Moral Obligation in Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 1   Moral Obligation in Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724...
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Postdoctoral Research Project

Michael Walschots 1  

Moral Obligation in Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) moral philosophy continues to be of interest to a wide variety of scholars, both philosophers and non-philosophers alike. One of the main reasons for this is that Kant offers what Jens Timmermann calls a “revolutionary” understanding of moral obligation (see Timmermann 2009b). According to Kant, we are unconditionally bound by his famous “categorical imperative,” a moral command we, as rational beings, autonomously impose upon ourselves rather than one imposed upon us by God, other individuals, or even our own sensible desires (see e.g. Schneewind 1998, Wood 1999, Guyer 2006). For quite some time (at least since Broad 1930) this novel understanding of obligation has been regarded as a – if not the – distinctive feature of Kant’s moral philosophy and has inspired a variety of other highly influential approaches to ethics (see e.g. Ross 1930, Nagel 1970, Rawls 1971, Korsgaard 1996, Scanlon 1998, Wood 2008). Despite its originality and the magnitude of both its influence and appeal, however, Kant’s understanding of obligation faces a number of problems. According to a classic objection, the notion of an obligation we autonomously impose upon ourselves is unsatisfactory because it leaves both the bindingness of obligation, i.e. whether or not we are bound by it, as well as its content, i.e. what it binds us to do, up to our own discretion (see Anscombe 1958). Issues like these continue to challenge Kant’s supporters (see e.g. Wood 1999, 2008 and Stern 2012), but surprisingly few interpreters make use of an important resource in the attempt to clarify them: the thought of Kant’s eighteenth century contemporaries. Although some scholars have already acknowledged that Kant’s notion of obligation owes a debt to his German contemporaries, most notably Christian Wolff (see Schwaiger 2009) and Alexander Baumgarten (see Bacin 2015), aside from a few exceptions (see Henrich 2009 and 2014) the influence of eighteenth century Scottish moral philosophy on Kant’s understanding of moral obligation has thus far been underappreciated. My postdoctoral research project seeks to remedy this situation by clarifying three aspects of Kant’s conception of moral obligation in light of the thought of eighteenth century Scottish moral philosophers Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith. The proposed project expands upon the results of my doctoral dissertation, Moral Sense Theory and The Development of Kant’s Ethics. In my dissertation I illustrate that the “moral sense” theorists, i.e. Anthony Ashley Cooper (a.k.a. Shaftesbury), Hutcheson, and Smith, had an influence on various aspects of Kant’s understanding of moral judgement and moral motivation. My dissertation therefore clarifies Kant’s views on these two topics in light of a broader philosophical movement in England and Scotland, namely “moral sense theory.” My postdoctoral project, on the other hand, focuses exclusively on the concept of obligation, and is concerned with the thought of Kant and eighteenth century Scottish moral philosophy more narrowly. At the same time, my previous research on Kant, Hutcheson, and Smith has prepared me to begin my postdoctoral research project as soon as possible My project has three parts and I proceed in a logical order. In the first part I discuss how we initially come to be bound by morality. Then, in the second part, I focus my attention on an aspect of the content of what we are morally obligated to do. I conclude in the third part by addressing a problem that arises as a result of the nature of this content. Part One: Kant and Smith on the Origin of Moral Obligation My project begins with the question of how and why we come to be bound by moral obligations in the first place. I illustrate that Smith’s answer to the question: “why be moral?” influenced what is known as Kant’s understanding of “moral education.” This part of my project is divided into two halves, the first devoted to Smith and the second to Kant. In the first half I clarify why Smith believes moral obligations bind us. Some of Smith’s predecessors have a relatively clear answer to this question, which has been well documented in the secondary literature. Shaftesbury, for example, argues that being bound by morality is appealing from the point of view of self-interest (see Shaftesbury 1999, Gill 2006, and

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 2   Darwall 1995). Smith’s stance on this issue is less clear, however, and no serious attempt has been made to reconstruct his position in the secondary literature. Samuel Fleischacker makes the suggestion that we desire to be moral, for Smith, because we desire approval (see Fleischacker 1991). I take Fleishacker’s suggestion as my starting point to argue that, similar to Shaftesbury, we come to be bound by morality, for Smith, because it is in our interest to be so bound. This is suggested by the fact that Smith states not only that we are moral because we desire approval, but also that the approval of others makes up “the chief part of human happiness” (Smith 1767, 66). At the same time, I will explain how not just any approval makes us happy, rather Smith believes that praise and approval only make us happy when we do what is praise-worthy, i.e. what we ought to do, morally speaking (ibid. 192-3). I will also make it clear here how this interpretation is consistent with Smith’s conception of moral motivation, according to which it is at times morally praise-worthy to act from self-interest (see ibid. 375). In the second half of part one I turn to the question of how Kant was influenced by Smith’s above-mentioned view. Although Kant argues that we bind ourselves to moral commands, he argues that we still need to become fully developed rational beings before we can do so. In this connection Kant occasionally discusses “moral education,” i.e. the process by which he believes human beings become fully rational and thereby bound by morality. As has been recently observed, moral education is “a fascinating, but often neglected, topic of Kant’s ethical theory” (see Ware 2012), and serious research on the topic has really just begun. Scholars have explored Kant’s debt to Rousseau (see Reisert 2012 and Scuderi 2012) and to figures from the German Enlightenment (Louden 2012 and Velkley 2012) on the matter, and others have explored the relation between moral education and Kant’s broader moral theory (see e.g. Moran 2009, Geisinger 2012, Munzel 2003). However, the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on Kant’s conception of moral education has not yet been a topic of discussion. This is surprising in that Kant explicitly emphasises the role of self-interest in moral education in the Critique of Practical Reason when he says: “It certainly cannot be denied that in order to bring … a mind that is still uncultivated … onto the track of the morally good in the first place, some preparatory guidance is needed to attract it by means of its own advantage or to alarm it by fear of harm” (Kant 5:152). In this part of my project I demonstrate that, similar to Smith, Kant believes that morality must be appealing from the perspective of self-interest, but only at a very specific phase in the process of moral education. After a first phase of “discipline” and a second of “cultivation,” it is only in the third, “civilizing” phase that “the human being becomes prudent” (Kant 9:450). In this phase, morality is shown to be a prudent option, but this is only the precursor to the fourth and final phase of “moralization” where only morally good ends are chosen, and they are chosen solely because they are good in themselves, not because they are in our interest (see Kant 9:450). In this way I hope to reconcile how Kant can simultaneously hold 1) that morality is in our interest, and 2) that we must perform our moral obligations not because they are in our interest, but solely because we ought to perform them. Part Two: Obligation and the Worthiness to be Happy In the second part of my project I discuss an aspect of Kant’s understanding of the content of moral obligation. I illustrate how both Smith and his teacher Hutcheson influenced Kant’s conception of the “object” of moral obligation, what he calls “the highest good.” According to Kant, we are morally obligated to perform particular actions in and of themselves and not for any other purpose or end, e.g. for the purpose of increasing our own happiness. At the same time, Kant believes that “[e]very action … has its end” (Kant 6:385), which means the actions we are morally obligated to perform must still have an end, even if it is not our direct intention to bring it about. Kant calls the end of moral action “the highest good” (Kant 5:108 ff.), which he defines as “happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy)” (Kant 5:110-1). Kant’s concept of the highest good and the distinction between happiness and the worthiness to be happy is central to his practical philosophy as a whole (see Watkins 2010, Beck 1960 and Wood 1970). Surprisingly, however, many of its features still lack an adequate discussion in the secondary literature. As is suggested in an article I

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 3   recently translated (see Recki) that is forthcoming in a volume devoted to Kant’s concept of the highest good (see Höwing), a neglected aspect of the concept is its connection to the thought of Kant’s contemporaries and predecessors. In line with the general aim of my project, in part two I will fill this gap in the literature by relating Kant’s concept of the highest good to eighteenth century Scottish philosophy. I will accomplish this in two ways. First, I will illustrate that Kant’s distinction between happiness and the worthiness to be happy is similar to Smith’s distinction between praise and praiseworthiness (see Smith 1767, 136 and 192ff.). I noted above how praise, for Smith, constitutes a large part of our happiness, but that we cannot enjoy this happiness unless we do what is praise-worthy. My first task will therefore be to highlight how, for both Smith and Kant, being worthy of happiness and acting virtuously is the condition of participating in happiness itself. Second, and perhaps more significantly, I will illustrate that in Hutcheson’s thought we find an important source for Kant’s idea that we must make certain necessary assumptions, i.e. what he calls the “postulates of pure practical reason,” if the highest good is to be possible. Kant argues that we must assume both the immortality of the soul and the existence of God if we are to believe that happiness will ever be in exact proportion to our virtue. This is because such a proportion can only be achieved in the afterlife and God is the only one with the power to make it happen (see Kant 5:122, Willaschek 2010, and Guyer 2000). Scholars have already observed that Hutcheson also believes that the happiness resulting from virtue is only possible in the afterlife (see Schollmeier 1967 and Stark 2004). However, in this part of my project I will illustrate that Hutcheson argues that belief in both an afterlife (Hutcheson 2002, 123) and in a divine being (Hutcheson 2002, 187f) are necessary presuppositions of our belief in happiness resulting from virtue. In these ways, I hope to show that Kant’s conception of the highest good both has important roots in, and can be clarified in light of, the thought of Hutcheson and Smith. Part Three: Hutcheson, Kant, and the Obligation to Act Morally In the third and final part of my project I will clarify an unresolved confusion common to both Hutcheson’s and Kant’s conception of moral obligation. First, Hutcheson claims that “there is naturally an obligation upon all men to benevolence” (Hutcheson 2004, 176). This can mean either that we simply ought to perform benevolent actions, or that we ought to have the benevolent desires from which such actions spring (see Jensen 1971). However, because all actions spring from desire, for Hutcheson (see Hutcheson 2004, 101), regardless of how one conceives of this obligation it implies that we are obligated to have benevolent desires. Now, because Hutcheson believes in the principle that “ought implies can” (see Hutcheson 2004, 191), if we are always under obligation to have benevolent desires, then we must be able to have these desires whenever we choose. Confusingly, Hutcheson’s psychology explicitly denies that desires can result from an act of will (see Hutcheson 2008, 224), thus it is unclear how we are to understand Hutcheson’s conception of the obligation to benevolence. Kant, for his part, advances two separate claims that each result in a similar confusion. First, Kant argues that moral obligations must be performed for a particular reason, i.e. solely because we ought to do them (see e.g. Kant 6:219). In this vein Kant claims there is a general obligation of virtue [Tugendverpflichtung] that instructs us to do our duty from duty, i.e. solely because we ought to do it (see Kant 6:410 and Guyer 2010). Second, Kant argues that it is our duty to make our own perfection an end of ours (see Kant 6:387), and since he claims that “[t]he greatest perfection of a human being is to do his duty from duty” (Kant 6:392), this duty also amounts to the claim that we are obligated to do our duty for a particular reason, i.e. solely because it is what we ought to do. Like Hutcheson, Kant also believes that “ought implies can” (see e.g. Kant 6:50), and as such these two views imply not only that we ought to do our duty from duty, but that we can do so as well. In a similarly confusing fashion, however, Kant explicitly denies that we can be obligated to do our duty from duty (see Kant 6:402-3 and 5:83). In this part of my project I clarify the nature of these obligations so as to make both Hutcheson and Kant consistent with their respective wider philosophical views. I will illustrate that, for both authors, an obligation always implies the necessity of an action (see Hutcheson 2004, 176; and Kant 4:439 and 5:32), and thus neither of them is claiming there is a distinct

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 4   obligation to have a particular desire or reason for acting. However, because they both claim that acting morally involves acting for a particular reason (for Hutcheson - a benevolent reason; for Kant - because duty requires it), I will explain that having such a desire or reason for action is simply part of what it means to properly fulfill a moral obligation but is not itself what we have an obligation to do. I will also illustrate that my interpretation avoids a related problem (see Ross 1930 and Pippin 2006), according to which, “if in connection with every duty we also have a further duty to do it from duty, then that principle must apply to that further duty ad infinitum” (see Allison 1990). The idea is that Kant’s above two views make him vulnerable to a regress problem (see Timmermann 2013b) that is presumably vicious and therefore damaging to his moral theory. Given the similarity of their views, this problem could apply to Hutcheson as well, but I will argue in this part of my project that neither of them is vulnerable to such a problem once one correctly understands how they conceive of the above obligations. Schedule I intend to complete the three parts of the proposed project in order, so as to respect the logical progression of their subject matter. I will publish each half of part one separately, therefore a relatively longer amount of time, the first 10 months of the project, will be devoted to completing this part. The first half is appropriate for a reputable journal devoted to Smith’s thought such as the Adam Smith Review, and the second is suitable for a top-tier Kant journal such as Kant-Studien or Kantian Review. I will then devote 7 months each to parts two and three, each of which will be published separately as selfstanding journal articles. Their subject matter makes them both appropriate for either a Kant journal or a more general journal in the history of philosophy such as the Journal for the History of Philosophy or the British Journal for the History of Philosophy. Additionally, because my postdoctoral project expands upon my doctoral research, the results of both projects will form the core of a future monograph on Kant’s engagement with eighteenth century British moral philosophy that I will submit to a press that has a history of publishing high-quality research on Kant’s practical philosophy, such as Cambridge University Press. During my postdoctoral period I will also be presenting the results of my research at conferences across Europe and North America. Citations Allison, Henry. (1990) Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1958) ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ in The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy. Vol. 33, No. 124, Jan., pg. 1-19. Bacin, Stefano. (2015) ‘Kant’s lectures on ethics and Baumgarten’s moral philosophy.’ In Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Ed. Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2015. Pg. 15 – 34. Beck, Lewis White. (1960) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. U of Chicago Press: Chicago. Broad, C.D. (1930) Five Types of Ethical Theories. Routledge: London. Fleischacker, Samuel. (1991) ‘Philosophy and Moral Practice: Kant and Smith.’ Kant-Studien. Vol. 82, No. 3, pg. 249-269. Darwall, Stephen. (1995) The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’:1640-1740. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Geisinger, Johannes. (2012) ‘Kant’s Account of Moral Education.’ Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 44, No. 7, pg. 776 – 786. Gill, Michael B. (2006) The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 5   Guyer, Paul. (2010) ‘The Obligation to be Virtuous: Kant’s Conception of the Tugendverpflichtung’ in Moral Obligation. Ed. By Ellen Frankel, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge, pg. 206 – 232. - (2006) Kant. New York: Routledge. - (2000) ‘From a Practical Point of View: Kant’s Conception of a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason’ in Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge, pg. 333-71. Henrich, Dieter. (2014) ‘Concerning Kant’s earliest ethics: an attempt at a reconstruction.’ In Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Ed. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley. Cambridge: Cambridge, pg. 13 – 37. -- (2009) ‘Hutcheson and Kant.’ In Ameriks and Höffe, Ed., Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge, pg. 29 – 57. Höwing, Thomas. Ed. (forthcoming) Kant on the Highest Good. Berlin: De Gruyter. Hutcheson, Francis. (2004) (Revised edition 2008) An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Ed. with Introduction by Wolfgang Leidhold. Liberty: Indianapolis. -- (2002) An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense. Ed. Aaron Garret, Liberty Fund: Indianapolis. Jensen, Henning. (1971) Motivation and the Moral Sense. International Archive of the History of Ideas, 46. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Kant, Immanuel. (1900ff.) Gesammelte Schriften (Akademie Ausgabe). Vol. 1 – 22 Ed. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vol. 23 Ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Vol. 24ff. Ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin. (all references to Kant cite the volume and page number of this edition separated by a colon) Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996) The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. Louden, Robert. (2012) ‘“Not a Slow Reform, but a Swift Revolution”: Kant and Basedow on the Need to Transform Education.’ ’ In Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Ed. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant. Routledge: New York. pg 39 – 54. Maliks, Reider. (2014) Kant’s Politics in Context. Oxford: Oxford. Moran, Kate A. (2009) ‘Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?’ Journal of Philosophy of Education. Vol. 43, No. 4, pg. 471 – 484. Nagel, Thomas. (1970) The Possibility of Altruism. Clarendon: Oxford. Munzel, G. Felicitas. (2003) ‘Kant on Moral Education, or “Enlightenment” and the Liberal Arts.’ The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 57, No. 1, pg. 43 – 73. Pippin, Robert. (2006) ‘Mine and Thine? The Kantian State.’ In The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Ed. Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge, pg. 416 – 446. Rawls, John. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard. Recki, Birgit. (forthcoming) ‘Mixtum compositum: On the Persistence of Kantian Dualism and its Consequences.’ Trans. by Michael Walschots in Kant on the Highest Good. Ed. Thomas Höwing. Berlin: De Gruyter. Reisert, Joseph R. (2012) ‘Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education.’ In Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Ed. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant. Routledge: New York, pg. 12 – 25. Ross, W. D. (1930) The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon. Scanlon, T.M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard. Schneewind, J.B. (1998) The Invention of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge. Schollmeier, Joseph. (1967) Johann Joachim Spalding: Ein Beitrag zur Theologie der Aufklärung. Mohn: Germany. Schwaiger, Clemens. (2009) ‘The Theory of Obligation in Wolff, Baumgarten, and the Early Kant.’ In Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy. Ed. Karl Ameriks and Ottfried Höffe. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2009. 58 – 73.

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 6   Scuderi, Phillip. (2012) “Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception.’ In Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Ed. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant. Routledge: New York, pg. 26 – 38. Shaftesbury, a.k.a. Anthony Ashley Cooper. (1999) Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Ed. Lawrence E. Klein, Cambridge. Smith, Adam. (1767) The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 3rd edition, London. Stark, Werner. (2004) Ed. Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie. By Immanuel Kant. De Gruyter: Berlin. Stern, Robert. (2012) Understanding Moral Obligation. New York: Cambridge. Timmermann, Jens. (2015) ‘What’s Wrong with ‘Deontology’? in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 65, pt. 1, pg. 75 – 92. -- (2013a) Ed. With Andreas Trampota and Oliver Sensen. Kant’s Tugendlehre: A Comprehensive Commentary. Berlin: De Gruyter. -- (2013b) ‘Duties to Oneself as Such (TL 6:417 – 420)’ in Kant’s Tugendlehre: A Comprehensive Commentary. Ed. Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann. Berlin: De Gruyter, pg 207 – 220. -- (2013c) ‘Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory’ in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95, pg. 36-64. -- (2010a) Ed. With Andrews Reath. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge. -- (2010b) ‘Reversal or Retreat? Kant’s deductions of freedom and morality’ in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermamnn. Cambridge: Cambridge. Pg. 73 – 90. -- (2009a) Ed. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge. -- (2009b) ‘Introduction’ in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Ed. Jens Timmermann. Cambridge: Cambridge. Pg 1-6. -- (2009c) ‘Acting from duty: inclination, reason and moral worth’ in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Ed. Jens Timmermann. Cambridge: Cambridge, pg. 45-62. -- (2007) Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Cambridge, 2007. -- (2006) ‘Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended’ in Philosophy, Vol. 81, pg. 505 – 530. Velkley, Richard. (2012) ‘Educating through Perplexity: Kant and the German Enlightenment.’ ’ In Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Ed. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant. Routledge: New York, pg. 69 – 80. Ware, Owen. (2012) ‘Review of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Ed. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant.’ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/29530kant-and-education-interpretations-and-commentary/. Watkins, Eric. (2010) ‘The Antinomy of Practical Reason: reason, the unconditioned and the highest good’ in in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermamnn. Cambridge: Cambridge. Willaschek, Marcus. (2010) ‘The primacy of practical reason and the idea of a practical postulate’ in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermamnn. Cambridge: Cambridge, pg. 168 – 196. Wood, Allen. (2008) Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge. -- (1999) Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge. -- (1970) Kant’s Moral Religion. Cornell: Cornell.

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Postdoctoral Research Project Bibliography (above sources are not repeated)

Adams, Robert M. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford, 1999. Alexander, Larry and Moore, Michael. ‘Deontological Ethics’ in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). Edward M. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ Allison, Henry. Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford, 2011. -- ‘Kant on freedom of the will.’ In The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. ed. Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2006. 381 – 416. Ameriks, Karl. Kant and the Historical Turn. Clarendon: Oxford, 2006. Baumgarten, Alexander. Metaphysics. Trans. And Ed. By Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers. Bloomsbury: London, 2013. Beck, Lewis White. A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. U of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1960. Bishop, John D. ‘Moral Motivation and the Development of Hutcheson’s Philosophy.’ Journal of the History of Ideas, 57.2, 1996, 277 – 295. Blackstone, William T. Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory. U of Georgia Press: Athens, 1965. Brandt, R. B. ‘The Concepts of Moral Obligation.’ Mind, Vol. 73, 1964, pg. 374 – 93. Broad, C.D. ‘Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics.’ In Readings in Ethical Theory. Ed. by Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers. 1952, pg. 363-388. Brink, David. Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge, 1989. Bykvist, Krister. ‘Objective versus Subjective Moral Oughts.’ Uppsala Philosophical Studies, Vol. 57, 2009, pg. 39 – 65. Chalier, Catherine. What Ought I To Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas. Trans. Jane Marie Todd. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. Darwall, Stephen. Deontology. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. -- The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’:1640-1740. Cambridge, 1995. -- Impartial Reason. Cornell UP: Ithaca, 1983. Dworkin, Gerald. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Dyck, Corey. Kant and Rational Psychology. Oxford: Oxford, 2014. Eckstein, Walther. ‘Einleitung’ to Theorie der Ethischen Gefühlen. New edition. Ed. and Trans. by Eckstein. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 2010. (original from 1926) Engstrom, Stephen. ‘The Triebfeder of pure practical reason.’ In Reath and Timmerman, Ed. Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2010, pg. 90 – 118. -- The Form of Practical Knowledge. Harvard U Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2009. -- and Whiting, Ed. Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. NY: Cambridge, 1996. Falduto, Antonino. The Faculties of the Human Mind and the Case of Moral Feeling in Kant’s Philosophy. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. Falk, W.D. ‘Obligation and Rightness.’ Philosophy, Vol. 20, 1945, pg. 129 – 47. -- ‘“Ought” and Motivation.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol. 48, 1947-8, pg.21 – 41. Finlay, Stephen. ‘What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can’t Detach It.’ Synthese, Vol. 177, 2010, pg. 67 – 89. Fleischacker, Samuel. ‘Adam Smith’s Moral and Political Philosophy.’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/smith-moral-political/ . 2013. Accessed April 1, 2015.

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 8   -- and Vivienne Brown, Ed. The Philosophy of Adam Smith. London: Routledge, 2010. Fowler, Thomas. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. London, 1882. Frankena, William. ‘Hutcheson’s Moral Sense Theory.’ Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 16, No. 3 (June 1955), pg 356-375. Geisinger, Johannes. ‘Kant’s Account of Moral Education.’ Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 44, No. 7, 2012. Pg. 776 – 786. Gill, Michael B. ‘Lord Shaftesbury [Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury]’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Article version – Wed. Jul. 20th, 2011. -- The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. -- ‘Shaftesbury’s Two Accounts of the Reason to be Virtuous’ in Journal of the History of Philosophy. Vol. 38, no. 4, 2000, pg. 529-48. Graham, Peter A. ‘In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation.’ Ethics, Vol. 121, 2010, pg. 88 – 115. Grean, Stanley. Shaftesbury’s Philosophy of Religion and Ethics. Ohio: Ohio UP, 1967. Greenspan, Patricia S. ‘Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives.’ Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, 1975, pg. 259 – 76. Gregor, Mary. Laws of Freedom. Oxford: Blackwell, 1963. Griswold, Charles L. Jr. Adam Smith and the Virtues of the Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge, 1999. Guyer, Paul. ‘Moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals.’ in Lara Denis Ed. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2010. -- Kant’s ‘Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals’. London: Continuum, 2007. -- Ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2006. -- Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. -- Kant and the Experience of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Haakonssen, Knud. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Hardimon, Michael O. ‘Role Obligations.’ The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 91, 1994, pg. 333 – 63. Henrich, Dieter. Unity of Reason. Cambridge: Harvard U Press, 1994. -- Aesthetic Judgement and the Moral Image of the World. Stanford, 1992. -- ‘The Context of Autonomy.’ In Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1983, pg. 255-277. -- ‘Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes.’ In Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus. Darmstadt, 1975, pg. 55-112. -- ‘The Basic Structure of Modern Philosophy.’ In Cultural Hermeneutics II. 1974, pg. 1-18. -- ‘Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft.’ In Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken. Tübingen, 1960, pg. 77-115. -- Hutcheson und Kant, Kantstudien, (Festschrift für H. J. Paton) 1957/58, pg. 49-69. -- ‘Das Prinzip der kantischen Ethik.’ Philosophische Rundschau, 1954/55, pg. 20-38. Höffe, Ottfried and Ameriks, Karl, Ed. Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2009. -- Ed. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989. Horton, John. Political Obligation. London: Metheun, 1992. Hutcheson, Francis. Philosophiae moralis institution compendiaria with a Short Introduction to Philosophy. Ed. Luigi Turco. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007. -- On Human Nature. Ed. Thomas Mautner. Cambridge: Cambridge, 1993.

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 9   -- Untersuchung unserer Begriffe von Schönheit und Tugend. Translated by J.H. Merk, Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1762. -- Abhandlung über die Natur und Beherrschung der Leidenschaften und Neigungen und über das moralische Gefühl insonderheit. Anonymous translation, Leipzig 1760. -- Sittenlehre der Vernunft. 2 volumes. Leipzig, 1756. -- A System of Moral Philosophy. 2 volumes. London, 1755. Irmscher, Hans Dietrich. Ed. Immanuel Kant: Aus den Vorlesungen der Jahre 1762 bis 1764. Auf Grund der Nachschriften Johann Gottfried Herders. Kant Studien Ergänzungsheft 88. Köln, 1964. Irwin, Terence. The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. Vol. 1-3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 – 2009. Jackson, Frank and Pargetter, Robert. ‘Oughts, Options, and Actualism.’ Philosophical Review, Vol. 95, pg. 233 – 55. Kail, P.J.E. ‘Hutcheson’s Moral Sense: Skepticism, Realism, and Secondary Qualities.’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 18, pg 57-77. 2001. Kant, Immanuel. Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy. Ed. Kenneth Westphal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 -- Lectures on Anthropology. Ed. G.F. Munzel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. -- Anthropology, History, Education. Ed. Günter Zöller and Robert Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. -- Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie. Ed. Werner Stark. De Gruyter, 2004. -- Critique of the Power of Judgement. Ed. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001a. -- Lectures on Metaphysics. Trans. and Ed. by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001b. -- Lectures on Ethics. Ed. and Trans. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001c. -- Religion and Rational Theology. Trans. and Ed. by Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001d. -- Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge, 1998. -- Lectures on Metaphysics. Trans. and Ed. by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge, 1997 --Practical Philosophy. Trans. and Ed. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. -- Lectures on Ethics. Trans. Louis Infield, forward by Lewis White Beck. Harper: New York, 1963. -- Eine Vorlesung Kants über Ethik. Ed. Paul Menzer. Berlin, 1924. Kiesewetter, Benjamin. ‘‘Ought’ and the Perspective of the Agent.’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Vol. 5, 2011, pg. 1 – 24. Klein, Lawrence E. Shaftesbury and the culture of politeness: Moral discourse and cultural politics in early eighteenth-century England. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. Klemme, Heiner F. ‘Knowing, Feeling, Desiring – Self-Possession. Reflections on the Connection between the Faculties in Kant’s Doctrine of the Categorical Imperative’ in: Kant's Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen, ed. Bernd Dörflinger, Claudio La Rocca, Robert Louden und Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo-Marques, Berlin, Boston, 2015 S. 143-161. -- ‘Freiheit, Recht und Selbsterhaltung. Zur philosophischen Bedeutung von Kants Begriff der Verbindlichkeit“, in: Normativität des Lebens – Normativität der Vernunft?, Ed. by Markus Rothhaar and Martin Hähnel, Berlin, Boston 2015, S. 95-116.

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 10   -- ‘‘als ob er frei wäre‘. Kants Rezension von Johann Heinrich Schulz’ Versuch einer Anleitung zur Sittenlehre für alle Menschen“, in: Crítica y Metafísica. Homenaje a Mario Caimi, ed. Claudia Jáuregui et al., Hildesheim, Zürich, New York 2015, S. 200-211. -- ‘Drei Dimensionen moralischer Motivation: Literatur Adresse.’ Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik. 2003, 14.4. Pg. 615. -- et. al. Ed. Moralische Motivation: Kant und die Alternativen. Meiner Verlag, 2006a. -- Ed. Reception of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany: Six Significant Translations, 1755 – 1782. 7 Vols. With Introductions by Heiner Klemme. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2000. -- ‘Motivational Internalism. A Kantian Perspective on Moral Motives and Reasons.” In The Concept of Love in 17th and 18th Century Philosophy Ed. by Gabor Boros, Herman de Dijn and Martin Moors. Leuven, 2007, pg 227-244. -- ‘Johann Georg Sulzers ‘vermischte Sittenlehre’. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte und Problemstellung von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.’ In Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779). Aufklärer zwischen Christian Wolff und David Hume. Ed. by Frank Grunert and Gideon Stiening. Berlin, 2011, pg. 309-322. Klemme, Heiner and Kuehn, Manfred. Ed. The Reception of British Aesthetics in Germany: Seven Significant Translations, 1745 – 1776. 7 Vols. With Introductions by Manfred Kuehn and Heiner F. Klemme. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001. Klemme, Heiner und Kuehn, Manfred. Ed. The Dictionary of 18th Century German Philosophers. 3 Vols. London, NY: Continuum, 2010. Klimchuk, Dennis. “Three Accounts of Respect for Persons in Kant’s Ethics.” Kantian Review Vol. 8, 2004, 38-61. Kolodny, Nike and MacFarlane, John. ‘Ifs and Oughts.’ Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 107, 2010, pg. 115 – 43. Kuehn, Manfred. Kant: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2001. -- Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768 – 1800. Kingston: McGill-Queens, 1987. Küenburg, Max S.J. Der Begriff der Pflicht in Kants vorkritischen Schriften. Innsbruck, 1927. (Dissertation) Korsgaard, Christine M. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. -- The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. -- Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. by Peter Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon, 1975. Louden, Robert B. Morality and Moral Theory: A Reappraisal and Reaffirmation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. 2nd Ed. London: Duckworth, 1985. Mackie, J.L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. McCarty, Richard. Kant’s Theory of Action. Oxford: Oxford, 2009. McDowell, John. ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 52, 1978, pg. 77 – 94. Morrison, Iain. Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action. Ohio UP: Athens, Ohio, 2008. Munzel, G Felicitas. Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The ‘Critical’ Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgement. U of Chicago Press, 1999. Norton, David Fate. ‘Hutcheson’s Moral Realism.’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 23, 397-418. 1985. Nuyen, A. T. ‘Sense, Passions and Morals in Hume and Kant.’ Kant-Studien Vol. 82, No. 1, pg 29 – 41, 1991.

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 11   O’Connell, Eoin. ‘Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good.’ In Kantian Review Vol 17, No. 2, July 2012, pg. 257 – 279. O’Neil, Onora. Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics. 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2013. Oncken, August. Adam Smith und Immanuel Kant: Der Einklang und das Wechselverhältniss ihrer Lehren über Sitte, Staat und Wirtschaft. Leipzig, 1877. Panknin-Schappert, Helke. Innerer Sinn und moralisches Gefühl: zur Bedeutung eines Begriffspaares bei Shaftesbury und Hutcheson sowie in Kant vorkritischen Schriften. Habilitation. Hildesheim 2007. Paton, H.J. The Categorical Imperative. Second Edition. Pennsylvania: U of Pennsylvania Press, 1953. Paul, Ellen Frankel. Ed. with Fred D. Miller Jr and Jeffrey Paul. Moral Obligation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Persson, Ingmar. ‘A Consequentialist Distinction Between What We Ought to Do and Ought to Try.’ Utilitas, Vol. 20, 2008, pg. 348 – 55. Pidgen, Charles. ‘Anscombe on “Ought.”’ Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 38, 1988, pg. 20 – 41. Pinkard, Terry. ‘Subjects, Objects, and Normativity: What is it like to be an Agent?’ International Yearbook of German Idealism, Vol. 1, 2003, 201 – 18. Potter, Nelson. ‘Kant and the Moral Worth of Actions.’ Southern Journal of Philosophy. 1996, vol 34:2, 225-242. Prichard, H. A. Moral Obligation: Essays and Lectures. Oxford: Clarendon, 1949. Quinn, Phillip. ‘In Adam’s Fall, We Sinned All.’ Philosophical Topics 16 (1988). Raphael, D.D. The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy. Clarendon: Oxford, 2007. -- ‘The Virtue of TMS 1759.’ in Vivienne Brown and Samuel Fleischacker, Ed. The Philosophy of Adam Smith. Routledge: London, 2010. Raphael, D.D. and Macfie, A.L. ‘Introduction’ in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Glasgow Edition: Ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie. Clarendon: Oxford, 1976. Rauscher, Frederick. ‘Kant’s Moral Anti-Realism.’ Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 40, 2002, pg. 477 – 99. Rawls, John. ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.’ The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 77, 1980, pg. 515 – 72. -- ‘Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.’ In Eckart Förster Ed., Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, pg. 81 – 113. -- Collected Papers. Ed. Samual Freeman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. -- Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Ed. Barbara Herman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Reath, Andrews. Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford, 2006. Rehberg, August Wilhelm. Rezension der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. in Allgemeine LiteraturZeitung Nr. 188, 6.8.1788, pg. 345-360. Reich, Klaus. Kant und die Ethik der Griechen. Tübingen: Mohr, 1935. -- Kant and Greek Ethics. Mind 48 (1939), pg. 338-359 and 446-463. Reiner, Hans. Pflicht und Neigung. Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1951. Roberts, T.A. The Concept of Benevolence. Macmillan: London, 1973. Rossvaer, Viggo. Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Oslo, 1979. Roth, Klas and Surprenant, Chris W. Ed. Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Routledge: New York, 2012 Rudolf, Eisler. Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe. Vol. 1. Berlin, 1904. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. ‘Sentiments and Spectators: Adam Smith’s theory of moral judgement.’ in The Philosophy of Adam Smith Ed. by Vivienne Brown and Samuel Fleischacker. Routledge: London, 2010. Schmucker, Joseph – Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und Reflexionen. Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Heim, 1961.

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 12   -- Die Entwicklung der Lehre Kants von den Prinzipien der Moralität bis zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft. München 1948. (Dissertation) Schneewind, Jerome B. Ed. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. -- Essays on the History of Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Schwaiger, Clemens. Kategorische und andere Imperative. Zur Entwicklung von Kants praktischer Philosophie bis 1785 [= Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, Abt. II, Bd. 14], Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1999. -- Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten – ein intellektuelles Porträt. Studien zur Metaphysik und Ethik von Kants Leitautor [= Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung Abt. II, Bd. 24], Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2011. Scott, William Robert. Francis Hutcheson. Cambridge, 1900. Sedgwick, Sally. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: An Introduction. Cambridge, 2008. Sellars, Wilfred and Hospers, John Ed. Readings in Ethical Theory. 2nd Ed. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1970. Sensen, Oliver. ‘Kant’s Conception of Inner Value.’ European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 19, 2011, pg. 262 – 80. Shaftesbury, a.k.a Anthony Ashley Cooper. An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit. 1699. (Untersuchung über die Tugend. 1777.) -- A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm. 1708. (Ein Brief über den Enthusiasmus. 1776.) -- Sensus Communis, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour. 1709. -- The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody. 1709. -- Miscellanien oder Vermischte Betrachtungen über die vorhergehenden Abhandlungen und andre kritische Materien. 1779. Shell, Susan Meld. The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant’s philosophy and politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980. Sidgwick, Henry. The Methods of Ethics. 7th Ed., republished. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981. Smith, Adam. Lectures on Jurisprudence. Ed. R.L. Meck, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. -- The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Glasgow Edition: Ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie. Clarendon: Oxford, 1976. -- Theorie der moralischen Empfindungen. 2 volumes. Trans. by Christian Günther Rautenberg. Braunschweig, 1770. -- An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 1776. -- Untersuchung der Natur und Ursachen von Nationalreichthümern. 5 volumes. 1776-1792. Smith, Holly M. ‘The ‘Prospective View’ of Obligation.’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Discussion Note, 2011, pg. 1 – 8. Smith, Michael. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Stern, Robert. ‘Does “Ought” Imply “Can”? And Did Kant Think it Does?’ Utilitas, Vol. 16, 2004, 42 – 61. Strasser, M.P. Francis Hutcheson’s Moral Theory. Wakefield, NH, 1990. Surprenant, Chris W. ‘Kant’s contribution to moral education: the relevant of catechistics.’ In Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2010, pg. 165 – 174. Timmermann, Jens. Ed. Immanuel Kant, Critik der praktischen Vernunft. Akademie Ausgabe. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. -- ‘Autonomy and Moral Regards for Ends’ in Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen. Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 2012. -- Ed. and Trans. with Mary Gregor. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Postdoctoral Research Project Michael Walschots 13   -- ‘Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.’ Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2007, pg. 167 – 182. -- ‘Value without Regress: Kant’s “Formula of Humanity” Revisited.’ European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, 2006, 69 – 93. -- ‘Why Kant Could not Have Been a Utilitarian.’ Utilitas, Vol. 17, No. 3, Nov. 2005, pg. 243 – 264. -- Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003. Velkley, Richard L. Freedom and the End of Reason. On the Moral Foundation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Chicago-London, 1989. Wallace, R. Jay. The View From Here:On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. -- Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. -- Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Ward, Keith – The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972. Warda, Arthur. Kants Bücher. Berlin: Martin Breslauer, 1922. Wolff, Robert Paul. The Autonomy of Reason. Harper and Row: New York, 1973. -- Ed. Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays. London: MacMillan, 1968. Wood, Allen. ‘Hegel’s Critique of Morality.’ In Ludwig Siep Ed. G.W.F. Hegel: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin (Klassiker Auslegen, Bd. 9), pg. 147-166. -- Ed. with Dieter Schönecker. Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Trans. by Nicholas Walker. Harvard U Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2015. Wuerth, Julian. ‘Sense and Sensibility in Kant’s Practical Agent: Against the Intellectualism of Korsgaard and Sidgwick.’ European Journal of Philosophy. 21:1, pg 1-36. (2010) -- Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford, 2014. Yala, Ahmet. ‘Kant’s View on Moral Education.’ Ankara University, Journal of Faculty of Educational Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2005, pg. 73-86. Zimmermann, Michael J. Ignorance and Moral Obligation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. -- The Concept of Moral Obligation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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