Sébastien Chailleux
ECPR 2014
Orienting a Controversy through Technical Expertise: The Struggle over Shale Gas in France and Quebec Sébastien Chailleux (Sciences Po Bordeaux, Centre Emile Durkheim / Université Laval de Québec, department of sociology) Résumé : l’industrie des gaz de schiste peut être considérée comme une controverse sociotechnique en France et au Québec. Elle mobilise des expertises multiples qui défendent des définitions conflictuelles de cet hydrocarbure de roche-mère. Les instruments d’action publique choisis pour gérer cette controverse ont tendance à séparer les enjeux techniques des aspects sociaux, ils divisent le débat entre un forum scientifique et administratif et un espace de consultation publique. Ils protègent une définition des gaz de schiste comme ressource nationale grâce à la légitimation de certaines expertises et rejettent la participation publique à une dimension d’acceptabilité sociale. Mots clés : controverse, gaz de schiste, comparaison, expertise, participation publique Abstract: The shale gas industry can be considered as a sociotechnical controversy in France and Quebec. It mobilizes multiple expertise defending conflictual definitions of this bedrock hydrocarbon. Instruments of public action chosen to manage this controversy tended to separate technical stakes from social aspects. They divided the debate between a scientific and administrative forum and a public consultation space. They protect shale gas as a national resource by legitimating particular expertise and pushing away public participation only as a mean of social acceptability. Keywords: controversy, shale gas, comparative analysis, expertise, public participation Introduction Shale gas started to be an energy of interest in the early 2000s, mainly in the United States, due to technical innovation and the increasing price of gas and oil. The exploitation of these bedrock hydrocarbons1 requires the combined techniques of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drillings. France and Quebec are thought to possess extensive resources (US Department of Energy, 2013) that companies have wanted to explore and extract since the late 2000s. The eventuality of such exploitation created a controversy on the environmental and social impacts of this industry. Previous studies had shown both the pros and cons of this new industry. In the United States, where the industry is already extracting shale gas, numerous studies and reports have discussed and contradicted the arguments of the companies regarding environmental impacts (Colburn et al., 2012 on air pollution; Warner et al., 2012 and Haluszczak et al., 2012 on water contamination; Slonecker et al., 2012 on landscape consequences just to cite a few), public health risks (Bamberger and Oswald, 2012), information access (Sierra Club, 2012; Fisk, 2013), regulation (Rabe and Borick, 2013; Davis, 2012) and economic impacts (Boersma and Johnson, 2012; Dutzik and Rumpler, 2012; Barth, 2013). These different studies bring a critical perspective to the shale gas industry but do not always widen the scope of the controversy. They discuss shale gas inside the stable frame of an innovative industry which needs risk management. Our sociotechnical approach is trying to outrun these technical aspects and to engage in a wider discussion on the sociopolitical aspects, implicit interests, and degree of democratic choice in this controversy. The controversy is settled in neither France nor Quebec, and there is still opportunity to debate such a project (decide on whether it 1
Bedrock hydrocarbons regroup shale gas, shale oil, coalbed methane and tar sands, they are considered as unconventional hydrocarbons because of the particular techniques used to extract them.
Sébastien Chailleux
IPSA 2014
should be carried forward, not on how to correct externalities). There is no hard data to analyze, but rather discourses and power relationships between the diverse stakeholders trying to legitimize their definition of the issue. The uncertainty of this innovative industry is larger because it includes the conflicting research on the technical aspects as well as the understanding of the social concerns and the values the opponents bear. The shale gas controversy gives us the opportunity to study how policy-makers manage such scientific uncertainty and social concerns. The aim of this study is to show how the French and Quebec governments have developed the shale gas controversy as an object of public policy. We seek to answer the following question: how can public participation and official expertise in such controversies be accommodated? France and Quebec share a common language but also close views on the role of the state in the public domain: high taxes and social expenditures, guiding rules to the private sector, risk assessment understood with high regard for the principle of precaution, etc. The mining legislation (subsurface mineral rights) is nearly the same with low financial incentives for local governments and mining precedence (free mining) over municipal and environmental rights. France and Quebec are different, however, when looking at the population density (even if the areas concerned with shale gas in Quebec are the most populated in the province), the share of the extractive sector in the overall economy (2.2% in France versus 10% in Quebec), the political system (federal parliamentary system in the Province of Quebec and semi presidential in the Nation-State France)2, and the gas market (Quebec is in the North American gas market with low prices compared to France in the European gas market which is quite dependent on Russian gas.) Finally, France and Quebec are different in their approach towards public participation. Quebec is more open to consultative and participative procedures than France (Blatrix et al., 2007), but France is more comfortable with social mobilization as a method of pressuring political decisions (Shorter and Tilly, 1974). This last point will be discussed in this paper. The 2011 French flash mobilization has been described by Chateauraynaud (2011) and Terral (2012). We try to understand this social mobilization in a wider scope that includes governmental responses to the public unrest. Furthermore, we bring a comparative point of view to the study of this controversy. The case of Quebec provides a different agenda-setting from the French one. However, we observe a similar technical framing endeavored by the institutional instruments. I previously demonstrated (Chailleux, 2014) the production of shale gas as a public policy issue by the social mobilization. This paper focuses on the transformation of the issue when it is processed by the administration and the parliament. It will underline the increasing technicality of the controversy that tends to push aside public participation in both cases. I will analyze the shale gas controversy with the tools provided by the Actor-Network Theory. Each stakeholder trying to translate the shale gas industry in his own words: “Translate is to describe, to organize a world inhabited by entities (human and non-human) which identities and interactions are thus defined” (Akrich et al., 2006: 243). ANT allows the study of the alliances schemes between the diverse stakeholders not only because of their position in their fields (Bourdieu, 1992; 1997) but because of the interactions they generate and the translation of shale gas they produce. Discourses over shale gas are thus central to the analysis. Sociology of translation will be improved with a discourse analysis in order to show both stakeholders and arguments logic (Chateauraynaud, 2011). However the definition of the shale gas controversy as a hybrid forum (Callon et al., 2001) is not working because of an asymmetrical relationship between the engaged stakeholders. We observe instead attempts of redefinition of the controversy through instruments of public action (Lascoumes, Le Galès, 2004: 13): “An instrument of public policy constitutes a device both technical and social organizing specific social relationships between the public power and the recipients according to the 2
An important difference that influenced the agenda-setting of the controversy is the structure of local political parties: in Quebec, local elected representatives are usually not affiliated with national or provincial parties whereas they are in France. 2 on 18
Sébastien Chailleux
IPSA 2014
representations and meanings it is holding.” Those instruments legitimize some expertise and rejected others. They implement regulatory science (Jasanoff, 1990) to manage shale gas impacts. They frame public participation to describe public preoccupation as an opinion which is opposed to scientific facts. The shale gas controversy allows to question the limitation of public participation to scientific expertise developed by Collins and Evans (2002, 2007) and the third wave of sociology of sciences3. They underline the role of “those who know what they are talking about” (Collins, Evans, 2007: 113) in order to avoid technological populism. In that direction, Collins and Evans categorized different kinds of experts. They acknowledged the role of “experience-based experts” in the political forum but they are denied the same legitimacy as the “contributory experts” who monopolize the discussion in the scientific and technical forums. Experience-based experts do not possess any particular qualification; their expertise includes folk wisdom, technical connoisseur and interactional expertise. To be admitted in a scientific debate, an expert has to be recognized as a contributor i.e. to be encultured into the scientific practice. Contributory experts possess tacit knowledge of the habits of their own scientific field and master reflexive and interactive expertise that enable them to see the limitations and stakes of their discipline. The recognition of experts outside a scientific or professional forum is therefore not effective in the instruments of public action. Although the alternative expertise from associations is gaining increased credibility (Ollitrault, 2008) and official expertise is suspected of being dictated by industrialists (Fischer, 2009), official public debate has not been able to accommodate either differences of expertise nor with public participation (Irwin, 2006; Macnaghten, 2010). There is a gap between the display of a participative proceeding and the actual instrumental practice. Participation is quite often understood as a way to reach social acceptability, i.e. the support of the citizens. The stake for the supporters of the shale gas industry is to lead to forget the values embedded in their definition and to present it as a scientific fact. They aim to describe this industry as seamless web (Hughes, 1998), whereas their opponents wish to curtail the production of technical irreversibility (Akrich et al., 2006; Barthe, 2006) in order not to lose legitimacy to participate to the choices concerning the future of shale gas. The aim of this study is to show how institutional instruments frame public participation and legitimize the use of some expertise in comparison to others in policy-making. We hypothesize that involved governments have tried to split the controversy into small parts in order to reduce the level of uncertainty. Without scientific consensus, the objective of the instruments implemented is to differentiate some experts from others. The priority given to specific expertise through particular instruments seems a way to protect the state or administration’s own definition of the issue. We draw a parallel between the institutional instruments for managing expertise by the administrations in France and Quebec. We also compare the institutional instruments with the development of an alternative expertise by the opponents of shale gas exploitation through the creation of scientific committees. The structure, line-up, and discourses of these different forums will be compared by focusing on the kind of expertise they legitimize. We analyze the kind of expertise cited in the different reports published by these stakeholders. This study is also based on 23 semi-directive interviews recorded in 2012 and 2013 in France and 12 interviews in 2013 in Quebec, on communication documents from the stakeholders involved and on almost 2000 press articles in six newspapers (2009 to 2014). We selected a sample of representative stakeholders for each category based on their discourse, modes of action, and presence in the debate. We sought to understand their influence on public decision by isolating their arguments and looking for them in the media and the official documentation.
3
After the first wave of the mertonian norms, the second wave showed the sciences are socially constructed (Bloor, 1972), whereas the third wave questions constructivism in claiming for limitations to participate to the scientific forum in order to keep legitimate sciences. 3 on 18
Sébastien Chailleux
IPSA 2014
This paper will first describe the engaged stakeholders, their discourses and the expertise which purports their legitimacy. Then, we will see that both governments tried to split the controversy into small parts to reduce uncertainty. Analyzing the different kinds of experts engaged will enable us to show the arbitrary choice of the legitimacy given by the instruments of public action. Finally, the paper will claim that the choice of expertise is a way for both States to protect their translation of the shale gas and to delegitimize public participation. Three kinds of stakeholders and their discourse Shale gas industry Before analyzing the transformation of the controversy, we must describe the competing translations of shale gas. All the stakeholders base their translation and discourse on expertise, but they differ on the identity of the expert (professional, “contributory” or “experience-based”) and his weight in the public forum. Shale gas companies, like Total and Schuepbach in France, or Talisman and Junex in Quebec, communicate mainly through their professional associations. Their experts are mostly geologists and engineers defending their know-how of risk management, but also lawyers. They are professional, certified by their institution and mostly defending its interests – economic and strategic interests. Their discourse translates the shale gas industry as an economic resource and as a technical area better understood by professionals and experts from the inside. They challenge the opposition to shale gas as a lack of knowledge or an ideological bias. The sociotechnical network of the industry allied at first the companies and their technical instruments like fracking. But it was not strong enough to enlist the population. Pro-drilling supporters recruited then economic tools such as job creation to maintain a viable definition of shale gas exploitation in the media and the political forum. The first argumentative tests were failed so the industry had to reorient its strategy insisting on the rejection of its opponents outside the scientific rationality. Since the loi Jacob of 2011 in France, a Manichean opposition is growing between obscurantism and knowledge improvement. The industry supports scientific researches as a way to demonstrate the harmlessness of this new activity. “Beyond this bushfire, what appeared a pity to us, and unusual compared to other processes, was to deprive ourselves from the possibility of examination of a potential resource, to check if there is a resource.”4 The industry’s translation of shale gas is blocked by the moratorium on exploitation in both our cases but it stays a possible future depending on scientific progress and political will. The State The State is not a monolithic stakeholder and regroups various stakeholders with divergent interests. Nonetheless, for the ease of reading, the use of the term State will further refer to the group of stakeholders who dominate at a given moment, i.e. members of the majority party at the parliament and their most important ministry concerned by the subject: the one of the industry/natural resources. Representatives took diverse stances on the subject, but a vast majority turned to scientific knowledge in order to reduce uncertainty. Representatives rely on administrative instruments to legitimize a viable stance. The French State asked for the expertise of research centers – Institut national de l’environnement et des risques industriels (INERIS)5 and Bureau des recherches géologiques et minières (BRGM)6 - and internal engineering expertise - Conseil Général de l’Industrie, de l’Energie et des Technologies (CGIET)7 and Conseil Général de l’Environnement et du Développement Durable (CGEDD)8 - which concluded the necessity of further studies because of the gap between theoretical fracking based on American experiences and the reality of French 4
Interview with general secretary of the Union française des industries pétrolières, April 2012. National institute for the environment and industrial risks 6 Bureau of mining and geological surveys 7 General Council of Industry, Energy and Technologies 8 General Council of Environment and Sustainable Development 5
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IPSA 2014
underground. Due to this fact, in France in 2013, the BRGM and the CNRS9 signed a framework agreement for the geological mapping of all French territories. In Quebec, the ministries of natural resources and sustainable development have their own expertise but also rely on university studies to understand the impacts of the shale gas industry. These experts are professionals and scientists, also certified by an institution; they defend wider interests than the industrial experts and keep in mind the global context of the innovative industry. They also defend their own interests when asking for more impact studies to be performed by their institution. A scientific from the INERIS wishes to be part of a future debate over shale gas because “we have skills on subsurface exploitation, toxic chemicals and surface installations accidents.”10 They do not support directly any exploitation but they wish to be able to explore the subsurface to acknowledge the potential resource. Their discourse translates the shale gas as a national resource which should be managed long term and on a wider scale. Thanks to the institutional instruments in place, the State is able to form an alliance with the industry in dangling a future exploitation. The State becomes also partially ally with some associations like France nature environnement which validated the mining law reform, or No fracking France which purports studies on shale gas. This network of stakeholders is powerful because it includes legislators, administration and research centers. However its definition failed the same way as the industrial one because of argumentative gaps. Shale gas opponents contradict the State’s discourse with a more global logic: the mining code is opposed to environmental law; economic growth is balanced with the protection of local lands; national interest is faced with common good, to cite a few. The State is forced to assert a hierarchy of values it would prefer not to proclaim. These first two discourses are constructed by contributory experts or professional experts. They have similar training and careers. The case of André Caillé in Quebec is exemplary: he has a Ph. D. in physics and chemistry, he ran both of the State-owned companies possessing successively exclusive rights on prospecting gas and oil in Quebec, before selling them to the private sector in 2007. The same year, he was nominated as director of the Association pétrolière et gazière du Québec11 and he entered the board of directors of Junex – a company engaged in prospecting shale gas in the SaintLaurent valley. In France, the corps des mines and Polytechnique play a major role in organizations like INERIS and IFPEN (Institut Français du pétrole et des energies nouvelles)12, and also inside the ministries concerned with shale gas: the energy and climate director of the ministry of ecology who signed the shale gas permits in 2010 is a polytechnician and an alumni of Ecole des mines. These contributory experts generally aim to protect their professional interests and the political legitimacy they possess in policy-making. Their translation bring together sciences and law, they create a regulatory science in reducing the lack of knowledge and developing a legal frame. Social mobilization These previous experts are accused of bias by the opponents of the shale gas industry, who claim independent expertise: “We understood the information the government had access to, was totally insufficient. I asked to the ministries: where did the information come from? And they told me: we have them from the company.”13 The shale gas opponents have succeeded to impose an emergency warning into the public forum. They have opposed the industry’s translation – shale gas is only natural gas – and generated a public issue over shale gas – shale gas exploitation could be dangerous and governance over mining is inadequate (Chailleux, 2014). To do so, they engaged experts as geologists and hydrogeologists, often retired from the industry or research centers, but also include 9
CNRS: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : National Center for Scientific Research Interview with a scientific from INERIS, August, 2012 11 Association of oil and gas companies of Quebec 12 French institute of oil and new energies 13 Interview of a member of the alternative scientific commission against shale gas in Quebec, 2012 (our own translation) 10
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Sébastien Chailleux
IPSA 2014
economists, sociologists, biologists, jurists, etc. They are professionals and scientists, but most of the time uncertified by an institution14 and they are interested in a less carbon-based economy and in expanding environmentally friendly activities. In Québec, a scientific commission was created around more than 170 university and college professors and researchers, bringing together all kinds of specialists. Those experts in their respected fields played the role of knowledge brokers as they explained the various aspects of shale gas exploitation during conferences and public meetings. They rarely engaged in official research programs but developed knowledge on the subject, even creating tools for the opponents such as the reglement Saint Bonaventure, a municipal law written by Richard Langelier, doctor of Law, which prevents the gas companies to inject chemicals into the ground. Those experts are engaged professionals showing a second assessment of the industrial technical data and widening the scope of inquiry. Their discourse enters the public forum thanks to the social mobilization because it is not valued in the official reports. Their expertise is not plainly recognized as contributory from the industry’s point of view defending the boundaries of its knowledge. This alternative assessment is present in the media and the activist’s forum but it has difficulties to enter the administrative and the dominant scientific forums. Moreover, a full range of experience-based experts is called upon: they are, for example, kayakers, speleologists, farmers, etc. who have local knowledge. There are different kinds of experience-based experts: they can be like the Cumbrian farmers, local people using their local discrimination to criticize the certified expertise; they can also be “technical connoisseurs” that have developed a documentary expertise on shale gas, or a part of the controversy, having access to primary sources of knowledge. They are individuals or associations gathering documents, translating US studies, or broadcasting newsletters. These experts seek to obtain legitimacy in situating the issue on a more global forum than only the technical one, although they show they can manage the technical discourses. Their expertise is not really legitimized in the scientific forum, and is dismissed as an opinion which should be expressed outside the technical debate. Thus, the French opponents refused to participate to official debates so they cannot be legitimized. On the contrary Quebeckers invest in these forums with their expertise as they participated to the BAPE hearings and even to the environmental assessment. Their discourse translates the shale gas industry as a threat for the environment, their way of life, and their values and as an issue that should be discussed on a wider scale. Their discourse is more diverse, more global but rooted in the local, and accessible to the general public. The expertise from the social mobilization tries to maintain a sociotechnical definition of the controversy against the attempt of monopolization by the technical experts. Their discourse translates shale gas as a bedrock hydrocarbon and not as a resource, word embedded with a value relationship with the object it qualifies. Their translation allies shale gas with multiple economic, social, environmental and cultural stakes. Social mobilization binds local preoccupation with political change and systemic questioning. Their network is powerful, bringing together local collectives, national associations, local and national elected representatives, unions, and well-known figures. Ultimately shale gas opponents support energy transition and new governance of natural resources. Their discourse is strengthened after numerous argumentative tests and gained in consistency, it is both local and global. For the opponents, the protection of local land enables a global defense of the environment: “It started with the protection of the land, local, really local. Here Causses-Mejean, it’s 33km2. At first, it was not protecting the Lozère, it was to preserve Causses-Mejean. But ideas evolved, when you did some research, you realized the scope of the issue, from where comes the motto “neither here nor somewhere else”. (…) The claim spreads to
14
They do not receive financial support from their institution when participating in shale gas meeting. 6 on 18
Sébastien Chailleux
IPSA 2014
the protection of the global environment, and towards energy transition. It is an evolution.”15 In France and in Quebec, their translation succeeded in generating shale gas exploitation as a public issue. However, their translation of the issue is then reformulated when it entered the administrative and parliamentary forums. Their discourse remains fragile, facing the reality of energy transition because the solutions suggested are more theoretical than effective. The opposition discourse is strong but the proposition discourse has difficulty to be heard. To split the controversy The flash mobilization in the parliamentary trap In France, anti-shale gas claims are quickly taken into account by the elected representatives who captured the controversy to remain confined inside the legislative wall. Then the representatives empowered technical and scientific forums to manage the public action. The activists succeeded the agenda-setting of shale gas but their translation of the issue is not the one processed in the administrative forum. Social mobilizations start at the beginning of 2011 and succeed to shape an important network around the claim of a moratorium even a ban of shale gas. Three channels broadcasting the activist’s discourse converge: activists’ actions carry the cause toward the public sphere, the media broadcasts it, and local and national political supports bring it inside the parliament and the political agenda. In February 2011, the newly appointed minister, Nathalie KoscuiskoMorisset, announces a moratorium and asks for a survey to the CGIET and CGEDD on shale gas. Two successively parliamentary committees also worked on the issue. Shale gas is set on the political agenda and a legislative response is voted in July 2011, the loi Jacob, which bans fracking as a technique to extract shale gas and oil. Activists gain a Pyrrhic victory in 2011. Fracking is banned, blocking de facto the exploitation of shale gas, but the loi Jacob lets the door open for experimentation, through which the companies and their supporters will rush. Further report from the technical and scientific advisory board of the parliament claims in 2013 in favor for a more open-minded approach towards shale gas (OPECST, 2013). The minister of industry challenges the minister of environment on the necessity of shale gas exploitation. Under the socialist administration, related issues such as the reform of the code minier are voluntarily kept away from the shale gas debate. The opponents, deprived from their main argument – fracking is dangerous - have difficulties to be heard on more global issues like energy transition and mining rights. The mobilization is less followed by the media: some actions like Global frackdown (international day against fracking) have little resonance outside the activist sphere. The overruled permits, because of the loi Jacob, bear upon the most activist lands, such as Ardèche and Larzac, putting their collectives to sleep. Whereas the newly concerned areas16 in eastern and northern France meet difficulties to mobilize the inhabitants against this industry since they already had coal mining industry in the past. The government expected a greater social acceptability in those areas with an industrial tradition. An Ardéchois activist is ironically declaring in 2012: “if I had a spiteful gossip, I would say it had been worked out that way. They gave us a bone easy to eat away, we eat it away, we get tired on it, and after that, it goes in every direction.” 17 The activists wish for a total ban on shale gas and bedrock hydrocarbons and not only a specific technique. Only three permits have been overruled but dozens are still valid and more are waiting for an administrative decision. Furthermore, European Union has a stance more favorable to this industry. Countries like Poland or the United Kingdom are open to the exploitation of these resources 15
Interview with a member of the collective Causses-Méjean, April 2012. Those areas are concerned by coalbed methane exploitation. 17 Interview with a member of collectif 07, March 2012 16
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Sébastien Chailleux
IPSA 2014
which could weight in the negotiations with Russia or Algeria on the price of natural gas in the longterm contracts.18 The relative confinement inside the administrative forum comes with a greater media visibility for the supporters of the industry, insisting from now on on the economic benefits of shale gas. The Le Monde editorial on July, 25th 2012 is explicit: “do not bury the shale gas debate”. The shale gas issue has been confined to closed circles in the aftermath of the loi Jacob: the nonspecialized press turns away from it but the economic press is more concerned than ever; closed seminars or private meetings happened in Paris at Ecole des mines or at the Academy of sciences, bringing together professionals from the industry and civil servants (Baudrin, Raimbault, 2014). There are almost none opponents in these meetings whereas they are participating at each public event dealing with the shale gas. The controversy is mutating into a conflict because the argumentative tests between both sides are rarer, each of them estimating that a discussion is neither possible nor useful. For many activists, the debate is done: “those people stay on their grounds which are those of ultra-liberalism and speculation on raw materials and energy, so I don’t see any mutual ground.” 19 The controversy settles on conflicting values, each side fighting with their own ammunitions: social mobilization tries to maintain shale gas in the media, and supporters of the industry try to confine it to technical and economic forums more favorable to them. The consultation of the stakeholders from the social mobilization and the processing of their main claim have only been a symbolic victory. In the long run, it has weakened the strength of their argumentation and lessened the number of opponents to shale gas and more generally to all bedrock hydrocarbons. The election of the PS in 2012 did not bring any improvement for the social mobilization because their main claim had already been taken care of. French activists did not benefit from a change of parliament majority. The coalition maturing In Quebec, agenda-setting is slower. Social mobilization is not backed by national elected representatives before the start of the proceeding of public hearings. The public participation proceeding highlights the multifaceted controversy but participates in fine to its confinement. The controversy starts in 2009 when a blogger warned her readers to the issue of fracking. Then the issue is carried by the association québécoise de lutte contre la pollution atmosphérique (AQLPA)20, claiming for a moratorium in fall 2009, beyond which rallies a majority of the opponents including many local collectives. Charest’s liberal government stands to its position to oppose a moratorium until 2010 when it finally accepts an inquiry of the Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement (BAPE)21. It is an official legitimation of the issue and an open tribune to the opponents which captures the nation’s newspaper headlines in the summer 2010. The media support takes more than a year to come, but the national political support is even slower. The Parti Québécois (PQ), the opposition party in Quebec parliament, signed a bill only in October 2010 to support a moratorium. At least, shale gas opponents receive a national political support. The BAPE concluded in 2011 to the necessity of a strategic environmental assessment, a wide study of impacts on shale gas favoring a sustainable development approach. The assessment lasted from May 2011 to January 2014 and constitutes in a scientific state of knowledge on shale gas, but it did not demobilize the social mobilization. In Quebec, the sociotechnical construction is clearer than in France because the opposition discourse matures longer, binding together with others causes and succeeds to broadcast its definition to the media and the representatives. The shale gas controversy combines with the issue of the mining law reform and the energy transition claims. It develops a network with “coalition pour que le Québec ait 18
Diplomatie, 2013, n°62 Interview with a member of collectif de Lodève, May 2012 20 Quebecker association against atmospheric pollution 21 Bureau of public hearings on environment 19
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meilleure mine”22 and “Maitre chez nous 21e siècle”23. It is already not only about shale gas for many activists, but also about transparent governance and renewable energy. Governance issue over resource extraction became central in Quebec. The PQ had already opposed the Charest government over mining precedence in 2010 in the loi 79 debates. A similar bill in May 2011 is also rejected thanks to the PQ opposition. It backs the social mobilization because those bills on mining precedence were a way to fight against shale gas opponents and the reglement de Saint Bonaventure. The PQ supports a better recognition of the municipal powers over the mining law. On this wider issue, the PQ gives its political support to the social mobilization while the parliamentary forum enters the shale gas controversy. The shale gas movement develops its action during 2011 and 2012, and participates to the Printemps érable24 that causes the downfall of the liberal government and the election of a PQ minority government. The political support of the PQ is important for the social mobilization. The newly elected Prime Minister, Pauline Marois, declares her opposition to shale gas. The new government rebalances the committee of the strategic environmental assessment over shale gas and supports a never-voted moratorium. Marois administration passed a reform of the mining law and mandated a global BAPE on the stakes of shale gas exploitation and a global environmental assessment on hydrocarbons exploitation in the Saint-Laurent valley. Besides, the opponents enlarge their claims to oppose shale oil, hydrocarbons transports by railways (after the accident of Lac Megantic in 2013) and by pipelines, and the exploitation of the Alberta tar sands.25 However, they are not supported by the PQ on these issues since the Marois government lets the door open to the oil of the Gulf of Saint-Laurent (it will even finance the exploration for oil on the Anticosti island). The cooperation with the social mobilization has its limits. The PQ helped the shale gas mobilization in a give-and-take relationship to win the 2012 elections but it does not support their wider claims on mining activities. The political stance of the PQ can also be explained by the downfall of the economic incentives to extract shale gas in Quebec. From 2011, the industry is rather investing in the conventional and shale oil of Gaspesie, iles de la Madeleine and ile d’Anticosti. The price of gas has scrambled (from 6$ in 2009 to 4.5$ in 2011 and at 3$ since 2012) because of the American gas rush. Investing in Quebec for gas is not considered profit-making and the industry has to wait for the report of the new BAPE implemented after the environmental assessment. The financial constraints to come with the new legislation would weight against a profitability of the natural gas of Quebec. The opponents have been slower to be heard by the government but they knew how to construct a coalition and generalize their issue with the themes of energy transition and mining law reform. The legislative and political gains since 2012 for social mobilization are the product of an alliance with the PQ. But the downfall of the Marois government in April 2014 and the rise of the liberal party don’t augur any gain for the mobilization for the years to come. Rationale of the political and administrative confinement The State set different instruments to manage the opposition movement and to respond to the opportunity of developing this industry: parliamentary reports, public hearings, environmental 22
Coalition for better mining/appearance in Quebec. It is an important coalition started in 2008. It regroups more than a dozen of organizations Canada-wide. The coalition published a report in October 2009 to make proposals to reform the mining law. We can underline the relationship between the strength of this coalition and the share of the extractive sector in Quebec and Canada. 23 Master at home 21st century. MCN21 is created in 2005 focusing on energetic issues. Founded by Daniel Breton, former minister of the environment of Quebec during fall 2012. In 2009, MCN21 published a book to promote renewable energy and to claim for a moratorium on shale gas. 24 Maple spring 25 Informative email from regroupement citoyen « mobilisation gaz de schiste » de Saint-Marc-sur-Richelieu, received on April, 25th 2014 9 on 18
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assessment, scientific surveys, law and regulatory reforms. We could consider the different tools through the concept of instrument of public action (Lascoumes, Le Galès, 2004: 13). This kind of instruments bears political and ideological goals. The first ones, more participative, allow the channeling of the social mobilization and to legitimize the results of the produced reports. The latters split the controversy between social preoccupations of the common sense and technical problems needing expertise. In France, there was no public participation per se but rather a consultation of the main stakeholders. The parliamentary representatives of the informative mission (Gonnot-Martin Report) and the ones of the sustainable development committee from the Assemblée Nationale (Havard-Chanteguet Report) could choose the stakeholders they wish to hear. Nonetheless, by consulting the main stakeholders of the opposition, those reports showed consideration for the social mobilization and could conclude on the risks to assess and manage. The activists’ discourse is important since it has a wide public attention and not because of its contents. The government acts over the social and media pressure of the first semester of 2011 and not because of political conviction. The goal of the reports produced is to appease and to orient the controversy toward a technical debate which won’t necessitate a global questioning over the system of energy production. For most of the representatives, the main risk is fracking and not the shale gas itself. The GonnotMartin report is quite balanced but inconclusive. The Havard-Chanteguet report, prior to the bill on fracking, is orienting the government action towards risk management. Its conclusive part titles “To strengthen our mining and environmental law in service for an energy development” 26. The objective is to manage the risks through a legislative frame and technical knowledge only possessed by specific scientific domains. The second article of the Loi Jacob on fracking, voted in July 2011, expresses this goal when it sets an evaluation committee upon shale gas and allows experimentation. This is the administrative frame for the controversy in France since 2011. Quebec chose a first instrument typically participative with the BAPE. It is a provincial public organization in charge of enlightening the government on environmental and sustainable development issues. Its mandate has been restricted by the liberal government: only three regions are concerned by the public hearings and the question is about sustainable development of shale gas industry and not about its opportunity27. Even if the BAPE opened the media forum to the opposition movement, the public hearings help mainly to select preoccupations which could be resolved through technical assessments, rejecting the others outside the rational debate towards ideology and emotion. The BAPE (report 273, 2011) condenses outputs from public hearings in chapter 5 (preoccupations and opinion of the stakeholders), while the rest of the report tackles more technical issues citing administrative and industrial expertise. When external contributions, from catchment basin organizations or universities for example, are relayed, it is on technical aspects. They point the lack of knowledge or the possibility of risks reduction thanks to stricter regulation – typically water issues are relayed to show that stricter guidelines for its use and treatment could lead to a joined management of the resource. So, if the preoccupations are heard, they are not handled the same way. The report in which they appear became legitimate thanks to the consultation it lays on, but its conclusions don’t respect the activists’ definition of the controversy. The main goal is to rank the preoccupation into a given order. The BAPE concludes on the necessity of a strategic environmental assessment in order to produce a state of the art on the impacts of the industry. It lets the door open for a future exploitation but it takes into account the social pressure in recommending the ban of fracking during the assessment excepted for experimental reasons. Committees in charge of the shale gas issue are also oriented by the question asked. Governments mandating them frame a specific question, as Fischer (2010: 127) explains: “The process of framing 26
Commission du développement durable et de l’aménagement du territoire, 2011, Rapport no 3392, p.26 This is the main reason for the Marois administration to set a new BAPE on the stakes of shale gas Quebec-wide in 2014. 27
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is the basis for not only identifying the problem, but also for defining it. In this sense, the processes of framing predetermine the direction and nature of the technical analysis that might follow.” None of the questions asked are about the opportunity of shale gas exploitation. Governments asked about alternative techniques and impacts (France-CGIET/CGEDD report) or about sustainable development of the shale gas industry (Quebec-BAPE report)28. In this context, Irwin (2006: 316) wonders “what scope can there be for dialogue when the direction is already set?” Institutions framed public meanings of scientific issues only as risk management as in the case of GMO. “The propositional issue of ‘is it safe?’ has to be accompanied by definition of what ‘it’ is, as well as what ‘safe’ is.” (Wynne, 2003: 407) The consultative and participative instruments of public action aimed to channel social mobilization. The produced reports ranked the importance of the expressed issues. They define technical data as a stronger base for public decision; social aspects are handled in an acceptability point of view. Most of the stakeholders wished for a global understanding of the issue (why this industry?) but governments aimed to split the controversy into scientifically manageable parts (how this industry?). The public hearings and the parliamentary committees are the first filter that redefines the issue of shale gas. This is not the systemic questioning over energy transition that is directly framed but rather the legislative gap, the weak social acceptability and the necessity of further research. Conflicting legitimation Scientific framing On both sides of the Atlantic, reports from public consultations ask for more scientific and technical instruments to improve the state of knowledge on shale gas. They have in common to materialize the split between social perception and technical reality constructed by the participative instruments. Moreover, they organize a hierarchy of scientific disciplines legitimate to be consulted on shale gas such as geology, engineering and economics. Those disciplines are fit to respond to the important issues framed by the consultative instruments. Geosciences are legitimized because they can construct knowledge on the susurface characteristics, engineering is helpful to create safer techniques, and economics are interesting because they can produce scenarios on the industry profitability. Sociology, ecology, biology and experience-based expertise are rejected in the background because they bring more uncertainty into the controversy. Official reports legitimize some kind of expertise and value specific scientific disciplines to the detriment of others. In France, the CGIET/CGEDD report is written in March 2012 by high civil servants and engineers. The report is commissioned before the consultative committees, so its mandate is framed before consulting the stakeholders. The CGIET and CGEDD are commissioned to assess the impacts, the techniques and legal frame of the industry. They concluded on the lack of knowledge on fracking and shale gas, recommending the government to wait for technical innovation safer for the environment but not to close the door to this industry. The report underlines also the lack of taxes for the local administrative levels, provided by the mining law. Consultations occurred – more than 150 for the CGIET/CGEDD and a hundred for the Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et techniques (OPECST)29 – but they were selective. The 2012 report cites especially INERIS, BRGM, IFPEN, the industry, the concerned administrative departments, publications from the international energy agency and the energy information administration. It mentions selective publications from universities and peer-reviewed articles but there is little space for the local representatives’ preoccupations and almost none for the inhabitants’ ones. The report speaks above all of subsurface characteristics, drilling ability and trade balance. It is about the feasibility of the 28
Once again, the 2014 BAPE opted for a more open frame in questioning the stakes of shale gas Quebec-wide. Parliamentary office (bicameral) in charge of assessing scientific and technological choices (in order for the Parliament to be enlightened on scientific issues). 29
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exploitation more than about its opportunity. The report is released more than six months after the loi Jacob on fracking ban, the representatives could not wait to appease the social mobilization with a legislative gesture. The report purports the article 2 of the loi Jacob over experimentation and scientific research. This instrument lessened the activists’ social and environmental claims, it reframed the controversy as a lack of knowledge. In 2013, the new socialist government entrusts the OPECST with the shale gas issue instead of setting up the planned committee from the loi Jacob’s article 2 to follow the evolution of the techniques. The advisory board looks scientific but it is regularly accused to be open to political factors and lobby influence, and from the confession of one of its members, to be “a stronghold of followers of scientism” 30. The OPECST report cannot be considered as a state of the art because it excludes many publications on shale gas, for example, the economist Thomas Porcher highlights American studies on the costs of shale gas exploitation during his hearing with the OPECST but they are not taken into account, and not even mentioned in the final report31. The OPECST report (2013) is favorable to a “cleaner” exploitation, echoing a previous report (Galois report, 2012) underlining the economic importance of this industry in times of budgetary deficit. Titles from the chapters of the report are meaningful: “fracking: an ancient technique bearing manageable risks” and “one priority: the assessment of national resources, essential prerequisite to valuing economic output”. The goal is clear: developing research programs to know how to make shale gas interesting. If fracking is a risk, it is manageable. The OPECST instrument reframed the shale gas as an opportunity and leaned towards a modification of the 2011 ban on fracking. In Quebec, the BAPE report is published at the beginning of 2011 and asks for a strategic environmental assessment (évaluation environnementale stratégique : EES). First criticized, the EES committee includes finally a variety of specialists and experts in its executive committee (selected on skills) and in the surveys and assessments it orders (coming from administrative departments, universities and research centers). Those improvements are beholden to the PQ election in 2012. We can note a relative transparency compared to the French proceedings: the ordered studies are available on-line and mirror-committees can express an opinion on the work in progress. However, it is a process oriented toward a possible exploitation of the resource because the four directions of the EES are: economic assessment, environmental assessment, definition of the regulatory parameters and assessment of the relevance of a scientific follow-up. The table of studies shows for example surveys on risks perceptions in local communities, communication strategy of the industry and best practices available (Comité EES, Tableau des etudes, 2013). The EES conclusions, published in February 2014, defuse the initial expressed fears while showing that there are actual risks (the main issue is not actually the water management but greenhouse gas emission linked to climate change) and that there is no social acceptability. The economic opportunity of this industry is also questioned. The assessment provides a state of the art concerning shale gas and is the closest to a “neutral” report. It builds a scientific credibility for the data it displays. However, EES divide the controversy into fragmentary problems split between a body of experts. EES participates to the technicality of the controversy and its fragmentation. It gives no recommendation but a synthesis on shale gas impact on which will be based the ongoing public hearings of new BAPE in 2014. It plays the role of regulatory science so the Quebec administration could base its decision on rational grounds. For many activists, the EES is a tool for social acceptability. They refused to participate to the EES studies on the social mobilization (CPDS, 2013) even if they tried to reorient the work of the committee through participation to mirror-committee. The EES instrument is the most scientific of 30
Denis Baupin, speech at Friends of the Earth seminar, "Sortir des énergies fossiles: quels rôles et ambitions pour la France en vue de la COP en 2015 ? Les enjeux des gaz de schiste, du charbon, et des sables bitumineux", October 2nd 2013, Assemblée nationale, Paris. 31 Interview with Thomas Porcher, May 2014 12 on 18
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the instruments above. It has a specific frame of the issue because of the political use of its fragmented conclusion but it came close to the activists’ global translation. Legislative support The framing on scientific resolution of technical issues is backed by a legislative framing of shale gas. The loi Jacob brings quickly a legislative solution to the French controversy in banning fracking but allowing a cleaner exploitation through further experimentation. The bill does not satisfy the opponents but it withdraws their main claim on fracking. Subsequently, in 2013, a reform of the code minier is initiated, both central to the future of shale gas and voluntarily kept in the dark and cut from any ties with this issue. This reform is supposed to manage the claim of transparent governance and local participation to the permit deliverance process. The activists have difficulty to be heard on the reform and only France nature environnement accepted to vouch the draft. The Tuot committee was in charge of the proposed reform, it constructed a compromise between mining precedence and the environment charter. Moreover, the final draft of the reform is in the hands of the ministry of industry instead of the initial tandem with the ministry of environment. This reform contains two threats for the anti-shale gas movement: profit-sharing of the royalties with the local representatives and the possibility of scientific experimentation outside the regulatory frame of permit deliverance. The reform would take charge of the local participation claim with mandatory public information and consultation, but it would weaken further mobilization on hydrocarbons extraction by cutting ties between local representatives and activists. It would facilitate a potential exploitation of coalbed methane by gaining social acceptability through upstream information. Legal instruments concur to strengthen the technical frame allowing some ways of exploitation. There is no specific bill on shale gas today in Quebec. The loi 37 on a five-year moratorium has not been voted before the downfall of the PQ last April. The activists lost their claim a few weeks before the parliament vote. However, a reform on the loi sur les mines has been promulgated. It has been a long parliamentary fight between the liberals and the PQ since 2011, the latter succeeded to pass a reform in December 2013 (loi 70). Contrary to France, shale gas opponents participated in the debate because of their alliance with the proponents of a reform of mining precedence and a quite benevolent PQ. The reform allows municipalities to exclude specific areas from mining activity. We note that, on the long-term, the Quebec mobilization gains advantages that are removed from the French opponents as they are excluded from the decisional forums. However, the comeback of the liberals might erase the gains and favors the industry even if there is a new BAPE processing and a new EES forthcoming on hydrocarbons. The legal frame allows an incremental gain for the activists but it does not address the main claim over the opposition to the opportunity of shale gas exploitation in Quebec. Denial of dissension The controversy is framed as a scientific issue of lack of knowledge and a legislative issue of regulatory inadequacy. The French and Quebecker governments have thus favored technical instruments to solve these problems and rejected social aspects into the political forum of conflicting opinions. Governments aim towards consensus and not to increase uncertainty (Irwin, 2006: 316). They wish to maximize popular and electoral support but they are also oriented towards an economic understanding of the controversy. To some political leaders, shale gas is an opportunity too good to miss, even more in France than in Quebec. It could result in a better trade balance and economic boom in a period of unemployment and public deficit. Science must find safe ways to extract it. Specific scientific disciplines are called upon and legitimized: geology, engineering and economics, as we saw on the reports’ sources. The legitimation is above all political because there is no scientific consensus over shale gas. Engineers drafting the CGIET/CGEDD report admit the limitations of the 13 on 18
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knowledge on the impacts of fracking in the French subsurface because they do not possess all the geological data. However, geologists from the industry claim for minor risks based on controversial American data. In the USA where most of the studies came from, there is a word to qualify the studies openly favorable to shale gas: frackademic. In fact, various controversies blew out following scientific studies financed by the industry or produced by scientists working as consultant for the industry.32 In Quebec, Marc Durand, doctor in geology, purports the anti-shale gas claims on the risks of fracking against the industrial discourse. There is no consensus in geology on the impacts of shale gas exploitation. Economic data are also questioned because figures from the industry or consulting firm are disputed, in particular concerning job creation and negative externalities (Porcher, 2013), most of those data did not go through peer-review. Paradoxically, the uncertainty argument is hijacked by the industry that recycles it as a way of favoring research and as the beginning of exploitation. As in the tobacco industry, the shale gas industry tends to play on the uncertainty of the impacts and the scientific controversies to let the door open for exploitation. The watchword is to experiment to know the resource available and then to decide to exploit or not. Nevertheless, the exploration stage is the most dangerous one and the costs of exploration have to be compensate by exploitation otherwise the company loses money. The sales pitch flickers between a mastered technique and uncertainty generating knowledge opportunities depending on the audience. The economic press praises the benefits of shale gas exploitation while institutional reports point out the lack of knowledge to fill. Intra-disciplinary consensus is weak but inter-disciplinary consensus is nonexistent. Hydrogeology slows down the enthusiasm of geologists insisting on deep water flows and hydrogeological faults. 33 Toxicologists (Picot, 2011) moderate the economic outputs highlighting the costs in terms of public health (linked to pollution, stress, work accidents, etc.). Social sciences are missing even if some surveys show undesirable effects of shale gas industry: road accidents, increased crimes, to cite a few (Food Water Watch, 2013). Environmental studies are not cited but they show for example the forest fragmentation in the USA (Drohan et al., 2012) or landscapes impacts (Slonecker et al., 2012). The selection of the legitimized disciplines prevent the recognition of the sociotechnical aspect of the controversy and the enlightenment of embedded ideological stances included in the definition of this activity by the industry and the State such as a productivist and capitalist economy. The subdivision of the scientific disciplines does not allow an actual and global argumentative test on shale gas. The few inter-disciplinary research projects have a hard time to construct a viable discussion between the various disciplines. The EES relatively succeeds in bringing together various disciplines and inputs but they hardly discuss with each other. The EES seems to be a relative exception accordingly to the political selection of specific expertise. The political legitimation of these specific disciplines serves the State in protecting economic interests but weakens the credibility of regulatory science as a neutral instrument. Jasanoff (1990: 105) recalls us the conclusion of Collingridge and Reeve (1986): “political factors nullify the power of science to make a positive difference in standard-setting.” Political framing of scientific data undermines the institutional reading of science and allows alternative understandings of those data to become legitimized and the controversy to carry on. Taking over the shale gas definition Governments’ interests at stake The instruments of public action protect above all the governments’ interests. In France, the loi Jacob still bans fracking but the government pushes on experimentation and scientific research, and favors gas exploitation with coalbed methane exploration permits in northern and eastern France. In Quebec, public hearings and environmental assessments are still ongoing, blocking shale gas 32 33
See University of Texas-Austin and University Cornell controversy over methane emission. Interview with an hydrogeologist from Université de Montpellier, December 2013. 14 on 18
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industry, but the oil industry is push forward by the government. Policies engaged toward scientific and technical studies for research centers (INERIS, BRGM and even CNRS in France; universities and administration in Quebec). The dynamic starts with research and leads to a future exploitation once all the grey areas would be assessed and the risk level judged acceptable. Shale gas as a national resource is still the dominant translation in the State’s discourse. Beside the effects of political alternation on both cases, we observe as a long-term trend a hidden will to exploit shale gas, only stopped by social mobilizations’ pressure and their political and media supports. Both cases show that, independently of the instruments used – participative or not – the technical forum has precedence to orient energy choices. The interests of the State are double-protected: first, scientific and technical work is engaged, then the possible exploitation yield economic benefits. Shale gas exploitation is asleep for now on, but only because of the social pressure. Temporal gap in the political process and economic context allow legislative progress in Quebec whereas in France, pioneer in the legal opposition to shale gas, the situation tends to deteriorate. Price of gas in Quebec explains the progressive withdrawal of the industry from this controversy which prefers to reorient its strategy toward oil. In France, the price of gas still motivates the companies and some elected representatives to look for alternative techniques to fracking and also to develop coalbed methane. The State’s interest over shale gas is still vivid, the exploitation is only delayed for a decade or two until scientific research and industrial prospection will be able to draw a full and viable picture of the resources available. The mapping of the precise geology and hydrogeology of the areas concerned with shale gas is recommended in most of the cited reports. The governments have to shift strategy to exploit natural resources important for economic growth and they turn to less controversial resource such as coalbed methane in France and shale oil in Quebec. The interdisciplinary project, Gazhouille, led by Nancy Georessources Laboratory and financed by CNRS, illustrates this will. Except for fracking, coalbed methane industry is close to shale gas but administrative reports underline the differences between them and the importance of exploiting coalbed methane. The State and the industry set an intense boundary work to differentiate the “bad” shale gas from the “good” coalbed methane. The OPECST report whishes “to continue the exploration and to engage, as soon as possible, the exploitation of coalbed methane: it does not necessitate fracking, so the prospection for this gas in Lorraine and Nord-Pas-de-Calais should not be delayed by the bedrock hydrocarbons controversy.”34 The latest research in Quebec points out the inopportunity of shale gas in the near future but exploitation of oil has more political support and less popular opposition. The Marois government even financed prospection for shale oil on Anticosti Island. This island has a declining community of 250 inhabitants and Petrolia, the oil company, provides investment and promises to use a new fracking technique with gas instead of water and chemicals. The boundary work is this case between shale oil and shale gas even if the fracking technique and the impacts are the same. Until now, oil and gas have not been processed together in Quebec, the further joined-environmental assessment should be controversial. Both governments worked with the social pressure, being not able to move forward with shale gas, they changed strategy with coalbed methane or shale oil. They continue to be interest in fossil fuel exploitation and they try to translate natural gas as part of the energy transition – in Quebec case, shale oil cannot be translated this way, so the government insists on the local benefits of homemade production of oil. Both States generate new discourse thanks to technical instruments used on the shale gas controversy. They take into account the activists’ reasoning over shale gas and respond with a new translation favoring energy transition, cleaner exploitation or less populated areas. The framing of the instruments is thus favorable to the State and its economic interests. The events agree with an economic reasoning over the opportunity of bedrock hydrocarbons exploitation. The controversy over shale gas is managed as a deflection for favoring other sources of fossil energy less in the limelight and under less social pressure. Policy instruments favor trade logic more than the 34
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environmental one, contradicting displayed objectives of energy transition and reduction of greenhouse gases. Rejection of the hybrid forum Our analysis confirms the orientation of the public action instruments towards a limitation of public participation to technical and scientific controversies. The different reports lead to think with Collins (2010: 188) that, even incomplete, expert knowledge should weight more than public opinion. As Beck reminds us, lay people can be distrustful of science but they do rely on it to reduce uncertainty (Beck, cited in Fischer, 2010: 310). For most of the State’s leaders, shale gas controversy is divided between a technical controversy and a social acceptability issue. However, sociology of translation states that a controversy becomes technical only in the end. First, a controversy is sociotechnical because each stakeholder tries to delimitate a technical area on which to impose his/her knowledge monopoly. There is no purely technical fact and the separation between objective and subjective perceptions is constructed to preserve specific interests. As we saw, the global translation of the activists that shale gas exploitation is a threat to their environment, and the narrow economic translation of the industry, have been reshape by the institutional instruments to protect a definition of shale gas as a national resource. This struggle to take away the definition of an object has been described as a hybrid forum (Callon et al., 2001). However, the shale gas controversy does not engage a collective reduction of uncertainty. We can highlight at least three debate forums: parliamentary forum in which political and economic views on shale gas allied and opposed; public and media forum in which activists’ and companies’ discourses struggle; and the administrative and scientific forum which is more limited to the conflicting interests of administrative departments, research centers and universities. The different stakeholders do not meet in a common deliberation forming a hybrid forum. We observe on the contrary various discourses expressed in different forums, given particular value rankings. The legitimizing institutions are not the same: although the activists’ discourse is legitimized in the parliamentary and the public forums, it is not the case in the administrative forum. On the contrary, the industrial discourse is legitimate in the administrative forum but not really heard in the media. The argumentative tests are narrowing and it leads to think of the controversy sedimentation into a conflict and trench warfare. Unless some kind of compromise appears: shale gas won’t be exploited but oil will in Quebec and coalbed methane in France. The parliament has the last word because it is through legislation that, in France as well as in Quebec, the shale gas industry has been put to sleep. The political forum keeps a form of superiority on the scientific forum. Nevertheless, we should include the convincing power of scientific and administrative rationality wishing to exploit shale gas. In the debate on the adoption of the OPECST report, representative Lenoir (UMP) declare “our goal is to contribute to change the law” 35 The policy logic is economic but necessitate a political endeavor. The political alternation in Quebec should illustrate that point because the newly empowered liberals are supporters of the mining industry. Conclusion The shale gas controversy illustrates power relationships at stake to define what this bedrock hydrocarbon that is called shale gas is. Public participation is efficient to set the controversy on the agenda but it is quickly framed by instruments of public action. In France, the parliament took over the issue and framed it as a scientific, technical and regulatory problem. In Quebec, it is a participative instrument that manages the question first. It is only afterwards that the representatives seized the issue linking it to mining law in the same time a strategic environmental assessment is led. Both our cases show a common orientation to favor technicality in this controversy from governments, and a rejection of public participation as a formal debate. It was not about constructing 35
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a hybrid forum but fragmenting the controversy. The instruments of public action implemented redefine the issue and rank the processing of the questions in legitimizing above all the expertise of geologists, engineers and economists. Those political choices aim to preserve the State definition of shale gas as a national resource, and to avoid a global opposition to fossil fuel exploitation in the national territory. Shale gas controversy is not over yet, debates are still occurring in Quebec with the new BAPE until the end of 2014 and two future environmental assessments on hydrocarbons. In France, the controversy does not catch the newspaper headlines and it is no more in the political agenda even if the social mobilization is still active on criticizing the reform of the code minier and denouncing the future transatlantic free trade area that might allow American gas companies to take to court the French fracking ban.
Références Akrich, M., Callon, M., Latour, B., 2006, Sociologie de la traduction – textes fondateurs, Paris, Écoles des mines de Paris. Bureau d’audiences publique sur l’environnement, 2011, Le développement durable de l’industrie des gaz de schiste au Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, http://www.bape.gouv.qc.ca/sections/rapports/publications/bape273.pdf (accès le 24/04/2014) Baudrin, M. Raimbault, B., 2014, Controverse des gaz de schiste en France : la reprise en main de l’industrie, séminaire Sociologie et politiques de l’énergie, EHESS, manuscrit. Blatrix, C., Blondiaux, L., Fourniau, J.-M., Hériard-Dubreuil, B., Lefevre, R., Revel, M. (dir.), 2007, Le débat public : une expérience française de démocratie participative, Paris, La découverte. Callon, M., Lascoumes, P., Barthe, Y., 2001, Agir dans un monde incertain, Paris, Le Seuil. Callon, M., 1986, “Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay”, First published in LAW, J., 1986, Power, action and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? London: Routledge, pp.196-223 Conseil général de l’industrie, de l’énergie et des technologies, Conseil général de l’environnement et du développement durable, 2012, Les hydrocarbures de roche-mère en France. Chailleux, S., 2014, Mobiliser dans un monde incertain, séminaire Sociologie et politiques de l’énergie, EHESS, manuscrit. Chateauraynaud, F., 2011, Argumenter dans un champ de force, Paris, Pétra. Chateauraynaud, F., Debaz, J., 2011, « Processus d’alerte et dispositifs d’expertise dans les dossiers sanitaires et environnementaux », http://socioargu.hypotheses.org/4129 (accès le 24/04/2014) Collins, H. Evans, R., 2007, Rethinking expertise, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Collins, H., Evans, R., 2002, “The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience”, Social Studies of Science, 32 (2), pp.235–296 Collins, H., Weinel, M., Evans, R., 2010, “The politics and policy of the Third Wave: new technologies and society”, Critical Policy Studies,4 (2),pp.185-201 Commission du développement durable et de l’aménagement du territoire, 2011, Rapport d’information sur les gaz et huiles de schiste, Assemblée Nationale. Commission du développement durable et de l’aménagement du territoire, 2011, Rapport 3392 sur la proposition de loi 3301, visant à interdire l’exploration et l’exploitation des mines d’hydrocarbures liquides ou gazeux par fracturation hydraulique et à abroger les permis exclusifs de recherches comportant des projets ayant recours à cette technique, Assemblée Nationale. Comité d’évaluation environnementale stratégique, 2014, Rapport de synthèse, Gouvernement du Québec. Fischer, F., 2009, Democracy and expertise, reorienting policy inquiry, UK, Oxford University Press.
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Gauthier, M., Simard, L., 2011, « Le Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement du Québec : genèse et développement d’un instrument voué à la participation publique », Télescope, 17 (1), pp.39-67 Irwin, A., 2006, “The politics of talk: coming to terms with the 'new' scientific governance”, Social Studies of Science, 36 (2), pp.299-320 Jasanoff, S., 1990, The fifth branch – science advisers as policymakers, Harvard university press, Cambridge Lascoumes, P., Le Galès, P., 2004, Gouverner par les instruments, Paris, Presses de Science Po. Macnaghten, P., 2010, “Researching technoscientific concerns in the making: narrative structures, public responses, and emerging nanotechnologies”, Environment and Planning, 42, pp.23-37 Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et techniques, 2013, Rapport sur les techniques alternatives à la fracturation hydraulique pour l’exploration et l’exploitation des hydrocarbures non conventionnels, Assemblée Nationale. Pestre, D., 2011, « Des sciences, des techniques et de l'ordre démocratique et participatif », Participations, 1 (1), pp.210-238 Picot, A., 2011, Bilan toxicologie – chimie – L’exploration et l’exploitation des huiles et des gaz de schiste, Association Toxicologie-Chimie, Paris. Shorter, E., Tilly, Ch., 1974, Strikes in France (1830-1968), Cambridge University Press. Terral, P.-M., 2012, « La fronde contre le gaz de schiste : essai d’histoire immédiate d’une mobilisation éclair (2010-2011) », Ecologie & politique, (45), pp.185–194 Wynne, B., “Sheepfarming after Chernobyl : a case study of communicating scientific information”, Environmental Magazine 31 (2), pp.33-39
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