Looking Beyond Quotas: Rules Guiding Women’s Representation in Politics in South Eastern Europe

Ekaterina R. Rashkova (University of Innsbruck), [email protected] & Emilia Zankina (American University in Bulgaria) [email protected]

Abstract Quotas have long been determined to be the main and very often most effective tool in the battle against gender inequality. As a result research on gender quotas and their effect on the representation of women in politics has thus far dominated the literature. The majority of the extant work on quotas, however, focuses primarily on established democracies, leaving little knowledge about other regions of the world. The gap is especially evident for many of the countries in the post-communist region of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it has been shown that political regulation found in the party and electoral laws for instance, has an effect on party competition. Our earlier work on gender representation in the Balkans suggests that via its effect on parties’ strategies regulation affects the gender balance in politics. Focusing on the countries from South Eastern Europe, we examine the regulatory framework and the conditions within which political parties need to compete. Against data on the descriptive representation of women, we then analyze the regulations in place from a gendered perspective, seeking to ultimately explain the historically low female representation in the region.

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Please do not cite without the permission of the authors -

Paper prepared for presentation at the European Conference on Politics and Gender to be held on June 11-13, 2015, at the University of Uppsala, Sweden.

In a time where same sex marriages, social heterogeneity and openness, and equality and acceptance of the ‘other’ are the hot topics, gender equality may often pass as something granted, something normal, something that we already have. Paradoxically, however, it is neither granted, nor we have it, despite the fact that women make up about half the population of the world. A recent press release of the Inter Parliamentary Union classifies the progress in the number of women in parliament and government as “inching forward”, and reports that despite the increase, the rate of progress is quite small (IPUa 2015). The fact of the matter is that, while the number of women and men are relatively equal in this world, the gender balance in politics is much to the favor of men. According to latest data from IPU, the world average for percent women in the lower house of parliament is 22.4 – a number far off from parity and varying even further when we look at regions individually (IPUa, 2015). As can be expected, the more developed and longer established democratic regions of the world, such as Europe and the Americas, have higher rates of women participation, especially the Nordic countries. What is interesting, and to an extent puzzling, is the reported greatest progress by the Balkans sub-region within the European group. As is commonly known, as well as discussed in the social science literature (Simic 1969, Buchanan 2002), Southeastern Europe is a region with very heavy patriarchic and macho mentality where the role of the woman, albeit changing, still remains largely understood in the traditional way – as a mother and a housewife. This continuing perception of the role of the woman, coupled with the highest increase in the number of women in parliament within Europe as a whole, presents an intriguing puzzle that calls for further examination. The low number of women in politics has triggered high interest among gender, electoral, and democratic transition scholars. Explanations of the low percentage of women legislators are mostly linked to the institutional context of the competitive space – the electoral system, the party system, the legislative competition – as well as to the party context, for example, to party ideology and party organization (Norris 1993). A significant amount of work identifies gender quotas as the most effective tool addressing women’s underrepresentation in national parliaments thus far. While a lot of the research on gender quotas focuses on explaining different paths in their adoption (Caul 2001; Krook 2006), an increasing number of studies use quotas to explain the success of female candidates in municipal elections (Schmidt and Saunders 2004) or women’s political engagement (Zetterberg 2009). Krook and Zetterberg (2014) summarize the three main directions of quota research as focusing on the effect of quotas on the descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation of women, while introducing a new collection of studies which look at additional paths to adopting quotas, as well as examining quota effectiveness in democratic and non-democratic settings. With the exception of Kayuni and Muriaas’ recent contribution on alternative ways to ‘make women more attractive to selectors’ (2014) and our previous work on the subject (Rashkova and Zankina 2013), little has been done to examine the effect of non-quota regulatory measures on women’s involvement in politics. Anderson (2006) explains the puzzle of the different speed of implementation of EU’s gender equality policy in the East with the importance of domestic actors in mediating external political pressures and thus altering the pace of change. Sedelmeier (2009), in turn, compares the level of compliance with EU’s gender equality policy in Eastern Europe, but does not find significant differences in the pre- and post-membership period. Despite the number of works on the effect of external regulation, the study of non-quota domestic constraints which structure the political game and can potentially change the female-male ratio in politics remains quite open. In an attempt to fill this gap, we focus on the regulation of political parties and on examining how it affects the representation of women. Our focus is on the regulation of political parties as given in the Party Law and the Constitution of the countries in our sample,

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and more specifically on those regulations that affect political representation and could alter the representation of women in particular. Building on existing research on the descriptive representation of women, we examine women’s representation and party regulation in five Southeast European states, attempting to expand our understanding of the causes (and potential remedies) of gender inequality in politics, as well as to broaden the empirical base of gender scholarship. Combining East and West political pasts, yet sharing similar traditions and cultural beliefs, the states of Southeastern Europe offer a unique set of cases for the examination of women representation. Wangnerud (2009) points out that variations in the proportion of women to men are greater across parties than across nations and one of the earliest findings - that Left party ideology is a strong predictor of the election of women - is becoming weaker as studies show an increase of women representation in traditionally non-women-friendly party families across the board. Recent research on populist radical right (PRR) parties argues that while parties from the PRR family are largely Männerparteien (Mudde 2007), the gender gap is often overemphasized when these parties are studied independently of others (Spierings and Zaslove 2015). The emphasis here is of course on the fact that women underrepresentation is a political phenomenon across the board and just as we cannot continue to ignore the women of the non-Left political parties, in order to get a comprehensive grasp of the causes of gender equality, we need to examine women underrepresentation on a system level, and not atomize it to individual parties or party families as has often been the case in the past. In this paper, we try to un-pack women’s representation in Southeastern Europe in order to answer questions on how the number of women varies across parties, parliaments, and time, and what sorts of factors account for this variation. To do that, we examine the effect that regulation of political parties, and more specifically rules about the establishment, activity and competition of parties, have on female representation in Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Greece. Our cases share some common characteristics, yet, there are also notable differences. For example, all countries, except Croatia, have been part of the Ottoman Empire and are Christian Orthodox countries. At the same time, all countries, except Greece, have experienced communist rule and communist emancipation policies. Yet, communism in Yugoslavia was very different and much more open to the West than communism in Bulgaria. Consequently, women activism in the Yugoslav republics and in Bulgaria starkly differs. Furthermore, all countries, except Bulgaria, have instituted gender quotas, yet Bulgaria has unexpectedly high levels of women represented both in parliament and government. Greece, by contrast, has lower levels of women, despite quotas, and Macedonia has very high levels of representation in parliament (due to quotas), but very low levels of representation in government. Such variation calls for an examination of factors beyond quotas which is what we set out to do here. The paper proceeds with a comparative examination of the regulation of political parties in the five states, a discussion on the political and historical context and women’s activism in the region, and an empirical section presenting and analyzing data on women representation across the party system in each individual country for the last 25 years. In addition to offering new data for a significantly understudied region, we try to explain the variation which we observe and offer a conceptual contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of the gender balance in politics. We argue that higher barriers to entry would stimulate the outreach to and the larger inclusion of diverse groups, therefore also of more female politicians by not specifically gender political parties, while it would lower the opportunity of political entry of small and minority-oriented political parties, including women parties. Another examined relationship is that between the political and historical context and the level of representation of women. In comparison with more egalitarian

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societies, we find that patriarchic cultural traits have an adverse effect on gender parity, even in the presence of gender quotas. Regulatory Framework for Political Parties In this section we look at how political regulation treats the question of gender equality. Specifically, we are interested in examining whether, and to what extent, the constitutions and the laws governing the conduct of political parties, address the issue of gender equality. As mentioned earlier, the motivation for this inquiry is twofold. First, the literature on issues of gender equality has been primarily focused on the study of quotas; second, as we argue in our previous work (Rashkova and Zankina 2013), we have reason to believe that how the incentives for political competition are structured may have an important effect on the proportion of male and female politicians. In that relation, we discuss the rules on the establishment, the internal party matters and on availability of public funding of political parties in our sample of countries. A main constraint that party regulation puts on political parties is how easy or difficult the process of setting up a party is. Within our group of countries, Greece does not have a Law on Political Parties and can thus be taken to have the most liberal environment for political entrepreneurs. Bulgaria, on the other hand, has fairly limited barriers to formation, as political parties may be established with the initiative of 50 Bulgarian citizens with voting rights (Art. 10. 1, Bulgarian Party Law 2009) and a constituent meeting with at least 500 supporters, where a charter is adopted and signed by 500 founders (Art. 12 & 13). Similarly, in Croatia, political parties may be established fairly easily, with a minimum of 100 Croatian citizens of legal age (Art. 6, Croatian Political Parties Act). The establishment requirements are more restrictive in Macedonia and Serbia, where one needs at least 1,000 citizens with voting rights in order to form a political party in Macedonia (Art. 11.1, Macedonian Law on Political Parties) and at least 10,000 citizens (Art. 8, Serbian Party Law 2009) or 1,000 citizens for national minorities (Art.9) in Serbia. An additional requirement in Macedonia is that political parties are obliged to submit the same number of individually given signatures necessary for the establishment of the political party every four years (Art. 11.3). Internal party organization in all countries is left relatively open, to the extent that the Croatian Party Law does not mention internal party matters at all. The two exceptions are the constitutional ban on organizing parties on an ethnic principle (Art. 11.4, Constitution)1 and the provision encouraging political parties to create their own youth and women’s organizations (Art. 20. 2, Bulgarian Party Law) in Bulgaria, and the provision that political parties shall consider ‘the adherence to the principle of gender equality in the availability of functions’ within their activity in Macedonia (Art. 4). Another aspect of party regulation which has a direct effect on party competition and the development of the party system, and thus has a strong potential to affect the gender balance in politics, is the availability of public funding. Political parties in Southeastern Europe all enjoy funding from the state, however, the amount of money and the allocation procedures differ quite significantly. All countries except Bulgaria have a special Party Finance Law which addresses the specific rules under which political activity is to be financed. In Bulgaria the funding of political parties is treated within the Party Law. The most restrictive funding allocation can be found in Serbia and in Croatia. Both countries do not provide any public funding for parties which do not have MPs. In Serbia, 30 percent of the public funding is divided in equal amounts to political parties with deputies, whilst the remaining 70 percent is divided proportionally to the number of deputies each parliamentary party has (Art. 4, Serbian Law on Financing of Political Parties 2009). Non-parliamentary parties receive only funding for electoral campaign costs, equivalent to an equal share of 20 percent of the total funds allocated for 1

The ban has not effectively prevented an ethnic Turkish party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) from becoming one of the largest and longest-lasting political actors in the country.

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electoral spending. The remaining 80 percent is distributed among parliamentary parties (Art. 10). In Croatia, the allocation of public money is described in Art. 19 of the Party Law, but it is not entirely clear how much money a party gets for each MP that it has. The functioning of political parties is linked to twenty-four average gross base salaries, but whether this amount is paid annually, or for the term of 4 years, is unclear. In Greece, the rules allow for non-parliamentary parties to receive what is referred to as ‘regular funding’, but in order to be eligible for such funding parties must have had full lists of candidates in at least 70 percent of the country’s electoral regions in the last parliamentary elections and must have secured at least 1.5 percent of the national popular vote (Art. 2, Greek Law on Funding of Political Parties). Bulgaria and Macedonia have the most inclusive regulation on state funding – both countries allow every political party that has received more than 1 percent of the vote in the last parliamentary election to receive a piece of the state funding. In Bulgaria, a party which has attained more than 1 percent of the popular vote is entitled to receive 5 percent of the minimum national wage for each vote that it has received (Art. 27. 1, Bulgarian Party Law). Given that the electoral threshold for parliamentary entry is 4 percent, the state subsidy allows even electorally weaker parties to exist and pursue political goals. In addition, parties are granted state owned premises for rent (Art. 31. 1), they can receive bank loans up to two-thirds of their accounted income of the preceding year (Art. 23. 3), and are entitled to free media use during the 30-day electoral campaign if they participate in elections. In Macedonia, political parties who have received 1 percent or more of popular vote are entitled to state funding, however, the funding is not equal to all parties, as in Bulgaria, but is divided between parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties in the form of 70 and 30 percent (Art. 10, Macedonian Law on Financing Political Parties). The amount of public funding in Bulgaria and Croatia is attached to the minimum salary, while in Macedonia, Greece and Serbia political parties get a share of the total funds allocated for parties’ funding from the state budget – Greece provides 1.02 percent of its state budget for the financing of political parties, while Macedonia and Serbia allocate a mere 0.06 and 0.15 percent, respectively. How does this affect women representation? Looking from the point of view of general (that is not women specific) political parties, it can be argued that stricter establishment rules will have a positive effect on the inclusion of women (since parties will need to broaden their support base in order to get in the game), while stricter financing rules will have an adverse effect (as we can expect that those who are already in the game do not want to further ‘divide the pie’, as well as those who are trying to either get funding for the first time or increase their share of public funding will have incentives to place male contenders which are more likely to win and thus increase the party’s overall funding than female candidates whose victory may be uncertain). On the other hand, some countries have included special clauses in their regulation of state funding for political parties, such as the inclusion of a necessary percentage of female candidates. Special rules are then adopted about the procedure for decreasing the amount of funding in proportion to the difference between the number of nominees from each sex, as Krook (2015) notes to be the case in France. In Serbia and Macedonia, the Electoral Laws stipulate an even stricter requirement stating that in order for political parties to be eligible to compete in elections, and thus for public funding, 25 and 30 percent, respectively, of the submitted electoral lists need to be made of the less represented gender (Art. 40a, Serbian Electoral 2011; Art. 64, Macedonian Electoral Law) The rights of women are most directly stated in the Constitutions of all five states. The most prominent right, that of equality among all persons, regardless of their race, ethnicity, sex, or social origin is established in Art. 6.2 of the Bulgarian Constitution, Art. 3 and 14 in the Constitution of Croatia, Art. 9 in the Constitution of Macedonia, Art 15. in the Serbian Constitution, and Art. 4 of the Constitution of Greece. The family, motherhood and

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children are also constitutionally protected by the State (Art. 14 of the Bulgarian Constitution; Art. 66 of Constitution of Serbia; Art. 21 of the Greek Constitution) and women and men are said to have equal rights and obligations in matrimony and family (Art. 46. 2, of the Bulgarian Constitution; Art. 61 and 62 of the Croatian Constitution; Art. 40-42 in the Constitution of Macedonia; Art. 62 & 65 of the Constitution of Serbia). Furthermore, all states less Bulgaria have adopted a Law on Gender Equality, and despite the fact that the implementation is still often viewed as lacking, legislatively at least, significant progress has been achieved. In Bulgaria, equality and non-discrimination are addressed in various laws, such as the Labour Law, the Family Law, the Law for Protection against Discrimination, however, advisors from the gender equality project admit that despite the existence of legal rules on equal treatment of men and women, the conditions that guarantee such equality are not yet present in every sphere of public life (NSEGE, 12). Whether a country has adopted a gender equality law or not, the question that remains to be answered is whether gender equality exists or is in its way of existence in reality. As we note in some of our previous work, a significant problem in this region is the mentality and the perception that people hold – whether they are a result of historical legacies or slow societal modernization or both. Therefore, it is interesting to examine the extent to which rules alone have the power to change the existent status quo, as well as to further ask what can help beyond the rules. Delving into the historical context and the development of women activism in the region, in the next section we pick up precisely on that question. Southeast European Women in Political and Historical Context All countries in our sample, except Croatia, were at one point part of the Ottoman Empire and, thus, carry the Ottoman legacy of a deeply engrained patriarchic culture. Although the extent of such patriarchy in private life has been questioned (Simic 1999), public life was largely dominated and organized according to patriarchic principles. The traditional socioeconomic organization of communal life in the region was based on extended households, further reinforcing patriarchic values. While the communist experience, accompanied by nationalization of property and collectivization of the land, has undermined these traditional forms of socio-economic organization in most countries in the region, in Greece (where such experience is lacking) a lot of businesses, particularly in the small-town tourist industry, conform to such model even today. Furthermore, machismo – the valorization of overt displays of virility – has been found to be prevalent in Southeastern Europe (Simic 1999), creating a powerful image in the communal psyche that continues to define gender roles and identities. Despite such cultural limitations, women activism in the region emerged in the 19 th century. Initially an elitist movement of educated and upper class women, its activities moved beyond charity and towards advocacy for rights to education and work. Political rights also figured in these early agendas, though, it was not until after World War II that Southeast European countries enfranchised women. Common cultural and historical characteristics notwithstanding, there is significant regional variation in the status of women in the region and in the development trajectories of women activism. Greece has the longest history of women activism, with women playing key role in the independence movement of 1821 and, later, in the revolution of 1974 that put an end to military rule (Poulos 2009). The Greek feminist movement has been traditionally linked to parties of the Left, thus, resembling its Western counterparts. However, despite a wellestablished feminist movement, Greece lagged behind other European countries in its emancipation efforts. Although women were enfranchised in 1952, patriarchic laws such as dowry were legally abolished as late as 1983, while child allowances and parental leave were not introduced until 1986 (Lyberaki 2010). The recent introduction of quotas at the local (2010) and national level (2010) led to an increase of women in parliament and in

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government and indicates a greater awareness of gender inequalities. The largest center-left party, PASOK, has had voluntary quotas, but does not have the highest percentage of women in parliament. The rest of the countries in our sample all experienced communist emancipation policies aimed at integrating women in politics and in the labor force. Gender quotas with a target of 30 percent significantly increased the proportion of women in politics and for the first time women accessed ministerial positions (Forest 2011). Yet, women’s engagement was limited to lower and local level positions and women hardly figured in supreme party bodies. Moreover, socialist emancipation policies were viewed as ‘state feminism or feminism from above’ (Gaber 2005) and came to be detested for their forced character and ulterior motives of achieving economic and demographic targets (Harvey 2002: 30). Yugoslav women were particularly pro-active in their criticism. Having greater access to the West, Yugoslav feminists were heavily influenced by radical Western feminism in the 1970s and started organizing independent feminist organizations that transcended ethnic and national differences and challenged official communist ideology. Such unity notwithstanding, it was Croatian, Slovene, and Serbian female intellectuals that were most active, while Macedonian women remained passive by comparison. In fact, Macedonia had the lowest percentages of parliamentary representation of women during communism, despite reserved seats. In Bulgaria, by contrast, the communist women’s movement was hostile to Western feminist ideas and focused on cooperation with development countries and on broader social issues, priding itself in offering an alternative forum for women’s issues (Ghodsee 2012). With the collapse of communism and the abolition of quotas, women’s political engagement sharply declined. The transition context proved unfavorable to women’s issues, as they were pushed aside by more immediate concerns at the time, namely, political instability and economic hardships. While women took active part in dissident organizations and new political formations, they rarely occupied leadership positions in the early years of the transition, leading to what one scholar terms ‘machocracy’ in politics (Ristova 2003).2 Former Yugoslav countries faced an additional, and by far the biggest, challenge. Rising nationalism in the late 1980’s split the Yugoslav feminist movement (Zarkov 2003). Ethnic conflict and war ‘did not provide much room for deliberations on questions of gender equality or the political representation of women’ (Gaber 2005:24) and further reinforced and polarized traditional gender roles with dichotomous rhetoric of the man-warrior and the woman-mother. What was left of the former feminist movement was absorbed into the antiwar movement, while women’s organizations became focused on social issues and providing assistance to rape victims. The 2000s brought an improvement in women’s status, largely due to external influence and international involvement. As Bulgaria became official EU candidate state, it transposed EU legislation, including gender equality clauses in various laws. External funding for the third sector further helped women NGO’s to organize. Similarly, in former Yugoslavia international involvement and funding empowered women NGOs and helped raise awareness of gender issues. Women’s organizations were key in reinstituting gender quotas in former Yugoslav countries. Croatia was the first to introduce voluntary party quotas. In 1996, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) adopted a 40 percent quota and, during its rule between 2000-2003, a number of gender-related laws. In 2008, Croatia adopted national quotas of 40% that are to be achieved within three election cycles. While there are no women’s caucuses, the SDP has an active women’s wing and in 2004, the Women’s Democratic Party (WDP) was formed. Though, the WDP declares it ‘is not feminist-based organization and has no support from the

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Machocracy here refers to the dominance of traditional gender roles in society, including in the economy and politics, where women are in a profoundly disadvantaged position compared to men. 6

Croatian feminist movement.’ Since the adoption of quotas, Croatia has witnessed a steady increase in women’s representation in parliament and government. Serbia instituted legislative candidate quotas for the local and national level in 2002 and 2004 respectively, and the Social Democratic Party adopted voluntary quotas of 40% even earlier. Consequently, the percentage of women in parliament has been steadily growing, reaching 33.6 percent in the current parliament and ranking 24th in the world. A women’s parliamentary club was established in 2013 that deals with gender related issues and legislature. There is a history of women’s political organization, including the Women’s Party (ZEST) formed after the first multi-party elections in 1990 and the Women’s Political Network formed in 2000. Macedonia has also witnessed a steady increase in the parliamentary representation of women, due to the adoption of quotas. In 2006, legislative candidate quotas were adopted at the national and local level. Before legislative quotas, party quotas were instituted by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party. A women’s parliamentary club was established in 2003 that deals with gender issues and legislative changes in various policy areas. Prior to that, in 1995, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy created a Unit for the Promotion of Gender Equality. Bulgaria is the only country from our sample without legislative quotas. In 2008, the Bulgarian Socialist Party adopted a 40% quota for the party leadership bodies, but such quota is not in effect for candidate lists. There are no women caucuses, albeit there was a failed attempt to organize a women parliamentary group. The short-lived Party of Bulgarian Women participated in elections from 1997 to 2005 and was even part of the 2001-2005 governing coalition, but since then has been unable to collect the necessary signatures for registration. Its platform explicitly states that it is a non-feminist organization that promotes family values. On the other hand, several of the major parties have women’s organizations and women’s representation in parliament and in government has been increasing, reaching over 33% of ministerial positions. Table 1. Gender Quotas Country Legislated Quotas Voluntary Quotas Bulgaria None BSP – 40% (2008)** Croatia 40% (2008)* national SDP – 40% (1996) Greece 1/3 (2012) national PASOK – 40% 1/3 (2010) local Macedonia 1/3 (2006) national SDSM 30% (2002) 1/3 (2006) local Serbia 1/3 (2004) national SDP 30% (2000) 1/3 (2002) local Sources: Antic and (2013) and www.quotaproject.com Notes: * 40% to be achieved within the third election after the adoption of the law. ** For party leadership bodies. Empirical Evidence As argued above, there have been attempts to influence the gender balance in all five countries – gender quotas have been introduced in four of the five countries, constitutional texts address the equality between men and women, as do Party Laws and other transformed or newly adopted legislation. Moreover, all countries have a history of women activism. Yet, as we have seen neither the regulatory framework, nor the cultural and historical legacies are uniform or have led to similar outcomes. Having examined such factors, we now turn to the descriptive representation of women in parliament in the five

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countries from the 1990s onwards3, examining trends across countries, across time and across parties within each state. Overall, women representation is increasing in all five states, albeit at a different level and with different speed. While the share of women in parliament was in the single digits in the early 1990s, currently women represent between 20 percent (Bulgaria) and 33.6 percent (Serbia) in the countries examined here. The highest percentage in the sample (35) is in the 2011 Macedonian parliament. Greece has experienced a more gradual increase in the percent of women, reaching 20 percent only after the introduction of gender quotas. In the rest of the countries there has been stark contrast between the 1990s and the 2000s, with a sharp increase in women representation in parliament in the 2000s. In Macedonia and Serbia the effect of quotas is extremely visible with the percentage of women almost doubling in both cases. In Croatia, we notice the effect of SDP’s voluntary quotas that resulted in an increase in the share of women in the party, but also an overall increase of the number of women in parliament. Similarly, in Bulgaria, the NDSV set a precedent in 2001 that has become the norm, with women representation maintaining values over 20 percent ever since. Our findings clearly show that quotas are the most effective instrument for increasing women representation in parliament. At the same time, we find that top-down approaches, such as legislated quotas, have their limits. For example, although Macedonia has had the highest percentage of women in parliament, women in government have ranged between 0 - 15.6 percent. Similarly in Greece, the growing percentage of women in parliament has not been coupled with a similar growth of the percent of women in government. This indicates that despite formal rules, cultural values persist and continue to define women representation, particularly in areas not regulated by the law. Furthermore, we have witnessed an increase of women representation in the absence of legislated quotas, as is the case in Croatia and Bulgaria. The former represents a rather interesting case as it has reached the highest percent of women in government – 35.3 percent in previous government and 33.3 percent in the current government – far beyond the figures in the rest of the countries. The Croatian and Bulgarian cases lead us to think that cultural norms and values can be countered in a soft way, an argument also forwarded by Krook (2015). Across parties In addition to looking at trends across time and across countries, we examine women representation across parties in an attempt to find additional regional specificities. In Bulgaria, the party which has staged the highest number of women historically is the center-right National Movement Simeon II (NDSV)4 with 40.5 percent female deputies in 2001. The party maintained its high inclusion of female representatives during its subsequent participation in parliament. The likely reason for the high percentage of women in the NDSV is the participation of the Bulgarian Party of Women as NDSV’s partner in the 2001 election. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) maintained the highest percentage of women in the early 1990s, even when in opposition, but was surpassed by parties from the center-Right in the late 1990s and the 2000s.5 This is due on the one hand to an increase in the number of women in the parties from the Right, and, on the other, to a decrease in women representation in BSP, particularly in the current parliament. The centrist ethnic Turkish party, Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), has an overall lower percentage of 3

The examined period for Serbia begins with the 2003 election due to the fact that the country was part of the breaking and war-torn Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. Data for Greece starts in 1990, though we plan to extend it back to 1974 – the first democratic elections following the end of military rule. 4 Now renamed to National Movement for Stability and Progress, but retaining its original initials in Bulgarian (NDSV). 5 For a discussion on the distinct meaning of Left and Right in post-communist states, see Rashkova and Zankina 2012.

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women than most other parties in parliament (not surprising for an ethnic party), with the exception of 1991, when the high percentage is a function of the low number of MPs from the MRF. The nationalist, ATAKA, on the other hand, has unexpectedly high percentage of women, again a function of the low number of MPs. The overall trend which we observe in Bulgaria is that the incumbent party has the highest percentage of women – a function of the ruling party having the most seats and the lower ranking of women in candidate lists. -- Table 2 about here -In contrast to Bulgaria, in Croatia it is the Social Democratic Party (SDP) staging the most women. This is also the party that has adopted voluntary quotas of 40%. The Center-Right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the longest ruling party in Croatia, comes nowhere near SDP’s figures, though it was the HDZ that appointed the first female prime minister in 2009. Hence, we see an interesting case -- a new democracy that rather conforms to the Western model of Left parties representing the most women, yet it is Right parties that appoint women to the highest ranking positions, as we have argued elsewhere (Rashkova and Zankina 2014). Given the historically highly fragmented Croatian parliament, we often find parties with unusually high percent of women (50 or 100 percent), those being parties with one or two MPs. -- Table 3 about here -In Greece, Syriza (earlier Synaspismos) has historically the highest percentage of women. Furthermore, the current Syriza-dominated parliament has the highest share of female ministers ever – 23 percent, but there are no female ministers in the current government. In the 2000s, however, the Greek Communist Party is where we see most female deputies. With the exception of the 1993 and the second 2012 parliament when small conservative parties had the highest share of women, in Greece the parties with highest percentage of women are always Left parties. Yet, PASOK, the historically largest center-Left party demonstrates unexpectedly low percentage of women, particularly in the previous two parliaments and a more than one left government has had no female ministers. The data shows that on the one hand Greece conforms to the norm found in Western democracies of having the highest female representation in the parties from the Left, and on the other, that patriarchic culture persists, effectively preventing women for accessing the highest echelons of power. -- Table 4 about here -Macedonia shows a puzzling pattern of women representation across parties. The Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) has had historically high share of women, often the highest, regardless of whether it was in power or in opposition – to be expected given the fact the SDSM has voluntary party quotas of 30 percent. The longest ruling party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO-DPMNE), in turn, has reached the record high of 42.3 percent in 2008. Following the introduction of quotas in 2006, the percent of women has sharply increased across parties, including ethnic Albanian parties, with one such party having the highest percentage of women (40) in 2011. Given the high number of parties in the Macedonian parliament, we often find parties with one or two MPs who may have 50 or 100 percent women – a function of the low number of MPs. One possible explanation for such pattern may be the specific mix of factors – a large ethnic

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minority6 with guaranteed electoral support and parliamentary representation7 which reduces the cost of nominating female candidates, and gender quotas that oblige Left, Right and ethnic parties to nominate women, but do not oblige ruling parties to appoint female ministers. -- Table 5 about here – Despite the shorter timeframe for the Serbian data, the electoral results from the 2000s offer valuable insight. In Serbia, it is again center and center-Right parties which have historically staged the largest percent of women. An exception is the current parliament, where the Left-wing Democratic Party holds the largest percent of women. Here (and in the Bulgarian case) we clearly notice the difference between new and old democracies, with new democracies deviating from the norm of Left female representation. As we have argued elsewhere (Rashkova and Zankina, 2014), in the post-communist realm, it is now the newer, pro-West parties that have more women. The explanation for the high percent of female legislators in Serbia however, is linked to the country’s existing legislated gender quota. Following the adoption of quotas in 2004, the percent of female MPs almost doubled for almost all political parties, currently ranging between 20 to over 40 percent. --Table 6 about here –

Conclusion Our examination of women representation of five Southeast European states leads to several conclusions. Quotas prove to be the most effective way to combat historically low levels of women representation. At the same time, quotas have limited influence beyond women representation in parliament and in countering cultural norms and gender stereotypes, as is particularly evident in the Greek and Macedonian cases. More importantly, women representation can be influenced even in the absence of quotas, as demonstrated by the Bulgarian and the Croatian case where it was specific parties that championed the staging of women both in parliament and government, setting a trend later to be followed by other parties. Party regulation demonstrates some limited effect on women representation. As argued, high barriers to entry in the political game, may lead mainstream parties to reach out to broader constituencies and include a greater share of women. This may be the case in Macedonia and Serbia which have the most restrictive rules for party formation and the highest levels of women representation in parliament. At the same time, our data does not allow us to differentiate between the effects of quotas and party regulation in those two cases. Therefore, it is possible the high share of women is linked primarily to legislated quotas. Party finance, in turn, has no observable effect on women representation. Bulgaria and Macedonia which have the most generous funding for small parties show different trends. In Macedonia, we see extreme fragmentation of parliament, reaching up to 13 parties, but no women’s parties. In Bulgaria, by contrast, the largest number of parties is 8

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Ethnic Albanians constitute 25.2% of the population in Macedonian, far exceeding any minority in the other countries of our sample. 7 According to the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, certain constitutional amendments ‘cannot be approved without a qualified majority of two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.’ Text available at: http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid%20Framework%20Agreement.pdf 10

and aside from the short-lived success of the Bulgarian Party of Women, there have been no women’s parties benefitting from public funding. Furthermore, we observe an important regional phenomenon, namely that Center and Right parties often include more women than Left parties, as is the case in the West, and this is particularly true in new democracies. Moreover, as examined elsewhere (Rashkova and Zankina 2014), Center and Right parties tend to appoint women to higher ranking positions. Our results show mixed patterns and a variety of factors that account for the level and variation in women representation in the region. The effect of quotas is clearly visible, yet, given the relatively recent adoption of quotas in the region, it would be interesting to observe whether quotas can lead to spillover effects and increase in the share of women in governments in the future. Furthermore, expanding the sample to more countries in the region will allow us to better differentiate the effects of quotas from other factors, such as party regulation and historical legacies. References: Anderson, Leah. 2006. “European Union Gender Regulations in the East: The Czech and Polish Accession Process”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 20 (1): 101-125. Antic, Milica G. and Sonja Lokar. 2013. “The Balkans: From Total Rejection to Gradual Acceptance of Gender Quotas”, in Drude Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quota, and Politics, Routledge, pp. 138-15? Buchanan, Donna A. 2002. “Soccer, Popular Music and National Consciousness in PostState-Socialist Buglaria, 1994-1996”, British Journal of Ethnomusicology, Vol. 1 (2): 1-27. Caul, Miki. 2001. “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross– National Analysis”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 63 (4): 1214-1229. Celis, Karen. 2006. “Substantive Representation of Women: The Representation of Women’s Interests and the Impact of Descriptive Representation in the Belgian Parliament (1900-1979)”, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, Vol. 28 (2): 85-114. Childs, Sarah and Mona Lena Krook. 2006. “Should Feminists Give Up on the Critical Mass? A Contingent Yes”, Politics & Gender, Vol. 2 (4): 522-530. Emmert, Thomas. 1999. “Zenksi Pokret: The Feminist Movement in Serbia in the 1920s” in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.). Gender and Politics in the Western Balkans: Women and Society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Successor States, University Park, Penssylvania State University Press, pp. 33-50. Gaber, Milica Antić. 2005. “Overview of Quota Systems in the Region of Central and Eastern Europe”. In Julie Ballington and Francesca Binda (ed), The Implementation of Quotas: European Experiences, Quota Report Series, pp. 24Ghodsee, Kristen. 2012. “Rethinking State Socialist Mass Women's Organizations: The Committee of the Bulgarian Women's Movement and the United Nations Decade for Women, 1975-1985.” Journal of Women's History, Vol. 24 (4): 49-73.

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Harvey, Jessica. 2002. “Re-theorizing Emancipation: Remembering ‘Gender Equality’ in Eastern European Womanist Thought.” Anthropology of East Europe Review, 20 (1): 27-39. International Parliamentary Union. 2015. “Slugish Progress on Women in Politics Will Hamper Development”, Press Release, March 2015. Available here: http://www.ipu.org/press-e/pressrelease201503101.htm. International Parliamentary Union(a). 2015. Women in National Parliaments. Available here: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm. Kayuni, Happy and Ragnhild Muriaas. 2014. “Alternatives to Gender Quotas: Electoral Financing of Women Candidates in Malawi”, Representation, 50 (3): 393-404. Kostadinova, Tatiana. 2003. “Women’s Legislative representation in Post-Communist Bulgaria” in Richard E. Matland and Kathleen A. Montgomery (eds). Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe. New York: Oxford University Press: 304320. Krook, Mona Lena. 2006. “Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide”, Politics & Gender, Vol. 2: 303-327. Krook , Mona Lena. 2015. “Gender and Elections: Temporary Special Measures Beyond Quotas”, CPPF Working Papers on Women and Politics, No. 4. Krook, Mona Lena and Par Zetterberg. 2014. “Introduction: Gender Quotas and Women’s Representation – New Directions in Research”, Representation, 50 (3): 287-294. Lyberaki, Antigone. 2010. “The Record of Gender Policies in Greece 1980-2010: Legal Reform and Economic Substance”, GreeSe Paper No. 36, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, LSE. McAllister, Ian and Donley Studlar. 2002. “Electoral Systems and Women’s Representation: A Long Term Perspective,” Representation, Vol. 1: 3-14. Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. 2012. Legal Framework for Gender Equality. Available at: http://www.mlsp.government.bg/equal/pravna.asp (in Bulgarian; last accessed 19.03.2012). Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. National Strategy for the Encouragement of Gender Equality for the Period 2009-2015. Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Sofia. Available at: http://www.mlsp.government.bg/equal/normativ.asp (in Bulgarian; last accessed 19.03.2012) Norris, Pippa. 1993. “Conclusions: Comparing legislative recruitment”, in Lovenduski, J. and P. Norris (eds.) Gender and Party Politics, London: Sage. Phillips, A. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Poulos, Margaret. 2009. Arms and the Woman: Just Warriors and Greek Feminist Identity, New York: Columbia University Press. Rashkova, Ekaterina. 2010. “Political Learning and the Number of Parties: Why Age Matters”, PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Rashkova, Ekaterina and Emilia Zankina. 2013. “Does Parity Exist in the 'Macho' World? Party Regulation and Gender Representation in the Balkans.” Representation, 49 (4), 425438. Rashkova, Ekaterina and Emilia Zankina. 2014. “When Less: More: Influential Women of the Right – the Case of Bulgaria”. in Sarah Childs and Karen Celis (eds.), Gender, Conservatism and Political Representation, ECPR Press, pp. 103-120. Ristova, Karolina. 2003. “Establishing a Machocracy: Women and Elections in Macedonia (1990–8).” In in R. E. Matland and K. A. Montgomery (eds), Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 196-216. Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2009. “Post-accession Compliance with EU Gender Equality Legislation in Post-Communist New Member-states”, European Integration Online Papers, Special Issue 2, Vol. 13, Art. 1. Simic, Andrei. 1969. “Management of the Male Image in Yugolsavia”, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 42 (2), (Apr., 1969): 89-101 Simic, Andrei. 1999. “Machismo and Cryptomatriarchy: Power, Affect and Authority in the Traditional Yugoslav Family” in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.). Gender and Politics in the Western Balkans: Women and Society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Successor States, University Park, Penssylvania State University Press, pp. 11-30. Schmidt, Gregory and Kyle Saunders. 2004. “Effective Quotas, Relative Party Magnitude, and the Success of Female Candidates: Peruvian Municipal Elections in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37 (6): 704-734. Spierings, Niels and Andrej Zaslove. 2015. “Gendering the Vote for Populist Radical-Right Parties”, Patters of Prejudice, 49 (1-2): 135-162. United Nations. 2005. Gender Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World, United Nations Research Institution for Social Research. Wangnerud, Lena. 2009. “Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation”, Annual Review Political Science, Vol. 12: 51-69. Walker, Alice. 1983. In Search of Our Mother’s Garden: Womanist Prose. San Diego: Harcourt. Zarkov, Dubravka. 2003. “Feminism and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia: On the Politics of Gender and Ethnicity”, Law, Culture and Society, 24 (3): 59-68. Zetterberg, Par. 2009. “Do Gender Quotas Foster Women’s Political Engagement? Lessons from Latin America”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 62 (4): 715-730. 13

Table 2. Women Representation in Bulgarian Politics, 1991-2015. Political Party BSP/Coalition BBB PU/BZNS+ Euroleft NDSV BNS/BZNS+ UDF DSB RZS MRF ATAKA GERB ABV PF BBTs Parliament (total) Government

Orientation Center-Left Right Center/Agrarian Center-Left Center/Center-Right Center/Agrarian Center-Right Right Right Center/Ethnic Far Right Center-Right Center-Left Far Right Right

1990 11.4 -6.3 ---6.2 --0.0 ------

1991 19.8 -----8.2 --12.5 ------

1994 16.8 7.7 5.6 ---8.7 --0.0 ------

1997 12.1 0.0 12.5 13.3 --14.5 --6.3 ------

2001 10.4 ---40.5 -17.6 --5.0 ------

2005 18.3 ---37.7 7.7 20.0 23.5 -8.8 24.3 -----

2009 17.5 ------

8.5 *

13.8

12.1

12.1

26.7

20.8

20.4

6.7

5.6

17.6

11.8

16.7

23.5

13.3 20.0 7.9 14.3 27.6 ----

2013 22.6 ------

2014 12.8 ------

--13.8 21.7 33.0 ----

4.3 -10.5 27.3 35.7 9.1 10.5 13.3

25.4 35.3

20.0 33.3

Sources: Kostadinova (2003) and own calculations based on the official Bulgarian parliament website (www.parliament.bg) Notes: *Appointed, not elected government. ABV = Alternative for Bulgarian Development; BBB = Bulgarian Business Block; BBTs = Bulgarian Without Censorship; Blue Coalition = SDS + DSB; BNS = Bulgarian People’s Union; BZNS = Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union; DSB = Democrats for Strong Bulgaria; GERB = Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria; PF = Patriotic Front; PU = People’s Union; RZS = Law, Justice and Order; UDF = United Democratic Forces (SDS+).

Table 3. Women Representation in the Croatian Parliament, 1992-present. Political Party Orientation 1990 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Center-Right Croatian Christian-Democratic Union (HKDU) Right Croatian Bloc (HB) Right Croatian Independent Democrats Center-Right Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) Center-Left Croatian People’s Party-LD (HNS) Center Party of Liberal Democrats-LD Center Croatian Labourists-LP Left Liberal Party (LS) Center-Left Democratic Alliance of Sl. and B. (HDSSB) Right/Regionalist Slavonija Baranja Croatian Party (SBHS) Istrian Democratic Assembly (ISD) Center-Left/Reg Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU) Single-Issue Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) Center-Left/Ethnic Serb People’s Party (SNS) Croatian Civic Party Right Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) Center-Right Croatian Party of Rights (HSP-AS) Right Bosnian Democratic Party of Croatia (BDPC) Ethnic Democratic Center Center-Right People’s Party-Reformists Center New Wave-Development Party -Croatian Sustainable Development Center-Left Croatian Social Democrats Center-Left Democratic Action for Croatia Center-Right

1992 3.5 ---15.4 16.7 -----0.0 --0.0 -0.0 0.0 --------

1995 8.0 --0.0 30.0 ------0.0 --0.0 -0.0 0.0 ------0.0

2000 18.2 0.0 20.0 0.0 36.4 50.0 10.0 -0.0 -0.0 25.0 --0.0 -18.7 0.0 -33.3 ------

2003 19.0

2007 23.1

2011 14.6

--43.3 18.2 ---0.0 -25.0 0.0 0.0 --11.1 14.3 -100 ----0.0

--35.8 40.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 --16.7 0.0 -----0.0 0.0

--33.9 18.2 -33.3 -0.0 -0.0 50 0.0 -50 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 66.6 0.0 100 ---

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Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) Center 0.0 8.3 21.4 33.3 --Democratic Alliance of Međimurje (MDS) Right/Regional ---0.0 --Alliance of Primorje Gorski Kotar (PGS) Center/Regional 0.0 -0.0 0.0 --Croatian True Revival (HIP) Right --0.0 Independents -0.0 0.0 33.3 10.0 22.2 23.1 Parliament (total) 4.3 7.8 22.5 21.0 25.5 25.2 Government 0.0 4.0/8.8 20.8 12.5 25.0 22.2/23.8 23.8 Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on the Croatian Parliament official website (www.sabor.hr). Notes: Figures for 1992-2001 are for the lower chamber. Starting with the 2003 election, the parliament is unicameral. Bolded figures are for the highest percentages seen among mainstream parties and parties who have at least 5 MPs. Data not available for the first parliament 1990-1992.

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Table 4. Women Representation in the Greek Parliament, 1990-2012. Political Party Orientation 1990 1993 1996 2000 2004 2007 2009 2012a 2012b 2015 New Democracy Center-right 3.4 4.5 4.7 8.0 9.1 11.3 11.0 11.1 14.0 11.8 PASOK Center-Left 5.6 5.8 4.3 10.8 15.4 20.6 21.3 9.6 9.1 15.4 Far Left 0.0 -30.0 33.3 Synaspismos / SYRIZA 16.7 14.3 15.4 32.7 31 26.8 Alternative Ecologists Left 100* ---------Democratic Renewal Center-Right 0.0 ---------Political Spring Right -20.0 --------Communist Party Left -12.5 18.2 18.2 25.0 31.8 23.8 26.9 33.3 20.0 DIKKI Left --11.1 -------LAOS Right -----10.0 6.7 ---Golden Dawn Far Right -------4.8 5.6 11.8 Democratic Left Center-Left -------31.6 29.4 -Independent Greeks Right -------27.3 35.0 23.1 Potami Center ---------23.5 Parliament (total) 4.7 6.0 6.0 10.3 12.4 16.1 17.3 18.7 20.0 23.0 Government 0.0 0.0 15.0/11.1 21.1/5.3 11.8 8.3 0.0 Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on the official Greek parliament website (www.hellenicparliament.gr) Notes: *one seat. The abbreviations of the parties above stand for: Communist Party = Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas; Democratic Left = DIMAR; Democratic Renewal = DIANA; DIKKI = Democratic Social Movement; Independent Greeks = Anel; LAOS = Popular Orthodox Rally; PASOK = Panhellenic Socialist Movement; Political Spring = Politiki Anixi; Potami = the River; Synaspismos =Coalition of the Left and Progress; SYRIZA = The Coalition of the Radical Left. No data for the 1990-1996 governments.

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Table 5. Women Representation in the Macedonian Parliament, 1991-present. Political Party Orientation VMRO-DPNE Center-Right/Right VMPO-PP Right VMRO-RMRO Right VMRO-Macedonian Right SDSM Center-Left NSDP Center-Left SPM Left DUI Ethnic Albanian DPA Far Right/Albanian NDP Right/Albanian NDParty Albanian PDP Albanian People’s Democratic Party Albanian GROM Center-Left PEF Center/Agrarian DOM Center-Left/Green New Democracy Union of Reform Forces Center Union of Reform Forces -YDPP Center Liberal Democratic Party Center Liberal Party Center Democratic Center Center-Left Democratic Party Center-Left Roma Union Ethnic PCERM Ethnic Democratic Party of Turks Ethnic

1991 8.1 ---3.3 -0.0 ---0.0 0.0 0.0 ----9.1 0.0 ---0.0 -0.0 --

1994 1998 -15.2 ---0.0 -0.0 4.8 7.4 --0.0 0.0 --0.0 -----0.0 0.0 -0.0 -------25.0 ----3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 --0.0 0.0 -0.0 --

2002 9.1 ---27.1 -0.0 6.3 0.0 -0.0 0.0 ---------------

2006 2008 2011 2014 28.9 42.3 35.7 34.4 33.3 -----------37.5 29.6 31.0 35.3 28.6 -------23.5 16.7 40.0 31.2 27.3 27.3 25.0 14.3 --50.0 100 ---------------0.0 0.0 0.0 --100 --------------------------------------------

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Party of Yugoslavs 0.0 -------Independents 0.0 0.0 0.0 -----Parliament (total) 4.2 3.4 7.6 16.8 31.1 34.2 35.0 33.3 Government 0.0/9.5 10.0 12.9 11.1/15.8 14.3 9.1 12.5 8.3 Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on the Macedonian Parliament official website (www.sobranie.mk). Notes: DPA = Democratic Party of Albanians; NDP = National Democratic Revival; GROM = Citizen Option for Macedonia; PEF = Party for European Future; NSDP = New Social Democratic Party; DOM= Democratic Renewal for Macedonia; PCERM = Party for the Full Emancipation of the Roma; PDP = Party for Democratic Prosperity; NDParty = National Democratic Party; SDSM = Social Democratic Union of Macedonia; DUI = Democratic Union for Integration; SPM = Socialist Party of Macedonia; VMRO-DPNE = Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity; VMROPP = Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization- People’s Party; VMRO-RMRO = Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Real Macedonian Reform Option; YDPP= Young Democratic Progressive Party.

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Table 6. Women Representation in the Serbian Parliament, 2003-2012. Political Party Orientation 2003 2007 2008 2012 2014 For a European Serbia* Left --29.4 --G17 Plus Center-Right 29.4 36.8 * --Democratic Party Left/Center-Left 16.2 26.6 * 31.0 43.7 Boris Tadic Coalition Left ----27.3 Socialist Party of Serbia Left 9.1 25.0 10.0 36.0 36.0 Party of United Pensioners Left ----41.7 Social-Democratic Party Center-Left ----30.0 Serbian Renewal Movement Center-Right --33.3 9.1 37.5’ New Serbia Center-Right --33.3 United Serbia Center-Right ----28.6 Serbian Radical Party Far Right 11.1 21 21.8 --Serbian Progressive Party Center-Right ----33.8 Liberal Democratic Party Center -26.7^ 30.1 30.8 -Democratic Party of Serbia Center-Right/Right 13.2 23.4 20.0 28.6 -Hungarian coalition Center-Right/Regional/Ethnic --25.0 20.0 33.3 League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina Center-Left/Regional ----33.3 Party for Democratic Action Ethnic/Regional ----20.0 Parliament (total) 14.4 24.4 24.4 32.8 33.6 Government 15.8 17.4 12.5 21.7 21.1 Sources: Authors calculations based on the Serbian’s Parliament official website (www.parliament.gov.rs). Notes: SRS = Serbian Radical Party; DSS = Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS; SLS); Socialist Party of Serbia = SPS; G17 Plus = (G17; SDP); Democratic Party = (DS; BDSS; GSS; SDU; D; SLPS); SPO-NS = (Serbian Renewal Party; New Serbia); ^in coalition with GSS-SDU-LSDV; *For a European Serbia = (DS; G17+; SPO; LSV; SPS); ’ New Serbia; Serbian Progressive Party = SNS.

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