Olympus and Irrationality: The Role of Greek Divinity in the Greek Struggle with Irrationality

11/4/08 First Year Seminar Beta Dr. Matthews Olympus and Irrationality: The Role of Greek Divinity in the Greek Struggle with Irrationality Paul Tilli...
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11/4/08 First Year Seminar Beta Dr. Matthews Olympus and Irrationality: The Role of Greek Divinity in the Greek Struggle with Irrationality Paul Tillich writes in his essay “Symbols of Faith” that “There are within us dimensions of which we cannot become aware except through symbols” (Tillich 573). These dimensions are matters of ultimate concern—dimensions that are relevant to our concern about finding meaning in our existence. Because these dimensions are issues of ultimate concern, they can only be expressed through symbols. Therefore, unknowable dimensions of ultimate concern are turned into gods. Faith, Tillich asserts, is “the state of being ultimately concerned” (Tillich 574). Thus, a society‟s divinity reflects its ultimate concern. According to modern interpretation, the ancient Greek divinity reflected the unconscious dimension, the unknowable realm of irrationality. How does Greek divinity reflect the Greek struggle with irrationality? Jonathan Lear and Nietzsche offer divergent arguments. Examination of Aeschylus‟ Prometheus Bound and Sophocles‟ Oedipus Rex reveals that, although Lear and Nietzsche‟s arguments are ostensibly contradictory, their conclusions are not mutually exclusive. Both Lear and Nietzsche provide accurate explanations of the relationship between the Greek ultimate concern with irrationality and the Greek divinity. In his essay “The Shrink is In,” Lear explores the Greek relationship to the unconscious, irrational mind. He argues that the Greeks shift “locus of hidden meaning” (25), representing it as an external, rather than internal, force. This force is Olympus, the divine sphere that houses the Olympian gods. This realm of irrational meaning cannot be easily deciphered by human reason (Lear 24). Lear contends that the unconscious domain is dangerous only if we fail to

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recognize its influence in our determinedly rational existence. If we deny the irrational, it will wreak havoc. But psychoanalysis, Lear explains, is a means of dealing with the irrational: “It is a technique that allows dark meanings and irrational motivations to rise to the surface of conscious awareness…they become less liable to disrupt human life in violent and unpredictable ways” (Lear 25). The role of the Greek divinity is comparable to the role of psychoanalysis; both psychoanalysis and Olympus enable us to accept and wrestle with the irrationality in our existence. The Greeks were able to cope with their ultimate concern, irrationality, by representing it as an external force, Olympus. Nietzsche makes the opposite case in his “Apollonianism and Dionysiansim.” His article is constructed on many of the same premises as Lear‟s, but reaches a contrary conclusion. Nietzsche approaches the Greek relationship with irrationality by discussing Dionysianism and Apollonianism. The Dionysiac state is a state of intoxication, of complete deferral to the id. The id is an irrational, unconscious force, an impulse that seeks primal satisfaction. Nietzsche describes Dionysiac celebrations as events marked by “… a complete sexual promiscuity overriding every form of established tribal law; all the savage urges of the mind were unleashed” (Nietzsche 555). Apollonianism is the opposite of Dionysianism. Apollolonianism celebrates the illusion of reason, a veil protecting us from a reality marred by inscrutable irrationality (Nietzsche 553). Apollo, the god of illusion, protected the Greeks from “those brutal and grotesque Dionysiac forces” (Nietzsche 555). These two opposing states, Apollonianism and Dionysianism, are the foundation of Nietzsche‟s argument. Nietzsche writes that the Greeks harbored a “tremendous distrust of the titanic forces of nature: Moira, mercilessly enthroned beyond the knowable world” (558). These titanic forces represent the id: the unknowable irrationality and barbarity of the unconscious.

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Moira is Fate, the illogical, omnipotent force that rules the lives of men. The Greeks were aware of the inexorable suffering—caused by unknowable irrationality—that is the fate of mankind, but struggled to find meaning in this existence. So they used Olympus to conquer irrational fate. How? The Greeks made their gods victims of fate in order to glorify irrational existence (Nietzsche 559). Apollo, unable to resist the Dionysiac id, instead “wrest[ed] the destructive weapon…from his opponent‟s hand” (Nietzsche 555). Nietzsche‟s argument parallels Lear‟s in the assertion that the Greeks used their Gods to help them deal with this enigmatic irrational force. However, he writes that Olympus was not a symbol of irrationality, but a talisman against it. The role of Olympus, epitomized in Apollo, was to create an illusion of meaning, a reason and rationality to existence (Nietzsche 556). Olympus gave meaning to the irrational life of humanity by living it. Aeschylus‟ play Prometheus Bound elucidates the role of Olympus in the Greek struggle with irrationality. Aeschylus‟s gods speak in riddles, straining communication between humanity and divinity. Admittedly, the gods do not deign to communicate directly with man. Instead, they speak through oracles, whose prophesies are incomprehensible. One character, desperately seeking to evade Zeus‟ wrath, sought advice from soothsayers, “but those he sent came back with riddling oracles dark and beyond the power of understanding” (Aeschylus 163). Divine riddling makes several appearances; Prometheus tells Io that he will speak plainly, without riddles (Aeschylus 161), and Hermes warns Prometheus not to speak in riddle (Aeschylus 175). Communication between the gods and men is obfuscated because the divine realm is irrational. Humans, who live in a world dominated by reason— veiled by the Apollonian illusion—cannot easily grasp the irrational lingo of the Gods. This evidence points to Lear‟s theory that the Greeks dealt will irrationality by expressing it in their divinity.

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However, Aeschylus‟ gods are not merely the source of irrationality. They are also its victims. The gods are subject to fate, the quintessence of irrationality. Even Zeus, the highest Olympian, cannot escape the authority of fate. Prometheus relates Zeus‟ doom: “His own lightwitted counsels will undo him…he will make a marriage which he one day will rue” (Aeschylus 167). Zeus is fated to fall at the hand of his heir unless he releases Prometheus from bondage (certainly a „twist of fate,‟ but fated nevertheless). Prometheus, a god himself, also mentions fate in passing. He asks, “Why should I fear, since death is not my fate?” (Aeschylus 174). Prometheus‟ declaration that death is not his fate implies that he is subject to fate. Thus, Aeschylus‟s portrayal of the Greek gods dovetails with Nietzsche‟s proposal. The Greeks conceived the gods as victims of fate (albeit unconsciously) in order to bring meaning to their irrational reality. Prometheus Bound affirms both Lear and Nietzsche‟s notions of the role of Greek divinity in helping the Greeks deal with their ultimate concern. Sophocles‟ Oedipus Rex, on the other hand, supports only Lear‟s hypothesis. Because Oedipus Rex is squarely situated in the mortal realm, it only addresses the human conflict with irrationality. Oedipus, the eponymous protagonist of Oedipus Rex, is fated to murder his father and wed his mother. Oracles reveal this fate in bits and pieces. An unnamed oracle tells Laius, Oedipus‟ father, that he is fated to be killed by his son (ironically the same fate that Prometheus prophesies for Zeus in Prometheus Bound) (Sophocles 41). Teiresias, an oracle of Apollo, discloses the same fate to a defiant Oedipus (Sophocles 26). Oracles are the messengers of the gods, which indicated that the gods are the origin of the irrational fate that befalls Oedipus. 1 Another aspect of Oedipus‟ struggle with fate bolsters Lear‟s argument. Lear, to reiterate, 1

Strictly speaking, the Fates, not the gods, are the perpetrators of fate. The role of oracles as messengers of the gods and conveyors of fate may be accounted for by acknowledged inconsistency in the Greeks‟ conception of their divinity.

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asserts that unrecognized irrationality will create violent chaos. For a large portion of Oedipus Rex, Oedipus adamantly disregards the influence of fate in his life. He says that he solved the Sphinx‟s riddle using wit alone, although his success was necessarily determined by fate (Sophocles 27). Later on, encouraged by his wife, Oedipus derides those who have faith in prophesy; he calls the oracles “dead…and worthless” (Sophocles 51). As Lear predicts, Oedipus‟ failure to acknowledge the irrational sphere of prophesy is his downfall. Ruined by the revelation of his actualized fate, Oedipus gouges out his eyes (Sophocles 66). In Oedipus Rex, Sophocles renders the Greek gods originators and perpetrators of irrationality, affirming Lear‟s contention that Greek irrationality was reflected in Greek divinity. Prometheus Bound supports Lear‟s argument, but also corroborates Nietzsche‟s assertion that Olympus defended the Greeks from irrationality by succumbing to it. The Greek gods serve a dual purpose. Like the Greeks themselves, the gods are both the source and the victims of irrationality. Interestingly, this is what solidifies their humanity. The animal core of humanity, the id, generates the very irrationality that inflicts pain and suffering on mankind. So although Lear and Nietzsche both understand the role of divinity in the ancient Greek struggle with irrationality, neither gives a comprehensive explanation. Neither Lear nor Nietzsche fully expresses the role of Olympus in terms of Tillichian symbols. In order to embody ultimate concern and aid in the search for meaning, Tillichian symbols must mirror humanity.

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Works Cited

Aeschylus. Prometheus Bound. 2nd ed. Ed. David Grene. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Lear, Jonathan. "The Shrink is In." The New Republic 25 Dec. 1995: 18-25.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Apollonianism and Dionysianism." The Birth of Tragedy, 550-563.

Sophocles. Oedipus the King. 2nd ed. Trans. David Grene. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Tillich, Paul. "Symbols of Faith." Dynamics of Faith, 1990. 572-580.

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