Professors World Peace Academy

SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONS AND THE CONTRA WAR Author(s): MARC EDELMAN Source: International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 5, No. 3 (JUL-SEP 1988), pp. 45-67 Published by: Professors World Peace Academy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20751268 . Accessed: 13/05/2013 14:34 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONS AND THE WAR

CONTRA

MARCEDELMAN Department ofAnthropology Yale University New

Haven,

Connecticut

06520

USA

Dr. Marc Edelman is assistant professor in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University.He received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees in anthropology from Colum bia University,where he has also studied Soviet politics and international relations as a fellow of the InternationalResearch and Exchanges Board (IREX). Dr. Edelman has done research inNicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, the United States, and the Soviet Union. He is an editor of a forthcoming anthology on Costa Rican politics and the author of numerous articles on Latin American history and development, including 'The Other Superpower: The Soviet Union and Latin America, 1917-1987," inReport on the Americas, January-February1987. This article examines Soviet perceptions ofNicaragua's Sandinistas and Sandinista perceptions of both the Soviet Union and the United States in the period prior to the 1979 defeat of Somoza. It then outlines the development of post-1979 Soviet-Nicaraguan military relations and discusses the ways inwhich the contra

US-sponsored

war

has contributed to forging closer

Soviet-Nicaraguan

ties. It is argued that Nicaragu?n security planners

have

no

alternative

but to prepare for

worst-case

and thatReagan administration policy, by viewing Third World conflicts exclusively in terms,

has

aimed

at undermining Nicaragua by forcing it to allocate amounts of disproportionate human

calation of the contra war, events

and material

resources for the defense

effort.

administration's

last-minute

3 JULY-SEPT

efforts

to deny power to the FSLN by supporting

"Provisional

President"

Francisco

Urcuyo.

In

Central America, where of five countriesonly Costa Rica had durable democratic institutions, andwhere earlierexperimentsin social change, such as thatof JacoboArbenz inGuatemala, had been crushed by US-supported mer for cenaries, itwas perhaps not unreasonable to the victorious Sandinistas expect eventual ef

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VOL. V NO.

in retrospect

appear to have had a certain inexorablequality Itwas to be expected thata radical,nationalist movement such as that led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) would har bor deep suspicionsof theUnited States, espe cially given the historyof US interventionin Nicaragua, with 14 official or filibuster in vasions between 1853 and 1926, two decades ofdirectoccupation inthiscenturyfourdecades of support for the Somoza dictatorship, and the Carter

developments

East-West

Introduction Seven yearsafterthetriumphof theSandinis ta revolutionand fiveyears afterthe serious es

1988

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RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

forts to organize

a counterrevolution.

In Nicaragua,

where

the vast majority

was politically and economicallydisenfranchisedand where proponents of liberaldemocracyhad historicallybeen unable tomount meaningful opposi tion to thedictatorship,itshould not be surprisingthatanti-Somoza youths turned to armed strugglesand dreamed of socialism and resurrectingSan dino. Nor was itpeculiar thatNicaraguans seeking to overthrow Somoza would seek support and refugewhere itwas to be had. In the earlyyearsof theSandinistas5existence,thismeant Cuba and, to a lesserdegree, theSoviet Union.1

In theUnited States,on theotherhand, theSandinistas5victorycoincided with a conservativeshiftin thepoliticalmood. The Iranian hostage crisis, and the sudden attentiongiven a Soviet armybrigade inCuba thathad ac tuallybeen detected longbefore,contributedto hardening attitudestoward groups which seized power by violentmeans, even if theydid so against otherswho had held power by violentmeans. The December 1979 Soviet invasionof Afghanistanmarked the end of detente and provided ammuni tion for thosewho sought to place allThirdWorld conflictsinan East-West context.

These mutual perceptionsare importantbecause, to a largedegree,policies are shaped by thesehistoricallyand ideologically influencedconstructs.As these initial views contributed to polariz relations worsened, that already contained ample structural reasons for generat there was the real threat of For Nicaragua, US-supported ing conflict. reasons almost from the for sound historical counterrevolution, anticipated

US-Nicaraguan a situation ing

firstdays afterJuly1979. For theUnited States, therewas the sudden un certaintybrought about by the Sandinista victory in a region thathas long been a stableand unquestionedUS preserve.For themore alarmistelements inWashington, theFSLN"s historic relationswith Cuba meant thatwhat seen throughtheprismofUS-Soviet happened inNicaragua could only be geopolitical competition. While ultimatelytheNicaragu?n revolutionmay have setoff alarm bells of capitalism,2immediate in Washington because itchallenged the legitimacy

related to loss of US control and a changing East-West balance security fears more were almost to examine the It is, therefore, certainly key important.

ways inwhich themilitary aidNicaragua has receivedfrom theEastern bloc developed in the contextof itsrelationswith theUnited States.This paper firstconsiders theways inwhich the Sandinistas and Soviets viewed each

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR

other in theperiod prior to July1979. It then considers thedevelopment of one aspect of post-1979 Soviet-Nicaraguan relations: the course of the contrawar and the expansion ofNicaragua's military carriedout primarily with Soviet assistance.As in thecase of economic relationswith the socialist countries,which have grown as other possibilitieswere blocked,3much of assistance has received has been in response to con military Nicaragua crete threats. Because in conflict situations involves security necessarily worst-case to for been has also scenarios, Nicaragua preparation required war contra for defense eventual escalations of the and direct prepare against the

US

intervention.

Pre-1979 Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations In late 1944, theUSSR andNicaragua, thenunder the ruleof Anastasio Somoza Garcia, exchanged notes establishingdiplomatic relations.There

was

not

subsequently,

however,

an actual

exchange

of missions.4

to reassure

the USSRs

Nicaragua's

recognitionof theUSSR, like thatof a number of other Latin American countrieswhich established linkswith the Soviets in thisperiod, occurred in a contextof reducedUS-Soviet tensionsgrowing out of both thewar time collaboration against theNazis and the 1943 abolition of theCom intern, a measure

specifically

intended

allies. These

earlySoviet-Nicaraguandiplomatic linkshad littlereal importance,however. Apart from someminor tradedeals in the 1960s and 1970s therewas vir tuallyno contactbetween theSoviet andNicaragu?n governmentsprior to the 1979 triumphof theSandinistas. InNicaragua, theWorld War II periodwas also the timeof a briefpoliti cal thaw thatwitnessed thecreationof thepro-MoscowNicaragu?n Socialist Party (PSN) in 1944. Founded from the remnantsof themore politically heterogeneousNicaragu?nWorkers Party (PTN), leadersofwhich had been forcedto seek refugeinCosta Rica during the late1930s, thePSN developed some presence

in the small union movement

and helped

secure

passage

of

the country'sfirst labor code beforebeing driven underground in 1948. In itsbrief legal life,thePSN lentsupport to theSomoza regime, refusingto conser participate,forexample, in the 1944 general strikeorganized by the vative

opposition.

The PSN was always among theweakest of the smallCentral American communist parties. Formed after the dissolution of the Comintern, its militants inall likelihoodnever experienced theclose Soviet ideological and

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RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

on other Latin American organizational supervision bestowed parties founded in the 1920s and 1930s. Strongly influencedby the largerCosta Rica Popular Vanguard (communist) Party (PVP), underwhose tutelage exiledNicaragu?n communists had firstorganized in the late 1930s, the PSN absorbed much of the gradualist, reformistorientation that charac terizedPVP ideology inCosta Rica's more open political environment.Ac cording to one authoritativeSoviet source, itonly established"strong" links with the internationalcommunistmovement in 1959, and the "definitive formation"of thePSN "as aMarxist-Leninist party" For themost occurred in 1967, when "a group of opportunists and conservatives entrenched in the party was part, Soviet routed."5Following thefailuresof thediverseguer analysts rillamovements that sought to overthrow the writing before Somoza dictatorship in the late 1950s,6 the PSN 1979 believed decided at a 1960 congress to "prepareforan armed to of a uprising and the formationand strengthening Nicaragua be one the single,anti-imperialist people's front."7But thiscall

of in places Latin

America(if

not theplace) whereUS domination was

appears

and weakness

only

one

in a series of resolu

of the PSN

organization.

In the 1950s, thefuturefoundersof theSandinis taNational Liberation Front (FSLN)?Carlos Fon seca,

strongest.

to have been

tions thatwere never carriedout due to infighting

and Tomas

Silvio Mayorga,

Borge?were

recruitedby thePSN, but itwas, as Borge was later to remark, "a halfway

Nicaraguans5

recruitment."8 These

acquaintance

with Marxism

young was su

was difficult to come perfida!, in part because Marxist literature by in Somoza's Nicaragua. Fonseca, theFSLN's principal theoretician,recalled thathis studyofMarxism was based on Mao Tse-tung*sNew Democracy, LenirfsLeftWing Communism:An InfantileDisorder, and a fewworks by were also irkedby thePSN's Marx and Engels.9 The young revolutionaries failure to pursue armed struggle against the Somoza regime. Sandinista reminiscencesare repletewith accusations of PSN perfidy includingchar ges of collaborationwith the Somozas, failureto support strikes,betrayals of peasant

organizers,

and, on one occasion,

of Fonseca

himself.10

The FSLN's dislikeof thePSN was coupledwith some acrimonious feuds with theCosta Rican PVP. ShortlyafterFonseca's abortive 1969 break from

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR

a Costa Rican prison, thePVP newspaper sarcasticallycharged thathewas an amateurish"Boy Scout55and, callinghim "Charles,55implied thathewas even connected to theNorth Americans.11Fonseca respondedwith possibly a long polemic lambasting thePVP for a 1934 attackon Sandino and its "very long policy of scorn for the revolutionaryvalues of theNicaragu?n people and its encouragement of conciliationwith the enemies of the Nicaragu?n

people.5512

Sandinista disdain for thepro-Moscow partiesdid not inmost cases ex tend to theUSSR itself.Fonseca, who travelledto the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1957 as the loneNicaragu?n delegate to the World Youth a en wrote Un later short which book, Festival, Nicaraguense Mosc?, praised Soviet economic development and achievements in social welfare.13Like numerous otherThirdWorld visitors toMoscow, Fonseca viewed theSoviet Union with theeyesof someonewith littleother travelexperience,froman impoverishedcountrythathad sufferedfrequentUS military interventions was sure and aUS-supported right-wingdictatorship.A similar impression a on to Gladys Baez, later Sandinista,who in 1962 "went theUSSR lymade without knowingManagua.5514But not all Sandinistas sharedFonseca5s rosy view of theSovietUnion. In themid- and late 19605sFSLN sympathizers studying

atMoscow5s

Patrice Lumumba

University

were

reported

to have

clashed frequently with theSoviets over issuesof ideological control,armed the Sino-Soviet struggle, dispute, and the Soviet occupation of Czecho slovakia.15

The few Sovietwritingswhich mention theFSLN prior to July1979 are largelyuncritical, although occasional PSN statementspublished in the

USSR

tend to be somewhat

less

accepting.16

Leonov,17

without

mention

ing theFSLN by name, describes the foundingby Fonseca of a "patriotic

notes that Fonseca5s front for struggle with the Somoza dictatorship,55 but once the in Costa Rica uselessness and frequent "confirms capture again 55 an adventurist policy of'direct action.5 Significantly, however, harmfulness of

thisauthor5scriticismsof thePSN18 are considerablymore severe,even in 1975.Merin, who condemns theGuatemalan guerrillamovement and the ultra leftgroup which tried to split thePSN around 1970, isnoncommit talon theFSLN,19 although some obvious errorsof fact inhis description suggest thathewas ratherunfamiliarwith thissubject.Chumakova, incon trast,refersto the"development of guerrillamovements inGuatemala and US domination in the Nicaragua55 as being one of the factors threatening

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49

RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

as the resultof to region.20She refers Fonseca's detention inCosta Rica recommendationsof theUS-sponsored ODECA military pact.21For the most part,Soviet analystswriting before 1979 believedNicaragua tobe one of theplaces inLatin America (ifnot theplace) where US dominationwas Leonov23 strongest.22 Only

presciently

referred to Central America

as "one

of theweak linksin thesystemofAmerican domination inthewestern hemi sphere.55

Perhaps because of thePSN's weakness, Soviet analysts appear to have had at least some hopes for theFSLN, even in theearly 1970s when theor militants. In 1971, for ganization probably had only a fewdozen full-time a greetingfromFonseca Pravda example, published Even after the to the24th CPSU Congress.24At thisCPSU Con were explicitly made to strengthen"ties gress,efforts major the with democratic revolutionary parties of the escalation of a category which developing countries,"25 the contra war included the FSLN. There was no presumably in 1982, the this of FSLN published repetition greetingon the occasion of the 25th CPSU Congress five years

Nicaragu?n government expressed its

later.26Nevertheless,

willingness on numerous

occasions to

provide guarantees

such gestures

are

likely

to have

smoothed theway within the Soviet Communist Partyfor approaches to theFSLN after1979. This was especially true in lightof thechronicorganiza tional and ideological problems of the "fraternal" PSN, which included a 1977 split inwhich a sig nificantportion of themembership opted to col laboratewith theFSLN.

addressing the

Even

as the Sandinista-led

insurrection

against

theSomoza dictatorshipgatheredsteam inlate1978 and early 1979, Soviet press coverage and analysis security were sparse,suggestinga lackof in-depthknowledge concerns of the of theFSLN. InOctober 1978, forexample,Kom United States. somohkaiaPravda printed a sympatheticinterview with Tomas Borge, who had recentlyarrived in Havana afterbeing freedfromprison in returnforFSLN hostages seized in theNational Palace, but itmisidentifiedhim as Tomas Jorge Martinez.27 another

50

an interview with Luis Guzman, published who had been released as a result of the Palace prisoner

later, Pravda

Several months

Sandinista

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR

But until thefinalweeks of the insurrectioninmid-1979, this take-over.28 was virtuallyall that theSoviet press reportedabout theFSLN. Cuba, of course,provided inspiration,sanctuaryand trainingto theFSLN no doubt because of the during its long struggleagainst Somoza, inpart latter'sgrantingof bases to anti-CastroCuban exiles during and after the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. In the finalmonths of the 1979 insurrection, Cuba also provided substantialarmsaid, alongwithVenezuela and Panama.29 What has been frequentlyobscured in the subsequent fragmentationof the FSLN-led anti-Somoza coalition, however, is thatvirtuallyall forces that opposed the dictatorship initiallyfavoredwarm relationswith Cuba. In 1979, even present-daycontra leaderAlfonso R?belo could declare that "Cuba andNicaragua will alwaysbe, as theyhave been, brotherpeoples."30 While thisaffectiondid not in all likelihoodextend to Eastern Europe and months of the revolution,there theUSSR, it isnoteworthythat,in thefirst was a broad consensus inNicaragu?n society infavorof a diversificationof foreignrelationsthatwould include the socialistcountries. The Lines Are Drawn: 1979-1981 Events in theperiod fromJuly1979 throughearly 1981 are crucial toun derstandingNicaragua's subsequent relationswith both the Soviet Union and itsallies and theUnited States. Several pointsmust be emphasized, al though theywill not be considered indetail here.The victoriousFSLN was, ingeneral, sympatheticto thesocialistcountries,particularlytoCuba, which had been virtuallytheonly significantsanctuaryitsmilitants had during the yearsof struggleagainstSomoza. Yet, in theperiod following the July1979 overthrow

of Somoza,

the Sandinistas

displayed

considerable

openness

toward theUnited States,guaranteeingpolitical space for theprivate sector and opposition parties and even seekingUS military aid.31Even after the major escalationof thecontrawar in 1982, theNicaragu?n governmentex pressed

itswillingness

on numerous

occasions

to

ing the securityconcernsof theUnited States. The

address

provide guarantees

new Sandinista-led security threat faced by the

government

was

one

of themain considerationswhich contributed to polarizing the situation. The guerrilla forcewhich overthrewSomoza had perhaps 5,000 full-time combatants,

a

motley

array of equipment,

no

developed

command

struc

The Reagan administrationand itssupporters ture,and virtuallyno aircraft. have frequentlyasserted thattheNicaragu?n governmentfacedno threatin

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RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

1979 and 1980, and that it thereforehad no legit?matereason fordevelop a or source of this charge is ing largearmy securityapparatus.32The main a a of 1979 FSLN meeting that the"72-Hour Document," report high-level or cited out of con administrationsupportershave frequently misquoted text.33In fact,however, the new government faced immediatedifficulties fromcounterrevolutionaries.In July1979, theSpanish news agency reported a fightwith 1,500 formerNational Guardsmen near theHonduran border and noted that"great tension is being experienced inManagua due to in tense sniperfireby alleged formersoldiersdressed in civilian clothes.The attacks,even on theCamino Real Hotel, headquartersof the junta of the

Government

of National

have been

Reconstruction,

staged

at

night."34

In August, itwas reported that therewere "skirmishesevery night in Managua."35 Nicaragua decided to protest to theUS governmentabout the activitiesof formerNational Guards who announced on US territorythat were organizinga counterrevolution.36 TheWashinjjtonPost?so reported they inAugust thatsome 2,000 ex-NationalGuards had regrouped justover the Honduran

border

and were

carrying

out

sporadic

raids.37 Tomas

Borge

declared that"we arenot seeking to setup a largearmy;our underdeveloped countrycould not affordthis,to saynothingof thefact thatwe do not even have thepower to pay for such a luxury.Still,we must consider thefact that

we

live in a state of constant

own army.We may lead."38

threat. Even

also do not know where

is organizing his today Somoza the hostile conduct of some countries

Over themonths, theseproblems continued. In October 1979, 20 San dinistamilitiamenwere killed in aManagua ambush,39and therewere fire fights inDiriamba, Jinotepe,and Corinto.40 In February 1980, theHon National Guards, partof a forceof around duranArmy captured270 former 800, thatwere planning an invasionofNicaragua.41 In June,some 200 con traswere captured in a battle northofManagua.42 Although someReagan administrationsupporters,indiscussing theviolentdeath inNovember 1980 of private sector leaderJorgeSalazar, referto his "alleged anti-Sandinistaac tivities,"43 others have documented

his involvement

in an armed group

seek

ing to foment a coup fromwithin the ranksof theNicaragu?n army.44 By late 1980, theCarter administrationhad begun a modest "covert action" program to support thepolitical opposition inNicaragua.45 Already in late 1980, theanti-SandinistaarmedgroupUnionDemocratica Nicaraguense (UDN), led by Francisco Cardenal and Edmundo and Fer

52

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR

nando ("El Negro55) Chamorro, was receivingfunds from theUS Central IntelligenceAgency.46 Boree5s

lament that "our underdeveloped

countrv

army reflectedanotheraspectof thedifficultreality facing the Sandinistas in 1979-1981. Fleeing functionariesof theSomoza regimehad absconded with all but $3,500,000 of Nicaragua's currency reserves and had left the new government

a

country

in ruins. If theSandinistaswere to realize theiram bitious social investmentgoals and build amodern army to defend against theveryreal securitythreat, itwas necessary to spend as littleas possible on arms.Nonetheless, theSandinistas soughtmilitary While theyreceived aid from theUnited States.47 some minuscule

amount

for binoculars

and com

passes, itwas clearby September 1979 thatno sig nificantarms aidwould be forthcoming. Although Sandinista

leaders had, on a number

of occasions,

arms a expressed preferenceforobtainingWestern (and actually signed a small arms deal with France in 1981), theyhad littlealternativeto turningto theUSSR and its allies, which were willing to provide stable supplieson favorable terms.48It has been

suggested49

that some of the Soviet arms that

Nicaragua has receivedhave been purchasedwith hard currency. However, it isnot likelythat this is the case, givenNicaragua's dire economic usually crisis.

The situation in the intelligenceareawas similar. Panamanians played an importantrole in training The the Sandinista police in 1979-1980. Nicaraguans, Panamanian

reluctant to accept however, were trainers into army intelligence because

could

not afford55 an

Although Sandinista leaders had, on a number of occasions, expressed a

preference for obtaining

Western

arms

(and actually signeda sma ll arms deal with France

in 1981),they had little

alternative

to

turning to the USSR and its allies, which werewilling toprovide stable supplies onfavorable

terms. of thePanamanianNational Guard's historic links to both Somoza's officercorps and theUnited States.50The FSLN had his toricties toCuba, and Cubans rapidlycame to play thekey foreignadvisory As RobertMatthews suggests,"Nicaragua faced role inmilitary intelligence.

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RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

aHobsorfs choice: acceptCuban offersofmilitaryhelp and arouseWestern or risk taking the Panamanians

antagonism,

into sensitive

security

areas. As

U.S. hostilitygrew,and blossomed intowar underReagan, theSandinistas must have felt that theirdecision to play itsafewith theCubans was awise one.5551

Among other factorswhich contributed toworsening relations in 1980 were theUS Congress's effortsto attachwhat were perceivedby Nicaraguans as onerous conditions to a loan $75,000,000 proposed package promised Nicaragua and thesubsequent signingof severalaid protocolswith theUSSR that included

a

party-to-party

agreement

for contacts

between

the FSLN

and theCPSU. The Sandinistas5 April reorganizationof theCouncil of State to provide greater representationfor FSLN-linked mass organizations provoked an outcry from themore conservativesectorsof thepolitical op position.Reagarfs electionon a platformthatwas deeply hostile to theSan dinistas52

Somocista

and

the contacts

exile groups were

between

the president-elect's staff and armed additional motives for concern.53 Nicaragu?n

There is also evidence that in thebriefperiod betweenReagarfs election inNovember 1980 and thefailureof theSalvadoran guerrillas5"finaloffen sive55in early 1981, the Sandinistas shipped some arms to theguerrillas,a stepwhich obviously arousedUS governmentanger.US warnings, however, led almost immediatelyto a virtual eliminationof the arms flow,and the US-sponsored militarizationofHonduras thatbegan in 1982 assuredagainst Nevertheless, the charge that the any significantresumptionof this traffic. Sandinistaswere supplying the Salvadoran insurgentscontinued to be a stapleofReagan administrationattacksagainstNicaragua and a key justifica tion for the initiationof the contrawar. By 1981, the die was cast. InMarch, sixweeks afterhis inauguration, Reagan issued a finding calling for stepped-up covert action in Central America.54 In April, theUnited States cut off all economic aid and began, systematically,to block Nicaragu?n loan requests inmultilateral lending moves widely viewed as a "radicalization55 agencies.55In July,in a seriesof of the revolution,

theNicaragu?n

government

announced

the

expropriation

of 13 largefirmsthathad been decapitalizing,promulgated a broad agrarian reform,and decreed certain limitson private sectoractivities. on the same dayAssistant Secretaryof StateThomas InAugust, literally Enders was inManagua with theostensible purpose of fosteringpeaceful reconciliation;

54

the FDN

(RiermDefmcraticaNicaraguense)

contra

organiza

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RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

tionwas foundedwith US encouragement.The Enders mission took place in an atmosphere of heightened tensions and the Sandinistas, angered by theUS handling of the $75,000,000 aid package and growing evidence of CIA ties to the contras,were skepticalofUS promises of a deal. Although theNicaraguans believed thatsufficientlegalguarantees existedagainstUS so as tomake additional pledges unnecessary,theycon sponsored attacks tinued

private

talks for several weeks.

The Nicaraguans

were

later reported

to regretthe end of thesenegotiations,56but itwas theUnited States that When Nicaragua protestedUS navalmaneuvers off its terminatedthe talks. coast inOctober, theReagan administrationbroke off thediscussions. In November, Secretaryof StateAlexanderHaig refusedto ruleout an armed interventionagainstNicaragua. Also inNovember, theUnited States allo cated $19,000,000 forcovertactivitiesagainst theNicaragu?n government. The Rhythm of theMilitary Build-up faces Any effortto examine thepost-1979 Nicaragu?n military build-up on inevitablemethodological difficulties.57 Reagan administrationfigures for even the early Nicaragu?n troop strengthand equipment acquisitions new with each been have revised conflict press release.58 upward yearsof the are not disaggregatedby importantcategories and in Frequently suchdata for example, the tonnage of all arms deliveries59or stead lump together, as or active combine dutymilitary and civilianmilitia "forces" both combat and noncombat airplanesunder the single rubricof "fixedwing aircraft.5560 In most

cases, Reagan

administration

claims about Nicaragu?n

strength

are

sourceswidely respectedfor theirobjectivity in substantiallyabove thoseof as the Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Institute this field, such (SIPRI), Jane'sDefenceWeekly and itsassociatedpublications, and theLon

don

International

Institute of Strategic

Studies.

It has also been

reported

theCIA has presented closed congressional hearingswith "much lower on than those published by the ad figures55 Nicaragua^ military capability

ministration.61 Borge5s

1979

assertion

that "we are not seeking

to set up a large army55

reiteratedon various occasions by other leadingSandinistas,62appears to be an examinationofNicaragu?n military acquisitions in largelyborne out by the 1979-1981 period.During thefirstyearsof the revolution,military aid fromtheSovietUnion and itsallieswas not very substantial.US intelligence worth of Soviet-bloc figures released in 1985 showed only $5,000,000

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RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

military imports in 1979.63 Imports during late 1979 and thefirsthalf of 1980 includedSoviet ZPU lightantiaircraft mis guns, SA-7 surface-to-air siles, RPG-7

antitank grenades,

and East German

trucks.64 US

Defense

Department (DOD) figures indicate thatby the end of 1980, Nicaragua DOD guns and sixmissile launchers.65 possessed a totalof 39 antiaircraft on a figures Nicaragua's importsduring 1980 suggest totalweight of deliveries of some 850 metric tons66worth between $6,000,000 and $7,000,000.67 The same sources report 1981 arms importsof 900 metric tons68 worth an estimated$39,000,000 to $45,000,000.69Most of the 1981 tonnagewas almost certainlyaccounted forby some 27 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks,weighing 32 metric tons each, thatwere acquired second-hand fromAlgeria. Part of the 1980-1981 build-upwas simply the constructionof national armed forceswhere none had existed and partwas almost certainlydue to perceived threatsfromNicaragua's neighbors and from contraswho were El Salvador,Guatemala, and alreadytrainingon US andHonduran territory. Honduras allmade significantpurchases of fighteraircraftin 1979, shortly aftertheSandinistas came to power.70Honduras, with themost hostile pos ture of the three and themost threateninggeographic position vis-a-vis Nicaragua, acquired 16 British Scorpion tanks in 1981, not long before Nicaragua received itstanksfromAlgeria. The Scorpions, built in the 1970s, are

considerably

faster and more

versatile

than the T-54s

and T-55s.

It is

only

if theNicaraguans' 1981 tank acquisitions are considered outside the con textof thisregionalbalance of power thatUS chargesof an unprovoked es

calation

of the Central American

arms race can be sustained.

What ismost interestingabout theDOD data released in 1985 is that theyfail to support convincinglytheReagan administration'scontention that theNicaragu?n build-up preceded themajor escalation of the contra war in 1982. Indeed, the jump in theweight ofmilitary importsfrom900 to 6,700 metric tons in 1981-198271 could plausibly be employed tomake theopposite argument,namely,that thebuild-up accelerated in response to the increased threatof attack,eitherfrom contrasor the armies of neigh boring countries such asHonduras. In eithercase, it is significantthat the DOD data, which are not likelyto giveNicaragua thebenefitof a doubt, suggest a rapid expansion of Nicaragua's military capability in 1982 and only limitedgrowth in 1981. Belatedly cognizant of the logicalproblemswith the arms deliverydata

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SOVIET-NICARAGU AN RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR

in their 1985 white paper, theDepartments of Defense and State relyon their 1986 white paper on estimatesof troop strengthover time tomake the same argument.72The troop strengthestimates,however, showmajor divergences from thoseof independentobservers, such as SIPRI. According to the 1986 white paper, inNovember 1981, theNicaragu?n armywas the largestinCentralAmerica,with almost40,000 troops.73SIPRI and The Washington Post, however, estimate that Even the Nicaragu?n troop strengthat thattimewas 25,000 the of army Honduras, but several ?larger than Kissinger thousand less than that of El Salvador.74Earlier Commission DOD figurespoint to a December 1981 total of report 39,000 that included both active duty forces and conceded that "mobilizedmilitia55.75 Of course, itmay be assumed thattheReagan administration'sdemonstrated ten dency toward hyperbole as regardsNicaragua has influencedits troop estimates.Even allowing for a "sophisticated largemargin of erroron thepartof independentex Soviet perts, itappears unlikelythattheNicaragu?n armed electronic forces in late 1981 had a totalstrengththatwas sig or took nificantlybeyond thoseofEl Salvador Honduras.

the first delivery of

November

1981

constitutes

an

important

water

shed, however.As the 1986 white paper states,76 Nicaragua's ambassador to theUnited States "claims that then theUnited States decided to assist the Nicaragu?n

armed

resistance55 (as if thiswere not an

established fact).After 1981, the rapid growth of contra forces and the US the US-sponsored

maneuvers

and build-up

inHonduras

gave

the arms

race in the Central American region a different dynamic.

In part,

this new

was determined dynamic

gear3'

place only in December 1982, more than a year

after theCIA

began active

support for the contras.

by the necessity of securityplanners of whatever

orientation

to prepare forworst-case

scenarios, even seemingly unlikely ones.

In the case ofNicaragua, in addition to confrontingthe real and by now daily incursionsof Honduras-based contras, thismeant preparation for a conventionalwar with Honduras or a directUS intervention,neither of which appeared particularlyimprobable in 1982. The 6,700 tons of military equipment imported in 1982 were worth

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR

This materiel in $80,000,000, according to theReagan administration.77 cluded 20 more T-54 tanks, 12 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers,six 105mm howitzers,and some 48 ZIS-2 37mm antiaircraft guns.78Even the conceded Commission that the first report Kissinger deliveryof "sophisti cated Soviet electronicgear" took place only inDecember 1982,more than a year aftertheCIA began active support for the contras.79By the end of 1982,Nicaragua had receivedan estimated totalof $125,000,000 worth of military equipment from theSoviet Union and its allies,80almost exacdy equivalent to the $124,100,000 inmilitary aid theUnited States provided El Salvador in 1980-1982.81 Honduras, not under attack as were the Nicaragu?n and Salvadoran governments, received $44,100,000 of US military aid in the same period.82The US aid toHonduras and El Salvador did not, of course, includethebasic start-upcosts for those countries5armed forces,as did the initialSoviet aid toNicaragua. In 1983-1984, increasedUS maneuvers inHonduras, CIA-directed com mando attackson Nicaragua's oil facilitiesand ports, and theUS invasion ofGrenada characterizedthechanged context inwhichNicaragu?n military planners had to consider theiroptions. Contra units,while unable to cap were increasinglyshiftingfromborder incursionsto tureand hold territory, longmarches of severalmonths5 duration into theAtlantic and northern regionsof the country.These considerationsprovided an impetusfor fur thergrowth in thesizeof theNicaragu?n armed forcesand inSovietmilitary aid.DOD figureson the size of the Sandinistamilitary and securityforces indicatea rather modest increasefrom39,000 to46,000 in 1981-1983, with a fnoresubstantial increase to 67,000 in 1984.83CIA estimatesof aid in theseyears are $125,000,000 for 1983 and $250,000,000 for 1984.84The weight of deliveries intheseyearswas estimatedat 14,000 and 18,700metric tons,respectively.85 however,a classifiedUS intelligencereport Importantly, that "theoverallbuildup isprimarilydefense in late 1984concluded prepared recent efforthas been devoted to improving oriented, and much of the counter insurgencycapabilities.5586 The years 1983-1984 brought themost contra significant military successes, with the CIA channeling over $54,000,000 inofficialaid just in the 18months prior tomid-1984, when Congress barred itfromparticipatingin thewar.87US governmentfigures indicatethatSoviet bloc arms aid toNicaragua actuallydeclined sharply in 1985 to 13,900 metric tonsworth an estimated$75,000,000.88 In 1986, with congressionalapproval of a $100,000,000 US aid package for thecon

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RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

trasa virtual certaintySoviet arms deliveries toNicaragua rose above their 1984 level,to some 18,800 metric tons in thefirst10months of theyear.89 A major problem for the Sandinistas has been what even TheNew Jork With the Times termed in 1985 "their small and almost antique air force.5590 that administration's declarations anyNicaragu?n acquisi repeated Reagan tionof jetfighters,such asMiG-2Ps, would bemet with instantretaliation, theSandinistashave been unable tobuild amodern airarm.The Nicaraguans have periodicallyexpressed interestin theMiG-21 and even in the subsonic Czech L-21 trainer,but thus farUS threatshave dissuaded themor their to potential suppliers.Honduras andEl Salvador continue have vastlygreater air capabilities thanNicaragua. In late 1986, theReagan administrationannounced thatHonduras would US F-5E5s or IsraeliKfirs. IfNicaragua be offeredadvanced jetfighters,either were to acquireMiG-215s in response to thisUS-Honduran move, itwould US attack. Paradoxically, ifNicaragua fails to acquire invitea significant MiG-215s thiswill be perceived in Washington as a signofweakness or as a lackof resolveon thepart of itsprincipal arms suppliers,the SovietUnion and Cuba.

A major qualitative change in the contrawar occurred in the second half of 1985 with thefirstuse incombat of Soviet-madeMI-24 helicoptergun more than 12 of these flyingtanksbetween late ships.Nicaragua received 1984 and mid-1986 according toUS figures.Later independent reports, however, indicate thatNicaragua's totalfleet ofMI-245s, and the similar MI-255s, only reached 12 or 15with thedeliveryof six new helicopters in October 1986.91 It also now reportedlyhas about 12 of the lesspowerful There is littledoubt that MI-8 model92 and some 35MI-17 troopcarriers.93 increaseduse of combat helicopters produced a rapid shift in themilitary balance infavorof theSandinistas.Large contraunits could no longercross without fearingattack and many were forcedback to their open territory base camps inHonduras. By late 1985, Sandinista officialswere beginning to comment

that the contras had been dealt a "strategic defeat.55

Estimating the number of foreignadvisors inNicaragua (and assessing theirrole) is fraughtwith even greatermethodological problems than es source timatingequipment acquisitions.The Cubans have been theprincipal of this assistance, with

small numbers

of advisors

from other countries.94

In

mid-1980, one US intelligence source suggested that therewere only "dozens55ofCuban militaryand securityadvisors inNicaragua.95The Reagan

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR

administrationwould laterclaim that therewere 200 Cuban advisors in Nicaragua by October 1979,96As late as 1984,Jane's DefenceWeekly put thefigureat approximately200.97 InOctober 1984, FSLN directoratemem ber Bayardo Arce remarkedthat therewere "less than500" Cuban military advisors.ByMarch 1985, PresidentDaniel Ortega gave a precise number: 786. The Reagan administrationclaims that thereare "more than 3,000" Cuban and "more than 100" Soviet and East While support European military and security advisors in

for the

Nicaragua.98

Sandinistas

has erodedto

some extent in Western

Europe since theearlyyears ofthe revolution, international condemnation

oftheUS role has, ifnothing, heightened,as

In some cases, the Reagan

administra

tionmay count as "militaryadvisors" anyCuban civilians who have received training in Cuba's military reserves.In other cases, itappears that the administration'sestimatesofEast bloc "securityad included auto mechanics, doctors and den and tists, experts onbankelectronicalarmsystems.99 visors"

The 1986 renewalof directUS military aid to thecontraswill undoubtedly lead to amajor escala tionof the conflict,especially ifreportsprove true that theCIA anticipates spending an additional above the $100,000,000 $400,000,000 ap propriated by Congress.100 Such expenditures would mean thatthebudget for a force that initial lyconsistsof approximately20,000 contraswould be

nearly

two times

Nicaragua's

entire export earn

ings,which were projected at $232,000,000 in 1986.101The scaleof thisUS aid is,of course, com the recent disproportionateto even themost outland decisionsofthe pletely ishclaimsof Sandinista supportforguerrillaforces World Court inneighboring countries. The renewalofdirectUS aid constitutesthecross suggest. ingof aRubicon inanother respectaswell. During thedebate which preceded the approval of the$100,000,000 for the con tras, Reagan administrationrhetoricreachednew heights.TermingNicaragua a major threattoUS securityand linkingaid to the contras to theUnited States5"global policy of deterrence55 close thedoor to thecontinuingefforts tofindpeaceful solutions and leave theadministrationno fall-backposition, should itspolicy of proxywar fail to generate results.The alternativesof a

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RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

war of attritionor directUS interventionleave continuing Nicaragu?n a strongdefense and one to choice: with maintain only military planners prepare

for the worst

eventualities.

The Dilemmas of a Revolution Under Siege For theSovietUnion and itsallies,militaryand economic aid toNicaragua which promises political dividends in an in is a relativelylow-cost strategy creasinglynationalistichemisphere.While support for the Sandinistas has Western Europe since theearlyyearsof the revolu eroded to some extent in of theUS rolehas, ifanything,heightened, condemnation international tion, as the recentdecisions of theWorld Court suggest.This has contributed to diplomatic isolation and loss of prestige for theUnited States and is thus consonant with overall Soviet foreign policy objectives. Finally, Soviet military

aid toNicaragua

has the very immediate

effects of guaranteeing

sur

vival foran endangered revolutionaryexperimentand raisingthecost ofUS intervention.

To

the extent, however,

that

Nicaragua

has become

more

on theUSSR, theprice of the stillmodest Soviet economicallydependent aid commitment toNicaragua is likelyto rise. For Nicaragua, theUS-contra onslaught poses a number of dilemmas. The economy has been devastatedby thewar and theUS economic boycott and is also still sufferingfrom the effectsof natural disasters and the in heritance of the Somoza dictatorship.How under such conditions can a governmentboth defend itselfand provide evenminimal living revolutionary standards

for the population?

How

can

the human

resources

be

trained,

which might permit the countryto emerge fromunderdevelopment,when largenumbersof young peoplemust devote yearsof theirlivesto thedefense How can thegovernmentmaintain itspolitical supportbase in the effort? face of deteriorating living conditions? How can the polarization of a Nicaragu?n societybe addressedwhen siegementalityhas arisen inresponse to real and potential threats? There are indeedno adequate answers to these war situation.The Reagan administration,in its in current the in questions sistenceon viewing ThirdWorld conflictsexclusively inEast-West terms, has aimed preciselyat presentingNicaragua with thesepainfulquandaries.

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NOTES An earlierversion of thispaperwas presented at the Acknowledgements. October 1986 convention of theLatin American Studies Association in Boston. Research in theSovietUnion was supportedby a fellowshipfrom the InternationalResearch and Exchanges Board of theAmerican Council of Learned Societies. 1 Bland?n, 1981. 2 Richard F?gen et al., "Introduction," inTransitionand Development: ProblemsofThirdWorld Socialism(New York:Monthly Review Press, 1986). 3Ruben Berrios andMarc Edelman, "Hacia esDiversificationde laDe pendencia.

Los V?nculos

Econ?micos

de

Nicaragua

con los Pa?ses Socialistas,"

ComercioExterior, Mexico, 35(10), October 1985, pp.998-1006. 4 Aleksandr Ivanovich Sizonenko, Ocherki Istorii Sovetsko Latinoamerikanskikh Otnoshenii (1924-1970gg.), (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), p.l96.

5Nikolai

Sergeevich Leonov, OcherkiNovoi iNoveishei Istorii Stran TsentraVnoi Ameriki (Moscow: Mysl, 1975), pp.201-202. 6 Bland?n,

cit.

op. 7RoaPd Efimovich Leshchiner,Nikaragua (Moscow:Mysl, 1965), p.60. 8 Tomas

Carlos, el Amanecer Borge Martinez, Casa de las Americas, (Havana: 1980), p.20. 9 Carlos Fonseca Amador, Obras, Tomo 1: Bajo

mo (Managua: Neuva Nicaragua, 1982), p.167. 10 Ibid., p.183; Ortega (1980), p.143. 11 "Pedro

Porras,"

pseudonym,

"Columna

ya no es Una la Bandera

Subversiva:

Carabina de Ambrosio," Libertad,March 21. 12

Fonseca,

"Los Ataques

Fonseca,

Un Nicaraguense

de

los Falsos

Revolucionarios

Tentaci?n

del Sandinis

La Culata de Costa

nos Honran," COPAN Revista Teorica, 2-3, 1984 (1970), pp.95-106. 13 enMosc?

[Managua:

Secretaria Nacional

de

la

Rica de

y Educaci?n Politica del FSLN, 1980 (1985)]. Propaganda 14 Margaret Randall, Todas EstamosDespiertas: Testimoniosde laMujer NicaragueneseHoy (Mexico: Siglo 21, 1980), p.222. 15PlutarcoHernandez Sancho,El FSLN porDentro, Relatos de un Com batiente (San Jose:Trejos Hermanos, 1982), pp.27-33; ShirleyChristian, Nicaragua: Revolution in theFamily, Second edition (New York: Vintage,

62

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR

1986), p.32. 16Luis Sanchez Sancho, "Besedas PervymSekretaremTskNikaraguanskoi Sotsialist?cheskoiPartiiLuisom Sanchesom Sancho,"LatinskaiaAmerika, 4, 1976, pp.107-108. July-August 17 Leonov, lsIbid.

op. cit., p.293.

19Boris Merin, TsentraVnaiaAmerika. ProblemySotaiaVno-politicheskqgo Razpitiia (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), pp.91, 119. 20 Marina Chumakova, Organizatnia TsentralNoamerikanskikh Gosudarstp Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenii, 1970), p.3. (Moscow: 21 Chumakova, Integratsionnye Protsessy StranakhTsentraVnoiAmeriki 109. (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), p. 22 Leschiner, op. cit.,p.6;Merin, op. cit.,p. 103; S. I. Semenov etal.,Kom LatinskoiAmerikiv munisticheskiePartii Bor'bemEdinstpoAntiimperialistiches kikhSil (Moscow:Mysl, 1976), p.13. 23 Leonov, "Osnovnye Problemy Politicheskoi Istorii TsentraPno AmerikanskikhStran (1821-1954 gg.)3"Doctor ofHistorical Sciences dis sertationat the Instituteof Latin America,Moscow, 1972, p.34. 24 Fonseca, "General'nomu SekretariuTSK," Pravda, April 14,1971, p.4. 25 Karen Burtents, National

Liberation Revolutions Today, Volume

2 (Mos

cow: Progress, 1977), p.215. 26Communist Partyof theSovietUnion (CPSU), PrivetsviiaXXVs'ezdu KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976). 27 V

"Khorkhe Marlines: Vesemskii, cMyVyshil KomsomoVskaia Pravda, Moscow, October 18,1987,

iz Boev

Okrepshimi,555

p.3.

28A. Serbin, "Luis Prodolzhaet Bor'bu," Pravda, January8, 1979, p.4. 29 William M. LoeGrande, "Cuba andNicaragua: From the Somoza to

the Sandinistas,"

in Barry B. Levine,

editor, The New

Cuban

Presence

in the

Caribbean (Boulder,Colorado: Westview, 1983), p.46. 30Frente Sandinista de Liberaci?n Nacional (FSLN), IremosHacia el Sol de laLibertad...Sandino (Managua: FSLN, 1979), p.45. 31Robert Matthew, "The Limits of Friendship:Nicaragua and the West," on 19 the Americas, Report (3),May-June 1985, pp.22-32. 32 YorkTimes, July "U.S., inU.N., Defends Aid toAnti-Sandinistas,"N?w? 3, 1986, p.A9; JiriValenta and Virginia Valenta, "Sandinistas inPower," Problems ofCommunism, 34 (5), Washington, D.C., September-October 1985, p.12.

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RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

33 Max Singer,Nicaragua: The StolenRevolution (Washington,D.C.: US InformationAgency, 1984). 34ACAN-EFE (SpanishNews Agency), "Pastora toPut Down Somozist in Uprising North,55Panama City ACAN, July26, inForeignBroadcast In American (FBIS-LAM), Washington, D.C., July27, formationService-Latin 1979, p.8.

35 ACAN-EFE,

"Sandinistas

Concerned

Over

Security Situation,55 Panama

City ACAN, August 1,1979, inFBIS-LAM, August 2,1979, pp.4-5. 36LATIN (Buenos AiresNews Agency), "GovernmentProtests toU.S., Trade Measures,55 inFBIS-LAM, August 3, 1979, p.7. Adopts 37Charles Krause, "Somoza StillRevered inKey Area ofNicaragua,55The

WashingtonPost,August 15,1979. 38 Budapest

Domestic

Service,

"Hungarian

Radio

Interview,55 August

14,

1979, inFBIS-LAM, August 15, 1979, p.4. 39Los Angeles Times, "20 SandinistaMilitiamen Reported Slain inCapi LosAngeles Times,October 6, 1979. tal,55 40

"Nicaragua:

the Revolution,55

Tempering

Central

America

Guatemala, October 22, 1979, pp.330-331. 41

"Somozists

Regrouping

for anti-Sandinist

Invasion,55 Agence

Presse (AFP), Paris, inFBIS-LAM, February 13,1980, p. 10. 42 "Rebels 43 Valenta

Seized, Nicaragua Says," Los Angeles and Vienta, op. cit., pp.204-213.

June 29,

Times,

Report, France 1980.

44 Christian, op. cit.,pp.204-213. 45 Christopher Dickey,With theContras: A Reporter in theWilds of Nicaragua (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), p.78. 46 Edgar Chamorro and Jefferson Morley "How theCIA Masterminds the Nicaragu?n

Insurgency.

Confessions

193 (6), August 5,1985, pp.19-20. 47 Matthews,

of a 'Contra,5

55 The New Republic,

op. cit., pp.22-32.

48Ibid. 49Theodore Schwab and Harold Sims, "Relations with Communist States,55inThomasWalker, cditor,Nicaragua:The FirstFiveTears (New York: 1985), p.454. Praeger, 50 Thomas

Bossert,

"Panama,55

inMorris

Blachman

et al., editors., Con

frontingRevolution (New York: Pantheon, 1986), p. 190. 51 Matthews, 52 Ibid., p.29.

op. cit., p.27.

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR

53Alfonso Chardy "Nicaraguans Seek Access to Reagan," TheMiami November Herald, 18,1980. 54 cit., op. p. 104. 55Dickey, Berrios and Edelman, op. cit.,p. 104. 56 LeoGrande, "The United States andNicaragua," inThomas W Walker, editor, Nicaragua: The FirstFiveYears (New York: Praeger, 1985), p.430. 57Carl AttitudesTowardsAid to,and Contactswith,Central Jacobsen,Soviet American

Revolutionaries

(Washington,

D.C.:

US

Department

of State,

1984), p.15. 58 Compare the arms acquisitions cited in theUnited StatesDepartment ofDefense andDepartment of State (DOD/DOS), The Soviet-CubanCon nection in Central America and the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: The Challenge to DOD/DOS, 1985), with those cited inDOD/DOS, Democracy inCentralAmerica (Washington,D.C.: DOD/DOS, 1986). 59 DOD/DOS, The Soviet-CubanConnection,op. cit.,p.25. 60DOD data cited inAlberto Coll, "SovietArms and Central American World Turmoil," Affairs, 148(1), Summer 1985, p.10. 61 "Soviet Expert Challenges White Paper," Latin America Regional Report?Mexico and CentralAmerica, London, March 22,1985, p.5; House of Representatives,Appropriations Subcommitee on theDOD, Hearings Part 2 (Washington, oftheCommitteeonAppropriations, Beforea Subcommittee D.C.: US Government PrintingOffice, 1985), pp.1133-1137. 62 Matthews, op. cit., p.25. 63 Clifford Krauss and Robert

Greenberger,

"Despite

Fears of U.S.,

Soviet

Aid toNicaragua Appears toBe Limited," TheWall Street Journal,April 3, 1985. 64 JozefGoldblat andVictorMillan, "The Honduras-Nicaragua Conflict and Prospects forArms Control," inSEPRIKearbook 1984 (London: Taylor and Francis, 1984), p.531. 65 Coll,

op. cit., p. 10.

66 DOD/DOS, 67 Krauss

Greenberger,

op. cit.

and Greenberger,

op. cit.

and

68 DOD/DOS, 69 Krauss

The Soviet-CubanConnection,op. cit.,p.25. The Soviet-CubanConnection,op. cit.,p.25.

70"Rushed of'Threat5 Jobon U.S. Nicaragua Paper: SketchyJustification Latin and America Central Thesis," America,May Regional Report-Mexico 3,1985, p.4.

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RELATIONSAND THE CONTRAWAR SOVIET-NICARAGUAN

71 DOD/DOS, The Sonet-Cuban Connection,op. cit.,p.25. 72 DOD/DOS, The Challenge, op. cit.,pp.19-20. 73 Ibid., p.20. 74 ChristopherDickey, "SandinistasTurning toEast Bloc,55TheWashington Post,November 22,1981. 75 Col, op. cit.,p. 10. 76 DOD/DOS, The Cha?enge, op. cit.,p.20. 77Colin Danby TheMililtary Balance inCentralAmerica (Washington, The Soviet D.C.: Council onHemispheric Affairs,1985), p. 15 DOD/DOS, ; Cuban Connection,op. cit.,p.25. 78Adrian English,Armed ForcesofLatinAmerica (London: Jane'sPublish Company, 1984), p.33; Coll, op. cit.,p. 10. ing 79National BipartisanCommission on CentralAmerica,Report oftheNa tionalBipartisan Commissionon Central America (Washington,D.C.: US Government PrintingOffice, 1984), appendix,p.40. 80 Coll, op. cit.,p.9; Krauss and Greenberger,op. cit. 81DOS Economic andMilitary Assistance toCentral America 1980-1985 D.C.: DOS, 1985). (Washington, 82Ibid. 83 DOD/DOS, The Challenge, op. cit.,p.38. 84 House

op. cit., p. 1134.

of

Representatives, 85 The Soviet-CubanConnection, op. cit.; JohnCushman, DOD/DOS, to GetMore Gunships,55TheNew TorkTimes,October 29, Said "Nicaragua 1986, p.A3. 86Cited inKrauss and Greenberger,op. cit. 87

un La 'Contra,5 Millonario,55 Ejercito "Nicaragua: Guatemala, Centroamericans, September 4,1986, p.5. 88 Information. Cushman, op. cit., Center for Defense

Inforpress

"Country Studies of Soviet Influence:Nicaragua,55The DefenseMonitor, 15(15), Washington, pp.30-31. 89 Cushman,

op. cit.

Cushman,

op. cit.

90 StephenKinzer, "Nicaragua's Edge in theArms Race,55TheNew Tork Times,October 27,1985, p.E2. 91 TheNew T?rkTimes,Oc Kinzer, "Nicaragua Assails U.S. Plan on Jets,55 tober31, 1985, p.A6; Cushman, op. cit. 92 DOD/DOS, The Challenge, op. cit.,p.21. 93

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SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATONS AND THE CONTRAWAR

94

Jacobsen,

op. cit., pp. 17-18.

Jacobsen,

op. cit., p. 17.

95U.S. Army,ProjectionofPower inLatin America bytheSovietUnion and Cuba (Gainesville,Florida: 467thMilitary IntelligenceDetachment, 1980). 96

97 English, "NicaraguaTreads Path Between East andWest," Jane'sDefense Weekly,April 21,1984, p.610. 98 DOD/DOS, The Challenge, op. cit.,p.20. 99 DOS, Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator'sReport 16. D.C.:DOS, 1986), (Washington, 100 Tom Morgenthau etal., "Rekindling theMagic: Reagan Wins a Con Newsweek, July7,1986, pp.20-21. gressionalVictory toAid theContras,55 on Soviets Level of Support,55Latin American Hedge "Nicaragua: October 16,1986, p.2. WeeklyReport (London),

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