P ol ic y p ap e r f or D e nm ar k ’s engagement in Somalia 2011

Publisher Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Asiatisk Plads 2 DK-1448 Copenhagen K Phone: +4533920000 Fax: +4532540533 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.um.dk Printing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Front cover photograph: Jesper Guhle Mogensen (2010) for the Danish Refugee Council ISBN 978-87-7087-501-1 (print version) ISBN 978-87-7087-502-8 (internet version) March 2011

Policy paper for Denmark’s engagement in Somalia 2011 1. SUMMARY Somalia is a fragile state with great regional differences. The southern part, with the capital Mogadishu, is experiencing a grave humanitarian crisis. Somaliland in the north is more stable, and in summer 2010 the region got a new, democratically elected government. Puntland to the east is somewhat stable but it is also characterised by the presence of pirates. The conflict in Somalia has a destabilising effect on the whole of the Horn of Africa and also influences orn of Africa and affects Europe and Denmark, for example through piracy, unregulated migration flows and the radicalisation of small groups in the Somalian diaspora. This paper places Denmark’s political and development assistance engagement in Somalia within an overall strategic framework and is in continuation of ”Peace and Stabilisation: Denmark’s Policy Towards Fragile States”, the Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation ” Freedom from Poverty, Freedom to Change” and the Government’s enhanced concerted planning and action effort. The long-term objective of the Danish effort is to make a contribution to a stable Somalia that can take care of its own security and further stable economic and social development. People’s freedom, security and living conditions are to occupy centre stage. The effort will be adapted to the situation in the individual regions and thus have a humanitarian focus while promoting growth and employment in more stable areas such as Somaliland. Denmark will support a broadly-based, coherent effort that can: -- Strengthen the engagement of the international community in Somalia by means of an integrated approach to managing the situation; -- Promote cooperation and coordination between the UN, the AU and IGAD as well as international donors; -- Contribute to the efforts of the international community to contain piracy off the coast of Somalia in consideration of the resources at disposal; -- Contribute to the steps taken by the international community to prevent and fight terrorism and extremist elements in and around Somalia, and prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for international extremism and terrorism; -- Support the transitional government in Mogadishu and regional/local structures and initiatives with special focus on Somaliland, where stability and development are being built up from the bottom; -- Build up the capacity to supply basic social services and create the frames for the development of the private sector and economic growth as part of Somalis taking ownership of development; -- Develop dialogue and cooperation with the Somali people. Denmark will increase its engagement in Somalia among other things by means of substantial development assistance in 2011-14, which will be gathered in one allocation of DKK 370 million. To this will be added funds from a number of other allocations including the global framework and the military effort. The engagement will encompass the following focus areas: -- 1) Active diplomacy; 2) Security, including piracy; 3) Governance; 4) Growth and employment; 5) Improved living conditions. Conditions are difficult in Somalia and any effort entails political, security and financial risks. No western country, including Denmark, has an embassy or mission in the capital. Denmark’s resources for implementing the effort are limited, and therefore we work to a considerable extent through the UN, international organisations and NGOs.

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DJIBOUTI

Asayita

Djibouti

Baki

Hargeysa

Jijiga

Ceerigaabo (Erigavo)

SANAAG Burco

(Burao)

De

WOQOOYI GALBEED

Boorama Togwajaale

Da

Dahot

Bullaxaar Berbera

r

Dudo

Ey

l Raas Gabbac

NUGAAL

K'ebri Dahar

MUDUG

War Galoh

Shilabo Mereer-Gur

(Dusa Marreb)

Beledweyne

Derri HIRAAN Buulobarde Tayeeglow bee

Baydhabo Buurhakaba

BAY

Mahadday DHEXE Weym Cadale

Wanlaweyn

Jawhar (Giohar) Balcad

Afgooye

We

Muqdisho (Mogadishu)

ub bi J

Qoryooley

JUBA DHEXE

INDIAN OCEAN

Ceeldheere

SHABELLE

(Baidoa)

Diinsoor

Xarardheere

lle

Garbahaarrey

SHABELLE HOOSE

ba

Afmadow

Ceel Buur

Sha

(Oddur)

Luuq

Wajir

Hobyo Ceel Huur

bi

Xuddur

Dolo Bay

We

BAKOOL

Baardheere

Marka

BANADIR (Merca)

SOMALIA National capital Regional capital Town, village Airport International boundary Regional boundary Indeterminate boundary Main road Track Railroad

Haaway

Bu'aale

Baraawe

Jilib Bilis Qooqaani

JUBA HOOSE

Jamaame

Kismaayo (Chisimayu)

SOMALIA

Isole Giuba

0

Buur Gaabo Raas Kaambooni

Garsen

Hilalaya

Mirsaale

GALGUDUUD Ferfer

El Beru Hagia

Baxdo

Dhuusamarreeb

Hargele

GEDO

Eyl

Xamure Berdaale Seemade Beyra Gaalkacyo (Galcaio) Garacad

Imi

KENYA

Bandarbeyla

Garoowe

Laascaanood

Werder

Gode

Xaafuun

Taxeex

Gori Rit

Megalo

Raas Xaafuun

Mountain s

Qardho

SOOL

Buuhoodle

ETHIOPIA

Raas Binna

Xudun

TOGDHEER Degeh Bur

BARI

Iskushuban

K a r k a ar

Garadag

Oodweyne Kiridh

Bargaal

Hurdiyo

o

rr

AWDAL

Harer

Xiis

Karin

Laasqoray

Maydh

e

Raas Khansiir

Breeda

Gees Gwardafuy

Butyaalo Qandala Ja c e

(Bender Cassim)

Raas Surud

Raas Maskan

l S ili

Dire Dawa

Bandar Murcaayo

Boosaaso

Saylac

Dikhil

Nazret

Caluula

GULF OF ADEN

0

50

100 50

150

200 km

100 mi

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Lamu

Map No. 3690 Rev. 7 January 2007

Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section

UNITED NATIONS

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2. INTRODUCTION The objective of this paper is to establish a general strategic framework for the overall Danish effort in Somalia in the coming years. The effort will include political, security policy and development policy initiatives. The foreign, development and defence ministers have identified integrated efforts in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, as a Danish focus area of special strategic importance. orn of Africa, including Somalia, as a new Danish focus area of particular strategic significance. The situation in Somalia is critical. The mandate of the Somalian transitional government is to expire in August 2011. A new draft constitution has been drawn up, but there is not much time or space for broad political discussion of the many outstanding issues such as form of state, federalism and governance. The government in Mogadishu, which is a result of the Djibouti agreement – a peace process initiated by the UN – is characterised by internal dissention and it is difficult for it to root its mandate and create legitimacy. It has not been Figure 1 Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland. able to create a broader political basis to the extent that was anticipated, nor is it able to keep the country together or supply the most fundamental basic social services to the population. In reality the transitional government only controls a small number of districts in Mogadishu protected by AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia), and it is completely dependent on the political, military and economic support of the international community. Large parts of southern/ central Somalia as well as Mogadishu are dominated by al Shabab, which is exploiting the vacuum that has arisen in the absence of a functioning government, and among other things supplies some basic social services to the inhabitants in these areas. In Mogadishu al Shabab is now attempting to dislodge the transitional government by force. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Kampala in Uganda in July 2010, the African countries are prioritising the strengthening of the military presence in Somalia, inter alia through AMISOM. At the same time as the situation in the southern part of Somalia has deteriorated, there are, however, encouraging developments in other parts of Somalia and not least in Somaliland. The 2010 election in Somaliland led to the peaceful handover of power to the former opposition. A regional government has also been established in Puntland. Finally, there are some areas in southern Somalia with local initiatives for peace and stability that can be further developed. This policy paper covers the period up to August 2011 when the mandate of the present transitional government in Somalia expires. A number of the activities will be more long-term, however, including assistance to Puntland and Somaliland. The international community does not wish to extend the mandate of the transitional government.

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3. RESULTS Denmark has achieved good results with its broadly-based approach to Somalia that builds on close coordination between the parties involved. On the political level, successful efforts have been made to contribute to placing Somalia high on the agenda of the international community. Denmark has also contributed to strengthening good governance and democracy in Somaliland (cf. box). In the area of security policy and stability, Denmark has contributed to enhancing capacity in the regional organisations. Participation in marine military counter-piracy operations has improved shipping safety, not least in the Gulf of Aden. In the judicial area, Denmark has taken the lead in finding solutions as to how the pirates can be prosecuted. On the international level, better knowledge has been gained about the development in Somalia and at the same time the dialogue with Somalis in Denmark has been strengthened as well.

Strengthened democracy in Somaliland Denmark has contributed to strengthening democracy in Somaliland. Specifically, Denmark has supported the national election commission in Somaliland, whose task it was to be responsible for the honest and trustworthy conduct of the presidential election on 26 June 2010. The election, which meant a democratic change of president, was received positively by the international community. Assistance for building up democracy in Somaliland will continue in 2010-11 based on this positive experience.

In the area of development assistance, since 1998 Danida has inter alia supported the improvement of living conditions and the integration of refugees. In Puntland local communities that house refugees and displaced persons have been supported. Since 2003 Danida has worked with vulnerable groups in Mogadishu, among other things by contributing to the daily distribution of food to 85,000 people. Through the regions of origin effort, Danida has operated activities that benefit host communities for the large group of Somali refugees in the regions of origin in Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. The regions of origin assistance has had a double aim. On the one hand, work has been carried out on reducing poverty and improving access to social services and employment opportunities for the refugees and the host communities. On the other hand, the Kenyan and Yemeni authorities’ capacity to protect refugees and asylum-seekers has been strengthened. Good results have been achieved. Many people have gained access to water, latrines and medical assistance. Schools have been built and children are once more attending school. In 2009 alone, 143,000 people obtained access to water in the whole of Somalia, inter alia thanks to the Danish effort. A special initiative has been set in motion for women in the regions of origin, and among other things support has been granted to a school of veterinary medicine where women comprise one third of the students.

4. THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA 4.1.

One country– three regions

At present Somalia is in reality divided into three regions, each of which has its own government. This is most visible in Somaliland, which is actively seeking independence of Somalia. At the same time own government structures are being built up. The division follows the borders from the colonial period to some degree, when southern and central Somalia was an Italian colony from the 1880s until 1941. Somaliland was part of the former British colony of Somalia and was independent for a couple of days in 1960 before the area became part of the Somali Republic.

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FACTS ON SOMALIA Population (World Bank, 2009)

8.9 million

Population outside of Somalia in the region1

5 million

Somalis in Denmark

Approx. 17,000

Estimated GDP (World Bank, 2002)

226 USD

Fertility rate (World Bank, 2010)

6.4 children per woman

Mortality of children under the age of 5 (World Bank, 2008)

2 out of 10 children born

Maternal mortality (World Bank, 2005)

14 out of 1000 live births

Share of the population dependent on food aid and water

43 % (including 1 out of 6 children suffering from malnutrition)

Life expectancy at birth (World Bank, 2009)

49.8 years

Displaced Somalis (UN, 2010) Of which internally displaced

Approx. 2 million Approx. 1.4 million

1 Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. A corresponding number are spread in the diaspora in the rest of the world.

The clan structure is the key to understanding the history, society and politics of the country. The clans comprise the central social unit, control local areas and business life and adjudicate in disputes/conflicts of a criminal and civilian nature. The clans are not clear-cut units but complex networks that enter changing alliances based on the clan leaders’ assessment of the best way of safeguarding the interests of clan members. Al Shabab’s growing influence crosses traditional clan structures to some degree and also constitutes a challenge to these. In the absence of a central government it is these local structures that have managed to create some semblance of stability in Somalia. Initiatives for peace and reconciliation in Somalia are impeded by an extremely complex mixture of conflicting interests which include regional security interests, national and local clan rivalry, the influence of fundamentalist religious groups, the engagement of the diaspora and economic and criminal interests. All of these factors contribute to a lack of cohesion in the country. In addition, Somalia has a harsh climate where drought influences the agricultural production and contributes to local conflicts. For two decades the Somali population has lived without an efficient central government, and the governing ability of the changing regimes has been more formal than genuine. Certain population groups, including elements in the influential diaspora, have exploited the situation to create lucrative economic and to some extent criminal activities. There is no tradition in Somalia for a fundamentalist approach to Islam, but difficult living conditions and a security situation that is out of control have given radical Islamist groups

such as al Shabab an opportunity to gain a footing in southern and central Somalia – at any rate until other actors can offer the same security and social development. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia is perhaps the worst in the world. According to the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees, there are more than 600,000 Somali refugees in camps in the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia and 1.4 million people are internally displaced. It is only Afghanistan and Iraq that generate more refugees than Somalia. The population of Somalia are deeply impoverished. According to the UN, more than 40 % of the population are living on less than one USD a

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day. The educational level is low and it is estimated that only one fifth of the children attend school. Somalia has also a very high rate of child and maternal mortality (cf. box). Legal rights are also at a low ebb in Somalia. There is neither a police force nor a judicial system to ensure that law and order are observed. The inadequate security situation means that human rights are violated to a wide extent. Freedom of expression is extremely limited. Extremist groups like al Shabab regard disseminating news about the conflict as treason, and the death penalty is imposed for negative statements about al Shabab in some areas controlled by the group. The Somali population demonstrate an astonishing power of resistance in spite of the crisis. There has been a good deal of precipitation over the last two years producing unusually high crop yields. During the past five years the export of livestock (particularly camels and goats) to the Arabian Peninsula has increased, giving the population a cash income. In addition, the large Somali diaspora transfer significant sums of money to the home country.

4.1.1. The transitional government The attempt to strengthen the country’s national institutions, which includes the establishment of a transitional government, has been a decisive element in the Somali peace process. The transitional government was established following a peace process led by the regional organisation IGAD. The transitional government’s mandate is based on a provisional constitution adopted by the provisional Somali parliament in November 2004. In recognition of the need to expand and strengthen the transitional government, the UN led a series of negotiations in Djibouti, which resulted in cooperation with the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, a group that broke away from the former Islamic Courts. Before that, the transitional government had been under heavy pressure from the Islamic Courts. Hence the transitional government requested military help from Ethiopia in order to regain control of the country. In 2007 the African Union decided to deploy a peacekeeping force, AMISOM. When the Ethiopian troops withdrew in January 2009, there was doubt as to whether AMISOM could hold the fort. This has been successful, however, and since then AMISOM has been an important part of maintaining the transitional government in power. In February 2009 a broader transitional federal government was formed with the previous relatively moderate leader of the Islamic Courts, Sheikh Sharif, as the new president. In addition, the transitional government, which had operated from Nairobi in Kenya, established a base in the capital of Mogadishu with the support of AMISOM. The international community had expected the expanded transitional government under Sheik Sharif to win popular backing and gain broad political support. It had also been expected that the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops and the establishment of the transitional government in Mogadishu would deflate the propaganda of the radical forces and increase the popularity of the government. However, these expectations have not been met. The transitional government has not been able to achieve wider popular support, not least because of internal dissension but also because it is regarded in certain quarters as being closely linked to Ethiopia, in addition to its lack of ability to keep the country together and supply the citizens with basic social services. Even though the Islamic Courts disintegrated, two new groups, al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam, continued to conduct military campaigns against the transitional government. The transitional government has remained relatively isolated and is dependent on military support from AMISOM. Since the bomb attacks in Kampala in Uganda in July 2010 and subsequent attacks in Mogadishu, the transitional government has worked actively to strengthen AMISOM and its own security forces with the support of countries in the region, primarily Uganda and Kenya. This military strategy is backed by AU and IGAD, all of whom assess that the transitional government needs room for manoeuvre to be able to complete the constitutional process. The international community is also prepared to support the military effort through strengthening AMISOM simultaneously with progress being made in the constitutional process, which is crucial for furthering long-term stability in the country.

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4.2.

Al Shabab

Al Shabab originates in the former youth section of the Islamic Courts, and started as a national alliance of different radical forces fighting the transitional government. Al Shabab has established itself as the most powerful group in the southern part of Somalia, primarily due to the absence of alternatives. A very strict interpretation of Sharia law has been introduced in the areas under its control. As there is no tradition of a strict interpretation of Sharia in Somalia, al Shabab’s popular support is limited. However, because of its ability to create relative stability, al Shabab has managed to develop its power bastion. The group has become increasingly radicalised and battle-hardened over the past two years, as it has attracted a number of elements with international experience, inter alia from Afghanistan. The group now consists of two wings who do not agree on their strategy or line. The first wing wants to concentrate on the national struggle and national objectives, while the other wing has higher ambitions and wishes to focus on international targets that can attract greater attention and possibly also gain it the formal recognition of al Qaida. The most extremist parts of the groups have officially declared their support for al Qaida. The terrorist attack in Kampala in Uganda in July 2010, for which al Shabab took responsibility, was the first example that the group also now possesses the capacity and the will to carry out terrorist attacks outside of Somalia. The attack must thus be regarded as a provisional victory for the international wing of al Shabab. It is unclear what the split in al Shabab will mean for the continued activity of the movement and its popular backing, which is not too strong to begin with.

4.3.

Somaliland

Somaliland, situated to the northwest and bordering on Ethiopia and Djibouti, has created stability and established a state-like structure with its own constitution, own government apparatus and government-like authorities following a locally-based peace and democratisation process. The government in the regional capital of Hargeisha has shown the will for change. In June 2010 a presidential election was held that led to a peaceful handover of power. Both the present and the former government prioritise independence very highly, and therefore Somaliland has not wished to take part in the work on the constitution led by the transitional government. Somaliland’s government are working determinedly to improve the living conditions of the population and have themselves created a certain degree of financial room for manoeuvre through fighting corruption and increasing customs revenue. Among the government’s priorities are efforts in the areas of health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, water supply and job creation for the young. The private sector already plays a key role and the government prioritises its development. The international community, including the EU and the World Bank, have shown considerable interest in supporting the continued development of Somaliland. It is important to support the positive progress in Somaliland, even though it presents political and economic challenges, in a situation where the institutional and democratic structures are still fragile. Denmark is to double its assistance to Somaliland. The support will be implemented within a framework in which Somaliland, the transitional government and the AU must be urged to enter dialogue concerning Somaliland’s status. This issue should primarily be resolved in an African context.

4.4.

Puntland

Puntland is also a region with its own, albeit weak, government apparatus selected by senior clan leaders. Puntland recognises the government in Mogadishu and wishes to remain a region in federal Somalia. The situation in Puntland is marked by the fact that

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Somaliland’s mixed form of state Over the last two decades, Somaliland has developed a form of state that is a unique mixture of traditional and modern elements. Somaliland’s constitution is the result of a number of consultations with different clans, which led to a form of government with a president, a bicameral parliament and independent courts. The Upper Chamber is particularly interesting because it was created from the traditional House of Elders (guurti) on the basis of a representative formula. The Upper Chamber has secured support in the traditional clan-based power structures, which means that the members are appointed and not elected. Such constructive experience of mixing traditional and western forms of government should serve to inspire security and stability in other areas of Somalia such as in Mogadishu.

the political system is not institutionalised to anything like the same degree as in Somaliland. Puntland is also more unstable, inter alia because of the presence of a large number of internally displaced persons from southern and central Somalia. Additionally, Puntland is home to piracy activity, and many see a close connection between the local authorities and the pirates. For the same reason, the fragile peace and relative stability of Puntland risk being undermined, which would worsen the humanitarian and security situation.

4.5.

Women’s situation

Women and children are severely affected by the conflict. Somalia is a traditional society with a largely patriarchal culture, and the position of women is weak. Politically, there are only a few women representatives in the parliament and the government in both the south and the north. Violence against women is widespread and is in practice not punished. This includes wife battering, which is almost generally accepted. While daughters can inherit, they inherit only half of what a son receives. Traditionally widows are obliged to marry their deceased husband’s (oldest) brother. Rape is prohibited, but in practice it is a frequent occurrence, committed by militia members, among others. Women often refrain from telling about the rape for fear that the family will force her to marry her rapist. Female genital mutilation is widespread and it is estimated that 98 % of all Somali women have been subjected to it. An unknown number of women die every year as a consequence of female genital mutilation. Al Shabab have further tightened their demands concerning women’s behaviour in the districts of southern/central Somalia controlled by the group. There are strict requirements for women to wear hijab. Different women’s organisations have been forced to close and women’s movements are strictly controlled. Children are suffering due to the conflict. As mentioned earlier, Somalia has the highest rate of child mortality in the world. Only a fifth of children attend school and as a rule schooling only lasts for five years. A mere 10 % of a year group obtain what corresponds to the Danish upper secondary school leaving examination. The recruitment of child soldiers constitutes a rising problem. Boys as young as 14-15 are being recruited by all parties to the conflict and since 2007 there have been reports of children being killed and wounded in the fighting.

4.6.

The regional context

The neighbouring countries are decisive for Somalia’s future, although their interest in the conflict is influenced to high degree by historical conditions and power balances, which does not make it easier to handle. Ethiopia, the major regional power, plays an absolutely key role and would like a Somalia that while stable is not too strong. At the same time, Ethiopia’s arch-enemy Eritrea is seeking to undermine Ethiopia’s security by supporting rebel movements in Somalia.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD is an organisation of the countries in the Horn of Africa, comprising orn of Africa and The Arab countries also have interests in the development in Somalia. The transitional consists of Djibouti, Ethiopia, government and its predecessors have received official support from the Arab countries, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. while Islamist rebel movements have received – probably much greater – support from dif- The organisation has been an ferent Arab donors through more unofficial channels. important driving force both in the attempts to negotiate a peace The situation in Somalia is thus intertwined with the security policy interests of its neighin Somalia and in managing the bouring countries, which does not promote a positive development in domestic policy. At peace. Eritrea left the organisation – the same time, it is a fact that there will only be a resolution of the conflict in Somalia if it is temporarily– in 2007 as part of the acceptable to the neighbouring countries, in particular Ethiopia and Kenya, whose security ongoing rivalry with Ethiopia. For has been directly linked to the situation in Somalia for a long time. This is the political rea- the moment there is no prospect of lity within which IGAD acts, and this was the platform on which IGAD took the initiative Eritrea returning to IGAD.

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to the peace process that led to Somalia’s provisional constitution and the transitional government. Therefore, it is also within this framework and in close cooperation with the AU and the UN that the challenges connected with the conclusion of the transitional process will have to be addressed. The fact that Eritrea has suspended its membership of IGAD means that IGAD has limited options in relation to Eritrea and to important actors in Somalia, not least Al Shabab and Hizbul Islam, which have their political base in Eritrea. Somalia has close historical and cultural ties to Yemen on the other side of the Gulf of Aden. Yemen has been a kind host for many Somali refugees, who could quite easily obtain a residence permit. According to the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees, there are 170,000 Somali refugees in Yemen, but the Somalia authorities state that the figure is far higher. There is growing concern that Yemen has become a stepping stone for smuggling people, drugs, weapons and money from the Horn of Africa to the wealthy Saudi Arabia and further to Europe. Since 2009 especially, Yemen has been destabilised by a group that is affiliated with al Qaida (Al Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP). There is an increasing amount of concern about whether al Shabab in Somalia is working together with its extremist neighbours in AQAP and the consequences this will have for the threat assessment vis-à-vis Europe.

4.7.

The international framework

The UN plays a key role in Somalia. The UN’s general political strategy was established in spring 2009 when the Security Council supported the retention of the AU’s operation in Somalia, AMISOM. (This took place through the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1872 (2009)). The objective of the UN’s engagement is a cautious, step by step build up of the UN’s civil presence in Somalia via a ”light footprint” when the security situation permits it. Formally the Security Council maintained its declared intention to establish an actual UN peacekeeping operation to replace AMISOM. Politically, however, there is no appetite for a military engagement on the ground in Somalia, and in reality there is satisfaction with authorising AMISOM to perform this task. The UN makes a considerable humanitarian and development effort in Somalia and the neighbouring countries. The UN High Commissioner and its special organisations finance the running of the refugee camps in Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia. The same organisation also operates the camps for the internally displaced in the northern part of Somalia. The World Food Programme supplies food to those who have fled, those who have been driven out and those who face famine. UNICEF seeks to create better conditions for children, inter alia through improved water supply and sanitation. WHO works for better health. Additionally, a large number of other UN organisations are involved in one of the biggest humanitarian programmes in the world, which is collected in a joint appeal (Common Appeal Process, CAP) for Somalia. In cooperation with the World Bank, the UN has formulated a broad, long-term development programme for Somalia, which in everyday speech is called RDP (Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme: Deepening Peace and Reducing Poverty (2008). The programme has three broad focus areas concerning: 1) peace/security/good governance; 2) better public services such as teaching, health and water and sanitation; and 3) improved framework conditions for growth and employment. The Danish effort thus harmonises fully with the priorities in the UN/the World Bank and in Somalia’s transitional government. The UN is also in the process of improving the coordination of the world organisation’s many activities, in order to obtain a united approach on the ground. In view of the short time that remains of the transition period, it is decisively important that the UN puts itself at the head of drawing up a new draft constitution. Denmark has welcomed the appointment of the Secretary-General’s new Special Representative, Mahiga. Mahiga has proved capable of infusing new energy into the UN’s engagement in Somalia. The UN’s coordinating role has been further strengthened by the UN leading the meetings in the international contact group, which gathers a large number of the countries contributing to development in Somalia. Finally, the coordination needs to be enhanced between the UN’s special organisations at regional level – for example in Somaliland and Puntland.

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IGAD has once again tried to play an active role in Somalia in recent years. IGAD regularly gathers together the heads of state and relevant ministers in the region for talks about the development in Somalia. In addition, the former president of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings, is the organisation’s designated mediator in the conflict. In light of the critical security development in Somalia, in June 2010 IGAD agreed to strengthen AMISOM. The aim was, first, to ensure that AMISOM came up to full strength in terms of the existing mandate. This meant the addition of a further 2,000 troops. In addition, it was also agreed within IGAD that a significantly larger military force was needed to create space for the transitional government to be able to use its political mandate. This decision was endorsed at the AU summit in Kampala in July, which took place shortly after al Shabab’s terrorist attack during the World Cup in 2010. In response to the standing invitation from the AU, Denmark supports capacity building of the East African Standby Force (EASF). The objective is to support the standby forces in gaining full operative capacity by 2015, in order to enable the African countries to handle the conflicts in their regions themselves, for example Somalia. The international contact group for Somalia, chaired by the UN, undertakes the general coordination of political and development assistance measures and includes both the UN organisations and important bilateral donors. The contact group meet three to four times a year at the level of executive secretaries or government officials. In addition, at the request of the United Nations’ Security Council a Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia has been set up. This contact group – with rotating chairs – coordinates the efforts of the international community to combat piracy off the Somali coast. Four working groups have been set up within the Contact Group, including a judicial group of which Denmark is the permanent chair. The EU is an important channel for Denmark’s efforts in Somalia. The EU’s effort is based on a policy for the Horn of Africa that was approved in 2009 and is expected to be translated into a more operative strategy. A prominent aspect in the policy is the support for the AU, AMISOM and to a certain degree IGAD as important strategic partners for creating peace in the region. The EU makes considerable contributions to both humanitarian efforts and to reconstruction and it also supports the training of Somali security forces through a military training mission based in Uganda. The EU is judged to have the potential to increase its engagement across the board in relation to Somalia. ---The development in the political and security situation in Somalia means that the international community is faced with a dilemma. Where state-building is a precondition for sustainable conflict resolution, on the other hand it is also a reality that this can only succeed if it is driven by and anchored in Somalia. There is broad support for the African Union and its initiatives to promote peaceful development. The AU and strong forces in Somalia still wish to maintain Somalia as a unitary state. This is why the international community is working on a comprehensive political solution based on the transitional government and a constitutional process that aims at the establishment of a federal state. At the same time, it is increasingly clear that the present transitional government is not the politically unifying factor that can take the country out of the lengthy crisis. On the other hand, the locally based reconciliation processes, inter alia in Somaliland and Puntland as well as small areas of south-western Somalia, would seem to be capable of delivering stability – also as an alternative to al Shabab – and creating better opportunities for development and better living conditions. In recognition of this, the international community continues to back these initiatives for peace and stability to a growing extent. Al Shabab’s increasing influence in the southern part of the country and the intensified pressure not least on the part of the transitional government and the neighbouring countries to stem this raises other questions. An enhanced military effort would not in itself contain al Shabab in the absence of a political strategy for the country as a whole. The experience from the Ethiopian presence in the country was that the Islamic groups can be pressurised militarily, but if there is no political plan behind the military intervention that can unite the Somali clans especially in the south, the effect of a military intervention will be short-term.

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5. THE DANISH ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA The situation in Somalia is complex and an effective Danish effort to support stabilisation and development requires the merging of the whole range of foreign, security and development assistance tools. The different efforts must be utilised strategically and efficiently and their interaction must be strengthened. Denmark will increase its engagement in Somalia, inter alia through a major development assistance effort between 2011 and 2014. The development assistance effort will be unified in one allocation of DKK 370 million, and funds will be added from a number of other allocations including the global stabilisation fund, which finances stabilisation projects on the borderline between security and development, and the military effort. The engagement will contain the following focus areas: 1) Active diplomacy; 2) Security, including piracy; 3) Governance; 4) Growth and employment; 5) Improved living conditions. The Danish engagement will consist of two parts and support both the transitional government in Mogadishu and regional/local initiatives where stability and development are being built up from the bottom. These efforts are fully in line with the reconstruction programme drawn up by the UN and the World Bank together with the cooperation of the transitional government. An effort for conditions for women and children will be an important crosscutting theme in the development assistance effort. There is a widespread need to involve women in the peace and reconstruction process and to work to strengthen women’s rights, equal access to resources and increased political influence. Women’s conditions are integrated in the political part, and in addition special projects are carried out. The training of women veterinary surgeons is one example, and Save the Children’s endeavours to improve conditions for children is another. Danish development assistance to Somalia in 2010 amounted to DKK 154 million. Approximately half of this went to improved living conditions, i.e. primarily humanitarian efforts. The soft security efforts comprised DKK 35 million and came from the global stabilisation fund. The active diplomacy effort is mainly political in nature and cannot as such be implemented in concrete projects. It should also be noted that the sums for the marine military effort have not been included. According to calculations by the World Bank, in 2008 Somalia received USD 758 million in development assistance, corresponding to DKK 4.3 billion. That is a large amount of money. But Somalia is only receiving USD 19 in development assistance per head of population. This is far less than the average for the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, which amounts to approximately USD 73 per capita. It is also below the average for sub-Saharan Africa, where it is USD 49 per head of population. The UN is the largest contributor. As mentioned earlier, the UN assistance is coordinated through a common financing mechanism called the Common Appeal Process (CAP). In 2008 the UN mobilised USD 476 million through the CAP. The EU is also an important actor by virtue of contributions from the Member States and the Commission. In 2008 the EU’s total contribution to Somalia amounted to USD 160 million.

5.1 .

Active diplomacy – at all levels

Objective: Promote a nationally rooted political solution based on an inclusive political process The Danish political effort is directed at all levels of the activities of the international community in relation to Somalia. The coming months are decisive for the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement, which should be completed by August 2011 with a new constitution for Somalia and an election. There is growing awareness in the international community that this will probably not be possible. At the same time there is international agreement that the transition period should not be prolonged. Work is continuing on expanding the political process and strengthening the legitimacy and scope of the transitional govern-

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ment. Interest is now focused on the way in which the constitutional process can become the instrument for a dialogue that unites important actors in Somalia. The UN together with the transitional government lead this part of the process. Given the political and security development in Somalia, there is more than ever a need for a common international strategy that creates common ground between all actors. The UN, with the support of the AU and IGAD, should take the lead in preparing such a strategy. Denmark will work specifically to: • Further a coherent international effort in Somalia that is based on a political solution and extends beyond the transition period, in cooperation with the UN, the AU and IGAD; • Have the UN, the AU and IGAD start the work on the constitutional process in an inclusive manner that contributes to the work being completed before the expiry of the transition period; • Strengthen the EU’s active engagement in relation to Somalia by implementing the strategy for the Horn of Africa; • Strengthen the dialogue with national, regional and local parties and thus promote ownership of the solutions in question. Strengthen the inclusion of women in the process.

5.2.

Security – on land and at sea

Objective: Promote stability and security locally, regionally and internationally The terrorist attack during the World Cup on 11 July 2010 in Kampala, for which al-Shabab claimed responsibility, has once again actualised the question of the terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa and in East Africa as a whole. It is the first time that al-Shabab has been behind a terrorist attack outside of Somalia and the immediate border areas. This confirms a trend towards a more global, ideological and al-Qaida inspired approach on the part of al Shabab, which up to now has mainly been national in focus. Denmark has granted extensive support to the civilian elements of AMISOM and to the training of police via UNDP. Denmark also contributes to the police training effort with a Danish police officer who renders technical assistance to the AU’s planning and control unit in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. Funds have been earmarked in 2010 and 2011 for supplementary stabilisation efforts in and around Somalia. The initiatives could The Joint Security Committee take place in the form of support for AMISOM, the East African Standby Force (EASF) and for building national security structures. Finally, some of the funds could be utilised The assistance of the international to support maritime capacity building in the region in order to contain the piracy. community to the stabilisation of In what remains of the transition period, there will be a need to build up the transitional government’s own military and police force to create the preconditions for the establishment of a national state. Experience from similar situations has shown that building up a national security structure is a difficult matter that takes a long time. It is relatively simple to carry out formal training of soldiers and police officers at targeted courses that provide the individuals with basic knowledge and skills. Thus the EU supports the training of Somali recruits. Because of the security situation, the training has to take place in Uganda, by which it is also possible to draw on the resources and experience of the Ugandan troops in Somalia. The recruits are in their 20s and have always lived in a Somalia without a state. Therefore they are not familiar with the Somali flag and many of them have never attended school. Against this background, it will take a very long time to build up tightly-knit military units. The basic courses are only a first step.

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Somalia is coordinated in The Joint Security Committee (JSC), which is chaired by the Somali prime minister and the UN’s special representative. The committee coordinates the contributions to AMISOM and the initiatives on the part of the UN, IGAD and the EU as well as the efforts of the transitional government itself to build up a security sector. The committee, which meets once a month, is assisted by a number of technical working groups.

As mentioned, there is no national state in Somalia with which individual citizens can identify. Individuals identify with and are loyal to the clan. In principle the clan can be allied with al Shabab or other extremist groups. There is a real risk that this pattern will also apply to the educated/trained soldiers and police officers. Therefore, loyalty to the transitional government cannot be taken for granted in advance. Thus, building up security forces places Denmark and the rest of the international community in a dilemma between the necessity of building up a national state with security forces and the risk of the trained/educated soldiers and police officers joining the anti-government forces. While this dilemma is not new, it is not less difficult in a Somali context. For some years Denmark has been engaged in measures to counter terrorism and radicalisation in the Horn of Africa/East Africa. The main focus has been on support for the regional East African organisation IGAD and its counter terrorism programme. Denmark has also implemented anti-radicalisation measures in relation to Muslim communities along the coast of Kenya. Denmark has, finally, been engaged in mapping the terrorist threat and in formulating recommendations for further focus areas. As a follow-up to this, Denmark has been engaged in increasing the capacity of the East African countries to make use of recently entered agreements about mutual legal aid and extradition in the counter-terrorism field also as a first step towards the establishment of a counter-terrorism network proper. As previously mentioned, there is growing concern that the unstable situation in Somalia will have a negative spillover effect on the neighbour, Yemen. In contrast to Somalia, however, Yemen has a functioning – if weak– administration in the capital of Saana. Yemen is one of the few countries in the region to have a coastguard service. Denmark, together with a number of other development partners, is working to strengthen this service and to build up both institutional and material capacity. Denmark will work specifically to: • Support stabilisation and security in Somalia within an international political framework; • Support the contribution of the African countries to stability and security in Somalia, primarily through AMISOM; • Further the coordination between the UN, AMISOM, IGAD and legitimate local security forces, if necessary through supporting The Joint Security Committee and its recommendations; • Strengthen the ability of EASF to contribute to land and marine military security in relation to Somalia; • Contribute to regional maritime capacity building; • Further the capacity of local communities to prevent and resolve conflict, also by strengthening the role of women; • Support the establishment of a counter-terrorism network in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda and Tanzania).

5.2.1. Piracy Objective: Promote maritime security and strengthen the international effort to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa. The absence of a centralised power, poverty and the breakdown of law and order have led to a steep rise in piracy off Somalia’s 1800 nautical mile long coastline. In recent years the increased piracy activity has also had a negative impact on global commercial shipping, for the African countries as well, and piracy has also entailed great personal costs for the sailors that are held hostage. The boosted military presence and the increasing compliance by the shipping industry of the industry’s precautionary rules against pirate attacks collected in Best Management Practices (BMP) have clearly helped to reduce the number of hijackings carried out in the Gulf of Aden between 2008 and 2009. In reaction to the naval presence and the increased focus on the Gulf of Aden, the pirates have expanded their field of operations to include large parts of the Indian Ocean, with attacks being registered close to the Maldives to the east and around Madagascar to the south. The effort to combat piracy encompasses a broad range of initiatives that cover marine military operations, prosecution of the alleged pirates and capacity building of coastguards and judicial systems in the region. The counter-piracy effort is carried out by both national and international actors in close interaction with private shipping companies and trade associations. The long-term

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solution to piracy is control of the areas by the authorities, also including monitoring the waters and enforcing Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as development, including alternative income opportunities for potential pirates. In the short term however, piracy must be combated through continued international marine military efforts in the waters around Somalia, just as it is important to ensure that piracy is punished. Right from the beginning – as one of the very first nations – Denmark has made a very active contribution to the international marine military counter-piracy effort on several occasions. In 2008, a Danish naval vessel escorted the World Food Programme ships with emergency aid to Somalia, and as well in 2008 and 2009 a Danish naval vessel participated in the international antipiracy efforts though the coalition naval forces Task Force 150 and Task Force 151. In 2010, from January to March and again from August to December Denmark took part in NATO’s counter piracy operation, Ocean Shield, off the coast of the Horn of Africa. The operation was under Danish command. The Danish contribution primarily consists of a support ship of the ABSALON class with helicopter and maritime task force (military police, mine sweepers and special maritime forces) and depending on the situation will number up to about 180 persons. In parts of 2011 Denmark will also participate with a naval vessel contribution in NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield. In addition to Operation Ocean Shield, the Combined Maritime Forces and have also initiated anti-piracy operations, Task Force 151 and Atalanta, respectively. Denmark is unable to participate in the latter because of the defence opt-out. International counter-piracy operations are coordinated together with contributions by single countries such as Russia, India and Japan in an international coordination mechanism, SHADE (Shared Information and Deconfliction Mechanism) with a view to ensuring the best possible utilisation of the marine military forces in the area. In order to coordinate the overall international activity to combat piracy off the Somali coast, as mentioned earlier an international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, CGPCS was set up with four working groups in 2009. Denmark chairs the judicial working group, the purpose of which is to identify practical solutions to the legal challenges presented by combating piracy. Legal proceedings constitute a key challenge which is dealt with in the judicial working group and the UN system. In August 2010 the UN Secretary General published a report with seven possible options concerning legal proceeding against pirates. The Security Council has appointed the former French minister for culture Jack Lang as its special adviser on piracy with a view to following up the Secretary General’s report. There is close cooperation between Jack Lang and the judicial working group on model solutions that ensure that pirates are prosecuted. Up to now there has been agreement that pirates should be prosecuted nationally. Denmark, like the EU and the USA, among others, regularly seeks to enter bilateral agreements with countries in the region concerning legal proceedings against pirates. In addition, Denmark has based itself on a system in which decisions are made on an ad hoc basis concerning which countries are able to and interested in prosecuting pirates detained by the Danish marine military contribution. There are estimated to be approximately 600 Somali pirates in a number of different countries who are either serving a sentence or awaiting a court ruling. Denmark will work specifically to: • Combat piracy, on the basis of a broad-based international approach; • Ensure international coordination of the counter-piracy effort through active participation in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the chair of the judicial working group; • Identify practical solutions to the judicial challenges presented by combating piracy, including coordinating the effort to build up the judicial capacity in the region to implement legal proceedings; • Continue to support marine military activity against piracy, including promoting efficient and coordinated utilisation of the marine military resources; • Seek to enter agreements concerning handing over suspected pirates in the region.

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5.3.

Governance in a country that is difficult to govern

Objective: Strengthen the build-up of legitimate and democratic structures and institutions based on local ownership, transparency and accountability. As mentioned earlier, the institutions in Somalia are weak and fragmented and it is difficult for them to administer prudent governance. A strategy to make Somalia more governable must be dual in nature. The one part must support a central government in the capital of Mogadishu. While this is not easy, it is unavoidable. The other part, building up institutions regionally and locally, is equally important. Experience gained in both Somaliland and Puntland can be built on together with experience from the area north of Mogadishu and south of Puntland. In the area under al Shabab control, it is crucial that the central government reaches out to groups outside of the Djibouti process and undermines al Shabab’s political base. The Somali transitional government is weak and has limited popular support. The different institutions quarrel among themselves, which has produced a confused picture of the political process. With less than 12 months left before the transitional period expires in August 2011, a conclusion to the constitutional process is quite crucial. An independent constitutional commission has proposed that the Somalia of the future should be based on federal state formation, a small parliament and a tripartition of power. As a consequence of the security situation, it goes without saying that it has been difficult for the commission to conduct comprehensive consultation and public participation in the process. Against this background, at present it is more an outline containing some main elements than a draft constitution as such. A federal state will require decisions about weighty issues such as the delimitation of the federal states, the definition of consultation mechanisms for consultation between the different levels and how resources and tax revenue are to be divided. Moreover, respect must be shown for the Sharia law which underpins the constitution. It is important that an understanding be reached between the transitional government in Mogadishu and the regional authorities in Somaliland and Puntland concerning extensive regional self-rule that builds on results already achieved. Needless to say, there is still a major effort remaining to concretise and carry forward the work of the constitutional commission. It is, therefore, important, that the transitional government should draw up a concrete plan for how much it can achieve during the remaining period of its mandate. Denmark will work specifically to: • Support activities for drawing up a long-term political framework for Somalia’s government and democratisation process that exceeds the expiry of the transitional government, including as part of this supporting the implementation of a Somali-owned constitutional process that can contribute to stabilising Somalia and the region; • Reconstruct Somaliland as a good example and double development assistance to the area in 2011; • Underpin the build-up of representative, transparent and well-functioning institutions at all levels, national, regional and local, including working for the increased inclusion of women; • Support the building up of good public administration, including capacity building of public employees and safeguarding the legal position of women; • Support the growth of civil society.

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5.4.

Growth and employment

Objective: Promote poverty reduction through private sector driven growth and employment. In spite of the unstable situation, the private sector has proved capable of developing in parts of Somalia, not least in Somaliland and Puntland. The absence of a centralised power has also led to private companies– in certain areas – offering services such as electricity and drinking water. However, the private sector needs better framework conditions and more consistent legalisation. In addition, the absence of a financial sector as such is an obstacle to the further development of the private sector. Agriculture and cattle farming are the largest occupations in the country. Somalia has traditionally had close commercial links with Yemen and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, to which it exports cattle, among other things, at very low prices. Traditionally, fishery has also been an important occupation. Fishery could also be an important source of income in the future for Somalis in the coastal districts, as long as the exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles is imposed and enforced, and if local fishery is safeguarded against pirate attacks. Particularly high youth unemployment is, furthermore, a feature of Somalia, together with a lack of employment and income opportunities. The bad living conditions have, inter alia, led to al Shabab finding it easier to gain a footing and to some Somalis choosing piracy as their occupation.

Dialogue with the diaspora

Tens of thousands of Somalis have fled their home country after 20 years of conflict and have settled in the USA, Canada, Europe and the Arabian Peninsula. About 17,000 Somalis live in Denmark. The Somali diaspora has political and economic influence in the home country and considerable sums of money are remitted to family and relatives. A number of Danish ministries and authorities enter dialogue with It is a political priority in Somaliland to break the vicious circle by strengthening the private the Somali diaspora in Denmark sector to create growth and jobs. The lack of a formal financial sector makes this difficult, and seek to utilise its potential even though the informal money-transfer schemes seem to function. Job creation and trairesources in connection with the ning of the large group of young unemployed people are necessary to maintain stability. Danish engagement in their home country. The dialogue is supported In Puntland there is, in addition, a possibility of supporting the private sector, and this will by a fund administered by the also benefit the employment opportunities of young people. At the same time a security Danish Refugee Council which aims fundament has been established here, making it possible to develop the private sector, to promote small development also in connection with the diaspora, which plays an important role as both driving force projects in the local communities.

and source of financing. No minerals or oil of any importance have either been found or extracted in Somalia. Denmark will work specifically to: • Promote the framework conditions for the development options of the private sector; • Further decent employment opportunities with special focus on young men and women; • Promote the involvement of the diaspora in the development of the private sector.

5.5.

Improved living conditions

Objective: Reduce vulnerability and promote lasting improvements of basic living conditions, in particular for vulnerable groups. Drought, economic crisis and an extensive, prolonged conflict have led to the humanitarian situation in Somalia becoming significantly worse in recent years. The number of people needing help is more than 2 million and today many families’ reserves are severely depleted. At present 145 out of 1,000 children die before the age of 5, and it is estimated that approximately 200,000 children are malnourished. 1.4 million people are internally displaced as a result of the lack of food and the conflict.

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The problems are particularly acute in the parts of southern and central Somalia that are affected by conflict, but they also impact on Somaliland and especially Puntland. After two decades of conflict in the Horn of Africa, the capacity of society to resist new crises is increasingly weaker. This is exacerbated by the continued internal displacement of a very large number of people in both southern and central Somalia and Puntland. A record harvest has improved the situation in recent months, but on the other hand and to a growing extent obstacles are placed in the way of the ability of the humanitarian organisations to reach vulnerable groups, particularly in areas controlled by al Shabab. Even in peaceful areas, the ability of the local authorities to supply basic services is still extremely limited. Potential exists to support the ability of local communities to resist crises by means of development-oriented activities. At the same time it becoming clearer that the Somali diaspora plays a very important role in this connection, inter alia through the transfer of considerable economic resources to the local communities. A special effort must be made for women in Somalia. Women and children are hit hard by the humanitarian situation, where the women often become the sole providers for a family. Special attention is paid to this in the humanitarian effort. In areas like Somaliland, it is possible to conduct more productive efforts such as microloans and technical vocational training. Denmark will work specifically to: • • • •

Reduce vulnerability and promote lasting improvements in living conditions, especially for vulnerable groups; Cover acute humanitarian needs; Initiate local development activities, especially for vulnerable groups; Contribute to protection and living conditions – on the basis of local groups and structures - for refugees and the internally displaced in and around Somalia; • Strengthen dialogue with and the capacity of local authorities to supply the population with basic services; • Maintain its active engagement as an advocate of protection of the humanitarian space in Somalia; • Involve the diaspora in the development of local communities.

6. RISKS The effort in Somalia involves considerable political, security and financial risks. As previously mentioned, the political process is fragile. The transitional government depends on the political, economic and military support of the international community. Denmark seeks to address this considerable challenge through active diplomacy at all levels and to support and build up security capacity. In the context of the broader work of managing risks in Danish development assistance, a concrete pilot project will be prepared with a point of departure in The Common Humanitarian Fund for Somalia. The pilot project will uncover how the risks can be managed and monitored. The underlying parameters for risk assessment will be identified in cooperation with OCHA’s risk manager in Nairobi. Denmark will thus be able to access the necessary information for being in a position to regularly assess the varied risks involved in the engagement in Somalia. Relatively fewer risks are involved in the effort in Somaliland and Puntland, politically speaking. The government in Garowe in Puntland, however, is pursuing a somewhat fluttering course, illustrated by the ties to local pirates. The new government in Hargeisa in Somaliland, which came to power through a peaceful election in June 2010, has, on the other hand, shown the will to lead the population towards reconstruction in which the private sector is playing a significant role. Regrettably, al Shabab has been successful in drawing a picture of the international community and the transitional government as allies of the arch-enemy Ethiopia.

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The major part of central/southern Somalia is controlled by the extremist and brutal group al Shabab. Without the presence of 8,000 troops from AMISOM, Mogadishu would fall into al Shabab’s hands. Al Shabab has declared a number of NGOs and aid agencies, also under the World Food Programme, unwanted. The consequence is a grave limitation of the humanitarian space. There is, in addition, a risk that al Shabab will collect taxes /bribes from the operators of emergency aid. In the central/southern parts, emergency aid workers are exposed to great risks in terms of personal security, free movement and residence. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not physically present in southern/central Somalia, but operates through international and local actors who advise their personnel concerning security. Denmark seeks to create a better security framework by supporting the efforts of the international community to promote a more secure Somalia; this includes training and educating security forces. Fragile states often suffer from corruption as there is neither capacity nor institutions that can ensure sound economic management. Somalia is no exception. In southern and central Somalia Danida works primarily with other actors responsible for auditing in relation to agreements entered, including undertaking auditing. Denmark also works together with the UN, which likewise is responsible for presenting accounts and for auditing. The Government intends to grant considerable assistance to Somaliland. As previously mentioned, the government in Hargeisa has shown political will for change. Somaliland’s financial capacity is still limited, however. There are no banks and financial transactions take place informally. The regional structures for budgetary control and presentation of accounts are being built up. However, some development partners are entering the financial field. One of these partners is the World Bank, which among other things will work to strengthen this area, which naturally is a condition for receiving loans from the Bank. On this basis, there is a possibility for crosscutting international cooperation, where budgeting, presentation of accounts and auditing can be strengthened. Danida is considering placing an adviser in Hargeisa, one of whose tasks will be to follow up the degree to which development assistance is being used as planned.

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