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Lighting the Powder Trail Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0008 Item type: chapter

In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the asbestos industry should have declined so swiftly. It was the 1960s — especially the mid-1960s — when the tide turned. The first force for change was economic. Turner & Newall's profits hit a peak in the mid-1960s and then dipped as technology and the company's manufacturing profile changed. The other catalyst for change was the rising trend of suspensions and deaths. After 1931 it had been hoped that the suspension rate would fall as less dusty conditions made asbestosis a disease of the past. For a while — in the 1930s and early 1940s — it had seemed as if this might happen: then in the 1950s and early 1960s, the number of new cases of asbestosis in the UK began rising.

The Asbestos ‘Bomb’ Explodes Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0009 Item type: chapter

The 1969 Regulations had for the first time set a quantitative limit for asbestos dust, yet neither the asbestos industry nor the government felt able to implement or enforce such a threshold immediately. The Factory Inspectorate stepped up its surveillance of asbestos factories and planned a new dust survey of the industry, but the demand for sampling was overwhelming. In industry itself, most of the asbestos textile factories in 1970 were operating over the 2-fibre limit and full compliance would clearly take some time. The situation was dire in Turner & Newall's Page 1 of 5

overseas plants. In 1973, an inspection of the company's Canadian plant showed dangerous and dusty conditions. Of the 166 men exposed to asbestos for fifteen years or more, 91 current employees had asbestosis. The Canadian situation was mirrored in Turner & Newall's extensive African mining and manufacturing interests.

Turner & Newall on Trial Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0010 Item type: chapter

In the early 1980s, the number of writs served on Turner & Newall began to mushroom. At least 700 claims files survive in the company archive for the post-1982 period, each one usually filled with solicitors' letters, writs, depositions, doctors' examinations, life histories, post-mortem reports, and inquest proceedings. What the documents demonstrate beyond any doubt are the poor working conditions between the 1940s and 1970s — especially in the lagging trades, but also in the factories — and the company's failure to enforce basic safety rules. By the 1990s, asbestosrelated disease claims — once paid ex gratia from loose change at head office — were racking up millions in compensation and legal costs.

An Acceptable Level of Death Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0011 Item type: chapter

The asbestos experience demonstrates starkly the political and social problems involved in any revamping of health and safety laws, compensation payments, and medical surveillance. Occupational diseases are deeply social and political. Industry inevitably influences both politicians and the formulation of industrial laws. The events surrounding the introduction of the Asbestos Regulations in 1969 should banish any naïve ideas that government and industry will logically follow the healthiest and safest option. Even if they did, decisions still have to be sold to the electorate, which traditionally abhors higher taxes, more expensive products, and lost jobs. Put simply, nothing will change Page 2 of 5

until society at large agrees to forsake the technologies and social organization that have led to the present health situation with asbestos. What is needed is a completely new mentality regarding occupational health in all sectors of society, from management down to the shop floor, and a recognition that the subject is vitally important.

A Physical Paradox Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0001 Item type: chapter

This chapter begins with a discussion of the growth of Turner Brothers's asbestos business. The company, which began as a five-hand operation in 1880 eventually became ‘Asbestos Giant’ Turner & Newall. The chapter also details the rising cases of asbestos poisoning and government regulation of the asbestos industry.

Dust Control and Mortality: 1931 to the 1940s Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0002 Item type: chapter

Dust was an accepted fact of life in many industries, besides asbestos. Late 19th-century bosses and their workers had no reason to believe that asbestos was any more dangerous than many other industrial killers. However, one thing is certain: dust control was crucial. If dust could be abolished then much of the medical and compensation legislation of 1931 would become redundant. It was to be ironic, then, that much of the government's activity should be directed at the medical monitoring of workers rather than the basic cause of the problem.

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Countervailing Forces Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0007 Item type: chapter

This chapter sheds more light on the central question of this book: why it took so many decades for the full implications of the asbestos health problem to be realized and acted upon. Data disseminated in the annual reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories showed that the Factory Inspectorate did provide important insights into the dangers of asbestos for those who cared to look. However, the culture of the Factory Inspectorate militated against dealing effectively with severe industrial hazards. Matters of health and safety involved a dialogue between the Inspectors and the bosses — a dialogue from which the workers were invariably excluded. Unions were largely ineffective in modifying the provisions of the 1931 legislation and gave health and safety a low priority. Evidence from Turner & Newall also highlights the difficulty trade unions faced in opposing a powerful commercial organization.

Medical Provision, Diagnosis, and Prescription Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0003 Item type: chapter

For most workers who joined or were employed in the asbestos industry, there was no indication that they were working with a hazardous material. However, for the minority employed in the ‘scheduled areas’ — in other words, workers engaged in jobs such as crushing, carding, spinning, and mattress-making — the situation was different. They came within the Medical Arrangements Scheme of 1931. They were handed a small booklet, a ‘Worker's Register’, which explained the basics of the medical and compensation scheme and gave them space to enter their job and medical examination details. The text contained no warnings about asbestosis or descriptions of the symptoms of the disease, though it did explain that workers would have to present themselves regularly before a Medical Board. This chapter examines how the Medical Board system operated in practice, drawing on internal documentation from Turner & Newall. Page 4 of 5

Compensation for Asbestos Workers Geoffrey Tweedale

in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard Published in print: 2001 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199243990 eISBN: 9780191697326 acprof:oso/9780199243990.003.0004 Item type: chapter

The Asbestos Scheme was introduced in 1931. Like the dust and medical regulations, the legislation applied only to ‘scheduled areas’, in other words, the main preparatory and textile processes; the making of insulation slabs and mattresses; the dry sawing and grinding of asbestos articles; and the cleaning of machinery. Workers such as laggers could theoretically claim compensation, but only if they could prove to the Medical Board that they were unfit — a difficult task when the medical scheme excluded them from periodic examination. Despite the limited nature of the Scheme, the official recognition of asbestos manufacture as a ‘dangerous trade’ was very worrying for the Turner & Newall directors. As regards to compensation, Turner & Newall set up its own Asbestosis Fund and made compensation ‘a purely internal question’ for the board.

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