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Structure I. Comparing types, roles and powers of legislatures II Legislative representation and electoral systems II.
Legislative representation
1. 2. 3. 4.
DPI-415
Public knowledge about candidates Contact with elected members Election of women Representation of minorities
III. Conclusions & implications
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Readings
Legislative capacity building You are asked to advise the parliament in the Netherlands how to make members more responsive to constituents. You are asked to advise the parliament in Iraq how to strengthen members oversight of budgetary decisionmaking and procurement. You are asked by the Egyptian parliament how best to increase the proportion of women in elected office. What would you advise?
Caramani ch 7 Legislatures (Kreppel) Newton and Van Deth Ch 6 Multilevel governance Further Resources: Inter-parliamentary Union www.ipu.org
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Types of legislatures Assembly, parliament, or congress Local, regional, national or supranational Separation of executive-legislature executive legislature powers (presidential executives) or fused powers (parliamentary democracies)
Roles (Kreppel) Which roles are most important? How do they function? – Legislature as agent • • • •
Linkage Representation Debating Legitimating
– Legislature as principal • Control • Oversight
– Legislature as lawmaker • Policy -making • Policy-influencing
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Legislative powers
Powers Ref Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig 2009. The Handbook of National Legislatures CUP Parliamentary Power index • • • •
The legislature’s influence over the executive Institutional autonomy Specific powers Institutional capacity
Experts, constitution and media accounts
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Legislative Powers
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Electoral Systems
II: Legislative roles & electoral systems
Nation States 191
Ref: Norris Electoral Engineering: CUP 2003 Theoretical framework (i) Politicians are rational vote-maximizers in pursuit of elected office (ii) There are 4 basic types of ballot structure: • • • •
Candidate-ballots,, Dual-ballots, Preference-ballots, and Party ballots
(iii) The type of ballot structure influences the provision of particularistic or programmatic benefits (iv) The type of ballot structure influences the selection of homogeneous or diverse candidates for legislative office (v) The behavior of politicians influences electorate (vi) Reforming the rules could potentially alter legislatures (in the long-term) • •
Majoritarian 91
Majority 26
Combined 29
PR 64
Plurality 65
Independent 21
Dependent 8
STV 2
Dual-ballot
Preference-ballot
AV 2
2nd Ballot 24
FPTP 54
Block Vote 9
SNTV 2
Candidate-Ballot
Candidate-ballot
Candidate-ballot
Party-Ballot or Preference-ballot
Preference-ballot
No direct elections 7
Party List 62
Party-ballot 35
Preference-ballot 27
Either increase local accountability or strength central party discipline Can increase diversity of political representatives
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Candidate-Ballot
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Combined (Mixed) Ballot
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Party-ballot (open or closed)
Other rules
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Evidence
CSES Coverage
CSES Module 1 (June 2002) 32 nations & 37 presidential & parliamentary elections ‘Most Most different’ different research strategy • • • •
Older & newer democracies Postindustrial & industrial Electoral systems Presidential & parliamentary executives Countries in the CSES Module 1 Excluded (159) Included (32)
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TYPE OF DISTRICTS Candidate-ballots Australia Canada UK USA Dual-ballots Japan Korea, Republic of Russia Taiwan
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Contact with members % With contact
Ukraine Germany Hungary New Zealand Mexico Thailand Preference-ballots Belgium Czech Republic Denmark
All
12
All Candidate-ballots
16
10
All Dual-ballots
Peru Poland Slovenia Sweden Switzerland Party ballots Iceland Israel Netherlands Norway
9
All Preference-ballots
8
All Party-ballots
0
Portugal Romania Spain
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Note: Q: “During the last twelve months, have you had any contact with a Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?” Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2002.
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Contact w. elected members Model I
Knowledge of Candidates
Model II
B
SE
Sig.
B
SE
Sig.
Level of development
3.18
.220
.000
2.82
.253
.000
Age
.002
.001
.012
.001
.001
.130
Gender (male)
.365
.029
.000
.375
.029
.000
Education
.249 249
.015 015
.000 000
.225 225
.015 015
.000 000
Income
.098
.011
.000
.101
.011
.000
.297
.054
.000
.329
.045
.000
-.196
.041
.000
% None Correct
SOCIAL CONTROLS
BALLOT STRUCTURE Candidate-ballot Dual-ballot Preference-ballot Mean district magnitude
Constant
-.004
-6.25
-5.36
% Correctly predicted
89.0
89.0
Nagelkerke R2
.040
.053
.000
.000
All
47
All candidate-ballots
41
All dual-ballots
41
All preference-ballots
45
All party-ballots
66 0
Note: Q: “During the last twelve months, have you had any contact with a [Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?” Source: Comparativ Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2002. Party-ballots are the default (reference) category in logistic regression models.
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10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Note: Q: “Do you happen to remember the name of any candidates who ran/stood in you [lower house primary electoral district] in the last [parliamentary/congressional] election? [If YES] What were their names?” Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2002.
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Knowledge of candidates
Women’s representation
B
Model I SE
Sig.
B
Model II SE
Sig.
1.09
.195
.000
7.72
.246
.000
Options
SOCIAL CONTROLS Level of Development Age
-.012
.001
.000
-.038
.001
.000
Gender (male)
.140
.026
.000
.264
.030
.000
Ed Education ti
.092 092
.013 013
.000 000
.103 103
.016 016
.000 000
Income
.067
.010
.000
-.019
.012
.129
Rhetorical Eg speeches and conventions
BALLOT STRUCTURE Candidate-ballot
6.82
1.37
.000
Dual-ballot
1.11
.049
.000
Preference-ballot
1.00
.035
.000
-.009
.000
.000
Mean district magnitude
Constant % Correctly predicted
.413 69.1
-5.81 80.8
Nagelkerke R2
.017
.395
Equal opportunities Eg training and finance for women and men
Voluntary gender quotas by party rules Least opposition
Positive action
Legal gender quotas by statute
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Reserved seats by statute Most opposition
Note: Q: “Do you happen to remember the name of any candidates who ran/stood in you [lower house primary electoral district] in the las [parliamentary/congressional] election? [If YES] What were their names?” (i) Only two categories were coded in Australia. Source: Comparative Study o Electoral Systems, 1996-2002. Party-ballots are the default (reference) category in logistic regression models.
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Electoral systems % Of women, 2000 All Majoritarian
Legal gender quotas
Number of nations
Alternative Vote
8.5 11.2
91 2
Block vote 2nd Ballot First-Past-The-Post First Past The Post
7.1 9.6 85 8.5
9 24 54
All Combined Combined Independent Combined Dependent
11.3 8.7 18.0
29 21 8
ALL Proportional Single Transferable Vote Party List
15.4 10.6 15.6
64 2 62
TOTAL
11.7
182
Note: The percentage of women in the lower house of national parliaments 2000, 182 nations worldwide. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.2
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Country
Date
% Quota
Argentina Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela Belgium Costa Rica Dominican Rep Panama Venezuela France Bolivia Mexico Bolivia Paraguay Brazil Mexico Average
1991 1997 1996 1997 1998 1994 1997 1997 1997 1998 1999 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997 1996
30 20 20 30 30 33 40 25 30 30 50 30 30 30 20 30 30 30
% Before
% After
6 4 11 11 6 18 14 12 8 8 11 11 15 4 3 7 17 10
Change
27 15 18 18 13 23 19 16 10 9 12 12 16 4 3 6 16 14
+21 +11 +7 +7 +7 +5 +5 +4 +2 +2 +1 +1 +1 0 0 -1 -1 +4
Note: Legal gender quotas for the lower house of national parliaments: laws which specify that each party must include a minimum proportion of women on party lists of candidates. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering T bl 8 5
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Why different impact? How statutory mechanisms are implemented The level of the gender quota Whether the rules regulate g the rank order of women and men candidates on lists Whether party lists are open or closed Levels of incumbency turnover. Any legal-financial penalties
Reserved seats Election
Number of seats reserved for women
% Of seats reserved for women
Tanzania
2000
43
20.0
Appointed
Uganda
2001
53
18.1
Indirectly elected
Pakistan
2002
60
16.8
Elected
Zimbabwe
2000
37
13.5
Appointed
Bangladesh
2001
30
10.0
Appointed
Sudan
2000
35
9.7
Elected
Morocco
2002
30
9.2
Elected
Botswana
1999
2
4.5
Appointed
Lesotho
1998
3
3.8
Appointed
Taiwan
1996
Varies
Varies
Appointed or elected
Elected
Note: Reserved seats in the lower house of the national parliament are defined as those that by law can only be filled by women, either by appointment or election. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.4
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Voluntary gender quotas
EU Parties with most women Party
Voluntary gender quotas: • Internal party rules, regulations, or constitutions specifying that the party should include a minimum proportion of women as candidates for elected office.
Evidence from 15-European Union member states, 2000 76 parties (each with at least 10 MPs) • 35 of these parties use voluntary gender quotas – On average 33% of their MPs are women
• 41 of these parties do not use voluntary quotas – On average, 18% of their MPs are women
Country Elect. Tot % Women Gender year MPs quota 1. VIHR Finland 1999 11 81.8 2. PDS Germany 1998 36 58.3 3. B90/Grüne Germany 1998 47 57.4 4. Centerpartiet Sweden 1998 18 55.6 X 5. GroenLinks Netherland 1998 11 54.5 s 6. Miljöpartiet de Grona Sweden 1998 16 50.0 7 7. S i lD Social Democrats t S d Sweden 1998 131 49 6 49.6 8. PvdA Netherland 1998 45 48.9 s 9. Ecolo Belgium 1999 11 45.5 10 SDP Finland 1999 51 43.1 . 11 D’66 Netherland 1998 14 42.9 X .12 s Vänsterpartiet Sweden 1998 43 41.9 .13 Christian Democrats Sweden 1998 42 40.5 .14 SKL Finland 1999 10 40.0 .15 Socialstick Folkeparti Denmark 1998 13 38.5 X .16 Venstre Liberale Parti Denmark 1998 42 38.1 X .17 KOK Finland 1999 46 37.0 .18 Social Democrats Denmark 1998 63 36.5 X .19 SPÖ Austria 1999 65 35.5 .20 Folkpartiet Liberelna Sweden 1998 17 35.3 Notes:.Voluntary gender quotas are defined as internal party rules, regulations, or constitutions specifying that the party should include a minimum proportion of women as candidates for elected office. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.6
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Voluntary quotas
Conclusions Candidate ballots are associated with significantly stronger contact and knowledge than party-ballots Preference-ballots and dual ballots intermediate categories More women can be elected through positive action strategies I li i Implications ffor electoral l l engineering i i – Candidate ballots promote local accountability and personal voting in legislatures with weak voter-member linkages – Party-ballots promote party discipline and cohesion in legislatures with excessive pork-barrel politics – Rules influence diversity of legislatures – What are the pros and cons of these options?
Effect varies according to… • Levels set (20%, 30%, etc) • Process of implementation – egg require q rankingg of women candidates on lists?
• Party organization and culture – Parties of the left more sympathetic
• May have a ‘contagion’ effect on other parties • May be easier to implement than legal quotas • Common, important, although not essential for women’s representation
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Case study: UK Labour party W om e n M P s in UK P a rlia m e nt 140 120
120118
N. of Women
100 80 60
60 41
40 20 0
1 2
8
14 15 4
24 21
24 25 17
29 26 26 27 23
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UK Labour party 1993 –all-women shortlists in 50% of Labour’s target seats 1996 - policy abandoned after legal challenge The 1997 election doubled the number of women in parliament overnight (from 60-120) In 2001, 118 women MPs were returned (incumbency) ‘Twinning’ policy adopted for regional assemblies: two seats, each pair selecting one man and one woman candidate
01 20 97 19 92 19 87 19 83 19 79 19 74 19 74 19 70 19 66 19 64 19 59 19 55 19 51 19 50 19 45 19 35 19 31 19 29 19 24 19 23 19 22 19 18 19
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