haveto explainhowI can havereasonto do something or desireofmine. no interest someoneeven ifit wouldfurther benefits Whereas mysterious. primafacie assumptions We mayfindagent-neutral for and his reasons desires and thelinkbetweentheagent'sowninterests reasons and his of others theinterests thelinkbetween actionseemsintuitive, Moreover,agent-relative foractionmay seem less clear or compelling. of reasonsforactionshould explainbetterwhyrecognition assumptions byagent-neutral tobe unmoved theagent,whereasitseemspossible motivate seem aboutrationality assumptions agent-relative Further, considerations. behavior, of explaining mode ofthe"rationalizing" extension tobe a natural sensesof'reasonfor and explanatory and thisallowsus to linknormative forthewelfare desires ifan agenthasnotalreadyformed action'.Bycontrast, ofotherpeople,it'shardto see howthewelfareofotherscouldexplainhis aboutrationality assumptions behaviorinanyway Butthenagent-neutral reasonsforaction. andexplanatory anylinkbetweennormative willnotforge aboutanother's believesthatfacts ofagent-neutrality thefriend Presumably, thatand whentheagentunderstands welfarecan and willbe motivational maintain can whysuchfactsprovidereasonsforaction.Ifso,agent-neutrality reasonsforaction.Explanatory and normative a linkbetweenexplanatory Normative givenheractualbeliefs. oftheagent'spro-attitudes, reasonsconsist rational Genuinely reasons. ofexplanatory an idealization reasonsrepresent theaimstheagentwouldhave in behavioris behaviorthatwouldsatisfy statein whichhervariousbeliefsand desireswere an idealizedepistemic (cf.Brink1989:63-6).Ifthereare convincing equilibrium inwidereflective theagent'saims reasons,thenthiswillaffect foragent-neutral arguments fromthe Ifso, therecan be no a prioriargument in reflective equilibrium. and orbetweenexplanatory andmotivation betweenrationality connection must We reasons.11 ofagent-neutral reasonsagainstthepossibility normative on a case by case basis. foragent-neutrality arguments considerparticular andtheoretical. intuitive toconsider: Therearetwomainkindsofargument ofrationality theories Agent-relative argument. first an intuitive Consider heraims.But theagentor further assumethatrationalactionmustbenefit or we have goodreasonto helpothersin distress surely,we mightthink, evenifhelping costtoourselves, harmtothemifwe cando so atlittle prevent ouraims.Supposethatwitha littleeffort us or further themwon'tbenefit is jammedor that I couldwarnyou,beforeourjump,thatyourparachute I couldeasilysteparoundyourgoutytoes.Surely,I have reasonto warn me or further my youand avoidyourtoesevenifdoingso doesn'tbenefit aims.12

13Buttheexternalist whoacceptsagentforce. Thisclaimhasconsiderable can acceptiton onereading.Shecan aboutrationality relativeassumptions agreethatthereis a moralreasonforme to warnyouaboutyourjammed

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12 / David 0. Brink parachute andwalkaroundyourgoutytoes,evenifdoingso doesnotbenefit ifI failtodo so. So sheagrees meorfurther myaims,andthatI amimmoral inthesensethatthereis a categorical thatI havea reasontodo thesethings normthatenjoinssuchconduct.She deniesonlythatthereis a categorical Assuming thatI wouldreceiveno benefit reasonforme to do thesethings. would not be irrational ofme to failto warnyouor fromtheseactions,it clearis thatitwouldbe (grossly) avoidyourgoutytoes.Whatis intuitively immoralof me to let you jumpor to treadon yourgoutytoes;it is not irrational. clearthatthiswouldalso be necessarily comparably forrecognizing arguments Kantand neo-Kantians also offer theoretical can be foundin ThomasNagel'sThe agent-neutral reasons.One argument and of Altruism. Nagelsees a parallelbetweenintertemporal Possibility ofbenefits andharms. He arguesforagent-neutrality interpersonal distribution ofan agent's future oraltruism Just as theinterests byanalogywithprudence. selfprovidehimwithreasonsforactionnow,so too,Nagelargues,others' prudence interests providehimwithreasonsforactionFailuretorecognize dissociation-failure to see thepresentas justone time involvestemporal involvespersonaldissociatorecognizealtruism amongothers-andfailure torecognize oneself as justonepersonamongothersBothkinds tion-failure ofdissociation aremistakes. Theparity oftimeandpersonwithin rationality, therefore, requiresacceptingagent-neutrality. by thisanalogywith Buttherationalegoistwillnotbe veryimpressed compensation, that requires prudence. Rational egoismassumesthatsacrifice if say to benefit another, is,thatan agenthas reasonto makea sacrifice, inreturn. andonlyiftheagentreceivessomesufficient benefit Nagelhimself strictpositionthattherecan be no interpersonal acceptsthe "extremely forsacrifice" requires compensation, (1970:142).Butifsacrifice compensation andaltruism mustbe importantly disanalogous. For,intheprudenprudence in favor fora sacrifice ofmypresentinterests tialcase,I am compensated are mine.Because of my greaterfutureinterests; thesefutureinterests andbeneficiary arethesame,diachronic, intrapersonal compensabenefactor isnotautomatic; benefactor tionisautomatic. Butinterpersonal compensation the andbeneficiary are distinct. Iftheindependence is correct, assumption ofmine. interests ofotherselves,howevergreat,are notipsofactointerests and thoseofothers betweenmyinterests Unlessthereis someconnection whenI sacrifice therewillinfactoften be),I amnotcompensated (as,ofcourse, concern forthoseofothers.Butthenjustified orfuture) myinterests (present does notitselfestablish concernforothers. formyownfuture justified A morepromising is to developthe Kantianattemptto link strategy thatmoralrequirenormsand categorical reasons.Kantthinks categorical mentsare categorical norms,becausetheyapplyto us insofaras we are andinclinations ofourcontingent interests rational beingsandindependently applyto us in (1785:408,411,425-7,432,442).Ifso, moralrequirements

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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 13

and theseare essentialto ourbeingagents virtueofourrationalfeatures, who deliberateand possessreasonsforaction.If so, suchrequirements of their arguablyprovideagentswithreasonsforactionindependently way to us in this that apply Any norms inclinations. interests and contingent action. for reasons agent-neutral categorical, generate would and thereareanysuchmoralrequirements tobe seenwhether Itremains so. He Kant thinks duties. other-regarding whethertheyincludefamiliar require that to Imperative oftheCategorical thefirst formulation understands one act on maximsthata rationalbeingas suchcouldwillto be universal thattheone thingthatan agentwouldchoose (1785:421,425-7).He thinks ofhercontingent as sheisrational, andindependently foritsownsakeinsofar agency.IfI rational of wouldbe therealization and interests, inclinations a thenI will being, chooserationalagencysolelyinsofaras I am rational as and not the rational agencyof chooseto developrationalagency such, If agency. so,thenreason notjustmyrational thisorthatbeing,inparticular, aboutotherrationalagents,as rationalagents, directsme to be concerned as we are rationalbeings fortheirownsakes.Kantconcludesthatinsofar and we wouldwillthatall rationalagentsbe treatedas endsin themselves of main formulation nevermerelyas means(1785:429);thisis hissecond theCategorical Imperative. treating duties.Itprohibits imposesother-regarding The secondformula no one be treated that as a means.Thenegative requirement anyonemerely and this carries as a meremeansrequiresthateach be treatedas an end, as ends requires certainpositiveduties.Forto treatotherrationalagents and agencyis valuable.This themas agentswhosedeliberation treating fromdoingthingsthat ceterisparibus,notsimplythatwe refrain requires, and agencyofothersbutalso thatwe do things wouldharmtheinterests agency.Andthiswillinvolvea concerntopromote topromote theirrational andagency, fordeliberation or assist,wherepossible,others'opportunities and theexecutionoftheirchoices theeffectiveness oftheirdeliberations, and commitments (cf.1785:430). a wayofunderstanding suggests ThisbriefsketchoftheKantianstrategy moralnormssuchthatthese ofother-regarding thecategorical application reasonsforaction. agent-neutral normsgeneratecategorical, as theyare rational applyto peopleinsofar 1. Moralrequirements agents. 2. Hencemoralrequirements supplyagentswithreasonsforaction. she willbe concernedwithrational 3. Insofar as an agentis rational, agency. 4. Insofaras an agentis concernedwithrationalagency,she will treatrationalagentsas end in themselves. dutiesto treat includeother-regarding 5. Hencemoralrequirements othersas ends.

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14 / David0. Brink 6. Henceagentshave reasonto act on other-regarding duties. Thisis nottheplacetodefendthedetailsofthisstrategy, butitis a solution to thepuzzleworthexploring further.14 4. MetaphysicalEgoist Solutions An agent-neutral solutionwouldbe unnecessary if the independence werefalse.Butthatassumption assumption looksveryplausibleas applied totheconnection betweenother-regarding actionandtheagent'sdesiresor pro-attitudes. We'vealreadynotedthatother-regarding attitudes seemneither universal nornecessary. Butthereis a moreabstract argument fordenying thatthereisa necessary connection betweenanyother-regarding actionand oftheagentthatappealstothesystematic anypro-attitude ofproplasticity attitudes. Thereare variousconnections betweenfactsand people'sproattitudes. Givensomeofmypro-attitudes, certainfactsor theirrecognition maycommitme to otherpro-attitudes. IfI wantto hirea suitableperson fortheposition, andyouaretheonlysuitable personavailable, then,ifI realize this,I willwantto hireyouforthepositionButthissortofconnection is nota necessary connection betweena factor beliefand a pro-attitude. For inresponse tothefactorbelief, itisalwayspossibletochangethepro-attitude thathadpreviously madethefactor beliefrelevant, ratherthanadoptthe newdesirethatthefactorbeliefrecommends. So ina context inwhichsome background are heldfixedthereare necessaryconnections pro-attitudes betweenfactsor beliefsand otherpro-attitudes. Buttheseconnections are not necessarysimpliciter, because systematic of one's promodification attitudes inlightofthefactsorone'sbeliefs Ifso,thisaspect isalwayspossible. oftheindependence is secure. assumption Butthisdoesnotruleoutthepossibility ofnecessary connections between actionsandtheagent'sinterests, other-regarding becausewe can construct non-conative of people'sinterests. If people'sinterests conceptions were in certainways,thiswouldundermine interdependent the independence We mightcall sucha viewmetaphysical assumption. egoism The metaphysicalegoistclaimsthatwhentheagent'sown happinessor interest is understood we willsee thatthegoodofothersis,intheappropriate correctly way,partoftheagent'sowngoodso thatactingon other-regarding moral isa wayofpromoting requirements hisowninterests. Ifso,therational egoist will be able to explainthe rationalauthority of other-regarding moral on agent-relative requirements assumptions. Metaphysical egoismis sometimes defended as partofabsoluteidealism, whichclaimsthateverything thatthereis existsas partofa singlecosmic or divineconsciousness. Forthenwhatwe thinkofas distinct lives(distinct streams ofconsciousness) as we wouldstandtocosmicordivineintelligence

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/ 15 ofMorality A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority now believe thatthe stages of a single lifestand to the person whose life it is. There would be a super-personalentitythat is both benefactorand beneficiaryin the interpersonalcase in much the same way thatwe take in diachronic,intrapersonal thepersonto be bothbenefactorand beneficiary sacrifice(contraryto Nozick'sclaim,quoted above). Whilethiswould make compensationautomatic,it would not yet establishinterpersonal intradeity compensation,because theperson who is benefactoris notalso beneficiary. compensation,rationalegoismwillnotrecognize And withoutinterpersonal demands.Ifabsoluteidealismis to the rationalauthorityof other-regarding establishinterpersonalcompensation,it musthold not only thatthereis a entitybutalso thatpersonsare essentiallypartsofthissupersuper-personal personal entitysuch thattheirwelfareis to be understoodin termsof its. This, I gather,is roughlythe view of idealistssuch as Hegel, Green,and Bradley.15 But, stated baldly,these metaphysicalassumptionsare likelyto seem implausible.The general strategy,however, is also familiarfromGreek to showthatjusticeis intheagent's philosophy.In theRepublicPlatoattempts own interest,properlyunderstood,because justiceis partof havinga wellorderedsoul. InNicomacheanEthicsix 4-12Aristotlearguesthatfriendship, whichis the virtueappropriateto communitiesand includesthe perfection ofjustice(1 155a22-8,1159b25-1160a8),is a virtuethatpromotesthe agent's own happiness,because the virtuousfriendis "another-self"(1168b2-6, benefits herpresumably thenbenefiting 1170b6-9).Ifthefriendis another-self, thenperhaps are associationsoffriendship, me. And ifpoliticalcommunities I can take thisattitudetowardsothersas well. Ifso, perhaps I can expect reasonto comply compensationand so willhave agent-relative interpersonal moral requirements. withother-regarding One attemptto unpack these claims relies on familiar,though not metaphysicalclaims.Indeed,I thinkthatthebasic strategy uncontroversial, Aristotleclaimsthatwe can justifyconcernforone's (best is Aristotelian.16 or complete)friendsand familymembers(e.g. childrenand siblings)as cases of, or on the model of,self-love(1161b15-1162a5,1166alO). in thesamewayas he is related The excellentpersonis relatedto hisfriend is anotherself,and therefore, to himself, sincea friend justas hisownbeing forhimin the is choiceworthy beingis choiceworthy forhim,thefriend's sameor a similarway [1170b6-9] One way to understand theseclaimsis as a proposalto modeltherelationship betweena selfand on therelationship between"other-selves" (e.g. intimates) its temporalparts. I have reason to regard my intimatesas other-selves, to me as future stages thesame relationship because theybear approximately bearto me,and thisfactprovidesme withreasonto care aboutthem. ofmyself Accordingto rationalegoism, concern for my own futureis rational; concernformy own futureis concernforme, and I am compensatedfor

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16 / David0. Brink ofmypresentselfon behalfofmyfuture self,becausemyfuture sacrifices self selfbe relatedto mypresent selfis a partofme.Buthowmusta future inorderforbothtobe partsofme?A commonandplausibleanswer(which On thisview, continuity.17 I shallemploybutnotdefend)is psychological continuous of psychologically person consists of a series a particular person justin case continuous stages.A seriesofpersonstagesis psychologically inthisseriesare psychologically wellconnected. And members contiguous connectedjustin case theyare a pairofpersonstagesis psychologically desires,andintenas beliefs, similar (intermsofsuchthings psychologically ofthelaterstagearecausallydependent features tions)andthepsychological wouldseemto implythatI upontheearlierstage.On thisview,self-love continuous with aboutselvesthatare psychologically shouldbe concerned mypresentself. withotherselveswithwhomI continuous ButI can be psychologically as wellas intrapersharea mentallifeand interact causally.Interpersonal, is possible.There will be psychological continuity sonal, psychological values,and goalsas the betweenanypeoplewhosharebeliefs, continuity extentin Thiswillbe trueto a significant resultoftheircausalinteraction. Itwillalso be trueto an thecase ofintimates, suchas spousesand friends. ofthesamecommunity, thoughlesser,extentamongmembers interesting, becausetheyhavecommongoalsandaimsandbecausethesesharedgoals and interaction. havebeen producedat leastin partby mutualdiscussion becauseit can continuity can also be indirect, Interpersonal psychological butwhoare each connected holdbetweenpeoplewhoare notthemselves whenitis mediated connected to othersincommon.Itcan also be indirect andpractices institu(e.g.mediaandlegalandpolitical bysocialinstitutions in. In theseways, tions)thatotherwiseisolatedpeople bothparticipate evenifthe can extendquitebroadly, continuity interpersonal psychological oftenweakensas it extendsfurther. degreeofcontinuity arepsychologically each individuals continuous, To theextentthatdistinct whoextendsherowninterests canandshouldviewtheotheras another-self Ifso, selfextendsherinterests. inmuchthesamewaythatherownfuture therecanbe automatic amongother-selves just compensation interpersonal Onewillhave as thereis automatic intrapersonal compensation. diachronic, tothe ofanother thewelfare reasonstopromote proportional agent-relative one bearsto her. continuity degreeofpsychological willpresumably theamountofother-regarding affect Degreeofcontinuity I have in thisway.Presumably, conductand concernthatcan be justified thanmyintimates, lessagent-relative reasontobenefit comparative strangers withme are less psychologically continuous precisely becausetheformer to a disthanthelatter.In thisway,metaphysical egoismseemscommitted to thedegreeofpsychological countrateofrationalconcernproportional tomorality, Butthisneednotbe a threat theagentbearstoothers. continuity

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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 17

tobe thought toothersis commonly becausetheextentofone'sobligations thatone can conferbutalso a function notsimplyoftheamountofbenefit beneficiaries. inwhichonestandstopotential ofthenatureoftherelationship obligations towards those more stringent Commonsense morality recognizes and family and friends in relationships (e.g. to stands special to whomone moral in Even impartial than towards others. topartners cooperative schemes) typically tryto justify or consequentialism, theories, suchas utilitarianism of differential concern and the legitimacy recognition ofspecialobligations The forthoseto whomtheagentstandsin specialrelationships.18 scale of to thoseto whomwe standin difamongourmoralobligations stringency a moraldiscount tobe seenwhether rate.Itremains ferent relationships forms discount rateofrational egoist's rateandthemetaphysical themoraldiscount butitisnota defect ofotherperse ofitsjustification concern areisomorphic, becausethere rateofconcern, regarding concernthatitembodiesa discount is a moraldiscountrate. conthedegreeofpsychological one'spowertoaffect Becauseitiswithin thereisa question whether oneshouldcultivate oneshareswithothers, tinuity or maintainother-selves. The metaphysical egoistcan claimthathaving inimportant extendsmyinterests ways.A plausibleconception another-self to exercisethose ofwelfarecan reasonably claimthatit is in myinterest capacitiesthatarecentraltothesortofbeingI am andthatthesecapacities deliberative capacities(cf.ENi 7). Havinganother-self include,importantly, capacities. Myothertoexercise mydeliberative provides uniqueopportunities I canlearnandbenefit theexperiences from selfbrings menewinformation. deliberation has by addingthemto myown.Moreover, thatmyother-self is exercisedin the Practicaldeliberation includespracticaldeliberation. andplans.Bydrawing andpursuit ofprojects reflective formation, assessment, I improve herindiscussion, ofmyother-self andengaging ontheexperience informed decisions notjustbyreaching better deliberations, myownpractical manner.I can also exercise mydecisionsina reflective butalsobyforming inmorecomplexprojects newdeliberative requiring capacities byengaging expandmydeliberative mutualcooperation. Intheseways,myother-selves and control. powers,activities, extendsone's interests Theseaspectsoftheway in whichanother-self one has reasonto seek in constrain similarity thedegreeofpsychological willbe morediverseand morecomplex sucha relationship. Myactivities I willdiversify ifmyother-self myexperiis no merecloneofme.19Clearly, interests different withsomeonewhohassomewhat encemorebyinteracting from willbe aidedbyinputandcriticism andexperiences. Mydeliberations willoften be enhanced incomplex newperspectives. Andcooperation projects andtalents. Theseconsiderations strengths whenparticipants havedifferent in larger,morediversegroupsas wellsmall providereasonto participate andmyownpractical willbe enlarged intimate associations. Myexperiences

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18 / David0. Brink deliberations willbe enhancedby the inputfrompeople withdifferent andlargergroupswithmorediverse experiences, values,andperspectives, make possiblemorecomplexformsof social membership will typically capacities. cooperation and,hence,theexerciseofnewkindsofdeliberative showthatbeneficial forcultivating another-self Indeed,thearguments one'sinterests. Ifso, one interaction withothersisitselfa wayofextending reasonto benefit others,as a way ofestablishing willhave agent-relative eventowardsthosewithwhomone is notalreadycontinuous. another-self, reasonstocultivate thatthereareagent-relative Thesearereasonstothink for compensation andmaintain other-selves, andbecausethereisautomatic sacrifice thereis reasonto thinkthatother-regarding amongother-selves, actioncan be a necessarypartofan agent'sgood. thefullrangeofmoral theegoistcanjustify Butwe maywonderwhether theactions formorality seemstorequirenotjustthatwe perform demands, itsdemandsfromtherightsortof it demandsofus butalso thatwe fulfill motives.Evenifegoismcan justify themoraldemandthatI benefit others, others itmayseemthatitcannotaccountforthemoraldemandthatI benefit fortheirownsakes.Becausethemetaphysical egoistjustifies outofa concern theother'sgoodas partofthe sacrifice onbehalfofanother byrepresenting actionnot agent'sowngood,thisseemsto base theagent'sother-regarding on concernfortheother'sownsake,butinsteadon self-love. to defendother-regarding Whilethestrategic egoistmayfinditdifficult is at the concernthat not, bottom, egoistcan do instrumental, metaphysical for cultivating other-selves appeals egoist's argument better. Themetaphysical of and that the to a deliberative welfare claims right conception individual extendmy interests sortof other-regarding by givingme relationships toexercisemorediverseandcomplexdeliberative capacities. opportunities onone's other-selves Thisargument acquiring byappealtoitseffects justifies other one's but in things, capacities, thecapacities questioninvolve,among if I'm andbeneficial ways.So justified relation tootherpeopleincooperative inentering becausetheyexercisethesesortsofcapacities, suchrelationships attitude does not obviouslyreflecta purelyinstrumental myjustification towardsthosewithwhomI'm entering suchrelationships. withothersis underway,psychological oncemyrelationship Moreover, and I can beginto see theirwelfareas continuity beginsto getestablished, partofmyown.Butifthisis true,thenmyconcernforthemwillnotbe Recallthe intrapersonal parallel.WhenI undergoa purelyinstrumental. ofmyfuture I do so becausetheinterests sacrifice fora future benefit present out of a selfare interests of mine;in thisway,I makepresentsacrifices self.Ofcourse,theon-balance concernforthesakeofmyfuture rationality ofthesacrifice myoverallgood.But,because dependsuponitspromoting thegoodofmyfuture selfispartofthisoverallgood,concernformyoverall self. as a constituent part,a concernforthegoodofmyfuture goodrequires,

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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 19

selfforitsownsake seemscompatible In thisway,concernformyfuture withand,indeed,essentialto self-love. and continuity egoistwantstomodelinterpersonal Nowthemetaphysical future as the agent's Just and concern. continuity concernon intrapersonal arepartofherinterests. ofother-selves selfisa partofher,so tootheinterests be concernedabout should agent the why Andso justas egoismexplains withherpresent continuous it is as selfforitsownsake,insofar herfuture aboutherother-selves self,so tooitexplainswhysheshouldbe concerned withher. as theyare continuous fortheirownsakes,insofar egoismhas appealedto bothdeliberative Myaccountof metaphysical accountsofpersonal continuity ofwelfareand psychological conceptions One could of argument. lines Thesemayseemto be independent identity. relationships other-regarding andmaintaining cultivating justify apparently theidea invoking ofwelfarewithout conceptions byappealto deliberative psychological appealtointerpersonal andonecouldapparently ofanother-self, evenifonewere,say, conduct ofother-regarding as a justification continuity are somewhatindependent, Whilethesetwolinesofargument a hedonist. egoism.The metaphysical andtogether strengthen theyarecomplementary why in role explaining ofwelfare playsa distinctive conception deliberative between parallel while the I shouldcultivateand maintainother-selves, providesa noncontinuity psychological and intrapersonal interpersonal to whom people about accountofwhyI shouldbe concerned instrumental the other. supports arguably eachlineofargument Moreover, I amso related. conceptions betweendeliberative Weshouldexpecttofindinterdependence of welfare,deliberativeconceptionsof personhood,and psychological in termsofreasonedcontroland accountsofpersonalidentity continuity continuity, (psychological of beliefs,desires,and intentions modification and category a normative isitself Becausepersonhood interpreted). properly in matters what personal is an accountof continuity becausepsychological ourviewsaboutwelfare oughttoaffect ourviewsaboutthesematters identity, or happiness.Ifwhatit is to be a personis to have certaindeliberative forthere andwhatitistobe thesamepersonovertimeis,roughly, capacities states,thenwe shouldexpectone's ofintentional tobe reasonedcontinuity of one's ingredient capacitiesto be an important exerciseof deliberative Andtotheextentthat inpartbecauseitwillextendone'sinterests. welfare, we should ina goodlife, ingredients seemtobe principal deliberative activities ingredient statesto be a principal ofintentional expectreasonedcontinuity tobe principal capacities anddeliberative inpersonal identity inwhatmatters egoist'sdualappeal Inthisway,themetaphysical inpersonhood. ingredients psychological conceptionsof welfareand interpersonal to deliberative promisesto be a virtue. continuity ofotherjustification egoistcan provideagent-relative The metaphysical howanother's goodcanbe partoftheagent's demands byshowing regarding

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20 / David0. Brink reasontofulfill an agentwillalwayshavean overriding owngood.Whether further moralrequirement isanother matter, requiring everyother-regarding ofboththenatureofmorality's other-regarding demandsand articulation egoism. versionofmetaphysical thisneo-Aristotelian 5. Solutions

of viewsaboutthefoundations I havetriedto showhowsomefamiliar be seenas, perhapstacit,solutions to thepuzzle.This ethicscan profitably perspective mayhelpus betterassesstheseviews. and minimalist For instance,whenwe view certainkindsof relativist andlocate tothepuzzle,we canbothsee theirrationale theories as solutions topreserve byan attempt theirimplausibility. Thesetheories aremotivated the the otherintuitively plausibleelementsof the puzzle.But rejecting whilemaintaining duties(norms), other-regarding existenceofcategorical tothepuzzle. seemstheleastplausible theindependence response assumption was to insistthatmoral Itwouldbe reasonableonlyifthesole alternative ofmere thanrequirements requirements have no morerationalauthority Butthisis notso. etiquette. Supposewe acceptnotonly(I)butalso(III)'sclaimthatallreasonsforaction areagent-relative and(IV)'sindependence assumption; thiswouldrequireus and reject(II). But thiswould not show thatmoral to be externalists For ofetiquette. thantherequirements requirements hadno moreauthority a rational ofstrategic reasoning toshowhow forms egoistcanemploycertain otherreasonsto fulfill agentshave generallyreliable,albeitcontingent, Andin offorbearance, andmutual-aid. cooperation, regarding requirements in whichactingon otherthoseactualor merelypossiblecircumstances theinterests oraimsofthe wouldnotfurther regarding moralrequirements offailure toactonthoserequirements theimmorality agent,we canmaintain itsirrationality. evenifwe cannotmaintain So,evenifwe hadtoaccept(III) and (IV),itwouldstillbe morereasonableto reject(II) than(I). isthecombination ofan agent-relative ethicaltheory What'sobjectionable Anagent-relative moraltheory thatdenied andtheindependence assumption. minimalist. Metatheindependence assumption neednotbe unacceptably understood, correctly thatpeople'sinterests, physical egoismtriestoestablish conductand are interdependent in waysthatensurethatother-regarding I presented metaconcernnecessarily promotetheagent'sown interests. ratherthanethical,egoism-that physicalegoismas a versionofrational, ofother-regarding andtherationalauthority is,as an accountofrationality moralrequirements, ratherthanas an accountofthecontentofmorality. Buttheresources ofmetaphysical egoismare availabletotheethicalegoist Insofar be agent-relative. whoinsists thatmoralrequirements mustthemselves

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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 21

other-regarding so as to justify egoismcan be articulated as metaphysical metamoral theoryincorporating conductand concern,an agent-relative minimalist clearly unacceptable while avoiding egoismcandeny(I) physical ofcategorical Indeed,we mightconcludethattherejection commitments. relativist is neither if it is in only asserted (I), plausible norms, other-regarding if it incorporates and minimalism only relativism will avoid it minimalist; nor egoism. metaphysical Of course,ifwe take (I) to be reasonablyfixed,our viewsaboutthe withour ofanyotherelementofthepuzzlewillvaryinversely plausibility if we for accept other two. instance, of the So, the viewsabout plausibility there are requirements the that other-regarding fixed claim orholdreasonably denial thenwe cansee thattheexternalist assumption, andtheindependence under will be If, plausible. denial of inversely (III) the of(II)and agent-neutral are agent-relative, that all reasons for action we also think theseassumptions, we mustconcludethatit is at leastpossibleforthereto be circumstances foran agentto failto fulfill butnotirrational inwhichitwouldbe immoral think (II)isfalse Wewill,therefore, moralrequirements. herother-regarding that moral we also assume if,undertheseassumptions, And,similarly, all that not think should we mustsupplyreasonsforaction, requirements If we (III). will to reject lead us This reasonsforactioncanbe agent-relative. we acceptagent-relative then,whether assumption, reject(IV)'sindependence we should accept(II)'sclaim aboutrationality, assumptions oragent-neutral for do supplyreasons action(thoughwe needn't thatmoralrequirements aboutmorality). truth does,thatthisis a conceptual as theinternalist think, can Moreover,we maypool resources.The friendof agent-relativity egoiststoprovide ofbothstrategic andmetaphysical combinetheresources ofother-regarding a strongrationalegoistdefenseoftherationalauthority maywishto enlistthe ofagent-neutrality moraldemands.Eventhefriend and metaphysical egoists.Forevenifwe reject(III)'sclaim aid ofstrategic ofagentandaccepttheexistence thatallreasonsforactionareagent-relative tothink thatallreasonsforactionareagentwe areunlikely neutral reasons, reasonsforaction.Butthisraises neutral.Therewillstillbe agent-relative otherreasonsthatsupport betweenagent-neutral thepossibility ofconflict reasonsthatmaynot.Ifwe andagent-relative moralrequirements regarding reasons ofmoralrequirements, agent-neutral theimportance aretovindicate agent-relative overridden by countervailing mustnot be systematically reasons theses andweakerrationalist theneedtodistinguish stronger Thissuggests reason to fulfill thesisclaimsthatthereis alwayssome A weak rationalist The todo so istothatextentirrational. suchthatfailure moralrequirements thesiswouldclaimthatforeveryagentthereis always rationalist strongest to do so is suchthatfailure moralrequirements reasonto fulfill overriding theses. rationalist irrational. on-balance And,ofcourse,thereareintermediate

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22 / David0. Brink ofthe thesiswillaffect ourformulation Infact,thestrength oftherationalist a ofthepuzzleso that(II)reflects puzzle.We mightreviseourformulation strongrationalist thesis to other-regarding obligations-apply I. Moralrequirements-including oftheiraimsor interests. agentsindependently or provideagentswithcompelling II. Moralrequirements necessarily overriding reasonsforaction. III. Reasonsforactionaredependent ontheaimsorinterests oftheagent who has them. IV Thereis no necessaryconnection betweenother-regarding action oftheagent. and anyaim or interest A solution theexistence ofagent-neutral totheinitial puzzlethatestablishes reasonstobe moralmaynotsolvetherevisedpuzzle.Thedefenseofagentabout reasonsandtherejection ofpurelyagent-relative assumptions neutral to vindicate therarationality, thoughsignificant claims,are notsufficient reasonsare tionalist elementof the revisedpuzzle.Unlessagent-neutral wouldbe toarguethatagentnecessarily superior reasons,thebestsolution moralrequireunderstood, support other-regarding relative reasons, properly the mentsas well.So friends ofagent-neutrality woulddo wellto cultivate egoists, eveniftheyrejecttherational resources ofstrategic andmetaphysical thatall reasonsforactionare agent-relative. egoistassumption ofthepuzzlewouldrequiremorecomprehensive Further investigation foragentof(III) and (IV).Are therecompelling arguments investigations foragent-neutrality be articulated CanKantian plausibly? relativity? arguments as theneo-Aristotelian viewclaims?If Arepeople'sinterests independent, moralrequirements and other-regarding aspectsof so, do other-regarding istheauthority ofmoral Howstrong an agent'swelfare dovetail appropriately? forjustifying conduct demandswhenthevariousresources other-regarding we willhavethe are countedtogether? Whenwe answerthesequestions, solution to thepuzzleabouttherational authority resources fora satisfying ofmorality.20 Notes it assumes the normsof moralityare normsof rationality, 1. Because internalism that(II) is an a prioriconstrainton moraltheoryand is not up implies,in effect, forgrabs So understood,internalismis a groundforasserting(II) Internalism is sometimesunderstoodas a claim about moralmotivation,whereas the kind or morality thatsupports(II) is a claimabouttherationalauthority ofinternalism see Brink1989 ch 3 Internalism For a discussionofvariousformsofinternalism, about moral motivationis relevantto a puzzle about moral motivation

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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthontyof Morality/ 23 I II III IV

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10 11

MoralJudgments express beliefs Moraljudgmentsimplymotivation Motivationinvolvespro-attitudes Thereis no necessaryconnectionbetweenany beliefand anypro-attitude

Noncognitivists (e g Stevensonand Hare) reject(I), externalists(e g Foot and I) deny(II),and new-wavetheoriesofmotivation(e g Nageland McDowell)deny either(III) or (IV) ThoughI do notagree withtheirsolutions,thissecond puzzle is usefullydiscussedby McNaughton1988 and Smith1989 theegoistclaimthatI have reason In some contextsit is important to distinguish to do somethinginsofaras it wouldpromotemyinterestsor advance myoverall claim thatI have reason to do somethinginsofar good and the instrumentalist as it would satisfymy presentdesires Amongotherdifferences, the latterhas an important thatthe formerdoes not But bothare agenttemporalrestriction relativeviews,and mypresentpurposesdo not in generalrequirethattheybe only where it seems relevant sharplydistinguishedI will markthe distinction to my argument As I am understanding it,agent-neutrality says onlythatotherpeople's interests ofanyconnection can directlyprovideme withreasonsforaction,independently withmy interestsor aims,it says nothingabout the scope or weightof various reasons So agent-neutral theoriescan be quite varied directlyother-regarding benevolence and Broad'sself-referential altruism For instance,Sidgwick'srational are both agent-neutral (cf Broad 1953 279-280) Cf Davidson 1963, 1974 Cf Hume 1739 III i 1, Mackie 1977 ch 1, Harman 1975, 1984 betweenact egoismandmotive Myaccountofstrategic egoismdoes notdistinguish egoism That's a topic foranotheroccasion Cf EpicurusKuriaiDoxa 31-38,Taylor 1987,Axelrod 1984,Gauthier1986,and such Frank 1988 Thougheach accepts a formof rationalegoismincorporating strategicreasoning,Epicurusand Gauthierare clearestabout employingsuch reasoningas partofethicalegoismand itsattemptto derivethecontentofmorality fromagent-relative rationalchoice constraintson the models of social interaction There are various significant in whichcooperationand restraint are strategically rational.The modelmustbe too much,the environment dynamic,actorsmustnot discountfuturepay-offs mustincludea sufficiently largenumberofconditionalcompliers,and conditional compliersmustbe able to monitorreliablythe complianceand noncompliance of others(thislast conditiontendsto be more easily satisfiedin small groups) The RingofGygesexposes thecounterfactual ofstrategicegoism,this instability is whyPlato insiststhatjusticebe shownto be valuable foritsintrinsic, and not simplyextrinsic,consequences(Rep 359b-361d) However,Repubhci-uiappears ofjustice, to be concernedwitha rationalegoistchallengeto therationalauthority notwithethicalegoism Ifso, it differs fromtheGorgias,inwhichCalliclespresents an ethicalegoist challengeto conventionaljustice Indeed, Gauthieris quite candid about these limitationsin his argument His situations ofother-regarding conductamongactorsinstrategic depends justification on theassumption thatsuchactorsare "psychologically translucent" (1986 173-4), and he acknowledgesthathe cannotexplaindutiesto thosewithwhomone has no strategicinteraction(1986 16, 17) My discussionhere owes much to Foot 1972 Anyview,such as this,thattreatsrationalactionas actionthatwouldsatisfythe aims the agent would have in an idealized epistemicstate in whichher beliefs

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24 / David 0 Brink anddesiresareinreflective equilibrium might seemtobe an agent-relative view Ifso,itmayseemthatnoarguments aboutrationality foragent-neutrality within reflective equilibrium couldunseatagent-relative assumptions aboutrationality, therationality ofother-regarding conductwouldstilldependon factsaboutthe agent'saimsor desires(cf Williams1980) Butthisa prioridefenseofagentisnota constituent relativity hastwoproblemsFirst, thiskindofagent-relativity elementofthepuzzle Ifreflective equilibrium might be suchthataimsthatare inreflective equilibrium mustincludedirectconcernforothers, thenthereis no problemabouttherationalauthority ofmorality on thekindofagent-relative ofthisreflective assumptions characteristic equilibrium accountofrationality Ifwe understand theagent-relativity of(III)inthisway,thereis or needbe no in(I-(IV)To putitanother inconsistency way,thekindofagent-neutrality sufficient toresolvethepuzzleisnotinconsistent withagent-relativity inthissenseSecond, whether thereflective isagent-relative equilibrium accountofrationality depends thearguments ifgood,are goodarguments foragent-neutrality, uponwhether becausethey'rein reflective equilibrium or whether they'repartofreflective Iftheformer, therationality equilibrium becausethey're goodarguments ofotherifthelatter, regarding conductis agent-relative, itis agent-neutral The friend ofagent-neutrality advancesarguments themerits presumably foragent-neutrality inreflective ofwhichareintended toexplainwhyagent-neutrality shouldfigure equilibriumAs such, these arguments,if successful,would vindicate

agent-neutrality

12 Theexampleinvolving gouty toesisHume's(1751ch V,pt ii),though hisconcern is withegoisttheoriesofmotivation, notrationality 13 Itwillhaveevenlessforceagainstagent-relative aboutrationality assumptions ifwe rejecttheindependence assumption (cf ?4 below) 14 I explorethisstrategy morefullyin Brink1991 15 Cf Hegel1821 ?268, 1840 ch 3, Green1883 ??180-91,199-203, 232-9,286, and Bradley1927 69-81,163,166-92,203-6,219-25 16 Whatfollowsis a condensedversionofclaimsthatI defendat greaterlength in Brink1990,cf Irwin1988 ch 18 is also PlatonicPlatoclaimsthat(1) thevirtuous Thisargument personwill haveloveforothers(Rep402d-403c, concernfor 412d),and(2)love(a) involves thebeloved'sownsake,and(b)is,forthelover,thenextbestthing toimmortality (Symp206e-212candPhdrs243c-257b)(Cf Irwin1977 241-3) Plato'sgrounds foraccepting toAristotle's reasonsforregarding one'sfriend (b)seemverysimilar as "another-self" (see below)(1)-(2)allowPlatoto arguethatthevirtuous agent willbe concernedabout othersfortheirown sakes and willnecessarilybenefit

frombenefiting them Also,thereis a readingof thisproject,whichI won'tpursue,thatbears to theidealiststrategy mentioned above resemblance 17 Cf Parfit 1984 partIII,Shoemaker1984 Forsomeevidencethatsucha view see Irwin1988 241-255,284-6,345,376-8 appealsto Aristotle, 18 Cf Sidgwick1907 432-9,Railton1984,and Brink1986 iscompatible the 19 Psychological withpsychological diversity continuity provided diversityis the resultof interactionin which the participantsexchanged and

resultfroma process discussedbeliefs, goals,and values Forthendifferences inwhichtherewerecommonintentional statesproduced bycausalinteraction at theCenterforAdvanced 20 Workon thispaperwas doneduringa fellowship Sciencesthatwasfunded StudyintheBehavioral byan OldDominion Fellowship andbygrants from theNational from theMassachusetts Institute ofTechnology

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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 25 and the AndrewW Mellon (#RA-20037-88) forthe Humanities Endowment fortheirsupportI wouldalso I wouldliketothanktheseinstitutions Foundation like to thankRandyCalvert,StephenDarwall,ThomasHurka,and David ofsomeoftheseissues forhelpful discussion McNaughton References Ethics(EN),trs T IrwinIndianapolisHackett,1985 Nicomachean Aristotle ofCooperationNewYork BasicBooks Axelrod,R 1984 TheEvolution Press F H 1927 EthicalStudies,2d ed OxfordClarendon Bradley, " Unpublished and KantianRationalism Imperatives D 0 1991 "Categorical Brink, Egoism,Self,andOthers" In 0 FlanaganandA Rorty D 0 1990 "Rational Brink, MA MITPress and MoralityCambridge, Character, (eds),Identity, Cambridge ofEthicsCambridge andtheFoundations D 0 1989MoralRealism Brink, Press University andthePersonalPointofView,"TheJournal Morality D 0 1986 "Utilitarian Brink, 83, pp 417-39 ofPhilosophy, Essays " Reprinted inD Cheney (ed),Broad'sCritical Broad,C D 1953"SelfandOthers in MoralPhilosophyLondonGeorgeAllen& Unwin,1971 Essays inD Davidson, D 1963 "Actions, Reasons,andCauses" Reprinted Davidson, Press,1980 on Actionsand EventsNewYork OxfordUniversity in D Davidson,Essays Reprinted as Philosophy" Davidson,D 1974 "Psychology Press,1980. on Actionsand EventsNewYork OxfordUniversity vol II, Philosophers, LivesofEminent EpicurusKuriaiDoxa. In DiogenesLaertius, 1925) MA Loeb Library, trs R Hicks(Cambridge, " Reprinted in P Imperatives as a SystemofHypothetical Foot,P 1972 "Morality Press,1978 ofCalifornia and Vices Los AngelesUniversity Foot,Virtues Reason NewYork Norton Frank,R 1988 Passionswithin Press D 1986 MoralsByAgreementOxfordClarendon Gauthier, to EthicsNewYork Crowell,1969 Green,T H 1883 Prolegomena In D CoppandM Zimmerman G 1984 "IsTherea SingleTrueMorality7" Harman, Reason,and TruthTotowa,NJ Romanand Littlefield (eds),Morahty, Review, 85,pp 3-22 ThePhilosophical Defended," Relativism Harman, G 1975."Moral of History,trs L Rauch to the Philosophy Hegel,G W F 1840 Introduction IndianapolisHackett,1988 Press, trsT M KnoxOxfordClarendon ofRight, Hegel,GW F 1821 ThePhilosophy 1942 Hackett, thePrinciples ofMoralsIndianapolis Concerning Hume,D 1751AnEnquiry 1983 Press, OxfordClarendon ed P Nidditch ofHumanNature, Hume,D 1739A Treatise 1978 Press FirstPrinciplesOxfordClarendon Irwin,T H 1988 Aristotle's Press Irwin,T H 1977 Plato'sMoralTheoryOxford:Clarendon Indianapolis ofMorals,trsJ Ellington fortheMetaphysics Kant,I 1785 Grounding Academypagination) Hackett,1981 (Prussian Rightand WrongNewYork Penguin Mackie,JL 1977 EthicsInventing D 1988 MoralVisionOxfordBlackwell McNaughton, Press University NJPrinceton Princeton, ofAltruism Nagel,T 1970 ThePossibility State,and UtopiaNewYork BasicBooks Nozick,R 1974 Anarchy, Press D 1984 Reasonsand PersonsOxfordClarendon Parfit, Plato Republic(Rep),trs G GrubeIndianapolisHackett,1974

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26 / David 0 Brink Plato Gorgias, trs T IrwinOxfordClarendon Press,1979

Plato Symposium(Symp),trs M Joyce In CollectedDialogues of Plato, eds E

University Press,1963 Hamilton and H CairnsPrincetonPrinceton

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A Materialist's Account"In S Shoemaker Shoemaker, S 1984 "PersonalIdentity and R Swinburne, PersonalIdentityOxfordBlackwell Sidgwick, H 1907 TheMethodsofEthics,7thed IndianapolisHackett,1981

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Press inB Williams, B 1980 "Internal Reasons" Reprinted Moral andExternal Williams, Luck CambridgeCambridge University Press,1981

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