Fall Term, 2013

PHIL 450 / 550 A1 Topics in Ethics / Moral Philosophy: Internalism in Ethics Course Syllabus Meeting Time: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 2:00 - 3:20 PM Location: Assiniboia Hall, 2 02A Course Website: Login at the e-Class website (https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/portal/index.php) and select “PHIL 450 PHIL 550 Fa13 - Combined Section (LEC Fa13)” Instructor: Howard Nye Office: Assiniboia Hall 2-59 E-mail: [email protected] Phone: (780) 492-3307 Office Hours: Tuesdays 11:50 AM – 1:50 PM, and by appointment Course Description We usually assume that if it would be morally wrong for you to do something, then there are strong - indeed conclusive - reasons for you not to do it. But is this assumption always correct? The answer may hinge on what exactly it is for there to be conclusive reasons for you to do something. Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea that, for there to be reasons for you to do something, it must be true that if you simply deliberated about the matter correctly you would (at least absent weakness of the will) be motivated to do it. But if this is right, the authority of morality seems to depend upon the ability of correct deliberation to lead us to agree on what the right thing is and motivate us to do it. In this course we will investigate the extent to which the authority of morality and reasons to act depends on their connection to our motivational psychologies, and whether there are good grounds for thinking that correct deliberation will lead us to converge on the same ethical views. We will examine contemporary philosophical work on the nature of and conceptual relationships among morality, reasons to act, deliberation, and motivation. We will also look at empirical work on causal relationships between ethical deliberation, intuition, and motivation, as well as similarities and differences in the ethical psychologies of different people. Course Requirements The Default Arrangement: 15% Class Participation 85% Term Paper Due Friday, Dec. 20

(UG: ~ 4,000 – 5,000 words / 15-20 2x sp), (G: ~ 5,000 – 7,500 words / 20-30 2x sp)

Alternative Arrangements: 15% Class Participation 85% An amount of writing totaling ~ 4,000 – 5,000 words (UG) or ~ 5,000 – 7,500 words (G) to be submitted in just about as many papers as you wish of whatever lengths you wish at whatever dates you wish before and including Dec. 20 (just make sure to arrange this with me before hand) 1

Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

Papers Paper Topics: If you are writing a term paper you are strongly encouraged to develop a topic of your own choosing. I will be providing sample term paper topics so you have a sense of the sorts of things you can do, but you should set up an appointment with me to discuss what you might like to write on. If you are writing more than one paper you should discuss with me the page lengths and deadlines you would prefer, and I can give you suggestions about what sorts of topics would be appropriate for shorter papers. Help with papers: I want to help you write the best papers you can, and I strongly encourage you to come to office hours or schedule meetings with me to discuss the content of your papers before they are due. You are in particular encouraged to show me outlines or rough drafts, on which I can give you feedback. If you are planning to write a term paper, we should have at least two meetings about it. First, before you write an initial draft, we should have a meeting where we talk about your ideas and I can give you some guidance and point you to some things you might want to look at and consider. Then you should write an initial draft, and send it to me for feedback. We should then have a second meeting at which I give you feedback on your draft, so you can improve it before submitting the draft. If you give me enough lead time I am happy to look at multiple drafts of term papers. But I strongly recommend that everyone get at least one round of comments from me, so as to make sure that they’re on the right track and considering the most important issues. Submitting papers: Papers should be submitted electronically on the course website or by email to me at [email protected]. They will be due by the end of the day (i.e. midnight) on the December 20 or on the dates we arrange if you’re not going with the default arrangement. If for some reason you face seriously extenuating circumstances (e.g. illness or family emergency) and are unable to submit a paper by the deadline, please contact me ahead of time to make arrangements if you can. Paper Evaluation: Papers will be graded electronically and returned to you on the course website. You can find the guidelines by which papers will be graded appended to the end of the syllabus. Plagiarism and Academic Integrity: If you draw upon the work or ideas of others, you must cite your sources. It is VERY important that you understand what counts as plagiarism and that you do not plagiarize; committing plagiarism will result in failure of the course and the possibility of expulsion from the university. Definitions and guidelines on what constitutes plagiarism and other breaches of academic integrity can be found in The Code of Student Behaviour (www.ualberta.ca/governance/studentappeals.cfm). See also the “Don’t Cheat Sheet” (http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/governance/StudentAppealsCheatsheet.cfm). The university is very concerned about maintaining standards of academic integrity and honesty and has mandated that all course outlines include the following statement: The University of Alberta is committed to the highest standards of academic integrity and honesty. Students are expected to uphold the policies of the University in this respect. Students are particularly urged to familiarize themselves with the provisions of the Code of Student

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Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

Behaviour (online at www.ualberta.ca/governance/studentappeals.cfm) and avoid any behaviour which could potentially result in suspicions of cheating, plagiarism, misrepresentation of facts and/or participation in an offence. Academic dishonesty is a serious offence and can result in suspension or expulsion from the University.

I am here to help you with your papers, so please let me know if you are struggling with them in any way. Also, the university recognizes the stressors faced by students, and provides a wide variety of support services, which can be found at the Truth in Education [TIE] website (http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/TIE/nav01.cfm?nav01=22064&).

Schedule of Topics and Readings This list is provisional and subject to change. All readings will be made available online on the course website. You will notice that many readings are listed as ‘further reading.’ I will be drawing on some of these in our discussions, and you may turn to them for further elaboration of what we discuss in class. They can be especially useful as resources if you are writing a paper on a topic with which they deal. But you should not feel any pressure to read these readings unless you find them particularly helpful or interesting.

Sept. 5: Morality and Reasons to Act - Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” - H.A. Pritchard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Further Reading: - Stephen Darwall, “Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality” - W. D. Falk, “‘Ought’ and Motivation” - Sam Black & Evan Tiffany, “Moral Philosophy Does Not Rest on a Mistake” Sept. 10: Ethical Deliberation and Prospects for Rational Convergence - Christine Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical Reason” - Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail” Further Reading: - Stephen Findlay and Mark Schroeder, “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External” - Carla Bagnoli, “Constructivism in Metaethics” - Hanno Sauer, “Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning” Why Be Moral? Sept. 12: Making Sense of the Question - John Tilley, “Reasons, Rational Requirements, and the Putative Pseudo-Question ‘Why be Moral?’” - Owen McLeod, “Just Plain ‘Ought’”

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Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

Further Reading: - David Copp, “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason” - Ruth Chang, “All Things Considered” - John Tilley, “Dismissive Replies to ‘Why Should I be Moral?’” Sept. 17: Self-Interested and Contractarian Answers - David Gauthier, “Why Contractarianism?” - Anita Superson, “The Self-Interest Based Contractarian Response to the Why-Be-Moral Skeptic” Further Reading: - Holly Smith, “Deriving Morality from Rationality” - David Copp, “Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism” - Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Chapter 1) - Gregory Kavka, “A Reconciliation Project” - Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, Chapter 1 - Sam Black, “Coalitions of Reasons and Reasons to be Moral” - John Tilley, “Desires, Reasons, and Reasons to be Moral” Sept. 19: Virtue Ethical Answers - Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Chapter 8 - Mark LeBar, “Prichard vs. Plato: Intuition vs. Reflection” Further Reading: - Tom Hurka, “Aristoltle on Virtue: Wrong, Wrong, and Wrong” - Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy” - Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 118; 127-8; 224 - Jennifer Whiting, “Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for Themselves” Sept. 24: Kantian Answers - Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Chapter 9 - Samuel Kerstein, “Korsgaard's Kantian Arguments for the Value of Humanity” Further Reading: - Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, Chapter 4 - Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Chapters 3 & 4 - Wlodek Rabinowicz, and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake” Sept. 26: Contractualist Answers - Tim Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Chapter 4 - Jay Wallace, “Scanlon’s Contractualism,” p.449-459 Further Reading: - Stephen Darwall, “Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach” - Michael Ridge, “Contractualism and the New and Improved Redundancy Objection” - Phillip Stratton-Lake, “Scanlon’s Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection” - Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights, Introduction 4

Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

- Frances Kamm, “Owing, Justifying, and Rejecting” - Brad Hooker, “Contractualism, Spare Wheel, Aggregation” Oct. 1: Consequentialist Answers - Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Bk I, Ch iii; Bk III, Ch viii; & Concluding Ch - Douglas Portmore, “Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism” Further Reading: - David Copp, “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” - J.J.C. Smart, “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism” - Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 10-13 & 212-220 - Tim Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Chapter 2 - Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics, Chapters 1-4 Oct. 3: Content-Neutral Considerations - Stephen Darwall, “Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach” - Douglas Portmore, “The Presumptive Case for Moral Rationalism” Further Reading: - Robert Johnson, “Prichard, Falk, and the End of Deliberation” - David Schmitz, “Because It’s Right” - Joshua Gert, “Moral Reasons and Rational Status” - Robert Audi, “Practical Reason and the Status of Moral Obligation” Oct. 8: To What Extent is Morality Overriding? - Douglas Portmore, “Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding? - David Sobel, “Subjectivism and Blame” Further Reading: - Archer, “Moral Rationalism Without Overridingness” - Dale Dorsey, “Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demands of Morality” - Mark Van Roojen, “Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism” Reasons for Action Oct. 10: The Instrumental or Simple Humean Theory - James Dreier, “Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality” - Tim Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 17-55 Further Reading: - Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason, Chapters 2-7 - Christine Korsgaard, “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason” - John Broome, Weighing Goods, Chapter 5 - Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, “Backgrounding Desire” - Chris Heathwood, “Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare” - Stephen Findlay, “Responding to Normativity” - Mark Schroeder, “Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons” - Tristam McPherson, “Mark Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism” - Russ Shafer-Landau, “Three Problems for Schroeder's Hypotheticalism” 5

Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

- Ralph Wedgwood, “Instrumental Rationality” - David Sobel, “Parfit’s Case Against Subjectivism” Oct. 15: Ideal Response Accounts - Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right, Chapter - Connie Rosati, “Brandt’s Notion of Therapeutic Agency” Further Reading: - David Velleman, “Brandt’s Definition of Good” - Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Chapter 1 - David Sobel, “Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action” - Roderick Firth, “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer” - Teresa Robertson, “Internalism, (Super)fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy” Oct. 17: Ideal Advisor Accounts - Michael Smith, “Internal Reasons” - Robert Johnson, “Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational” Further Reading: - Peter Railton, “Moral Realism” - Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Selection) - Robert Johnson, “Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy” - Connie Rosati, “Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good” Oct. 22: Constitutive Norm Accounts I - Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, Chapter 3 - David Velleman, “The Possibility of Practical Reason” Further Reading: - Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, Chapter 7 - G.A. Cohen, “Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law” - Douglas Lavin, “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error” - Niko Kolodny, “Why Be Rational?” - William Fitzpatrick, “The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory” Oct. 24: Constitutive Norm Accounts II - Ana Barandalla and Michael Ridge, “Function and Self-Constitution” - David Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency” Further Reading: - Mark Lebar, “Aristotelian Constructivism” - Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity, Chapters 3, 7 & 8 - Luca Ferrero: Constitutivism and the Schmagency Challenge - David Enoch, “Shmagency Revisited” - Arthur Ripstein, “Foundationalism in Political Theory” - Michael Smith, “The Explanatory Role of Being Rational” - Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity, Chapters 1 and 7

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Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

Oct. 29: Agents’ Deliberations Accounts I - Sharon Street, “Constructivism About Reasons” - James Lenman, “Humean Constructivism in Moral Theory” Further Reading: - David Velleman, How We Get Along, (Selection) - Jacob Ross: Rationality, Normativity and Commitment - John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” - Sharon Street, “What is Constructivism in Metaethics?” - Carla Bagnoli, “Constructivism in Metaethics” Oct. 31: Agents’ Deliberations Accounts II - Allan Gibbard: How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts - David Enoch, “Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism about Practical Reason?” Further Reading: - James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer, Constructivism in Practical Philosophy - Carla Bagnoli, “Moral Constructivism: A Phenomenological Argument,” - Carla Bagnoli, “Obligation and Respect: The Scope of Kant's Constructivism” - Carla Bagnoli, “Morality as Practical Cognition” Nov. 5: Psychopaths and the Limits of Deliberative Convergence - Shaun Nichols, “How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism - David Shoemaker, “Psychopathy, Responsibility, & the Moral-Conventional Distinction Further Reading: - Jana Borg and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Do Psychopaths Make Moral Judgments?” - Stephen Finlay, “The Selves & The Shoemaker” - Shaun Nichols & Manuel Vargas, “How to Be Fair to Psychopaths” - Patricia Greenspan, “Responsible psychopaths” - Matthew Talbert, “Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons” - David Shoemaker, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability” Nov. 7: Could Reasons be Wholly External? - Derek Parfit, “Reason and Motivation” - Julia Markovits: Why be An Internalist about Reasons? Further Reading: - Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Selection) - Parfit, On What Matters, Volume 2 (Selection) Nov. 12: No Class

Deliberation and Convergence Nov. 14: Intuitions About Cases - Walter Sinnott Armstrong, “Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology” - J. Greene and J. Haidt, “How (and Where) does Moral Judgment Work?” 7

Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

Further Reading: - J. Greene et al. “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment” - Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Selection) - T. Wheatley and J. Haidt, “Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgment More Severe” - S. Schnall, et al. ‘Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment.’ - H. Saltzstein & T. Kasachkoff. “Haidt’s Moral Intuitionist Theory” - S. Clarke, “SIM and the City” - B. Musschenga, “Moral Judgement and Moral Reasoning” - Jonathan Haidt “The Emotional Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum.” - J. Paxton and J. Greene. ‘Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations.’ - J. Greene et al., “The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment.” - J. Greene et al. “Pushing Moral Buttons” Nov. 19: Universal Moral Grammar? - John Mikhail, “Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future.” - Susan Dwyer, “How Good is the Linguistic Analogy?” Further Reading: - John Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition, (Selection) - John Mikhail, “Moral Grammar and Human Rights” - Marc Hauser et al., “A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications” - Chandra Sirpada, “Nativism & Moral Psychology” - Marc Hauser et al., “Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy” Nov. 21: “Consistency Reasoning” - Richmond Campbell & Victor Kumar, “Moral Reasoning on the Ground” - Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason, & Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong, “Moral Reasoning” Further Reading: - Philip Kitcher, The Ethical Project (Selection) - J. Evans, “In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning. - J. Evans, “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition” Nov. 26: Intuitions about Cases vs. Principles - Peter Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions” - Sandberg & Juth, “Ethics and Intuitions A Reply to Singer” Further Reading: - Mason Moral Psychology & Moral Intuition A Pox on All Your Houses - Selim Berker, “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience” - Jeff McMahan, “Moral Intuition” - F. Cushman, et al., “The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment” - Shaun Nichols and R. Mallon. “Moral Dilemmas and Moral Rules.” - A. Leslie, et al., “Transgressors, Victims, and Cry Babies” Nov. 28: Differences in Intuitions about Principles and their Weights - E. Uhlmann, et al. “The Motivated Use of Moral Principles” - Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Selection) 8

Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

Further Reading: - Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind (Selection) - Alan Fiske, “The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality” Dec. 3: Prospects for Rational Convergence - M. Monteith and A. Mark, “Changing One’s Prejudiced Ways” - J. Kennett, J. and C. Fine, “Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?” Further Reading: - A. Sneddon, “A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding” - T. Horgan and M. Timmons, “Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment” - R.M. Hogarth, Educating Intuition (Selection) - G. Gigerenzer, “Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics?” - C.R. Sunstein, “Moral heuristics” - P. Gollwitzer, “Implementation Intentions” - P. Gollwitzer et al. “Strategic Automation of Emotion Regulation” - L. Rudman et al., “‘Unlearning’ Automatic Biases” - N. Schwartz & G. Clore, “Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments of Well-Being” - T. Wilson & N. Brekke, “Mental Contamination and Mental Correction”

The university has mandated that all syllabi include the following statement regarding information on course outline policy: “Policy about course outlines can be found in §23.4(2) of the University Calendar.”

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Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

Standards for Grading Papers B: The baseline grade of competent but not exceptional work. The grade of "B" functions as a baseline grade, signifying competent but not exceptional work. Papers are graded up or down relative to these baseline "B" criteria:  the paper addresses all parts of the paper topic  offers consistent, coherent arguments for a clearly articulated position that makes sense  considers significant objections to that position  replies to those objections  makes relevant use of course readings and lectures, displaying a grasp of, without merely replicating, their content  is generally well-written and well-organized, with few or no grammatical, punctuation and spelling errors  does not contain significant misunderstandings B+: The beginnings of distinction. A "B+" paper meets all of the standards for a "B", but in addition:  offers the germs of an original, striking, or powerful idea, argument, or illustration/application--something beyond the ordinary, beyond what one would expect an undergraduate to come up with on a first pass at the topic. An unusually apt analogy that illuminates a previously obscure aspect of the problem; a clever counterexample to a seemingly persuasive claim; a sharp distinction that does real philosophical work; a subtle point drawn from a close reading of a text; a compelling illustration or application of a principle--all of these can count as an idea that rises the paper above the ordinary  alternatively, the paper might just work out ordinary ideas to a greater depth (more iterations of significant objections and replies, which help deepen the idea) than usual, or develop relevant arguments that demonstrate real mastery of the course readings A- or A: Outstanding work. An A- or A paper meets all of the standards for a B+, but in addition:  works out the original, striking, or powerful idea, argument, or illustration/application fully and deeply, with outstanding execution that demonstrates a firm grasp of the underlying concepts, principles, facts, and argumentative strategy  alternatively, the paper might offer an unusually comprehensive survey of possible moves by both sides, and clearly and systematically evaluate them, coming to a closely reasoned conclusion. The survey must be systematic, not scattershot: it must develop the alternatives logically and to substantial depth, not just assess a random mix of ad hoc considerations. And it must consistently display an understanding of the underlying point of different arguments, what they are really getting at (not just a superficial swipe at them).  alternatively, for a paper based on a text, the paper might offer an unusually sophisticated, close and systematic reading of a philosopher's texts, paying attention to tensions and contradictions in the author's work, alternative interpretations of passages (offering persuasive arguments for preferring one interpretation to another), and interpretations that bring out philosophically significant points, especially if they offer fresh, unconventional readings 10

Course Syllabus

PHIL 450/550 A1 Internalism in Ethics

Now, for the downside: B-: Most of the paper is O.K., but it but contains significant errors, omissions, or misunderstandings. A B- paper falls just short of "B" standards, by, for example (this list is not exhaustive):  failing to answer one of the parts of the paper topic misunderstanding a substantial philosophical point, or confusing different positions  failing to articulate a consistent position  offering fallacious arguments, or arguments that don't really address the core issue  failing to consider objections to one's position  wasting space on issues that are not pertinent to the paper topic  offering a confused, sloppy, superficial, or erroneous interpretation of course readings or other  

cited texts containing numerous grammatical, spelling, or punctuation errors lacking a clear organization, failing to logically order and signpost important points

C+, C, C-: Exemplifies one or more of the problems of a B- paper, more often or more pervasively. "C" grades may also be assigned to papers that miss the point of the assignment or confuse polemical assertion with argumentation, or lack proper citation of central points. D, E: These grades are reserved for moral failings: not bothering to make a serious effort, plagiarism.

Grading System Letter Grade

Grade Point

Percentage

A+ A AB+ B BC+ C CD+ D F

4.0 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.0

90 – 100 85 – 89 80 – 84 76 – 79 73 – 75 70 – 72 66 – 69 62 – 65 58 – 61 54 – 57 50 – 53 49 and under

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