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Presenting a live 90-minute webinar with interactive Q&A Bank Enforcement Actions—Roundtable With the Experts: New Issues, Higher Penalties, Joint En...
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Presenting a live 90-minute webinar with interactive Q&A

Bank Enforcement Actions—Roundtable With the Experts: New Issues, Higher Penalties, Joint Enforcement Actions Preparing for Scrutiny of AML/OFAC Policies, BHC Capital and Stress Test Issues, D&O Liability, and More TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014

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12pm Central | 11am Mountain

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10am Pacific

Today’s faculty features:

Thomas P. Vartanian, Partner, Dechert, Washington, D.C. Richard M. Alexander, Partner, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C. Ronald Glancz, Partner, Venable, Washington, D.C. Robert H. Ledig, Partner, Dechert, Washington, D.C. Andrew L. Sandler, Chairman & Executive Partner, Buckley Sandler, Washington, D.C. Ryan T. Scarborough, Partner, Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C. The audio portion of the conference may be accessed via the telephone or by using your computer's speakers. Please refer to the instructions emailed to registrants for additional information. If you have any questions, please contact Customer Service at 1-800-926-7926 ext. 10.

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Overview of Federal Bank Enforcement Actions Presented by Venable LLP Ronald R. Glancz, Esq. (Chair, Financial Services Group) Ralph Sharpe, Esq., Thomas Gilbertsen, Esq., Peter Frechette, Esq.

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Discussion Topics Statutory Authority for Bank Enforcement Powers Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act

12 U.S.C.§1818 (termination/suspension of insurance, cease & desist, removal/prohibition/suspension, civil money penalties) 12 U.S.C.§1831o (prompt corrective action) 12 U.S.C.§1831p-1 (safety & soundness directives) 12 U.S.C.§3907 (capital adequacy) (International Lending Supervision Act of 1983)

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Supervisory Authority How a bank responds to findings and recommendations in a report of examination, Matters Requiring Attention (MRAs) and Matters Requiring Board Attention (MRBAs), is a key factor in whether a Federal Banking Authority (“FBA”) will take an enforcement action and how severe that action will be. See OCC PPM 5310-3 at 8 (Sept. 9, 2011). • Note: an enforcement action may be taken before an exam is completed.

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Informal Actions “Informal actions are voluntary commitments made by the Board of Directors/trustees of a financial institution. They are designed to correct identified deficiencies and ensure compliance with federal and state banking laws and regulations. Informal actions are neither publicly disclosed nor legally enforceable.” FDIC Compliance Manual (June 2009) II-8.1 (emphasis added).

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Informal actions generally are utilized for banks with composite ratings of 3 or worse. The OCC has instructed its examiners that “use of an informal enforcement action for a 4-rated bank, or an action other than a PCA directive or cease and desist order for a 5-rated bank, must be specifically approved by the appropriate senior deputy comptroller for Bank Supervision Operations.” See OCC PPM 5310-3 at 8-9 (Sept. 9, 2011).

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Board Resolution Voluntary commitment made by Board of Directors, “directing

the institution’s personnel to take corrective action regarding specific noted deficiencies.” FDIC Compliance Manual (June 2009) II-8.1. Utilized “[w]hen a bank’s overall condition is sound, but it is necessary to obtain written commitments from a bank’s board of directors to ensure that identified problems and weaknesses will be corrected. . .” See OCC PPM 5310-3 at 4 (Sept. 9, 2011). Regulator not a party to resolution. Generally implemented in banks with composite ratings of 3 or better. See OCC PPM 5310-3 at 8 (Sept. 9, 2011). Although not legally enforceable, failure to honor the resolution could give rise to a formal enforcement action. 9

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Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”)

Generally used when regulator has “reason to believe that a Board resolution would not adequately address the deficiencies noted” during an examination. FDIC Compliance Manual (June 2009) II-8.1. Regulator a party; drafts the agreement. Requirements often similar to those in C&D. Failure to comply with MOU can result in formal enforcement action.

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Individual Minimum Capital Ratio (“IMCR”) Requirement Preceded by a notice of intent to issue an IMCR with period for bank to respond. IMCR usually issued by letter to bank board of directors. Unlike PCA directives, IMCRs are considered confidential and do not affect a bank’s ability to accept brokered deposits. Failure to maintain the ratio established could be deemed an unsafe or unsound practice and trigger a formal enforcement action.

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Formal Actions Formal Written Agreement Cease & Desist (C&D) Personal Cease and Desist Order (PC&D) Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) Safety and Soundness Directive Termination of FDIC Insurance Removal/Suspension of Institution Affiliated Party (IAP) Civil Money Penalties (CMPs) 12

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“Unlike most informal actions, formal enforcement actions are authorized by statute (mandated in some cases), are generally more severe, and are disclosed to the public. Also, formal actions are enforceable through the assessment of civil money penalties and, with the exception of formal agreements, through the federal court system.” OCC PPM 5310-3 at 4 (Sept. 9, 2011).

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“[T]he presumption for formal action under 12 USC 1818 is particularly strong, regardless of a bank’s composite CAMELS rating or capital levels, when it is experiencing significant problems or weaknesses in its systems and controls; serious insider abuse; substantial violations of law or serious compliance problems; material noncompliance with prior commitments to take corrective action; or failure to maintain satisfactory books and records or provide examiner access to books and records.” OCC PPM 5310-3 at 5 (Sept. 9, 2011).

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FDIC: “may initiate informal or formal action when an insured depository institution is found to be in an unsatisfactory

condition.” FDIC Compliance Manual (June 2009). FRB: “Generally, the Federal Reserve takes formal enforcement actions against the above entities for violations of laws, rules, or regulations, unsafe or unsound practices, breaches of fiduciary duty, and violations of final orders.” http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/enforcementactions/default.aspx

FinCEN: “Under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), 31 U.S.C. 5311 et seq., and its implementing regulations at 31 C.F.R. Chapter X (formerly 31 C.F.R. Part 103), FinCEN may bring an enforcement action for violations of the reporting, recordkeeping, or other requirements of the BSA.” http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/

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Cease & Desist - 12 U.S.C. 1818(b) “Issued to halt violations of law as well as to require affirmative action to correct any condition resulting from such violations.” FDIC Compliance

Manual (June 2009) II-8.1. May be issued upon consent by Board (“Consent Order”), or involuntarily, after service of a Notice of Charges and an administrative hearing resulting in a final agency Order. A temporary C&D may be issued “in the most severe situations to halt particularly egregious practices pending a formal hearing” on a permanent C&D. FDIC Compliance Manual (June 2009) II-8.1; 12 U.S.C. §1818(c)-(d). A temporary C&D is subject to review by a U.S. District Court within 10 days of issuance. Strong presumption for use of a C&D if institution has a composite rating of 4 or 5. Formal Written Agreements – similar to Consent Order, but not enforceable in federal court (and violation is not ground for receivership). Personal Cease & Desist Orders (PC&Ds) may be issued against an “institution-affiliated party” as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u).

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Cease & Desist (cont.) Remedial actions permitted under C&D may include: – – – – – –

– –

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Restitution Restrictions on growth Disposal of troubled assets Termination of agreements Changes to management/employees Improvements to asset quality, management, internal controls and compliance-related issues Improvements regarding liquidity Capital directives

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Prompt Corrective Action – 12 U.S.C. 1831o “The purpose of this section is to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund.” 12 U.S.C. § 1831o. PCA actions are triggered by a bank’s capital category. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b). • •

• • •

Well-Capitalized (“significantly exceeds the required minimum level for each relevant capital measure”) Adequately Capitalized (“meets the required minimum level for each relevant capital measure”); a downgrade to Adequately Capitalized triggers restrictions on a bank’s ability to accept brokered deposits (though that prohibition may be waived by the FDIC) Undercapitalized (“fails to meet the required minimum level for any relevant capital measure”) Significantly Undercapitalized (“significantly below the required minimum level for any relevant capital measure”) Critically Undercapitalized (“fails to meet any level specified under subsection (c)(3)(A)”)

An FBA can impose “more stringent treatment” (e.g. re-classifying a bank from wellcapitalized to adequately capitalized) if engaging in unsafe or unsound practices or if in an unsafe or unsound condition. See 12 U.S.C. §1831o(g). A bank’s failure to improve capital or submit an acceptable capital restoration plan may lead to receivership. Strong presumption for use if institution has a composite rating of 4 or 5. Generally requires disclosure of PCA to shareholders.

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Safety & Soundness – 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1 (hybrid informal/formal action)

12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(a) requires each FBA to prescribe standards relating to internal controls, loan documentation, credit underwriting, interest rate exposure, asset growth, compensation, asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation. If an FBA determines that an institution fails to meet a prescribed standard the regulator shall require the institution to submit a plan specifying the steps that the institution will take to correct the deficiency. 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(e)(1). This part of the process amounts to an informal enforcement action. If the institution fails to submit an acceptable plan, the FBA shall issue an order requiring the institution to correct the deficiency and may require the institution to take other steps (including limiting asset growth). 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(e)(2). This part of the process is a formal enforcement action. –



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The OCC has commented that “a determination that the bank is not in compliance with an approved plan should be based on a finding that the bank has failed in a material respect to implement the plan. This failure must be substantial enough to jeopardize or preclude achieving the objective of the plan.” OCC PPM 5310-3 at 75 (Sept. 9, 2011). The OCC has further commented that the “safety and soundness order process should generally only be used when the problems or weaknesses are narrow in scope and correctable” and when the regulator is “confident in the board and management’s commitment and ability to correct the problems or weaknesses.” Id.

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OCC Heightened Standards for Certain Large Banks Heightened Standards for Large Financial Institutions: On September 2, 2014, the OCC published final guidelines (“guidelines”) to formalize heightened supervisory expectations for large national banks, under the OCC’s authority to prescribe safety and soundness standards in 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1. 79 Fed. Reg. 4282. The guidelines are available from the OCC website and are forthcoming in the Federal Register. Application: The guidelines apply to “Covered Banks”: insured national banks, insured federal savings associations, and insured federal branches of foreign banks with $50 billion or more average consolidated assets (the guidelines also apply to an OCC-regulated institution with less than $50 billion in average total consolidated assets if that institution’s parent company controls at least one other covered institution). They are immediately effective for Banks with more than $750 billion in assets and will be phased in over time for banks between $50 and $750 billion.

Enforcement: If OCC determines that a Covered Bank has not met the requirements standards, the OCC can request that the Covered Bank submit a compliance plan within 30 days. The OCC may issue a formal order if the Covered Bank does not submit an acceptable compliance plan or fails to adhere to it. The OCC may also use its authority under 12 USC 1818 to enforce the guidelines.

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OCC Heightened Standards for Certain Large Banks (cont.) Risk Governance Framework: The guidelines call for Covered Banks -- and their CEOs -to develop a risk governance framework (“Framework”) to include eight specific risk categories, as well as third party risk. The risk categories include: credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, price risk, operational risk, compliance risk, strategic risk, and reputation risk. Also, as part of the Framework, Covered Banks must: – – –

Develop a risk appetite statement Develop a risk profile Set concentration risk limits

Risk Management Roles: The guidelines establish risk management roles for three designated bank functions: “front-line” units, an “independent risk management” unit, and “internal audit.” –

– –

“Front line” unit: A unit that engages in activities designed to generate revenue for a Covered Bank or its parent, or that provides services or support to the Bank or any unit covered by the guidelines. “Independent risk management” unit: The unit within the Covered Bank charged with identifying, measuring, monitoring, and controlling aggregate risks “Internal Audit”: Internal Audit is responsible for ensuring that a Covered Bank’s Framework complies with the guidelines and for maintaining a complete and current inventory of the Covered Bank’s material business, product lines, services, and functions, and to assess and rate the associated risks.

Strategic Plan: Covered Banks must develop a written strategic plan and explain how the Framework will address anticipated risks. 21

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OCC Heightened Standards for Certain Large Banks (cont.) Some Positive Changes in Final Guidelines – Legal not considered a front-line unit – Board relieved of “managerial” responsibilities (no longer required to “ensure”) Some Concerns Linger – Not clear that FDIC and Fed are fully on-board or will not promulgate their own guidelines – Potential for a “check the box” approach by examiners? – All risk areas continue to be covered – including compliance (a new avenue of enforcement for BSA?) – Will OCC hold the line at $50 billion, or will examiners begin to expect similar approaches by other large banks?

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Termination of FDI Insurance – 12 U.S.C. 1818(a) If the FDIC Board finds that an institution is unsafe or unsound, or that its board of directors is engaging in unsafe or unsound practices, or has violated any law, order, or agreement, the FDIC shall: •



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notify the institution’s FBA or State banking supervisor (if the Corporation is the appropriate Federal banking agency) “of the Board’s determination and the facts and circumstances on which such determination is based for the purpose of securing the correction of such practice, condition, or violation.” notify the institution of the intention to terminate insurance, along with a statement of charges, and a hearing date. If, at the hearing, the FDIC Board finds any “unsafe or unsound practice or condition” it may issue an order terminating the institution’s insured status.

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Removal/Suspension of Institution Affiliated Party – 12 U.S.C. 1818(e) Institution Affiliated Party (IAP): generally, “any director, officer, employee, or controlling stockholder (other than a bank holding company) of, or agent for, an insured depository institution,” can also include “any independent contractor (including any attorney, appraiser, or accountant) who knowingly or recklessly” engages in misconduct. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u). The prohibition may apply to specific activities, but more typically bans the IAP from participating in the affairs of any insured depository institution or industry.

An IAP may be temporarily suspended pending a hearing on an order of removal if the “individual’s continued participation poses an immediate threat to the institution or to the interests of the institution’s depositors.” FDIC Compliance Manual (June 2009) II-8.1. An IAP may be suspended when charged with felonies involving dishonesty or breach of trust. Id.

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Removal/Suspension of Institution Affiliated Party for Certain Criminal Offenses – 12 U.S.C. 1818(g) An IAP may be suspended when subject to any information, indictment, or complaint, involving the commission of or participation in— – (i) a crime involving dishonesty or breach of trust which is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under State or Federal law, or – (ii) a criminal violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of title 18 or section 5322 or 5324 of title 31, and – If, the appropriate Federal banking agency determines that continued service by such party posed, poses, or may pose a threat to the interests of the depositors of, or threatens, or may threaten to impair public confidence in the depository institution. An IAP may also be permanently removed on the same grounds as above upon judgment of conviction or an agreement to enter a pretrial diversion or other similar program at such time as the judgment is not subject to further appellate review.

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Civil Money Penalties 12 U.S.C. 1818(i) Violation of a law, rule, regulation, or a final Order may result

in the imposition of CMPs. In certain circumstances, CMPs may be imposed as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty or unsafe or unsound banking practice. “Assessed to sanction an institution or IAP according to the degree of culpability and severity of the violation, breach, and/or practice and also to deter future occurrences.” FDIC Compliance Manual (June 2009) II-8.1. Amounts (Electronic Code of Fed. Regs.; Current as of Feb. 3, 2012) – – –

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12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A) Violation of Law or Unsafe or Unsound Practice—1st Tier $7,500 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B) Violation of Law or Unsafe or Unsound Practice—2nd Tier $37,500 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(C) Violation of Law or Unsafe or Unsound Practice—3rd Tier $1,375,000

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Civil Money Penalties 12 U.S.C. 1818(i) (cont.) Interagency Policy Regarding the Assessment of Civil Money

Penalties by the Federal Financial Institutions Regulatory Agencies (63 Fed. Reg. 30227, June 3, 1998) provides guidance on the criteria used by the FBAs. Relevant factors include: • Whether the violation was intentional • Duration of the violation, history of prior violations, previous criticism • Failure to cooperate with regulator • Concealment of violation • Actual loss or threat of loss to institution • Financial gain by participant • Lack of compliance program

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BSA-Related Enforcement Actions May take the form of Consent Orders, CMPs or both

– –

C&D Orders are required in the case of Program Violations (i.e., failure to establish or implement any of the required components of a BSA Program) Such Orders frequently include “Look Back” provisions requiring review of past transactions and the filing of SARs

FinCEN has separate authority to assess CMPs for BSA-related violations. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321 & 31 C.F.R., Chapter X. –

FinCEN BSA related enforcement actions can be found at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/

Not unusual for CMPs to be assessed concurrently by federal banking agency and FinCEN. If criminal money laundering is implicated, Department of Justice may also

participate – generally by means of a deferred prosecution agreement. State actions may also be possible. In 2012, New York’s Department of Financial Services (NYDSF) joined with the NY Fed in assessing $340 million in BSA-related penalties against Standard Chartered Bank. On June 30, 2014, NYDSF joined other State and Federal authorities in assessing an $8.9 billion penalty ($2.24 billion constituting a NYDFS civil penalty) against BNP Paribas (BNPP).

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DOJ FIRREA Authority FIRREA provides that the DOJ may seek civil penalties for violations of 14

different federal criminal laws, including mail and wire fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343). Certain violations, such as mail and wire fraud, must affect federally insured financial institutions. See 12 U.S.C. §1833a. Under FIRREA, the DOJ need only prove that there was a violation of one of these 14 predicate criminal offenses “by a preponderance of the evidence,” which is a civil evidentiary burden. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f). The scope of FIRREA is broad and growing. Courts have recently held that a financial institution can subject itself to FIRREA penalties through its own misconduct: – – –

United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 12 CIV. 1422 JSR, 2014 WL 587364 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2014) United States v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

DOJ FIRREA Authority has also recently been used in a complaint against Four Oaks Fincorp and Four Oaks Bank and Trust Co. See DOJ Press Release. – –

Four Oaks Complaint Four Oaks Consent Order

For a full discussion of Section 951, see FIRREA: The DOJ’s Expansive (And Expensive) Tool of Choice, by Allyson B. Baker & Andrew Olmen. 29

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“Operation Chokepoint” Operation Chokepoint is an initiative led by DOJ that is investigating banks’ business with payment processors, payday lenders, and similar companies. The Four Oaks settlement represents enforcement action arising out of the Operation Chokepoint investigations.

Recently, the FDIC provided updated guidance on third-party payment processors (TPPPs), FIL 41-2014. The guidance may indicate a shift in the FDIC’s approach to insured institutions’ relationships with TPPPs. 30

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Collateral Consequences of an Enforcement Action Federal bank regulators’ use of the “troubled condition” designation has consequences outside the traditional formal and informal enforcement structure. The troubled condition designation occurs when a bank is poorly rated or receives an enforcement action. –

See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 303.101(c) (FDIC definition); C.F.R. § 5.51(c)(6) (OCC definition); 12 C.F.R. § 225.71(d) (FRB definition); 12 C.F.R. § 563.555 (OTS definition); 12 C.F.R. § 701.14(b)(3) (NCUA definition).

Consequences may include: – – – –

Restrictions on growth Restrictions on brokered deposits Requiring new directors and officers be approved by the regulator Restrictions on merger activities or other corporate applications

Further, under Dodd Frank, a bank may not convert its charter while under an enforcement action (including an MOU) without the permission of the regulator. See Section 612 of Dodd Frank “Restrictions on Conversions of Troubled Banks;” see also FDIC FIL-50-2012, dated November 26, 2012, on the same subject. An adverse rating (3 or worse) also automatically increases FDIC insurance 31

premiums.

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Review of Enforcement Actions C&D (involuntarily issued after hearing before ALJ and final agency order) is reviewable by a U.S. Court of Appeals within 30 days of issuance. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2). Temporary C&D may be challenged in U.S. District Court within 10 days of issuance. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2). Termination of FDI Insurance is reviewable by a U.S. Court of Appeals within 30 days of order. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2). Notice of Suspension or Order of Removal: Within 30 days of notice, IAP may request to appear before agency “to show that the continued service to or participation in the conduct of the affairs of the depository institution by such party does not, or is not likely to, pose a threat to the interests of the bank’s depositors or threaten to impair public confidence in the depository institution.” 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(3). CMPs: Agency hearing if requested within 20 days after notice of assessment. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(H). PCA: Statute does not specify administrative or judicial review process. However, the “bank is given an opportunity to respond to the Notice of Intent, explaining why the proposed directive is not necessary or offering suggested modifications to the proposed directive.” OCC PPM 5310-3 at 20 (Sept. 9, 2011). Note that some OTS consent PCAs include a waiver of the bank’s “right to seek judicial review of the PCA Directive, including, but not limited to, any such right provided by Section 8(h) of FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h).” OTS Order No.: NE-11-22 (July 1, 2011).

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2013-2014 Enforcement Actions: OCC OCC (2013) – – – – – –

87 C&Ds 12 PC&Ds 4 PCAs 16 Removal/Prohibition Orders 25 Bank CMPS (ranging from $1,540 to $300,000,000) 23 IAP CMPS (ranging from $1,500 to $250,000)

OCC (2014, as of September 2) – – – – – –

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45 C&D-related actions 4 PC&Ds 2 PCAs 12 Removal/Prohibition Orders 10 Bank CMPS (ranging from $4,000 to $350,000,000) 24 IAP CMPS (ranging from $1,000 to $40,000)

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2013-2014 Enforcement Actions: FDIC FDIC (2013) – – – –

5 C&D-related actions 9 PCAs 114 Removal/Prohibition Orders 93 CMPS ($1,200 to $500,000)

FDIC (2014, as of September 2) – – – –

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1 C&D-related actions 5 PCAs 56 Removal/Prohibition Orders 34 CMPS (ranging from $1,000 to $485,000)

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2013-2014 Enforcement Actions: FRB FRB (2013) – – – – –

6 C&Ds (88 Written Agreements) 0 PCAs 0 Prohibition Order 11 Bank CMPs (ranging from $975,000 to $165,000,000) 0 IAP CMPs

FRB (2014, as of September 2) – – – – –

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4 C&Ds (5 Written Agreements) 2 PCAs 3 Prohibition Order 12 Bank CMPs (ranging from $2,710 to $508,000,000) 0 IAP CMPs

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2013-2014 Enforcement Actions: FinCEN FinCEN (2013) – 2 Bank CMPs ($4,100,000 & $37,500,000) FinCEN (2014, as of September 2) – 1 Bank CMPs ($4,100,000 & $37,500,000)

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Notable 2014 Enforcement Actions Bank of America Corp. (DOJ, FBI, FDIC, FHA, FHFA, FinCEN, FRB, HUD, SEC, TARP, State Attorneys General, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices) – $16.65B settlement that resolves federal and state claims against Bank of America and its former and current subsidiaries – The settlement includes a $5B penalty under FIRREA – the largest FIRREA penalty to date – The settlement stems from civil investigations related (in part) to BAC’s practices regarding securities, underwriting and origination of mortgage loans, and representations to federal officials Standard Chartered (NYDFS) – $300M penalty for alleged AML compliance problems – Additional settlement terms include: • NYDFS approval for certain new accounts • Suspend dollar-clearing activity for certain high-risk clients • Discontinue business relationships with the UAE Price Waterhouse Cooper (NYDFS) – 2-year suspension from consulting with financial institutions regulated by NYDFS due to AML compliance issues 37

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Notable 2014 Enforcement Actions (cont.) BNP Paribas SA (OFAC, DOJ, DANY, NYDFS) – $963M settlement for potential liability for apparent violations of U.S. sanctions regulations – Combined settlement of $8.9B with State and federal agencies J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (FinCEN) – $461M fine for willfully violating the BSA, for failure to report suspicious transactions connected with Bernard Madoff – FinCEN acted in coordination with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) and the OCC. – Concurrent $350M fine by OCC – Concurrent $1.7B asset forfeiture to be collected by SDNY.

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Notable 2013 Enforcement Actions Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (FRB, NYDFS, and OFAC) – $50 million CMP related to “insufficient oversight ” of dollar clearing practices and economic sanctions programs; Consent Order also issues – DFS assessed a concurrent $50 million penalty – OFAC assessed a concurrent $33 million penalty TD Bank, N.A. (OCC, FinCEN and SEC) – Concurrent $37.5 million CMP by OCC and FinCEN, and $15 million fine by SEC for failure to file SARs related to a SouthFlorida based Ponzi scheme Citigroup (FRB) – Consent Order addressing AML/BSA deficiencies and BSA and OFAC compliance risk management – Companion orders issued by OCC for Citibank and by FDIC for Banamex USA

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Questions and Comments Ronald R. Glancz Partner, Washington, DC Office t 202.344.4947 f 202.344.8300 [email protected] Ralph E. Sharpe Partner, Washington, DC Office t 202.344.4344 f 202.344.8300 [email protected] Thomas E. Gilbertsen Partner, Washington, DC Office t 202.344.4598 f 202.344.8300 [email protected] Peter S. Frechette Associate, Washington, DC Office t 202.344.4616 f 202.344.8300 [email protected]

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See the additional pdf titled “Reference Materials” Thomas P. Vartanian, Partner Dechert 202.261.3439 [email protected] Richard M. Alexander, Partner Arnold & Porter 202.942.5728 [email protected] Robert H. Ledig, Partner Dechert 202.261.3454 [email protected]

Andrew L. Sandler, Chairman & Executive Partner Buckley Sandler 202.349.8001 [email protected] Ryan T. Scarborough, Partner Williams & Connolly 202.434.5173 [email protected]

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