Chapter 1 1. Portugal and East Timor are further non-African members of the CPLP. 2. For an overview of the advantages of eclecticism in the study of international relations, see Sil/Katzenstein 2010. 3. Brazilian policy makers, media, and even the president and his foreign minister predominantly speak of the African continent as if it were a single country. Interestingly, this is not only the case when referring to African countries before a Brazilian audience, but also in speeches held by the Brazilian president and other official representatives on bilateral visits to African partners. On these occasions, the Brazilian representatives would usually refer shortly to the bilateral relations at the beginning of their speeches and then lead over to Brazil’s engagement with “Africa.”

Chapter 2 1. In line with the English School theory, this work understands the “international system” as a social realm in which states have social relations with each other and constitute an “international society.” For a detailed introduction to the concept of international society, see Bull (1979). 2. Some scholars also refer to Great Powers as “Major Powers” or “established powers” when describing the phenomenon of a group of states that is endowed with special rights and a higher status (see, for instance, Volgy et al. [2011, 2014] or Narlikar [2013]). As it is common practice in contemporary international relations to use the terms interchangeably, they will also be used synonymously with the term “Great Powers” in this book. However, it should be mentioned that the term Great Power is the only one that has been historically used and defined as a state category in International Relations theory. 3. The modern (Western) state system is considered to have begun with the Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) in which the major European countries at that time (the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, France, Sweden, and the Dutch Republic) agreed to respect the principles of the sovereignty of states and their right of political self-determination as well as the principle of nonintervention of one state in the internal affairs of another. 4. The Congress of Vienna (1815) was a conference of ambassadors of European states held to redraw the continent’s political map after the defeat of Napoleonic France. It was the first occasion in history where, on

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a continental scale, national representatives came together to formulate treaties. The Congress of Vienna settlement formed the framework for European international politics until the outbreak of the World War I in 1914. Although representatives from all the states that had participated in the wars were invited, the principal negotiations were conducted by the “Big Four” (Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria) and, later on, royalist France. 5. On April 25, 1945, the UN Conference on International Organization began in San Francisco, California, laying the foundations for the drafting of the United Nations Charter and the establishment of the current regime of the United Nations. 6. The P5+1 group consists of the five powers that hold a permanent seat at the UN Security Council (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, China) and Germany and is concerned with the Iranian nuclear program. The six-party talks is a format that comprises the United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. It is concerned with North Korea’s nuclear program. 7. The US National Security Strategies of 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2012, for instance, refer to the United States, the European Union, China, India, and Russia as Great Powers or “centers of global power,” thus including two powers that do not hold a seat in the United Nations Security Council (Government of the United States 2002–13). 8. Literature is not clear on the question of which powers are considered part of the “Great Power elite.” Relatively undisputed is the status of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. France is usually counted as a member of the Great Power club despite some status inconsistencies (see Badie 2011). China, despite its unquestionable material capabilities and its seat at the UN Security Council, is mostly categorized as a “Rising Power” that has not been fully recognized by the other Great Powers (see Suzuki 2008; Deng 2011). 9. Iran and North Korea, for example, have international pariah status due to their nuclear programs. India, on the other hand, has not been sanctioned for the development of nuclear weapons but constitutes a special case as it is considered a strategic partner of the leading Great Power, the United States. For the reasons for the United States backing of India’s nuclear ambitions, see, for example, Perkovich (2005). 10. Consider the example of Russia’s conflict with Georgia in 2008 when the EU put negotiations on the Partnership Agreement on hold and demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgian soil (see, for example, Mukhopadhyay 2008). 11. Citation of Wolfgang Ischinger, state secretary at the German Federal Foreign Office from 1998–2001, quoted after Hellmann (2001:255). 12. A recent publication by the IR scholars Paul, Welch Larson, and Wohlforth (2014) has started to explore the phenomenon of “Status in World Politics.” However, this publication is a notable exception and has only started to fill the research gap on the role of status in international relations.

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13. Taking an example from a different social setting to illustrate the difference between power and status, the status of being a manager, for instance, is based on a specific set of rights and duties that endow the manager with power over the workers of the company. Yet, the power of the manager is tied to the status as it is his/her position within the company that gives him/her the right to dismiss people from the company. If the manager does not behave according to the role prescribed by his/ her special rights and duties, his/her status will sooner or later not be recognized by the workers anymore. 14. Joseph Nye has termed this sort of influence “soft power.” In contrast to “hard power” (e.g., military or financial coercion), soft power is the ability to get others to want the outcomes you want by influencing them through persuasion and attraction (Nye 2004). 15. For an introduction to the principle of social comparison, see Darley (2010:762–765) and Corcoran et al. (2011:119–139). 16. See for example Cameron Thies’s analysis of Israel’s international role conceptions and its unsuccessful drive for status (2012) or Shogo Suzuki’s work on China and Japan as “frustrated Great Powers” seeking higher international standing (2008). 17. Definition after Nye (2004), see footnote 8. 18. This assumption excludes tied-aid agreements that oblige the recipient country to buy certain products from the donor country in return for development aid. 19. To illustrate this argument, here are some recent examples of the hosting of international events by Rising Powers: Brazil: Rio+20, FIFA World Cup 2014, Olympics 2016, World Youth Day 2013; Mexico: hosting of COP-16 in 2010 and G20 in 2012; India: Commonwealth Games 2010; Russia: Olympics 2014, bid for FIFA 2018; South Africa: hosting of COP-17 in 2011, FIFA World Cup 2010; South Korea: hosting of G20 in 2010, FIFA 2002. 20. While China has many characteristics of classical Great Power status (nuclear weapons, seat at the UN Security Council, economic power) its international status is still debated and it is often considered to be a Rising Power that has not yet been accepted at the club of the traditional Great Powers. For a discussion of China as a “status-inconsistent major power,” see, for example, Deng (2011) and Suzuki (2008). 21. China is the second biggest economy of the world, Brazil has risen to rank seven, and India occupies rank ten among the biggest economies of the world (IMF 2012). 22. See, for example, the argument of Narkilar (2013) that Rising Powers are reluctant to take on new responsibilities and to share the burden of providing global public goods despite the established powers’ expectations for them to do so, as well as his argument on a “reform for responsibility” mechanism that grants greater voice to Rising Powers if they take over global responsibility (Narkilar 2013:576). 23. See subchapter 2.1.

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24. Finding themselves in a sandwich position between smaller powers and Great Powers and lacking great material power resources to pursue their interests against dominant Great Powers, Rising Powers traditionally had to leverage their power through international coalitions. For a comprehensive analysis of Middle Power strategies, see Cooper (1997).

1. Brasil. Grande Potência no Século XXI (Dória 2012). 2. “Esse país preparado a se transformar em uma das grandes nações do mundo” (Da Silva 2012). 3. “Mais dia ou menos dia o nosso país será inevitavelmente uma das grandes potencias económicas e politicas do mundo” (quoted in Vargas Garcia 2012:77). 4. With US$ 33.1 billion military expenditure in 2012 (1.5 percent of GDP) Brazil ranks eleventh in SIPRI’s worldwide ranking on military spending, while China (2), Russia (3), and India (7) occupy front ranks (SIPRI 2013). Traditional Great Powers like the United States (1), Great Britain (4), and France (6) are also much ahead of Brazil in military terms (ibid.). 5. “O Brasil desponta como uma potência emergente sui generis: um país que, sem descuidar da modernização de suas Forcas Armadas, se afirma, e define seu comportamento internacional, como um actor voltado para a cooperação económica e comercial, para a democracia e a justiça social, para o dialogo e a diplomacia, em suma, para a paz.” (Patriota 2010). 6. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are the only exceptions in this regard. 7. For a detailed discussion of Brazil’s growing engagement in UN missions see (Kenkel 2013). 8. A Brazilian squad that had been sent in addition to the medical mission only arrived in Europe on the eve of the conclusion of peace. Brazil’s human losses in World War I were limited to 156 men who died from Spanish Flu during a stopover in Africa before the squad had arrived in Europe (Santos 2010:164). 9. Brazil’s entry into World War II on the side of the United States also yielded loans and technical assistance by the United States for the construction of the first Brazilian steel plant. 10. “O sacrificio dos brasileiros nos campos de batalha da Europa será compensado pela posição que ocuparemos no concerto das nações vencedoras, entre as quais teremos voz e voto e idênticas garantias de paz e prosperidade.” Quoted in Vargas Garcia (2012:291) without date and place. 11. The permanent members of the League Council were Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. 12. A permanent seat for the four powers participating at the Dumbar ton Oaks Conference (United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and

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China) was already set. Along with the issue of a possible Brazilian seat, the United States also proposed a permanent seat for France (Vargas Garcia 2012:105). 13. During this period, Freitas-Valle was not Brazil’s head of delegation to the United Nations. He returned to this post only in 1956. 14. Brazil held a nonpermanent seat at the UNSC in 1946/47, 1951/52, 1954/55, 1963/64, 1967/68, 1988/89, 1993/94, 1998/99, 2004/05, and 2010/11. 15. The proposal included an enlargement of the UNSC from 15 to 25 members, with permanent seats for the G4, two permanent seats for Africa and one further nonpermanent seat for Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe (Group of Four 2005). 16. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Ministério de Relações Exteriores — MRE) is often referred to as ‘Itamaraty’ for its historical location at the Itamaraty Palace in the former capital of Rio de Janeiro. 17. The Complexo de Vira-Lata is a national complex diagnosed by the Brazilian thinker Nelson Rodrigues as the feeling of Brazilian elites of being only “second-class Europeans” because of their mestizo origin resulting both in a feeling of inferiority on the one hand and a profound admiration for and orientation toward the “civilized and developed” Europe on the other hand. 18. “O Brasil não é um país pobre e pequeno. O Brasil é um país grande. O que faltava para ele era respeito. Como agora ele se autorespeita, poderemos fazer as coisas com mais igualdade de condições” (cited in Nidecker 2009). 19. “Finalmente, nossa política externa derrubou ‘aquela velha opinião’ de que o Brasil precisa pedir licença para agir nas relações internacionais.” 20. “O Brasil não vai agir como se fosse um paisinho pequeno, sem importância” (cited in Berlinck 2009). 21. “De pouco vale sermos convidados para a sobremesa no banquete dos poderosos” (Estado de São Paulo 2007a). 22. “Yes, somos potência” (“Yes, we are a Great Power”). 23. The P5 are the five veto powers of the UN Security Council (United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France). 24. For a discussion of Brazil’s status as Regional Power in South America, see Soares de Lima/Hirst 2006; Gratius 2007; Hurrell 2008; Flemes 2007, 2010a. 25. The entente was not realized at the time of Rio Branco but formed the idea for the ABC-Pact between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed in 1915. 26. For a good overview of Brazil’s regional engagement, see Herz (2011:173–176). 27. This period of Brazilian foreign policy will be treated in more detail in subchapter 3.3. 28. “Procuraremos ter com os Estados Unidos da América uma parceria madura, com base no interesse recíproco e no respeito mútuo” (Da Silva 2003).

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29. Some international analysts interviewed by the author in April 2012 maintained that President Lula’s foreign policy was in fact the “compensation of an inferiority complex.” A critical Brazilian diplomat even accused Lula’s foreign policy of being driven by “motivations of personal aggrandizement” rather than by Brazil’s national interests (De Almaida 2010:162). 30. Note that the Group of 20 at the WTO is distinct from the “G20 major economies” that comprise the finance ministers and central bank governors from the 20 major economies. In order to differentiate the two groups, the G20 at the WTO is now often labeled “G20 developing nations” or “G20+.” 31. Despite the negative reaction to Brazil’s efforts to mediate in the issue of the Iranian nuclear program it was Brazil’s endeavor to reach an international agreement with Iran that would include the US demands for international controls. For a discussion of this initiative, see, for example, Spektor (2010). 32. Some authors diagnosed a “respect deficit” between the United States and Brazil (see, Hakim 2012). 33. See subchapter 3.2. 34. Foreign policy under the military regime was generally designed and executed in the Itamaraty that remained relatively independent from influence from the military. 35. Examples are the nuclear cooperation with Germany and the cooperation with the People’s Republic of China on the construction of rockets and satellites. 36. “Durante 500 anos acreditamos que os benefícios para o nosso desenvolvimento viriam do Norte, agora há a consciência de que nos precisamos começar a resolver os nossos problemas e não ficar dependentes, tanto, das promessas dos países desenvolvidos que, dificilmente, chegam a se concretizar” (Da Silva 2005). 37. “Não podemos falar em integração Sul-Sul quando só chegamos a outro país do Sul passando por um do Norte” (Pimentel 2007). 38. Between 2003 and 2010, the Lula government carried out 153 economic missions. Out of these economic missions, which were mostly directed toward the global South, President Lula accompanied 86 personally (MRE 2010a). 39. This development is largely due to the fact that China replaced the United States as Brazil’s biggest single trade partner. 40. At the end of 2011, about 65 countries around the world had implemented social programs based on the Brazilian model (Estado de São Paulo 2011). 41. Brazil refuses to be classified as a “donor” and prefers to present itself as a partner for development. Brazil’s Development Cooperation agency stresses on its webpage: “It is important to emphasize that Brazil does not present itself as a donor country, although it finances triangular actions with international organizations or other countries.” (“É importante

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ressaltar que o Brasil não se apresenta como um país doador, ainda que financie ações triangulares com organismo internacional ou com países”) (ABC 2013). 42. According to World Bank data, Brazil received US$ 870,020,000 Official Development Assistance in 2011. However, this figure has been growing in recent years. In 2009 under the Lula administration Brazil received only US$ 336,930,000 of Official Development Assistance (World Bank 2013a). 43. Various Brazilian ministries and government agencies are involved in Brazil’s South-South cooperation but are not included in the official statistics (Inoue/Costa Vaz 2012:511). 44. It is remarkable that Brazil’s triangular cooperation has been only executed with traditional donors and not with other new donors like China. For a good overview on Brazil’s trilateral cooperation projects, see Inoue/Costa Vaz (2012:524–525) and Ayllón (2011). 45. At personal interviews with ABC staff in Brasília in 2010 and 2012 various officials of the cooperation agency expressed criticism on the trilateral cooperation schemes because of extensive bureaucracy. Yet, the growing number of triangular cooperation projects with the established donors signals that the ABC has a foreign policy interest in this South-NorthSouth development cooperation. 46. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), responsible for Brazil’s development cooperation is part of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and run by Brazilian diplomats. For the influence of foreign policy considerations on Brazil’s South-South cooperation, see also Cabral/Weinstock (2010b:VII) and Ayllon (2010).

Chapter 4 1. In fact, the 2011 census showed that a majority of 50.7 percent of Brazil’s 188 million population is of Afro-Brazilian origin (Phillips 2011). 2. “Herdamos da África uma cultura que impregna nossa língua, nossos corpos, nossa culinária, nossa música e nossa religião. Está presente na forma de sentir e de agir dos brasileiros. É genuíno e recíproco o sentimento de fraternidade que nos une” (Da Silva, July 1, 2009). 3. Cited in Barbosa et al. 2009:59. 4. An essay on Brazil–Africa relations in an introductory book to Brazil’s foreign relations published in 2006, for instance, states that: “[Africa] remains in crisis and humanitarian tragedy” and “improvements are little evident in the economic domain.” (“Permanecen as crises e as tragédias humanitárias”; “As melhorias são pouco evidentes no domínio económico.”) (Mourão et al. 2006:217–218). 5. The Quadros administration sought to stress Brazil’s cultural proximity with Africa by sending Afro-Brazilian ambassadors to Africa. Yet, due to a lack of “black professionals” at the Itamaraty, the first two black Brazilian ambassadors (Ghana and Nigeria) were not professional diplomats but

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a journalist (Souza Dantas) and an athlete (Adhemar Ferreira da Silva) (Cicalo 2012:4). 6. Between 1957 and 1960, 21 African states gained their independence. 7. Barbosa visited Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey (Benin), Nigeria, Cameroon, Gaboon, Zaire (Dem. Rep. Congo), Kenia (Rosi 2010:35). 8. It should take another ten years until a Brazilian president visited Africa for the first time in 1983 (Saraiva 2012:45). 9. Community of Portuguese-speaking countries. 10. This was a common opinion expressed by interview partners from Brazilian business representations. Interviews at the CNI, the Brazilian Ministry of Development and Trade, and the BNDES were carried out in June 2012. 11. In fact, only President Fernando Henrique Cardoso visited Africa once. Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco did not pay a single visit to the continent (Rizzi et al. 2011:67). 12. Chinese President Hu Jintao has visited Africa seven times in ten years (Luce 2013). 13. With only limited financial resources to expand its presence on the African continent, it has been easier for Brazil to raise its profile in smaller countries. 14. Despite the general endeavor to broaden its relations with all of Africa, Brazilian activities within the CPLP also markedly intensified under the Lula administration (Saraiva 2012:109). 15. As diplomatic telegrams between the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and the Brazilian embassy in South Africa show, during a meeting between Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and his South African counterpart Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini-Zuma on January 10, 2003, the original idea to establish a strategic dialogue between Brazil and South Africa and form a coordination group of developing countries was modified into a trilateral mechanism that included India (MRE 2003b). 16. Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Graduação (PEC-G) (Graduation Program) and Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Pós-Graduação (PEC-PG) (Post-Graduate Program). 17. UNILAB-Universidade Federal da Integracao Luso-Afro-Brasileira. 18. Conferencia de Intelectuais da Africa e da Diáspora. 19. In addition to a normal upgrade of Brazil’s aging naval equipment, these measures include diverse projects such as the purchase of a nuclear submarine or the planned development of a new satellite and radar system dubbed as the “Blue Amazon Management System” (Abdenur/Marcondes 2013:2). 20. The increasing interest of Brazilian business in Africa is reflected by a growing number of conferences and special supplements in economic newspapers on the issue of doing business in Africa. In May 2012, the Brazilian development bank organized a big conference on business opportunities in the continent (“Investindo na África: Oportunidades, Desafios e Instrumentos para a Cooperação Econômica,” May 3, 2013), and one

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year later, the Brazilian National Federation of Industry CNI and the leading financial newspaper Valor organized a seminar on the same topic (“As Relações Brasil com a África, a Nova Fronteira do Desenvolvimento Global,” May 21, 2013). Newspaper articles and supplements declaring the continent a “land of opportunities” (Valor Economico 2013) or an “Eldorado” (Correio Braziliense 2010) have accompanied the trend. 21. Data provided to author by BNDES in July 2012. 22. Brazilian oil and mining companies also claim a natural advantage in mining and drilling on the African continent due to geological similarities between Brazil and Africa, which were united in a single landmass (Gondwana) 200 million years ago (World Bank/IPEA 2011:1–2; Stolte 2012). 23. See subchapter “Brazil–Africa Relations in a Nutshell.” 24. Data by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s Economic Intelligence Division, handed over to the author during interview in June 2012. 25. According to data from the Energy Information Administration, Brazil is already the ninth biggest oil producer in the world, with a production that surpasses that of its African oil suppliers Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria (Energy Information Administration 2013). Yet, due to the composition of Brazil’s oil (mostly heavy crude oil) Brazil imports light crude oil from Africa for the needs of its refineries (ibid.). 26. As the oil fields are located under a layer of salt in the deep sea, they are referred to as presalt fields. For a good overview on the presalt discoveries, see Leahy (2013). 27. Interviews at the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade [MDIC-Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior], the Department for Trade and Investment Promotion at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry [Departamento de Promoção Comercial e Investimentos], the Brazilian National Federation of Industry CNI [Confederação Nacional de Indústria], and the Afrochamber [Câmera de Comêrcio Afro-Brasileira] between May and June 2012. 28. These data refer to the official numbers on Brazil’s South-South cooperation published by the ABC. However, as has already been mentioned in Chapter 3, the real numbers of Brazil’s development aid might be much higher as services by other ministries or government agencies are not included (see also, Inoue/Costa Vaz 2013:511). 29. In 2012, the ABC listed even 42 African countries among the receivers of Brazilian development aid. 30. In his preface to the first official publication of Brazil’s Cooperation Agency ABC on technical cooperation with Africa, the then Foreign Minister Celso Amorim declared Brazil’s South-South cooperation “a key instrument of Brazil’s foreign actions” (“A cooperação técnica é um instrument central da ação externa brasileira.”) (ABC 2010:5). See also, Amorim (2006:16). 31. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) counts 42 different state entities (ministries and governmental agencies) involved in Brazil’s SouthSouth cooperation.

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32. The worldwide acclaims of the two Brazilian research institutes include the “World Food Prize for the greatest achievements of agricultural science in the twentieth century” for Embrapa (The World Food Prize 2006) and the nomination for the “best public health institution in the world” by the World Federation of Public Health Associations for Fiocruz (Fiocruz 2006). 33. According to the list of Africa projects executed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency in 2010, Lula’s last year of administration, South-South cooperation in the area of education and vocational training was executed in only four non-Lusophone countries (Benin, Morocco, Liberia, Zambia) (ABC 2011). 34. According to the World Bank “between 2001 and 2009, the income growth rate of the poorest 10 percent of the Brazilian population was 7 percent per year, while that of the richest 10 percent was 1.7 percent . This helped decrease income inequality (measured by the Gini index) to reach a 50-year low of 0.519 in 2011” (World Bank 2013b). 35. Among those are the FAO Agricola Medal (2005), the UNESCO’s Felix Houphouët-Boigny Peace Prize (2009), the World Food Program’s “Global Champion in the Fight Against Hunger” Award (2010), and the World Food Prize (2011) (see also Fraundorfer 2013). 36. The information in this subchapter is based predominantly on international media articles as they cover the complex topic in a more general manner and also reflect the positive international attention that Brazil’s agricultural development has attracted. For scientific assessments of Brazilian agricultural development and the cultivation of the Cerrado, see, for example, Rada (2013) and Goedert (1983). 37. According to the WTO Brazil is the world’s third largest exporter of agricultural products (WTO 2012:69). 38. In 2011, the regional Embrapa office in Ghana was downgraded to a country office while the major focus of Embrapa shifted to Mozambique (Cabral et al. 2013:8; Chichava et al. 2013). 39. The Project has recently been the focus of criticism from Mozambican and international NGOs that accuse Brazil of seeking land and business opportunities for Brazilian agro-industrial farmers. For a detailed overview and a balanced discussion of the project, see Chichava et al. (2013). 40. Brazil won the UNESCO Human Rights and Culture of Peace Award in 2001 and the Gates Award in 2003, among others. 41. In 1975 foreign oil imports accounted for almost 90 percent of Brazil’s fuel consumption (Reel 2006). 42. The information in this subchapter is based predominantly on media articles as they provide a general overview on Brazil’s energy politics and reflect the positive international reporting on the topic. For scientific assessments of Brazil’s energy policy and especially its ethanol program, see, for example, Goldemberg (2006) or Hira/De Oliveira (2009). 43. However, the Brazilian energy scenario has changed significantly since 2011, with liquid fuels consumption surpassing Brazil’s liquid fuels production and driving the country’s oil imports (EIA 2013).

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44. Ultimately, the demand for biofuels in Brazil has diminished. For an analysis of the current state of ethanol production in Brazil, see Daltro (2013). The data presented in this work refer to the years between 2006 and 2009 when international oil prices skyrocketed and Brazil resorted to the large-scale substitution of fossil fuels. 45. See earlier in this chapter. 46. This list of countries is based on data from ABC 2011; African Development Bank 2011; Freemantle/Stevens 2010; and World Bank/ IPEA 2011. Other sources like White (2010) count Brazilian “technical agreements with more than 20 countries across the continent” (White 2010:234). 47. Due to their history as single landmass (Gondwana), Brazil and Africa share many geological similarities (World Bank/IPEA 2011:1–2; Stolte 2012). 48. This topic will be treated in a more detailed way in the following chapter. 49. Interviews conducted at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry in June 2012.

Chapter 5 1. “Avanço de Chineses na África preocupa Brasil,” in: Valor Econômico (2010a). 2. “Investimento da China na África é alerta para o Brasil, diz Lula,” in: Estado de São Paulo (2007b). 3. “Lula acirra competição entre Brasil e China pelo mercado africano,” in: Agência Brasil (2010). 4. Ironically, Brazil and Africa have both witnessed the same phenomenon, as Chinese demand for natural resources has rendered high growth rates and increasing wealth. 5. The Cotton-4 project for the four African cotton producers helps the countries to produce cotton more efficiently. Yet, beyond the transfer of know-how, Brazil has fought for fairer production and trade conditions at the World Trade Organization. After winning the case against the United States it agreed to share the financial penalties that the United States had to pay as compensation to Brazil with the African cotton producers (Coelho 2010). The generic drug factory in Mozambique that produces cheap AIDS drugs is also related to a global fight of Brazil against patents for live-saving drugs (Lee/Gomez 2011). For both projects, see also Chapter 4. 6. “Ver esse país preparando a se transformar em uma das grandes nações do mundo” (Da Silva 2012). 7. “O verdadeiro caminho da paz é o combate sem tréguas à fome e à miséria” (Da Silva 2003b). 8. “O desenvolvimento indispensável para a segurança e paz” (Da Silva 2003c). 9. “Precisamos engajar-nos—política e materialmente—na única guerra da qual sairemos todos vencedores: a guerra contra a fome e a miséria” (Da Silva 2003b).

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1. Different commentators have claimed that France is using its Africa policy to demonstrate its Great Power status to the world. See, for example, Erlanger (2011): “Africa is the only region of the world where France can take itself for a Great Power, capable of changing the course of history with 500 men.” And French (1996): “Only the African continent gives France the illusion of being a Great Power.” 2. “Queremos levar ao Conselho a visão de um país do Sul, que fez soberanamente a opção de não produzir armos nucleares, que atribui importância especial a relação entre a paz e o desenvolvimento e aos meios pacíficos de solução de controvérsias” (Da Silva 2005). 3. Germany is not a Great Power but is nevertheless considered part of the group of Western powers that have dominated global decision making over the past decades. Despite its lacking Great Power status, it is therefore cited as an example of a traditional power as opposed to the predominantly non-Western Rising Powers. 4. Both quotations cited from Brands (2010). 5. Interview conducted at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (MRE) in June 2012. 6. Whereas a presence in Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was defined as having a colony on the continent, emerging powers’ Africa presence today is characterized by strong economic and diplomatic engagement. Yet, comparing, for example, Germany’s quest for “a place in the sun” under Emperor Wilhelm II (see, for example, Holmes 2004) and Brazil’s belief that, due to other emerging powers’ presence in Africa, it should also be represented on the continent, there are striking similarities with respect to international status-seeking through the demonstration of “presence” in Africa.

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Chapter 6