Purpose of the Brief

Purpose of the Brief • • To provide information concerning the ABLE DANGER project and the Department of Defense efforts to determine facts relat...
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Purpose of the Brief





To provide information concerning the ABLE DANGER project and the Department of Defense efforts to determine facts related to recent public statements concerning ABLE DANGER. This briefing will address the following questions: - What was ABLE DANGER? Did ABLE DANGER produce a chart that depicted 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta? If so, was that information passed to any other USG organization? - What were the legal authorities applicable to ABLE DANGER? - Was DoD responsive to the

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9/11 Commission's request for data?

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Able Danger







In October 1999, the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tasked Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to develop a comorehensive campaign plan against transnational terrorism with an initial focus on Al Qaida. ABLE DANGER was the unclassified nickname for this effort. Commander, USSOCOM tasked an internal cross-disciplinary working group to develop the plan. -

Planning tasks included nodal analysis, determination of exploitable vulnerabilities and establishment of IO objectives.

ABLE DANGER was never intended to be a targeting effort. •

IRTJCS PLANORD, USSOCOM provided a draft Operations Plan to Joint Staff in January 2001, completing the ABLE DANGER planning effort -



Sub-bullet summary of Plan(tentative or back-up slide)

Placeholder - what did JS do with this plan?

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Chronology of Significant Events

6 Oct99

CTCS PLANORD directed CDR USSOCOM to develop campaign pfan to counter trans-national terrorism, with an initial focus on the AQ terrorist network ·

Dec99

USSOCOM and Joint Warfare Analysis Center Q"WAC)

collaboration began

JanOO

USSOCOM and Land Information Warfare Activity's (LIWA) Information Dominance Center (IDC) collaboration be ; L I WA support to ABLE DANGER ended in Feb/Mar 00

MarOO

USSOCOM decided to create organic data mining/ nodal analysis caEahility; employed contractor fii cility in Garland, TX; opened facility in July 2000

Oct/NovOO

USSOCOM decision to create USSOCOM Tointinteragency Collaboration Center (SOJICC) in Tampa; Garland facility ceased work to produce draft OPLAN

Jan 01

Draft OPLAN delivered and briefed to Joint Staff

Oct03

Mr. Tony Shaffer met with9 /11 Commission staff in Afghanistan

Jul04

CDR Scott Phillpott met with9 /11 Commission staff in Washington reference ABLE DANGER and the Chart

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The ''Chart''



Nodal analysis involves a computerized search of data to identify individuals and associated patterns and trends; the data is then reviewed against previous activities to identify indicators and warning of future activity. - Data can come from any source, open source or classified data; it has little value independent of analysis and context





Using nodal analysis, numerous (perhaps hundreds) Analyst Notebook charts depicting linkages among Al Qaida were created under the rubric of ABLE DANGER. Several individuals, including Mr. Shaffer and CAPT Phillpott, recall that during the planning effort, a proof of concept chart was produced depicting terrorist ties to Al Qaida, and included a photograph of 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta linked to a "Brooklyn Cell."

9-11 Commission .



DoD did not have such a chart when first responding to the



DoD has not discovered such a chart in the current search .



DoD has not discovered the data that would have enabled creation of such a chart .

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Sharing AD Information •







DoD has the authorities necessary to share information of interest with respect to collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence with other U.S. government organizations and agencies. -

These authorities have remained unchanged since

-

Since 9/11 the policy implementation of information sharing has been focused on more sharing and less restrictions on information characterization by the originator

1998

It is routine to for attorneys to review projects like ABLE DANGER. Attorneys from DoD General Counsel, Joint Staff, USSOCOM and the Army provided advice/ support during the Able Danger project. The Legal focus was to ensure compliance with existing authorities, e.g., EO 12333 & DoD Directive 5240.1-R, and specifically, collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence on U.S. persons. DoD has discovered no evidence of any legal advice provided that prohibited: The collection of information that was acquired consistent with the EO and DoD Directive -

The sharing of an ABLE DANGER information with other federal agencies

DoD is unaware of any information provided to any other federal agency as a result of

ABIE DANGER

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Disposition of Mr. Tony Shaffer's

DIA Files



Jan-Feb 2004: Mr. Shaffer consolidated his DIA paper files prior to his deployment to Afghanistan and in anticipation of transfer to new DIA office

I

upon his return from deployment •

Mar 2004: Mr. Shaffer's boxes moved to his new office area



Apr 2004: Mr. Shaffer's SCI access suspended



I

Apr-Jul 2004: To make room for incoming personnel, 0-6 level DIA supervisor tasked administrative officer to separate out Mr. Shaffer's personal papers/ materials ·and properly dispose of classified material in burn bags. Classified papers destroyed believed to have been related to Mr. Shaffer's last assignment working Africa issues. Mr. Shaffer contacted to pick up his boxes of personal materials; he did not take possession of the boxes.



Aug 2005: DIA examined all of Mr. Shaffer's electronic files/emails on the

DIA SCI Infrastructure and has not located any information, charts or photos in these files identifying Mohammed Atta or other hijackers

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Interaction with 9 /11 Commission











Mr. Shaffer briefed the 9/11 Commission staff on ABLE DANGER in Afghanistan in October 2003. DoD responded to two 9/11 Commission requests for documents on ABLE DANGER (Nov 2003). The Department provided copies of x# documents in response to the Commission's requests for ABLE DANGER documents. (DR C wants back­ up ftle on list of documents -· can you provide?) DoD has not discovered additional documentation related to ABLE DANGER that would have been responsive to the 9/11 Commission's original request. DoD facilitated a 12 July 2004 meeting between the 9/11 Commission staff and CDR Scott Phillpott, after he expressed a desire to speak with the Commission concerning ABLE DANGER and the C hart.

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Department Response



Conducted numerous interviews. Interviewed personnel

included key ABLE DANGER participants, LIWA supervi s ors / managers, DoD lawyers, government and contract analysts. •

Performed extensive search of records, files and electronic data to identify ABLE DANGER materials.

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Summary



ABLE DANGER was a CJCS directed planning effort at USSOCOM designed to campaign against transnational terrorism, starting with

AQ. •

Interviewed individuals from USSOCOM, Army, Navy, OUSDI, intelligence agencies and private industry·



DoD has been unable to locate any chart or

information that alludes to Atta.



X people devoted Y hours to this effort.

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CJCS

GUIDANCE

l USSOCOM

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JWAC •

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Dec 99

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ABLE DANGER

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i GARLAND

Feb 00 Jul 00

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Nov 01

SOJICC

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