Organisational Management and Information Systems

This issue Papers P4 and P6 OMIS and MABS Paper P3 MARCS Paper P2 MADM study notes pAPER P4 (ALSO RELEVANT TO PAPER P6) GLOBAL CONTACT Details n CIM...
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This issue Papers P4 and P6 OMIS and MABS Paper P3 MARCS Paper P2 MADM

study notes pAPER P4 (ALSO RELEVANT TO PAPER P6)

GLOBAL CONTACT Details n CIMA Contact E: cima.contact@ cimaglobal.com T: +44 (0)20 8849 2251 F: +44 (0)20 8849 2450 n Australia office Level 3, The Plaza Building, Australia Square, 95 Pitt Street, Sydney NSW 2000 E: sydney@ cimaglobal.com T: 1800 679 996 (toll-free within Australia) or: +61 (0)2 9776 7982 F: +61 (0)2 9262 5979 n CIMA Botswana Plot 50370 Ground Floor Acumen Park Building Fairgrounds Office Park Gaborone E: [email protected] T: +267 395 2362 F: +267 397 2982 n CIMA China office Unit 1905 Westgate Tower 1038 Nanjing Road (W) Shanghai 200041 E: CIMA-China@ vip.sina.com T: +86 (0)21 52285119 F: +86 (0)21 52285120 n Hong Kong Division Suites 1414 – 1415 14th Floor Jardine House Central Hong Kong E: juliee.tan@ cimaglobal.com T: +852 2511 2003 F: +852 2507 4701

Continued on page 41.

Organisational Management and Information Systems Business process re-engineering is so last decade. Bob Scarlett charts the rise and fall of the movement, and the emergence of a complementary approach.

The restructuring wave that swept across the business world in the early nineties has abated. The business process re-engineering (BPR) movement was a conspicuous part of this wave. It may have served a purpose as a survival response by businesses to the economic recession that was occurring at the time, but it has also had its day. Inspired by the seminal text Re-engineering the Corporation, by Michael Hammer and James Champy (Harper Business, 1993), organisations downsized, rightsized, delayered, divested and outsourced. Whatever the merits of the term, BPR became a buzzword to describe almost any organisation-related project. It also spawned a large body of management writing and consulting. BPR’s particular strength was its focus on identifying core processes in a business and examining ways in which these processes could be honed in order to achieve corporate goals more effectively. The idea was that a process could be made cheaper and more responsive to customer needs by stripping away peripheral activities and bureaucratic layers. Management literature contains many cases of how BPR projects have achieved results. For example, in 1997 the FT Mastering Management Review reported the case of US firm Scott Paper. Its chief executive downsized the organisation, outsourced its peripheral activities, divested the company of all non-core businesses and then sold what was left to KimberlyClark. The enterprise was effectively eliminated, but this proved very much to the financial advantage of its shareholders – a case of “value-based management” at its most extreme. BPR was not about entering new markets or introducing new products. It was about rearranging existing processes with the help of new technology. The rise of BPR coincided with the

Illustration: Patrick Morgan

widespread adoption of new IT systems based on PCs, networks and the internet. They permitted more decentralisation by improving communications, which allowed firms to strip out layers of middle management and cut more costs as the recession took hold. It was very much a creature of its time. The advocates of BPR said that it required the following four basic actions: n Assess fundamental organisational objectives. n Identify core processes. n Clarify objectives and identify associated goals. n Achieve reform through reorganisation and the incorporation of new IT. That may have been an eminently reasonable basis for organisational restructuring at the time. But the approach incorporated critical weaknesses that make BPR ill-suited to life in the mid-noughties. There are two main conceptual difficulties with BPR. First, it has an inherently high level of disregard for the impact it may have in social and behavioural terms. BPR’s cost savings were usually achieved through staff reductions, so the movement became associated with waves of job cuts that were often implemented by consultancy firms brought in for the purpose. Organisations that survived re-engineering were often drastically slimmed-down versions of their former selves. They often found that their remaining employees were overworked, demoralised and burned out. The advocates of BPR have often argued that the problem here was that re-engineering had been done insensitively or where the organisations concerned weren’t good candidates for re-engineering. The second flaw of BPR is its tendency to lack “contextual analysis”. The practice of re-engineering took on a rather



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papers p4 and p6

Global contact details continued from page 39. n India liaison office DBS Corporate Centre Second Floor Raheja Chambers 213 Nariman Point Mumbai 400 021 E: [email protected] T: +91 (0) 22 5630 9200 n Malaysia Division 123 Jalan SS6/12 Kelana Jaya Urban Centre 47301 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan E: kualalumpur@ cimaglobal.com T: +60 (0)3 7803 5531/5536 F: +60 (0)3 7803 9404 n Republic of Ireland Division 45-47 Pembroke Road, Ballsbridge, Dublin 4 E: dublin@ cimaglobal.com T: +353 (0)1 6430400 F: +353 (0)1 6430401 n Singapore office 16 Raffles Quay, Unit 33-03 B Hong Leong Building, Singapore 048581 E: singapore@ cimaglobal.com T: +65 6535 6822 F: +65 6534 3992 n South Africa Division Postal: PO Box 745 Northlands 2116 Physical: Second Floor Thrupps Centre, 204 Oxford Road, Illovo E: johannesburg@ cimaglobal.com T: +27 (0)11 268 2555 F: +27 (0)11 268 2556 n Sri Lanka Division 356 Elvitigala Mawatha Colombo 05 E: colombo@ cimaglobal.com T: + 94 (0)11 250 3880 F: + 94 (0)11 250 3881 n CIMA Zambia Box 30640 Lusaka, Zambia E: lusaka@ cimaglobal.com T: +260 1290 219 F: +260 1290 548 n CIMA Zimbabwe PO Box 3831 Harare, Zimbabwe E: harare@ cimaglobal.com T: +263 (0)4 250475 F: +263 (0)4 708600/ 720379

mechanistic, macho quality over the years, with the idea that a given set of Ansoff matrix adapted for revitalisation practices could be applied in any situation with no regard for an organisation’s Present products New products particular circumstances. This failed to recognise the full value that employees and their accumulated knowledge brought to a business. For example, organisations Present markets Market penetration Product launch trading in a turbulent and changeable environment may be far less amenable to re‑engineering than those doing business in more predictable markets. Operating in Market development Diversification New markets the former may necessitate a big investment in flexibility in the form of well-developed in‑house R&D, marketing and customer-support capabilities. Such departments are highly vulnerable to re‑engineering exercises, since they may appear outwardly to be performing peripheral, non-core business activities. It’s now widely accepted that BPR is in essence a backwardIn practice, BPR often produced a quick fix to perceived looking approach. It takes what has happened in the past and problems, but at a long-term cost that may not have been seeks to improve on it, but with limited regard for what’s going immediately apparent. It caused specific practical problems to happen in future. The concept of revitalisation, on the other including the following: hand, is in essence forward-looking. It requires a business to n A decline in morale. Many service functions in an organisation evolve its operation by developing its products and markets – eg, marketing – rely heavily on trust, motivation and using a portfolio of options. enthusiasm. A re-engineering exercise may well erode these The classic approach to the consideration of these options is and lead to a deterioration in performance. This may be a the Ansoff matrix, first presented in 1957. An adapted version is critical loss in some types of business. shown in the panel, above. The central concern of revitalisation is n A loss of communication and co-ordination. Re-engineering not cost engineering. Market penetration is normally a relatively typically involves stripping out layers of middle management low-investment, low-risk strategy. It involves taking existing in order to produce a flatter and, hopefully, cheaper products or services and trying to increase your business’s organisational structure. But middle management often plays market share by meeting customers’ evolving needs. At the other a subtle role in ensuring that different parts of an extreme, diversification (through either organic growth or organisation know what each other are doing. acquisition) is likely to be a high-investment, high-risk strategy. n A loss of quality and control. Farming out both business BPR and revitalisation are not best considered as alternatives. processes and elements of production can achieve immediate Rather, they complement one another. The first seeks to perform cost savings, but with adverse consequences for flexibility and existing activities better and the second seeks to evolve the quality. Outsourcing your firm’s customer-service function to activities being performed. They are different dimensions of a call-centre company overseas results in a loss of control business strategy and cannot be considered in isolation. over what happens, while the contracting involved makes it Hammer’s then influential but now infamous 1990 Harvard difficult to change any arrangements. Business Review article, “Re-engineering work: don’t automate, n “Dumbsizing”. There are cases where organisations have obliterate”, should be viewed in that context. FM reduced their headcount only to have to hire back the same employees whom they had released. Bob Scarlett is an accountant and consultant.



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pAPER p3

Management Accounting – Risk and Control Strategy Does your FD use the green-cross code? The examiner for paper P3 considers how people manage risk and compares their strategies to those of organisations.

Candidates taking paper P3 should understand the central role of risk management in every organisation, whether it’s a business, a public-sector body or a charity. Risk management is sometimes thought of – incorrectly – as a method for reducing or eliminating risk. This view is too restrictive, because risk is an unavoidable part of life. If we consider an event such as crossing the road, we face the risk of being killed or seriously injured by a vehicle, but that doesn’t prevent us from crossing roads. Whether we realise it or not, we all go through a quick mental process to assess the risk and take appropriate action. First, we identify that there is a risk. If we don’t, we leave things completely to chance, which is dangerous. Second, we estimate the scale of the risk: we automatically take into account the road width, the surface conditions, visibility, the density and speed of traffic and so on. We might also consider our own physical capabilities and other factors such as whether we’ve got children with us or whether we’re running late for an important appointment. We perform a mental calculation that weighs all these factors and assesses the risk. Without thinking deliberately about it, we then balance the likelihood of being hit by a car against the consequences. In fast-moving traffic, we may get killed; in slow-moving traffic, cars may stop for us. As individuals we make a decision about when and where to cross a road. We do not avoid risk altogether; we manage it through some deliberate action. We use a pedestrian crossing, we wait until the traffic diminishes – or we simply accept the risk, hope for the best and make a dash for it. Why will some people run across a busy road while others always wait patiently at a pedestrian crossing for the lights to change, even if there’s not much traffic? It’s because we all perceive risks differently as a result of our upbringing, our education and our personality. It can also be influenced by cultural factors and our own experiences. If we’ve had a near miss ourselves or know someone who has been injured or killed in a road accident, this is likely to influence whether we’re risktakers or risk-avoiders when it comes to crossing roads. The fact that people don’t approach risk in the same way makes managing risk in organisations a challenge. The process follows similar principles, but it is more complicated, of course.

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One complication is that organisations are collectives of people with different views of the conditions, different experiences and different attitudes to risk. For example, accountants are seen (stereotypically) as risk-averse, while sales people are seen as more risk-orientated. Another complication is that organisational objectives are far more complex than those of individuals, because organisations are trying to satisfy a range of stakeholders, whose attitudes may also vary. Organisations are expected to produce continuously improving results and set stretching objectives to satisfy their stakeholders. Risk, therefore, is not only about the possibility that something bad will occur; it’s also about missed opportunities – goals that can’t be achieved. In order to meet its objectives a business must take risks, such as introducing a new product, and there is usually a trade-off between risk and return. Investing in government securities is a safe option, for example, but the returns will be low. Introducing a new product, on the other hand, may pay much higher returns but there’s a risk that the product may not be successful. There are different organisational risk management models, but the following process contains seven key steps: n Identify the risks. Risks are an everyday part of life, so organisations need a system to identify all those they face. This involves collecting information from a variety of sources: individuals, reports, observation and environmental assessments. Common methods of collecting data that identify risks include workshops, scenarios, brainstorming and surveys. These may be linked with consultations with stakeholders, environmental analyses, strategic plans etc. n Assess their impact. Once the risks have been identified, some assessment needs to be made of their likely impact. This involves quantifying the risk in some way. We might conduct market surveys, computer simulations, cost-benefit analyses, use a Delphi technique or apply probabilities, statistical tests or sensitivity analysis. Alternatively, we may rely on subjective judgments. n Map the risks. This involves prioritising the most critical risks by mapping the probability of each risk eventuating against the consequences of its eventuation. Organisations may use a simple high-medium-low scale for both likelihood and

Photograph: Alamy

Mapping and responding to risk

Impact of risk

MEDIUM RISK: high impact, low probability

HIGH RISK: high impact, high probability

Transfer/share

Mitigate and control

Probability of occurrence LOW RISK: low impact, low probability MEDIUM RISK: low impact, high probability Accept

Control

Source: the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission. (See also “Safety spec”, page 25.)

consequences, or they may use a more complex scale. Whichever one they use, prioritisation is important because organisations typically face hundreds or even thousands of risks, and only the most significant ones can be managed. n Record risks in a register. The risk register lists the risks that have been identified, together with the likelihood and consequences of the occurrence of each one. This is a comprehensive register that ensures that risks are constantly evaluated. But mapping ensures that the biggest risks get the most attention. Risks are often grouped into categories in the register to make many related risks more manageable. n Evaluate the risks against the organisation’s appetite for taking them. This must ultimately be the board’s call. It’s a question of setting the parameters for whether particular risks should be accepted, rejected or managed in some way. n Treat the risks. This involves decisions on whether particular risks should be avoided, reduced, transferred or accepted. Avoidance involves withdrawing from high-risk activities. Reduction involves mitigating either the likelihood or the impact of a risk by introducing internal control mechanisms. Transferral can occur through methods such as outsourcing, insurance or hedging, while acceptance implies that no action is necessary. The panel above shows the prioritisation of risks and appropriate responses to them using the likelihood/ consequences (or impact/probability) matrix. n Report the risks. This informs the whole organisation about the risks it faces and its responses to them, explaining how they are identified, assessed and managed. Only the biggest risks, in terms of their likelihood and consequences, need to be reported. Risk reports should show both the gross risk (before controls are introduced) and the net risk (after the effect of controls is taken into account) to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of those controls. A question that often emerges is whether organisational risk management is a bottom-up or top-down process. In practice, it is both. Business units and departments must identify and

assess risks facing them at local level. The top management team will see more strategic risks as a result of changing economic, competitive or regulatory conditions. Both processes need to be combined to ensure that risks are identified and assessed throughout the organisation. Best practice suggests that a risk management group (RMG) should be established to perform this seven-step process. The RMG should report formally to the board, usually through the audit committee or a separate risk committee. The group’s recommendations will influence the internal controls that the organisation implements. The RMG should also monitor the effectiveness of the whole risk management process, making improvements as necessary. Together with internal and external audit, the risk management process ought to provide a high level of assurance to the board that an effective system for risk management and control exists. The RMG operates at corporate level but can also advise individual business units and departments on their risk management practices. The seven-step process also takes place in business units and departments, where operational risks are identified, assessed, mapped and recorded on a register. While an organisation’s appetite for taking risks and its responses to them will generally be established by the board, a portfolio approach may result in differing appetites in different business units or departments, because the risk/return trade-off often varies in separate parts of an organisation. For example, a marketing department may be able to take risks in new promotions while an HR department will be risk-averse for fear of the problems caused by poor employment practices. It is important that risks identified at each level are communicated up and down the organisation. This is an important function of the RMG. So risk management at individual level has a great deal in common with how it’s done at organisational level. The sevenstep process is a good way to think about how organisations deal with the risks that they face. FM



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pAPER p2

Management Accounting – Decision Management In the first of two articles, Tim Thompson introduces the case of a company that’s facing a tricky short-term quality problem – and invites you to solve it.

AGJ is a company that manufactures a product called the Pool Heater and sells it to local authorities, country clubs and private householders. As its name suggests, this product is used to heat water in swimming pools. AGJ buys various components from suppliers and assembles these into the finished product. One of the company’s key stated policies is its commitment to quality. Each heater contains a critical part named component Y. It’s company policy to procure all critical components from two separate suppliers and, when the company was formed, AGJ began obtaining component Y from both HKP and PQR. Six months after AGJ was formed, HKP went out of business and immediately stopped supplying component Y. Fortunately, AGJ managed to obtain extra supplies from PQR and, as a result, was able to meet all of its customer demand. Later it found a new supplier, XYZ, to continue its dual-supplier policy. About six months after HKP’s failure, there was a board meeting at AGJ and the directors spent much time complimenting each other on how well they had managed the switch to the new supplier. They were particularly pleased that all of the stock originally supplied by HKP had been used in assembly, and that the associated Pool Heaters had all been sold. But a week later the firm was in turmoil. A former employee of HKP had blown the whistle, alerting AGJ to the following problems: n Throughout the year before it went out of business, HKP had failed to inspect any of the component Y that it had made and sold. This was a cost-cutting measure taken when it was clear that the company was in financial difficulty. n Before this cost-cutting exercise, HKP had inspected all such components and scrapped any that were deemed faulty. On average, three per cent were found to be faulty. n The inspection was an industry-standard process, but it did not detect all faulty components. In common with the rest of the industry, 0.5 per cent of the components that were sent to customers still failed. A further AGJ board meeting was immediately convened and the following extracts were recorded in the verbatim minutes: Managing director: “This is a nightmare. If any of the heaters we have sold include a faulty component Y, we know that this will eventually cause a failure. We give a five-year guarantee on these products and we’re committed to rectifying any faults that occur. I can’t imagine the cost to us in terms of our damaged reputation, but we need to begin by knowing something about the costs of putting any failed heaters back into operation.” Technical director: “We already knew about the industrystandard failure rate of 0.5 per cent and were expecting this to

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arise for components supplied by both PQR and HKP. We have not yet had any component Y failures in the heaters that we have sold, but we anticipate that any failures that do occur will start happening in about three months’ time.” Production director: “We don’t inspect these components ourselves. This would be a non-value-added activity and we don’t have the technology to conduct such inspections anyway. A 0.5 per cent failure rate is very low and we should be able to live with the consequences of any failures that do occur at this level.” Technical director: “If a component Y does fail, it will need to be replaced with a new one costing $100. But to do this would require an emergency visit by a service engineer. It would

“Using Bayes’s theorem, I should be able to calculate some expected values to determine the estimated costs of the alternative options” take an average of three hours to travel to and from the customer and make the repair. As you will recall, we have established that the opportunity cost of these engineers is $50 per hour. But the problem is not that simple. When a failure occurs, it’s not only a matter of replacing the faulty component Y. These heaters have water running through them and, if the component fails, it will leak out and cause all sorts of damage to our customers’ premises. We have previously researched this in some detail and we estimate that, on average, we would have to pay a further $500 for each component Y failure to clear up the mess and rectify the damage. “We already have in place detailed plans to deal with any such failures. The service engineer will identify whether it was HKP or PQR that supplied the faulty component and we will keep detailed records of all of the costs that we incur. With the guarantees provided by the suppliers, we expected to charge these costs in full back to the supplier. So, although we guarantee the product, it is the supplier, not us, that should pay for the fault and its consequences. The problem that we now have, of course, is that we cannot go back to HKP, since it has gone out of business. We will have to bear that cost ourselves and I am very worried that I will be held accountable in future for some significant adverse cost variances.” Sales and marketing director: “If the number of failed components is to be as great as we are now expecting, then

paper p2

I agree that this will cost us even more in terms of our reputation – we could lose future sales as a result. I think that we should look at ways of eliminating, or at least minimising, this risk. Our engineers will visit all of our customers within the next three months to perform routine maintenance work on the heaters. At these visits, could we inspect the component Y in all of the heaters concerned? If we did this, we could replace any that are found to be faulty. With luck, we might complete this before any of the components fail.” Production director: “The greater risk clearly lies with the components supplied by HKP. Unfortunately, we don’t keep records of which supplier’s components were assembled into which heater. We won’t know this information until we open the heaters up and see the component. What we do know is that we have assembled and sold a total of 4,000 heaters since we started the business. Our purchasing records show that, of the 4,000 of component Y that we purchased, 2,500 were obtained from HKP and 1,500 were obtained from PQR.” Finance director: “Performing these inspections during the routine maintenance visits would mean that there would be no extra travelling costs. The only relevant costs would be the purchase of replacement components for each one found to be faulty; the extra time that the engineers would need to spend on the inspection and replacement activities; and the cost of providing any testing equipment.” Technical director: “I have some figures here: replacing component Y is one of the standard operations for which our service engineers are trained. Each job should take 30 minutes. But, if we are going to conduct this inspection, we do need some special testing equipment. For a cost of $20,000 (in total, not per engineer), we can equip all our engineers with a device that can be taken on site to test component Y. If the component proves to be faulty, then it can be replaced. This test takes about 15 minutes for each heater. The devices are 100 per cent reliable and will detect all faulty components. This testing method would also detect those faulty components that we were planning to accept within the 0.5 per cent normal failure rate. It would ensure that any components that we use as on‑site replacements are not faulty, either.” Finance director: “I think we’re in a position to evaluate the alternatives that we face. We seem to have three choices here. We could take the passive approach, which means waiting for any

Photograph: Ruth Prickett

failures to occur and dealing with them as they happen. Alternatively, there are two possible active approaches, both of which call for the engineers to inspect all of the heaters concerned and make replacements as required. The first of these would be to launch an immediate programme of special visits and the second would be to perform this activity at the routine maintenance visits. I think that the first key issue here is to determine how many of component Y we might reasonably expect to fail. We also need to determine the likelihood that, if a component Y is found to be faulty, it was supplied by HKP as opposed to PQR. This is important, as the financial consequences are radically different. I recall from my CIMA studies that Bayes’s theorem may be of help here. Using this, I should be able to calculate some expected values to determine the estimated costs of the alternatives, which should help us to make our decision.” Managing director: “I don’t think that the first of the active approaches is feasible. We simply don’t have enough service engineers to commit to such an extensive exercise. You’d better focus your attention on a comparison of the passive approach with the second of the active approaches. Please get to work on this straight away and let me know when you have prepared your figures. We will reconvene tomorrow and make a decision.” At that point, the board meeting was adjourned and the finance director returned to his office. By the early evening he’d prepared some draft notes ready to edit into his formal report. Requirement Imagine that you are the firm’s FD and prepare draft notes that: n Evaluate the numerical data and, based upon this alone, recommend whether the company should adopt the active or the passive approach to solving the problem. n Demonstrate how Bayes’s theorem may be useful in evaluating the data in the case. n Discuss the longer-term issues of quality that the company should consider and comment on whether these might affect the recommendation that you have just made. A specimen solution to this question will be published in the next (December/January) issue. FM Tim Thompson FCMA is a senior lecturer in accountancy and finance at Lincoln Business School, University of Lincoln.



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Exam notice Visit www.cimaglobal.com regularly for updates.

n November 2006 exam entry for the professional qualification November’s exams will be held on Tuesday 21, Wednesday 22 and Thursday 23. The deadline for entries was September 21. n Cancellations and changes We do not accept cancellations and will not refund fees. The closing date for requesting changes to papers or exam centres was September 30. n Admission advice letters You must print out your admission advice online. You have been able to do this since October 18. The admission advice shows the exact details of your exam centre, as well as the exams you have entered for. You must take it with you to the exams and keep it safely afterwards, because it contains your candidate numbers. n Attestation forms (Sri Lanka only) If you are sitting exams in Sri Lanka you must also print out an attestation form (www.cimaglobal.com/attestationform) for each exam you have entered, sign it and bring it to the exam hall. You will not be allowed into the venue if you fail to produce a completed attestation form.

These will be your confirmation of attendance and are valid for four months from the date of the exam. n Pre-seen material for TOPCIMA The TOPCIMA pre-seen material and assessment matrix has been available to download from www.cimaglobal.com/ topcima since September 11. It is your responsibility to download this material and familiarise yourself with it before the exam. A “clean” copy of the pre-seen material will be given to you in the exam. You cannot take any notes in with you. n Examinable legislation A list of examinable legislation is available on www.cimaglobal.com. n Exam paper formats Ensure that you visit the web site to familiarise yourself with the exam paper formats before taking the exams.

n Going to the exam As well as your admission advice, you will need to take another means of identification, such as a passport or driving licence, to the exam hall.

n Important notice for managerial level candidates All managerial level candidates are reminded that the answers to all questions – including all section A objective test sub-questions – must be written in your answer books. If candidates draft their responses on the question paper, these should be transferred to the answer book before the end of the exam. It will be assumed that all writings in the question paper are the candidate’s notes, so they will not be considered by the markers. An article providing guidance on how to answer section A questions is available at www.cimaglobal.com/sectiona.

n Attendance slips You must complete attendance slips before starting each exam. The slips have tear-off sections, which you should retain.

n Question papers Please note that you cannot take question papers out of the exam hall. The November papers will be available at

n Exam rules You must download and read the exam rules from the CIMA web site when you download your admission advice.



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www.cimaglobal.com/studyresources immediately after the exams. n Exam talkback line The talkback line is open for you to make comments relating to the exam papers, the exam halls and their facilities. The service is available for two weeks during and after the exams. For more details visit www.cimaglobal.com/talkback. n Exam results The results of the November exams will be sent out by the end of January 2007. Visit www.cimaglobal.com/cimaonline to register to receive your results via e-mail. n Computer-based assessments For full information on entering for a computer-based assessment at certificate level, visit the CIMA web site at www.cimaglobal.com/certificateentry. n The new 2006 CIMA certificate in business accounting Assessments based on the CIMA certificate in business accounting 2006 syllabus have been available since October 2 at CIMAapproved assessment centres. Assessments based on the CIMA certificate in business accounting 2000 syllabus will be available until March 1, 2007. Assessments based on the 2000 and 2006 syllabuses are, therefore, available concurrently until March 1, 2007. For further information about the new 2006 CIMA certificate in business accounting, including the full syllabus and transition arrangements, visit www.cimaglobal.com/certificate. n Queries If you have any questions, please visit CIMA’s web site to see if they are answered there, or get in touch with CIMA Contact (see page 39) or your local office. FM

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