Prague, February 2017 Prague Model United Nations Conference Model United Nations Prague z.s. Jaurisova 515/4 140 00 Prague 4 The Czech Republic Web: www.praguemun.cz Author: Isabel Vicaria Barker, Plamen Pachev Graphic Design: Jiří Drozd, MUN Prague

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Dear delegates, Welcome to the 2017 edition of the European Council at PragueMUN 2017! As your chairs, we – Isabel and Plamen – are delighted to be presiding over this committee. Plamen is a master student in Economics at the University of Vienna and got recently introduced to the world of diplomatic role-plays. He participated in several MUNs/MEUs, chaired various bodies at conferences in Central and Eastern Europe, and is currently serving as a Deputy-Director General of MEU Vienna. For him, MUN is more a hobby, which brings some variety to the university life but also teaches discipline, flexibility, and awareness of internationally important topics. Isabel was born and raised in Berlin, Germany in a multicultural environment. Upon graduation, she moved to Munich to pursue a degree in German law and is currently specialising in international and European law at the LMU. Her MUN career began in her freshman year of high school. Since then, she has chaired in numerous conferences across the German, Spanish and English circuits and has also been a Secretariat member on a number of occasions. For her, MUN is a way of life, which has lead her to participate in 13 conferences in the span of 1,5 years. As a delegate, your task will be to research not only the topics at hand but also your country’s stance regarding the topics. Delegates are strongly encouraged to research beyond this, in order to gain a better understanding of their adoptive countries. Consider what recent events and what memberships influence and shape your countries’ policies. Please be reminded that this study guide is by no means a complete and comprehensive exploration of the issues at hand. Delegates are strongly encouraged to explore other information sources and stay tuned to current events. Best of luck for your preparation and looking forward to meeting you soon in Prague Isabel Vicaría Barker & Plamen Pachev

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Contents European Council Overview ............................................................................................................................................ 5 Committee description ............................................................................................................................................... 5 Topic A: Strengthening EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy ........................................................... 7 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Discussion of the topic................................................................................................................................................ 8 Common strategies ................................................................................................................................................11 Joint actions and common positions ............................................................................................................12 Systematic cooperation between member states ...................................................................................13 Country and block positions .................................................................................................................................. 14 Germany.................................................................................................................................................................... 14 France ......................................................................................................................................................................... 14 Italy ...............................................................................................................................................................................15 Poland .........................................................................................................................................................................15 Sweden ....................................................................................................................................................................... 16 Latvia .......................................................................................................................................................................... 16 United Kingdom ..................................................................................................................................................... 16 Points a conclusion paper could address ......................................................................................................... 17 References....................................................................................................................................................................... 17 Further Reading .......................................................................................................................................................... 18 Topic B: The future of relations between the EU and Turkey ....................................................................... 20 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 20 EU-Turkey Relations Timeline ...............................................................................................................................21 Discussion of the topic............................................................................................................................................. 22 Current status of the Accession Proceedings ........................................................................................... 22 Turkey, Visa liberalisation and the Refugee Treaty............................................................................... 24 The Attempted Turkish Coup and its Implications for Future Relations with the EU............. 26 Country and block positions ................................................................................................................................. 28 3

Turkey ........................................................................................................................................................................ 28 Germany................................................................................................................................................................... 28 Austria........................................................................................................................................................................ 28 Sweden ...................................................................................................................................................................... 29 Points delegates should consider ....................................................................................................................... 29 Further reading ........................................................................................................................................................... 30 Bibliography...................................................................................................................................................................31

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European Council

European Council Overview Committee description The European Council – not to be confused with the Council of Europe or the Council of the EU – is one of the main organs of the European Union. 1 Composed of the heads of states of each Member State as well as the European Council President and the President of the European Commission, it defines the Union’s overall political direction as well as priorities. 2 It is not a legislative organ and therefore is not mandated to negotiate or adopt laws in the name of the EU. 3 Instead, it defines the EU policy agenda and regularly adopts so-called conclusions that establish specific areas of concern and suggest action plans. 4 Thus the European Council, while not influencing the legislature of the EU, is able to lead the EU in a certain direction.

The European Council has a pivotal role in the strategic direction, scope and main decisions of the Union’s foreign policy. With regard to CSDP/CSFP, the European Council defines the “principles” and “general guidelines” and decides “on common strategies” to be implemented by the Union, as outlined in art. 13 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Although it does not have a formal role in the first pillar (European Community) – foreign policy legislative process – it is clear that no strategic decision can be adopted in the first pillar without the consent of the European Council. The body has led EU foreign policy in new directions, such as adopting new strategies towards other regions or developing ESDP from 1999 onwards. However, it is its role as an “organe d’impulsion” rather than as a decision-making actor that is more important. For most issues on the agenda of its meetings, the European Council “confirms”, “welcomes” or “endorses” decisions and documents. 5

Normally meeting only 4 times a year, the European Council cannot provide the permanent strategic leadership needed for many foreign policy actions, particularly the most sensitive and 1

"The European Council - About." The European Council. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/. Ibid. 3 Ibid. " Setting the EU's political agenda." The European Council. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/role-settingeu-political-agenda/. 4 5 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 2

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Prague Model United Nations 2017 urgent ones. It is also worth to be noted that Heads of State and Government first and foremost defend their national interests as well as foreign policy and act according to their national agendas. Given the high external visibility of European Council meetings, their main purpose often relates to interrelational and identity objectives rather than external objectives. Even where Member States are divided on an issue, being seen as to having an united and “European” approach is often prioritized above formulating guidelines that actually provide a basis for action. Consequently, conclusions adopted tend to be purposefully vague and declaratory so that they can be interpreted in different ways and used for all kinds of future action. 6

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European Council: Topic A

Topic A: Strengthening EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy Introduction

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The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht in the year 1992, rests upon 3 pillars: European Economic Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs. Considering a contemplation of a fundamental document concerning the Union, the reader might assume that the Foreign and Security Policy constitutes a major deal of the functioning of the Union. Indeed, the name “Common Foreign and Security Policy” aroused big expectations, both in terms of integration and scope of policy. These expectations continued to grow when, in the 1990s, the Amsterdam Treaty mandated the establishment of a High Representative for CFSP and Member States agreed to give the EU a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the second pillar. This ESDP included the creation of new permanent political and military capabilities, enabling the EU to deploy up to 60 000 troops, capable of carrying peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. Evaluating the foreign policy of the EU since the launch of its CFSP leads to rather mixed or even contradictory conclusions. On the negative side of the balance, we can identify some remarkable failures in defining a common European foreign policy towards international crises, for example Rwanda, Darfur, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. The nature of these failures included, for example, inaction, not providing financial means, low-level diplomacy or incoherent and not coordinated foreign policy of various member states. Formulation of effective common foreign policies has proven indeed to be a burden in the last 20 years. A remarkable example is the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A Strategy and Action Plan was developed where a range of initiatives was outlined. However, the enduring differences between the Member States made the realization of the Plan

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This chapter is based on Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 as well as on Hill and Smith 2005

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Prague Model United Nations 2017 nearly impossible. All this followed in incapability of the EU to take a common stance at the NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2005. Of course, there were also some positive examples. 2003 marked the launch of the first EU military operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Democratic Republic of Congo. In the following years, 15 more followed, including also civilian crisis management operations. Although modest in design, they symbolize a remarkable progress in the development of the EU foreign policy. One has to bear in mind that until the mid-1990s, it was inconceivable that the EU could embark on military operations. These crisis-management operations demonstrated that the EU was willing and able to match promises with action. The operation in FYROM, for example, implied in some diplomatic efforts that have proven to be effective in order to prevent further tensions that might could have led to a new Balkan war. These CFSP actions were part of broader efforts of the EU to stabilise the Balkans. Nevertheless, the 2004 and 2007 extensions can be considered as one of the main achievements in EU Foreign Policy. This was the final step in nearly two decades of EU policy aimed at supporting the process of political and economic transformation of the region following the breakup of the Soviet bloc as well as tackling the regional conflicts.

Discussion of the topic

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According to Article 11 TEU, “The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy”. The name explicitly indicates that CFSP is a “common” policy. This leaves an impression that it was similar to the EU’s common agricultural policy or the EU’s common commercial policy. However, the Maastricht Treaty from 1993 did not provide for the common actors, common instruments, or common budget that would have been necessary to develop a common policy. In the European Community (EC) context, “common” denotes policy domains that in which the EC has the exclusive or quasi-exclusive competence. In contrast, foreign and security policy is a kind of parallel competence, with competences remaining largely in member state hands. The word “policy” suggested that the CFSP was qualitatively different from the “cooperation” between Member States, which had characterised the CFSP’s lesser ambition predecessor European Political Cooperation (EPC). In fact, cooperation between Member States in the conduct of their national foreign policy remains of crucial importance to CFSP. Articles 11 (1) and 17 (1) of TEU explicitly state that CFSP was to cover “all areas of foreign and security policy” and should 8

This chapter is based on Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008

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European Council: Topic A “include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide.” It is important to note that both of these constellations are a bit misleading. CFSP is not all-encompassing, does not cover all areas of foreign and security policy and also doesn’t include all questions related to the security of the Union. For instance, the territorial defence of the member states is not covered by CFSP and for many Member States of the EU, NATO remains the major partner for security policy. The Treaty’s opening article on CFSP is generating expectations that member states had entered into a higher level of commitment (Art. 11(2) TEU):

“The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.” From a legal perspective, this provision, and particularly the use of the word “shall” is significant as it indicates that CFSP is legally binding. However, from a political perspective, this is just a highly conditional binding power - the Member States’ “active and unreserved support” and “loyalty” towards CFSP depends on the degree to which specific policies have actually been developed within the CFSP framework, the degree to which “the interests of the Union” have been specified and the degree to which the EU is indeed acting efficiently, as a cohesive force in international relations in this matter. When these conditions are not met, then treaty provisions imply that the member states can go their own way- as they have clearly have done on many occasions. However, where a well-elaborated and unambiguous policy has been developed towards a specific foreign policy issue, it becomes politically more problematic for Member States to get out of line. Peer pressure amongst member states and a degree of socialization does have an impact. The main problem for CFSP is not Member States deliberately embarking on policies which run counter to those developed within the EU but rather their apathy, their lack of active support both for CFSP in general as well as for many of its specific policy initiatives. The objectives of CFSP are listed in Art. 11(1) TEU as follows:  Safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter; 9

Prague Model United Nations 2017  Strengthening the security of the Union in all ways;  Preserving peace and strengthening international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;  Promoting international cooperation;  Developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The last three objectives are the central ones for the EU foreign policy towards other parts of the world. Preserving peace, strengthening international security, and promoting international cooperation, democracy and other values are consistently evident in the CFSP’s declarations and actions. Moreover, the references to UN and OSCE (Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter) are not random. Many CFSP actions are aimed towards strengthening, supporting or complementing UN and OSCE actions as part of a multi-location foreign policy. Some critical comments are, however, useful. Firstly, rather than being precise goals for concrete foreign policy actions, the Treaty provisions are general principles to which member states could easily subscribe, but the scope for interpretation is set broadly. A prominent illustration of this is the war against Iraq in 2003. For some countries, a military operation was necessary to “strengthen international security” while others considered military operation as undermining international security. For some Member States, UN resolutions provided a basis for military actions while for others they were insufficient to legitimize the use of violence. Secondly, some of the CFSP objectives are not always compatible. For instance, initiatives to promote human rights and democracy in China and Russia may actually impede international cooperation with these countries to tackle specific international crises (such as Darfur, North Korea or Iran). Thirdly, the CFSP objectives are identity and interrelational objectives rather than external objectives. The repetition of these consensus-generating objectives in declarations on all possible foreign policy issues serves both to mask disagreements between member states on their actual operationalization and to underscore the EU’s moral identity. Article 12 TEU states that the EU shall pursue the CFSP’s objectives by:  Defining the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP;  Deciding on common strategies; 10

European Council: Topic A  Adopting joint actions;  Adopting common positions;  Strengthening systematic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy.

All these are sometimes referred to the instruments of CFSP. The CFSP’s highest political authority (European Council) defines the principles, general guidelines, and common strategies. The Council of the European Union (the Ministerial summit, a co-legislative organ of EU) then adopts the decisions to further develop and implement the policy. Now, let get into detail in each of the CFSP objectives.

Common strategies It is important to be noted that there are two types of common strategies: ad hoc and legally binding ones. An example for ad hoc strategies is the EU Strategy for Africa. 9 Legally binding common strategies, to be implemented as an instrument, were created in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Such strategies also targeted vis-à-vis specific regions, countries or policy issues. They provide an appropriate framework for conducting specific policy. According to TEU, the European Council decides on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have common important interests. This instrument allows the EU to use relevant instruments from all other three EU-pillars as well as from the Member States in one comprehensive strategy. This would thus increase the consistency of the EU foreign policy. Of course, the use of these common strategies has not proven to be without errors. The “common strategies” instrument was not launched because Member States wanted to strengthen the effectiveness and cohesion of EU foreign policy, but because in the negotiations leading to the Amsterdam Treaty, it appeared to be essential device to bridge the gap between those countries that wanted majority voting in CFSP matters and those that opposed it. The problematic nature of this instrument became clear in the preparation and implementation of the common strategies on Russia and Ukraine in 1999 and Mediterranean in 2000. Less than two years after the first common strategy was adopted, Javier Solana presented to the European Council his Common Strategies Report which wasn’t promising at all and thus, this instrument was in fact suspended. The main reason for failing was the fact that they just continued the broadly defined policies of

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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ar12540

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Prague Model United Nations 2017 the first pillar, which were existing prior to the Amsterdam Treaty. They did not cover new ground and offered no added value.

Joint actions and common positions Following the treaties, joint actions are the most important instrument of EU foreign policy. Article 14 TEU, dedicated to joint actions, is indeed the longest of the whole CFSP chapter. The main features are summarized in the following paragraphs:

“Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the mans to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity”. Joint actions commit the Member States in their positions and the conduct of their activities. Whenever they “plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, they shall provide information in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council” (Art. J.3.5. of the Treaty of Maastricht). In the case of urgent need, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency and inform the Council immediately. In practice, however, the story is rather different. From mid-2000 on, joint actions have been mainly used for the limited number of CFSP/ESDP actions that are financed through CFSP budget and need to be adopted through a legal act. We can draw a few conclusions from this. First, the fields of application and the added value of the joint action instrument are limited. This is because many operational actions that could have been undertaken through joint action are often more effectively undertaken through the first pillar. It is the EC that possesses the necessary budgets, procedures, expertise and contractual relations with third countries to undertake the kind of actions that could also have been implemented using joint actions. Secondly, the fields covered by joint actions do not require any particular additional commitment from the Member States. This is even true for those joint actions relating to civilian crisis management operations - Member States have to put national personnel at the EU’s disposal but their participation is voluntary. Similar conclusions also apply to common positions. This legal instrument is briefly described in Article 15 TEU. In practice, instead of becoming a useful tool to gradually define an EU approach towards foreign policy issues, the use of common positions has been restricted to adoption of sanctions and restrictive measures against regimes and key individuals from countries concerned (through embargos, travel bans, freezing of funds, etc.). 12

European Council: Topic A

Systematic cooperation between member states This last instrument is mentioned in Article 12 of TEU. It is probably one of the most important instruments as well as one of the most overlooked. The fact that Art. 12 TEU speaks about “strengthening” systematic cooperation already testifies its ambiguity, signifying as it does that systematic cooperation should not be taken for granted. Strengthening systematic cooperation between national diplomacies, which was the heart of EPC, remains the backbone of CFSP mechanisms and output. This brings us to a fundamental point on CFSP- that despite its expanding set of common actors and instruments, national foreign policies and diplomacies maintain a central position. After we have discussed the nature of the CFSP, its objectives and instrument, the only aspect that left, in order to understand the second pillar of the European Union at 100%, is the scope and substance of CFSP. Assessing the CFSP in isolation from the EU’s general foreign policy and particularly the first pillar could prove to be artificial. Its scope has been widened greatly in the last 15 years. This expansive reach becomes evident if we look at some indicators. In 2006, besides the thousands of messages touching on all parts of the world, exchanged through COREU network, there were approximately:  150 CFSP declarations directed towards 60 countries;  220 protests and messages through diplomatic channels towards almost all countries in the world;  320 reports from Heads of Mission of EU member states and the Commission in the capitals of approximately 100 third countries;  155 “Political Dialogue meetings” (Head of State, Government, Ministerial or senior official level) with 50 third countries and with the member states of 20 regional organizations;  Joint actions, common positions and other decisions covering dozens of countries. The main focus of CFSP is Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa. There are, however, differences in the intensity of the CFSP actions. A low level of attention can indicate that the issue is not prioritized by the EU or that there are major disagreements between member states.

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Country and block positions Germany For Germany, the CFSP and the CSDP are an important part of its foreign policy. Separating the German Foreign Policy from its European context is not advisable as the country is in fact one of the leading actors in defining the EU’s policy agenda, and foreign and security policy is an essential part of it. The German army, “Bundeswehr” is having some traditions with regards to disaster relief operations. Development of Civil/Military capabilities, however, does not have a top priority. Possible fields of improvement for Germany could be keeping of transport means, communication systems, engineer or medical capacities available and ready for employment and deployment abroad. For Germany, CSDP should not be a military alliance, comparable with NATO. It could be a framework for policy coordination, a platform for harmonizing capability developments, and an instrument of measured independence of the EU. The CSDP institutions could be employed in order intergovernmental policy to be conducted well and thus, Europe could be made less dependent upon US policies by enabling capabilities through high-level involvement of Heads of States and Government in favor of a European defense agenda. 10

France The country believes that a Common Security and Defense Policy should have to do with security and defense. It also believes that CSDP should be a policy for the European Community to do things together in these two areas. The main emphasis of the France’s defense policy is “to ensure that France’s capacity to make autonomous decisions based on independent intelligence, and the country’s capacity to act of its own accord is guaranteed.” This aspect can be explained when taking into consideration the global role that France considers it still playing in the international arena. Thus, CSDP, is seen as one of the channels to execute the aforementioned global role. Despite repeated accusations from the Ministry of Finance for having too intense defense budget,

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European Council: Topic A this defense budget has been kept up in good condition, meaning that it constitutes an essential part of the overall spendings of the French Republic. 11

Italy The CSDP is important for Italy for 3 reasons. First, Rome is seeing the EU as an inspiration for collective action with regard to the Union’s neighbors which is more effective than single actions by Member States. Second, multilateralism, international law and civil-military cooperation are an integral part of Italy’s strategic culture, and the CSDP seems to fit perfectly with these elements. Third, the current High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini is the former Italian foreign minister and this, without doubts, can create an emotional connection between Italy and CSDP. Italy has a proven interest in strengthening further the civil-military capability development inside CSDP. In 2013, Italy proposed the document ‘More Europe on Defense’ – jointly created by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which included important proposals. Italy is also ready and willing to invest in pooling and sharing initiatives, through flexible formats but within an EU institutional context. EU-CSDP and NATO are for Italy complementary elements and in no case an opposition. In addition, division of labor and operative tasks between NATO and EU-CSDP is not considered a useful way to think strategically.

Poland The new Polish National Security Strategy was adopted on November 5, 2014. There, some lines were dedicated to CSDP as well, stating that ‘further evolution of the CSDP depends on the progress of integration processes within the EU, intensification of collaboration between the EU and NATO, political will to build defense capabilities, and active operational involvement of the EU in its neighborhood’. Poland is especially aware of the current geopolitical turbulences in Eastern Europe and therefore is seeing the CSDP as a mean to set the right priorities in order to help the Union to confront the Russian geopolitical challenge in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis. 12

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Sweden Sweden is one of the countries that placed most efforts in creating a strong CSDP and in particular, the civilian aspects of it. After the military intervention in Libya 2011 however, where the EU was barely considered despite the fact that geographicall, it was near and therefore, some refugee waves could have hit the Continent, it became clear that CSDP was lacking practical purposes aimed at tackling such issues. This led to an attitude change, targeted towards NATO. We can now observe that the opinion among public about NATO in Sweden is more positive than ever and subsequently, the first voices of a majority in favor of joining the alliance came in November 2011. In this way, it rather looks like closer cooperation with NATO is more important for solving the most pressing security problems facing Sweden where Russia takes the first place. For Sweden, a cooperation with NATO enhances its defense capability and until now, a CSDP has not served as a substitute. However, CSDP retains a unique competence in crisis management, especially related to civilian aspects, and for that reason it will remain important. 13

Latvia Latvia is located in the north-eastern part of the EU, which means that its security and defence policy is strongly affected by Russia’s moves in Ukraine. According to Latvia, Russia’s disrespect for international law and its increase of demonstration of military force in the Baltic Sea region has raised concerns in 2014 and in 2015. Nevertheless, what needs to be understood and clarified is that Latvia is not placing less emphasis on security threats in South-Eastern Europe for instance Latvian defence priorities have underlined that EU-NATO and EU-US cooperation, strengthening the EU’s response to hybrid threats, increasing the Union’s maritime and cyber security are important to all EU member states. For Latvia, CSDP is a very good complement to NATO in areas like “defence capability development or crisis management outside the EU”. 14

United Kingdom The UK’s attitude- to push for defense cooperation for others while abstaining, was reinforced by the initial American suspicion of attempts for European Defense and security initiatives. London was careful not to raise the Washington’s displeasure. American approval was, and for many in the British defense establishment still remains, a vital way towards the British self-esteem. Back in the late 1990s, the UK promised Washington that they would control EU defense developments, 13 14

Fiott 2015 Fiott 2015

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European Council: Topic A in order to ensure the supremacy of NATO. The implications of this policy can be seen in “the continuing British veto, in isolation and in defiance of all logic and experience, of a proper EU headquarters”. All these British scepticisms about European defense have more recently been compounded by the rising inappropriateness of the ‘E-word’ in domestic politics. 15

Points a conclusion paper could address  Common European Army- myth or reality?  Should the EU emancipate from NATO or collaborate even more closely?  Should the capacity of the EU troops be extended and if yes, which crisis regions need to be considered?  EU enlargement towards Western Balkans – pursuing it further or freezing it?  Common European Coastguard? Should it be strived for?  How should the further cooperation between EU and international organizations like the UN or OSCE look like?  Should a new start of the ad hoc or legally binding common strategies be given?  What is the role in the EU in the fight against terrorism?

References Europeangeostrategy.org ; “Germany and the CSDP”, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2015/01/germany-csdp/

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at:

Fiott, D. 2015: The Common Security and Defense Policy: National Perspectives, Egmont Paper 79, published by The Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, Belgium Hill, C. and Michael Smith 2005: International Relations and the European Union, Oxford University Press Keukeleire, S. and Jennifer MacNaughtan 2008: The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Palgrave MacMillan

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Further Reading Bakker, A. et al. 2016, “A stronger CSDP: Deepening Defense Cooperation”, Clingendael Report January 2016 Blockmans, S. 2016: New Trust for the CSDP from the Refugee and Migrant Crisis, CEPS Special Report, no. 142/ July 2016 Declaration of the EPP Summit, June 2015: For a Stronger European Security and Defense. Available at: http://www.epp.eu/files/uploads/2016/05/For-a-stronger-European-Securityand-Defence.pdf Ljetz, A., 2016: Opportunities for Reforming EU Common Security and Defense. Available at: http://www.progressivepost.eu/opportunities-reforming-eu-common-security-defence/ Peters, D. 2014: European Security Policy for the People? Public Opinion and the EU’s Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy, published in “European Security” Vol. 23(2014), Issue 4 Pohl, B. 2014: EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: power, purpose, and domestic politics, Routledge Rehrl, S. 2014: The Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union, Handbook for Decision Makers, Publication of the Federal Ministry of Defense and Sports of the Republic of Austria Riekeles, G.E. 2016: A Security and Defense Union, published in European View, June 2016, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp. 13-26 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, the new EU’s global strategy. Available at: http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-europeanunion Tardy, T. 2015: CSDP in Action- what contribution to International Security? Chaillot Papers, May 2015 Treaty on European Union. Available lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

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European Council: Topic A Wahl, T.: “The European Union as an Actor in the Fight Against Terrorism”, Chapter 4 of the book “A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat. Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications”, Springer Publishing

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Topic B: The future of relations between the EU and Turkey Introduction Regardless of whether one believes that Turkey is “European” or “Asian”, it would be ignorant to ignore its involvement, influence as well as contributions to European history and geopolitics. The Ottoman Empire, at its greatest extent, stretched from modern day Yemen to modern day Algeria and Austria. Modern Turkey was founded in 1923 as the legal successor of the Ottoman Empire, which had been around for over 600 years. After the First World War, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose name also means “Father of the Turks”, established a provisional government and went on to become president of the newly Source: britannica.com founded Turkish republic. 16 He introduced a series of political and economic reforms in an attempt to modernise Turkey and to turn it into a secular state. 17 The first parliamentary gathering, the Grand National Assembly, introduced a governing system based on Western values, such as parliamentary democracy, division of powers, human rights as well as private ownership. His party would rule Turkey until 1945.18 Today, Turkey is led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who assumed the power in 2002 - just a year after the establishment of his political party, AK (Justice and Development) Party. 19 In 2014 he became the first directly-elected president of Turkey. 20

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"History - Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938)." BBC News. Accessed December 18, 2016. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/ataturk_kemal.shtml. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 "Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's dominant president." BBC News. July 21, 2016. Accessed December 10, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679. 20 Ibid.

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European Council: Topic B He is largely supported by Turkish conservatives. 21 Erdogan has often been described as authoritarian and has often used his power to quell his critics. 22 Since his rise to power, he has begun to desecularise Turkey by rescinding headscarf bans and attempting to criminalise adultery as well as attempting to introduce “alcohol-free zones”. 23 At the same time, he enabled the building of a lavish presidential palace that cost the taxpayer approximately 500m EUR and reflects his authoritarian tendencies. 24 This slow paced development has caused some concern within the EU. While Turkey is not only a NATO partner but also an important strategic ally, recent developments suggest that Turkey perhaps does not share the same values as those shared by Member States of the EU. Relations between Turkey and the EU have become very strained and it remains unsure how these will continue in the years to come.

EU-Turkey Relations Timeline

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Year

Event

September 1963

Turkey and the EEC sign the Ankara Agreement

1965

Establishment of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC)

1970

Signing of the Additional Protocol

1996

Turkey becomes part of the Customs Union

1999

Turkey assumes “candidate status”

October 2005

Negotiations for full membership are opened

May 2012

The Positive Agenda is established

September 2014

The “NEW EU strategy of Turkey” is announced

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Ibid. Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Based on the Guardian’s “Timeline: Turkey and the EU”: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/13/turkey.eu3 22

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Discussion of the topic Current status of the Accession Proceedings Turkey has been keen to join European Integration since 1963, after the Ankara Association Agreement was adopted. 26 In 1987 it applied to become a member of the European Economic Community, the EU predecessor and it wasn’t until 1997 that Turkey was declared eligible to join the EU. 27 Official negotiations began in 2005. However, due to a series of circumstances, negotiations have been halted. 28

Summary of EU Accession Criteria In order to become a full EU Member, a series of requirements need to be fulfilled. In general terms, a candidate country must be in line with EU standards and rules, obtain approval from all EU organs and Member States as well as obtaining the consent of its own people. 29 These accession criteria – also referred to as “Copenhagen criteria” – include more specific political, economic and administrative criteria:  Political: “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” 30  Economic: “a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces” 31  Administrative: “administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis* and ability to take on the obligations of membership”. 32

26

"Turkey - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 16, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey_en. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 "Conditions for membership - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm. 30 "Accession criteria - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.

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European Council: Topic B Accession to the EU is comprised of three broad steps: (1) becoming a candidate country, (2) entering formal membership negotiations and (3) the formal act of joining the EU. 33

The Ankara Association Agreement The Ankara Agreement (AAA) establishes a three stage process for Turkish integration: a prepatory stage, a transitional stage and a final stage (art. 2.3 (AAA)). Although Turkey has signed the Additional Protocol to the AAA, it has yet to agree to apply the Additional Protocol to Cyprus, in order to “fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol”. 34 Only then will the next eight negotiation chapters be opened. 35

Current open chapters open to Turkey The following chapters are currently open for negotiation for Turkey: Free Movement of Capital, Company Law, Intellectual Property Law, Information Society and Media, Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy, Taxation, Statistics, Enterprise & Industrial Policy, Trans-European Networks, Environment, Consumer & Health Protection, Financial Control, Regional policy & coordination of structural instruments, Economic and Monetary Policy and Financial and budgetary provisions.

The EU Parliament’s concerns regarding a potential Turkish accession The EU-Parliament adopts an annual resolution on Turkey, outlining its position and concerns regarding the current status of Turkish fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. In its last resolution, it largely focused, amongst others on the current human rights situation in Turkey – in particular with regards to the freedom of assembly, freedom of the press as well as expression, respect for human rights, the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. Turkey, at least according to the Parliament, currently lacks in these areas. For example, the latest Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index ranks Turkey 151st out of 180 countries. 36

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"Steps towards joining - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining_en. 34 "2015 Report on Turkey (P8_TA-PROV(2016)0133)." European Parliament. April 14, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BTA%2BP8-TA-20160133%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN. 35 "Turkey - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission." 36 "2016 World Press Freedom Index." Reporters Without Borders. Accessed November 22, 2016. https://rsf.org/en/ranking.

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Prague Model United Nations 2017 While the EU Parliament is not a formal partner in accession negotiations, it main official role is to approve an accession treaty before it is signed. However, it does contribute to the enlargement process. For example, in 1997, it called for an inclusive enlargement strategy, “implying the involvement of all applicants in the accession process, which was essential to avoid negative sideeffects in certain applicant countries”. 37For more information regarding the involvement of the EU Parliament in enlargement processes, please refer here.38

Summary While Turkey is an official candidate for EU membership, it has still to negotiate several chapters before accession can be formalised. It will only be able to do so once it agrees to apply the Additional Protocol of the Anakara Association Agreement with regards to Cyprus.

Turkey, Visa liberalisation and the Refugee Treaty In light of the Syrian Civil War, many civilians have fled the region to seek refuge and asylum in Europe. Many of these have taken the journey through Turkey and has resulted in many Syrians being “stuck” in Turkey, unable to continue their journey. This lead to the negotiation of the socalled “EU-Turkey joint action plan”. Turkey would limit the “flow” of refugees travelling to Greece and would allow Greece to return “all new irregular migrants” arriving after the 20th of March to Turkey. In return, Turkey is to receive financial assistance (an estimated 6bn EUR39) for the approximately 2,7 million refugees40 living in Turkey as well as visa liberalisations for Turkish citizens.41 Negotiations for these already began in 2013 with the launch of the so-called “Visa Liberalisation Dialogue”. This was based on a Roadmap that outlines the requirements Turkey needs to fulfil to allow the EU-Parliament and Council to relieve Turkish citizens from needing a visa to travel within Europe. 42 The requirements concern document security, migration management, public order and security, fundamental rights. As of May 2016, Turkey had fulfilled most of the 72 conditions. However, one condition – regarding its anti-terror legislation - it has yet to fulfil, as the definition 37

"The European Parliament in the Enlargement Process - An Overview." Role of the European Parliament in enlargement of the EU. March 2003. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/positionep/ep_role_en.htm. 38 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/positionep/ep_role_en.htm 39 Kingsley, Patrick. "Refugee crisis: What does the EU's deal with Turkey mean?" The Guardian. March 18, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/18/eu-deal-turkey-migrants-refugees-q-and-a. 40 Ibid. 41 Girit 2016. 42 "Turkey’s progress on the visa liberalisation roadmap." European Commission. May 4, 2016. Accessed November 22, 2016.

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European Council: Topic B of terrorism have been deemed “broad and excessively vague”. For more information regarding the content of the agreement, please refer to the EU- Turkey Statement, 16 March 2016. EU policy makers hope that this will curb the influx of migrants and refugees into Europe. However, as Patrick Kingsley points out, “historical migration patterns consistently show that when one route closes, another one opens”.43 The route to Europe through Turkey is not the only route into Europe and closure of the Turkish route could lead to increased pressure along other routes, such as through Greece, Italy, Spain, Russia and Finland. Some legal scholars argue that this agreement with Turkey is illegal as it goes against EU law and the Geneva Convention on Refugee. Amongst others, the Geneva Convention states that an asylum case must be decided upon on an individual basis. The EU has responded to these statements by stating that will continue to decide case-by-case. However, as Turkey will be classified as a “safe country of origin”, which will allow for asylum authorities to deport asylum seekers to Turkey.44 However, this has caused outraged amongst the public, as Turkey has not fully obligated itself to the Geneva Convention on Refugees. It has only ratified parts of the treaty and thus only has a limited application. For example, it only grants asylum to those fleeing events in Europe (so-called “geographic limitation”).45 There have been reports that Turkish authorities have sent Syrian refugees back to Syria and despite new labour laws, de facto does not allow most Syrians to work. As a consequence, many Syrians have resorted to making their children work, in order to make ends meet. 46 Whether this deal will work or not will depend on a variety of factors. For example, Greece will have to process and decide a large number of asylum applicants if it wants to send these back to Turkey, while complying with EU law. However, Greece – just as it did before – is in desperate need of approximately 2,500 asylum officials in order to fulfil this task. 47

43

Kingsley 2016. Ibid. 45 "PROTECTING REFUGEES." Human Rights Watch. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/turkey2/Turk009-10.htm. 46 Kingsley 2016. 47 Ibid. 44

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Prague Model United Nations 2017

The Attempted Turkish Coup and its Implications for Future Relations with the EU On July 15 2016, a small fraction of the Turkish military tried to overthrow the Erdogan government in a coup. Since the coup, more than 36,000 people have been arrested (including 10 legislators of the second largest opposition party and numerous journalists) and more than 100,000 state employees (including bureaucrats, judges, military officers and police) have been fired due to alleged links with Fethullah Gülen, a US-based preacher who is accused of instigating the coup.48 In addition, many newspapers and other media outlets have been shut down. In November 2016, the EU-Parliament voted upon whether or not to suspend the negotiation talks.49 471 parliamentarians voted for the suspension and 47 against.50 The MEPs believed that the recent developments in Turkey would trigger art. 5 of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey.51 According to this provision, “in the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption.” In addition, European parliamentarians are of the opinion that they newly introduced capital punishment is “a red line not to be crossed”52 and in itself a reason to suspend formal negotiations, as "the unequivocal rejection of the death penalty is an essential element of the Union acquis."53 MEPs would be willing to continue negotiations once Turkey revokes its measures and return to the rule of law.54 Even though this vote is not legally binding – mainly because the Parliament is not involved with the triggering of these type of mechanisms55 – it has significant implications for the future of

48

Rankin, Jennifer, and Kareem Shaheen. "Turkey reacts angrily to symbolic EU parliament vote on its membership." The Guardian. November 24, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/eu-parliament-votesfreeze-membership-talks-turkey. 49 Girit 2016. 50 "Freeze EU accession talks with Turkey until it halts repression, urge MEPs." News | European Parliament. November 24, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161117IPR51549/freeze-eu-accessiontalks-with-turkey-until-it-halts-repression-urge-meps. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.

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European Council: Topic B negotiation talks and Member States are not likely to ignore its decision.56 On the one hand, it means a de fact suspension, as no further chapters can be opened.57 On the other hand, it means that the EU-Turkey joint action plan may be suspended too.58 This could pose as a security risk too, as with the so-called Islamic State is losing territory and power, many foreign fighters could use the route to re-enter Europe. 59 This vote was not received well in Turkey. The Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim was unimpressed by this decision but cautioned that Turkish-EU relations were already strained and called for the EU to decide to “continue its future vision with or without Turkey”.60 Erdogan declared that the vote “has no value”61 warned that should the EU not deliver with regards to visafree travel for Turkish citizens, it would “tear up” the agreement regarding refugees.62 The deputy prime minister of Turkey has declared that “With this vote, the European parliament will freeze itself out of any constructive dialogue with Turkey and raise further serious questions over Europe’s reliability as a partner”.63 Erdogan wants to host a referendum in order to ascertain whether the Turkish people want to vote to join the EU as early as 2017. 64 This vote has also received criticism within the EU. For example, former Swedish prime minister, Carl Bildt, declared via twitter that MEPs were “a populist short-term rather than strategic longterm approach”.65 Frederica Mogherini, EU’s foreign policy chief, stated that pausing accession talks would constitute a lose-lose situation and that Europe would loose a vital dialogue channel.66 She also declared that “We should also ask ourselves which tools and instruments we have at our disposal in order to increase, and not reduce, our leverage on Turkey’s reforms and on its society”. 67

56

Ibid. Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Rankin Shaheen, 2016. 61 Ibid, 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 57

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Prague Model United Nations 2017

Country and block positions Turkey Although Turkey has been keen on joining the EU for a long time now, the newly developed authoritarian tendencies have caused a shift, with Erdogan recently stating that “Turkey should feel relaxed about the EU and not be fixated about joining it” and is supposedly contemplating joining the Eurasian security group Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.68

Germany Germany has always enjoyed close relations with Turkey. Some 3 million people of Turkish descent live in Germany. However, this relationship has come under strain in recent years. For example, after Jan Böhmermann, a famous German comedian and satirist, read out a poem insulting the Turkish president, Erdogan vowed to sue him through the German court system, on the basis of a seldom-used provision in the German penal code. While the German government allowed the legal proceedings to go ahead, it this so that the German courts could decide upon the merits of the case, rather than allowing the government to dictate the judicial system. By doing so, the German government indirectly referred to the rule of law deficits that are currently in place in Turkey. Other recent incidents include the controversies surrounding visa-free travel, the prohibition of a live address by Erdogan at a rally in Cologn due to security concerns, the Turkish response to the attempted coup as well as the so-called Armenia-Resolution adopted by the German parliament. In June, the Bundestag adopted a resolution recognising the Armenian genocide in Turkey in 1915-1916. Turkey has warned Germany not to do so and responded by preventing German politicians from visiting the air base in Incirlik.

Austria It was reported on December 11th that Austria would veto a continuation of accession talks with Turkey, citing alleged human rights violations and persecution of the opposition. In an interview with Spiegel online, Sebastian Kurz, current Foreign Minister of Austria, declared that “The European Parliament has adopted a courageous and correct resolution demanding that the accession negotiations with Turkey be frozen. In the conclusions of the Foreign Ministers, there must also be a reaction to developments in Turkey. We must also propose that the accession talks 68

Girit 2016.

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European Council: Topic B be frozen”. 69 He does not believe that the EU and Turkey share the same values and calls for a clear response from the EU regarding the coup of July 15th.

Sweden Turkish-Swedish relations too became strained after Turkey’s constitutional court annulled a provision that labelled “all sexual acts involving children under the age of 15” as “sexual abuse”.70 Swedish foreign minister, Margot Wallström, used her official twitter account to release the following statement: “Turkish decision to allow sex with children under 15 must be reversed”.71 In a televised address, the Turkish foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, responded that “It is a scandal for a foreign minister to post such a tweet based on false news or speculation”. He also stated that “A foreign minister should not tell lies and should not adopt an approach accusing Turkey”. The reasoning behind this annulment was that a lower court was “was worried there was no distinction between cases of sexual acts involving a young teenager or a toddler”. The legal age of consent – 18 – has not been affected by this ruling, but activists are concerned that “it would open the way for unpunished child sexual abuse”. 72

Points delegates should consider Delegates, when researching their countries’ stances and formulating documents during the committee sessions, should bear in mind the following points:  Has your country recently been involved with a dispute with Turkey? To what extent have these impacted relations?  What is the ultimate aim of your country? Does it want Turkey to accede to the EU? On what basis has it decided this? What alternatives does it envision for Turkey?  To what extent does your country’s willingness to take in refugees encourage support for the EU-Turkey Agreement? What alternatives could it consider?

69

"Vienna will veto EU membership talks with Turkey – Austrian FM." RT International. December 11, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016. https://www.rt.com/news/369915-austria-block-turkey-eu-accession/. 70 Agence France-Presse in Istanbul. "Turkey hits back after Sweden accuses it of legalising child sex." The Guardian. August 15, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/15/sweden-accuses-turkey-legalising-childsex. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid.

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Prague Model United Nations 2017  In light of the recent attempted coup, how is your country planning to continue relations with Turkey? The same? Different?

Further reading 1.

Important documents:    

Ankara Association Agreement and Protocol EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, Implementation Report 2015 European Council Documents EC EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016 (Press release 144/16)

EP Documents  EP Resolution of 14 April 2016 on the European Commission’s 2015 report on Turkey ( 2015/2898(RSP) )  EP Resolution of 24 November 2016 on EU-Turkey Relations ( 2016/2993(RSP))

European Commission Documents  Turkey 2016 Report (COM(2016) 715 final) 2.

Background information

Regarding the EU-Turkey Agreement:  European Commission Q&A: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16963_en.htm  The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal

Regarding the accession process:  from EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:l14536&from=EN  Information from the EU Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130437/L DM_BRI(2013)130437_REV3_EN.pdf

Regarding Turkey’s current Membership Status:

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European Council: Topic B  European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey_en

Bibliography "2015 Report on Turkey (P8_TA-PROV(2016)0133)." European Parliament. April 14, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BTA%2BP8-TA-20160133%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN. "2016 World Press Freedom Index." Reporters Without Borders. Accessed November 22, 2016. https://rsf.org/en/ranking. "Accession criteria - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accessioncriteria_en.htm. Agence France-Presse in Istanbul. "Turkey hits back after Sweden accuses it of legalising child sex." The Guardian. August 15, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/15/sweden-accuses-turkey-legalising-childsex. "Conditions for membership - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditionsmembership/index_en.htm. "Freeze EU accession talks with Turkey until it halts repression, urge MEPs." News | European Parliament. November 24, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161117IPR51549/freeze-eu-accessiontalks-with-turkey-until-it-halts-repression-urge-meps. Girit, Selin. "Turkey and the EU: The end of the affair?" BBC News. November 22, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38055357. "History - Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938)." BBC News. Accessed December 18, 2016. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/ataturk_kemal.shtml. 31

Prague Model United Nations 2017 "PROTECTING REFUGEES." Human Rights Watch. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/turkey2/Turk009-10.htm. Rankin, Jennifer, and Kareem Shaheen. "Turkey reacts angrily to symbolic EU parliament vote on its membership." The Guardian. November 24, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/eu-parliament-votes-freezemembership-talks-turkey. "Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's dominant president." BBC News. July 21, 2016. Accessed December 10, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679. "Steps towards joining - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/stepstowards-joining_en. "The European Parliament in the Enlargement Process - An Overview." Role of the European Parliament in enlargement of the EU. March 2003. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/positionep/ep_role_en.htm. "Turkey - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 16, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailedcountry-information/turkey_en. “Turkey’s progress on the visa liberalisation roadmap." European Commission. May 4, 2016. Accessed November 22, http://avrupa.info.tr/fileadmin/Content/2016__April/Visa_factsheet_01246.pdf

2016.

"Vienna will veto EU membership talks with Turkey – Austrian FM." RT International. December 11, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016. https://www.rt.com/news/369915-austria-block-turkey-euaccession/.

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