Legislative representation

3/23/2010 2 Structure I. Comparing types, roles and powers of legislatures II Legislative representation and electoral systems II. Legislative repr...
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3/23/2010

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Structure I. Comparing types, roles and powers of legislatures II Legislative representation and electoral systems II.

Legislative representation

1. 2. 3. 4.

DPI-415

Public knowledge about candidates Contact with elected members Election of women Representation of minorities

III. Conclusions & implications

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Readings

Legislative capacity building You are asked to advise the parliament in the Netherlands how to make members more responsive to constituents. You are asked to advise the parliament in Iraq how to strengthen members oversight of budgetary decisionmaking and procurement. You are asked by the Egyptian parliament how best to increase the proportion of women in elected office. What would you advise?

Caramani ch 7 Legislatures (Kreppel) Newton and Van Deth Ch 6 Multilevel governance Further Resources: Inter-parliamentary Union www.ipu.org

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Types of legislatures Assembly, parliament, or congress Local, regional, national or supranational Separation of executive-legislature executive legislature powers (presidential executives) or fused powers (parliamentary democracies)

Roles (Kreppel) Which roles are most important? How do they function? – Legislature as agent • • • •

Linkage Representation Debating Legitimating

– Legislature as principal • Control • Oversight

– Legislature as lawmaker • Policy -making • Policy-influencing

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Legislative powers

Powers Ref Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig 2009. The Handbook of National Legislatures CUP Parliamentary Power index • • • •

The legislature’s influence over the executive Institutional autonomy Specific powers Institutional capacity

Experts, constitution and media accounts

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Legislative Powers

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Electoral Systems

II: Legislative roles & electoral systems

Nation States 191

Ref: Norris Electoral Engineering: CUP 2003 Theoretical framework (i) Politicians are rational vote-maximizers in pursuit of elected office (ii) There are 4 basic types of ballot structure: • • • •

Candidate-ballots,, Dual-ballots, Preference-ballots, and Party ballots

(iii) The type of ballot structure influences the provision of particularistic or programmatic benefits (iv) The type of ballot structure influences the selection of homogeneous or diverse candidates for legislative office (v) The behavior of politicians influences electorate (vi) Reforming the rules could potentially alter legislatures (in the long-term) • •

Majoritarian 91

Majority 26

Combined 29

PR 64

Plurality 65

Independent 21

Dependent 8

STV 2

Dual-ballot

Preference-ballot

AV 2

2nd Ballot 24

FPTP 54

Block Vote 9

SNTV 2

Candidate-Ballot

Candidate-ballot

Candidate-ballot

Party-Ballot or Preference-ballot

Preference-ballot

No direct elections 7

Party List 62

Party-ballot 35

Preference-ballot 27

Either increase local accountability or strength central party discipline Can increase diversity of political representatives

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Candidate-Ballot

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Combined (Mixed) Ballot

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Party-ballot (open or closed)

Other rules

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Evidence

CSES Coverage

CSES Module 1 (June 2002) 32 nations & 37 presidential & parliamentary elections ‘Most Most different’ different research strategy • • • •

Older & newer democracies Postindustrial & industrial Electoral systems Presidential & parliamentary executives Countries in the CSES Module 1 Excluded (159) Included (32)

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TYPE OF DISTRICTS Candidate-ballots Australia Canada UK USA Dual-ballots Japan Korea, Republic of Russia Taiwan

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Contact with members % With contact

Ukraine Germany Hungary New Zealand Mexico Thailand Preference-ballots Belgium Czech Republic Denmark

All

12

All Candidate-ballots

16

10

All Dual-ballots

Peru Poland Slovenia Sweden Switzerland Party ballots Iceland Israel Netherlands Norway

9

All Preference-ballots

8

All Party-ballots

0

Portugal Romania Spain

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Note: Q: “During the last twelve months, have you had any contact with a Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?” Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2002.

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Contact w. elected members Model I

Knowledge of Candidates

Model II

B

SE

Sig.

B

SE

Sig.

Level of development

3.18

.220

.000

2.82

.253

.000

Age

.002

.001

.012

.001

.001

.130

Gender (male)

.365

.029

.000

.375

.029

.000

Education

.249 249

.015 015

.000 000

.225 225

.015 015

.000 000

Income

.098

.011

.000

.101

.011

.000

.297

.054

.000

.329

.045

.000

-.196

.041

.000

% None Correct

SOCIAL CONTROLS

BALLOT STRUCTURE Candidate-ballot Dual-ballot Preference-ballot Mean district magnitude

Constant

-.004

-6.25

-5.36

% Correctly predicted

89.0

89.0

Nagelkerke R2

.040

.053

.000

.000

All

47

All candidate-ballots

41

All dual-ballots

41

All preference-ballots

45

All party-ballots

66 0

Note: Q: “During the last twelve months, have you had any contact with a [Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?” Source: Comparativ Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2002. Party-ballots are the default (reference) category in logistic regression models.

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10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Note: Q: “Do you happen to remember the name of any candidates who ran/stood in you [lower house primary electoral district] in the last [parliamentary/congressional] election? [If YES] What were their names?” Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2002.

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Knowledge of candidates

Women’s representation

B

Model I SE

Sig.

B

Model II SE

Sig.

1.09

.195

.000

7.72

.246

.000

Options

SOCIAL CONTROLS Level of Development Age

-.012

.001

.000

-.038

.001

.000

Gender (male)

.140

.026

.000

.264

.030

.000

Ed Education ti

.092 092

.013 013

.000 000

.103 103

.016 016

.000 000

Income

.067

.010

.000

-.019

.012

.129

Rhetorical Eg speeches and conventions

BALLOT STRUCTURE Candidate-ballot

6.82

1.37

.000

Dual-ballot

1.11

.049

.000

Preference-ballot

1.00

.035

.000

-.009

.000

.000

Mean district magnitude

Constant % Correctly predicted

.413 69.1

-5.81 80.8

Nagelkerke R2

.017

.395

Equal opportunities Eg training and finance for women and men

Voluntary gender quotas by party rules Least opposition

Positive action

Legal gender quotas by statute

--------------------------------------------

Reserved seats by statute Most opposition

Note: Q: “Do you happen to remember the name of any candidates who ran/stood in you [lower house primary electoral district] in the las [parliamentary/congressional] election? [If YES] What were their names?” (i) Only two categories were coded in Australia. Source: Comparative Study o Electoral Systems, 1996-2002. Party-ballots are the default (reference) category in logistic regression models.

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Electoral systems % Of women, 2000 All Majoritarian

Legal gender quotas

Number of nations

Alternative Vote

8.5 11.2

91 2

Block vote 2nd Ballot First-Past-The-Post First Past The Post

7.1 9.6 85 8.5

9 24 54

All Combined Combined Independent Combined Dependent

11.3 8.7 18.0

29 21 8

ALL Proportional Single Transferable Vote Party List

15.4 10.6 15.6

64 2 62

TOTAL

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182

Note: The percentage of women in the lower house of national parliaments 2000, 182 nations worldwide. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.2

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Country

Date

% Quota

Argentina Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela Belgium Costa Rica Dominican Rep Panama Venezuela France Bolivia Mexico Bolivia Paraguay Brazil Mexico Average

1991 1997 1996 1997 1998 1994 1997 1997 1997 1998 1999 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997 1996

30 20 20 30 30 33 40 25 30 30 50 30 30 30 20 30 30 30

% Before

% After

6 4 11 11 6 18 14 12 8 8 11 11 15 4 3 7 17 10

Change

27 15 18 18 13 23 19 16 10 9 12 12 16 4 3 6 16 14

+21 +11 +7 +7 +7 +5 +5 +4 +2 +2 +1 +1 +1 0 0 -1 -1 +4

Note: Legal gender quotas for the lower house of national parliaments: laws which specify that each party must include a minimum proportion of women on party lists of candidates. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering T bl 8 5

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Why different impact? How statutory mechanisms are implemented The level of the gender quota Whether the rules regulate g the rank order of women and men candidates on lists Whether party lists are open or closed Levels of incumbency turnover. Any legal-financial penalties

Reserved seats Election

Number of seats reserved for women

% Of seats reserved for women

Tanzania

2000

43

20.0

Appointed

Uganda

2001

53

18.1

Indirectly elected

Pakistan

2002

60

16.8

Elected

Zimbabwe

2000

37

13.5

Appointed

Bangladesh

2001

30

10.0

Appointed

Sudan

2000

35

9.7

Elected

Morocco

2002

30

9.2

Elected

Botswana

1999

2

4.5

Appointed

Lesotho

1998

3

3.8

Appointed

Taiwan

1996

Varies

Varies

Appointed or elected

Elected

Note: Reserved seats in the lower house of the national parliament are defined as those that by law can only be filled by women, either by appointment or election. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.4

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Voluntary gender quotas

EU Parties with most women Party

Voluntary gender quotas: • Internal party rules, regulations, or constitutions specifying that the party should include a minimum proportion of women as candidates for elected office.

Evidence from 15-European Union member states, 2000 76 parties (each with at least 10 MPs) • 35 of these parties use voluntary gender quotas – On average 33% of their MPs are women

• 41 of these parties do not use voluntary quotas – On average, 18% of their MPs are women

Country Elect. Tot % Women Gender year MPs quota 1. VIHR Finland 1999 11 81.8  2. PDS Germany 1998 36 58.3  3. B90/Grüne Germany 1998 47 57.4  4. Centerpartiet Sweden 1998 18 55.6 X 5. GroenLinks Netherland 1998 11 54.5  s 6. Miljöpartiet de Grona Sweden 1998 16 50.0  7 7. S i lD Social Democrats t S d Sweden 1998 131 49 6 49.6  8. PvdA Netherland 1998 45 48.9  s 9. Ecolo Belgium 1999 11 45.5  10 SDP Finland 1999 51 43.1  . 11 D’66 Netherland 1998 14 42.9 X .12 s Vänsterpartiet Sweden 1998 43 41.9  .13 Christian Democrats Sweden 1998 42 40.5  .14 SKL Finland 1999 10 40.0  .15 Socialstick Folkeparti Denmark 1998 13 38.5 X .16 Venstre Liberale Parti Denmark 1998 42 38.1 X .17 KOK Finland 1999 46 37.0  .18 Social Democrats Denmark 1998 63 36.5 X .19 SPÖ Austria 1999 65 35.5  .20 Folkpartiet Liberelna Sweden 1998 17 35.3  Notes:.Voluntary gender quotas are defined as internal party rules, regulations, or constitutions specifying that the party should include a minimum proportion of women as candidates for elected office. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.6

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Voluntary quotas

Conclusions Candidate ballots are associated with significantly stronger contact and knowledge than party-ballots Preference-ballots and dual ballots intermediate categories More women can be elected through positive action strategies I li i Implications ffor electoral l l engineering i i – Candidate ballots promote local accountability and personal voting in legislatures with weak voter-member linkages – Party-ballots promote party discipline and cohesion in legislatures with excessive pork-barrel politics – Rules influence diversity of legislatures – What are the pros and cons of these options?

Effect varies according to… • Levels set (20%, 30%, etc) • Process of implementation – egg require q rankingg of women candidates on lists?

• Party organization and culture – Parties of the left more sympathetic

• May have a ‘contagion’ effect on other parties • May be easier to implement than legal quotas • Common, important, although not essential for women’s representation

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Case study: UK Labour party W om e n M P s in UK P a rlia m e nt 140 120

120118

N. of Women

100 80 60

60 41

40 20 0

1 2

8

14 15 4

24 21

24 25 17

29 26 26 27 23

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UK Labour party 1993 –all-women shortlists in 50% of Labour’s target seats 1996 - policy abandoned after legal challenge The 1997 election doubled the number of women in parliament overnight (from 60-120) In 2001, 118 women MPs were returned (incumbency) ‘Twinning’ policy adopted for regional assemblies: two seats, each pair selecting one man and one woman candidate

01 20 97 19 92 19 87 19 83 19 79 19 74 19 74 19 70 19 66 19 64 19 59 19 55 19 51 19 50 19 45 19 35 19 31 19 29 19 24 19 23 19 22 19 18 19

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