Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 55, No.3, March 2007

On vijnanapariname

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in Trimsikakarika

MATSUOKA Hiroko 0. In the first verse of his Trimsikakarika(TrK)Vasubandhustates: atmadharmopacaro hi vividho yah pravartate/vijnanapariname 'sau parinamah sa ca tridha (TrKI [L13.3-4]).This verse is well known as expressingthe core of the Yogacaradoctrine accepted by Vasubandhu. Thus, a correct interpretation of the verse is crucial to a proper understanding of Vasubandhu'sdoctrine. This paper will examine two interpretations of the verse: one commonly adopted by modern scholars, such as Unebe and another put forth by the commentatorSthiramati. In fact, Sthiramati anticipates the interpretation of modern scholars and presents an argument to reject it. This argument is also presented below. 1. To begin with, let us see what Unebe says. Unebe[2004:137.6-13]: "Accordingto him (Sthiramati),the verse(pada abc) means that variousverbalexpressionssuch as "atman" or "jiva"for humanbeingsand "dharma"or "ayatana" for other constituentsof this worldare used amongpeople(loka)as well as in the scientificsystem(sastra),but theyreferto the transformationsof consciousness (vijh naparinama) in reality and,therefore,they are meresecondaryapplications(upacara)." The important point to note here is that Unebe takes vijnanaparinama as the referent of a 'verbal expression' (upacara). According to Unebe [2004:137.3-5],the expression upacarah pravartate vijnanapariname is a construction of the type sabdahpravartate arthe 'A certain word occurs in the domain of a certain meaning', so that it means 'A verbal expressionrefers to vijnanaparinama'. It is debatable, however,whether the expressionin question can be a construction of the type described above. I think that it is difficult to establish a signifier-significand relation between upacara as a verbal expressionand vijnanaparinama. 2.1. Sthiramati introduces the followingarguments made on the assumption that the term upacara means a metaphorical expression. 1121

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On vijnanapariname in Trimsikakarika (H. MATSUOKA)

"It is not properto have a metaphoricalexpression(upacara)when theredo not existatman and dharmasas primary referents(mukhya). For, a metaphoricalexpressionmust meetthree conditions:the primaryreferentof the word,the actualreferentresemblingthe primaryone, and a commonqualityexistingbetweenthe two."(TrBh[L17.7-9]) The point made here is this: Suppose that the word atman refers to the self which really exists. If the same word is used to refer to a thing which is not atman and similar to it, this use of the word atman is called upacara or secondary. In this case it is also said that the word atman has two meanings: primary and secondary (gauna). 2.2. Sthiramati denies such a distinction: "Thereis also no primaryreferentfor a word sincethe essenceof that [i.e.,the primary thing]goes beyondthe scopeof thought(jnana)and language(abhidhana).For,it is only to grasp and to conveyan [unreal]secondaryaspect(gunarupa)that a cognitionand a verbalexpressionoccur,becausethey do not touchthe essenceof the primarything. Otherwise[a cognitionand a verbalexpression,whichare relatedonlyto] an [unreal]secondary aspect,wouldbecomeuseless. Indeed,thereis no meansof determiningthe essence of the primarything other than a cognitionand a verbalexpression. Thus it is to be understoodthat therecannotbe any primaryreferentsincethereis no cognitionor verbal expressionto grasp or to conveyit." (TrBh[L17.23-27]) Sthiramati argues that a cognition and a verbal expressiondo not touch the very essence of a primary thing but its unreal secondary aspect, which amounts to saying that they do not occur with reference to the ultimate reality but to the conventional reality. It is clear that he intends to imply here that the use of any word is secondary (upacara), so that no essential distinction can be made between the use of a certain word with reference to a certain thing and that of the same word with reference to another similar thing. Thus we may say that to take the term upacara as meaning a metaphorical expression as opposed to a primary expressioncarries us too far away from the original intention of Vasubandhu. 3.1. We have to consider what Sthiramati states in his comments on the verse, to see how he understands Vasubandhu'sstatement atmadharmopacarah pravartate vijnanapariname. "In that [vijnanaparinama] (tatra) there arise from storehouse consciousness (alayavij1122

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nana) the conceptual cognition (vikalpa) in which [a thing such as] atman (the self) appears (nirbhasa) and the one in which [dharmas (constituent factors of experience) such as] a material factor (rupa) appear, on the basis of the full development(pariposa) of the impression (vasana) left by the conceptualization of atman and the like and on the basis of the full developmentof the impression left by the conceptualization of a material factor and the like. Although atman and dharmas do not exist externally, there occur the conceptual construction (upacara) of [such a thing as] atman and that of [such dharmas as] a material factor, which are beginningless, by means of thinking of the appearance of [a thing such as] atman and the appearance of [dharmas such as] a material factor as if they were entities outside the conceptual cognition, and clinging to them." (TrBh[L16.2-6]) Here it is pointed out that in the vijnanaparinama

there arise from dlayavijndna the

conceptual cognitions in which atman and dharmas appear and that when such conceptual cognitions are produced, the conceptual construction, which I think is meant by the term upacara here, of atman and dharmas occur. shows that the expression upacdrah pravartate

Thus Sthiramati

vijnanapariname does not admit of

Unebe's interpretation. 3.2. Then we have to determine exactly what is meant by the locative ending in the word vijnanapariname. Sthiramati says: "Moreover , [it must be said that] when x does not exist in y then x is conceptually constructed in y (yac ca yatra nasti tat tatropacaryate); for instance, [when the cause for the use of the word] go [does not exist in a Bahika then] it is conceptually constructed in the Bahika. Similarly,because dtman and dharmas exist neither in the [transformationof] consciousness itself nor outside of it, atman and dharmas are just conceptual constructs (parikalpita) and do not exist from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth (paramarthatas). Therefore, the one-sided view should not be accepted that as a cognition (vijnana) exists as a real entity (dravyatas), so also does something to be cognized (vijneya). Since no conceptual construction can take place without a locus (adhara), it should necessarily be accepted that the vijnanaparinama, in which occurs the conceptual construction of atman and dharmas, exists as a real entity (vastutas). Therefore, it is not reasonable to accept that as something to be cognized is simply conventionally real and not ultimately real (samvrtitas), so is also a cognition. For, the undesirable consequence would follow 1123

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On vijnanapariname in Trimsikakarika (H. MATSUOKA)

that the cognitiondoesnot existevenat the conventionallevel. Indeedit is notproperto say that a conventionalrealityhas no basis(nirupadana)."(TrBh[L16.6-11)) The point to note here is that the vijnanaparinama is described as the locus in which the conceptual construction of atman and dharmas occurs. According to Sthiramati, atman and dharmas are simply conceptual constructs (parikalpita;TrBh [L15.20-21]: atma dharmas ca upacaryantaity atmadharmopacarah),whereas the vijnanaparinama exists as a real entity. It is patent that he takes the locative ending in vijnanapariname as signifying a locus. If the vijnanaparinama serves as locus in such a conceptual construction, it is properly to be said to be the cause of the conceptual construction. Thus we may say that there obtains a causal relation between vijnanaparinama and upacara as a conceptual construction. 4. The followingpoints have become clear: (1) The term upacara in atmadharmopacara is to be understood as signifying conceptual construction or a conceptual construct, leading to conventional discourse, rather than a metaphoricalexpression. (2) The locative ending of the word vijnanapariname signifies the locus (adhara) in which occur the conceptual construction (upacara)of atman and that of dharmas. This shows that the vijnanaparinama is the cause for the occurrence of the conceptual constructions. Unebe cannot be justified in saying that various verbal expressions(upacara)refer to the transformationof consciousness. According to the Yogacaradoctrine, the vijnanaparinama exists as a real entity and hence cannot be referred to by any verbal expression. Rather, what can be the referent of a verbal expressionis simply atman or dharmas, which are just conceptual constructs. Thus the verse (padasa-c) is to be translated as follows: "Indeed, the differentkinds of conceptualconstruction(upacara)of atman and dharmas, whichoccurin everydaylife(loka)and in theoreticaldiscourse(sastra),occurin the transformationof consciousness." 〈References〉 (Vasubandhu).

TrBh[L]: Sylvain

Trimsikabhasya Levi

ed.,

(Sthiramati).

Vijnaptimatratasiddhi:

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See

TrK[L].

deux

Traites

TrK[L]: de

Trimsikakarika

Vasubandhu:

Vim-

On vijnanapariname in Trimsikakarika (H. MATSUOKA)

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satika (la Vingtaine) accompagnee d'une Explication en Prose et Trimsika (la Trentaine) avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honore Champion Press, 1925. Unebe, Toshiya [2004]: "The "Grammarian's Objection" in Sthiramati's Trimsikabhasya and Bhartrhari's Argument on the Secondary Application of Words," in Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof Musashi Tachikawa'sFelicitation Volume,Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

〈Key

Words〉

Trimsikakarika,

upacara, vijnanaparinama

(Graduate Student, Hiroshima University)

新刊紹介 四津 谷

孝道

『ツ ォ ン カ パ の 中 観 思 想 ― こ とば に よ る こ とば の 否 定― A5版

・389頁 ・定 価9,975円 大 蔵 出版 ・2006年11月

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』