Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies Vol. 10 No. 1

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Regionalism in Asia and Europe in a Theoretical Perspective: ‘Rationalist’ and ‘Ideational’ Approaches*1 CHRISTIAN FJÄDER** Helsinki, Finland

The regional integration processes in Asia and Europe have been generally considered different in nature and practice. Whereas European regionalism is seen as highly institutionalised through a set of binding treaties enforced by a massive bureaucracy, regionalism in East Asia is seen as the outcome of free market forces bringing closer economic interaction and interdependence, rather than by institutions and binding treaties. Correspondingly there is a dichotomy in International Relations regionalism theory between Rationalist and Ideational approaches to regionalism in Asia and Europe. Whilst ontological and epistemological differences between these are so fundamental that a synthesis is unlikely, this article argues that the dichotomy may become somewhat breached and a level of convergence may emerge due to the evolution of regionalism in these regions. Keywords: Asia, Analytical Eclecticism, ASEAN, APEC, East Asia Summit, European Union, International Relations Theory, Regionalism

I. INTRODUCTION The regional integration processes in Asia and Europe have been generally considered different in nature and practice. Whereas European regionalism is seen as highly institutionalised through a set of binding treaties enforced by a massive bureaucracy, regionalism in East Asia is seen as the outcome of free market forces bringing closer economic interaction and interdependence, rather than by institutions and binding treaties. Consequently, East Asian regionalism is often characterised as soft and normative regionalism, or as “pragmatic” regionalism, in contrast to the *

The author is an independent scholar and wishes to thank EUSA AP for the generous grant to attend its annual conference “EU’s Unknown Asia: New Horizons and New Beginnings” 4th and 5th June 2012 in Singapore and to present this paper. ** Helsinki, Finland; E-mail: [email protected]

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legalistic, political and civilizational regionalism in Europe. Alternatively, some observers have distinguished between the processes of regionalism and that of regionalization in order to differentiate between institutionalised (political) and social regional integration.1 Moreover, I argue that there is a dichotomy in International Relations regionalism theory between Rationalist and Ideational approaches-primarily Functionalism, Neofunctionalism and Neoliberalism in the first group and Social Constructivism and critical theories in the latter-to regionalism in Asia and Europe. Whilst Neofunctionalism and Neoliberalism have ruled the study of European regionalism, with the exception of a recent challenge by Social Constructivism, East Asian regionalism studies have increasingly relied on Social Constructivism as a theoretical framework. The challenge with this setup is the notion within these paradigms that the two approaches are incommensurate due to ontological and epistemological differences. Consequently, the studies of regionalism typically follow one or the other the other with little or no effort to integrate areas of strength from the other approach into research agendas. Strict adherence to paradigms also limits the research agenda to topics that suit the convention, whilst ignoring research problems that do not. Moreover, there appears to be a convention that one cannot compare Asian and European regionalism effectively, and when it is done the focus of comparisons has tended to be what Asia should learn from Europe. Whilst it should be acknowledged that different theoretical paradigms have particular strengths in explaining different aspects and phases of regional integration, neither approach can explain regionalism as a phenomenon, its drivers and processes in an exhaustive fashion. Nowhere is this more evident than in the study of region formation and enlargement, where I would argue that material interests or ideational motives are most intertwined and hence, neither approach alone can produce sufficient explanations. Hence, this article argues that the dichotomy needs to breached in order to facilitate a more holistic understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches to region building and enlargement, two areas that best describe what the regions “are made of”. Consequently, a “third way” approach, in the spirit of pragmatism and analytical eclecticism would benefit the discipline in terms of making the research agenda more balanced, broader and policy relevant. Katzenstein and Sil have defined analytic eclecticism as “any approach that seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements-concepts, logics, mechanisms, and interpretations-of theories or narratives that have been developed within separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive prob1

Hurrell (1995), p. 39.

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lems that have both scholarly and practical significance.”2 Analytic eclecticism is closely associated with pragmatism, established by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and others, which argues that the purpose of science is pragmatic and hence, the purpose of is to support problem based research that supports policy-making, not only the creation of theory.

II. REGIONALISM IN ASIA AND EUROPE: ORIGINS, NATURE AND LIMITS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION The difference in nature of regionalism in Asia and Europe is one of the most contested areas in the study of regionalism. Albeit both were essentially Cold War constructs, built on the legacy of the Second World War and the end of colonialism following it and thus, arguably neorealist and neoliberal in inception, the two have developed in different pace building institutions and identities in different sequence and speed. In fact, the two regions’ approaches to region formation, institutionalisation and enlargement have significant differences. Yet, comparative approaches have not succeeded in capturing the similarities nor the possible lessons for each of the regions in comparison to the other (in particular in terms of what Europe could learn from Asia. Neorealist and neoliberal theories, for instance, have suffered from a failure to account for ASEAN’s success, or even the organisation’s continuing existence, as well as explaining the EU’s CEEC-10 (“Eastern Enlargement of 2004). Social Constructivism on the other hand has gained ground in these two issues, but as Van Langenhove (2003)3 has posited it is unable to address the problem “what is a region” as it assumes that each actor defines the region differently.

1. Regionalism in Asia: Many Regionalisms Asia is home for many regionalisms comprising East Asian, Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asian variants, with the corresponding mix of regional institutions.4 The broadest of these regionalisms is the one of the AsiaPacific, whilst East Asian regionalism is the most recent and least developed. The most advanced form of regionalism in Asia is that of Southeast Asia, which arguably forms the core around which the other regionalisms are built. 2 3 4

Katzenstein and Sil (2010), p. 10. Van Langenhove (2003), pp. 2-3. South Asian regionalism is not in scope of this article.

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What makes deeper integration difficult in the broader region is the diversity in definitions of the region itself. The broadest definition is that of “Asia-Pacific”, which is institutionalised in APEC and covers Russia, North and South American Pacific Basin countries in addition to East Asia and Oceania. The Pacific Basin countries, however, are not members in the East Asia Summit and thus “Asia-Pacific”5 is beyond the scope of the emerging East Asian Community. The result of all this has been rather vague definitions of East Asia and its constituent parts: 1) Southeast Asia is the territory south of China and east of India (which was enforced by ASEAN’s rejection of India and Sri Lanka) and 2) East Asia is Asia-Pacific minus Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (APEC comprises the Pacific Rim region, which an extension of Asia-Pacific). Thus, speaking of Asian regionalism in singular does not do justice to the complexities of the problem. The following is a brief review of Asian regionalisms.

(1) Asia-Pacific Regionalism The development of Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific has been a long road paved with a series of proposals for regional institutions. The beginning of this journey started in n the early 1960s when the Japan Economic Research Center (JERC) began to explore the opportunities for regional integration. Its first report “Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Area” argued that there was indeed sufficient potential in the region to promote regional cooperation and proposed the establishment of annual ministerial meetings between Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States.6 Based on these findings, Japanese economist Kiyoshi Kojima first sketched an idea of a Pacific Community in 1966. The idea was taken further by the Japan-Australia Business Cooperation Committee that established the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967 to promote study and discussion regarding regional trade and investment, as well as to promote public-private sector cooperation in economic matters.7Whilst this did not result into the establishment of regional institutions as such, the idea of Asia-Pacific Regionalism had been born. The idea of Asia-Pacific Regionalism was taken significantly further by the creation of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980, initiated by Japan’s Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira and Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser.8 PECC was much broader in membership and 5

6 7 8

‘Asia-Pacific’ is generally considered to comprise East Asia and the Pacific Rim countries. In Japanese academia the common notion has been that the ‘Pacific’ is code for the liberal countries of the Pacific Rim, specifically Australia, United States and New Zealand. Soesastro (1994), p. 79. Soesastro (1994), p. 80. Gibney (1998), p. 33.

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involved twenty Asia Pacific nations in national member committees.9 The most significant contribution of PECC, however, was paving the way for the establishment of the first genuine regional institution in the AsiaPacific: the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation in 1989. The major breakthrough with APEC, however, was reached only when in early 1990 ASEAN Economic Ministers adopted the “Kuching Consensus”, which produced an agreement on the terms of ASEAN’s participation in APEC and thus, making the organisation truly region-wide in reach.10 APEC’s membership also expanded to cover a total of 21 member economies after four waves of enlargement in 1991 (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan), 1993 (Mexico, and Papua New Guinea), 1994 (Chile) and 1998 (Peru, Russia and Vietnam).11 Institutional development of APEC was a commonly perceived weakness until it took a new dimension following the 1993 Seattle summit as a consequence of the Clinton administration’s endorsement of APEC in general and a push for a transformation of APEC from a purely consultative body into an international organisation with a small secretariat in Singapore.12 The 1995 Osaka Summit, on the other hand, produced the “Osaka Action Agenda”, detailing how APEC as an organisation and its member economies planned to reach these targets and support the non-discriminatory trading system. In the Manila 1996 Summit the leaders agreed on the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA), reaffirming the organisation’s commitment to trade liberalisation and facilitation through following the principles of open Regionalism,13 signifying that APEC was to be open to any economy with strong economic linkages to the region and a demonstrated will to adhere to shared principles.14 The 1997 Asian financial crisis, in particular the speed and extend of the contagion spread in the region, reminded the regional states of their interdependency and the weakness of cooperation between them. The cri9

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12 13 14

The twenty national member committees were: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan (under the name Chinese Taipei), Thailand, the United States and the Pacific Islands nations. Pitty (2003), p. 41. The term ‘member economies’ was adopted to emphasise the economic and non-political nature of APEC. APEC’s 21 Member Economies are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Republic of the Philippines, The Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Thailand, the United States of America and Viet Nam. Source: APEC Secretariat, http://www.apec. org/apec/about_apec.html. Pitty (2003), p. 34. Also referred to as ‘new Regionalism’ or as Drysdale has titled it ‘Open Economic Association’. Drysdale and Elk (1997), p. 42.

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sis, as unfortunate as it was, produced a major turning point in APEC’s development. As Naoko Munakata has suggested the opportunity to fill the perceived gap offered a major opportunity to APEC and following the crisis “APEC became the primary vehicle for regional cooperation.”15 Boosted by the newly found enthusiasm towards APEC, The Eminent Persons Group was tasked to produce a new vision for APEC that included APEC FTA (PAFTA). PAFTA, however, failed to attract widespread support and the APEC leaders decided instead stick to Bogor principles of voluntary liberalisation and peer pressure.16 Another setback was a decisive attempt by ASEAN to increase its influence in the region through the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three (ATP), involving ASEAN and the major East Asian powers China, Japan and South Korea. Nonetheless, APEC is a major regional organisation that involves 21 countries, covering approximately 41% of the world’s population, 49% of world’s GDP and 49% of world trade.

(2) East Asian Regionalism Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohammad, Malaysia’s long-serving Prime Minister, concerned about the poor progress made in the GATT Uruguay Round for multilateral trade liberalisation, as well as the increasing discriminatory regionalism in the EU and NAFTA, proposed in late 1990 an Asian economic block-East Asian Economic Group-comprising ASEAN, Indo-China, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan.17 Mahathir’s intention was that the new block would be exclusively an “Asians only” grouping to countervail the “Western” blocks. Japan, however, immediately vehemently opposed to the notion of an exclusively Asian block. The United States and ASEAN also were hostile towards the idea; United States because it would have been totally excluded and ASEAN because it was concerned for losing its centrality in East Asian Regionalism. Due to the fierce opposition a more informal version of the EAEG, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) was put forward in 1991.18 EAEC, however, was soon dubbed as the “caucus without Caucasians” and was dismissed due to opposition by Japan since it would have excluded Australia and New Zealand. When Mahathir was replaced by Abdullah Badawi in 2003, the new Prime Minister began rapidly repairing ruptured bilateral relations with Singapore, the United States and Australia.19 Badawi 15 16 17 18 19

Munakata (2006), pp. 143-145. Munakata (2006), p. 143. Munakata (2006), p. 142. Pitty (2003), p. 31. Richardson (2005), p. 355.

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also resurrected the idea of East Asian Regionalism and suggested the establishment of an East Asian Summit in 2004 ATP meeting. The major East Asian powers, however, were still not unified in what kind of Regionalism they wanted to promote. For instance, China wanted exclusive form of Regionalism and was strongly opposed to India’s and Australia’s membership, whilst Japan preferred a more inclusive approach supporting the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in particular. Being confronted with strong support for Australia’s and New Zealand’s inclusion by Japan, China then demanded that ATP forms the basis for East Asian region building within the context of emerging East Asian Community (EAC).20 The Badawi proposal nonetheless took wind under its wings in the ASEAN+3 Leaders’ Summit in November 2004, which decided on the establishment of an “East Asian Community” along the lines of a report by the East Asia Vision Group issued in 2001. The report envisioned the formation of the East Asian Community with ASEAN as the core and the enlargement of the ATP process to include more countries, including Australia. In this spirit the report made a number of far-reaching recommendations in economic, financial, political and security, environmental, social and cultural and institutional cooperation in East Asia, including; Establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and faster liberalisation of trade well ahead of APEC Bogor goals Formation of a East Asia Business Council to stimulate private enterprise activity in the region Expansion of the Framework Agreement on an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to all of East Asia and East Asian Investment Information Network to stimulate intra- regional investment Financial cooperation to include intra-regional lending arrangements with the most far-reaching goal being the establishment of an East Asian Monetary Fund, as well as regional exchange rate coordination Code of Conduct in lines with UN Charter and ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) Promotion of development and technological cooperation among regional countries, to provide assistance to less developed countries; Realisation of a knowledge-based “New Economy” and establishment of a future-oriented economic structure throughout the region

20

Malik (2006), p. 208.

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The East Asian regional architecture is likely to continue to consist of multiple institutional arrangements for the foreseeable future. ASEAN, however, is likely to remain a core in most of region building projects. For instance the emerging ASEAN Economic Community is likely to form the centre of East Asian economic integration 21 and EAS is in equal to ASEAN+6 in terms of membership (ASEAN+Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the other hand is likely to remain the dominant regional security institution. Whatever the exact institutional architecture of the emerging EAC will be, it will cover approximately half of the world’s population, a combined GDP greater than the EU and a trading volume larger than NAFTA.22

(3) Southeast Asian Regionalism The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in August 1967, after failed attempts with SEATO,23 the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)24 and Maphilindo.25 Southeast Asia at the time of the foundation of ASEAN was in fact an unlikely candidate for regional cooperation and integration. Not only was Southeast Asia divided by colonial design of the region’s borders, making it prone to conflict and regional rivalry, actual territorial disputes and confrontation between the establishing members were frequent. The most serious of these was between Indonesia and Malaysia that were locked in a process of confrontation and conflict during the years of Konfrontasi over the Borneo provinces of Sabah and Sarawak. Moreover, the region had been subject to intervention in the context of the great power rivalry during the Cold War. The United States and its allies in particular were concerned about the advancement of communism in Vietnam and communist insurgencies elsewhere in the region, fearing the Southeast Asian states falling to communism one-by-one, as envisioned by the ‘Domino Theory.’ In response to this historical and struc21 22 23

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Kawai and Wignaraja (2007), p. 11. Richardson (2005), p. 359. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (‘the Manila Pact’) in 1955, was planned to become an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but was dissolved as defunct in 1977. ASA was formed by Thailand, the Philippines and the Federation of Malaya in 1961. Although ASA remained dormant through regional conflicts, and paralysed during the Konfrontasi, it provided a basis for the foundation of ASEAN in 1967. Maphilindo was an attempt to create a non-political confederation of Malay races, involving Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines in 1963. Maphilindo, however, was scrapped due to political infighting between the newly created Malaysian Federation and Indonesia that eventually led into the Konfrontasi.

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tural background one of ASEAN’s main objectives was to bring stability and peace in the region whilst safeguarding national sovereignty. Consequently, the Bangkok Declaration (8 August 1967) set amity, cooperation and non-interference in national affairs of member states as the guiding principles in regional affairs. Moreover, the ASEAN countries agreed to stay outside the super-power rivalry as much as possible, as later explicitly spelled out in the declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971. Indonesia, the leading member of ASEAN, was also a core member in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Thus, ASEAN could be argued being a Cold War construct and a political project that has only relatively recently expanded to economic and social spheres of regional integration.

(a) ASEAN Enlargement ASEAN’s enlargement has been modest and informal with no formal criteria or process to speak of. The organisation has nonetheless grown from 5 to 10 since its inception; Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar (Burma) in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. Although in general the ASEAN‘s enlargement to the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries in the 1990s was successful, the membership of Myanmar caused problems with the European Union and other international partners over human rights. Further enlargement has not been seriously considered, although in the past Sri Lanka and India has shown some interest. The possible future members for consideration are Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste (East Timor), neither of which is likely in the near future.

(b) ASEAN’s Distinctive Style of Regionalism Whilst ASEAN’s purpose and form has somewhat changed towards economic cooperation and community building, it is still not very institutionalised. Instead of emphasising formal institutions the organisation has rather relied on its own unique mode of operation, commonly coined as the “ASEAN Way”, which operates based on consultation and consensus (mushawara and mufakat). Consequently, decision-making in ASEAN has not involved any formal mechanisms or voting rules. To the critics this has translated into the lack of concrete and binding resolutions, not to mention enforcement of decisions. Whilst this has fuelled criticism of ASEAN being a “talk shop”, it is hard to argue that it has not worked for the organisation. ASEAN has after all transformed the region from a socio-

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economic backwater to economic powerhouse in a very short span of time. This is a convincing testimony to the importance of regional stability as a prerequisite to economic and socio-economic development. Much of this success is credit to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which since 1994 has become the heart of the Asian regional security structure through the inclusion of great powers in the region India, China and the United States, as well as extra-regional powers such as the European Union, and tying them into a regional code of conduct within the normative framework offered by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Moreover, not only has ASEAN been very successful in avoiding interstate conflict between its members, regardless of abundance of potential conflict situations, it has been central in the creation of a level of stability that has been at times titled as the miracle of the East Asia’s long peace. A testimony to AFR’s appeal was its ability to convince China to join the organisation. China has traditionally has been suspicious of multilateral forums and security and has jealously guarded the maintenance of the sovereignty principle in international relations. However, whilst China’s inclusion certainly adds considerable clout to ARF, it also constituted a compromise that effectively rules out the organisation’s role in any meaningful resolution to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea disputes,26 as China would consider this as meddling into its internal affairs. Nonetheless, ARF is the only genuinely multilateral security forum that covers the entire Asia Pacific. Finally, President Obama’s Pacific strategy will ensure that ASEAN and ARF will retain and probably strengthen their relevance and influence in the regional affairs.

(c) Towards an ASEAN Community The ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted in December 1997 in ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, envisioned an ASEAN Community that was outward looking and united by pursuit for peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic economic development and in a community of caring societies. In October 2003 the ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) announcing the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2020 to be based on three pillars: ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.27 The ASEAN Concord II is an important development in ASEAN’s evolution in the 26 27

Ramses et al. (2007), p. 31. ASEAN Secretariat (1997), Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), available online: http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm.

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sense of elevating political and socio-cultural aspects on par with economic matters as basis for further integration. The strategic objective of ASEAN Concord II was to achieve deeper integration and accelerate regional identity building. Another particularly important, as well as ambitious, commitment is to establish the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. This will effectively constitute a single market, covering free movement of goods and services, as well as remove controls on the movement of skilled labour and capital flows. It is, however, unlikely to become a custom union. Nonetheless, this is certainly one of the core areas where ASEAN should make use of the EU’s experience and adopt ideas for governance of the Economic Community. It will also transform ASEAN into a considerably more EUstyle organisation than many would have been expected.

(d) The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Steps up Institutional Development As ASEAN aims to become a more EU-style (albeit rejecting supranationalism) regional organisation, it is also moving towards defining its shared regional values, norms and identity. In fact, this project is ongoing in ASEAN and is being performed in preparation for the ASEAN Community. Even more significantly, the organisation has embarked on a mission to codify these norms and values by establishing an ASEAN Charter. The Charter, adopted in November 2007, sets official norms for ASEAN, perhaps surprisingly exactly the same as the EU’s: democracy, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Significantly, the ASEAN Charter also for the first time established an institutional structure and a legal personality for ASEAN, thus paving way for further institutionalisation. The Charter also created for the fist time a formal membership criteria in its 6th Article:28 1) Location in the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia; 2) Recognition by all ASEAN Member States; 3) Agreement to be bound and to abide by the Charter; and 4) Ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of Membership Furthermore, the Charter states that new members are admitted by consensus of the ASEAN Summit, based on the recommendation of the ASEAN Coordinating Council. 28

ASEAN Charter is available from ASEAN Secretariat website: http://www.aseansec. org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.

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(e) ASEAN in the Broader Structure of Asian Regionalism As noted earlier, ASEAN has also been successful in establishing itself as a core for broader forms of regionalism and in a sense managed to create a process of “ASEAN-ization” of Asia-Pacific and East Asian regionalisms. The East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organisation (APEC) could have both become challengers to ASEAN, but instead it has managed to tie these in its own regional structures either through ASEAN Plus Three (ATP), comprising the ten ASEAN member states and China, Japan and South Korea, or ASEAN+6, which also includes Australia, India and New Zealand and thus, forms the framework for the EAS. ASEAN has thus emphasised the establishment of a regional network and regional norms through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), to which all EAS members have to subscribe to, instead of enlargement and deeper integration. Moreover ASEAN Plus Three (ATP) is particularly important as it ties all East Asia’s (South-and Northeast Asia) economic powers into one framework. In fact, ATP’s main achievements have been in the fields of economic and financial regional cooperation, culminating around the free trade agreements (FTAs) between ASEAN and Northeast Asian countries, in particular the ASEANChina FTA, and regional financial cooperation built on basis of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) that could potentially result into the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). As long as EAS is subject to ASEAN meetings structure (EAS takes place in conjunction with the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Plus Three Summit) and ASEAN norms and working culture, ASEAN will remain on the driver’s seat of a fledging East Asian Community. ATP’s strength and weakness at the same time, however, stems from its exclusively Asian composition, making it more focused and homogenous but also subject to rivalry due to the competing interests between China and Japan.

2. Regionalism in Europe: The 1.0 of Regional Integration The European Union has its roots in the aftermath of the Second World War in the commitment of avoiding further wars in Europe after two devastating world wars by creating interdependency between Germany and France, as well as the other major powers in the continent. The basis for European integration was the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Commission by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, which focused on pooling of strategic industries. The project then progressed into the European Economic Community (EEC) by ratification of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, creating a customs union amongst the original 6 members-Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The third pil-

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lar of early regional integration The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was formed in 1958. In 1967 the three pillars were merged into the European Communities. The Single European Act was signed in 1986 to establish a Single European Market by 1992, by removing the barriers to free movement of capital, labour, goods and services and the European Union was formally established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. Following numerous rounds of enlargement Europe entered into a “deepening and widening” crisis, resulting into a realisation that the existing institutions and processes no longer adequately supported the new larger and more diverse EU 27 and that there was a pressing need to reform of EU institutions and decision-making. The outcome was the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (also known as the “reform treaty”), which introduced double majority voting, empowered the European Parliament and created a legal personality for the EU. It also created two new highlevel positions at the top of the EU: the President of the European Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

(1) Enlargement of the European Union The European Union (EU) has had a total of 6 rounds of enlargement expanding membership from 6 to 27 states; In 1973 the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined, Greece joined in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and in 1995 EU-15 was created when the former EFTA countries Austria, Finland and Sweden joined. The most significant enlargement round, however, was the “Eastern Enlargement” in 2004 the Central and Eastern European states Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland joined. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, bringing membership to the current 27 members. The most significant further enlargement would be that of Turkey, which was declared as an official candidate by the Helsinki European Council in 1999 and the accession process began in 2005. Turkey’s membership quest has, however, been controversial as its “Europeanness” has been popularly contested in Europe. Thus, the outcome of Turkey’s accession process will determine what Europe’s ultimate borders are. In theory the EU is open to all European states, as long as these are democratic, free market states. Unlike ASEAN, however, the EU has a formal and rigid enlargement process and membership criteria, comprising political and economic criteria as formalised in the “Copenhagen Criteria” of 1993. Furthermore, the EU has a structured “Accession” process in which the candidate countries are required to adopt EU legislation (acquis communitaire), as verified by the European Commission in its annual progress reports.

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The EU has no official position as to what its final limits will be geographically, but instead states that the Union is open to all “European” states that respect its values. The “European values” criterion is fairly well defined in the Copenhagen Criteria, but what constitutes “European” is left vague. Such vagueness arguably reflects the lack of consensus on what in fact constitutes “Europeanness”; for some the determining factors are history and geography, where as for others the experience of Renaissance and the Enlightenment defines Europe in cultural terms. Yet for some others, the Christian heritage is what defines Europe.29 Finally, the EU can be seen as primarily a political project, developing common political identity and values, as well participation in regional institutions ultimately defining the region.

(2) Defining the EU’s “Final Borders” Perhaps the most conceptually difficult questions in the EU enlargement debate, however, is defining the geographic borders of Europe. Geography defines Europe as the westernmost peninsula of Eurasia west of Asia. Its western, northern and southern borders are well defined by clear boundaries; the Atlantic Ocean in the west, Barents Sea to the north and the Mediterranean to the south. The eastern boundaries of Europe, however, are contested. In terms of physical “natural” geographic boundaries the European continent is often said to be limited in the east by the Ural Mountains, and further down by the Caspian Sea, Caucasus Mountains, Black Sea, the Bosporus Straits, Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles.30 However, this definition is contested and geographers have never reached a full consensus as to Europe’s borders in the east. The European Union’s current borders on the other hand, as the former Commissioner for Enlargement, Dr Olli Rehn points out, are defined by the Treaty of Nice, the various accession treaties since then and the Withdrawal Treaty of Greenland in 1985. The borders of the EU are thus a legal concept also.31 The EU is thus geographically limited to Lapland in the North, the Reunion in the South, Guadeloupe in the West, and Cyprus in the East.32 The EU’s borders to the west or north have never been an issue and there was a precedent made in regards to the southern limits when Morocco’s application was turned down in 1993.33 This again leaves the eastern limits of the Union as an open question, strengthening the argument that Europe 29

30 31 32 33

Avery (2007), p. 104. Wikipedia, ‘Europe.’ Rehn (2006), p. 56. Ibid. Rehn (2006), p. 57.

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is an ideational construct in essence. Also, the fact that the French overseas territories are within EU’s borders defends the view that its borders are not exclusively geographic. European institutions say nothing conclusive about the future limits of the EU, perhaps because the issue is largely considered a taboo. Nonetheless, a common position, especially in the European Commission, is that the limits of the EU are not geographic but it is rather the common values that form the ties that bind the community together.34 However, the criterion of values is not very conclusive either, as other European institutions that are also based on values have a much broader membership. For instance the Council of Europe had 47 members in 2007 and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 56 members. Since some of the member countries are either not European, or have no interest in joining the EU, one could speculate about the potential maximum membership stock for the EU by engaging in a process of exclusion too seed out the unsuitable and unwilling candidates. First step in such a process would be to exclude the US and Canada, the Central Asian states and European micro-states that have no interest in joining. This would leave us with 17 states that are officially recognised as European but are not EU members: Balkan states, Turkey, countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia. This would imply that the outer limits of the EU could be considered EU-44. Of these the Balkan states and Turkey are currently considered as potential members. Russia is not currently interested in EU membership and possibly would react unfavourably if the EU sought to include the ENP countries that it considers as being in its sphere of influence. In any case can the EU become EU-44? In the short term most likely not since many of these countries would not be able to meet the Copenhagen Criteria any time soon. However, even if they did, would they still be considered European by the incumbent member states? Graham Avery, a former European Commission official and a European Policy Centre advisor has suggested that candidate countries cannot be excluded on the basis of not being of “European” if they at the same time are members in other European institutions. However, they can be rejected based on other legitimate grounds, i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria or “absorption capacity”.35 In other words, membership criteria should be based on “Rationalist” factors, not Ideational. In any case, the process of enlargement and the ultimate borders of the EU are existential questions for the Union, which can provide enhanced understanding of regionalism, its motives and its limits. 34 35

Avery (2007), p. 102. Avery (2007), p. 106.

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(3) Theorizing European Integration Whilst the foundation of European integration was political in motivation and emphasised supranationalism in order to eradicate extreme nationalism that had created havoc to the continent, economic integration served as the principal instrument of regionalism in Europe. Consequently, the early evolution of the European Union and the major milestones in its evolution corresponded with Balassa Bela’s (1962) theory on regional integration, which argued that integration follows a linear increase in the level of regional economic interdependence and proceeds through a stage process that begins with a preferential trading area and develops further to a free trade area, followed by a customs union, common market, economic union and ultimately may develop into a political union.36 The emphasis on supranationalism on the other hand produced the first regionalism specific International Relations (IR) theories: Functionalism by David Mitrany37and Neofunctionalism by Ernst B. Haas38 and others. Following a long rule of rationalist approaches in the study of European regionalism the Central and Eastern European enlargement highlighted the Ideational goal of uniting the region and to bring all European states into a community united by a shared history, values and identity. Moreover, the emphasis on the creation of a European identity, together with the corresponding symbols, brought the Ideational aspects of integration into the fore and facilitated a rapid rise of Social Constructivism in the study of European regionalism.

III. ‘THEORETICAL ASPECTS: RATIONALIST’ AND ‘IDEATIONAL’ APPROACHES TO REGIONALISM “No longer were realism and liberalism ‘incommensurable’-on the contrary they shared a ‘Rationalist’ research programme, a conception of science, a shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy (Waltz) and investigate the evolution of cooperation and whether institutions matter (Keohane)39 This section argues that the current mainstream literature on Regionalism can be divided into two rough categories: “Rationalist” and “Ideational.” The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material interdependency as the main driving force behind integration. Thus, Regionalism is seen as a 36 37 38 39

See: Balassa (1962). Mitrany (1975). Haas (1958). Wæver (1996), p. 399.

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consequence of rational calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Ideational”, or Social Constructivist approach, emphasises shared regional identity and culture as driving forces that produce levels of “cognitive interdependence. Other researchers have chosen to focus on cultural aspect such as identity, culture and religion. Whilst it is mainly a meta-theoretical debate within the context of International Relations, the dichotomy has also contributed towards the separation of research agendas on Asian and European regionalisms. The dichotomy in International Relations between Rationalist and Ideational schools ‘officially’ started when Robert Keohane in a 1988 conference acknowledged the rise of a new approach that he at the time called ‘reflective’ and challenged the discipline dominated by the Rationalist approaches to reinvigorate itself and engage in ‘a vigorous program of empirical research.’40 In 1999 Keohane, Katzenstein and Krasner41 acknowledged that Constructivism and Rationalism were the focal points of the future debate in the discipline.42 Within the context of this dichotomy, the Rationalists base their core assumptions on rational choice theory of agent behaviour, which states that agents choose a course of action that produces the best-conceived result, mainly in terms of material security and/or wealth.43 Wendt identifies the most fundamental material forces in IR for Rationalists: the nature and organisation of material forces, natural resources, forces of production and destruction.44 In terms of Regionalism, this has meant that Rationalists have tended to view Regionalism as a result of bargaining by calculating self-interested state actors that in the name of raison d’état and balance of power thinking attempt to maximize material gains within the regional institutional setting.45 Hence, European integration is largely seen in the light of scepticism after the two devastating and traumatic world wars, experiences that highlighted the importance of material and power gains.46 In this spirit, the Neofunctional model assumes that integration is basically (but not exclusively) a rational process whereby actors calculate anticipated returns from various alternative strategies of participation in regional cooperation and decision-making, but at the same time 40

41 42 43

44 45 46

Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), p. 391. See: Katzenstein et al. (1999). Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), p. 392 See also: Keohane (1998). This assumes that agents correctly anticipate the results of their actions, or because a selective process ensures that only rational behaviour will be rewarded. See: Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 4. Wendt (2006), p. 407. Kahler (1998), pp. 931-932. The counter-argument for this view would be that precisely due to those traumatic experiences, the Europeans wanted integration to remove the material incentives for war, which would make it essentially an idealistic act. Kahler (1998), p. 920.

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conceding that shared values, culture and history may strengthen the process. This has been called the “soft rationality” assumption by Ernst B. Haas.”47 Neorealists and Neoliberal Institutionalists, on the other hand, see state interests as exogenous and argue that their behaviour depends ultimately on systemic variables.48 The “Ideational” approaches, in contrast, emphasise the impact of ideas rather than material forces and how identities and interests are perceived.49 Social Constructivists see International Relations as “socially constructed” (Wendt 1999) and emphasise; “how political actors define themselves and their interests, and thus modify their behaviour.”50 It rejects the idea of International Relations being based on rational individual agents acting on purely material interests and that institutions are a simple collective sum of individual interests.51 Regional cooperation is thus seen rather driven by “cognitive interdependence” than material interdependence.52 Hence, regional awareness and regional identity have a central role in how regional cooperation is shaped.

1. Rationalist Approaches to Regionalism “Rationalist” theories here refer to a broad set of theories that are not in agreement on a variety of aspects of International Relations (and hence, Regionalism), but nonetheless share some fundamental assumptions about the nature of international and regional cooperation. These theories can be labelled ‘Rationalist’ because they share a notion of agents (states, international institutions) in International Relations as being rational actors that engage in rational decision-making and bargaining for some form of material gains (economic principally, but also security and political).53 The relevant mainstream theories in this group include Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Neofunctionalism and International Political Economy (IPE). According to Neorealism states only participate in regional integration to avoid relative losses that result from shifts in the global distribution of power. Moreover, it asserts that international cooperation is extremely hard to achieve simply because states are too preoccupied with survival and relative gains and hence, it does not significantly concern itself with 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

Breslin et al. (2002), p. 12. Wendt (2006), p. 412. Walt (1998), p. 392. Ibid. Kahler (1998), p. 936. Hurrell (1995), pp. 64-65. Essentially corresponding to the ‘rational choice’ theory in political science and even to game theory approach in the most extreme format.

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regionalism as an independent phenomena. Neoliberal Institutionalism in general accepts the basic assumptions of Neorealism on the nature and agency of the international system. Like Neorealism, it considers the international system as being characterised by anarchy, i.e. lacking ‘an authoritative government that can enact and enforce rules of behaviour.’54 Moreover, it also considers nation-states as the most important actors in the international system. Finally, like Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism is utilitarian and Rationalistic in its reasoning.55 Hence, it prioritises material over Ideational structures and borrows the concepts of wealth and power creation from neo-realists, whilst conceding that ‘ideas do matter.’56 According to Neoliberal Institutionalism Regionalism essentially boils down to material interdependence, the most important issue areas being the economy and security. Consequently regional integration is seen as mainly driven by regionalization that leads to economic integration. Regional states consequently cooperate in these areas when collective regional problems emerge. This in turn spills over to other areas and regional institutions created to deal with these problems create and further develop regional cohesion.57 The technical processes of regional cooperation, however, are, on the other hand, seen as being driven by the most powerful states who aim at satisfying their self-interest through bargaining, rather than through the institutions themselves (as institutions are seen primarily as tools for states, where as states remain the principal actors). The EU is seen as an example where cooperation has developed from specific areas (coal and steel) and spilled over into other areas. Neofunctionalism builds on the work of David Mitrany’s Functional theory58 and the works of Ernst B. Haas.59 Functionalism was developed as the “grand theory” of European integration largely inspired by Haas’ work in the European Coal and Steel Community with the European founding fathers Monnet and Schuman. Its grand goal was to explain the dynamics of European integration and to draw conclusions on how and why a political community was developing in Western Europe following the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Community.60 Haas observed a political community developing out of a process of political integration in Europe. He argued that the integration process was all about welfare maximization, not about regional high politics. In his view 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Keohane (1984), p. 7. Keohane and Martin (1995), p. 39. Keohane (1984), pp. 18-21. Hurrell (1995), p. 63. Mitrany (1975). Haas (1965). See: Haas (1958).

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the process of political integration was an inevitable and self-sustaining process. The main actors in the process were states, interest groups and political parties below them, and supranational regional institutions above;61 “the process whereby actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new centre whose institutions posses or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”62 Neofunctionalism represents a revised and upgraded version of Functionalism. It accepts Functionalism’s main assumptions, but shifts the emphasis from explaining integration on a global level (using the European model as the model) to more specifically explaining the phenomena of European integration per se.63 It is essentially a utilitarian version of Functionalism whereby states are completely self-interested rational actors that seek to integrate only when it is profitable and when the use of supranational institutions maximizes welfare creation.64 The theory attempts to explain European integration as a result of high and rising levels of interdependence that led to an ongoing process of cooperation culminating in political integration.65 The process begins with low-key technical and noncontroversial issues, spilling over to higher realms. Moreover, the process is seen as a self-sustaining phenomena; the cost of maintaining national rules and policies acts as an additional incentive to increase supranationalism.66 The concept of “spillovers” entails two kinds of variations; 1) Functional spillover, which assumes that small integration steps create new problems leading to demand for further integration, and 2) Political spillover “whereby the existence of supranational institutions would set in motion a self-reinforcing process of institution building” Supranational institutions and technocrats are seen as superior to Intergovernmentalism in managing the complex interdependencies.67 Whilst Neofunctionalism has been credited as the ‘grand theory’ of (European) integration it has also attracted its fair share of criticism. In particular following the crisis in EC in the mid-1960s onwards, the theory was widely criticised for failing to take into account the effects of nationalism and the states’ sensitivity over sovereignty. It was suggested that whilst member states were happy to surrender the control of ‘low politics’ issues to regional technocrats, they jealously guarded their control over issues of ‘high politics’ (as demonstrated by the 1965 ‘empty chair cri61 62 63 64 65 66 67

Mattli, (1999), p. 24. Haas quoted in Hurrell (1995), p. 60. Haas quoted in Hurrell (1995), p. 60. Mattli (1999), p. 25. Hurrell (1995), p. 59. Breslin, et al. (2002), p. 4. Hurrell (1995), p. 59.

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sis’).68 Neofunctionalism was also blamed for ignoring a number of intervening externalities in economic, political and security fields.69 Schmitter in his 1976 “A Revised theory of Regional Integration”, published in International Organization, called integration theory a failure and admitted that he and Haas had failed in providing an adequate account of the integration process, and consequently suggested an overhaul of the theory.70 Haas himself denounced Neofunctionalism in “The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory” (1975), but regained his faith a year later in an article in the same journal, in which he stressed the paramount importance of interdependency over ‘functional policy linkages.”71 The theory experienced resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s with the development of the single market and later the monetary union.72 Nonetheless, Neofunctionalism’s obsession with the European experience, which has still not been copied elsewhere, despite the alleged supremacy of supranationalism, still renders the theory only marginally applicable elsewhere, especially in the case of ASEAN. As a technocratic integration theory, Neofunctionalism is not interested in enlargement, the role of identity or bilateral relations between a region and outsiders in general and in relations between countries that are closely associated but not members (that I have chosen to title as the ‘borderline states’) and the regional grouping. In a similar way to other ‘Rationalist’ theories, Neofunctionalism approaches the problem by addressing it as a technical process of economic and political integration driven by rational actors.73

2. Ideational Approaches to Regionalism In contrast to materialism of rationalist models, Social Constructivism focuses on actors’ subjective and intersubjective beliefs, focusing on the social construction of collective rules and norms that guide political behaviour. Social Constructivist approaches to Regionalism in general focus on the development of a regional awareness that leads to the formation of a ‘regional identity’, or a shared feeling of ‘we-ness’, often is titled as ‘cognitive 68

69 70 71 72 73

Hurrell (1995), p. 60. The ‘empty chair crisis’ of June 1965~January 1966 refers to France’s refusal to take part in intergovernmental meetings of the European Community due to disagreements with the Commission of the European Communities over the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), thus producing an institutional gridlock. Hurrell (1995), p. 60. Schmitter (1976), p. 836. Haas (1976), p. 209, see also p. 199 and pp. 208-210. Breslin et al. (2002), p. 7. Breslin et al. (2002), p. 5.

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Regionalism.’74 According to this view regional cohesion relies on ‘cognitive interdependence’ rather than ‘material interdependence.’75 Social Constructivism’s one major contribution to Regionalism and IR in general has been that it has provided a credible and sustainable challenge to rational theories. The notion that regional integration is not primarily driven by rational/material interdependency or technical processes, but rather by a perception of collective identity that uses institutions as social vehicles and framework in which rational action takes place,76 is a powerful argument in ASEAN’s case in particular where institutions are ‘soft’, but also in European case where integration has reached such an advanced state that mere economic or institutional rationales may well prove short of acting as sufficient motivations for further integration (and enlargement). As Stephen M. Walt has argued; “It matters if political identity in Europe continues to shift from the nation-state to more local regions or a broader sense of European identity, just as it matters if nationalism is gradually supplanted by the sort of ‘civilizational’ affinities emphasized by Huntington.”77 One of the most relevant accounts of Constructivism on the subject of Regionalism comes from Amitav Acharya’s work on ASEAN and its “soft and normative Regionalism” which the “Rationalist” theories have had trouble explaining (Acharya, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2005). Acharya responds, like many Constructivists, to what he sees as the neo-realist neglect of identity and institutions as independent actors in Regionalism and the exclusivity of material forces in inter-national relations.78 Instead he argues that the examination of the process whereby regional identity is built and fostered offers the best chance to ascertain what is going on in a particular region. He asserts that “ignoring identity as an analytical tool also leads to undue neglect of long-term historical processes that go into the making of international and regional orders.”79 Whilst norms and identity are not the only variables that matter (thus also acknowledging material and institutional forces), they have played an especially important role in Southeast Asian Regionalism and the development of ASEAN as a regional institution.80 He argues that ASEAN elites have deliberately formed norms and identity, aiming to build a regional ASEAN identity, and that “region-building is a social and political act; like nationalism and 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Hurrell (1995), p. 64. Hurrell (1995), p. 64. Breslin et al. (2002), p. 11. Walt (1998), p. 394. Acharya (2005), p. 96. Acharya (2005), p. 106. Acharya (2005), p. 98.

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nation-states, regions may be “imagined and constructed.”81 As evidence for this he demonstrates how the ASEAN elite engaged in a process of socialization within an institutional context (ASEAN) and that in this process they ‘imagined’ themselves to be part of a distinctive group.”82 “ASEAN’s self-conscious attempt to imagine and build a regional order despite the intra-regional physical and political differences ” was probably one of the foremost examples of the importance of identity in region building.83 As a direct result of this self-conscious regional identity building exercise “ASEAN has rejected request for membership by countries such as Sri Lanka, especially under president Jayawardane, and the possibility of membership by India and Australia on the grounds of their lack of belonging to the Southeast Asia region.”84 Sri Lanka was invited in 1967 during the formation of ASEAN, but was not interested at the time. Later it reversed this policy but its application was turned down.85 Moreover, he notes that whilst ASEAN has not as of yet achieved any permanent identity, it is attempting to build one.86 Hence, Acharya emphasizes the importance of differences in identity as an empirical fact and as an analytical tool in the study of Regionalism.

IV. THE PATH FORWARD: AN EMERGING CONVERGENCE IN RESEARCH AGENDAS? This section briefly examines how the study of Asian and European regional integration and the theory of regionalism may be developing, arguing that the dichotomy between Asian and European regionalism studies, as well as between the ‘rationalist’ and ‘ideational’ theoretical approaches, may become breached somewhat to the point that even a certain level of convergence in the study agendas could emerge as a result of developments in the two regions. First of all, although ASEAN has had arguably little or no interest in adopting “EU style” regionalism, it is interested in adopting some of its institutions. Consequently, the dichotomy between Asian and European regionalisms may be crumbling somewhat. ASEAN may also be becoming a model in its own right, rather than being a reflection of any European paradigm (Acharya 2009, Johnston 1999 and Katzenstein 2005). Within 81 82 83 84 85

86

Acharya (2005), pp. 102-103. Acharya (2005), p. 103. Acharya (2005), p. 104. Ibid Acharya (2005), p. 105. Acharya (2005), pp. 104-106.

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this context ASEAN may adopt some EU institutions but do so in its own unique manner, probably without the legalistic approach of the EU. Thus far, however, ASEAN’s regionalism has been normative and thus, increasingly in the scope of Social Constructivist regionalism research agenda. However, with further institutionalisation, other established theoretical approaches, such as Neofunctionalism and Neoliberalism will probably become more relevant and prominent in the study of ASEAN, albeit they probably need to be adjusted to account for ASEAN’s soft regionalism that gives primacy to normative structures over institutions. The role of identity, culture and norms in Asian regionalism should definitely not be discounted. Given that ASEAN is in the process of strengthening its regional identity and building a regional community, Social Constructivism will probably retain its position as a popular approach. ASEAN has certainly achieved something special by accomplishing regional integration and cooperation in a region that has astonishing level of diversity in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion, ideology and levels of economic development. Accomplishing any level of regional integration under these circumstances should be considered a success. In Europe, on the other hand, the current fiscal crisis and its aftermath may well produce a political crisis in the EU, which in turn is likely to motivate a period of self-examination, necessarily reopening fundamental questions about the ideational foundations of the EU’s and its future. This in turn is likely to motivate further research focusing on European identity, culture and values, probably from a somewhat more critical standpoint that has been the case in the recent past. Consequently, Social Constructivism probably retains or increases its relevance as a theoretical framework in European regionalism studies, but also simultaneously attracts increasing criticism as European unity is seen crumbling. On the other hand, the possibility of a push towards a political union and institutional responses to the crisis is likely to motivate reassessments of EU institutions, possibly (albeit unlikely) even treaties, as well as Europe’s role in emerging global governance due to the increasingly global nature of the fiscal crisis. Consequently, rationalist approaches may well also experience resurgence. This is likely to include Neofunctionalism, possibly in its third reincarnation that makes further concessions to include identity as a variable. Whilst the convergence in research agendas is not easily reached, it would be useful in terms of broadening the current research agenda, which tends to be separated into two, both due to differences in Asian and European regionalism and the dichotomy between paradigmatic approaches. Whist regionalisms in East Asia and Europe indeed have significant differences, I would argue that both models have their merits (as well as problems) and that consequently both can and should learn from each

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other. In policy terms, ideally this would entail Asia and Europe to adopt and adapt components of integration that the other region excels in. However, paradigmatic approaches tend to consider regionalism in Europe as a model and have even argued that the two are incomparable due to ontological and epistemological differences that lead different definitions of the research problem. Consequently, a convergence in research agendas would require breaching the paradigmatic dichotomy, not to facilitate a synthesis, but to identify and cultivate points of convergence in the research agendas around middle-range theories. One possible path towards facilitating such convergence around middle-range theories would be the utilisation of analytic eclecticism in order to promote a problem-based approach to regionalism studies and to broaden the research agenda and facilitate increased policy-relevance in the discipline. Analytical eclecticism, advanced by Peter Katzenstein among others, focuses on solving specific complex problems, where paradigmatic research produces incomplete results, “by examining a broad range of plausible causal mechanisms drawn from competing research traditions.”87 In the simplest possible terms this entails using the best available method for the research problem without excessive concern over whether this meets the standards of a particular paradigm. Analytic eclecticism also offers an excellent tool for testing of explanatory power of theoretical frameworks and seeking areas of convergence between them. In the spirit of pragmatism, it argues that academic research should not only serve the goal of social sciences as the production of theories and acquisition of evidence that supports a particular theoretical framework. Katzenstein has argued that ideas of Rationalism and Constructivism, which do not have moral implications, can be combined. Katzenstein himself combines Constructivism with liberalism and thus, for instance A World of Regions “operates within three definitions of regions-material, Ideational and behavioural” to analyse the different regional orders in Europe and Asia.88 Analytical eclecticism, however, does not seek to establish a new master theory by creating a synthesis of competing theories. It does not aim to solve multiple problems under one paradigm, but instead it aims to provide an alternative for pragmatic research as a mid-range approach. The approach has been criticised for an alleged tendency to sacrifice analytical parsimony, as there is no clear definition of “dependent” variables and thus, it appears an unsystematic ad hoc approach.89 Katzenstein, however, has responded to the concern over parsimony versus empirical vigour by stating that: 87 88 89

Katzenstein (2007), p. 398. Katzenstein (2007), p. 397. Aggrawal et al. (2007), p. 365.

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“Analytical eclecticism thus can be helpful in detaching particular concepts, causal mechanisms, explanations, and prescriptions from particular research traditions and combining them in novel frameworks to capture a more nuanced understanding of a complex world. The potential benefits of analytical eclecticism are clear: more experimentation, better communication, and the promise of a consensus that may capture the attention of policymakers.”90 The question arises of how analytical eclecticism can contribute towards a better understanding of Regionalism? I would argue that enlargement is an increasingly critical topic in the study of regionalism, as it essentially defines the region by distinguishing between ‘the core’ and ‘the boundaries’, thus revealing what the predominant “idea” of the region is as it is perceived by the incumbent members. Thus analysis of enlargement provides a good test as to what really constitutes a region, and whether they are driven by “material interdependency” or “cognitive interdependency”, or more likely a combination of both, revealing additional information about the interplay between interests, identity and structure. This, however, is not possible with strict adherence to paradigms and thus, presents a significant opportunity for eclectic research.

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lateralising Regionalism, Geneva, Switzerland, 2007. Keohane, Robert O., After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1984. Keohane, Robert O. and Martin Lisa L., “The promise of institutional theory (Response to John J. Mearsheimer”, International Security, Vol.20, No.1, 1995. Keohane, Robert, “International Institutions: 2 Approaches”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.32, 1998, pp. 379-396. Malik, Mohan, “The East Asia Summit“, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.60, No.2, 2006a, pp. 207-211. Mattli, Walter, The Logic of Regional Integration, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Mitrany, David, The Functional Theory of Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975. Munakata, Naoko, “Has Politics Caught Up with Markets? In Search of East Asian Economic Regionalism”, in Katzenstein, Peter and Takashi Shiraishi (Eds.), Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2006, pp. 143-145. Pitty, Roger, “Regional Economic Co-operation”, in Edwards, Peter and David Goldsworthy (Eds.), Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia: 1970s to 2000, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, Vol.2, 2003. Ramses Amer, Timo Kivimäki, Christian Fjäder, and Liselotte Odgaard, “Sovereignty and Regional Political Realities in ASEAN Security Problem Solving”, in Sukma, Rizal, Simon, Tay and Hwee Yeo Lay (Eds.), ‘Operationalising The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy in ASEAN and the ARF’, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 2007. Rehn, Olli, Europe’s Next Borders, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006. Richardson, Michael, “Australia-Southeast Asia relations and the East Asian Summit”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.59, No.3, 2005, pp. 351-365. Schmitter, Philippe C., “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration”, International Organization, Vol.24, No.4, 1976. Soesastro, Hadi, “Pacific economic cooperation: the history of an idea”, in Garnaut, Ross and Peter Drysdale(Eds.), Asia Pacific Regionalism: Readings in International Economic Relations, Harper Education, Sydney, 1994, pp. 77-89. Van Langenhove, Luk, “Theorising Regionhood”, UNU/CRIS Working Papers, Working Paper 1/2003, Comparative Regional Integration

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