Politics, Book Four Written 350 B.C.E

By Aristotle

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

Part I In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of any subject, and do not come into being in a fragmentary way, it is the province of a single art or science to consider all that appertains to a single subject. For example, the art of gymnastic considers not only the suitableness of different modes of training to different bodies (2), but what sort is absolutely the best (1); (for the absolutely best must suit that which is by nature best and best furnished with the means of life), and also what common form of training is adapted to the great majority of men (4). And if a man does not desire the best habit of body, or the greatest skill in gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer or the teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart any lower degree of either (3). The same principle equally holds in medicine and shipbuilding, and the making of clothes, and in the arts generally. Hence it is obvious that government too is the subject of a single science, which has to consider what government is best and of what sort it must be, to be most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were no external impediment, and also what kind of government is adapted to particular states. For the best is often unattainable, and therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only with (1) that which is best in the abstract, but also with (2) that which is best relatively to circumstances. We should be able further to say how a state may be constituted under any given conditions (3); both how it is originally formed and, when formed, how it may be longest preserved; the supposed state being so far from having the best constitution that it is unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the best; neither is it the best under the circumstances, but of an inferior type. He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of government which is best suited to states in general; for political writers, although they have excellent ideas, are often unpractical. We should consider, not only what form of government is best, but also what is possible and what is easily attainable by all. There are some who would have none but the most perfect; for this many natural advantages are required. Others, again, speak of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the constitution under which they are living, they extol some one in particular, for example the Lacedaemonian. Any change of government which has to be introduced should be one which men, starting from their existing constitutions, will be both willing and able to adopt, since there is quite as much trouble in the reformation of an old constitution as in the establishment of a new one, just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn. And therefore, in addition to the qualifications of the statesman already mentioned, he should be able to find remedies for the defects of existing constitutions, as has been said before. This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of government there are. It is often supposed that there is only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy. But this is a mistake; and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many ways they are combined. The same political insight will enable a man to know which laws are the best, and which are suited to different constitutions; for the laws are, and ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the constitution to the laws. A constitution is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of each community. But laws are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitution; they are the rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders. So that we must know the varieties, and the number of varieties, of each form of government, if only with a view to making laws. For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies or to all democracies, since there is certainly more than one form both of democracy and of oligarchy. Part II In our original discussion about governments we divided them into three true forms: kingly rule, aristocracy, and constitutional government, and three corresponding perversions- tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Of kingly rule and of aristocracy, we have already spoken, for the inquiry into the perfect state is the same thing with the discussion of the two forms thus named, since both imply a principle of virtue provided with external means. We have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the latter should be established. In what follows we have to describe the so-called constitutional government, which bears the common name of all constitutions, and the other forms, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. It is obvious which of the three perversions is the worst, and which is the next in badness. That which is the perversion of the first and most divine is necessarily the worst. And just as a royal rule, if not a mere name, must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king, so tyranny, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily the farthest removed from a well-constituted form; oligarchy is little better, for it is a long way from aristocracy, and democracy is the most tolerable of the three.

A writer who preceded me has already made these distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as mine. For he lays down the principle that when all the constitutions are good (the oligarchy and the rest being virtuous), democracy is the worst, but the best when all are bad. Whereas we maintain that they are in any case defective, and that one oligarchy is not to be accounted better than another, but only less bad. Not to pursue this question further at present, let us begin by determining (1) how many varieties of constitution there are (since of democracy and oligarchy there are several): (2) what constitution is the most generally acceptable, and what is eligible in the next degree after the perfect state; and besides this what other there is which is aristocratical and well-constituted, and at the same time adapted to states in general; (3) of the other forms of government to whom each is suited. For democracy may meet the needs of some better than oligarchy, and conversely. In the next place (4) we have to consider in what manner a man ought to proceed who desires to establish some one among these various forms, whether of democracy or of oligarchy; and lastly, (5) having briefly discussed these subjects to the best of our power, we will endeavor to ascertain the modes of ruin and preservation both of constitutions generally and of each separately, and to what causes they are to be attributed. Part III The reason why there are many forms of government is that every state contains many elements. In the first place we see that all states are made up of families, and in the multitude of citizen there must be some rich and some poor, and some in a middle condition; the rich are heavy-armed, and the poor not. Of the common people, some are husbandmen, and some traders, and some artisans. There are also among the notables differences of wealth and property- for example, in the number of horses which they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are rich. And therefore in old times the cities whose strength lay in their cavalry were oligarchies, and they used cavalry in wars against their neighbors; as was the practice of the Eretrians and Chalcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the river Maeander, and of other peoples in Asia. Besides differences of wealth there are differences of rank and merit, and there are some other elements which were mentioned by us when in treating of aristocracy we enumerated the essentials of a state. Of these elements, sometimes all, sometimes the lesser and sometimes the greater number, have a share in the government. It is evident then that there must be many forms of government, differing in kind, since the parts of which they are composed differ from each other in kind. For a constitution is an organization of offices, which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess, for example the rich or the poor, or according to some principle of equality which includes both. There must therefore be as many forms of government as there are modes of arranging the offices, according to the superiorities and differences of the parts of the state. There are generally thought to be two principal forms: as men say of the winds that there are but two- north and south, and that the rest of them are only variations of these, so of governments there are said to be only two forms- democracy and oligarchy. For aristocracy is considered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being the rule of a few, and the so-called constitutional government to be really a democracy, just as among the winds we make the west a variation of the north, and the east of the south wind. Similarly of musical modes there are said to be two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian; the other arrangements of the scale are comprehended under one or other of these two. About forms of government this is a very favorite notion. But in either case the better and more exact way is to distinguish, as I have done, the one or two which are true forms, and to regard the others as perversions, whether of the most perfectly attempered mode or of the best form of government: we may compare the severer and more overpowering modes to the oligarchical forms, and the more relaxed and gentler ones to the democratic. Part IV It must not be assumed, as some are fond of saying, that democracy is simply that form of government in which the greater number are sovereign, for in oligarchies, and indeed in every government, the majority rules; nor again is oligarchy that form of government in which a few are sovereign. Suppose the whole population of a city to be 1300, and that of these 1000 are rich, and do not allow the remaining 300 who are poor, but free, and in an other respects their equals, a share of the government- no one will say that this is a democracy. In like manner, if the poor were few and the masters of the rich who outnumber them, no one would ever call such a government, in which the rich majority have no share of office, an oligarchy. Therefore we should rather say that democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers, and oligarchy in which the rich; it is only an accident that the free are the many and the rich are the few. Otherwise a government in which the offices were given according to stature, as is said to be the case in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, would be an oligarchy; for the number of tall or good-looking men is small. And yet oligarchy and democracy are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of wealth and freedom. Both of them contain many other

elements, and therefore we must carry our analysis further, and say that the government is not a democracy in which the freemen, being few in number, rule over the many who are not free, as at Apollonia, on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera; (for in each of these states the nobles, who were also the earliest settlers, were held in chief honor, although they were but a few out of many). Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government because they exceed in number; as was the case formerly at Colophon, where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed of large property before the Lydian War. But the form of government is a democracy when the free, who are also poor and the majority, govern, and an oligarchy when the rich and the noble govern, they being at the same time few in number. I have said that there are many forms of government, and have explained to what causes the variety is due. Why there are more than those already mentioned, and what they are, and whence they arise, I will now proceed to consider, starting from the principle already admitted, which is that every state consists, not of one, but of many parts. If we were going to speak of the different species of animals, we should first of all determine the organs which are indispensable to every animal, as for example some organs of sense and the instruments of receiving and digesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach, besides organs of locomotion. Assuming now that there are only so many kinds of organs, but that there may be differences in them- I mean different kinds of mouths, and stomachs, and perceptive and locomotive organs- the possible combinations of these differences will necessarily furnish many variedes of animals. (For animals cannot be the same which have different kinds of mouths or of ears.) And when all the combinations are exhausted, there will be as many sorts of animals as there are combinations of the necessary organs. The same, then, is true of the forms of government which have been described; states, as I have repeatedly said, are composed, not of one, but of many elements. One element is the food-producing class, who are called husbandmen; a second, the class of mechanics who practice the arts without which a city cannot exist; of these arts some are absolutely necessary, others contribute to luxury or to the grace of life. The third class is that of traders, and by traders I mean those who are engaged in buying and selling, whether in commerce or in retail trade. A fourth class is that of the serfs or laborers. The warriors make up the fifth class, and they are as necessary as any of the others, if the country is not to be the slave of every invader. For how can a state which has any title to the name be of a slavish nature? The state is independent and self-sufficing, but a slave is the reverse of independent. Hence we see that this subject, though ingeniously, has not been satisfactorily treated in the Republic. Socrates says that a state is made up of four sorts of people who are absolutely necessary; these are a weaver, a husbandman, a shoemaker, and a builder; afterwards, finding that they are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman, to look after the necessary animals; then a merchant, and then a retail trader. All these together form the complement of the first state, as if a state were established merely to supply the necessaries of life, rather than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in need of shoemakers and of husbandmen. But he does not admit into the state a military class until the country has increased in size, and is beginning to encroach on its neighbor's land, whereupon they go to war. Yet even amongst his four original citizens, or whatever be the number of those whom he associates in the state, there must be some one who will dispense justice and determine what is just. And as the soul may be said to be more truly part of an animal than the body, so the higher parts of states, that is to say, the warrior class, the class engaged in the administration of justice, and that engaged in deliberation, which is the special business of political common sense-these are more essential to the state than the parts which minister to the necessaries of life. Whether their several functions are the functions of different citizens, or of the same- for it may often happen that the same persons are both warriors and husbandmen- is immaterial to the argument. The higher as well as the lower elements are to be equally considered parts of the state, and if so, the military element at any rate must be included. There are also the wealthy who minister to the state with their property; these form the seventh class. The eighth class is that of magistrates and of officers; for the state cannot exist without rulers. And therefore some must be able to take office and to serve the state, either always or in turn. There only remains the class of those who deliberate and who judge between disputants; we were just now distinguishing them. If presence of all these elements, and their fair and equitable organization, is necessary to states, then there must also be persons who have the ability of statesmen. Different functions appear to be often combined in the same individual; for example, the warrior may also be a husbandman, or an artisan; or, again, the councillor a judge. And all claim to possess political ability, and think that they are quite competent to fill most offices. But the same persons cannot be rich and poor at the same time. For this reason the rich and the poor are regarded in an especial sense as parts of a state. Again, because the rich are generally few in number, while the poor are many, they appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails they form the government. Hence arises the common opinion that there are two kinds of governmentdemocracy and oligarchy. I have already explained that there are many forms of constitution, and to what causes the variety is due. Let me now show that there are different forms both of democracy and oligarchy, as will indeed be evident from what has preceded. For both in the common people and in the notables various classes are included; of the common people, one class are husbandmen, another artisans; another traders, who are employed in buying and selling; another are the seafaring class, whether engaged in war or in trade, as ferrymen or as fishermen. (In many places any one of these classes forms quite a large population; for example, fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, crews of triremes at Athens, merchant seamen at Aegina and Chios, ferrymen at Tenedos.) To the classes already

mentioned may be added day-laborers, and those who, owing to their needy circumstances, have no leisure, or those who are not of free birth on both sides; and there may be other classes as well. The notables again may be divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue, education, and similar differences. Of forms of democracy first comes that which is said to be based strictly on equality. In such a democracy the law says that it is just for the poor to have no more advantage than the rich; and that neither should be masters, but both equal. For if liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. And since the people are the majority, and the opinion of the majority is decisive, such a government must necessarily be a democracy. Here then is one sort of democracy. There is another, in which the magistrates are elected according to a certain property qualification, but a low one; he who has the required amount of property has a share in the government, but he who loses his property loses his rights. Another kind is that in which all the citizens who are under no disqualification share in the government, but still the law is supreme. In another, everybody, if he be only a citizen, is admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before. A fifth form of democracy, in other respects the same, is that in which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power, and supersede the law by their decrees. This is a state of affairs brought about by the demagogues. For in democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens hold the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one; and the many have the power in their hands, not as individuals, but collectively. Homer says that 'it is not good to have a rule of many,' but whether he means this corporate rule, or the rule of many individuals, is uncertain. At all events this sort of democracy, which is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot; the flatterer is held in honor; this sort of democracy being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens. The decrees of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant; and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. Both have great power; the flatterer with the tyrant, the demagogue with democracies of the kind which we are describing. The demagogues make the decrees of the people override the laws, by referring all things to the popular assembly. And therefore they grow great, because the people have an things in their hands, and they hold in their hands the votes of the people, who are too ready to listen to them. Further, those who have any complaint to bring against the magistrates say, 'Let the people be judges'; the people are too happy to accept the invitation; and so the authority of every office is undermined. Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all; for where the laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme over all, and the magistracies should judge of particulars, and only this should be considered a constitution. So that if democracy be a real form of government, the sort of system in which all things are regulated by decrees is clearly not even a democracy in the true sense of the word, for decrees relate only to particulars. These then are the different kinds of democracy. Part V Of oligarchies, too, there are different kinds: one where the property qualification for office is such that the poor, although they form the majority, have no share in the government, yet he who acquires a qualification may obtain a share. Another sort is when there is a qualification for office, but a high one, and the vacancies in the governing body are fired by co-optation. If the election is made out of all the qualified persons, a constitution of this kind inclines to an aristocracy, if out of a privileged class, to an oligarchy. Another sort of oligarchy is when the son succeeds the father. There is a fourth form, likewise hereditary, in which the magistrates are supreme and not the law. Among oligarchies this is what tyranny is among monarchies, and the last-mentioned form of democracy among democracies; and in fact this sort of oligarchy receives the name of a dynasty (or rule of powerful families). These are the different sorts of oligarchies and democracies. It should, however, be remembered that in many states the constitution which is established by law, although not democratic, owing to the education and habits of the people may be administered democratically, and conversely in other states the established constitution may incline to democracy, but may be administered in an oligarchical spirit. This most often happens after a revolution: for governments do not change at once; at first the dominant party are content with encroaching a little upon their opponents. The laws which existed previously continue in force, but the authors of the revolution have the power in their hands. Part VI From what has been already said we may safely infer that there are so many different kinds of democracies and of oligarchies. For it is evident that either all the classes whom we mentioned must share in the government, or some only and not others. When the class of

husbandmen and of those who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the government is administered according to law. For the citizens being compelled to live by their labor have no leisure; and so they set up the authority of the law, and attend assemblies only when necessary. They all obtain a share in the government when they have acquired the qualification which is fixed by the law- the absolute exclusion of any class would be a step towards oligarchy; hence all who have acquired the property qualification are admitted to a share in the constitution. But leisure cannot be provided for them unless there are revenues to support them. This is one sort of democracy, and these are the causes which give birth to it. Another kind is based on the distinction which naturally comes next in order; in this, every one to whose birth there is no objection is eligible, but actually shares in the government only if he can find leisure. Hence in such a democracy the supreme power is vested in the laws, because the state has no means of paying the citizens. A third kind is when all freemen have a right to share in the government, but do not actually share, for the reason which has been already given; so that in this form again the law must rule. A fourth kind of democracy is that which comes latest in the history of states. In our own day, when cities have far outgrown their original size, and their revenues have increased, all the citizens have a place in the government, through the great preponderance of the multitude; and they all, including the poor who receive pay, and therefore have leisure to exercise their rights, share in the administration. Indeed, when they are paid, the common people have the most leisure, for they are not hindered by the care of their property, which often fetters the rich, who are thereby prevented from taking part in the assembly or in the courts, and so the state is governed by the poor, who are a majority, and not by the laws. So many kinds of democracies there are, and they grow out of these necessary causes. Of oligarchies, one form is that in which the majority of the citizens have some property, but not very much; and this is the first form, which allows to any one who obtains the required amount the right of sharing in the government. The sharers in the government being a numerous body, it follows that the law must govern, and not individuals. For in proportion as they are further removed from a monarchical form of government, and in respect of property have neither so much as to be able to live without attending to business, nor so little as to need state support, they must admit the rule of law and not claim to rule themselves. But if the men of property in the state are fewer than in the former case, and own more property, there arises a second form of oligarchy. For the stronger they are, the more power they claim, and having this object in view, they themselves select those of the other classes who are to be admitted to the government; but, not being as yet strong enough to rule without the law, they make the law represent their wishes. When this power is intensified by a further diminution of their numbers and increase of their property, there arises a third and further stage of oligarchy, in which the governing class keep the offices in their own hands, and the law ordains that the son shall succeed the father. When, again, the rulers have great wealth and numerous friends, this sort of family despotism approaches a monarchy; individuals rule and not the law. This is the fourth sort of oligarchy, and is analogous to the last sort of democracy. Part VII There are still two forms besides democracy and oligarchy; one of them is universally recognized and included among the four principal forms of government, which are said to be (1) monarchy, (2) oligarchy, (3) democracy, and (4) the so-called aristocracy or government of the best. But there is also a fifth, which retains the generic name of polity or constitutional government; this is not common, and therefore has not been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the different kinds of government; like Plato, in their books about the state, they recognize four only. The term 'aristocracy' is rightly applied to the form of government which is described in the first part of our treatise; for that only can be rightly called aristocracy which is a government formed of the best men absolutely, and not merely of men who are good when tried by any given standard. In the perfect state the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government. But there are some states differing from oligarchies and also differing from the so-called polity or constitutional government; these are termed aristocracies, and in them the magistrates are certainly chosen, both according to their wealth and according to their merit. Such a form of government differs from each of the two just now mentioned, and is termed an aristocracy. For indeed in states which do not make virtue the aim of the community, men of merit and reputation for virtue may be found. And so where a government has regard to wealth, virtue, and numbers, as at Carthage, that is aristocracy; and also where it has regard only to two out of the three, as at Lacedaemon, to virtue and numbers, and the two principles of democracy and virtue temper each other. There are these two forms of aristocracy in addition to the first and perfect state, and there is a third form, viz., the constitutions which incline more than the socalled polity towards oligarchy….

Polybius 6.11.11-6.18.3:

The Constitution of the Roman Republic

John Porter, translator

[Polybius here sets forth a general analysis of the Roman constitution at the time of the Second Punic War, c.200 BCE] [6.11.11] I have already mentioned the three divisions of government in control of state affairs. Regarding their respective roles, everything was so equally and fittingly set out and administered, in all respects, that no one, not even any of the Romans themselves, could say for certain whether their system of government was aristocratic in its general nature, or democratic, or monarchical. And this uncertainty is only reasonable, for if we were to focus on the powers of the consuls it would appear to be altogether monarchical and kingly in nature. If, however, we were to focus on the powers of the Senate, it would appear to be a government under the control of an aristocracy. And yet if one were to look at the powers enjoyed by the People, it would seem plain that it was democratic in nature. As for the parts of government controlled by each element, they were at that time and (with a few exceptions) still are as follows: [6.12.1] The consuls, when in Rome prior to leading out their legions, are in charge of all public affairs. For all of the other public officials, with the exception of the tribunes, are below the consuls and subject to their authority, and it is the consuls who introduce ambassadors to the Senate. In addition to the powers just mentioned, the consuls introduce to the Senate urgent matters for its consideration and bring about the detailed implementation of its decrees. Moreover, it is the consuls' duty to consider all matters of public concern which are to be decided by the People: they summon the assemblies, introduce measures requiring a vote, and have authority over the execution of the decisions of the majority. Furthermore, they enjoy nearly autocratic powers as regards preparations for war and the general conduct of military affairs in the field. It is within their power to give whatever commands to the allies that they think right, to appoint military tribunes, to levy soldiers, and to choose those fit for military service. When in the field they also have authority to punish any of those under their command whom they wish. And they have the power to dispense whatever public funds they might propose, a quaestor being appointed to accompany them and carry out their orders in such matters. As a result, one might reasonably say, if one were to look at this section of the government, that the Roman constitution was a pure monarchy or kingship. ... [6.13.1] The Senate, first of all, has control of the treasury, for it has complete authority over all revenues and expenditures. For the quaestors are unable to disburse funds for any particular purpose without a decree from the Senate, the only exception being in the case of the consuls [see above]. The Senate is in charge of by far the most important and the greatest expenditure of public funds — that which the censors make every lustrum [i.e. every five years] for the repair and construction of public works: it is through the Senate that the funds are allocated to the censors. Similarly, whatever crimes committed in Italy require a public investigation — for example, treason, conspiracy, poisoning, assassination — these all fall under the jurisdiction of the Senate. In addition, if some private person or one of the communities in Italy requires legal settlement of a dispute or indeed the assessment of a penalty or aid or protection, all of these things lie in the Senate's care. And indeed, if it should be necessary to send an embassy to any people outside of Italy — either to effect a truce, or to call for aid, or to impose duties on them, or to accept their submission, or to declare war on them — the Senate makes provision for such things. In the same way, when embassies arrive in Rome, the Senate handles the question of how to deal with them and what reply is to be given them. Not one of the above matters is presented to the People for consideration. As a result, if one were in Rome when the consuls were not present, the constitution would appear altogether aristocratic in nature. This, indeed, is the firm conviction of many of the Greeks and likewise of many eastern kings, on account of the Senate's authority in nearly all dealings that these foreign peoples have with Rome. [6.14.1] After this who would not reasonably enquire as to just what sort of role is left in the Roman state for the People, and just what that role is, seeing that the authority of the Senate extends over the various jurisdictions that I have detailed — and over the greatest of all, that being revenues and expenditures — while the consuls in turn have absolute authority concerning preparations for war and operations in the field? But in fact there is a role left for the People as well, and a most weighty one. For the People alone amid the organs of state have jurisdiction over the conferring of rewards and punishments, these representing the sole bonds by which kingdoms and states and, in short, all human society are held together. ... The People often pass judgment, then, even where a financial penalty is concerned, whenever the punishment for a crime involves a substantial penalty, and especially when the accused have held high office. And the People alone pass judgment in capital cases. ... It is the People who grant offices to the deserving, the most noble prize for virtue in a state. They also have authority over the ratifying of laws and — the greatest of their powers — they deliberate and pass judgment concerning war and peace. Also, as for the various military alliances, truces, and other treaties, they approve the particulars of these, rendering them valid or rejecting them. The result is that, with a view to these powers, one might reasonably say that the People have the greatest role in the state, and that the constitution is democratic in nature.

[6.15.1] I have now indicated how the various functions of the state are divided among the different parts of the government. Now I will indicate how each can counteract the others, should it so wish, or work in harmony with them. Whenever the consul sets out with his forces, invested with the aforementioned powers, he appears to have absolute authority as regards the mission at hand, yet he requires the cooperation of both the People and the Senate, and without them he lacks sufficient power to bring his operation to a successful conclusion. For it is clear that supplies must always be sent to accompany his armies, but neither food nor clothing nor pay for the soldiers can be allocated without a decree of the Senate, with the result that the commander's plans are rendered ineffectual if the Senate chooses to be negligent or obstructionist. Furthermore, it lies with the Senate whether the commander's plans and designs ultimately come to fulfillment or not, since the Senate has the authority to send another commander out to supersede the old at the end of a year's time or to extend the command of the consul in the field [sc. as pro consule]. It also has the power to celebrate and thus increase the fame of the consul's achievements, or to belittle them and render them obscure. For the celebrations that they call triumphs, in which the spectacle of the general's achievements is brought strikingly before the eyes of the citizens, cannot be organized as is fitting — and at times cannot be held at all — unless the Senate should concur and should provide the requisite expenditures. As for the People, it is altogether necessary for the consuls to court their favor, even if they should happen to be quite far from Rome. For it is the People who reject or ratify truces and other treaties, as I have noted above. Of greatest weight is the fact that, upon laying aside their office, it is before the People that they must submit an account of their actions. The result is that it is in no way safe for the commanders to slight the Senate or the good will of the People. [6.16.1] The Senate, in turn, which enjoys so much authority, first of all must pay attention to the masses and court the favor of the People in matters of public concern. The most important and greatest enquiries into crimes against the state, and the penalties thereby adjudicated — those that involve the death sentence — cannot be carried out by it unless the People first ratify what it has proposed. The same is true of those things that concern the Senate itself: for if ever anyone introduces a law that would strip the Senate of some part of the powers accorded it by tradition, or would abolish their right of precedence in seating and other honors accorded senators, or, indeed, would effect a reduction in their livelihoods — the People have authority over all such matters, whether to pass them or not. Most important of all, if a single one of the tribunes interposes his veto, the Senate is unable to put into effect any of its resolutions; indeed, it cannot even convene or come together at all. And the tribunes are bound always to effect the will of the People and to be guided by their wishes. As a result of all of these factors, the Senate fears the masses and is ever mindful of the People. [6.17.1] Similarly, in turn, the People are subordinate to the Senate and must have regard for its wishes, both in public matters and private. Many projects are contracted out by the censors for the repair and construction of public works throughout all of Italy — so many that one could scarcely number them all — and also the rights to collect the revenues from many rivers, harbors, gardens, mines, lands — everything that falls under Roman control. All of the aforementioned are administered through the People, and nearly everyone, so to speak, has an interest in the contracts and the works derived therefrom. For some in fact purchase the grants of these contracts from the censors, others act as partners in such ventures, others provide sureties for the purchasers, and others still pledge their property to the public treasury for this purpose. But the Senate has authority over all of these procedures: it is able to grant extensions and, in the case of an unforeseen catastrophe, can lessen the contractor's liability, or can release him from his contract altogether should he prove unable to complete it. And there are in fact many ways in which the Senate either greatly harms or greatly benefits those who have charge of public works, for all of the aforementioned are referred to it. Most important, it is from the Senate that judges are appointed in most public and private suits that concern charges of any weight. As a result, everyone, being bound to the good will of the Senate and fearing the uncertainty of litigation, takes care with regard to obstructing or opposing its wishes. Similarly, as regards the initiatives of the consuls, the People are loathe to oppose them since all citizens, both privately and collectively, fall under their authority when in the field. [6.18.1] Such then are the powers of each of the parts of government both to oppose one another and to work in conjunction. In unison they are a match for any and all emergencies, the result being that it is impossible to find a constitution that is better constructed. For whenever some common external danger comes upon them and compels them to band together in counsel and in action, the power of their state becomes so great that nothing that is required is neglected, inasmuch as all compete without fail to devise some means of meeting the emergency, nor do they dally in reaching a decision until too late, but each, both communally and individually, work together to complete the task that lies before them. The result is that their unique form of constitution comes to be unconquerable and successfully achieves every goal upon which it resolves. M. Tullius Cicero: excerpts from On the Laws

Marcus Tullius Cicero was the eldest son of an equestrian, though not noble, family. He was born 105 B.C. and was beheaded by Antony's soldiers in 43 B.C. The path open for political honors to a "new man" [i.e., no one of whose family had held a magistracy in Rome] was through the law, and at twenty-six, after a thorough Greek and Latin education, Cicero pleaded his first case. The next year he successfully defended Publius Sextus Roscius against the favorite of Sulla, the dictator, and thought it best, during the rest of Sulla's dictatorship, to travel for his education and his health. At thirtytwo he was elected quaestor to Sicily, and because of his integrity while holding this magistracy, was soon afterwards chosen by the Sicilians to prosecute their former governor Verres for extortion. Cicero was curule aedile in 69 B.C., praetor urbanus in 66 B.C. In this year he supported Pompey for the eastern command, and the two never quite ceased to be friends. Cicero was consul in 63 B.C., and put down the conspiracy of Catiline. Sulla's constitution had been gradually changing since his death, and Cicero slowly came to side with the optimates as against the populares and to try to carry the equestrians with him. He might have been a member of the "First Triumvirate" but perhaps preferred the existing institutions to such highhanded measures. In 58 B.C. he was exiled through the efforts of the demagogue Publius Clodius, but was recalled the next year. When civil war broke out between Caesar and Pompey, Cicero tried to side with neither, but at length joined Pompey's army in Epirus. After the defeat of the latter at Pharsalus, Cicero, whom sickness had kept from the battle, returned to Italy and sought pardon of Caesar. When Caesar was assassinated four years later, Cicero saw visions of the old republican government revived once more, and delivered his fierce philippics against Antony; but upon the coalition of Octavius and Antony, was proscribed by Antony and killed by the latter's soldiers. Book II 4. Marcus: Let us, then, once more examine, before we come to the consideration of particular laws, what is the power and nature of law in general; lest, when we come to refer everything to it, we occasionally make mistakes from the employment of incorrect language, and show ourselves ignorant of the force of those terms which we ought to employ in the definition of laws. Quintus: This is a very necessary caution, and the proper method of seeking truth. Marcus: This, then, as it appears to me, has been the decision of the wisest philosophers---that law was neither a thing to be contrived by the genius of man, nor established by any decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle, which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong. Therefore, they called that aboriginal and supreme law the mind of God, enjoining or forbidding each separate thing in accordance with reason. On which account it is that this law, which the gods have bestowed upon the human race, is so justly applauded. For it is the reason and mind of a wise Being equally able to urge us to good or to deter us from evil. Quintus: You have, on more than one occasion, already touched on this topic. But before you come to treat of the laws of nations, I wish you would endeavor to explain the force and power of this divine and celestial law, lest the torrent of custom should overwhelm our understanding, and betray us into the vulgar method of expression. Marcus: From our childhood we have learned, my Quintus, to call such phrases as this "that a man appeals to justice, and goes to law," and many similar expressions "law," but, nevertheless, we should understand that these, and other similar commandments and prohibitions, have sufficient power to lead us on to virtuous actions and to call us away from vicious ones. Which power is not only far more ancient than any existence of states and people, but is coeval with God himself, who beholds and governs both heaven and earth. For it is impossible that the divine mind can exist in a state devoid of reason; and divine reason must necessarily be possessed of a power to determine what is virtuous and what is vicious. Nor, because it was nowhere written, that one man should maintain the pass of a bridge against the enemy's whole army, and that he should order the bridge behind him to be cut down, are we therefore to imagine that the valiant Cocles [i.e., Horatius] did not perform this great exploit agreeably to the laws of nature and the dictates of true bravery. Again, though in the reign of Tarquin there was no written law concerning adultery, it does not therefore follow that Sextus Tarquinius did not offend against the eternal law when he committed a rape on Lucretia, daughter of Tricipitius. For, even then he had the light of reason from the nature of things, that incites to good actions and dissuades from evil ones; and which does not begin for the first time to be a law when it is drawn up in writing, but from the first moment that it exists. And this existence of moral obligation is co-eternal with that of the divine mind. Therefore, the true and supreme law, whose commands and prohibitions are equally authoritative, is the right reason of the Sovereign Jupiter. 5. Quintus: I grant you, my brother, that whatever is just is also at all times the true law; nor can this true law either be originated or abrogated by the written forms in which decrees are drawn up.

Marcus: Therefore, as that Divine Mind, or reason, is the supreme law, so it exists in the mind of the sage, so far as it can be perfected in man. But with respect to civil laws, which are drawn up in various forms, and framed to meet the occasional requirements of the people, the name of law belongs to them not so much by right as by the favor of the people. For men prove by some such arguments as the following, that every law which deserves the name of a law, ought to be morally good and laudable. It is clear, say they, that laws were originally made for the security of the people, for the preservation of states, for the peace and happiness of society; and that they who first framed enactments of that kind, persuaded the people that they would write and publish such laws only as should conduce to the general morality and happiness, if they would receive and obey them. And then such regulations, being thus settled and sanctioned, they justly entitled Laws. From which we may reasonably conclude, that those who made unjustifiable and pernicious enactments for the people, acted in a manner contrary to their own promises and professions, and established anything rather than laws, properly so called, since it is evident that the very signification of the word "law" comprehends the whole essence and energy of justice and equity. I would, therefore, interrogate you on this point, my Quintus, as those philosophers are in the habit of doing. If a state wants something for the want of which it is reckoned no state at all, must not that something be something good? Quintus: A very great good. Marcus: And if a state has no law, is it not for that reason to be reckoned no state at all? Quintus: We must needs say so. Marcus: We must therefore reckon law among the very best things. Quintus: I entirely agree with you. Marcus: If, then, in the majority of nations, many pernicious and mischievous enactments are made, which have no more right to the name of law than the mutual engagement of robbers, are we bound to call them laws? For as we cannot call the recipes of ignorant and unskillful empirics, who give poisons instead of medicines, the prescriptions of a physician, so likewise we cannot call that the true law of a people, of whatever kind it may be, if it enjoins what is injurious, let the people receive it as they will. For law is the just distinction between right and wrong, made conformable to that most ancient nature of all, the original and principal regulator of all things, by which the laws of men should be measured, whether they punish the guilty or protect and preserve the innocent. 6. Quintus: I quite understand you, and think that no law but that of justice should either be proclaimed as one or enforced as one. Marcus: Then you regard as null and void the laws of Titius and Apuleius, because they are unjust. Quintus: Yes; and I would say the same of the laws of Livius. Marcus: You are right, and so much more the more, since a single vote of the senate would be sufficient to abrogate them in an instant. But that law of justice, the power of which I have explained, can never be abrogated. Certainly, if I could get you both to agree with me. But Plato, that wisest of all men, that most dignified of all philosophers, who was the first man who ever composed a treatise on a Commonwealth, and afterwards a separate one on Laws, induces me to follow his illustrious example, and to proclaim the praises of law, before I begin to recite its regulations. Such, likewise, was the practice of Zaleucus and Charondas, who wrote the laws which they gave their cities, not for the sake of study or amusement, but for the benefit of their country and their fellow-citizens. And imitating them, Plato considered that it was the property of law, to persuade in some instances, and not to compel everything by threats and violence. Quintus: What, do you venture to cite Zaleucus, when Timaeus denies that he ever existed ? Marcus: But Theophrastus, an author, in my opinion, quite as respectable, and as may think, much more so, corroborates my statement. His fellow-citizens, too, my clients, the Locrians, commemorate him; but whether he was a real man or not, is of no great consequence to our argument; we are only speaking according to tradition.

7. Let this, therefore, be a fundamental principle in all societies, that the gods are the supreme lords and governors of all things---that all events are directed by their influence, and wisdom, and Divine power; that they deserve very well of the race of mankind; and that they likewise know what sort of person every one really is; that they observe his actions, whether good or bad; that they take notice with what feelings and with what piety he attends to his religious duties, and that they are sure to make a difference between the good and the wicked. For when once our minds are confirmed in these views, it will not be difficult to inspire them with true and useful sentiments. For what can be more true than that no man should be so madly presumptuous as to believe that he has either reason or intelligence, while he does not believe that the heaven and the world possess them likewise, or to think that those things which he can scarcely comprehend by the greatest possible exertion of his intellect, are put in motion without the agency of reason? In truth, we can scarcely reckon him a man, whom neither the regular courses of the stars, nor the alterations of day and night, nor the temperature of the seasons, nor the productions that nature displays for his use and enjoyment, urge to gratitude towards heaven. And as those beings which are furnished with reason are incomparably superior to those which want it, and as we cannot say, without impiety, that anything is superior to the universal Nature, we must therefore confess that divine reason is contained within her. And who will dispute the utility of these sentiments, when he reflects how many cases of the greatest importance are decided by oaths; how much the sacred rites performed in making treaties tend to assure peace and tranquility; and what numbers of people the fear of divine punishment has reclaimed from a vicious course of life; and how sacred the social rights must be in a society where a firm persuasion obtains the immediate intervention of the immortal gods, both as witnesses and judges of our actions? Such is the "preamble of the law," to use the expression of Plato. …. let us therefore hear the terms of the law. 9. As to alliances, peace, war, truces, and the rights of ambassadors, let the two Fetiales be the appropriate judges, and let them determine all questions relating to military affairs. Let them report all prodigies and portents to the Etruscans and soothsayers, if the senate orders it; and let the chiefs of Etruria explain their system. Then will they learn what deities it behooves them to propitiate, and deprecate the fury of the thunderbolt against the object of its vengeance. Let there be no nocturnal sacrifices performed by women, except those which they offer according to custom on behalf of the people; and let none be initiated in the mysteries except by the usual forms consecrated to Ceres, according to the Grecian ceremonials. A crime which has been committed and cannot be expiated has been an act of impiety; as to the faults which can be expiated, let the public priests expiate them. Let men temper the public hilarity with song, and harp, and flute at the public games, as far as can be done without the games of the racecourse and the wrestling-matches, and let them unite these amusements with the honors of the gods. Let them retain whatever is best and purest in the ancient form of worship. Except the devotees of Cybele, to whom this privilege is allowed on certain days, let no one presume to levy rates for private emolument. Whoever purloins or robs any temple, or steals any property deposited in a temple, shall be accounted a parricide. The divine punishment of perjury is destruction---the human penalty is infamy. With regard to incest, let the chief priest sentence it to the extreme penalty of the law. Let not the impious man attempt to appease the gods by gifts and offerings. Let vows be carefully performed. Wherever law is violated let its punishments be executed. Let no private person presume to consecrate his land; and let his consecration of gold, silver, and ivory, be made within the limits of moderation. Let the sacred actions of private persons be preserved for ever. Let the rights of the deities of the dead be considered sacred. Let those who have passed into the world of souls be considered as deified! but let men diminish the unnecessary expense and sorrow which is lavished on them. 10. Atticus: You have managed to include a great deal of law in a very small compass; but it seems to me, that this class of religious maxims does not much differ from the Laws of Numa and our national regulations.

Marcus: Do you suppose, then, that when, in my Treatise on the Commonwealth, Scipio appears to be arguing that our ancient Roman Commonwealth was the best of all republics, it was not indispensable that I should give laws of corresponding excellence to that best of all republics? Atticus: Undoubtedly I think you should. Marcus: Well, then, you may expect such laws as may embrace that most perfect kind of republic. And if any others should haply be demanded of me this day, which are not to be found, and never have existed, in our Roman Commonwealth, yet even these formed a portion of the customs of our ancestors, which at that time were maintained as religiously as the laws themselves. Book III. 1. Marcus: I shall, therefore, imitate that divine man, Plato… …You see, then, that this is the duty of magistrates, to superintend and prescribe all things which are just and useful, and in accordance with the law. For as the law is set over the magistrate, even so are the magistrates set over the people. And, therefore, it may be truly said "that the magistrate is a speaking law, and the law is a silent magistrate." Moreover, nothing is so conformable to justice and to the condition of nature (and when I use that expression, I wish it to be understood that I mean the law, and nothing else) as sovereign power; without which, neither house, nor commonwealth, nor nation, nor mankind itself, nor the entire nature of things, nor the universe itself, could exist. For this universe is obedient to God, and land and sea are submissive to the universe; and human life depends on the just administration of the laws of the universe; and human life depends on the just administration of the laws of order. 2. But to come to considerations nearer home, and more familiar to us, all ancient nations have been at one time or other under the dominion of kings. Which kind of authority was at first conferred on the wisest and justest of men (and this rule mainly prevailed in our own commonwealth, as long as the regal power lasted). Afterward, the authority of kings was handed down in succession to their descendants, and this practice remains to this day in those which are governed by kings. And even those to whom the regal domination was distasteful, did not desire to be obedient to no one, but only to be always under the authority of the same person. For ourselves, then, as we are proposing laws for a free people, and we have already set forth in six books all our own opinions about the best kind of commonwealth, we shall on the present occasion endeavor to accommodate our laws to that constitutional government of which we have expressed our approval. It is clear, then, that magistrates are absolutely necessary; since, without their prudence and diligence, a state cannot exist; and since it is by their regulations that the whole commonwealth is kept within the bounds of moderation. But it is not enough to prescribe them a rule of domination, unless we likewise prescribe the citizens a rule of obedience. For he who commands well, must at some time or other have obeyed; and he who obeys with modesty appears worthy of some day or other being allowed to command. It is desirable, therefore, that he who obeys should expect that some day he will come to command, and that he who commands should bear in mind that ere long he may be called to the duty of submission. We would not, however, limit ourselves to requiring from the citizens submission and obedience towards their magistrates; we would also enjoin them by all means to honor and love their rulers, as Charondas prescribes in his code. Our Plato likewise declares that they are of the race of the Titans, who, as they rebelled against the heavenly deities, do in like manner oppose their magistrates. These points being granted, we will, if you please, advance to the examination of the laws themselves. Atticus: I certainly do please, and the arrangement seems advisable. 3. Marcus: Let all authorities be just, and let them be honestly obeyed by the people with modesty and without opposition. Let the magistrate restrain the disobedient and mischievous citizen, by fine, imprisonment, and corporal chastisement; unless some equal or greater power, or the people forbid it; for there should be an appeal thereto. If the magistrate shall have decided, and inflicted a penalty, let there be a public appeal to the people respecting the penalty and fine imposed. With respect to the army, and the general that commands it by martial law, there should be no appeal from his authority. And whatever he who conducts the war commands, shall be absolute law, and ratified as such.

As to the minor magistrates, let there be such a distribution of their legal duties, that each may more effectively superintend his own department of justice. In the army let those who are appointed command, and let them have tribunes. In the city, let men be appointed as superintendents of the public treasury. Let some devote their attention to the prison discipline, and capital punishments. Let others supervise the public coinage of gold, and silver, and copper. Let others judge suits and arbitrations; and let others carry the orders of the senate into execution. Let there likewise be aediles, curators of the city, the provisions, and the public games, and let these offices be the first steps to higher promotions of honor. Let the censors take a census of the people, according to age, offspring, family, and property. Let them have the inspection of the temples, the streets, the aqueducts, the rates, and the customs. Let them distribute the citizens, according to their tribes; after that let them divide them with reference to their fortunes, ages, and ranks. Let them keep a register of the families of those of the equestrian and plebeian orders. Let them impose a tax on celibates. Let them guard the morals of the people. Let them permit no scandal in the senate. Let the number of such censors be two. Let their magistracy continue five years. Let the other magistrates be annual, but their offices themselves should be perpetual. Let the judge of the law who shall decide private actions, or send them for decision to the praetor---let him be the proper guardian of civil jurisprudence. Let him have as many colleagues of equal power, as the senate think necessary, and the people allows him. Let two magistrates be invested with sovereign authority; from their presiding, judging, and counseling, let them be called praetors, judges, or consuls. Let them have supreme authority over the army, and let them be subject to none; for the safety of the people is the supreme law; and no one should succeed to this magistracy till it has been held ten years---regulating the duration by an annual law. When a considerable war is undertaken, or discord is likely to ensue among the citizens, let a single supreme magistrate be appointed, who shall unite in his own person the authority of both consuls, if the senate so decrees, for six months only. And when such a magistrate has been proclaimed under favorable auspices, let him be the master of the people. Let him have for a colleague, with equal powers with himself, a knight whomsoever he may choose to appoint, as judge of the law. And when such a dictator or master of the people is created the other magistrates shall be suppressed. Let the auspices be observed by the senate, and let them authorize persons of their body to elect the consuls in the Comitia, according to the established ceremonials. Let the commanders, generals, and lieutenants, leave the city whenever the senate decrees or the people orders that they shall do so. Let them properly prosecute all just wars. Let them spare our allies, and restrain themselves and their subordinates. Let them increase the glory of our country. Let them return home with honor. Let no one be made an ambassador with a view to his own interest. Let the ten officers whom the people elect to protect them against oppression be their tribunes; and let all their prohibitions and adjudications be established, and their persons considered inviolable, so that tribunes may never be wanting to the people. Let all magistrates possess their auspices and jurisdictions, and let the senate be composed of these legitimate authorities. Let its ordinances be absolute, and let its enactments be written and ratified, unless an equal or greater authority disannul them. Let the order of the senators be free from reproach and scandal, and let them be an example of virtue to all. In the creation of magistrates, the judgment of the accused, and the reception or rejection of laws, when suffrages are employed, let the suffrages be at once notorious to the nobles, and free to the people. 4. If any question occur out of the established jurisdiction of the magistrates, let another magistrate be appointed by the people, whose jurisdiction shall expressly extend thereto. Let the consul, the praetor, the censor, the master of the people and of the equites, and he to whom the senate has committed the election of consuls, have full liberty to treat both with the senate and the people, and endeavor to reconcile the interests of all parties. Let the tribunes of the people likewise have free access to the senate, and advocate the interests of the people in all their deliberations. Let a just moderation predominate in the opinions and declarations of those who would thus act as mediators between the senate and the people. Let a senator who does not attend the senate, either show cause of his non-attendance, or

submit to an appropriate fine. Let a senator speak in his turn, with all moderation, and let him be thoroughly acquainted with the interests of the people. By all means avoid violence among the people. Let the greatest authority have the greatest weight in decisions. If any one shall disturb the public harmony, and foment party quarrels, let him be punished as a criminal. To act the intercessor in cases of offence should be considered the part of a good citizen. Let those who act observe the auspices; obey the public augur, and carry into effect all proclamations, taking care that they are exhibited in the treasury and generally known. Let the public consultations be concentrated in one point at a time, let them instruct the people in the nature of the question, and let all the magistrates and the people be permitted to advise on the subject. Let them permit no monopolies, or privileges. With respect to the capital punishment of any citizen, let it not take place, unless by the adjudication of the high courts of justice, and the ministry of those whom the censors have placed over the popular orders. Let no bribes be given or received, either in soliciting, discharging, or resigning an official situation. If any one infringe any of these laws, let him be liable to penalty. Let these regulations be committed to the charge of the censors. Let public officers, on their retiring from their posts, gives the censors an account of their conduct, but let them not by this means escape from legal prosecution if they have been guilty of corruption. I have here recited the whole law; now, consider the question, and give your votes. 5. Quintus: With what conciseness, my brother, have you brought before our eyes the duties and offices of all magistrates! But your system of laws is almost that of our own commonwealth, although a little that is new has also been added by you. Marcus: Your observation is very just, my Quintus, for this is the very system of a commonwealth which Scipio eulogizes in my treatise, and which he mainly approves---and which cannot be kept in operation but by a successive order of magistrates, such as we have described. For you may take it for granted that it is the establishment of magistrates that gives its form to a commonwealth, and it is exactly by their distribution and subordination that we must determine the nature of the constitution. Which establishment being very wisely and discretely settled by our ancestors, there is nothing, or at all events very little alteration that I think necessary in the laws. Source: From: Oliver J. Thatcher, ed., The Library of Original Sources (Milwaukee: University Research Extension Co., 1907), Vol. III: The Roman World, pp. 216-241.

Augustine of Hippo: On Grace and Free Will (CE 426-427) Let us, however, read, and by the Lord’s help understand, what the apostle tells us: “Because by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in His sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin.” (Rom 3:20) Observe, he says “the knowledge,” not “the destruction,” of sin. But when a man knows sin, and grace does not help him to avoid what he knows, undoubtedly the law works wrath. And this the apostle explicitly says in another passage. His words are: “The law works wrath.” (Rom 4:15) The reason of this statement lies in the fact that God’s wrath is greater in the case of the transgressor who by the law knows sin, and yet commits it; such a man is thus a transgressor of the law, even as the apostle says in another sentence, “For where no law is, there is no transgression.” (Rom 4:15) It is in accordance with this principle that he elsewhere says, “That we may serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter;” (Rom 7:6) wishing the law to be here understood by “the oldness of the letter,” and what else by “newness of spirit” than grace?(chapter 22) Here Augustine, around the age of seventy, explains that the law does not destroy sin, but only provides the knowledge of sin. Without grace, therefore, the law works wrath, because it increases the transgression, by making those who violate it more culpable, because where there is no law there is no transgression. But we who have received grace serve in newness of spirit, because by the infusion of grace and agape our spirit has been made to share in the life of God. As many, therefore, as are led by their own spirit, trusting in their own virtue, with the addition merely of the law’s assistance, without the help of grace, are not the sons of God. Such are they of whom the same apostle speaks as “being ignorant of God’s righteousness, and wishing to establish their own righteousness, who have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God.” (Rom 10:3) He said this of the Jews, who in their self-assumption rejected grace, and therefore did not believe in Christ. Their own righteousness, indeed, he says, they wish to establish; and this righteousness is of the law, — not that the law was established by themselves, but that they had constituted their righteousness in the law which is of God, when they supposed themselves able to fulfil that law by their own strength, ignorant of God’s righteousness — not indeed that by which God is Himself righteous, but that which man has from God. (chapter 24) Who are those “under the law”? They are those who trust in their own virtue or power to keep the law, and so seek to establish a righteousness of their own. Augustine explains that Paul was referring to those Jews who had not believed in the messiah. Augustine continues: And that you may know that he designated as theirs the righteousness which is of the law, and as God’s that which man receives from God, hear what he says in another passage, when speaking of Christ: “For whose sake I counted all things not only as loss, but I deemed them to be dung, that I might win Christ, and be found in Him — not having my own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, which is of God.” (Philippians 3:8-9) Now what does he mean by “not having my own righteousness, which is of the law,” when the law is really not his at all, but God’s, — except this, that he called it his own righteousness, although it was of the law, because he thought he could fulfil the law by his own will, without the aid of grace which is through faith in Christ? Wherefore, after saying, “Not having my own righteousness, which is of the law,” he immediately subjoined, “But that which is through the faith of Christ, which is of God.” This is what they were ignorant of, of whom he says, “Being ignorant of God’s righteousness,” — that is, the righteousness which is of God (for it is given not by the letter, which kills, but by the life-giving Spirit), “and wishing to establish their own righteousness,” which he expressly described as the righteousness of the law, when he said, “Not having my own righteousness, which is of the law;” they were not subject to the righteousness of God — in other words, they submitted not themselves to the grace of God. For they were under the law, not under grace, and therefore sin had dominion over them, from which a man is not freed by the law, but by grace. On which account he elsewhere says, “For sin shall not have dominion over you; because you are not under the law, but under grace.” (Rom 6:14) Not that the law is evil; but because they are under its power, whom it makes guilty by imposing commandments, not by aiding. It is by grace that any one is a doer of the law; and without this grace, he who is placed under the law will be only a hearer of the law. To such persons he addresses these words: “You who are justified by the law are fallen from grace.” (Gal 5:4) (chapter 24) Here Augustine explains what Paul means in saying speaking of his “own righteousness, which is of the law.” The righteousness which is by faith is not given by the letter of the law, but given by the Spirit, through the sacraments. But the righteousness which comes from ourselves is not subject to that righteousness. That is, in pride it resists and rejects that righteousness, because it does not wish to humble itself, and admits its entire worthlessness. Law-keeping without grace is a righteousness of our own that Paul describes as σκατά, ‘skata’, literally ‘shit’. Without grace, sin has dominion over us, and so we are in bondage to the law. But by the infusion of grace and agape into our hearts, we are able to keep the law, and no longer powerless to keep from breaking the law. Those persons are under the power of

the law, says Augustine, who by the law know what is required of them, but have not been given the power to keep the law. Grace aids us internally, so that we become doers of the law, not just hearers. Without grace, anyone who is placed under the law will be only a hearer of the law, not a doer of the law.

Thomas Aquinas on Law Late in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas turns to the problem of law. His treatment of the subject shows the coherence of Thomas' thought and his confidence in the ability of reason to guide us in making ethical decisions. The sections are reproduced here in streamlined form, with only the responsio sections included and with some articles omitted entirely. Whether law is something pertaining to reason Law is a rule and measure of actions through which one is induced to act or restrained from acting. Lex, "law," is derived from ligare, "to bind," because it binds one to act. The rule and measure of human activity is reason, however, for it is the first principle of human acts. Indeed, it is the function of reason to order to an end, and that is the first principle of all activity according to Aristotle. That which is the first principle in any genus is the rule and measure of that genus, e.g., unity in the genus of number or first movement in the genus of movement. Thus it follows that law is something pertaining to reason. Whether law is always ordered to the common good Law pertains to that which is the principle of human acts because it is a rule and measure. Just as reason is the principle of human acts, however, there is something in reason which is principle of all the rest. It is to this that law principally and mostly pertains. The first principle in activity, the sphere of practical reason, is the final end. The final end of human life is happiness or beatitude. Thus law necessarily concerns itself primarily with the order directing us toward beatitude. Furthermore, since each part is ordered to the whole as imperfect to perfect, and since each single man is a part of the perfect community, law necessarily concerns itself particularly with communal happiness. Thus Aristotle, in defining legal matters, mentions both happiness and the political community, saying, "We term 'just' those legal acts which produce and preserve happiness and its components within the political community." For the state is a perfect community, as he says in his Politics. In any genus, that which is called "most of all" is the principal of everything else in that genus, and everything else fits into the genus insofar as it is ordered to that thing. For example, fire, the hottest thing, is cause of heat in mixed bodies, which are said to be hot insofar as they share in fire. Thus, since law is called "most of all" in relation to the common good, no precept concerning action has the nature of law unless it is ordered to the common good. Whether anyone can make laws Law principally and properly seeks the common good. Planning for the common good is the task of the whole people or of someone ruling in the person of the whole people. Thus lawmaking is the task of the whole charge of the whole people; for in all other matters direction toward an end is the function of him to whom the end belongs. Whether promulgation is an essential part of law Law is imposed on others as a rule and measure. A rule and measure is imposed by being applied to those who are ruled and measured. Thus in order for a law to have binding power - and this is an essential part of law - it must be applied to those who ought to be ruled by it. Such application comes about when the law is made known to those people through promulgation. Thus such promulgation is necessary if a law is to have binding force. Thus from the four preceding articles we arrive at a definition of law: Law is nothing other than a certain ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community. Whether it was useful for human laws to be made by man There is a certain aptitude for virtue in man, but the perfection of that virtue must be achieved through training. In the same way we see that industry aids man in achieving necessities like food and clothing; for he has the beginnings of these things from nature - that is, nature gives him reason and a pair of hands - but not the complete product, as is the case with other animals to whom natures gives food and clothing. It is hard for a single man to gain such training by himself, for the perfection of virtue consists in withdrawing from undue pleasures, to which men are particularly prone. This is particularly true of the young, who are also more easily trained. Thus the training through which men come to virtue needs to be received from someone else.

In the case of those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue by natural disposition, by habit, or by divine gift, paternal discipline in the form of friendly reminders will be sufficient. Nevertheless, since some are not easily moved by words because they are depraved and inclined to vice, it is necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, so that they will at least stop their evil-doing and leave others in peace, or perhaps eventually, by force of habit, be brought to do willingly what they formerly did through fear, thus becoming virtuous. This kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the training of laws. Thus it was necessary for peace and virtue that there be laws. As Aristotle says, "If man is perfected by virtue, he is the best animal. If he is separated from law and justice, he is the worst." Such is the case because man can use the weapons of reason, which other animals lack, to satisfy his lust and rage. Whether it is the business of human law to restrain all vice Law is established as a certain rule or measure of human actions. A measure ought to be of the same type as the thing measured, as Aristotle observes, for different things have different standards, Thus laws should be imposed on men: according to their condition, because, as Isidore says, "Law should be possible according to the customs of the land." The power or possibility of action springs from an internal habit or disposition. Actions that are possible to a virtuous man are not possible to him who lacks the habit of virtue, any more than a boy can do all that a grown man can do. Thus the same law is not imposed on adults and children alike, and many things permitted to children are punished or at least blamed when performed by adults. Similarly, many things are permitted to men imperfect in virtue which would not be tolerated in more virtuous men. Human law is imposed on the multitude, a part of which is composed of men imperfect in virtue. Thus all the vices from which the virtuous abstain are not punished by human law, but only the more grievous ones which most people can avoid, and especially those which can hurt others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be preserved. Thus homicide, theft and the like are prohibited by human law. Whether human law prescribes all virtuous acts Virtues are differentiated according to their objects. These objects all involve either the private good of an individual or the common good of the multitude. Thus an act of courage may be performed to preserve one's city or to preserve the rights of a friend. It is the same with other virtues. Law, however, is ordered to the common good. Thus there is no virtue the acts of which cannot be prescribed by law. Nevertheless, law does not prescribe every act of every virtue, but only those which are ordained to the common good, either immediately as when things are done directly for the common good, or mediately as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to good discipline through which the citizens will be trained to preserve peace and justice. Whether human law binds a man's conscience Human laws are either just or unjust. If they are just, they have the power to bind our conscience because of the eternal law from which they are derived. As Proverbs says, "Through me kings reign and lawmakers decree just laws" (Prov. 8:15). Laws are said to be just either because of their end, when they are ordained to the common good; or because of their author, when the law does not exceed the power of the lawmaker; or because of their form, when burdens are distributed equitably among subjects for the common good. For since a man is part of the multitude, whatever he is or has belongs to the multitude as a part belongs to the whole. Thus nature inflicts harm on a part in order to save the whole. Accordingly laws which inflict burdens equitably are just, bind the conscience, and are legal laws. Laws are unjust in two ways: First, they may be such because they oppose human good by denying the three criteria just mentioned. This can occur because of their end, when a ruler imposes burdens with an eye, not to the common good, but to his own enrichment or glory; because of their author, when someone imposes laws beyond the scope of his authority; or because of their form, when burdens are inequitably distributed, even if they are ordered to the common good. Such decrees are not so much laws as acts of violence, because, as Augustine says, "An unjust law does not seem to be a law at all." Such laws do not bind the conscience, except perhaps to avoid scandal or disturbance, on account of which one should yield his right. As Christ says, "If someone forces you to go a mile, go another two with him; and if he takes your tunic, give him your pallium" (Mtt. 5:40f.).

Second, laws may be unjust because they are opposed to the divine good, as when the laws of tyrants lead men to idolatry or to something else contrary to divine law. Such laws must never be observed, because "one must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). Whether someone subject to the law can act outside the letter of the law All law is ordered to the common well-being of men and gains the force of law from precisely that fact. To the degree that it fails in accomplishing this end, it loses its binding force. Thus the Jurist says, "No reason of law or advantage of equity allows us to interpret harshly and render burdensome those healthy measures which were originally enacted for man s welfare." It often happens that a law aimed at the general welfare is useful in most cases and yet on occasion is very harmful. Because a legislator cannot foresee all possible individual cases, he promulgates a law which fits the majority of cases, having the common good in mind. If a case emerges in which the law is harmful to the common good, it should not be observed. For example, if a law says that the gates of a certain besieged city should remain closed, such a law is beneficial to the city in most cases; yet if the enemy is pursuing some of the very citizens by whom the city is defended, refusal to open the gates and let them in would be harmful to the city. In such cases, the gates should be opened despite the letter of the law, in order to attain the common good intended by the legislator. Note, though, that if obedience to the letter of the law involves no immediate danger calling for instant remedy, not everyone is competent to decide what is good or bad for the city, but only the leaders, who have authority to dispense with the law in such cases. If it is indeed a matter of immediate danger allowing no time to consult a superior, such necessity carries its own dispensation, for necessity knows no law. Whether human law should be changed in any way Human law is a dictate of reason by which human actions are directed. Thus change in law has a twofold source: One on the part of reason, the other on the part of the men whose actions are regulated by law. On the part of reason, it can be changed because it seems natural for human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Thus we see in the speculative sciences that the early philosophers produced imperfect teachings which were later improved by their successors. So also in the practical realm, those who first tried to discover what was beneficial for human community, being unable to think everything through by themselves, created imperfect situations which were lacking in many ways. These institutions were then altered by subsequent lawmakers, producing institutions which departed from the common good in fewer instances. On the part of the men whose activities are regulated by law, a law is rightly changed when there is a change in the conditions of men, for different things are expedient in accordance with different conditions. Augustine offers the following example: "If the people are moderate, responsible, and careful guardians of the common good, it is proper to enact a law allowing them to choose magistrates through whom the commonwealth can be administered. If, however, in time the people become corrupted and sell their votes, entrusting the government to scoundrels and criminals, they forfeit their power to elect public officials and the right devolves upon a few good men. Whether human law should always be changed when something better is possible It is right to change human law if such a change is conducive to the common good. Nevertheless, the very act of changing a law damages the common good to some extent, because custom encourages people to observe the law. Even minor changes seem to be major when they involve a breach of custom. Thus when a law is changed its binding force is diminished insofar as custom is abolished. For this reason, human law should never be changed unless the advantage to the common good resulting from its alteration outweighs the damage done by the change itself. Such may be the case if some great and evident benefit is derived from the new law, or if some extreme emergency is occasioned by the fact that the existing law is clearly unjust or its observance extremely harmful new laws the benefit to be derived should be evident before one dispenses with a law that was long considered just. Translation by David Burr .

Marsiligio of Padua: Conclusions from Defensor Pacis, 1324 Defensor Pacis is a treatise on politics written by Marsilius or Marsiglio, a canon of the church of Padua, in 1324. His authority is the Politics of Aristotle, which Marsilius knew from a Latin summary current in the Middle Age. From this as a basis he constructs a political theory and tests the existing institutions by it. The work is divided into three parts; the first two form a diffuse essay, and the last is a summary of his arguments in the form of forty-two conclusiones, which are translated here, because they give in a concise form the essential points of his theory. As regards the political situation of his own time, the general tendency of the treatise is imperial and anti-papal; it was used by Ludwig IV in his conflict with the Avignon popes. Hence it was regarded by the bull of John XXII, 1327, as heretical. His views n the origin and nature of the state are Aristotelian: the state is a perfected community existing for the good of the people; the supreme power resides in the body of the citizens, who make the laws, and choose the form of government, etc. The prince rules by the authority of the whole body of citizens. To this body Marsilius gives the name legislator. The elective monarchy is the form of government preferred by Marsilius, whose ideal state thus corresponds in theory with the holy Roman empire. His views on the relation of the state and the church are that the supreme institution is the state which has established the priesthood or the church to look after the spiritual welfare of its citizens. Hence the state has the right to control the church, but the church has not the corresponding right to control the state. Conclusions 1. The one divine canonical Scripture, the conclusions that necessarily follow from it, and the interpretation placed upon it by the common consent of Christians, are true, and belief in them is necessary to the salvation of those to whom they are made known. 2. The general council of Christians or its majority alone has the authority to define doubtful passages of the divine law, and to determine those that are to be regarded as articles of the Christian faith, belief in which is essential to salvation; and no partial council or single person of any position has the authority to decide these questions. 3. The gospels teach that no temporal punishment or penalty should be used to compel observance of divine commandments. 4. It is necessary to salvation to obey the commandments of the new divine law [the New Testament] and the conclusions that follow necessarily from it and the precepts of reason; but it is not necessary to salvation to obey all the commandments of the ancient law [the Old Testament]. 5. No mortal has the right to dispense with the commands or prohibitions of the new divine law; but the general council and the Christian "legislator" I alone have the right prohibit things which are permitted by the new law, under penalties in this world or the next, and no partial council or single person of any position has that right. [Note: In regard to the "legislator," Marsilius cites Aristotle as follows: 'The legislator or the effective cause of the law is the people, the whole body of the citizens, or the majority of that body, expressing its will and choice in a general meeting of the citizens, and commanding or deciding that certain things shall be done or left undone, under threat of temporal penalty or punishment."] 6. The whole body of citizens or its majority alone is the human "legislator." 7. Decretals and decrees of the bishop of Rome, or of any other bishops or body of bishops, have no power to coerce anyone by secular penalties or punishments, except by the authorization of the human "legislator." 8. The "legislator" alone or the one who rules by its authority has the power to dispense with human laws. 9. The elective principality or other office derives its authority from the election of the body having the right to elect, and not from the confirmation or approval of any other power. 10. The election of any prince or other official, especially ,,one who has the coercive power is determined solely by the ,,expressed will of the "legislator." [Note: "Coercive" or "coactive" power is the power, residing in the ruler or the officials of the state and derived from the "legislator," to compel observance of the laws or decrees of the state by force or threat of penalty. A coercive judgment is a judgment given by an official who has the power to enforce his decisions. Marsilius maintains that coercive power and coercive judgments are the prerogatives of the state and cannot be exercised by the church.] 11. There can be only one supreme ruling power in a state or kingdom. 12. The number and the qualifications of persons who hold state offices and all civil matters are to be determined solely by the Christian ruler according to the law or approved custom [of the state]. 13. No prince, still more, no partial council or single person of any position, has full authority and control over other persons, laymen or clergy, without the authorization of the "legislator. 14. No bishop or priest has coercive authority or jurisdiction over any layman or clergyman, even if he is a heretic. 15. The prince who rules by the authority of the "legislator" has jurisdiction over the persons and possessions of every single mortal of every station, whether lay or clerical, and over every body of laymen or clergy. 16. No bishop or priest or body of bishops or priests has the authority to excommunicate anyone or to interdict the performance of divine services, without the authorization of the "legislator."

17. All bishops derive their authority in equal measure immediately from Christ, and it cannot be proved from the. divine law that one bishop should be over or under another, in temporal or spiritual matters. 18. The other bishops, singly or in a body, have the same right by divine authority to excommunicate or otherwise exercise authority over the bishop of Rome, having obtained the consent of the "legislator," as the bishop of Rome has to excommunicate or control them. 19. No mortal has the authority to permit marriages that are prohibited by the divine law, especially by the New Testament. The right to permit marriages which are prohibited by human law belongs solely to the "legislator" or to the one who rules by its authority. 20. The right to legitimatize children born of illegitimate union so that they may receive inheritances, or other civil or ecclesiastical offices or benefits, belongs solely to the "legislator." 21. The "legislator" alone has the right to promote to ecclesiastical orders, and to judge of the qualifications of persons for these offices, by a coercive decision, and no priest or bishop has the right to promote anyone without its authority. 22. The prince who rules by the authority of the laws of Christians, has the right to determine the number of churches and temples, and the number of priests, deacons, and other clergy who shall serve in them. 23. "Separable" ecclesiastical offices may be conferred or taken away only by the authority of the "legislator"; the same e is true of ecclesiastical benefices and other property devoted to pious purposes. [Note: "Separable" offices of the clergy, according to Marsilius, are those functions commonly exercised by the clergy, which are not essentially bound up with their spiritual character. The terms essential and non-essential are used as synonymous respectively with inseparable and separable. The essential or inseparable powers of the clergy are "the power to bless the bread and wine, and turn them Into the blamed body and blood of Christ, to administer the other sacraments of the church, and to bind and to loose men from their sins." Non-essential or separable functions are the government or control of one priest over others (i.e., the offices of bishop, arch. bishop, etc.), the administration of the sacraments, etc., in a certain place and to a certain people, and the administration of temporal possessions of the church. In respect to their separable functions the clergy are under the control of the state.] 24. No bishop or body of bishops has the right to establish notaries or other civil officials. 25. No bishop or body of bishops may give permission to teach or practice in any profession or occupation, but this right belongs to the Christian "legislator" or to the one who rules by its authority. 26. In ecclesiastical offices and benefices those who have received consecration as deacons or priests, or have been otherwise irrevocably dedicated to God, should be preferred those who have not been thus consecrated. 27. The human "legislator" has the right to use ecclesiastical temporalities for the common public good and defence after the needs of the priests and clergy, the expenses of divine worship, and the necessities of the poor have been satisfied. 28. All properties established for pious purposes or for works of mercy, such as those that are left by will for the making of a crusade, the redeeming of captives, or the support of the poor, and similar purposes, may be disposed of by the prince alone according to the decision of the "legislator" and the purpose of the testator or giver. 29. The Christian "legislator" alone has the right to forbid or permit the establishment of religious orders or houses. 30. The prince alone, acting in accordance with the laws of the "legislator," has the authority to condemn heretics, delinquents, and all others who should endure temporal punishment, to inflict bodily punishment upon them, and to exact fines from them. 31. No subject who is bound to another by a legal oath may be released from his obligation by any bishop or priest, unless the "legislator" has decided by a coercive decision that there is just cause for it32. The general council of all Christians alone has the authority to create a metropolitan bishop or church, and to reduce him or it from that position. 33. The Christian "legislator" or the one who rules by its authority over Christian states, alone has the right to convoke either a general or local council of priests, bishops, and other Christians, by coercive power; and no man may be compelled by threats of temporal or spiritual punishment to obey the decrees of a council convoked in any other way. 34. The general council of Christians or the Christian "legislator" alone has the authority to ordain fasts and other prohibitions of the use of food; the council or "legislator" alone may prohibit the practice of mechanical arts or teaching which divine law permits to be practiced on any day, and the "legislator" or the one who rules by its authority alone may constrain men to obey the prohibition by temporal penalties. 35. The general council of Christians alone has the authority to canonize anyone or to order anyone to be adored as a saint. 36. The general council of Christians alone has the authority to forbid the marriage of priests, bishops, and other clergy, and to make other laws concerning ecclesiastical discipline, and that council or the one to whom it delegates its authority alone may dispense with these laws.

37. It is always permitted to appeal to the "legislator" from a coercive decision rendered by a bishop or priest with the authorization of the "legislator." 38. Those who are pledged to observe complete poverty may not have in their possession any immovable property, unless it be with the fixed intention of selling it as soon as possible and giving the money to the poor; they may not have such rights in either movable or immovable property as would enable them, for example, to recover them by a coercive decision from any person who should take or try to take them away. 39. The people as a community and as individuals, according to their several means, are required by divine law support the bishops and other clergy authorized by the gospel, so that they may have food and clothing and the other necessaries of life; but the people are not required to pay tithes or other taxes beyond the amount necessary for such support. 40. The Christian "legislator" or the one who rules by its authority has the right to compel bishops and other clergy ho live in the province under its control and whom it supplies with the necessities of life, to perform divine services and administer the sacrament. 41. The bishop of Rome and any other ecclesiastical or spiritual minister may be advanced to a "separable" ecclesiastical office only by the Christian "legislator" or the one who rules by its authority, or by the general council of Christians; and they may be suspended from or deprived of office by the same authority. from Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, Part III, ch. ii; in Goldet, Monarchia Sancti Romani Imperii, 11, pp. 309 ff. trans in Oliver J. Thatcher, and Edgar Holmes McNeal, eds., A Source Book for Medieval History, (New York: Scribners, 1905), pp. 317-324

The "Laws of Henry I": The Murder Fine There is some evidence that the French conquerors of England faced some resistence from the conquered population. 91. Concerning the payment of murder [fine.] If any Frenchman, or any Norman or, lastly, any man from beyond the sea is slain, and the affair turns out so calamitously that it is considered murder and the slayer is unknown and eventually flees, so that within seven days he is not handed over to the king's justice for the carrying out of whatever may be right, 46 m. of silver shall be paid--40 m. to the king and 6 m. to the relatives of the slain man. If the relative have no accusers or provers, these [6m.] shall go to him who does prove [who committed] the murder. Where, however, [the slain man] is found, there must investigation be made according to the law, and the aldermen of the hundred and [the lord] on whose land [the slain man] lies should give security that he will be paid for.... If the murder is discovered in a house or in a hall or in a close, when it comes to paying the aforesaid 46m., whatever is in that manor...shall first be sold... And if thereby the 46 m. are forthcoming, nothing is to be sought elsewhere, but if there is a deficiency, it is made up by the hundred in common. If, moreover, the manor in which the murder is discovered is of the king's demense farm, and if the king so orders, composition for it shall be made by the entire hundred. If the murder is discovered in fields that are open and generally accessible, [the money] shall be supplied by the whole hundred in common, and not merely by him to whom the land belongs. If it happens on the boundary. [the obligation] shall fall on both [hundreds]. If it is on the king's highway, compensation is to be paid by him who owns the adjacent land... 92. [The death of] an Englishman is not regarded or paid for as murder, but only [that of] a Frenchman; indeed, should there be no one to prove that the slain man is English, he is held to be French.... If a hundred wishes to prove concerning someone that he is not a Frenchman and that [accordingly] there is no murder, this obligation is to be entrusted to twelve of the better men from the same hundred, swearing [to that effect]...

Magna Carta Preamble: John, by the grace of God, king of England, lord of Ireland, duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, and count of Anjou, to the archbishop, bishops, abbots, earls, barons, justiciaries, foresters, sheriffs, stewards, servants, and to all his bailiffs and liege subjects, greetings. Know that, having regard to God and for the salvation of our soul, and those of all our ancestors and heirs, and unto the honor of God and the advancement of his holy Church and for the rectifying of our realm, we have granted as underwritten by advice of our venerable fathers, Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, primate of all England and cardinal of the holy Roman Church, Henry, archbishop of Dublin, William of London, Peter of Winchester, Jocelyn of Bath and Glastonbury, Hugh of Lincoln, Walter of Worcester, William of Coventry, Benedict of Rochester, bishops; of Master Pandulf, subdeacon and member of the household of our lord the Pope, of brother Aymeric (master of the Knights of the Temple in England), and of the illustrious men William Marshal, earl of Pembroke, William, earl of Salisbury, William, earl of Warenne, William, earl of Arundel, Alan of Galloway (constable of Scotland), Waren Fitz Gerold, Peter Fitz Herbert, Hubert De Burgh (seneschal of Poitou), Hugh de Neville, Matthew Fitz Herbert, Thomas Basset, Alan Basset, Philip d'Aubigny, Robert of Roppesley, John Marshal, John Fitz Hugh, and others, our liegemen. 1. In the first place we have granted to God, and by this our present charter confirmed for us and our heirs forever that the English Church shall be free, and shall have her rights entire, and her liberties inviolate; and we will that it be thus observed; which is apparent from this that the freedom of elections, which is reckoned most important and very essential to the English Church, we, of our pure and unconstrained will, did grant, and did by our charter confirm and did obtain the ratification of the same from our lord, Pope Innocent III, before the quarrel arose between us and our barons: and this we will observe, and our will is that it be observed in good faith by our heirs forever. We have also granted to all freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs forever, all the underwritten liberties, to be had and held by them and their heirs, of us and our heirs forever.

2. If any of our earls or barons, or others holding of us in chief by military service shall have died, and at the time of his death his heir shall be full of age and owe "relief", he shall have his inheritance by the old relief, to wit, the heir or heirs of an earl, for the whole barony of an earl by £100; the heir or heirs of a baron, £100 for a whole barony; the heir or heirs of a knight, 100s, at most, and whoever owes less let him give less, according to the ancient custom of fees. 3. If, however, the heir of any one of the aforesaid has been under age and in wardship, let him have his inheritance without relief and without fine when he comes of age. 4. The guardian of the land of an heir who is thus under age, shall take from the land of the heir nothing but reasonable produce, reasonable customs, and reasonable services, and that without destruction or waste of men or goods; and if we have committed the wardship of the lands of any such minor to the sheriff, or to any other who is responsible to us for its issues, and he has made destruction or waster of what he holds in wardship, we will take of him amends, and the land shall be committed to two lawful and discreet men of that fee, who shall be responsible for the issues to us or to him to whom we shall assign them; and if we have given or sold the wardship of any such land to anyone and he has therein made destruction or waste, he shall lose that wardship, and it shall be transferred to two lawful and discreet men of that fief, who shall be responsible to us in like manner as aforesaid. 5. The guardian, moreover, so long as he has the wardship of the land, shall keep up the houses, parks, fishponds, stanks, mills, and other things pertaining to the land, out of the issues of the same land; and he shall restore to the heir, when he has come to full age, all his land, stocked with ploughs and wainage, according as the season of husbandry shall require, and the issues of the land can reasonable bear. 6. Heirs shall be married without disparagement, yet so that before the marriage takes place the nearest in blood to that heir shall have notice. 7. A widow, after the death of her husband, shall forthwith and without difficulty have her marriage portion and inheritance; nor shall she give anything for her dower, or for her marriage portion, or for the inheritance which her husband and she held on the day of the death of that husband; and she may remain in the house of her husband for forty days after his death, within which time her dower shall be assigned to her. 8. No widow shall be compelled to marry, so long as she prefers to live without a husband; provided always that she gives security not to marry without our consent, if she holds of us, or without the consent of the lord of whom she holds, if she holds of another. 9. Neither we nor our bailiffs will seize any land or rent for any debt, as long as the chattels of the debtor are sufficient to repay the debt; nor shall the sureties of the debtor be distrained so long as the principal debtor is able to satisfy the debt; and if the principal debtor shall fail to pay the debt, having nothing wherewith to pay it, then the sureties shall answer for the debt; and let them have the lands and rents of the debtor, if they desire them, until they are indemnified for the debt which they have paid for him, unless the principal debtor can show proof that he is discharged thereof as against the said sureties. 10. If one who has borrowed from the Jews any sum, great or small, die before that loan be repaid, the debt shall not bear interest while the heir is under age, of whomsoever he may hold; and if the debt fall into our hands, we will not take anything except the principal sum contained in the bond. 11. And if anyone die indebted to the Jews, his wife shall have her dower and pay nothing of that debt; and if any children of the deceased are left under age, necessaries shall be provided for them in keeping with the holding of the deceased; and out of the residue the debt shall be paid, reserving, however, service due to feudal lords; in like manner let it be done touching debts due to others than Jews. 12. No scutage not aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common counsel of our kingdom, except for ransoming our person, for making our eldest son a knight, and for once marrying our eldest daughter; and for these there shall not be levied more than a reasonable aid. In like manner it shall be done concerning aids from the city of London.

13. And the city of London shall have all it ancient liberties and free customs, as well by land as by water; furthermore, we decree and grant that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall have all their liberties and free customs. 14. And for obtaining the common counsel of the kingdom anent the assessing of an aid (except in the three cases aforesaid) or of a scutage, we will cause to be summoned the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons, severally by our letters; and we will moveover cause to be summoned generally, through our sheriffs and bailiffs, and others who hold of us in chief, for a fixed date, namely, after the expiry of at least forty days, and at a fixed place; and in all letters of such summons we will specify the reason of the summons. And when the summons has thus been made, the business shall proceed on the day appointed, according to the counsel of such as are present, although not all who were summoned have come. 15. We will not for the future grant to anyone license to take an aid from his own free tenants, except to ransom his person, to make his eldest son a knight, and once to marry his eldest daughter; and on each of these occasions there shall be levied only a reasonable aid. 16. No one shall be distrained for performance of greater service for a knight's fee, or for any other free tenement, than is due therefrom. 17. Common pleas shall not follow our court, but shall be held in some fixed place. 18. Inquests of novel disseisin, of mort d'ancestor, and of darrein presentment shall not be held elsewhere than in their own county courts, and that in manner following; We, or, if we should be out of the realm, our chief justiciar, will send two justiciaries through every county four times a year, who shall alone with four knights of the county chosen by the county, hold the said assizes in the county court, on the day and in the place of meeting of that court. 19. And if any of the said assizes cannot be taken on the day of the county court, let there remain of the knights and freeholders, who were present at the county court on that day, as many as may be required for the efficient making of judgments, according as the business be more or less. 20. A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight offense, except in accordance with the degree of the offense; and for a grave offense he shall be amerced in accordance with the gravity of the offense, yet saving always his "contentment"; and a merchant in the same way, saving his "merchandise"; and a villein shall be amerced in the same way, saving his "wainage" if they have fallen into our mercy: and none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed except by the oath of honest men of the neighborhood. 21. Earls and barons shall not be amerced except through their peers, and only in accordance with the degree of the offense. 22. A clerk shall not be amerced in respect of his lay holding except after the manner of the others aforesaid; further, he shall not be amerced in accordance with the extent of his ecclesiastical benefice. 23. No village or individual shall be compelled to make bridges at river banks, except those who from of old were legally bound to do so. 24. No sheriff, constable, coroners, or others of our bailiffs, shall hold pleas of our Crown. 25. All counties, hundred, wapentakes, and trithings (except our demesne manors) shall remain at the old rents, and without any additional payment. 26. If anyone holding of us a lay fief shall die, and our sheriff or bailiff shall exhibit our letters patent of summons for a debt which the deceased owed us, it shall be lawful for our sheriff or bailiff to attach and enroll the chattels of the deceased, found upon the lay fief, to the value of that debt, at the sight of law worthy men, provided always that nothing whatever be thence removed until the debt which is evident shall be fully paid to us; and the residue shall be left to the

executors to fulfill the will of the deceased; and if there be nothing due from him to us, all the chattels shall go to the deceased, saving to his wife and children their reasonable shares. 27. If any freeman shall die intestate, his chattels shall be distributed by the hands of his nearest kinsfolk and friends, under supervision of the Church, saving to every one the debts which the deceased owed to him. 28. No constable or other bailiff of ours shall take corn or other provisions from anyone without immediately tendering money therefor, unless he can have postponement thereof by permission of the seller. 29. No constable shall compel any knight to give money in lieu of castle-guard, when he is willing to perform it in his own person, or (if he himself cannot do it from any reasonable cause) then by another responsible man. Further, if we have led or sent him upon military service, he shall be relieved from guard in proportion to the time during which he has been on service because of us. 30. No sheriff or bailiff of ours, or other person, shall take the horses or carts of any freeman for transport duty, against the will of the said freeman. 31. Neither we nor our bailiffs shall take, for our castles or for any other work of ours, wood which is not ours, against the will of the owner of that wood. 32. We will not retain beyond one year and one day, the lands those who have been convicted of felony, and the lands shall thereafter be handed over to the lords of the fiefs. 33. All kydells for the future shall be removed altogether from Thames and Medway, and throughout all England, except upon the seashore. 34. The writ which is called praecipe shall not for the future be issued to anyone, regarding any tenement whereby a freeman may lose his court. 35. Let there be one measure of wine throughout our whole realm; and one measure of ale; and one measure of corn, to wit, "the London quarter"; and one width of cloth (whether dyed, or russet, or "halberget"), to wit, two ells within the selvedges; of weights also let it be as of measures. 36. Nothing in future shall be given or taken for a writ of inquisition of life or limbs, but freely it shall be granted, and never denied. 37. If anyone holds of us by fee-farm, either by socage or by burage, or of any other land by knight's service, we will not (by reason of that fee-farm, socage, or burgage), have the wardship of the heir, or of such land of his as if of the fief of that other; nor shall we have wardship of that fee-farm, socage, or burgage, unless such fee-farm owes knight's service. We will not by reason of any small serjeancy which anyone may hold of us by the service of rendering to us knives, arrows, or the like, have wardship of his heir or of the land which he holds of another lord by knight's service. 38. No bailiff for the future shall, upon his own unsupported complaint, put anyone to his "law", without credible witnesses brought for this purposes. 39. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. 40. To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice. 41. All merchants shall have safe and secure exit from England, and entry to England, with the right to tarry there and to move about as well by land as by water, for buying and selling by the ancient and right customs, quit from all evil tolls, except (in time of war) such merchants as are of the land at war with us. And if such are found in our land at the beginning of the war, they shall be detained, without injury to their bodies or goods, until information be received by us,

or by our chief justiciar, how the merchants of our land found in the land at war with us are treated; and if our men are safe there, the others shall be safe in our land. 42. It shall be lawful in future for anyone (excepting always those imprisoned or outlawed in accordance with the law of the kingdom, and natives of any country at war with us, and merchants, who shall be treated as if above provided) to leave our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land and water, except for a short period in time of war, on grounds of public policy- reserving always the allegiance due to us. 43. If anyone holding of some escheat (such as the honor of Wallingford, Nottingham, Boulogne, Lancaster, or of other escheats which are in our hands and are baronies) shall die, his heir shall give no other relief, and perform no other service to us than he would have done to the baron if that barony had been in the baron's hand; and we shall hold it in the same manner in which the baron held it. 44. Men who dwell without the forest need not henceforth come before our justiciaries of the forest upon a general summons, unless they are in plea, or sureties of one or more, who are attached for the forest. 45. We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs only such as know the law of the realm and mean to observe it well. 46. All barons who have founded abbeys, concerning which they hold charters from the kings of England, or of which they have long continued possession, shall have the wardship of them, when vacant, as they ought to have. 47. All forests that have been made such in our time shall forthwith be disafforsted; and a similar course shall be followed with regard to river banks that have been placed "in defense" by us in our time. 48. All evil customs connected with forests and warrens, foresters and warreners, sheriffs and their officers, river banks and their wardens, shall immediately by inquired into in each county by twelve sworn knights of the same county chosen by the honest men of the same county, and shall, within forty days of the said inquest, be utterly abolished, so as never to be restored, provided always that we previously have intimation thereof, or our justiciar, if we should not be in England. 49. We will immediately restore all hostages and charters delivered to us by Englishmen, as sureties of the peace of faithful service. 50. We will entirely remove from their bailiwicks, the relations of Gerard of Athee (so that in future they shall have no bailiwick in England); namely, Engelard of Cigogne, Peter, Guy, and Andrew of Chanceaux, Guy of Cigogne, Geoffrey of Martigny with his brothers, Philip Mark with his brothers and his nephew Geoffrey, and the whole brood of the same. 51. As soon as peace is restored, we will banish from the kingdom all foreign born knights, crossbowmen, serjeants, and mercenary soldiers who have come with horses and arms to the kingdom's hurt. 52. If anyone has been dispossessed or removed by us, without the legal judgment of his peers, from his lands, castles, franchises, or from his right, we will immediately restore them to him; and if a dispute arise over this, then let it be decided by the five and twenty barons of whom mention is made below in the clause for securing the peace. Moreover, for all those possessions, from which anyone has, without the lawful judgment of his peers, been disseised or removed, by our father, King Henry, or by our brother, King Richard, and which we retain in our hand (or which as possessed by others, to whom we are bound to warrant them) we shall have respite until the usual term of crusaders; excepting those things about which a plea has been raised, or an inquest made by our order, before our taking of the cross; but as soon as we return from the expedition, we will immediately grant full justice therein. 53. We shall have, moreover, the same respite and in the same manner in rendering justice concerning the disafforestation or retention of those forests which Henry our father and Richard our broter afforested, and concerning the wardship of lands which are of the fief of another (namely, such wardships as we have hitherto had by reason of a fief which anyone held of us by knight's service), and concerning abbeys founded on other fiefs than our own, in which the lord of the fee

claims to have right; and when we have returned, or if we desist from our expedition, we will immediately grant full justice to all who complain of such things. 54. No one shall be arrested or imprisoned upon the appeal of a woman, for the death of any other than her husband. 55. All fines made with us unjustly and against the law of the land, and all amercements, imposed unjustly and against the law of the land, shall be entirely remitted, or else it shall be done concerning them according to the decision of the five and twenty barons whom mention is made below in the clause for securing the pease, or according to the judgment of the majority of the same, along with the aforesaid Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, if he can be present, and such others as he may wish to bring with him for this purpose, and if he cannot be present the business shall nevertheless proceed without him, provided always that if any one or more of the aforesaid five and twenty barons are in a similar suit, they shall be removed as far as concerns this particular judgment, others being substituted in their places after having been selected by the rest of the same five and twenty for this purpose only, and after having been sworn. 56. If we have disseised or removed Welshmen from lands or liberties, or other things, without the legal judgment of their peers in England or in Wales, they shall be immediately restored to them; and if a dispute arise over this, then let it be decided in the marches by the judgment of their peers; for the tenements in England according to the law of England, for tenements in Wales according to the law of Wales, and for tenements in the marches according to the law of the marches. Welshmen shall do the same to us and ours. 57. Further, for all those possessions from which any Welshman has, without the lawful judgment of his peers, been disseised or removed by King Henry our father, or King Richard our brother, and which we retain in our hand (or which are possessed by others, and which we ought to warrant), we will have respite until the usual term of crusaders; excepting those things about which a plea has been raised or an inquest made by our order before we took the cross; but as soon as we return (or if perchance we desist from our expedition), we will immediately grant full justice in accordance with the laws of the Welsh and in relation to the foresaid regions. 58. We will immediately give up the son of Llywelyn and all the hostages of Wales, and the charters delivered to us as security for the peace. 59. We will do towards Alexander, king of Scots, concerning the return of his sisters and his hostages, and concerning his franchises, and his right, in the same manner as we shall do towards our owher barons of England, unless it ought to be otherwise according to the charters which we hold from William his father, formerly king of Scots; and this shall be according to the judgment of his peers in our court. 60. Moreover, all these aforesaid customs and liberties, the observances of which we have granted in our kingdom as far as pertains to us towards our men, shall be observed b all of our kingdom, as well clergy as laymen, as far as pertains to them towards their men. 61. Since, moveover, for God and the amendment of our kingdom and for the better allaying of the quarrel that has arisen between us and our barons, we have granted all these concessions, desirous that they should enjoy them in complete and firm endurance forever, we give and grant to them the underwritten security, namely, that the barons choose five and twenty barons of the kingdom, whomsoever they will, who shall be bound with all their might, to observe and hold, and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties we have granted and confirmed to them by this our present Charter, so that if we, or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any one of our officers, shall in anything be at fault towards anyone, or shall have broken any one of the articles of this peace or of this security, and the offense be notified to four barons of the foresaid five and twenty, the said four barons shall repair to us (or our justiciar, if we are out of the realm) and, laying the transgression before us, petition to have that transgression redressed without delay. And if we shall not have corrected the transgression (or, in the event of our being out of the realm, if our justiciar shall not have corrected it) within forty days, reckoning from the time it has been intimated to us (or to our justiciar, if we should be out of the realm), the four barons aforesaid shall refer that matter to the rest of the five and twenty barons, and those five and twenty barons shall, together with the community of the whole realm, distrain and distress us in all possible ways, namely, by seizing our

castles, lands, possessions, and in any other way they can, until redress has been obtained as they deem fit, saving harmless our own person, and the persons of our queen and children; and when redress has been obtained, they shall resume their old relations towards us. And let whoever in the country desires it, swear to obey the orders of the said five and twenty barons for the execution of all the aforesaid matters, and along with them, to molest us to the utmost of his power; and we publicly and freely grant leave to everyone who wishes to swear, and we shall never forbid anyone to swear. All those, moveover, in the land who of themselves and of their own accord are unwilling to swear to the twenty five to help them in constraining and molesting us, we shall by our command compel the same to swear to the effect foresaid. And if any one of the five and twenty barons shall have died or departed from the land, or be incapacitated in any other manner which would prevent the foresaid provisions being carried out, those of the said twenty five barons who are left shall choose another in his place according to their own judgment, and he shall be sworn in the same way as the others. Further, in all matters, the execution of which is entrusted,to these twenty five barons, if perchance these twenty five are present and disagree about anything, or if some of them, after being summoned, are unwilling or unable to be present, that which the majority of those present ordain or command shall be held as fixed and established, exactly as if the whole twenty five had concurred in this; and the said twenty five shall swear that they will faithfully observe all that is aforesaid, and cause it to be observed with all their might. And we shall procure nothing from anyone, directly or indirectly, whereby any part of these concessions and liberties might be revoked or diminished; and if any such things has been procured, let it be void and null, and we shall never use it personally or by another. 62. And all the will, hatreds, and bitterness that have arisen between us and our men, clergy and lay, from the date of the quarrel, we have completely remitted and pardoned to everyone. Moreover, all trespasses occasioned by the said quarrel, from Easter in the sixteenth year of our reign till the restoration of peace, we have fully remitted to all, both clergy and laymen, and completely forgiven, as far as pertains to us. And on this head, we have caused to be made for them letters testimonial patent of the lord Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, of the lord Henry, archbishop of Dublin, of the bishops aforesaid, and of Master Pandulf as touching this security and the concessions aforesaid. 63. Wherefore we will and firmly order that the English Church be free, and that the men in our kingdom have and hold all the aforesaid liberties, rights, and concessions, well and peaceably, freely and quietly, fully and wholly, for themselves and their heirs, of us and our heirs, in all respects and in all places forever, as is aforesaid. An oath, moreover, has been taken, as well on our part as on the art of the barons, that all these conditions aforesaid shall be kept in good faith and without evil intent. Given under our hand - the above named and many others being witnesses - in the meadow which is called Runnymede, between Windsor and Staines, on the fifteenth day of June, in the seventeenth year of our reign.

BASILIKON DORON by KING JAMES II OF A KINGS CHRISTIAN DVETIE TOWARDS GOD+. THE FIRST BOOKE. As he cannot be thought worthy to rule and command others, that cannot rule and dantone his owne proper affections and vnreasonable appetites, so can hee not be thought worthie to gouerne a Christian people,{king_over_self+} knowing and fearing God, that in his owne person and heart, feareth not and loueth not the Diuine Maiestie. Neither can anything in his gouernment succeed well with him, (deuise and labour as he list) as comming from a filthie spring, if his person be vnsanctified: for (as that royal Prophet saith) Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vaine that build it: except the Lord keepe the City, the keepers watch it in vaine: /1 in respect the blessing of God hath onely power to giue the successe thereunto: and as Paul saith, he planteth, Apollos watereth; but it is God onely that giueth the increase./2 Therefore (my Sonne) first of all things, learne to know and loue that God, whom-to ye haue a double obligation+; first, for thathe madeyou aman; and next, for that he made you a little GOD to sit on his Throne, and rule ouer other men. Remember, that as in dignitie hee hath erected you aboue others, so ought ye in thankfulnesse towards him, goe as farre beyond all others. A moate in anothers eye, is a beame into yours: a blemish in another, is a leprouse byle into you: and a veniall sinne (as the Papifts call it) in another, is a great crime into you. Thinke not therefore, that the highnesse of your dignitie, diminisheth

your faults (much lesse giueth you a licence to sinne) but by the contrary your fault shall be aggrauated, according to the height of your dignitie; any sinne that ye commit, not being a single sinne procuring but the fall of one; but being an exemplare sinne, and therefore drawing with it the whole multitude to be guiltie of the same. Remember then, that this glistering worldly glorie of Kings, is giuen them by God, to teach them to preasse so to glister and shine before their people, in all workes of sanctification and righteousnesse, that their persons as bright lampes of godlinesse and vertue, may, going in and out before their people, giue light to all their steps. Remember also, that by the right knowledge, and feare of God (which is the beginning of Wisedome,/3 as Salomon saith) ye shall know all the things necessarie for the discharge of your duetie, both as a Christian, and as a King; seeing in him, as in a mirrour, the course of all earthly things, whereof hee is the spring and onely moouer. Now, the onely way to bring you to this knowledge, is diligently to reade his word, and earnestly to pray for the right vnderstanding thereof. Search the Scriptures, sayth Christ, for they beare testimonie of me:/4 and, the whole Scripture, saith Paul, is giuen by inspiration of God, and is profitable to teach, to conuince, to correct, and to instruct in righteousnesse; that the man of God may be absolute, being made perfite vnto all good workes./5 And most properly of any other, belongeth the reading thereof vnto Kings, ----1 Psal. 12.7. 2 1. Cor. 3. 6. 3 Prou. 9.10. 4 Iohn 5.39. 5 2Tim. 3. 16,17. since in that part of Scripture, where the godly Kings are first made mention of, that were ordained to rule ouer the people of God, there is an expresse and most notable exhortation and commandement giuen them, to reade and meditate in the Law of `God./1 I ioyne to this, the carefull hearing of the doctrine with attendance and reuerence: for, faith commeth by hearing,/2 sayeth the same Apostle. But aboue all, beware ye wrest not the word to your owne appetite, as ouer many doe, making it like a bell to sound as ye please to interprete: but by the contrary, frame all your affections, to follow precisely the rule there set downe. The whole Scripture chiefly containeth two things: a command, and a prohhibition, to doe such things, and to abstaine from the contrary. Obey in both; neither thinke it enough to abstaine from euill, and do no good; nor thinke not that if yee doe many good things, it may serve you for a cloake to mixe euill turnes therewith. And as in these two points, the whole Scripture principally consisteth, so in two degrees standeth the whole seruice of God by man: interiour, or vpward; exteriour, or downward: the first, by prayer in-faith towards God; the next, by workes flowing therefra before the world: which is nothing else, but the exercise of Religion towards God, and of equitie towards your neighbour. As for the particular points of Religion, I need not to dilate them; I am no hypocrite, follow my footsteps, and your owne present education therein. I thanke God, I was neuer ashamed to giue account of my profession, howsoeuer the malicious lying tongues of some haue traduced me: and if my conscience had not resolued me, that all my Religion presently professed by me and my kingdome, was grounded vpon the plaine words of the Scripture, without the which all points of Religion are superfluous, as any thing contrary to the same is abomination, I had neuer outwardly auowed it, for pleasure or awe of any flesh. And as for the points of equitie towards your neighbour (because that will fall in properly, vpon the second part concerning a Kings office+) I leaue it to the owne roume. For the first part then of mans seruice to his God, which is Religion, that is, the worship of God according to his reuealed will, it is wholly grounded vpon the Scripture, as I haue alreadie said, quickened by faith, and conserued by conscience: For the Scripture, I haue now spoken of it in generall, but that yee may the more readily make choice of any part thereof, for your instruction or comfort, remember shortly this methode. The whole Scripture is dyted by Gods Spirit, thereby, as by his liuely word, to instruct and rule the whole Church militant to the and of the world: It is composed of two parts, the Olde and New Testament: The ground of the former is the Lawe, which sheweth our sinne, and containeth iustice+: the ground of the other is Christ, who pardoning sinne containeth grace+. The summe of the Law is the tenne Commandements, more largely delated in the bookes of Moses, interpreted ----1. Deut. 17. 2. Rom. 10.17. and applied by the Prophets; and by the histories+, are the examples shewed of obedience or disobedience thereto, and what praemium or paena was accordingly giuen by God: But because no man was able to keepe the Law, nor any part thereof, it pleased God of his infinite wisedome and goodnesse, to incarnate his only Sonne in our nature, for satisfaction of his iustice in his suffering for vs; that since we could not be saued by doing, we might at least, bee saued by beleeuing. The ground therefore of the word of grace, is contained in the foure histories of the birth, life, death, resurrection and ascention of Christ: The larger interpretation and vse thereof, is contained in the Epistles of the Apostles: and the practise in the faithfull or vnfaithfull, with the historie of the infancie and first progresse of the Church is contained in their Actes. Would ye then know your sinne by the Lawe ? reade the bookes of Moses containing it. Would ye haue a commentarie thereupon? Reade the Prophets, and likewise the bookes of the Prouerbes and Ecclesiastes, written by that great patterne of wisedome Salomon, which will not only serue you for instruction, how to walke in the obedience of the Lawe of God, but is also so full of golden sentences, and morall precepts, in all things that can concerne your conuersation in the world, as among all the prophane Philosophers and Poets, ye shall not finde so rich a storehouse of precepts of naturall wisedome, agreeing with the will and diuine wisedome of

God. Would ye see how good men are rewarded, and wicked punished? looke the historicall parts of these same bookes of Moses, together with the histories of Ioshua, the ludges, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and Iob: but especially the bookes, of the Kings , and Chronicles, wherewith ye ought to bee familiarly acquainted: for there shall yee see your selfe, as in a myrrour, in the catalogue either of the good or the euill Kings. Would yee know the doctrine, life, and death of our Sauiour Christ? reade the Euangelists. Would ye bee more particularly trained vp in his Schoole? meditate vpon the Epistles of the Apostles. And would ye be acquainted with the practises of that doctrine in the persons of the primitiue Church? Cast vp the Apostles Actes. And as to the Apocryphe bookes, I omit them, because I am no Papist, as I said before; and indeed some of them are no wayes like the dytement of the Spirit of God. But when ye reade the Scripture, reade it with a sanctified and chaste heart: admire reuerently such obscure places as ye vnderstand not, blaming onely your owne capacitie: read with delight the plaine places, and studie carefully to vnderstand those that are somewhat difficile: preasse to bee a, good textuarie; for the Scripture is euer the best interpreter of it selfe; but preasse not curiously to seeke out farther then is contained therein; for that were ouer vnmannerly a presumption, to striue to bee further vpon Gods secrets, then he hath will ye be; for what hee thought needfull for vs to know, that hath he reuealed there: And delyte most in reading such parts of the Scripture, as may best serue for your instruction+ iin your calling; reiecting foolish curiosities vpon genealogies and contentions, was which are but vaine, and profite not,/1 as Paul saith. Now, as to Faith, which is the nourisher and quickner of Religion, as I haue alreadie said, It is a sure perswasion and apprehension of the promises of God, applying them to your soule: and therefore may it iustly be called, the golden chaine that linketh the faithfullsoule to Christ: And because it groweth not in our garden, but is the free gift of God,/2 as the same Apostle saith, it must be nourished by prayer, Which is nothing else, but a friendly talking with God. As for teaching you the forme of your prayers, the Psalmes of Dauid are the the meetest schoole-master that ye can be acquainted with (next the prayer of our t Sauiour, which is the onely rule of prayer) whereout of, as of most rich and pure fountaines, ye may learne all forme of prayer necessarie for your comfort at all occasions: And so much the fitter are they for you, then for the common sort, n and in respect the composer thereof was a King: and therefore best behoued to knowKings wants, and what things were meetest to be required by a King at Gods hand for remedie thereof. Vse often to pray when ye are quietest, especially forget it not in your bed how oft soeuer ye doe it at other times: for publike prayer serueth as much for example, as for any particular comfort to the supplicant. In your prayer, bee neither ouer strange with God, like the ignorant common sort, that prayeth nothing but out of bookes, nor yet ouer homely with him, like some of the vaine Pharisaicallpuritanes+, that thinke they rule him vpon their fingers: The former way will breede an vncouth coldnesse in you towards him, the other will breede in you a contempt of him. But in your prayer to God speake the with all reuerence: for if a subiect will not speake but reuerently to a King, much lesse should any flesh presume to talke with God as with his companion. Craue in your prayer, not onelythings spirituall, but also things temporall, sometimes of greater, and sometimes of lesse consequence; that yee may lay vp in store his grant of these things, for confirmation of your faith, and to be an arles-peny vnto you of his loue. Pray, as yee finde your heart moueth you, pro re nata: but see that yee sute no vnlawfull things, as reuenge, lust, or such like: for that prayer can not come of faith: and whatsoeuer is dome without faith, is sinne,/ 3 as the Apostle saith. When ye obtaine your prayer, thanke him ioyfully therefore: if otherwaies, beare patiently, preassing to winne him with importunitie, as the widow did the vnrighteous Iludge: and if notwithstanding thereof yee be not heard, assure your selfe, God foreseeth that which yee aske is not for your weale: and learne in time, so to interprete all the aduersities that God shall send vnto you; so shall yee in the middest of them, not onely be armed with patience, but ioyfully lift vp your eyes from the present trouble, to the happie end that God will turne it to. And when ye finde it once so fall out by proofe, arme your selfe with the experience -----1. Tit. 3.9 2. Philip. 1. 29. 3. Rom. 14. 23- n bb nn thereof against the next trouble, assuring your selfe, though yee cannot in time of the showre see through the cloude, yet in the end shall ye find, God sent if for your weale, as ye found in the former. And as for conscience, which I called the conseruer of Religion, It is nothing else, but the light of knowledge that God hath planted in man, which euer watching ouer all his actions, as it beareth him a ioyfull testimonie when he does right, so choppeth it him with a feeling that hee hath done wrong, when euer he commiteth any sinne. And surely, although this conscience be a great torture to the wicked, yet is it as great a comfort to the godly, if we will consider it rightlyz For haue wee not a great aduantage, that haue within our selues while wee liuc here, a Count-booke and Inuentarie of all the crimes that wee shall bee accused of, either at the houre of our death, or at the Great day of Iudgement; which when wee please (yea though we forget) will chop, and remember vs to looke vpon it; that while we haue leasure and are here, we may remember to amend; and so at the day of our triall, compeare with new and white garments washed in the blood of the Lambe,/1 as St. Iohn saith. Aboue all them, my Sonne, labour to keepe sound this conscience,

which many prattle of, but ouer few feele: especially be carefull to keepe it free from two diseases, wherewith it vseth oft to be infected; to wit, Leaprosie, and Superstition; the former is the mother of Atheisme, the other of Heresies. By a leaprouse conscience, I meane a cauterized conscience,/2 as Paul calleth it, being become senselesse of sinne, through sleeping in a carelesse securitie as King Dauids was after his murther and adulterie, euer til he was wakened by the Prophet Nathans similitude. And by superstition, I meane, when one restraines himselfe to any other rule in the seruice of God, then is warranted by the word, the onely trew square of Gods seruice? As for a preseruatiue against this Leaprosie, remember euer once in the foure and twentie houres, either in the night, or when yee are at greatest quiet, to call your selfe to account of all your last dayes actions, either wherein ye haue committed things yee should not, or omitted the things ye should doe, either in your Christian or Kingly calling: and in that account, let not your selfe be smoothed ouer with that flattering+ OtXavrla, which is ouerkindly a sicknesse to all mankind: but censure your selfeas sharply, as if ye were your owne enemie:{self_criticism+} For if ye iudge your selfe, ye shall not be iudged,/3 as the Apostle saith: and then according to your censure, reforme your actions as farre as yee may, eschewing euer wilfully and wittingly to contrare your conscience: For a small sinne wilfully committed, with a deliberate resolution to breake the bridle of conscience therein, is farre more grieuous before God, then a greater sinne committed in a suddaine passion, when conscience is asleepe. Remember therefore in all your actions, of the great account that yee are one day to make: in all the dayes of your life, euer learning to die, {Stoic+} and liuing euery day as it were you last;| Omnem diem crede tibi diluxisse supremum./4 {sufficient_unto_day+} ----1. Reu. 7.14. 2. 1. Tim. 4. 2.

3. 1. Cor. 11. 31.

4 Horat. lib. i. Epist.

And therefore, I would not haue you to pray with the Papists, to be preserued from suddaine death, but that God would giue you grace so to liue, as ye may euery houre of your life be ready for death: so shall ye attaine to the vertue of trew fortitude+, neuer being afraid for the horrour of death+, come when he list: And especially, beware to offend your conscience with vse of swearing or lying, suppose but in iest; for othes are but an vse, and a sinne cloathed with no delight nor gaine, and therefore the more inexcusable euen in the sight of men: and lying commeth also much of a vile vse, which banisheth shame: Therefore beware euen to deny the trewth, which is a sort of lie, that may best be eschewed by a person of your ranke. For if any thing be asked at you that yee thinke not meete to reueale, if yee say, that question is not pertinent for them to aske, who dare examine you further? and vsing sometimes this answere both in trew and false things that shall be asked at you, such vnmanerly people will neuer be the wiser thereof. And for keeping your conscience sound from that sickenesse of superstition, yee must neither lay the safetie of your conscience vpon the credit of your owne conceits, nor yet of other mens humors, how great doctors of Diuinitie that euer they be; but yee must onely ground it vpon the expresse Scripture: for consciencenot grounded vpon sure knowledge, is either an ignorant fantasie, or an arrogant vanitie. Beware therefore in this case with two extremities: the one, to beleeue with the Papists, the Churches authority, better then your owne knowledge; the other, to leane with the Anabaptists+, tio your owne conceits and dreamed reuellations. But learne wisely to discerne betwixt points of saluation and indifferent things, betwixt substance and ceremonies; and etwixt the expresse commandement and will of God in his word, and the inuention. or ordinance of man; since all that is necessarie for saluation is contained in the Scripture: For in any thing that is urexpressely commanded or prohibited in the booke of God, ye cannot be ouer precise+, euen in the least thing; counting euery sinne, not according to the light estimation and common vse of it in the world, but as the booke of Gad counteth ye iudgeof it. But as for all other things not contained in the scripture, spare not to vse or alter them, as the necessitie of the time shall require. And when any of the spirituall office-bearers in the Church, speake vnto you any thing that is well warranted by the word, reuerence and obey them as the heraulds of the most high God: but, if passing that bounds, they vrge you to embrace any of their fantasies in the place of Gods word, or would colour their particulars with a pretended zeal, acknowledge them for no other then vaine men, exceeding the bounds of their alling; and according to your office, grauely and with authoritie redact them in order againe. To conclude then, both this purpose of conscience, and the first part of this booke, keepe God more sparingly in your mouth, but abundantly in your heart: be precise in effect, but sociall in shew: kythe more by your deeds+ then by your wordes, the loue of vertue and hatred of vice: and delight more to be godly and vertuous indeed, then to be thought and called so; expecting more for your praise and reward in heauen, then heere: and apply to all your outward actions Christs command, to pray and giue your almes secretly: {Wyf+} So shal ye on the one part be inwardly garnished with trew Christian humilitie, not outwardly (with the proud Pharisie) glorying in your godlinesse; but saying, as Christ commandeth vs all, when we haue done all that we can, Inutiles serui sumus:/1 And on the other part, yee shall eschew outwardly before the world, the suspition of filthie proude hypocrisie, and deceitfull dissimulation….

PATRIARCHA OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KINGS By THE LEARNED SIR ROBERT FILMER, BART. [1680] Libertas .... populi, quem regna coercent Libertate perit .... — Lucan, Lib. iii. Fallitur egregio quisquis sub principe credit Servitium; nunquam libertas gratior extat Quam sub Rege pio .... — Claudian. CHAPTER I THAT THE FIRST KINGS WERE FATHERS OF FAMILIES 1. SINCE the time that school divinity began to flourish there hath been a common opinion maintained, as well by divines as by divers other learned men, which affirms: "Mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection, and at liberty to choose what form of government it please, and that the power which any one man hath over others was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude." This tenet was first hatched in the schools, and hath been fostered by all succeeding Papists for good divinity. The divines, also, of the Reformed Churches have entertained it, and the common people everywhere tenderly embrace it as being most plausible to flesh and blood, for that it prodigally distributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the multitude, who magnify liberty as if the height of human felicity were only to be found in it, never remembering that the desire of liberty was the first cause of the fall of Adam. But howsoever this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained a great reputation, yet it is not to be found in the ancient fathers and doctors of the primitive Church. It contradicts the doctrine and history of the Holy Scriptures, the constant practice of all ancient monarchies, and the very principles of the law of nature. It is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in divinity or dangerous in policy. Yet upon the ground of this doctrine, both Jesuits and some other zealous favourers of the Geneva discipline have built a perilous conclusion, which is, that the people or multitude have power to punish or deprive the prince if he transgress the laws of the kingdom; witness Parsons and Buchanan. The first, under the name of Dolman, in the third chapter of his first book, labours to prove that kings have been lawfully chastised by their commonwealths. The latter, in his book De Jure Regni apud Scotos, maintains a liberty of the people to depose their prince. Cardinal Bellarmine and Calvin both look asquint this way. This desperate assertion whereby kings are made subject to the censures and deprivations of their subjects follows — as the authors of it conceive — as a necessary consequence of that former position of the supposed natural equality and freedom of mankind, and liberty to choose what form of government it please. And though Sir John Heywood, Adam Blackwood, John Barclay, and some others have learnedly confuted both Buchanan and Parsons, and bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points, yet all of them, when they come to the argument drawn from the "natural liberty" and "equality of mankind," do with one consent admit it for a truth unquestionable, not so much as once denying or opposing it, whereas if they did but confute this first erroneous principle the whole fabric of this vast engine of popular sedition would drop down of itself. The rebellious consequence which follows this prime article of the natural freedom of mankind may be my sufficient warrant for a modest examination of the original truth of it. Much hath been said, and by many, for the affirmative; equity requires that an ear be reserved a little for the negative. In this discourse I shall give myself these cautions: First, I have nothing to do to meddle with mysteries of state, such arcana imperii, or cabinet councils, the vulgar may not pry into. An implicit faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft; how much more is it, then, due to a prince in the profound secrets of government. The causes and ends of the greatest politic actions and motions of state dazzle the eyes and exceed the capacities of all men, save only those that are hourly versed in the managing public affairs. Yet since the rule for each man to know in what to obey his prince cannot be learnt without a relative knowledge of those points wherein a sovereign may command, it is necessary when the commands and pleasures of superiors come abroad and call for an obedience that every man himself know how to regulate his actions or his sufferings; for according to the quality of the thing commanded an active or passive obedience is to be yielded, and this is not to limit the prince's power, but the extent of the subject's obedience, by giving to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, etc.

Secondly, I am not to question or quarrel at the rights or liberties of this or any other nation; my task is chiefly to inquire from whom these first came, not to dispute what or how many these are, but whether they were derived from the laws of natural liberty or from the grace and bounty of princes. My desire and hope is that the people of England may and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under heaven; the greatest liberty in the world — if it be duly considered — is for a people to live under a monarch. It is the Magna Charta of this kingdom; all other shows or pretexts of liberty are but several degrees of slavery, and a liberty only to destroy liberty. If such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind take offence at the liberty I take to examine it, they must take heed that they do not deny by retail that liberty which they affirm by wholesale. For if the thesis be true, the hypothesis will follow that all men may examine their own charters, deeds, or evidences by which they claim and hold the inheritance or freehold of their liberties. Thirdly, I must not detract from the worth of all those learned men who are of a contrary opinion in the point of natural liberty. The profoundest scholar that ever was known hath not been able to search out every truth that is discoverable; neither Aristotle in philosophy, nor Hooker in divinity. They are but men, yet I reverence their judgments in most points, and confess myself beholding to their errors too in this. Something that I found amiss in their opinions guided me in the discovery of that truth which — I persuade myself — they missed. A dwarf sometimes may see that which a giant looks over; for whilst one truth is curiously searched after, another must necessarily be neglected. Late writers have taken up too much upon trust from the subtile schoolmen, who, to be sure to thrust down the king below the pope, thought it the safest course to advance the people above the king, that so the papal power might take place of the regal. Thus many an ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith that a man may become a martyr for his country by being a traitor to his prince; whereas the new coined distinction of subjects into royalists and patriots is most unnatural, since the relation between king and people is so great that their well-being is so reciprocal. 2. To make evident the grounds of this question about the natural liberty of mankind, I will lay down some passages of Cardinal Bellarmine that may best unfold the state of this controversy. Secular or civil power is instituted by men, it is in the people, unless they bestow it on a prince. This power is immediately in the whole multitude, as in the subject of it; for this power is in the divine law, but the divine law hath given this power to no particular man. If the positive law be taken away, there is left no reason why amongst a multitude — who are equal — one rather than another should bear rule over the rest. Power is given by the multitude to one man or to more by the same law of nature; for the commonwealth cannot exercise this power; therefore it is bound to bestow it upon some one man, or some few. It depends upon the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a king, or consul, or other magistrates; and if there be a lawful cause, the multitude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy. Thus far Bellarmine, in which passages are comprised the strength of all that ever I have read or heard produced for the natural liberty of the subject…. CHAPTER II IT IS UNNATURAL FOR THE PEOPLE TO GOVERN OR CHOOSE GOVERNORS 1. By conferring these proofs and reasons, drawn from the authority of the Scripture, it appears little less than a paradox which Bellarmine and others affirm of the freedom of the multitude, to choose what rulers they please. Had the patriarchs their power given them by their own children? Bellarmine does not say it, but the contrary. If then the fatherhood enjoyed this authority for so many ages by the law of nature, when was it lost, or when forfeited, or how is it devolved to the liberty of the multitude? Because the Scripture is not favourable to the liberty of the people, therefore many fly to natural reason, and to the authority of Aristotle. I must crave liberty to examine or explain the opinion of this great philosopher; but briefly, I find this sentence in the third of his Politics, chap. 16: dokei de tisin oude kata fusiu einai to kurion ena pantwn einai twn politwn, opou sunesthken ex omoiwn h poliV. It seems to some not to be natural for one man to be lord of all the citizens, since a city consists of equals. D. Lambine, in his Latin interpretation of this text, hath omitted the translation of this word tisiu, by this means he maketh that to be the opinion of Aristotle, which Aristotle allegeth to be the opinion but of some. This negligence, or wilful escape, of Lambine, in not translating a word so material, hath been an occasion to deceive many who, looking no further than this Latin translation, have concluded, and made the world now of late believe, that Aristotle here maintains a natural equality of men; and not only our English translator of Aristotle's Politics is, in this place, misled by following Lambine, but even the learned Monsieur Duvall, in his Synopsis, bears them company; and yet this version of Lambine's is esteemed the best, and printed at Paris, with Causabon's corrected Greek copy, though in the rendering of this place the elder translations have been more faithful; and he that shall compare the Greek text with the Latin shall find that Causabon had just cause in his preface to Aristotle's works to complain that the best translations of Aristotle did need correction. To prove that in these words, which seem to favour the equality of mankind, Aristotle doth not speak according to his own judgment, but recites only the opinion of others, we find him clearly deliver his own opinion that the power of government did

originally arise from the right of fatherhood, which cannot possibly consist with that natural equality which men dream of; for in the first of his Politics he agrees exactly with the Scripture, and lays this foundation of government: The first society made of many houses is a village, which seems most naturally to be a colony of families or foster-brethren of children and children's children. And, therefore, at the beginning, cities were under the government of kings, for the eldest in every house is king. And so for kindred sake it is in colonies. And in the fourth of his Politics, chap. 2, he gives the title of the first and divinest sort of government to the institution of kings, by defining tyranny to be a digression from the first and divinest. Whosoever weights advisedly these passages will find little hope of natural reason in Aristotle to prove the natural liberty of the multitude. Also before him the divine Plato concludes a commonweal to be nothing else but a large family. I know for this position Aristotle quarrels with his master, but most unjustly; for therein he contradicts his own principles, for they both agree to fetch the original of civil government from the prime government. No doubt but Moses' history of the creation guided these two philosophers in finding out of this lineal subjection deduced from the laws of the first parents, according to that rule of St. Chrysostom: "God made all mankind of one man, that he might teach the world to be governed by a king, and not by a multitude." The ignorance of the Creation occasioned several errors amongst the heathen philosophers, Polybius, though otherwise a most profound philosopher and judicious historian, yet here he stumbles; for in searching out the original of civil societies, he conceited that multitudes of men after a deluge, a famine, or a pestilence, met together like herds of cattle without any dependency, until the strongest bodies . and boldest minds got the mastery of their fellows, "even as it is," saith he, "among bulls, bears, and cocks." And Aristotle himself, forgetting his first doctrine, tells us the first heroical kings were chosen by the people for their deserving well of the multitude, either by teaching them some new arts, or by warring for them, or by gathering them together, or by dividing land amongst them; also Aristotle had another fancy that those men who prove wise of mind were by nature intended to be lords and govern; and those which were strong of body were ordained to obey, and to be servants. But this is a dangerous and uncertain rule, and not without some folly; for if a man prove both wise and strong, what will Aristotle have done with him? As he was wise, he could be no servant, and as he had strength, he could not be a master; besides, to speak like a philosopher, nature intends all things to be perfect both in wit and strength. The folly or imbecility proceeds from some error in generation or education; for nature aims at perfection in all her works. 2. Suarez, the Jesuit, riseth up against the royal authority of Adam, in defence of the freedom and liberty of the people, and thus argues: By right of creation Adam had only economical power, but not political. He had a power over his wife, and a fatherly power over his sons, whilst they were not made free. He might also, in process of time, have servants and a complete family, and in that family he might have complete economical power. But after that families began to be multiplied, and men to be separated and become the heads of several families, they had the same power over their families. But political power did not begin until families began to be gathered together into one perfect community; wherefore, as the community did not begin by the creation of Adam, nor by his will alone, but of all them which did agree in this community, so we cannot say that Adam naturally had political primacy in that community; for that cannot be gathered by any natural principles, because by the force of the law of nature alone it is not due unto any progenitor to be also king of his posterity. And if this be not gathered out of the principles of nature, we cannot say God by a special gift or providence gave him this power, for there is no revelation of this, nor testimony of Scripture — Hitherto Suarez. Whereas he makes Adam to have a "fatherly power" over his sons, and yet shuts up this power within one family, he seems either to imagine that all Adam's children lived within one house and under one roof with their father, or else, as soon as any of his children lived out of his house, they ceased to be subject and did thereby become free. For my part I cannot believe that Adam, although he were sole monarch of the world, had any such spacious palace as might contain any such considerable part of his children. It is likelier that some mean cottage or tent did serve him to keep his court in. It were hard he should lose part of his authority because his children lay not within the wails of his house. But if Suarez will allow all Adam's children to be of his family, howsoever they were separate in dwellings, if their habitations were either contiguous or at such distance as might easily receive his fatherly commands; and that all that were under his commands were of his family, although they had many children or servants married, having themselves also children, then I see no reason but that we may call Adam's family a commonwealth, except we will wrangle about words, for Adam, living nine hundred and thirty years, and seeing seven or eight descents from himself, he might live to command of his children and their posterity a multitude far bigger than many commonwealths and kingdoms. 3. I know the politicians and civil lawyers do not agree well about the definition of a family, and Bodin[1] doth seem in one place to confine it to a house; yet in his definition he doth enlarge his meaning to all persons under the obedience of one and the same head of the family, and he approves better of the propriety of the Hebrew word for a family which is derived from a word that signifies a head, a prince, or lord, than the Greek word for a family which is derived from oikoiV, which signifies a house. Nor doth Aristotle confine a family to one house, but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together; whereas, before him, Charondas called a family homosypioi, those that feed together out of one common pannier. And Epimenides the Cretian terms a family komocapnoi, those that

sit by a common fire or smoke. But let Suarez understand what he please by Adam's family, if he will but confess, as he needs must, that Adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death, of peace and war, and the like, within their houses or families, he must give us leave, at least, to call them kings of their houses or families; and if they be so by the law of nature, what liberty will be left to their children to dispose of? Aristotle gives the lie to Plato and those that say political and economical societies are all one and do not differ specie, but only multitudine and paucitate, as if there were no difference betwixt a great house and a little city. All the argument I find he brings against them is this: The community of man and wife differs from the community of master and servant, because they have several ends. The intention of nature, by conjunction of male and female, is generation; but the scope of master and servant is preservation, so that a wife and a servant are by nature distinguished, because nature does not work like the cutlers of Delphos, for she makes but one thing for one use. If we allow this argument to be sound, nothing doth follow but only this: that conjugal and despotical communities do differ. But it is no consequence that therefore economical and political societies do the like; for though it prove a family to consist of two distinct communities, yet it follows not that a family and a commonwealth are distinct, because, as well in the commonweal as in the families, both these communities are found.[2]… Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, Thomas Hobbes Summary – In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes argues that the state of nature is the worst possible way in which people could live. Because there is no higher authority to protect and enforce rights, and no guarantee that anything we own will be permanently ours, people are constantly under threat from other people. If A decides to pick an apple off of a tree, then B may decide to take it. A will have to fight with B merely to maintain ownership over an apple, as well as anything else she owns. Even more frightening is that B might decide to band together with other people to take A's apple. A is outnumbered and therefore will be defeated. However, when B's band manages to take away A's apple, they will no longer act as a team working together. They will begin to fight among themselves over the apple and the conflict will go on and on. Given that this conflict is over one simple possession, it is unavoidable that people will constantly be at war with one another over territory, possessions, and even spouses. There is no room for peace and never any time to pursue leisurely activities like art, music, or education. Hobbes also argues that every person is equal to every other person. In the conception of equality to which most westerners are accustomed, this means that everyone has basically equal rights and equality. Hobbes's understanding of equality, however, is much different and turns out to only make the state of war in the state of nature worse. In the Hobbesian state of nature, every person is equal because each of us is equally vulnerable. We all have to sleep at some point, which means that when someone wants to rob us of our possessions, they simply must wait until we go to sleep or become otherwise distracted. There is little opportunity for a single person to become consistently stronger than everyone else and thus be able to defend their property or become an enforcer of others' property rights. Even a very strong, very intelligent person would still have to take care of basic bodily functions like sleep,which not only leaves everyone at constant risk, but eliminates any opportunity for a few strong people to rebalance power. Hobbes proposes that the best solution to this miserable life is to come together under a social contract. People are motivated by their fear of one another to agreee to stop stealing, killing, and waging war on each other and to make the Leviathan the enforcer of these rules. The Leviathan is the authorized representative of the people, and thus has a monopoly on violence, taking of property, and other actions that had previously occurred in the state of nature. The Leviathan is also authorized to do whatever is necessary to maintain the commonwealth. This can include killing dissenters and curtailing liberties when they place the social contract at risk. Part of Hobbes's argument in favor of this sort of system is his understanding of the will and consent. He believes that the will is defined as the last thought a person has before making a decision, and that consent therefore can be given under coercion and threat of death because a person has still willed to consent to whatever action they are being coerced into. Consequently, a person consenting to a government or to a law out of fear of the state of nature is still giving consent. More importantly, a person consenting to the Leviathan's rule as a way out of the state of nature is also giving tacit consent to the future actions of the Leviathan because this person has authorized the Leviathan to do whatever is necessary to keep the society from returning to the state of nature. The notion of consent is critical in the Leviathan and in formulating any understanding of a social contract. Part I: Of Man

In Part I, Hobbes attempts an analysis of society from first principles, beginning with Man and the Senses. He develops this in a sequence of definitions (for example: Imagination is "nothing but decaying sense" and is the same as Memory). He points out the Necessity of Definitions, which is a hint that he is attempting an axiomatisation of political philosophy in line with the programme of geometry. He defines various passions in an unsentimental way: e.g. "But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves…". A whole sequence of such definitions follows (Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called Hope… Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality is an argument and sign of power.). Chapter XIII is an exposition "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery" and contains the famous quotation describing life in the state of war of every man against every man: the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short Hobbes finds three basic causes of the conflict in this state of nature: competition, diffidence and glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. His first law of nature is that that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.[2] In the state of nature, every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body[3] but the second law is that, in order to secure the advantages of peace, that a man be willing, when others are so too… to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.[4] This is the beginning of contracts/covenants; performing of which is the third law of nature. Injustice, therefore, is failure to perform in a covenant; all else is just. However, Hobbes also posits a primitive form of the inalienable rights—which would later be restated by John Locke--implying that some covenants may be derived axiomatically, and consequently held to be universally true. Part II: Of Common-wealth The purpose of a commonwealth is given at the start of Part II: THE final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants…. The commonwealth is instituted when all agree in the following manner: I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. The sovereign has twelve principal rights: 1. because a successive covenant cannot override a prior one, the subjects cannot (lawfully) change the form of government. 2. because the covenant forming the commonwealth results from subjects giving to the sovereign the right to act for them, the sovereign cannot possibly breach the covenant; and therefore the subjects can never argue to be freed from the covenant because of the actions of the sovereign. 3. the sovereign exists because the majority has consented to his rule; the minority have agreed to abide by this arrangement and must then assent to the sovereign's actions. 4. every subject is author of the acts of the sovereign: hence the sovereign cannot injure any of his subjects, and cannot be accused of injustice. 5. following this, the sovereign cannot justly be put to death by the subjects. 6. because the purpose of the commonwealth is peace, and the sovereign has the right to do whatever he thinks necessary for the preserving of peace and security and prevention of discord, therefore the sovereign may judge what opinions and doctrines are averse; who shall be allowed to speak to multitudes; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they are published. 7. to prescribe the rules of civil law and property. 8. to be judge in all cases.

9. to make war and peace as he sees fit; and to command the army. 10. to choose counsellors, ministers, magistrates and officers. 11. to reward with riches and honour; or to punish with corporal or pecuniary punishment or ignominy. 12. to establish laws about honour and a scale of worth. Hobbes explicitly rejects the idea of Separation of Powers, in particular the form that would later become the separation of powers under the United States Constitution. Part 6 is a perhaps under-emphasised feature of Hobbes's argument: his is explicitly in favour of censorship of the press and restrictions on the rights of free speech, should they be considered desirable by the sovereign in order to promote order. Types of commonwealth There are three (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy): The difference of Commonwealths consisted in the difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest there can be but three kinds of Commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man, or more; and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one man, then is the Commonwealth a monarchy; when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a democracy, or popular Commonwealth; when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an aristocracy. And only three: Other kind of Commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire. There be other names of government in the histories and books of policy; as tyranny and oligarchy; but they are not the names of other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under monarchy call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a democracy call it anarchy, which signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes that want of government is any new kind of government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when they like it, and another when they mislike it or are oppressed by the governors. And monarchy is the best, on practical grounds: The difference between these three kinds of Commonwealth consisteth not in the difference of power, but in the difference of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe: first, that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person. And though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest, yet he is more, or no less, careful to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private: for the passions of men are commonly more potent than their reason. From whence it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war against their enemies; whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war. Succession The right of succession always lies with the sovereign. Democracies and aristocracies have easy succession; monarchy is harder: The greatest difficulty about the right of succession is in monarchy: and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor; nor many times who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination than every man is accustomed to use.

Because in general people haven't thought carefully. However, the succession is definitely in the gift of the monarch: As to the question who shall appoint the successor of a monarch that hath the sovereign authority… we are to consider that either he that is in possession has right to dispose of the succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude. … Therefore it is manifest that by the institution of monarchy, the disposing of the successor is always left to the judgement and will of the present possessor. But, it is not always obvious who the monarch has appointed: And for the question which may arise sometimes, who it is that the monarch in possession hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power However, the answer is: it is determined by his express words and testament; or by other tacit signs sufficient. And this means: By express words, or testament, when it is declared by him in his lifetime, viva voce, or by writing; as the first emperors of Rome declared who should be their heirs. Note that (perhaps rather radically) this does not have to be any blood relative: For the word heir does not of itself imply the children or nearest kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare he would have to succeed him in his estate. If therefore a monarch declare expressly that such a man shall be his heir, either by word or writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his predecessor invested in the right of being monarch. However, practically this means: But where testament and express words are wanting, other natural signs of the will are to be followed: whereof the one is custom. And therefore where the custom is that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of kindred hath right to the succession; for that, if the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his lifetime… So we end up back at the first-born son, in practice. Religion In Leviathan, Hobbes explicitly states that the sovereign has authority to assert power over matters of faith and doctrine, and that if he does not do so, he invites discord. Hobbes presents his own religious theory, but states that he would defer to the will of the sovereign (when that was re-established: again, Leviathan was written during the Civil War) as to whether his theory was acceptable. Tuck argues that it further marks Hobbes as a supporter of the religious policy of the post-Civil War English republic, Independency.[citation needed] Taxation Thomas Hobbes also touched upon the sovereign's ability to tax in Leviathan, although he is not as widely cited for his economic theories as he is for his political theories.[5] Hobbes believed that equal justice includes the equal imposition of taxes. The equality of taxes doesn’t depend on equality of wealth, but on the equality of the debt that every man owes to the commonwealth for his defence and the maintenance of the rule of law.[6] Hobbes also supported public support for those unable to maintain themselves by labour, which would presumably be funded by taxation. He advocated public encouragement of works of Navigation etc. to usefully employ the poor who could work. Part III: Of a Christian Common-wealth In Part III Hobbes seeks to investigate the nature of a Christian commonwealth. This immediately raises the question of which scriptures we should trust, and why. If any person may claim supernatural revelation superior to the civil law, then there would be

chaos, and Hobbes' fervent desire is to avoid this. Hobbes thus begins by establishing that we cannot infallibly know another's personal word to be divine revelation: When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately or by mediation of another man, to whom He had formerly spoken by Himself immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately may be understood by those well enough to whom He hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another is hard, if not impossible, to know. For if a man pretend to me that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce to oblige me to believe it. This is good, but if applied too fervently would lead to all the Bible being rejected. So, Hobbes says, we need a test: and the true test is established by examining the books of scripture, and is: So that it is manifest that the teaching of the religion which God hath established, and the showing of a present miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true prophet. And Seeing therefore miracles now cease this means that only the books of the Bible can be trusted. Hobbes then discusses the various books which are accepted by various sects, and the question much disputed between the diverse sects of Christian religion, from whence the Scriptures derive their authority. To Hobbes, it is manifest that none can know they are God's word (though all true Christians believe it) but those to whom God Himself hath revealed it supernaturally. And therefore The question truly stated is: by what authority they are made law? Unsurprisingly, Hobbes concludes that ultimately there is no way to determine this other than the civil power: He therefore to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed that they are His, nor that those that published them were sent by Him, is not obliged to obey them by any authority but his whose commands have already the force of laws; that is to say, by any other authority than that of the Commonwealth, residing in the sovereign, who only has the legislative power. He discusses the Ten Commandments, and asks who it was that gave to these written tables the obligatory force of laws. There is no doubt but they were made laws by God Himself: but because a law obliges not, nor is law to any but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the sovereign, how could the people of Israel, that were forbidden to approach the mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obedience to all those laws which Moses propounded to them? and concludes, as before, that making of the Scripture law, belonged to the civil sovereign. Finally: We are to consider now what office in the Church those persons have who, being civil sovereigns, have embraced also the Christian faith? to which the answer is: Christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the people committed to their charge. There is an enormous amount of biblical scholarship in this third part. However, once Hobbes's initial argument is accepted (that noone can know for sure anyone else's divine revelation) his conclusion (the religious power is subordinate to the civil) follows from his logic. The very extensive discussions of the chapter were probably necessary for its time. The need (as Hobbes saw it) for the civil sovereign to be supreme arose partly from the many sects that arose around the civil war, and to quash the Pope of Rome's challenge, to which Hobbes devotes an extensive section. Part IV: Of the Kingdom of Darkness Hobbes named Part IV of his book Kingdom of Darkness. By this, Hobbes does not mean Hell (he did not believe in Hell or Purgatory)[7] but the darkness of ignorance as opposed to the light of true knowledge. Hobbes' interpretation is largely unorthodox and so sees much darkness in what he sees as the misinterpretation of Scripture. This considered, the kingdom of darkness… is nothing else but a confederacy of deceivers that, to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour, by dark and erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light…. Chapter XLIV Hobbes enumerates four causes of this darkness. The first is by extinguishing the light of scripture through misinterpretation. Hobbes sees the main abuse as teaching that the kingdom of God can be found in the church, thus undermining the authority of the civil sovereign. Another general abuse of scripture, in his view, is the turning of consecration into conjuration, or silly ritual.

The second cause is the demonology of the heathen poets concerning demons, which in Hobbes opinion are nothing more than constructs of the brain. Hobbes then goes on to criticise what he sees as many of the practices of Catholicism: "Now for the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things at this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not allowed by the word of God". The third is by mixing with the Scripture diverse relics of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle. Hobbes has little time for the various disputing sects of philosophers, and objects to what people have taken From Aristotle's civil philosophy, they have learned to call all manner of Commonwealths but the popular (such as was at that time the state of Athens), tyranny. At the end of this comes an interesting section (darkness is suppressing true knowledge as well as introducing falsehoods), which would appear to bear on the discoveries of Galileo Galilei. "Our own navigations make manifest, and all men learned in human sciences now acknowledge, there are antipodes" (i.e., the Earth is round) "…Nevertheless, men… have been punished for it by authority ecclesiastical. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they be true." However, Hobbes is quite happy for the truth to be suppressed if necessary: if "they tend to disorder in government, as countenancing rebellion or sedition? Then let them be silenced, and the teachers punished" — but only by the civil authority. The fourth is by mingling with both these, false or uncertain traditions, and feigned or uncertain history. Hobbes finishes by inquiring who benefits from the errors he diagnoses: CICERO maketh honourable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe judge amongst the Romans, for a custom he had in criminal causes, when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, to ask the accusers, cui bono; that is to say, what profit, honour, or other contentment the accused obtained or expected by the fact. For amongst presumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the author as doth the benefit of the action.

Two Treatises of Government: In the Former, The False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, And His Followers, are Detected and Overthrown. The Latter is an Essay concerning The True Original, Extent, and End of Civil-Government John Locke Two Treatises is divided into the First Treatise and the Second Treatise. The original title of the Second Treatise appears to have been simply "Book II," corresponding to the title of the First Treatise, "Book I." Before publication, however, Locke gave it greater prominence by (hastily) inserting a separate title page: "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government."[9] The First Treatise is focused on the refutation of Sir Robert Filmer, in particular his Patriarcha, which argued that civil society was founded on a divinely-sanctioned patriarchalism. Locke proceeds through Filmer's arguments, contesting his proofs from Scripture and ridiculing them as senseless, until concluding that no government can be justified by an appeal to the divine right of kings. The Second Treatise outlines a theory of civil society. John Locke begins by describing the state of nature, a picture much more stable than Thomas Hobbes' state of "war of every man against every man," and argues that all men are created equal in the state of nature by God. From this, he goes on to explain the hypothetical rise of property and civilization, in the process explaining that the only legitimate governments are those that have the consent of the people. Therefore, any government that rules without the consent of the people can, in theory, be overthrown. First Treatise The First Treatise is an extended attack on Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha. Locke's argument proceeds along two lines: first, he undercuts the Scriptural support that Filmer had offered for his thesis, and second he argues that the acceptance of Filmer's thesis can lead only to absurdity. Locke chose Filmer as his target, he says, because of his reputation and because he "carried this Argument [jure divino] farthest, and is supposed to have brought it to perfection" (1st Tr., §5). Filmer's text presented an argument for a divinely-ordained, hereditary, absolute monarchy. According to Filmer, the Biblical Adam in his role as father possessed unlimited power over his children and this authority passed down through the generations. Locke attacks this on several grounds. Accepting that fatherhood grants authority, he argues, it would do so only by the act of begetting, and so cannot be transmitted to one's children because only God can create life. Nor is the power of a father over his children absolute, as

Filmer would have it; Locke points to the joint power parents share over their children outlined in the Bible. In the Second Treatise Locke returns to a discussion of parental power. (Both of these discussions have drawn the interest of modern feminists such as Carole Pateman.) Filmer also suggested that Adam's absolute authority came from his ownership over all the world. To this, Locke rebuts that the world was originally held in common (a theme that will return in the Second Treatise). But, even if it were not, he argues, God's grant to Adam covered only the land and brute animals, not human beings. Nor could Adam, or his heir, leverage this grant to enslave mankind, for the law of nature forbids reducing one's fellows to a state of desperation, if one possesses a sufficient surplus to maintain oneself securely. And even if this charity were not commanded by reason, Locke continues, such a strategy for gaining dominion would prove only that the foundation of government lies in consent. Locke intimates in the First Treatise that the doctrine of divine right of kings (jure divino) will eventually be the downfall of all governments. In his final chapter Locke asks, "Who heir?" If Filmer is correct, there should be only one rightful king in all the world—the heir of Adam. But since it is impossible to discover the true heir of Adam, no government, under Filmer's principles, can require that its members obey its rulers. Filmer must therefore say that men are duty-bound to obey their present rulers. Locke writes: I think he is the first Politician, who, pretending to settle Government upon its true Basis, and to establish the Thrones of lawful Princes, ever told the World, That he was properly a King, whose Manner of Government was by Supreme Power, by what Means soever he obtained it; which in plain English is to say, that Regal and Supreme Power is properly and truly his, who can by any Means seize upon it; and if this be, to be properly a King, I wonder how he came to think of, or where he will find, an Usurper. (1st Tr., §79) Locke ends the First Treatise by examining the history told in the Bible and the history of the world since then; he concludes that there is no evidence to support Filmer's hypothesis. According to Locke, no king has ever claimed that his authority rested upon his being the heir of Adam. It is Filmer, Locke alleges, that is the innovator in politics, not those who assert the natural equality and freedom of man. Second Treatise In the Second Treatise Locke develops a number of notable themes. It begins with a depiction of the state of nature, wherein individuals are under no obligation to obey one another but are each themselves judge of what the law of nature requires. It also covers conquest and slavery, property, representative government, and the right of revolution. State of nature Locke defines the state of nature thus: "To properly understand political power and trace its origins, we must consider the state that all people are in naturally. That is a state of perfect freedom of acting and disposing of their own possessions and persons as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature. People in this state do not have to ask permission to act or depend on the will of others to arrange matters on their behalf. The natural state is also one of equality in which all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal and no one has more than another. It is evident that all human beings – as creatures belonging to the same species and rank and born indiscriminately with all the same natural advantages and faculties – are equal amongst themselves. They have no relationship of subordination or subjection unless God (the lord and master of them all) had clearly set one person above another and conferred on him an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty."[10] The work of Thomas Hobbes made theories based upon a state of nature popular in seventeenth-century England, even as most of those who employed such arguments were deeply troubled by his absolutist conclusions. Locke's state of nature can be seen in light of this tradition. Because there is no divinely ordained monarch over all the world, as was argued in the First Treatise, the natural state of mankind is anarchic. In contrast to Hobbes, who posited the state of nature as a hypothetical possibility, Locke took great pains to show that such a state did indeed exist. Indeed, it exists wherever there is no legitimate government. Whereas Hobbes speaks of the misery of the State of Nature more directly, Locke waits until Chapter IX to describe the state of nature as one that 'however free, is full of continual dangers.' While no individual in this state may tell another what to do or authoritatively pronounce justice in a given case, men are not free to do whatever they please. "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it" (2nd Tr., §6). The specifics of this law are unwritten, however, and so each is likely to

misapply it in his own case. Lacking any commonly recognized, impartial judge, there is no way to correct these misapplications. Even were such a judge available, the just are vastly outnumbered by the unjust and indifferent, so his pronouncements would lack effect. This section, §6, also presumes theism. In other words, rather than arguing for the presence of men by natural ideas, Locke assumes that all men are born by God. The law of nature is therefore ill enforced in the state of nature. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property. (2nd Tr., §123) What should be a state of peace very quickly begins to look like the state of war that Hobbes described (though the ill enforcement of the law of nature does not release individuals from their obligation to it, as it does in Hobbes). It is to avoid the state of war that often occurs in the state of nature, and to protect their private property that men enter into civil or political society, i.e., state of society. It is also the state that men return to upon the dissolution of government, i.e., under tyranny. Conquest and slavery Ch. 4 ("Of Slavery") and Ch. 16 ("Of Conquest") are sources of some confusion: the former provides a justification for slavery, the latter, the rights of conquerors. Because the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina provided that a master had perfect authority over his slaves, some have taken these chapters to be an apology for the institution of slavery in Colonial America. Most Locke scholars roundly reject this reading, as it is directly at odds with the text. The extent of Locke's involvement in drafting the Fundamental Constitutions is a matter of some debate, but even attributing full culpability for its contents and for his having profited from the Atlantic slave trade, the majority of experts will concede that Locke may have been a hypocrite in this matter, but are adamant that no part of the Two Treatises can be used to provide theoretical support for slavery by bare right of conquest. In the rhetoric of seventeenth-century England, those who opposed the increasing power of the kings claimed that the country was headed for a condition of slavery. Locke therefore asks, facetiously, under what conditions such slavery might be justified. He notes that slavery cannot come about as a matter of contract (which became the basis of Locke's political system). To be a slave is to be subject to the absolute, arbitrary power of another; as men do not have this power even over themselves, they cannot sell or otherwise grant it to another. One that is deserving of death, i.e., who has violated the law of nature, may be enslaved. This is, however, "but the state of war continued" (2nd Tr., §24), and even one justly a slave therefore has no obligation to obedience. In providing a justification for slavery, he has rendered all forms of slavery as it actually exists invalid. Moreover, as one may not submit to slavery, there is a moral injunction to attempt to throw off and escape it whenever it looms. Most scholars take this to be Locke's point regarding slavery: submission to absolute monarchy is a violation of the law of nature, for one does not have the right to enslave oneself. The legitimacy of an English king depended on (somehow) demonstrating descent from William the Conqueror: the right of conquest was therefore a topic rife with constitutional connotations. Locke does not say that all subsequent English monarchs have been illegitimate, but he does make their rightful authority dependent solely upon their having acquired the people's approbation. Locke first argues that, clearly, aggressors in an unjust war can claim no right of conquest: everything they despoil may be retaken as soon as the dispossessed have the strength to do so. Their children retain this right, so an ancient usurpation does not become lawful with time. The rest of the chapter then considers what rights a just conqueror might have. The argument proceeds negatively: Locke proposes one power a conqueror could gain, and then demonstrates how in point of fact that power cannot be claimed. He gains no authority over those that conquered with him, for they did not wage war unjustly: thus, whatever other right William may have had in England, he could not claim kingship over his fellow Normans by right of conquest. The subdued are under the conqueror's despotical authority, but only those who actually took part in the fighting. Those who were

governed by the defeated aggressor do not become subject to the authority of the victorious aggressor. They lacked the power to do an unjust thing, and so could not have granted that power to their governors: the aggressor therefore was not acting as their representative, and they cannot be punished for his actions. And while the conqueror may seize the person of the vanquished aggressor in an unjust war, he cannot seize the latter's property: he may not drive the innocent wife and children of a villain into poverty for another's unjust acts. While the property is technically that of the defeated, his innocent dependents have a claim that the just conqueror must honor. He cannot seize more than the vanquished could forfeit, and the latter had no right to ruin his dependents. (He may, however, demand and take reparations for the damages suffered in the war, so long as these leave enough in the possession of the aggressor's dependants for their survival). In so arguing, Locke accomplishes two objectives. First, he neutralizes the claims of those who see all authority flowing from William I by the latter's right of conquest. In the absence of any other claims to authority (e.g., Filmer's primogeniture from Adam, divine anointment, etc.), all kings would have to found their authority on the consent of the governed. Second, he removes much of the incentive for conquest in the first place, for even in a just war the spoils are limited to the persons of the defeated and reparations sufficient only to cover the costs of the war, and even then only when the aggressor's territory can easily sustain such costs (i.e., it can never be a profitable endeavor). Needless to say, the bare claim that one's spoils are the just compensation for a just war does not suffice to make it so, in Locke's view. Property In the Second Treatise, Locke claims that civil society was created for the protection of property. In saying this, he relies on the etymological root of "property," Latin proprius, or what is one's own, including oneself (cf. French propre). Thus, by "property" he means "life, liberty, and estate." By saying that political society was established for the better protection of property, he claims that it serves the private (and non-political) interests of its constituent members: it does not promote some good that can be realized only in community with others (e.g., virtue). For this account to work, individuals must possess some property outside of society, i.e., in the state of nature: the state cannot be the sole origin of property, declaring what belongs to whom. If the purpose of government is the protection of property, the latter must exist independently of the former. Filmer had said that, if there even were a state of nature (which he denied), everything would be held in common: there could be no private property, and hence no justice or injustice (injustice being understood as treating someone else's goods, liberty, or life as if it were one's own). Thomas Hobbes had argued the same thing. Locke therefore provides an account of how material property could arise in the absence of government. He begins by asserting that each individual, at a minimum, "owns" himself; this is a corollary of each individual's being free and equal in the state of nature. As a result, each must also own his own labor: to deny him his labor would be to make him a slave. One can therefore take items from the common store of goods by mixing one's labor with them: an apple on the tree is of no use to anyone — it must be picked to be eaten — and the picking of that apple makes it one's own. In an alternate argument, Locke claims that we must allow it to become private property lest all mankind have starved, despite the bounty of the world. A man must be allowed to eat, and thus have what he has eaten be his own (such that he could deny others a right to use it). The apple is surely his when he swallows it, when he chews it, when he bites into it, when he brings it to his mouth, etc.: it became his as soon as he mixed his labor with it (by picking it from the tree). This does not yet say why an individual is allowed to take from the common store of nature. There is a necessity to do so in order to eat, but this does not yet establish why others must respect one's property, especially as they labor under the like necessity. Locke assures his readers that the state of nature is a state of plenty: one may take from communal store if one leaves a) enough and b) as good for others, and since nature is bountiful, one can take all that one can use without taking anything from someone else. Moreover, one can take only so much as one can use before it spoils. There are then two provisos regarding what one can take, the "enough and as good" condition and "spoilage." Gold does not rot. Neither does silver, or any other precious metal or gem. They are, moreover, useless, their aesthetic value not entering into the equation. One can heap up as much of them as one wishes, or take them in trade for food. By the tacit consent of mankind, they become a form of money (one accepts gold in exchange for apples with the understanding that someone else will accept that gold in exchange for wheat). One can therefore avoid the spoilage limitation by selling all that one has amassed before it rots; the limits on acquisition thus disappear. In this way, Locke argues that a full economic system could, in principle, exist within the state of nature. Property could therefore predate the existence of government, and thus society can be dedicated to the protection of property.

In the Twentieth Century, Marxist scholars viewed Locke as the founder of bourgeois capitalism. Those who were opposed to communism accepted this reading of Locke, and celebrated him for it. He has therefore become associated with capitalism.[citation needed] Representative government It is a misconception that Locke and his social contract demanded a democracy. Rather, Locke felt that a legitimate contract could exist between citizens and monarchies or oligarchies. His ideas heavily influenced, however, both the American and French Revolutions. His notions of people's rights and the role of civil government provided strong support for the intellectual movements of both revolutions. Right of revolution Locke believed that the relationship between the state and its citizens took the form of a 'contract,' whereby the governed agreed to surrender certain freedoms they enjoyed under the state of nature in exchange for the order and protection provided by a state, exercised according to the rule of law. However, if the state oversteps its limits and begins to exercise arbitrary power, it forfeits its 'side' of the contract and thus, the contract becomes void; the citizens not only have the right to overthrow the state, but are indeed morally compelled to revolt and replace it. Locke believes that the citizens are compelled to revolt because absolute power is never a remedy for the state of nature; however, Locke makes great effort to point out that if the citizens are going to revolt they must be on the right side of the issue. A secondary view on Locke's position of revolution argues that Locke requires that the legislative power must be dissolved, not by the actions of the common people, which effectively puts people back into the state of nature. This view would not suggest that people have the right to revolt, but rather to resist an arbitrary power to dissolve itself in order to make way for a new political structure. Charter of Connecticut

1662

CHARLES the Second, by the Grace of GOD, KING of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c. To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting.

Whereas by the several Navigations, Discoveries, and Successful Plantations of divers of Our loving Subjects of this Our Realm of England, several lands, Islands, Places, Colonies, and Plantations have been obtained and settled in that Part of the Continent of America called NewEngland, and thereby the Trade and Commerce there, bath been of late Years much increased: And whereas We have been informed by the hirable Petition of our Trusty and Well beloved John Winthrop, John Mason, Samuel Wyllys, Henry Clarke, Matthew Allyn, John Tapping, Nathan Gold, Richard Treat, Richard Lord, Henry Wolcott, John Talcott, Daniel Clarke, John Ogden, Thomas Wells, Obadias Brewen, John Clerke, Anthony Hawkins, John Deming, and Matthew Camfeild, being Persons principally interested in Our Colony or Plantation of Connecticut, in NewEngland, that the same Colony, or the greatest part thereof, was Purchased and obtained for great and valuable Considerations, and some other Part thereof gained by Conquest, and with touch difficulty, and at the only Endeavors, Cadence, and Charges of theirs and their Associates, arced those under whom they Claim, Subdued, and Improved, and thereby become a considerable Enlargement and Addition of Our Dominions and Interest there. Now Know YE, That in consideration thereof, and in Regard the said Colony is remote from other the English Plantations in the places aforesaid, and to the End the Affairs and Business which shall from Time to Time happen or arise concerning the same, may be duly Ordered and Managed, we have thought fit, and at the humble Petition of the Persons aforesaid, and are graciously Pleased to create and make them a Body Politicly and Corporate, with the Powers and Privileges herein after mentioned; and accordingly Our Will and Pleasure is, and of our especial Grace, certain Knowledge, and meer Motion, We have ordained, constituted and declared, and by these presents, for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, Do ordain, constitute and declare, that they the said John Winthrop, John Mason, Samuel Wyllys, Henry Clarke, Matthew Allyn, John Tapping, Nathan Gold, Richard Treat, Richard lord, Henry Wolcott, John Talcott, Daniel Clarke, John Ogden, Thomas Wells, Obadiah Bowed, John Clerke, Anthony Hawkins, John Deming, and Matthew Camfeild, and all such others as now are, or hereafter shall be admitted and made free of the Company and Society of Our Colony of Connecticut, in America, shall from Time to Time, and for ever hereafter, be One Body Corporate and politique, in Fact and Name, by the Name of, Governor and Company of the English colony of Connecticut in New-England, in America; And that by the same Name they and their Successors shall and may have perpetual Succession, and shall and may be Persons able and capable in the Law, to plead and be impleaded, to answer and to be answered unto, to defend and be defended in all and singular Suits, Causes, Quarrels, Matters, Actions, and Things, of what Kind or Nature soever; and also to have, take, possess, acquire, and purchase Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, or any Goods or Chattels, and the same to lease, grant, demise, alien, bargain, sell, and dispose of, as other Our liege People of this Our Realm of England, or any other Corporation or Body Politique within the same may lawfully do. And further, That the said Governor and Company, and their Successors shall and may forever hereafter have a common Seal, to serve and use for all Causes, Matters, Things, and affairs

whatsoever, of them and their Successors, and the same Seal, to alter, change, break and make new from Time to Time, at their Wills and Pleasures, as they shall think fit. And further, We will and ordain, and by these Presents, forms, our Heirs and Successors, do declare and appoint, that for the better ordering and managing of the Affairs and Business of the said Company and their Successors, there shall be One Governor, One DeputyGovernor, and Twelve Assistants, to be from time to Time constituted, elected and chosen out of the Freemen of the said Company for the Time being, in such Manner and Form as hereafter in these Presents is expressed, which said Officers shall apply themselves to take Care for the best disposing and ordering of the general Business and all airs of and concerning the Land and Hereditaments herein after mentioned to- be granted, and the Plantation thereof, and the Government of the People thereof: And for the better Execution of Our Royal Pleasure herein, We do for Us, Our Heirs, and Successors, assign, name, constitute and appoint the aforesaid John Winthrop to be the first and present Governor of the said Company, and the said John Mason, to be the Deputy-Governor, and the said Samuel Wyllys, Matthew Allyn, Nathan Gold, Henry Clerke, Richard Treat, John Ogden, John Tapping, John Talcott, Thomas Wells, Henry Wolcott, Richard Lord, and Daniel Clerke, to be the Twelve present assistants of the said Company, to continue in the said several Offices respectively, until the second Thursday which shall be in the Month of October now next coming. And further we Will, and by these Presents for Us, Our Heirs, and Successors, Do ordain and grant, That the Governor of the said Company for the Time being, or in his Absence by occasion of Sickness, or otherwise by his Leave or Permission, the Deputy-Governor for the Time being, shall and may from Time to Time upon all Occasions, give Order for the assembling of the said Company, and calling them together to consult and advise of the Business and Affairs of the said Company, and that for ever hereafter, twice in every Year, That is to say, On every Second Thursday in October, and on every Second Thursday in May, or oftener in case it shall be requisite; the Assistants, and Freemen of the said Company, or such of them (not exceeding Two Persons from each Place, Town, or City) who shall be from Time to Time "hereunto elected or deputed by the major Part of the Freemen of the respective Towns, Cities, and Places for which they shall be elected or deputed, shall have a General Meeting or Assembly, then and there to consult and advise in and about the Affairs and Business of the said Company: and that the Governor, or in his Absence the Deputy-Governor of the said Company for the Time being, and such of the Assistants and Freemen of the said Company as shall be so elected or deputed, and be present at such Meeting or Assembly, or the greatest Number of them, whereof the Governor of Deputy-Governor, and Six of the Assistants at least, to be Seven, shall be called the General Assembly, and shall have full Popover and authority to alter-and change their Days and Times of Meeting, or General-Assemblies, for electing the Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Assistants, other Officers or any other Courts, Assemblies or Meetings, and to choose, nominate and appoint such and so many other Persons as they shall; and shall be willing to accept the same, to be Free of the said Company and Body Politique, and them into the same to admit; And to elect and constitute such Officers as they shall think fit and requisite for the ordering, managing and disposing of the Affairs of the said Governor and Company, and their Successors: And we do hereby for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, establish and ordain, That once in the Year for ever hereafter, Namely, the said Second Thursday in May, the Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Assistants of the said Company, and other Officers of the said Company, or such of them as the said General Assembly shall thinly fit, shall be in the said General Court and Assembly to be held from that Day or Time, newly chosen for the Year ensuing, by such greater Part of the said Company for the Time being, then and there present; and if the Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Assistants by these Presents appointed, or such as hereafter be newly chosen into their Rooms, or any of them, or any other the Officers to be appointed for the said Company shall die, or be removed from his or their several Offices or Places before the said general Day of Election, whom We do hereby declare for any Misdemeanor or Default, to be removable by the Governor, Assistants, and Company, or such greater Part of them in any of the said public Courts to be assembled, as is aforesaid, that then and in every such Case, it shall and may be lawful to and for the Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Assistants, and Company aforesaid, or such greater Part of them so to be assembled, as is aforesaid, in any of their Assemblies, to proceed to a new Election of one or more of their Company, in the Room or Place, Rooms or Places of such Governor, DeputyGovernor, Assistant, or other Officer or Officers so dying or removed, according to their Discretions, and immediately upon and after such Election or Elections made of such Governor, Deputy-Governor, Assistant or Assistants,- or any other Officer of the said Company, in Manner and Form aforesaid, the Authority, Office and Power before given to the former Governor, Deputy-Governor, or other Officer and Officers so removed, in whose Stead and Place new shall be chosen, shall as to him and them, and every of them respectively, cease and determine. Provided also, And Our Will and Pleasure is, That as well such as are by these Presents appointed to be the present Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Assistants of the said Company, as those that shall succeed them, and all other Officers to be appointed and chosen, as aforesaid, shall before they undertake the Execution of their said Offices and Places respectively, take their several and respective corporal Oaths for the due and faithful Performance of their Duties, in their several Offices and Places, before such Person or Persons as are by these Presents hereafter appointed to take and receive the same; That is to say, The said John Winthrop, who is herein before nominated and appointed the present Governor of the said Company, shall take the said Oath before One or more of the Masters of Our Court of Chancery for the Time being, unto which Master of Chancery, We do by these Presents give full Power and Authority to administer the Oath to the said John Winthrop accordingly: And the said John Mason, who is herein before nominated and appointed the present Deputy-Governor of the said Company, shall take Math before the said John Winthrop, or any Two of the Assistants of the said Company, unto whom We do by these Presents give full Power and Authority to administer the said Oath to the said John Mason accordingly: And the said Saqnnel Wyllys, Henry Clerice, Matthew Allyn, John Tapping, Nathan Cold, Richard Treat, Richard Lord, Henry Wolcott, John Talcott, Daniel Clerke, John Ogden, and Thomas Wells, who are herein before nominated and appointed the present Assistants of the said Company, shall take the Oath before the said John Winthrop, and John Mason, or One of them, to whom We do hereby give full Power and Authority to administer the same accordingly.

And Our further Will and Pleasure is, that all and every Governor, or Deputy-Governor to be elected and chosen by Virtue of these Presents, shall take the said Oath before Two or more of the Assistants of the said Company for the Time being, unto whom We do by these Presents give full Power and Authority to give and administer the said Oath accordingly; and the said Assistants, and every of them, and all and every other Officer or Officers to be here after chosen from Time to Time, to take the said Oath before the Governor, or Deputy-Governor for the Time being, unto which Governor, or Deputy-Governor, We do by these Presents give full Power and Authority to administer the same accordingly. And further, Of Our more ample Grace, certain Knowledge, and meer Motion, We have given and granted, and by these presents for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, do give and grant unto the said Governor and Company of the English Colony of Connecticut, in New England, in America, and to every Inhabitant there, and to every Person and Persons trading thither, and to every such Person and Persons as are or shall be Free of the said Colony, full Power and Authority from Time to Time, and at all Times hereafter, to take Ship, Transport and carry away for and towards the Plantation and Defence of the said Colony, such of Our loving Subjects and Strangers, as shall or will willingly accompany them in, and to their said Colony and Plantation, except such Person and Persons as are or shall be therein restrained by Us, Our Heirs and Successors; and also to ship and transport all, and all Manner of Goods, Chattels, Merchandises, and other Things whatsoever that are or shall be useful or necessary for the Inhabitants of the said Colony, and may lawfully be transported thither; Nevertheless, not to be discharged of Payment to Us, our Heirs and Successors, of the Duties, Customs and Subsidies which are or ought to be paid or payable for the same. And further, Our Will and Pleasure is, and We do for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, ordain, declare, and grant unto the said Governor and Company, and their Successors, That all, and every the Subjects of Us, Our Heirs, or Successors, which shall go to inhabit within the said Colony, and every of their Children, which shall happen to be born there, or on the Seas in going thither, or returning from thence, shall have and enjoy all Liberties and Immunities of free Did natural Subjects within any the Dominions of US, Our Heirs or Successors, to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes whatsoever, as if the they and every of them were born within the realm of England; And We do authorize and impower the Governor or in his Absence the Deputy governor for the Time being, to appoint Two or more of the said Assistants at any of their Courts or Assemblies to be held as aforesaid, to have Power and Authority to administer the Oath of Supremacy and Obedience to all and every Person or Persons which shall at any Time or Times hereafter go or pass into the said Colony of Connecticut, unto which said Assistants so to be appointed as aforesaid We do by these Presents give full Power and Authority to administer the said Oath accordingly. And We do further of Our especial Grace, certain Knowledge: and meer Motion, give, and grant unto the said Governor and Company of the English Colony of Connecticut, in New-England, in America, and their Successors, That it shall and may be lawful to and for the Governor, or Deputy-Governor, and such of the Assistants of the said Company for the Time being as shall be assembled in any of the General Courts aforesaid, or in any Courts to be especially summoned or assembled for that Purpose, or the greater part of them, whereof the Governor, or Deputy-Governor, and Six of the Assistants to be always Seven, to erect and make such Judicatories, for the hearing, and determining of all Actions, Causes, Matters, and Things happening within the said Colony, or Plantation, and which shall be in Dispute, and Depending there, as they shall think Fit, and Convenient, and also from Time to Time to Make, Ordain, and Establish all manner of wholesome, and reasonable Laws Statutes, Ordinances, Directions, and Instructions, not Contrary to the Laws of this Realm of England, as well for settling the Forms, and Ceremonies of Government, and Magistracy, fit and necessary for the said Plantation, and the Inhabitants there, as for Naming, and Stiling all Sorts of Officers, both Superior and Inferior, which they shall find Needful for the Government, and Plantation of the said Colony, and the distinguishing and setting forth of the several Duties, Powels, and Limits of every such Office and Place, and the Forms of such Oaths not being contrary to the Laws and Statutes of this Our Realm of England, to be administered for the Execution of the said several Offices and Places as also for the disposing and ordering of the Election of such of the said Officers as are to be annually chosen, and of such others as shall succeed in case of Death or Removal, and administring the said Oath to the newly-elected Officers, and granting necessary Commissions, and for Imposition of lawful Fines, Mulcts. Imprisonment or other Punishment upon Offenders and Delinquents according to the Curse of other Corporations within this our Kingdom of England, and the same Laws, Fines, Mulcts and Executions, to alter, change, revoke, annul, release, or pardon under their Common Seal, as by the said General Assembly, or the major Part of them shall be thought fit, and for the directing, ruling and disposing of all other Matters and things, whereby Our said People Inhabitants there, may be so religiously, peaceably and civilly governed, as their good Life and orderly Conversation may win and invite the Natives of the Country to the Knowledge and Obedience of the only true GOD, and He Saviour of Mankind, and the Christian Faith, which in Our Royal Intentions, and the adventurers free Possession, is the only and principal End of this Plantation; willing, commanding and requiring, and by these Presents for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, ordaining and appointing, that all such Laws, Statutes and Ordinances, Instructions, Impositions and Directions as shall be so made by the Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Assistants as aforesaid, and published in Writing under their Common Seal, shall carefully and duly be observed, kept, performed, and put in Execution, according to the true Intent and Meaning of The same, and these Our Letters Patents, or the Duplicate, or Exemplification thereof, shall be to all and every such Officers, Superiors and Inferiors from Time to Time, for the putting of the same Orders, Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, Instructions, and Directions in due Execution, against Us, Our Heirs and Successors, a sufficient Warrant and Discharge. And We do further for US, Our Heirs and Successors, give and grant unto the said Governor and Company, and their Successors, by these Presents, That it shall and may be lawful to, and for the Chief Commanders, Governors and Officers of the said Company for the Time being, who shall be resident in the Parts of New-England hereafter mentioned, and others inhabiting there, by their Leave, Admittance Appointment, or Direction, from Time to Time, and at Al Times hereafter, for their special Defence and Safety, to Assemble, Martial-Array, and put in warlike Posture the Inhabitants of the said Colony, and to Commissionate, Impower, and Authorize such Person or Persons as they shall think fit, to lead and conduct the said Inhabitants, and to encounter, expulse, repel and resist by Force of Arms, as well by Sea as by Land, and also to kill, slay, and destroy by all

fitting Ways' Enterprises, and Means whatsoever, all and every such Person or Persons as shall at any Time hereafter attempt or enterprise the Destruction, Invasion, Detriment, or Annoyance of the said Inhabitants or Plantation, and to use and exercise the Law Martial in such Cases only as Occasion shall require; and to take or surprize by all Ways and Means whatsoever, all and every such Person and Persons, with their Ships' Armour, Ammunition and other Goods of such as shall in such hostile Manner invade or attempt the defeating of the said Plantation, or the hurt of the said Company and Inhabitants, and upon just Causes to invade and destroy the Natives, or other Enemies of the said Colony. Nevertheless; Our Will and Pleasure is, and We do hereby declare unto all Christian Icings, Princes, and States, that if any Persons which shall hereafter lie of the said Company or Plantation, or any other by Appointment of the said Governor and Company for the Time being, shall at anv Time or Times hereafter rob or spoil by Sea or by Land, and do any Hurt, Violence, or unlawful Hostility to any of the Subjects of Us, Our Heirs or Successors, or any of the Subjects of any Prince or State, being then in League with Us, Our Heirs or Successors, upon Complaint of such Injury done to any such Prince or State, or their Subjects, We, Our Heirs and Successors will make open Proclamation within any Parts of Our Realm of England fit for that Purpose, thin the Person or Persons committing any such Robbery or Spoil, shall within the Time limited by such Proclamation, make full Restitution or Satisfaction of all such Injuries Lone or committed, so as the Said Prince, or others so complaining may be fully satisfied and contented; and if the said Person or Persons who shall commit any such Robbery or Spoil shall not make Satisfaction accordingly, within such Time so to be limited, that then it shall and may be lawful for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, to put such Person or Persons out of (whir Allegiance and Protection; and that it shall and may be lawful and free for all Princes or others to prosecute with Hostility such Offenders, and every of them, their, and every of their Procurers, Aiders, Abettors and Counsellors in that Behalf. Provided also, and Our express Will and Pleasure is, and We do by these Presents for Us, Our Heirs; and Successors, Ordain and Appoint, that these Presents shall not in any Manner hinder any of Our loving Subjects whatsoever to use and exercise the Trade of Fishing upon the Coast of NewEngland, in America, but they and every or any of them shall have full and free Power and Liberty, to continue, and use the said Trade of Fishing upon the said Coast, in any of the Seas thereunto adjoining, or any Arms of the Seas, or Salt Water Rivers where they have been accustomed to fish, and to build and set up on the. waste Land belonging to the said Colony of Connecticut, such Wharves, Stages, and Work-Houses as shall be necessary for the salting, drying, and keeping of their Fish to be taken, or gotten upon that Coast, any Thing in these Presents contained to the contrary notwithstanding. And Know Ye further, That We, of Our abundant Grace, certain Knowledge, and mere Motion, have given, granted, and confirmed, and by these Presents for Us, our Heirs and Successors, do give, grant and confirm unto the said Governor and Company, and their Successors, all that Part of Our Dominions in New-England in America, bounded on the East by Narraganset-River, commonly called Narraganset-Bay, where the said River falleth into the Sea; and on the North by the Line of the If Massachusetts-Plantation; and on the South by the Sea; and in Longitude as the Line of the Massachusetts-Colony, running from East to West, That is to say, From the said Narraganset-Bay on the East, to the South Sea on the West Part, with the Islands thereunto adjoining, together with all firm Lands, Soils, Grounds, Havens, Ports, Rivers, Waters, Dishings, Mines, Minerals, precious Stones, Quarries, and all and singular other Commodities, Jurisdictions, Royalties, Privileges, Franchises, Preheminences, and Hereditaments whatsoever, within the said Tract, Bounds, Lands, and Islands aforesaid, or to them or any of them belonging. To have and to hold the same unto the said Governor and Company, their Successors and Assigns for ever, upon Trust, and for the Use and Benefit of Themselves and their Associates, Freemen of the said Colony, their Heirs and Assigns, to be holden of Its, Our Heirs and Successors, as of Our Manor of East-Greenwich, in free and common Soccage, and not in Capite, nor by Knights Service, yielding and paying therefore to Us, Our Heirs and Successors, only the Fifth Part of all the Ore of Gold add Silver which from Time to Time, and at all Times hereafter, shall be there gotten, had, or obtained, in Lieu of all Services, Duties, and Demands whatsoever, to be to Us, our Heirs, or Successors therefore, or thereout rendered, made, or paid. And lastly, We do for Us, our Heirs and Successors, grant to the said Governor and Company, and their Successors, by these Presents, That these Our Letters Patents, shall be firm, good and effectual in the Law, to all Intents, Constructions, and Purposes whatsoever according to Our true Intent and Meaning herein before declared, as shall be construed, reputed and adjudged most favourable on the Behalf, and for the best Benefit, and Behoof of the said Governor and Company, and their Successors, although express Mention of the true Yearly Value or Certainty of the Premises, or of any of them, or of any other Gifts or Grants by Us, or by any of Our Progenitors, or Predecessors, heretofore made to the said Governor and Company of the English Colony of Connecticut, in New-England, in America, aforesaid, in these Presents is not made, or any Statute, Act, Ordinance, Provision, Proclamation, or Restriction heretofore had, made, enacted, ordained, or provided, or any other Matter, Cause, or Thing whatsoever, to the contrary thereof, in any wise notwithstanding. In Witness whereof, We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patents. Witness Ourself at Westminster, the Three and Twentieth Day of April, in the Fourteenth Year of our Reign. By Writ of Privy Seal, HOWARD

Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen Approved by the National Assembly of France, August 26, 1789 The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assembly, believing that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments, have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being constantly before all the members of the Social body, shall remind them continually of their rights and duties; in order that the acts of the legislative power, as well as those of the executive power, may be compared at any moment with the objects and purposes of all political institutions and may thus be more respected, and, lastly, in order that the grievances of the citizens, based hereafter upon simple and incontestable principles, shall tend to the maintenance of the constitution and redound to the happiness of all. Therefore the National Assembly recognizes and proclaims, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the following rights of man and of the citizen: Articles: 1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good. 2. The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. 3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation. 4. Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by law. 5. Law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law. 6. Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to participate personally, or through his representative, in its foundation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents. 7. No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by law. Any one soliciting, transmitting, executing, or causing to be executed, any arbitrary order, shall be punished. But any citizen summoned or arrested in virtue of the law shall submit without delay, as resistance constitutes an offense. 8. The law shall provide for such punishments only as are strictly and obviously necessary, and no one shall suffer punishment except it be legally inflicted in virtue of a law passed and promulgated before the commission of the offense. 9. As all persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared guilty, if arrest shall be deemed indispensable, all harshness not essential to the securing of the prisoner's person shall be severely repressed by law. 10. No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law. 11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law. 12. The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public military forces. These forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be intrusted. 13. A common contribution is essential for the maintenance of the public forces and for the cost of administration. This should be equitably distributed among all the citizens in proportion to their means. 14. All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their representatives, as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to what uses it is put; and to fix the proportion, the mode of assessment and of collection and the duration of the taxes. 15. Society has the right to require of every public agent an account of his administration. 16. A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all. 17. Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.

Jean-Jacques RousseauPerhaps Rousseau's most important work is The Social Contract, which outlines the basis for a legitimate political order within a framework of classical republicanism. Published in 1762, it became one of the most influential works of political philosophy in the Western tradition. It developed some of the ideas mentioned in an earlier work, the article Economie Politique (Discourse on Political Economy), featured in Diderot's Encyclopédie. The treatise begins with the dramatic opening lines, "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains. One man thinks himself the master of others, but remains more of a slave than they." Rousseau claimed that the state of nature was a primitive condition without law or morality, which human beings left for the benefits and necessity of cooperation. As society developed, division of labor and private property required the human race to adopt institutions of law. In the degenerate phase of society, man is prone to be in frequent competition with his fellow men while also becoming increasingly dependent on them. This double pressure threatens both his survival and his freedom. According to Rousseau, by joining together into civil society through the social contract and abandoning their claims of natural right, individuals can both preserve themselves and remain free. This is because submission to the authority of the general will of the people as a whole guarantees individuals against being subordinated to the wills of others and also ensures that they obey themselves because they are, collectively, the authors of the law. Although Rousseau argues that sovereignty (or the power to make the laws) should be in the hands of the people, he also makes a sharp distinction between the sovereign and the government. The government is composed of magistrates, charged with implementing and enforcing the general will. The "sovereign" is the rule of law, ideally decided on by direct democracy in an assembly. Under a monarchy, however, the real sovereign is still the law. Rousseau was opposed to the idea that the people should exercise sovereignty via a representative assembly (Book III, Chapter XV). The kind of republican government of which Rousseau approved was that of the city state, of which Geneva, was a model, or would have been, if renewed on Rousseau's principles. France could not meet Rousseau's criterion of an ideal state because it was too big. Much subsequent controversy about Rousseau's work has hinged on disagreements concerning his claims that citizens constrained to obey the general will are thereby rendered free: The notion of the general will is wholly central to Rousseau's theory of political legitimacy. ... It is, however, an unfortunately obscure and controversial notion. Some commentators see it as no more than the dictatorship of the proletariat or the tyranny of the urban poor (such as may perhaps be seen in the French Revolution). Such was not Rousseau's meaning. This is clear from the Discourse on Political Economy, where Rousseau emphasizes that the general will exists to protect individuals against the mass, not to require them to be sacrificed to it. He is, of course, sharply aware that men have selfish and sectional interests which will lead them to try to oppress others. It is for this reason that loyalty to the good of all alike must be a supreme (although not exclusive) commitment by everyone, not only if a truly general will is to be heeded but also if it is to be formulated successfully in the first place".[21] David Hume It is difficult to categorize Hume's political affiliations. His thought contains elements that are, in modern terms, both conservative and liberal, as well as ones that are both contractarian and utilitarian, though these terms are all anachronistic. Thomas Jefferson banned Hume's History from the University of Virginia, fearing that it "has spread universal toryism over the land" [69]. Yet, Samuel Johnson thought Hume "a Tory by chance... for he has no principle. If he is anything, he is a Hobbist" [70]. His central concern is to show the importance of the rule of law, and stresses throughout his political Essays the importance of moderation in politics. This outlook needs to be seen within the historical context of eighteenth century Scotland, where the legacy of religious civil war, combined with the relatively recent memory of the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite risings, fostered in a historian such as Hume a distaste for enthusiasm and factionalism that appeared to threaten the fragile and nascent political and social stability of a country that was deeply politically and religiously divided. He thinks that society is best governed by a general and impartial system of laws, based principally on the "artifice" of contract; he is less concerned about the form of government that administers these laws, so long as it does so fairly (though he thought that republics were more likely to do so than monarchies). Hume expressed suspicion of attempts to reform society in ways that departed from long-established custom, and he counselled peoples not to resist their governments except in cases of the most egregious tyranny[71]. However, he resisted aligning himself with either of Britain's two political parties, the Whigs and the Tories, and he believed that we should try to balance our demands for liberty with the need for strong authority, without sacrificing either. He supported liberty of the press, and was sympathetic to democracy, when suitably constrained. It has been argued that he was a major inspiration for James Madison's writings, and the Federalist No. 10 in particular. He was also, in general, an optimist about social progress, believing that, thanks to the economic development that comes with the expansion of trade, societies progress from a state of "barbarism" to one of "civilisation". Civilised

societies are open, peaceful and sociable, and their citizens are as a result much happier. It is therefore not fair to characterise him, as Leslie Stephen did, as favouring "...that stagnation which is the natural ideal of a skeptic."[73] Though it has been suggested Hume had no positive vision of the best society, he in fact produced an essay titled Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,[74] which lays out what he thought was the best form of government. His pragmatism shone through, however, in his caveat that we should only seek to implement such a system should an opportunity present itself, which would not upset established structures. He defended a strict separation of powers, decentralisation, extending the franchise to anyone who held property of value and limiting the power of the clergy. The Swiss militia system was proposed as the best form of protection. Elections were to take place on an annual basis and representatives were to be unpaid. It is also important to note that the ideal commonwealth laid out by Hume was held to be ideal only for the British Isles in the 18th century. Hume was a relativist, and realized that such a form of government would not be ideal for all cultures, nor would it necessarily be permanent as historical conditions change. Adam Smith The Wealth of Nations (An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations) expounds that the free market, while appearing chaotic and unrestrained, is actually guided to produce the right amount and variety of goods by a so-called "invisible hand".[53]The image of the invisible hand was previously employed by Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, but it has its original use in his essay, "The History of Astronomy". Smith believed that when an individual pursues his self-interest, he indirectly promotes the good of society: "by pursuing his own interest, [the individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he intends to promote it."[57] Self-interested competition in the free market, he argued, would tend to benefit society as a whole by keeping prices low, while still building in an incentive for a wide variety of goods and services. Nevertheless, he was wary of businessmen and argued against the formation of monopolies.[citation needed] An often-quoted passage from The Wealth of Nations is: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages."[58] Value theory was important in classical theory. Smith wrote that the "real price of every thing ... is the toil and trouble of acquiring it" as influenced by its scarcity, a precursor to the modern concept of opportunity cost. Smith maintained that, with rent and profit, other costs besides wages also enter the price of a commodity.[59] Other classical economists presented competing theories to those of Smith, termed the "labour theory of value".[citation needed] Smith's advocacy of self-interest based economic exchange did not, however, preclude for him issues of fairness and justice. In Asia, Europeans "by different arts of oppression..have reduced the population of several of the Moluccas,"[60] he wrote, while "the savage injustice of the Europeans" arriving in America, "rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to all, ruinous and destructive to several of those unfortunate countries."[61] The Native Americans, "far from having ever injured the people of Europe, had received the first adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospitality." However, "superiority of force" was "so great on the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries."[60] Smith also believed that a division of labour would effect a great increase in production. One example he used was the making of pins. One worker could probably make only twenty pins per day. However, if ten people divided up the eighteen steps required to make a pin, they could make a combined amount of 48,000 pins in one day. However, Smith's views on division of labour are not unambiguously positive, and are typically mis-characterized.[62] On labor relations, Smith noted "severity" of laws against worker actions, and contrasted the masters' "clamour" against workers associations, with associations and collusions of the masters which "are never heard by the people" though such actions are "always" and "everywhere" taking place.[63]