Motti Tactics in Finnish Military Historiography since World War II

International Bibliography of Military History 33 (2013) 121–147 brill.com/ibmh Motti Tactics in Finnish Military Historiography since World War II ...
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International Bibliography of Military History 33 (2013) 121–147

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Motti Tactics in Finnish Military Historiography since World War II Pasi Tuunainen

Adjunct Professor and Senior Lecturer in Military History, University of Eastern Finland [email protected]

Abstract This article explores Motti tactics, the key research topic in the Finnish art of war. The Finns have earned an international reputation for Mottis (encircled enemy units), which are often associated with winter warfare. However, Motti tactics were also used by the Finns in summer and autumn conditions, between 1941 and 1944 against the Red Army, and in late 1944 against the Wehrmacht. This article traces the origin of the Motti (encirclement) concept and examines how Motti tactics have been interpreted in Finnish military historical literature over more than 70 years. Contemporary interpretations of the topic, drawing upon officers’ own combat experiences, have dominated Finnish his­ toriography until now. The phenomenon has been described as slicing off the roadbound enemy columns to allow their defeat in detail (dispersing the enemy’s forces and destroying it one unit at the time). The traditional view holds that the application of Motti tactics was largely based on the Finnish troops’ greater mobility, the element of surprise, the exploitation of harsh and difficult forested terrain and climatic conditions, as well as on the Finns’ ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Since the 1970s our knowledge of the topic has accumulated and become more nuanced due to the contributions of a younger generation of researchers, both military and civilian, working with archival documents. This generation, for example, has seen Motti tactics as a part of the evolution of manoeuvre warfare in Europe. Placing the topic in a larger context has led some authors to maintain that Motti tactics had foreign influences, in particular from Germany. They have also identified ways in which this method benefitted from military innovation and mission-type orders.

* Pasi Tuunainen has written a published doctoral dissertation The Role of Presi­ dential  Advisory Systems in US Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of the National Security Council and Vietnam 1953–1961 (Helsinki, 2001). In it he concentrated on the advisory role played by the US military in South Vietnam, and focusing on themes such as counterin­ surgency. Dr. Tuunainen has also published several works on the history of the Finnish art of war, military innovation, and control and command issues that emerged in the inter­ war  period and World War II. Currently he is completing a book on Finnish military effectiveness in the Winter War of 1939–1940. The author would like to thank Dr. Mauro Mantovani and the anonymous reviewers of this article for their insightful comments and suggestions. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013

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DOI 10.1163/22115757-03302003

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Keywords Motti tactics; Winter War (1939-1940); Continuation War (1941-1944); Lapland War (1944-1945); encirclement; defeat in detail; manoeuvre warfare; military adaptation and innovation; mission-type orders

Introduction In many World War II documentary films there is footage of the Soviet inva­ sion of Finland during the winter of 1939-1940. The footage shows long col­ umns of destroyed and abandoned Red Army tanks, trucks and baggage trains along narrow roads in a snowy northern forest. Around the battle­ field debris and captured matériel lie the countless frozen stiff bodies of Red Army soldiers. The narrator usually refers to the extreme cold weather and deep snow, and that the Soviet troops had been cut off by Finnish ski troops clad in white camouflage. This image was a reality in many locations along the Finnish-Russian border. It was the result of the Finns’ use of Motti tactics. These above-mentioned encirclement battles were tactical level engage­ ments fought in secondary sectors such as Suomussalmi, Kuhmo and in the Karelian areas north of Lake Ladoga. The outcome of the Winter War was decided on the Karelian Isthmus, the area near the Gulf of Finland and the city of Leningrad. Yet both then and later, Motti tactics greatly helped the Finnish Army accomplish its mission to defend their country’s indepen­ dence and frustrate Soviet plans to occupy Finland. Scholars generally agree that victory is not the only criterion for military effectiveness. Many share the view that the Finnish Army performed effectively on the battle­ fields of the Second World War.1 This contention owes much to the utiliza­ tion of Motti tactics. Indeed a country with a population of less than 4 million lasted for 105 days against a 170 million-strong nation. During the Winter War the Finnish Army was able to win many battles against the Red

1 See, for example, Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” in Military Effectiveness. Volume I: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, 1988), 2; Bruce I. Gudmundsson, “Maneuver Warfare: The German Tradition,” in Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (Novato, 1993), 287; John Keegan, “Do We Need a New History of the Second World War?,” in War Experience, Self Image and National Identity: The Second World War as Myth and History, eds. Stig Ekman and Nils Edling (Södertälje, 1997), 86.

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Army. The Winter War ended in a negotiated settlement, and the Finns suf­ fered some territorial losses.2 After the Winter War (1939-1940) Finland was caught between Germany and the Soviet Union. The Finns sought German protection in 1941. This time Finland rearmed and mobilized 16 % of its manpower resources. The Finnish Army joined Operation Barbarossa in an attempt to reclaim the land annexed by the Soviet Union. Finland was not officially an Axis nation, but it was an Axis-aligned co-belligerent with a shared enemy. During the so-called Continuation War (1941-1944) the Finns also conducted many encirclement operations. The offensive phase of the war ended in late 1941, and was followed by a long period of stationary war. In the summer of 1944 the Finnish Army fought the Red Army’s fourth strategic offensive to knock Finland out of the war. The Finns managed to bring the Soviet offensive to a halt. The last big battle of the Continuation War was a victorious doubleencirclement at Ilomantsi in the eastern part of the country. With its mili­ tary performance and political efforts Finland avoided capitulation and unconditional surrender, but according to the agreement made at the armi­ stice with the Soviets in September 1944, the Finns turned against the German Mountain Army in Lapland. The objective of the ensuing Lapland War was to expel the German troops from Finnish territory to Norway. Motti tactics were repeatedly applied against the retreating Germans.3 Motti tactics were just one method in the Finnish repertoire during the Second World War. Yet they remain a highly significant issue and central research topic for both the Finnish military and academia. The multifaceted nature of Motti tactics has been widely discussed in Finnish mili­ tary historiography for more than 70 years. Initially, practically all the Finnish contributors were army officers, from captains to generals, and civilian researchers later joined them. The aim of this historiographical essay is to review how various authors have interpreted Motti tactics at dif­ ferent times. When was the concept created? How were Motti tactics applied against the Soviet and German forces? How were they connected to the Finnish tactical tradition? What was their place in the evolution of land warfare tactics in Europe? Due to the significance of Motti tactics as a research topic, its historiography aptly reflects the state of military history scholarship in Finland, besides its wider significance. 2 Olli Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia (Chippenham, 2002), 46–73. 3 Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second World War, (fn. 2), 74–174; Pasi Tuunainen, “The Finnish Army at War: Operations and Soldiers, 1939–45,” in Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations, eds. Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki (Leiden, 2012), 151–171.

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The etymology of the motti concept and definitions of Motti tactics The Finnish word motti is a noun that has many meanings. In military usage it refers to an encircled enemy unit or the terrain into which the unit has been encircled. Motti is a loan from the Swedish word mått, meaning a mea­ surement. In civilian use since the 1880s at least, the word meant a measure of volume, in particular a cubic metre of firewood. In some Finnish dialects it also refers to a bump, knar(l), boil or cup. In military use motti has also later meant a training centre or a motor.4 It is not clear when the word began to mean a pocket or envelopment. There is no agreement among the authors about the content of motti as an unofficial military slang term. From many accounts it becomes clear, how­ ever, that the word was invented sometime in January 1940, and that it was first used to describe a pocket in the Finnish IV Army Corps operating in an area north of Lake Ladoga in correspondence (most probably situation reports from the field) between the Army Corps headquarters and its sub­ ordinate units, most likely the 13th Division and its 37th Infantry Regiment. There have been a couple of former officers who claim to have coined the term. Later, in February 1940, the term began to be used more widely.5 Documents reveal that the term was not used during the Winter War. According to Simo Hämäläinen, it was at first a semi-official term that was often written in parentheses. It was used together with or as a substitute for expressions like siege, boils, positions or strongholds.6 There are three main theories about how the term was invented: the forest work, tadpole and the signal centre theories. Håkan Mörne and the Corps Commander Major General Woldemar Hägglund both see that the term was borrowed from loggers’ professional terminology. Hägglund thought that it originated in the rank and file soldiers, among whom there were many forest workers. Their contention was supported by 4 Tauno Räisänen, Kenraalimotti: Laatokan koillispuolen talvisotaa 1939–40 (Jyväskylä, 1959), 10; Otto Korpijaakko, Tulessa ja pakkasessa: Laatokan koilliskulmalla 1939–1940 (Porvoo, 1959), 177; Anssi Vuorenmaa, “ Mottisotaa,” in Itsenäisyyden puolustajat: Rintamalla (Porvoo, 2002), 78; Pasi Tuunainen, “Saarrostustraditiota Pitkärannan alueella – huomioita talviso­ dassa (1939–1940) syntyneen motti-sanan etymologiasta ja käytöstä,” in Itä-Suomi ja Venäjän Karjala: traditio ja laki karjalaisten elämässä, eds. Aleksandr Pashkov and Ilja Solomesch (Petroskoi, 2005), 202–203, 207. 5 Antti Juutilainen’s letter to Helge Seppälä 22 June 1977, in Suomi taisteli 2, ed. Helge Seppälä (Porvoo, 1978), 13; Antti Juutilainen, Mottien maa: IV Armeijakunnan sotatoimet talvisodassa (Juva, 1985), 170–172. 6 Simo Hämäläinen, Suomalainen sotilasslangi (Helsinki, 1963), 134–135; Tuunainen, “Saarrostustraditiota Pitkärannan alueella,” in Itä-Suomi ja Venäjän Karjala, 205.

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Yrjö A. Järvinen and Tauno Räisänen. This traditional explanation domi­ nated the literature for a long time. Furthermore, Yrjö Hakanen, who served as a battalion commander in the 9th Division in the Kainuu area (Suomussalmi and Kuhmo), talks about a metaphor referring to “the state of the Soviet troops after they had been dealt with by the Finns”. He made a reference to “chopping up” the enemy, and continued that the Finnish log­ gers had a habit of placing mottis, i.e. enclosed piles of logs of wood, in many places in the forests, especially near the roads. Allegedly, one battalion commander used the word tadpole in describing the shape of one motti and the terrain features to his superior officer. Axel Suvantola who served in the 13th Division operations office argues that there was a signal centre near the command post of the 37th Infantry Regiment, just north of the most famous Motti at Lemetti. The code word for this signal centre was motti. For Suvantola, motti meant first the com­ mand post, and later in January 1940 it gave the name to the pocket of Lemetti, and subsequently it was used for all encirclements.7 None of the theories have gained a dominant position. Niilo Lappalainen for example presents all three without saying which one is the most plau­ sible. Others such as Antti Juutilainen and Anssi Vuorenmaa suggest that Suvantola’s idea of the signal centre is the best one.8 Motti tactics comprise not only encircling but also the destruction of the enemy. A group of Finnish officers serving with the US Army in the late 1940s wrote instructional articles that associated Motti tactics with the idea of defeat in detail, defining the concept as “the development of the Finnish slicing-encircling tactics against extended and often road-bound columns”, or, in the caption of one article: “making little ones out of big ones by cut­ ting, slicing and encircling the enemy.”9 Yrjö Hakanen emphasizes that the verb motittaa (to make mottis) devel­ oped as soon as the Finns noticed that pockets were formed as a result of 7 Olle Salmi, “Kuka keksi sanan MOTTI?” (8 January, 1941), in Suomi taisteli 2, 13; Håkan Mörne, Kunnian latu: kuvia talvisodastamme 1939–1940 (Helsinki, 1941), 111; J. Woldemar Hägglund, “Sotatoimet Laatokan koillispuolella,” in Kunnia – Isänmaa: Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton sota 1939–1940, eds. Viljo E. Tuompo and Väinö A. M. Karikoski (Helsinki, 1942), 182; Yrjö A. Järvinen, Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa (Porvoo, 1948), 194; Räisänen, Kenraalimotti, (fn. 4), 10; Yrjö Hakanen, Sisulla …: erään täydennyspataljoonan kohtalot Suomussalmella ja Kuhmossa (Turku, 1969), 120; Axel Suvantola, “Motti,” Sotilasaikakauslehti No. 7 (1952), 252–254. 8 Niilo Lappalainen, Sotiemme suurmotit (Juva, 1990), 9–10; Antti Juutilainen, Mottien maa, (fn. 5), 170–172; Vuorenmaa, “Mottisotaa” (fn. 4), 78. 9 “Motti,” Infantry School Quarterly, Vol. XXXIV No. 2 (April 1949), 113; “Motti tactics,” Infantry Journal, Vol. LXIV (January 1950), 8.

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Soviet practices and Finnish actions. Towards the end of the Winter War, Hakanen adds, the verb was replaced by the concept of Motti tactics.10 According to Antti Juutilainen’s definition, Motti tactics are “the ability to create conditions in which the enemy can be encircled and subjugated by rapid movement and is annihilated in battles characterized by the calcu­ lated and economical use of own scarce resources.”11 The basic interpretation (1940–1950) The first authors to write about the topic were army officers drawing upon their own recent war experiences. This happened when the war was still going on in Europe. Many of those were operational level texts with expla­ nations for both military professionals and wider audiences. The Finnish victory in the double battle of Suomussalmi–Raate in January 1940 was reported in the international media. After the Winter War ended in March 1940, the Commander of the Finnish 9th Division, Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Hjalmar Siilasvuo, started to write a book about the encirclement operations which he had recently personally led. He facil­ itated the writing process by requesting after-action reports from his for­ mer subordinates. Siilasvuo’s book Suomussalmen taistelut (the battles at Suomussalmi) became a national bestseller, and it was even translated into other languages. The book had an impact on the manner in which the Finnish general public understood these events. Later in 1944 Siilasvuo published another volume on the encircling operations at Kuhmo.12 Siilasvuo wrote about his intentions against the road-bound Red Army 44th Division on the Raate Road at the end of December 1939: “The enemy had to be completely cut off in order for it to be destroyed. We also needed to prevent the arrival of additional (Soviet) forces from the East by all pos­ sible means. When this had been accomplished, the column was to be sliced into pieces by flank attacks, and those pieces were to be decimated by encircling attacks.” Siilasvuo also holds that an operation to gain posi­ tional advantage would not have been possible without meticulous supply preparations and the opening of parallel winter road along the ice-covered lakes south of the Raate Road.13 10 Hakanen, Sisulla, (fn. 7), 199–121. 11 Juutilainen, Mottien maa, (fn. 5), 195. 12 Hjalmar Siilasvuo, Suomussalmen taistelut (Helsinki, 1940); Siilasvuo, “Suomussalmen taistelut,” in Kunnia – Isänmaa, 306; Siilasvuo, Kuhmo talvisodassa (Helsinki, 1944). 13 Siilasvuo, Suomussalmen taistelut, (fn. 12), 124–125.

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The Finnish Commander-in-Chief Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim was not pleased that one of his front commanders wrote about his war experiences so soon. Mannerheim felt that this would reveal Finnish mili­ tary secrets to the Soviets. Even though Siilasvuo’s manuscript had passed the censor, this was not the case for everyone. In 1941 Major (later Lieutenant General) Erkki W. Kukkonen finished a study of the Soviet war plans and operations in Finland. He had been an operations officer at the Finnish High Command during the Winter War, and thus had access to all situation reports from all areas of operation.14 The proofs of the study show that Kukkonen had dedicated one full chap­ ter to Motti tactics. He proposed that Finnish Motti tactics originated as a response to Soviet tactics. In the wilderness stable fronts were only formed near roads leaving the flanks open, and freedom of manoeuvre to the Finns. According to Kukkonen, the Soviet defensive posture could be compared to a “mushroom lying with its cap facing the Finns and its stalk along the sup­ ply line”. This gave the Finns a chance to flank the Soviet positions, press them, continue to their rear, and isolate the strongholds from each other and the troops fighting in the front. The Finns did not employ spoiling attacks targeted at the enemy assembly areas but cut the roads at points where the enemy had less combat effective, second-line units. The largest Mottis were in the western part of the area of operation where the strongest front line fighting units had been surrounded. If the Red Army units had time to dig in, the situation became more complicated. They fought bravely despite cold and hunger. The Finns did not have enough artillery support or forces to storm the Mottis, and, therefore, they had to resort to developing “siege methods” (Kukkonen does not specify what kind of methods these were). The new front was formed 20-25 kilometres behind the Motti front. The Finns rotated their forces to fix and contain the Mottis and to maintain constant pressure on the encircled forces. They left some Mottis thinly guarded and concentrated their forces against one Motti at a time.15 Interestingly, Kukkonen considers that the guiding principle in action against the isolated enemy trapped in Mottis was to achieve maximum 14 Antti Juutilainen, “Kun ylipäällikkö rankaisi kenraalia harkitsemattomuudesta,” Sotilasaikakauslehti No. 1 (1991), 30–32; Pertti Lassila, Otavan historia. Volume 3: 1941–1975 (Keuruu, 1990), 14; Helena Pilke, Etulinjan kynämiehet: Suomalaisen sotakirjallisuuden kustantaminen ja ennakkosensuuri kirjojen julkaisutoiminnan sääntelijänä 1939–1944 (Helsinki, 2009), 134; Proofs of Erkki W. Kukkonen’s unpublished book Venäläisten sotasuun­ nitelmat ja sodankäynti Suomessa vv. 1939–40 (written in 1941, deposited at the Finnish National Archives, Kukkonen’s collection, Pk-1018/1), 140–141, 158, 163–164. 15 Kukkonen, Venäläisten sotasuunnitelmat, (fn. 14), 140–141, 158, 163–164.

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results with minimal casualties. The Motti battles of the Winter War proved cost-effective. Writing his book manuscript in 1940, Kukkonen had studied the Germans in the West. He concluded that Finnish Motti tactics bore resemblance to German tactics used in the Low Countries and France: pen­ etration to shatter the defender’s front and destroy them piecemeal. Kukkonen also pointed out the differences. The Finnish Army was a “poor man’s fighting force” lacking equipment to break the pockets before they were even properly formed. The attacks against the Mottis in the north were like breaching fortified positions. Kukkonen also commented on the Finnish preparations and ability to fight in the special cold weather condi­ tions: “Cold weather accompanied with snow blizzards would have halted all military operations in Central Europe.”16 Many of the Mottis in the Winter War were “accidents”. This conclusion can be read from General Hägglund’s arcticle published in 1942. He com­ manded the Finnish IV Army Corps operating in Ladoga Karelia where his forces conducted a major counter-offensive in January 1940 that led to the formation of many Mottis. Hägglund clarified with the exception of one large Motti in which the Soviet 168th Division was trapped at Koirinoja, these were not planned by the Finns. He explained that the fronts were extended and the Mottis tied up a considerable number of troops to guard them, which the Finns could not spare. The other more than ten smaller Mottis were formed because the Finns were lacking forces and equipment and due to the Red Army soldiers’ resistance. According to Hägglund, the Finns expected the Mottis to surrender soon, but this was not the case. Hägglund also writes that difficulties like the depth of snow, the firepower of the encircled Soviet troops and the necessity of saving manpower resources prevented the Finns from quickly taking the Mottis. Therefore they decided to act against them one at the time and use trench warfare methods, adapted to the special local conditions.17 Some war correspondents had been issued permits to visit the Motti bat­ tle areas. In 1941 Håkan Mörne wrote the book Kunnian latu (“ski track of honour”). It was based on his visits to the front during the Winter War. Mörne saw a precise logic in the execution of IV Army Corps’ counter-offensive in early January 1940 by comparing it to the clock face. He paid attention to the Army Corps headquarter’s view of the situation and its ability to deter­ mine the order in which the Mottis were to be destroyed. The order was decided based on the strength and tactical position of each Motti, and the 16 Kukkonen, Venäläisten sotasuunnitelmat, (fn. 14), 158, 164–165. 17 J. Woldemar Hägglund, “Sotatoimet Laatokan koillispuolella”, (fn. 7), 163–192.

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possibilities of using the same unit for follow-up duties. Mörne noticed how the Finns continuously altered their attack methods and built impro­ vised siege equipment. They also initiated feints and demonstrations and prepared decoys (fake guns) and dummy positions to fool the Soviet air force who sometimes bombed their own troops inside the Mottis.18 Siilasvuo’s superior, the commander of the North Finland Group Major General Viljo Tuompo, wrote in 1942 that during the operations in Suomussalmi during the Winter War the Finns enjoyed the advantage of interior lines. First the Finns attempted to defeat one enemy group while using token forces to prevent the other one from participating in the deci­ sive battle. Then they brought their main forces to bear against the latter one in order to destroy it. The biggest difference to similar well-known bat­ tles was, as Tuompo pointed out, that even with a concentration of forces the Finns could never outnumber the Soviets.19 The Finnish War College was responsible for developing tactics, and immediately after the war they started to gather information from war-time commanders. Torvald Ekman produced a study in the form of an afteraction report in 1945. In his paper, Ekman observed that the season really mattered. His argument was that the application of Motti tactics was easier in winter if the snow was deep. Furthermore, he wrote that in summer con­ ditions sizable Mottis in the wilderness were impossible to close completely with small forces because the defenders could easily break out from the encirclements. For Ekman, the summer Mottis were “leaky”.20 The “grand old man of Finnish tactical research” Yrjö A. Järvinen explored the Winter War tactics of both belligerents. When analysing the operations at Suomussalmi, he wrote that encirclements were the predominant Finnish tactical method. He compared the pincer tactics used in the Winter War to a carnivore crab catching a fish or seafood; first the animal retreats, then takes a firm stand with its tail, grabs the prey in his pincers, cuts it in pieces, and finally eats it. Järvinen reminds the reader that the Finns had a chance to choose difficult places (such as bridges or embankments) to bypass and stop the columns before sending their main forces to their flanks. This involved serious risk-taking on the part of the Finns. According to Järvinen, each Motti was different, and their sizes varied considerably depending on where the road had been cut. The strongest Mottis were 18 Håkan Mörne, Kunnian latu, (fn. 7), 98–103, 128, 130–131, 151, 164. 19 Viljo E. Tuompo, “Taistelut Pohjois-Suomessa ja arktisilla alueilla,” in Kunnia – Isänmaa, 273. 20 Torvald Ekman’s paper from 1945 published in Vansjärveltä Ilomantsiin: Venttiprikaatin taistelujen tie 1943–1944 (Helsinki, 1993), 51, 54.

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those with tanks. The Soviets often dug their armour into the ground as gun emplacements to support their hedgehog defences. The common feature of the encircled Red Army units was the passiveness of their commanders. Järvinen writes about harassing the Mottis with mortar fire and softening them. The Finns often applied the squeeze technique under the cover of night by taking up positions on the fringes, and thus gradually tightening the ring around those encircled. Sometimes the Finns used the escape route technique and intentionally left gaps in their positions to lure the Soviet soldiers out onto an avenue of escape. “Technology ruled along main roads, but tactics ruled in the forests”, Järvinen wrote.21 In 1950 Järvinen published a sequel to his earlier book, this time on mili­ tary tactics applied by the Finns in the Continuation War. He concluded that the trackless terrain in the border areas had an impact on the planning and execution of offensive operations. Most commonly the Finns attempted to go round the flanks and encircle the Soviet positions. After the enemy had been fixed by limited small scale attacks, the Finnish battle detach­ ments (varying in size from battalions to regiments) enveloped the Soviet elements and cut their connections in the rear to prevent reinforcements from coming to the rescue. This was done because the Finns disliked frontal attacks. These Motti and envelopment tactics were more daring than those used in the Winter War. Flanking distances increased from an average of 5 to 10 kilometers in the previous war, now, to up to 40 or even 50 kilometres to the rear of the enemy in 1941. There was a great demand for engineers to enhance the manoeuvrability and the speed of the Finnish troops operat­ ing in the difficult, marshy terrain of Eastern Karelia.22 Järvinen adds that the flaws of these outflanking manoeuvres included re-supply, negligence of reconnaissance, the limited range of artillery and radio communication or the lack of mobile anti-tank capability. Thus the depth of the outflanking movements was sometimes reduced in 1941, which meant that the Finns were able to surround smaller Red Army forces than they had planned. According to Järvinen, timing was crucial after the flank­ ing manoeuvre because fast action determined the outcome of the whole operation. Thus the outflanking detachments had to be made strong enough to be able to repel Soviet counter-offensives and hold the captured ground. At the same time the main effort had to be concentrated on the destruction of the encircled enemy forces.23 21 Järvinen, Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa, (fn. 7), 191–206. 22 Yrjö A. Järvinen, Jatkosodan taistelut (Porvoo, 1950), 127, 163, 171. 23 Järvinen, Jatkosodan taistelut, (fn. 22), 171.

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Sometimes the tactic included amphibious operations. Järvinen pointed out that on the Karelian Isthmus the advancing Finns re-captured the city of Viipuri (Vyborg) by an encirclement operation including an amphibious landing on the Bay of Vyborg which formed the southern pincer of the envelopment. With this action in late August 1941 they surrounded three Soviet divisions. The Leningrad Front gave them permission to break out. When fighting in the northern wilderness the Finns normally preferred to go around away from the defiles between lakes. However, Järvinen notes the gradual learning process of the Red Army, and quotes one amazed com­ mander saying: “The Soviets don’t stay on roads anymore!”24 War experiences were different on various fronts and sectors according to local conditions and military geography. Yet the authors agree that the Finns generally understood the utility of Motti tactics, so these became almost a standard operating procedure in the Continuation War. The Finnish commanders often applied Motti tactics when the Finnish Army advanced into Soviet Eastern Karelia in the summer of 1941. This time the Finns could not achieve long strings of Mottis, but Finnish envelopments resulted in many small Mottis or semi-Mottis. Paavo Susitaival, who served as a regimental commander in Eastern Karelia, noted that some Mottis were not deliberate but were formed arbitrarily in the midst of fast mobile operations as the Soviets had echeloned their forces in depth.25 Addendum to the basic interpretation – Motti tactics as seen by ex-Finnish officers in the US Army There was a process of military knowledge transfer from Finland to the United States around the beginning of the Cold War. A group of some 20 ex-Finnish officers joined the US Army in 1947 as enlisted men. Most of them were later, during the 1960s, promoted to Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels. They were first used as cross-country ski instructors but they also developed winter equipment and wrote and taught about winter warfare, particularly about Mottis which many of them had experienced first-hand. The Finns were also able to disseminate their know-how by serving in various military schools, planning winter exercises and acting as umpires in them. They took part in re-writing the US Army cold weather and arctic 24 Järvinen, Jatkosodan taistelut, (fn. 22), 179–180, 340. 25 Paavo Susitaival, Rykmentti taistelee: Jalkaväkirykmentti 29 vuosina 1941–1942 (Porvoo, 1948), passim.

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manuals. The most distinguished of the Finns was the Mannerheim Cross recipient Colonel Alpo K. Marttinen, who had been a Captain in the Winter War and served as the Chief of Staff of the Finnish 9th Infantry Division. He had planned the Suomussalmi–Raate encirclement operations.26 In 1949 Marttinen published an article about the battles in Suomussalmi in Military Review under the pseudonym of Victor Suomalainen. He called the double operation a “Northern Cannae”. Marttinen’s main points con­ cerned the element of surprise, the exploitation of weather conditions and the forested terrain and the superior over-snow mobility of the Finns. The mobility compensated for numerical weakness and allowed the Finns to replenish quickly and cut off the Red Army divisions with rapid move­ ment. Marttinen also emphasized the analysis of enemy’s problems and the swift exploitation of its failures. These continuous and aggressive guer­ rilla attacks gave the Soviet commanders an exaggerated view of Finnish strength and intentions. Yet this indirect approach of deception strikes and harassment was also reconnaissance in force and did not allow the Red Army units time to rest at night. When the roads were cut and mined in several places, Soviet tanks were stopped in road blocks and caused traffic jams. The Mottis could not support each other by fire. In some cases Red Army soldiers broke out of the Mottis. After passing the rupture points Soviet foot soldiers in breakout columns or in smaller parties were vulner­ able because they were advancing very slowly in deep snow, and they were no match to the Finnish ski troops in pursuit.27 In Marttinen’s article, which was based on his own vivid recollections, he argued that the main reason for the Soviet loss at Suomussalmi was poor preparation for the Arctic conditions, not only in personnel but also equip­ ment. The Red Army counted on their numbers, firepower and materiél. These were useless assets in such conditions along few narrow unpaved gravel roads. Air superiority could not help the Soviets much either since it was the darkest time of the year and there were often snow blizzards. The Finns clearly tended to exploit darkness and limited visibility to conceal their own actions. The Red Army troops’ morale and will to fight were much lower than that of the Finns who were fighting on their own soil.28 26 See, for example, FM 31–70: Basic Arctic Manual (Washington, D.C., 1951), FM 31–71: Northern Operations (Washington, D. C., 1951) and FM 31–72: Administration in the Arctic (Washington, D. C., 1951); Paavo A. Kairinen, Marttisen miehet: Asekätkijäveljet (Porvoo, 1987), passim and Pasi Tuunainen, Marttinen: Kahden armeijan soturi (Keuruu, 2012), 205–280. 27 Victor Suomalainen (aka Alpo K. Marttinen), “The Battle of Suomussalmi,” Military Review, Vol. XXIX (December 1949), 54–62. 28 Suomalainen, “The Battle of Suomussalmi,” (fn. 27), 61–62.

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Marttinen and the other Finns, notably Eino Lassila, were tactical experts involved in producing two other articles for instructional purposes. These appeared in Infantry School Quarterly (April 1949) and Infantry Journal (1950). The articles give readers an idea of how these ex-Finnish officers saw the Motti warfare. They had understood that the application of Motti tac­ tics was not restricted to Finland, although they saw Motti tactics as suited to the Finns as “an outgrowth of the sisu (perseverance) spirit”.29 The ex-Finnish officers used the Suomussalmi and Kuhmo operations of the 9th Division as their examples from the Winter War, and the Ilomantsi operation from the summer of 1944. The authors, based on the selected cases, found three partly overlapping phases in Motti tactics. The first phase was reconnaissance and stopping, which was characterized by ambushes and hit-and-run tactics. The following attack and cutting phase “is one of surprise flanking movement and envelopments”, they wrote. This second phase could be further divided into movement to assembly areas, move­ ment into attack areas, and the actual envelopment and cutting. The third and final phase comprised the isolation and annihilation that had to be initiated without delay. If the enemy had enough time to consolidate and prepare field fortifications, softening and exhaustion was then required before the third phase could start.30 In addition, the authors shed light on suitable equipment and weapons and some technical and practical skills required for successful Motti opera­ tions in winter. Finnish ski troopers hauled ahkios, the boat-hull deep snow toboggans or sleds, which were “as the versatile jeep is to the American Infantry”. The Finns used sleds and horses, and preferred mortars over artil­ lery. The ability of the Finns to bivouac in heated tents in the attack areas in roadless terrain in cold weather was essential to sustain their operations and maintain their combat effectiveness. Furthermore, the ex-Finnish offi­ cers argued that their skiing speed was kept low to avoid undue perspira­ tion in order to keep the men fit for battle. Finnish forces had a very good local knowledge of the terrain, and thus they were able to orienteer accu­ rately in any conditions, even in pitch black night. Timing was also impor­ tant since the operations at all road cutting points were generally executed simultaneously. These ex-Finnish officers also noted that small unit leaders were capable of exhibiting initiative and independent action. They were encouraged to do so and thus delegated responsibility. In the first phase of Motti tactics for example, the division commander “retains indirect control 29 “Motti” (fn. 9), 113, 116. 30 “Motti” and “Motti tactics”, (fn. 9), 8–13.

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over attacks on companies or larger units”. Furthermore, they wrote, the battles in the northern forests also proved the usefulness of the Finnish made 9 mm Suomi submachine gun.31 More details in participant accounts (1950s–1960s) Finnish veteran officers continued to write about the Second World War during the following two decades. They were now able to look at events and applied tactics from a distance and offer their readers more details about the peculiarities of Motti warfare. One of the major works of this period were Marshal Mannerheim’s mem­ oirs, published posthumously in the early 1950s. He practically reiterated what had been written earlier. In contrast to many authors emphasizing the benefits of the Mottis the war-time commander-in-chief, who had served in the Imperial Russian Army, commented on the unorthodox and unwanted character of operations. He called the Motti battles in Ladoga Karelia “peculiar” engagements tying down the bulk of the forces of the IV Army Corps. Mannerheim argued that, in essence, the Mottis had been formed because Hägglund’s troops had used similar tactics to those used at the Raate Road in Suomussalmi. The Marshal had wanted to get rid of the Mottis but a few of them (in Ladoga Karelia and Kuhmo) had survived because they had been supplied by air drops, and because the encircled troops ate their horses. A little later Lieutenant General Karl L. Oesch described that in the case of the IV Army Corps a flanking attack had turned to Motti battles.32 Tauno Räisänen, who served under Hägglund as a junior officer, main­ tained that the lack of anti-tank weapons was behind the formation of Mottis. Räisänen points out that the methods employed against the Mottis varied from place to place. It was common practice to apply a wedge tech­ nique and try to divide the enemy forces within the Mottis in two halves. This allowed the Finnish commander to concentrate his efforts against a small portion of the enemy at a time. Some of the Mottis only survived for a couple of days; it is questionable whether these can be considered Mottis at all. In between the Mottis was a “no-man’s-land” with circular Finnish ski 31 “Motti” and “Motti tactics”, (fn. 9), 8–13. 32 Carl G. E. Mannerheim, Muistelmat: Volume II (Helsinki, 1952), 190–194; Karl L. Oesch, “Laatokan Karjala talvisodassa,” in Laatokan Karjalan nousun vuosikymmenet, ed. Yrjö-Pekka Mäkinen (Pieksämäki, 1956), 255.

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tracks, similar to those used traditionally in “bear hunting”. The Soviet com­ manders did not often dispatch flank security forces. Their flanks were thus wide open, and those guarding the Mottis were, at times, in jeopardy of being surrounded themselves. Yet the Finns, who were constantly on the move in their mobile operations, did not normally dig proper positions around the Mottis.33 Matti Aarnio, who was later nicknamed “Motti-Matti” for his achieve­ ments, was a key Finnish Motti commander in the Winter War. He had studied the Red Army’s options in the Ladoga Karelia in his War College final thesis already in the 1930s. In 1966 Aarnio published the book Talvisodan ihme (The Miracle of the Winter War). He describes in detail how the Finns imitated the World War I German storm troop tactics against the Mottis. The size of storm troops was from squad to platoon. In the Finnish case, they did not consist of any elite units, but only of motivated volunteers from regular reservist infantry units, or even sometimes of indi­ vidual fighters from supply units. Aarnio also wrote that everyone had to do their share properly to ensure the success of attacks against the Mottis. The defenders at one side of a Motti had to be fixed by movement (diversionary attacks). When the encircled troops fired their weapons in vain their ammunitions were depleted and their positions were also revealed. Sometimes the Finns formed their own small Mottis among the Red Army inside the bigger Mottis. Aarnio was a resourceful military leader who con­ tinuously came up with innovations. Under his supervision a “Trojan horse” was built, containing a direct firing cannon behind log walls to destroy dugouts and tanks from a close range. He also developed other improvised weapons and shelter structures to provide cover for his men.34 Otto Korpijaakko, a military chaplain serving in the IV Army Corps in the Winter War, explains that the storm squads relied on satchel charges, hand grenades and Molotov cocktails when destroying the Soviet positions inside the Mottis. They started from the corners and worked their way through deeper into the Soviet defence system. The Finns had very few anti-aircraft weapons, and were therefore unable to prevent the Soviets supplying the Mottis from the air. According to Korpijaakko however, the Finns soon learned the Red Army’s markings for the incoming aircraft and were able to fool the aircraft dropping supplies intended for the Mottis into supplying themselves.35 33 Räisänen, Kenraalimotti, (fn. 4), 55, 63, 99–101, 109, 125, 233. 34 Matti Aarnio, Talvisodan ihme: Itärintaman venäläiskeskitykset ja suomalaisten torjun­ tavoitot (Jyväskylä, 1966), passim; Räisänen, Kenraalimotti, (fn. 4), 143, 155, 211–212. 35 Korpijaakko, Tulessa ja pakkasessa, (fn. 4), 245–248.

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Motti tactics were first and foremost associated with forest fighting in the Continuation War. Wolf H. Halsti argued that the Finns were able to complete many Mottis in the wilderness because the Soviet command­ ers failed to initiate timely retreats or breakouts. Instead the Soviet troops held on to certain ground regardless of the actions of the Finns. In Lapland the Finns conducted many operations in co-operation with the Germans. Halsti also concluded that some of the planned combined encircle­ ment operations failed as the Germans were not used to fighting in north­ ern forests and their heavy baggage train was unsuitable for the terrain and roads.36 According to Yrjö Hakanen, Motti tactics were a simple idea. The advanc­ ing road-bound enemy had to be stopped and destroyed in the border area where there were few roads. Its columns were stretched and vulnerable. Defence was not enough; delaying action and other active countermeasures were needed. In Kuhmo the Finns attempted to reduce the size of the Mottis, and the battles against them took on the character of separate storm troop battles.37 Studies of tactical lessons (1970s–1980s) The study of military sciences, including military history, is an applied discipline with the aim of drawing lessons from past experiences. This educational viewpoint is also reflected in the writing about Motti tactics. Since the 1970s new generations of researchers have been relying on the generally well-preserved documents deposited at the former Finnish War Archives (now part of the National Archives). They also conducted lengthy interviews with the wartime officers on the tactical lessons. The “official” histories of Finland in the Second World War were prepared under the auspices of the Finnish Army: The four-volume History of the Winter War in 1977-79, and the six-volume history of the Continuation War in 19881994 (based on Suomen sota 1941-1945, the eleven-volume detailed history published from 1951-1965). They were organizational and operational histo­ ries of the Finnish Army at war. Motti tactics were not thoroughly explained. In these histories of events, references to Motti tactics were scattered in offshoot accounts and War College studies of single operations. The authors

36 Wolf H. Halsti, Suomen sota 1939–1945. Part 2: Kesäsota 1941 (Keuruu, 1956), 161, 253. 37 Hakanen: Sisulla, (fn. 7), 119–121.

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of these works did not really challenge the basic interpretation of Motti tactics.38 Sampo Ahto has taught military history at the Finnish War College and other military schools for many years, and also published actively. Ahto has argued that it is difficult to find truly national characteristics in the Finnish art of war. He adds that it is easier to detect common features from the offensive methods employed by different countries. The development of weapons technology standardized tactics everywhere. According to Ahto, early Finnish military historians writing during the interwar period over­ emphasized the originality of the Finnish art of war. The battle of Joutselkä in March 1555 in particular, in which the Finnish peasant ski troops encir­ cled and defeated the superior Russian force, was often used as a typical example of Finnish tactical methods. All generations of conscripts were told about the battle, and it even influenced the winter warfare and other exercises organized before the war by the Civil Guard organization and the army. Furthermore, the Finnish Jaegers in the Swedish Army practicing open order and skirmisher tactics during the late 18th century were seen as early representatives of uniquely Finnish guerrillas, even though they were products of their time.39 Motti tactics largely appear to be a war time improvisation. Ahto noted that they were not mentioned in pre-war manuals, and they were already obsolete when these were published. Even though the Finns had copied many manuals directly from abroad, they considered the texts only as a basis for application. The most important command principle of the Finnish Army was the system of decentralized command (Auftragstaktik) which they had copied from Germany. Finland had just become indepen­ dent in 1917, and thus had no tactical tradition. German influences had been transmitted to the Finnish Army through the 2000 Finnish volunteers serving with Royal Prussian Jaeger Battalion 27 of the Imperial German Army during the First World War. With these mission-type orders lower level leaders (and even soldiers) at various echelons were delegated powers to use their initiative which was to be important in Motti battles. The dou­ ble-sided envelopment of the aforementioned battle of Joutselkä became a 38 Ville Kivimäki, “Introduction,” in Finland in World War II, 20; Talvisodan historia, volumes 1–4 (Porvoo, 1977–1979); Jatkosodan historia, volumes 1–6 (Helsinki, 1988–1994); Suomen sota 1941–1945, volumes 1–11 (Various publishing places, 1951–1965). 39 Sampo Ahto, “Suomalaisen taktiikan perinne” Sotilasaikakauslehti No. 9 (1977), 515– 516; Sampo Ahto, “Suomalainen sotataito toisessa maailmansodassa,” in Suomen turvallisu­ uspolitiikka (Keuruu, 1987), 141–143; Sampo Ahto, “Finnish Tactics in the Second World War,” in Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire No. 62 (Vaasa, 1985), 177–179.

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standard model for forest fighting, and the attacks from the cover of the forest against the enemy flanks and rear “automatically became a method offering the best results”. Single or double encirclements were classical movements in the art of war. According to Ahto, the Raate Road was a true battle of annihilation that is rare in military history. Yet, he concludes, Motti tactics became “the trademark of the Finnish art of war”.40 Veikko Karhunen served in Suomussalmi as a junior officer. He main­ tained that Finnish operations were practically infantry operations. For Karhunen, the chosen Motti tactics came naturally to the Finns. They sim­ ply aimed at avoiding the strengths of the Red Army, while using their own strengths in attacking the weak spots of their enemies. The reason for Finnish military effectiveness was that they were able to inflict heavy casu­ alties on the Soviets while minimizing their own losses. According to Karhunen, it was imperative that the Finnish active duty commanders and reserve officers utilized the best qualities of the Finnish soldiers, used com­ mon sense and continuously improvised. Guerrilla tactics were also a vital ingredient in Motti tactics.41 The Finnish Army needed manoeuvrability, and thus it utilized “the methods of the farmers and the lumberjacks”. This was the conclusion of Vilho Tervasmäki. By this he meant the development of sleighs, sleds and skis to transport heavy arms and equipment in a trackless terrain. By mov­ ing the traffic from roads to forests, the Finns could be undercover and con­ cealed and achieve surprise. According to Tervasmäki, the Motti tactics was that the outnumbered Finns knew that “the enemy had to be forced to attack under the worst possible conditions for them”. Finnish innova­ tions and dispositions, such as heated tents and portable box stoves also aided them.42 Kalevi Usva wrote about the battles in Northern Finland in the History of the Winter War, volume 3. He argued that from the outbreak of the Winter War the Finns aimed at denying the Soviets mobility and firepower. In this they soon noticed the value of guerrilla tactics. Usva also wrote that the Finns thought they had invented a victory formula at Suomussalmi-Raate. They tried to apply the same formula to the situation in Kuhmo. The attempt to decimate the Red Army 54th Division failed as the Finns did not 40 Ahto, “Suomalaisen taktiikan perinne” (fn. 39); Ahto, “Suomalainen sotataito toisessa maailmansodassa” (fn. 39) 142–143; Ahto, “Ranua ja ranualaiset toisessa maailmansodassa,” in Ranuan historia, ed. Mauno Hiltunen (Kemi, 1990), 752. 41 Veikko Karhunen, Raatteen tieltä Turjanlinnaan (Porvoo, 1974), 329–336. 42 Vilho Tervasmäki, “The impact of technical development on winter operations in Finland’s wars 1939–1945,” ICHM Acta No. 2 (Washington, D. C., 1975), 119–123.

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have sufficient artillery support, and Soviet soldiers had enough time to for­ tify their positions and to arrange their fields of fire. In addition to guarding the Mottis, the Finns had to deal with ski brigades on the flanks and fight off another Soviet division in the eastern part of the area of operations.43 The role of some key personalities in the Motti front of the Winter War has also been noted by military historians. Sampo Ahto noticed that the actions of Colonel Valo K. Nihtilä were crucial to the plan of operations of the IV Army Corps. Nihtilä was an operations officer who had been sent by the Finnish High Command to oversee the offensive operations, for over two weeks. Upon his insistence, General Hägglund decided to attack fur­ ther east than he had originally planned. Antti Juutilainen has extensively studied the operations of the IV Army Corps in the Winter War, and he argues that the sending of Nihtilä was an exceptional arrangement, yet there are some analogies like the case of German Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch’s actions at the Marne in the autumn of 1914.44 Juutilainen concluded that when conducting offensive operations in the Winter War the Finns broke up their organizations and used ad hoc regi­ mental combat teams and battalion task forces. In the IV Army Corps they had orders to bypass the Soviet strongholds on their path and continue their advance directly to the shore of Lake Ladoga. In their attacks on the Mottis the Finns turned to diversion. Often they did not use artillery prepa­ ration to achieve surprise. According to Juutilainen, Finnish tactics in Motti warfare were, to some extent, original, and utterly practical, and also based on quick insights of combat techniques. Juutilainen wrote about the con­ tent of Motti tactics: “The will and skills, need and ability of the Finns to innovate were the reason for Mottis.” Some Mottis survived until the end of the Winter War. Juutilainen attributes this to the light calibres of the Finnish artillery (mainly 76 millimetres). The Finnish field artillery had sophisti­ cated firing methods but the Finns lacked shells, and they were not effec­ tive in thick snow against fortified positions. There were also many duds in the cold weather.45 Motti tactics, Juutilainen continues, were predominantly about offensive warfare, but it also had defensive elements. The Finnish forces normally 43 Kalevi Usva, “Talvisodan sotatoimet Pohjois-Suomessa: Operatiiviset ja taktilliset kokemukset,” Tiede ja ase No. 34 (1976), 50; Talvisodan historia 3 (Porvoo, 1978), 191–344. 44 Sampo Ahto, “Valo Nihtilä – suomalainen yleisesikuntaupseeri,” Tiede ja ase No. 42 (1984), 22–24; Pertti Kilkki, Valo Nihtilä: Päämajan eversti (Juva, 1994), 46–49; Juutilainen, Mottien maa, (fn. 5), 150–151. See also Martin van Creveld: Command in War (Cambridge, 1985), 174. 45 Juutilainen, Mottien maa, (fn. 5), 49–50, 173, 178, 182–187, 254.

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had inner and outer encircling arms, and they established the outer perim­ eter where the frontline normally stabilized. The Red Army commanders started to insert additional units. They sent their own ski troops to ease the difficult status of the encircled troops in Ladoga Karelia and Kuhmo. This complicated the Finnish situation as there were many battles fought against the rescue parties. These attempts were not, however, co-ordinated. Juutilainen compares the Red Army’s defences in the Mottis of Ladoga Karelia to the methods used by Jan Ziska’s Hussites in the 15th century. The only big difference was that the Soviet troops very rarely tried to break out. Even though the Finns attempted psychological and propaganda opera­ tions (loudspeaker and leaflet) to demoralize the encircled troops, the Soviet soldiers, terrified by anti-Finnish propaganda, had an iron discipline. Juutilainen sees an indication of this in that only one small Motti surren­ dered to the troops of the Finnish IV Army Corps.46 In addition Juutilainen notes that all the units operating against a single Motti were attached to one commander chosen upon his merits and quali­ fications, not seniority. The commanders met occasionally to share their experiences. A special meeting was held in the IV Army Corps in late January to assist General Hägglund in planning and decision-making. After consulting the commanders, Hägglund decided the order in which the Mottis would be destroyed. The utility of the storm troop tactics was soon noticed by the Finns. The kill ratio achieved by these methods was some­ times exceptionally high: 1:122 killed in action in the case of the Western Lemetti Motti.47 According to Keijo Mikola, the command arrangements in Motti battles were seriously affected by the lack of signal equipment. The command posts had to be moved constantly. The orderly was often the most impor­ tant means of communication. At Suomussalmi the commanders had to come up with improvised solutions: sometimes they had to dispatch their troops based only on the sounds of battle.48 Raimo Heiskanen contributed an important viewpoint to the discus­ sion  about Motti tactics. During the Winter War the Finns benefitted greatly from their effective radio intelligence services. The commanders of the Motti fronts received, intercepted, deciphered and translated Soviet

46 Juutilainen, Mottien maa, (fn. 5), 174–178. 47 The overall kill ratio of the Winter War was approximately 1:6, see Juutilainen, Mottien maa, (fn. 5), 179–184. 48 Keijo J. Mikola, Sodan ja rauhanaikainen viestitoiminta Suomessa (Helsinki, 1980), 147–151, 233–234.

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messages from the Mottis in a matter of hours. This helped them to obtain an accurate view of the situation and the aims of the encircled troops and plan their own actions accordingly to prevent outbreaks. The Red Army commanders spoke openly and did not try to convey false information. To support his argument Heiskanen writes that in the course of the Winter War the headquarters of the North Finland Group intercepted a total of almost 500 radio messages from the communication and radio traffic between three encircled Red Army divisions and the Soviet 9th Army headquarters.49 Many of the authors, for instance Niilo Lappalainen, have accepted that Motti tactics were also valuable in that Finns, who had severe material shortages in the Winter War, received huge amounts of war booty from the Mottis they had destroyed. These weapons and ammunition, many of the same calibre as those which the Finns were using, were immediately used against their former owners.50 Anssi Vuorenmaa points out that in the Winter War the Finnish delaying action, defensive and offensive operations formed an operational complex in which all actions were vital because they supported other operations taking place in adjacent sectors. For Vuorenmaa, the Motti battles were part of the strategic level defence from Lake Ladoga to the Arctic Ocean. The outcome of those battles was not decisive, but the Finnish operational level successes that were achieved with limited resources at Suomussalmi and Kuhmo were important in the sense that the Red Army failed to cut Finland in two.51 Naturally, the Finns were not always successful in their encirclement operations. Helge Seppälä breaks the myth that the Finns always used rapid movement in Motti operations. Seppälä writes that in their operation to take the town of Sortavala in August 1941 the Finns moved slowly. Even though they managed to push the Soviet forces against the shore of Lake Ladoga at Rautalahti, they were unable to stop them from evacuating by boat. While drawing a blank this time, the concept of the Motti “hauling only water” or vesiperämotti was born.52 49 Raimo Heiskanen, Saadun tiedon mukaan…: Päämajan johtama tiedustelu 1939–1945 (Keuruu, 1989), 90. 50 Lappalainen, Sotiemme suurmotit, (fn. 8), 55, 111, 161, 183–184, 231–232, 278. 51 Anssi Vuorenmaa, “Itärajan mottitaistelut,” in Kansakunta sodassa: 1. Sodasta sotaan, ed. Silvo Hietanen (Helsinki, 1989), 182–184; Anssi Vuorenmaa, “Defensive Strategy and Basic Operational Decisions in the Finland–Soviet Winter War 1939–1940,” in Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire, 74–95. 52 Helge Seppälä, Suomi hyökkääjänä 1941 (Juva, 1984), 147.

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The Finns continued to apply Motti tactics until 1945. Sampo Ahto wrote a book on the Lapland War in 1980. It was a balanced account as he had access to both Finnish and German military records. Ahto showed that the Finns attempted to apply Motti tactics against the Germans in the North but they very seldom managed to entrap them. The Germans knew what to expect from the Finns, and normally slipped away before the circles had been completed.53 Motti tactics in a larger context (1990s to the present) Over the past couple of decades researchers have been able to place the phenomenon in its wider context, viewing Motti tactics as a part of the Western European art of war. Yet they have not challenged the stan­ dard  interpretations of the 1940s. The period from the 1990s was also marked by an increasing number of non-military academic research. Many civilian researchers have placed more emphasis on political history and society at war. In the 1990s Finnish and Russian research co-operation produced comparative approaches and edited collections. Some Finns used the archives of both belligerents since they now had easier access to Russian archives. Ohto Manninen, for example, has asserted that the Finns had difficulties at the beginning of the Winter War. He concludes that during the month of December 1939 they did not have enough troops or experience with encir­ clement. When they succeeded in early January their plan was to drive the Soviet forces into disarray and retreat rather than to create Mottis.54 The encirclement operations in the north have also been viewed by Osmo Hyvönen. In his book on the battle at Tornio he presents an interpre­ tation of the daring Finnish landing behind the German lines around their right flank. The Finns, led by Lieutenant General Hjalmar Siilasvuo, sur­ prised the Germans and managed to surround them in the city of Tornio in October 1944. The majority of the entrapped Germans broke out of the Motti but by conducting this operation the Finns were able to maintain the vital land connection to Sweden. Hyvönen also published a book on the Motti of Kiestinki, where, in August–September 1941, a Finnish regiment together with German forces was encircled by Soviet troops along a field 53 Sampo Ahto, Aseveljet vastakkain: Lapin sota 1944–1945 (Helsinki, 1980), 99–191. 54 Ohto Manninen, “Taistelujen ensimmäinen vaihe,” in Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa, eds. Olli Vehviläinen and Oleg A. Ržeševski (Jyväskylä, 1997), 159, 161.

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railroad line, but soon broke away. This was the only time Finns were really in a Motti themselves.55 Vesa Tynkkynen agrees with Ahto that Finnish tactics were a European military art. It was not just pure loan; the Finnishness was largely that the Finnish officers applied general principles to the Finnish conditions. Tynkkynen writes that it is difficult to point out how these foreign influ­ ences spread. Yet German and Swedish influences were strong. The Finns prioritised activeness, “a cult of the offensive” even prevailed and defen­ siveness was emphasized only shortly prior to the outbreak of the Winter War. Encirclement transmitted the battle to the enemy’s rear so it could not use its superior firepower. In the Winter War, according to Tynkkynen, the Finns emphasized the centre of gravity, surprise and reserves. They trained their troops well in offensive methods with the aim of outperforming their most likely potential enemies – the Soviets – in order to compensate for their numerical inferiority. Tynkkynen has stressed that Motti tactics greatly contributed to the image of the Finnish military effectiveness in World War II.56 Offensive tactics have become the focus of research again during the new millennium. Antti Juutilainen asserts that by 1944 the Soviet troops had learned from the Finns and exhibited more flexibility. The Soviets even ini­ tiated a series of outflanking manoeuvres in difficult forested terrain, build­ ing new supply routes behind them. When trying to circle the Finns, the Red Army units simply cut the roads behind the Finnish front. Yet, as the Finns had already noticed, this was not enough. There had to be a goal – and that was annihilation. Juha Mälkki accepts Juutilainen’s observation: “The idea of just flanking or encircling the enemy was definitely not a desired end state (for the Finns), as the Winter War had proven.”57 Mikko Karjalainen’s published doctoral dissertation was on the Finnish planning of offensive operations at the beginning of the Continuation War. According to Karjalainen, the Finns failed to increase the mobility of larger 55 Osmo Hyvönen, Tornio (Oulu, 1991), passim; Osmo Hyvönen, Kiestinki (Oulu, 1994), passim. 56 Vesa Tynkkynen, Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen: Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa (Joutsa, 1996), preface, 7, 14, 31, 55–56, 74, 89–91, 189, 384, 385–387. See also Sampo Ahto, “Mottitaktiikka vastaan massataktiikka,” in Suomi sodassa: Talvi- ja jatkosota viikosta viikkoon, 4th revised edition (Farigliano, 1998), 98–99. 57 Antti Juutilainen, “Suomalainen hyökkäystaktiikka jatkosodassa” and “Ilomantsi – Suomen armeija ottaa viimeisen sanan,” both in Jatkosodan taistelut, ed. Mikko Karjalainen (Saarijärvi, 2002), 23–33, 190–202; Juha Mälkki, Operational Art & Design – Western Traditions and the New Challenges (Tampere, 2013), 111.

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formations which would have been necessary for executing successful encirclement operations on a larger scale. Thus Motti tactics were con­ stantly used, but at the company or battalion levels. Finns had difficulties in closing the encirclement and leaving the Soviet forces an escape route (“golden bridge”).58 The encirclement operations in Ilomantsi during the summer 1944, in which two Soviet divisions were encircled with a temporary all-arms for­ mation, have been studied from various perspectives. Juutilainen and Pasi Tuunainen have emphasized the successful utilization of the idea of Cannae in the difficult terrain in which the military geographical features channelled movement. The commanding officer Major General Erkki Raappana, who made his decision based on his intuition and his good local knowledge, used two double envelopment movements side by side with the bulk of his forces linking up behind the Soviet forces. Raappana had roughly the same combat power as the Soviet forces. The operation ended in a clear Finnish victory with Raappana’s forces pushing the Soviets back 30 kilometres. Juha Mälkki, who studied the classical writings on the art of war, adds that the starting point of the Ilomantsi operation was the classi­ cal feigned withdrawal.59 Juutilainen has shown that the practice of assigning specific Motti com­ manders to be in charge of the destruction continued between 1941 and 1944 and that this was also the case in Ilomantsi. The Motti commanders needed to keep in close contact with their troops, lead from the front, have local knowledge, possess intelligence on the defences of the Motti and the fighting methods of the Red Army units. The effective command and con­ trol arrangements meant that the chains of command had to be clarified, and none of the command posts could be too far from the frontline. Experience also showed that the Motti commanders could not be changed while the battles were still going on.60 General Raappana, whom Yrjö A. Järvinen has called “the Motti mas­ ter”, was a Frontier Guard officer who was confident that Motti tactics were 58 Mikko Karjalainen, Ajatuksista operaatioiksi: Suomen armeijan hyökkäysoperaatioiden suunnittelu jatkosodassa (Helsinki, 2009), passim. 59 Antti Juutilainen, Ilomantsi – lopultakin voitto: Ryhmä Raappanan taistelut 26.7.13.8.1944 (Rauma, 1994), 139 and passim; Pasi Tuunainen, “The Battle of Encirclement at Ilomantsi in July – August 1944: An Example of the Application of the Idea of Cannae in the Finnish Art of War,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 19 No. 1 (March 2006), 107–22; Juha Mälkki, Sotataitoa ihmisten johtajille: Sotataito ja sen klassikot uudelleenarvioituna (Helsinki, 2010), 213. 60 Juutilainen, Ilomantsi, (fn. 59), 139–140.

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natural to many Finns who were accustomed to getting their livelihood from the forests. The Finns had a long history of living in harmony with nature. The forests were not viewed as a hostile environment by the Finns in any season. It was understood that forests gave them shelter, cover and concealment, and their movement was not restricted there. In the late 1920s, Raappana’s biographers point out that he was active in experiments and tests conducted to develop Finnish winter tactics and equipment. They made “General Winter” their ally which helped them later to put Motti tac­ tics into practice effectively.61 Storm troop tactics were the most common offensive method used by the Finns against the Mottis. Pasi Tuunainen has focused on the process of how this military innovation spread from Germany to Finland. In his study on the development of Motti tactics from the First World War until the Winter War Tuunainen applied Everett M. Rogers’ diffusion of innovations theory to view the Finns as adopters and appliers of German military innovation. Tuunainen identified the channels through which the ideas were transmit­ ted and finally tested on the battlefields of the Winter War. The ideas spread through studies abroad, excursions and visits, journals and military litera­ ture, translated manuals, meetings, lectures and discussions and the use of Germans as instructors in the Army and the Civil Guard Organization. The Finnish officers had read their Schlieffens and Rommels. Tuunainen stressed that the storm troop tactics and the German emphasis on the bat­ tle of encirclement were well suited to Finnish needs and tactical thinking. The Finns soon realized its “cost-effectiveness”. German style training had prepared each individual fighter to perform the task two levels above him in the hierarchy. The ordinary soldiers could make independent decisions and could substitute for a squad leader.62 The Suomussalmi–Raate double operation has also been analysed from a command perspective. Raimo Heiskanen asserts that from the viewpoint of the Finnish High Command, the planning looks like a typical Napoleonic principle of “moving separately but fighting together”. This was done because the foe was numerically superior. It was imperative that the forces could be made to operate in battle in a co-ordinated fashion. Pasi Tuunainen holds that at Kuhmo the Finnish actions against isolated strongholds appear at first sight to be scattered and lacking in sound logic. Yet he adds 61 Yrjö A. Järvinen, Jatkosodan taistelut, 361; Jukka Partanen, Juha Pohjonen and Pasi Tuunainen, Erkki J. Raappana: Rajan ja sodan kenraali (Keuruu, 2007), 85–93, 165. 62 Pasi Tuunainen, Syöksyjoukot ja talvisodan mottitaktiikan synty: Suomalaiset saksalais­ peräisen hyökkäystaktisen ja – taisteluteknisen innovaation omaksujina ja soveltajina 1917– 1940 (Helsinki, 2008), 62, 263, 265.

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that the commander of the 9th Division constantly changed the battle array and took troops from wherever he could get them. This enabled the Finns to maintain continuous action, hold the initiative, and keep the encircled troops and those coming to their rescue under constantly changing conditions.63 Conclusion Motti is a Finnish military term first used in January 1940 in Ladoga Karelia among the IV Army Corps to describe the situation of the surrounded Red Army units. The Finns are known for Motti tactics which refer to a multifaceted phenomenon and “poor man’s tactics” used to compensate for their inferior numbers. The Finns placed their strengths against the absolute weaknesses and comparative disadvantages of the Red Army. In order to achieve big results with small resources, they chose to defeat their enemies in small portions in sequence rather than engaging their entire strength. This tactic is widely known as defeat in detail. By applying Motti tactics the Finns were taking a gamble; they took calculated risks in order to be strong at vital road-cutting points. This paid off many times since Motti tactics turned out to be “cost-effective”. By employing Motti tactics in World War II the Finns were able to outfight and defeat their enemies and inflict heavy casualties on them while minimizing their own losses. Motti tactics included the employment of flanking and encircling manoeuvres and anni­ hilation and also incorporated features from operational art. The Mottis achieved by the Finns in World War II were often tactical level outcomes of operations, nothing compared to the encirclements such as the Falaise pocket in Normandy, or the large pockets of the Eastern Front. Motti tactics have been a key research question in the study of the Finnish art of war. Our understanding of Motti tactics as a phenomenon has grown over the past decades. Finnish former commanders with first-hand experi­ ence were laying the foundation already during World War II and immedi­ ately after it. The topic has been re-assessed from time to time but the basic interpretation has not been challenged since. Additional details were pro­ vided by others in the following decades. In the 1970s and 1980s military 63 Raimo Heiskanen, Talvisodan operaatioiden johtaminen ja edellytysten luominen sodankäynnille Päämajan operatiivisen osaston näkökulmasta (Jyväskylä, 1996), 188–189; Pasi Tuunainen, Tahtojen taisto: Alpo K. Marttinen ja Hjalmar Siilasvuo talvisodassa (Keuruu, 2010), 275.

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historians without combat experience were detecting tactical lessons from Motti tactics for officer training purposes. Since the 1990s Finnish military historians – both military and civilian – have placed the phenomenon in a larger context. Motti tactics have been seen as part of the evolution of manoeuvre warfare in Europe. Military historians have agreed unanimously upon the pre-conditions for successful use of Motti tactics. Their interpretations have centred on the Finnish troops’ manoeuvring speed and the utilization of military geo­ graphical factors to their advantage. There has been a consensus that it was easiest to apply Motti tactics during the winter against a road-bound enemy. The historiography shows that the application of Motti tactics did not end with the Winter War. Authors have commented that the Finns studied the operations of the Winter War afterwards, analysed the experiences and wrote about possibilities for their application in future. Authors agree that Motti tactics were enabled by the Finns’ greater tactical level of over-snow (and cross-country) mobility and the use of terrain and climatic conditions to achieve surprise. The Finns chose ground which was unfavourable to the Red Army who could not make the best use of its air superiority and formi­ dable firepower. The successful application of Motti tactics was also based on suitable training and equipment. Several current military historians argue that Motti tactics were an amal­ gamation of many tactical influences from abroad, and thus not uniquely Finnish. They incorporated features of the Napoleonic art of war and from offensive warfare practiced by European armies in two World Wars. Motti tactics was not mentioned in Finnish field manuals. Yet flexibility and dis­ trust of pre-conceived ideas were the rule among the Finnish Motti com­ manders who always wanted to retain freedom of manoeuvre. With the system of directive command (mission-type orders) the lowest echelons of leaders had been delegated powers to use common sense, improvise, and adapt to situations depending on the circumstances. The Finns made use of military innovations, in particular the German storm troop tactics, when storming the Mottis. Thus Motti tactics contributed to the image of Finnish military effectiveness.

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