Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013 Trip Report From April 14 through 21, 2013, a leadership delegation from The Chicago Council on Global Affairs traveled to Turkey to explore the country’s momentous transformation. The delegation met with senior officials, business and civic leaders, academics, and journalists and visited three cities: Istanbul, Ankara, and Kayseri. Turkey, which made its reputation as a NATO stalwart with the alliance’s second largest army, is today the world’s 17th largest economy. It is a respected—if not listened to—power in its immediate region, while changing dramatically in state-society relations. The delegation observed a country on the move. Turkey has an ambitious agenda, and it is clearly not willing to sit on its laurels. It also faces serious challenges. The newly started peace process with its rebellious Kurdish minority has yet to take shape and prove that it has legs. The Syrian crisis looms large on the horizon. Turkey’s politics are in a tantalizing quandary as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country’s dominant leader, makes a play for the country’s presidency and significantly expanded powers. The trip occurred just six weeks before mass protests began in Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park and spread across the country. Turkey has had more than 10 years of stable government under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has succeeded in winning three elections in a row (2002, 2007, and 2011), each time with a larger share of the votes. Not since the 1950s, when the Democrat Party won three consecutive elections, has Turkey experienced the kind of policy stability of the last decade, even given recent events. This, more than anything else, has enabled Turkey to deepen the reforms begun in the 1980s under Prime Minister and then President Turgut Özal. The AKP came to power on the heels of Turkey’s most devastating economic crisis in 2001, when the economy contracted by 9.5 percent. This required a complete overhaul of the country’s financial sector, especially the consolidation of its banks. These changes introduced before the AKP’s rise to power have served Turkey well, especially in 2008 when the world economy went into a

tailspin. Though still affected by the great crisis of 2008, Turkey weathered it well and two years later was once again on the path of significant growth. The improving economy, the robustness of its export sector, and sound monetary policy has given Turkey a sense of self-respect and accomplishment. Many, in addition to Özal, deserve credit for these accomplishments, including Kemal Dervis, the former World Bank official brought back in 2001 to save the economy and the countless business enterprises that had mushroomed in Turkey’s hinterland. Nevertheless, Erdogan and the AKP have been the main beneficiaries. This is not to say that they do not deserve the credit; quite on the contrary, their astute handling of the Turkish political economy and natural affinity for the business sector helped deepen the transformation of Turkey. The other main development of recent decades is the collapse of traditional political parties and the defeat of the military, which had long cast an inordinate shadow over Turkish politics. The military had incessantly meddled not just in national security matters, but in societal issues, imposing a strict ideological viewpoint that came to be known as Kemalism, named for the country’s founder Kemal Atatürk. Although Atatürk may have lost some of his luster, the delegation did observe his omnipresence in the many portraits that adorn government buildings and are displayed in the streets and elsewhere. Today, notwithstanding recent events, there is no credible political opposition party in Turkey. The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), is a shadow of its former self. It has been unable to formulate coherent policy alternatives and strategies to the AKP government, preferring instead to simply oppose everything the government has done. The other opposition party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), is a fiercely nationalist, if not racialist, party that has only one issue: Turkish nationalism. Ironically, many of our interlocutors saw the only serious opposition coming either from the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) or from the Gülen movement, a vast network of followers of respected Islamist scholar Fethullah Gülen. Gülen sought refuge in the United States in the 1990s, fearing persecution by secular authorities and the military. Gülen’s movement has built its following among the conservative and religiously inspired Turks. The movement is also known for building schools all over the world, including in the United States. While the movement has supported the AKP government and has close links with it, at times it has also clashed over policy issues. The result is that the AKP and Erdogan have few concerns regarding their rule, although the mass protests may have shaken their confidence somewhat. There is no one on the horizon that can challenge the party’s electoral dominance for years to come. Erdogan Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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remains singularly popular. This has come at a price, as Turkey has increasingly become a one-party, one-man country. This report will focus on four aspects of Turkey’s transformation as gleaned from The Chicago Council’s leadership group’s meetings in Turkey: 1) economic transformation, 2) new foreign policy and challenges, 3) the Kurdish question, and 4) domestic politics and constitutional change.

I. Economic Transformation The remarkable change in Turkey’s economic fortunes began with Özal when he decided that Turkey could no longer afford to remain wedded to its inward-oriented economic development model. The import substitution strategy had ended with the Turkish Central Bank literally running out of foreign exchange. Özal pushed for an exportoriented strategy as he liberalized foreign trade, pushed for a realistic foreign exchange regime, and encouraged domestic growth. The result was a gradual but then dramatic expansion of Turkish exports. From less than $3 billion in exports in 1980, Turkish exports mushroomed to $152 billion in 2012 (see figure below). One noteworthy development was the introduction of a Customs Union with the European Union in 1996. The Customs Union opened EU markets to Turkish entrepreneurs and vice versa. It allowed Turkish companies to compete in one of the world’s most discerning markets, enabling them to gain strong competitive qualities. In many ways, the Customs Union agreement, as one of the interlocutors pointed out, allowed Turkey to “become part of the world economy.” The same speaker also said that it is thanks to the EU that foreign direct investment comes to Turkey. The expansion of exports was accompanied by an equally important improvement in gross domestic and gross per capita income. Between 1990 and 2012, GDP has quadrupled according to government estimates. Turkey has experienced, according to the observers the delegation met with, the second highest sustained growth rate in the world after China. Much of the growth, we were told, is driven by domestic demand. Despite the dip in exports and momentary decline in growth during the 2008 global financial crisis, one of our interlocutors categorized Turkey as the biggest beneficiary of that crisis. Because Turkey’s own 2001 financial crisis had forced it to solve its fiscal problems, the debt to GDP ratio, which was 90 percent some 12 years ago, has now been cut to 37 percent, a very respectable ratio especially when compared with European economies. Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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Turkish Exports (billions $) 180.00 160.00 140.00 120.00 100.00

80.00 60.00 40.00 20.00

0.00

Source: Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu, http://www.tuik.gov.tr Turkey, in the words of one banking industry spokesman, is increasingly becoming a normal country where income has to be earned. He described the AKP government as the most private-sector-friendly and free-market-friendly government Turkey has had. It has encouraged capital formation and improved infrastructure benefiting the private sector. It also invested in health and education by bringing new services to the population. Turkey’s economic transformation also restructured state-society relations as it gave rise to a new class of entrepreneurs who did not come from the two traditional economic centers of Istanbul and Izmir. Unlike the traditional centers, which owed their development to state largesse, the new entrepreneurs came from the hinterland in Anatolia—hence their designation as Anatolian Tigers—and sought to develop new markets and products. Towns such as Kayseri, Kahramanmaras, Sanliurfa, and Gaziantep spearheaded the change. Interestingly, the new entrepreneurs were by and large conservative and pious. They emerged as the strongest advocates of the AKP and the party’s funders. The AKP appealed to both their attachment to religion and traditional values and also to their fiercely laissez-faire orientation. In the interlocking patterns of alliance and dependency, many of these entrepreneurs also formed the backbone of the Gülen movement and funded the latter’s expansion into the rest of the world. These new entrepreneurs proved to be far more global than their more established EuropeanChicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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oriented counterparts in Istanbul as they sought new markets in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The Turkish private sector is bifurcated. The Anatolian Tigers tend to support the AKP and have joined voluntary business organizations such as TUSKON, created by Gülen. Traditional large, Istanbul-based enterprises are members of TUSIAD, the oldest and more prosperous business organization. TUSIAD was said to have only 600 individual members representing some 4,500 companies. During our visit to TUSIAD, which tends to be more critical of the government, especially on social issues, there was support for the AKP’s stewardship of the economy. They welcomed the government’s commitment to the renovation of cities, a project called, “kentlesel donusum,” in Turkey. One of the more counter-intuitive characteristics of the AKP is its broad appeal to the masses and not just to the “tigers.” In the words of one our speakers, in Turkey, left is right and right is left.” In Kayseri, at the edge of the snow-capped Erciyes mountain, the delegation had a chance to see first hand one of the successful “Anatolian Tigers.” The group visited the Boydak family of companies, TUSKON members, that manufacture a wide variety of products from furniture to steel to mattresses. In fact, that enterprise lived up to its promise. Its success, especially in international markets, was due completely to its ability to invest in R&D and bring out products that were truly new and imaginative. As one of the members of the Chicago delegation said: “No one can stop these guys.” In many ways, this company was an exception, as Turkey is only beginning to focus on R&D investments. Turkish R&D expenditure is one-third of the European average (a senior government official told us that the government’s R&D expenditure is on par with Europe’s). Like most Turkish companies, the Boydak group is part of a family-owned group. The current leadership is getting ready to transfer control to the third generation of Boydaks. This fact engendered an interesting discussion between the Boydaks and members of the Chicago delegation, as the Boydaks were interested in how their US counterparts managed intergenerational change. The new cities of the hinterland are undertaking notable change, as can be seen in Kayseri. We were told that at least two new universities, including one named for the native son and current president, Abdullah Gul, were in different stages of planning and construction. Kayseri is also eyeing the tourism industry, making the most of its limited natural endowments by developing its ski infrastructure on Mount Erciyes. The remarkable change has, of course, still some way to go. The delegation heard that regional disparities, especially between well-to-do western provinces and the east and Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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southeast are quite significant; this is especially true for unemployment statistics. In addition, female labor force participation is low by comparison to other southern European countries such as Greece and Italy. While indices for poverty have shown a significant improvement, poverty remains relatively high. Members of the Chicago delegation inquired about the comparative wage rates between new EU members and Turkey. As it turns out, the minimum wage rate in Turkey is higher than six European countries, including Bulgaria and Romania. We were told that despite nonexistent diplomatic relations, up to 40,000 Armenians were working in Turkey. Despite the difficulties with the European Union and the fact that the “shine” of EU membership has dulled, members of the delegation were surprised to hear that EU membership is still considered a desirable goal. Turks have three important short-term issues with Europe. First is the opening of chapters in accession negotiations. Some of these had been blocked by French President Nicholas Sarkozy. The expectation, we were told, is that François Hollande will change his predecessor’s approach. Second is the question of visas. Turkish elites bitterly complain of the difficulties they encounter when applying for them. Europe, by contrast, is weary of Turkey’s own immigration policies since some 80 percent of illegal migrants entering Europe transit Turkish soil. Finally, there is the issue of the looming US-EU free trade negotiations to which Turkey is not a party. But Turkey will nonetheless be impacted because of its customs union agreement with the EU. What are some of the key structural changes and challenges facing Turkey as it tries to be one of the world’s top 10 countries economically? According to one senior government official, there are six: 1) moving up the value chain in production by increasing R&D, 2) improving the quality of education, 3) dealing with energy dependence, 4) making infrastructure investments (of which they already are doing a great deal), 5) labor market reform, including social security reform, and 6) political and constitutional reform to deal with such problems as the Kurdish question.

II. The New Foreign Policy and Its Challenges Turkey’s visibility and importance have considerably increased since the end of the Cold War. This is somewhat paradoxical since it was Turkey’s NATO role in that period that defined its relationships with the United States and other Western societies. Yet with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it would appear that Turkey’s importance has grown exponentially. There are perhaps three distinct reasons for this. First is the shift of focus toward Turkey’s multiple regional neighborhoods as well as the Afghan and Iraqi wars. Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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Turkey, which had performed a front-line role in the Cold War by virtue of its large army, paradoxically found that it was the West’s most important and versatile ally in the Middle East and elsewhere. Second, its economic prowess has made Turkey a far more attractive nation-state with which to not only trade but also curry favor. The search for markets also led Turkish businessmen to become more dynamic. The third reason is that in the AKP, Turkey found a governing party willing to expend resources and play a role in foreign affairs. Unlike previous governments that punched below their weight, the AKP is ambitious. One of its first acts was to seek Turkish representation in the UN Security Council for the first time since 1960. By 2023, at the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the republic, the AKP wants Turkey to become one of the top 10 economies of the world. The Turks had come up with a name for their new foreign policy approach: zero problems with the neighbors. Initially, this seemed to work well. Syria became the poster child for the new policy as the two countries embarked on numerous ambitious projects designed to bring their economic and political goals in line with each other. With the exception of Israel and Armenia, the new policy enhanced Turkey’s regional role as Erdogan became one of the most popular leaders on the proverbial Arab street. Turkey’s role in the Iran nuclear crisis has been spotty. Ankara tried hard to prevent further sanctions from being levied on Tehran. Turkey purchases significant quantities of gas and oil from Iran. It has defended Iran’s right to enrichment and negotiated a deal with Tehran and Brazil in 2010. This past year there was a great deal of consternation among American officials about the large amounts of gold Turkey had started to export to Iran. Many assumed that this was a covert means of paying the Iranians back for gas exports, given Tehran’s difficulties in accessing banking systems. American officials told us that in the end the gold exports were private gold sales and not government ones. In any event, a senior Turkish official also told us those gold sales in 2013 had declined precipitously, some $5 billion out of a total of $152 billion. The Arab Spring has been a mixed blessing for Turkey. At the outset, new leaders in Tunisia and Egypt in particular were anxious to emulate Turkey’s success in not just the economic arena but also in the joining of Islam and democracy. Discussions of the Turkish model abounded in the press and academia. Yet the crisis in Syria has put a severe dent in Turkey’s regional leadership role. With violence escalating on its border, Turkey’s original gambit of calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s ouster demonstrated the limits of Turkish influence. Assad, who had spent countless time with Erdogan, balked at the Turkish leader’s initial reform suggestions as he elected to brutally suppress the uprising. Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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Today, Syria has emerged as the principal foreign policy headache. On the one hand, the crisis has helped Erdogan rebuild his relationship with President Obama, which had soured after the Turks sided with Iran in the Security Council in 2010. But as the AKP comes under increasing pressure in Turkey for its Syria policy, which has netted some 400,000 to 500,000 refugees, Ankara wants the United States to take action against Damascus. This has given rise to new tensions between Washington and Ankara, but it has also demonstrated to Ankara the utility and importance of the United States. Turkey’s Syria policy is also giving rise to disagreements within the ruling party hierarchy. Our interlocutors argued that lack of transparency in the policy had given rise to serious doubts and worries among many Turks. TUSIAD, for instance, told the delegation that it wants the government to spend less time worrying about and focusing on Syria. Instead, it would rather see the government put its energies on Europe and the rest of the world. One of the more remarkable foreign policy transformations has had to do with northern Iraq, or the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Once refusing to even acknowledge its existence, Turkey has now embraced Iraqi Kurdistan at the expense of its relations with the Maliki government in Baghdad. Turkish companies abound in the KRG, and Turkish exports to Iraq are the second highest of any country. Remarkably, the KRG, were it to be counted separately, would rank among Turkey’s top 10 export partners. Regarding Israel, Turkish business leaders with whom the delegation met welcomed the recent rapprochement. Still, these relations are likely to remain lukewarm at best for the foreseeable future. As one of the delegation’s interlocutors put it, “the broken vase has now been fixed, but you cannot still put any water in it.” Finally, the delegation heard that despite the longstanding ties between the United States and Turkey, there are still embers of resentment burning in the Turkish mindset. Anti-Americanism is very prevalent in Turkey. It is the most anti-American country in NATO. Turkey’s new self-confidence and assertiveness have not diminished these feelings. At the time of The Chicago Council visit, Prime Minister Erdogan’s May 2013 trip to Washington had not yet happened, but there was a great deal of anticipation building up in advance of the trip. III. The Kurdish Question During the delegation’s visit, Turkey was seized by discussions and news about the deal between the government and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) to end the latest in a series of insurrections by Turkey’s Kurdish minority. By one count this was the 29th such insurrection. Kurds, who represent some 20 percent of the population, have traditionally inhabited the southeastern and eastern provinces of Turkey. In the last few Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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decades, lack of economic opportunity as well as a brutal counterinsurgency campaign has forced many to leave their ancestral lands and resettle in other parts of the country. As a result, Istanbul may be the world’s largest Kurdish city, with as many as 4 million Kurds by some estimates making up part of the city’s 12 to15 million inhabitants. Throughout the republican period, Kurds were subjected to a campaign of denial— denial of their differences, language, and existence. While challenges and opposition to the deal struck between Erdogan and the PKK’s incarcerated leader Abdullah Öcalan remain and much of its details remain secret, there was a clear sense of hope and expectation in the air. It seemed that many groups in society, from journalists to women’s organizations to government officials, were calculating the benefits of a peace deal with the Kurds. At the very least, the Kurdish peace process will help the democratization of Turkey. Fears of Kurdish separatism have undermined the Turkish political and judicial systems for decades, if not since 1923. Kurdish opponents have been imprisoned, killed, and made to disappear by the security forces, often for expressing one’s right to free speech. Journalists and human rights activists expect that the restrictions on reporting on the Kurdish question will not only diminish, but that many of the Kurdish colleagues currently in jail will win their freedom. Women’s organizations, by contrast, expect that the Kurdish movement, which has been more open to the participation of women—the BDP hails the largest percentage of women members of parliament and party leaders— will help with the antiwomen and patriarchal attitudes seen in the Kurdish majority areas. Finally, government officials suggested that the resolution of this problem will not only give rise to a peace dividend, but that an albatross will be lifted from Turkey’s shoulders in its dealings with the rest of the world and, in particular, with Europe. The Kurdish question had been viewed as an existential matter for Turkey’s traditional elites. However, the increasingly peaceful relations with Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, greater self-confidence, the defeat of the military as a political actor, and the weariness of the public, both Turkish and Kurdish, with the unending conflict, pushed the Turkish government to offer the most comprehensive path yet to a healing process. Polls show as many as 65 percent of the population supports the process. High-ranking government officials spoke of their commitment to implementing fundamental reforms in this area. So far, however, it is the PKK that appears to have made all the concessions. The government will have to eventually also offer concrete remedies. At the top of the list is a change in the current 1982 constitution. The generals who authored this document made it an extremely restrictive and almost a chauvinistic text. Still, changing it is not Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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going to be easy, especially redefining citizenship separately from Turkish ethnicity. In addition, changing the constitution is made all the more complex because Erdogan wants to amend the document to enhance the power of the presidency in time for his run for that office in 2014 (see next section). The Kurds will also demand the relaxation of cultural barriers, including the ban on the use of their language in education, the freedom to publish and broadcast in Kurdish, and the loosening of the extremely centralized Turkish state to allow for greater local decision making. It would be unrealistic to expect that the process will be concluded quickly. It may take at least a year if not longer before the PKK finally gives up its arms and all the changes are implemented. The likelihood is that the process will go through fits and starts. Both sides say they are committed to making it work; the one who breaks the agreement will certainly be made to pay a heavy price.

IV. Domestic Politics and Constitutional Change One of the more important developments of the last decade was the forced return of the military to their barracks. The Turkish military, which intervened directly in 1960, 1971, and 1980 and then indirectly in 1997, overplayed its hand when it once again tried to indirectly intervene in 2007. The officers who had become accustomed to a dominant role in politics misjudged both the public’s appetite for their meddling and the AKP government’s resilience and anger at their constant interference. There already were significant signs that the public, while revering their soldiers, had had enough of the military’s interference. It was one thing when they overthrew the government in 1980 amidst a political and economic crisis punctuated by street violence between left and right wing groups. Even then, in 1983 the public defied the generals’ “order” not to vote for Özal, who was running a campaign against their anointed successors. What made things worse for the officers was their conduct during the war against the PKK, when repeated revelations in the press—a press that felt somewhat freer after early reforms—demonstrated the military’s callousness when it came to the death of soldiers and their attempts to cover up embarrassing incidents in which they were directly responsible for casualties. So when they overplayed their hand in 2007 by trying to block the selection of then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to the presidency, the AKP decided to call their bluff. It called for early elections that were contested principally over the issue of the presidency. The AKP won overwhelmingly. The officers made a cardinal strategic mistake: they took on a government that by then had, by any measure, brought a great deal of stability and Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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economic growth to the country and thereby developed support among average citizens because of these accomplishments. From then on, the AKP government systematically chiseled at the military edifice. Today, the generals are a spent force; they have no role to play in politics, especially since so many of them have been jailed on suspicion of involvement in coup attempts. The disappearance of the military and the emptiness of the main opposition party has allowed Erdogan, who has complete control of his own party, to dominate Turkish politics in a way not seen since the days of the Kemal Atatürk. Turkey has unquestionably become a one party, one-man state. With the exception of his economic advisers, people who are largely reluctant to contradict him surround him. In some ways, he has defied the odds. He has been extremely successful. Hence it is not surprising that it is difficult to argue with him. Nevertheless, his seeming omnipotence became the subject of mass protests weeks after our visit. Tensions were certainly on display, but they didn’t appear as combustible as they became in response to the Taksim Square protests. Edrogan’s attention to detail is legendary; no issue is small enough for him to ignore. As a result, he is seen intervening in matters best left to civil society. He has become intolerant of public criticism. Media bosses, in turn, sensing Erdogan’s disapproval, have forced many journalists out for angering the prime minister in their broadcasts or articles. Some of the victims have been very prominent ones, including in many ways the doyen of Turkish journalism, Hasan Cemal. This is despite the large number of news outlets. A journalist interlocutor provided the following details on the Turkish media: there are some 40 national newspapers, 2,500 local ones, 1,300 private radios, and 250 private TV channels. Internet penetration is approximately 50 percent of the total population, of which urban penetration stands at 70 percent. Conglomerates with 80 percent ownership have an inordinate hold on the media. Turkey remains one the more unfriendly places for journalists. This is also why the question of constitutional reform has become a very sensitive issue. Even Erdogan’s supporters fear that his wish to make Turkey into a French-style presidential state would concentrate far too much power in his hands and eliminate the boundaries between the executive and legislative balance of power. Here too, the main problem is the absence of serious opposition. The inability of the CHP to relate to voters other than through fear—fear of the AKP— has rendered it marginal to the political process. Hence there are no credible sources of opposition or even questioning of Erdogan’s policies other than civil society groups.

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Irrespective of the prime minister’s intentions, a new constitution is a must for Turkey. On this there seems to be almost universal agreement. The current constitution serves as a straight jacket. It is primarily designed to safeguard the state from the individual and not vice versa, as a liberal constitution ought to do. The strength of civil society remains both the good news and bad news about Turkey. Civil society is still not powerful enough to challenge and block government initiatives. However, Turkey has seen a significant improvement in civil society’s growth, influence, and sophistication. Unquestionably, as our civil society and academic interlocutors stressed often, the EU process, at least in its earlier years, proved to be decisive in the expansion and strengthening of Turkish civil society. The Turkish population expects more from its government today. The judiciary remains one of the most retrogressive arenas of the Turkish state. Change, we were told, has not yet come there. Finally, there is much progress to be made on gender equality. Turkey ranks 92nd on the global scale. The bureaucracy is almost completely male dominated. In fact, one cannot see any women in Erdogan’s entourage other than his immediate family. Still, much progress has been made in civil society. If it is not ready today to challenge the powers that be head on, it will not be long before it becomes ready. And this is perhaps the best news about Turkey. Conclusion For many in the delegation, this was their first trip to Turkey. Others had had a longterm relationship through their businesses. Turkey is a country that confounds expectations; it is on the cusp of many developments in the region and beyond. It is modern, yet its citizens are quite conservative in their philosophical approach to life. It is an ally of the United States, but one where anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories rule the airwaves. Yet every Turk expresses a wish that the United States take Turkey more seriously, invest more, and trade more. It wishes to play a much more important role in the world, but as the case of Syria demonstrates, it is reluctant to be adventurous. Whether it succeeds in becoming one the top 10 economies in the world by 2023, the fact of the matter is Turkey has earned its current place in the global distribution of power, and it is unlikely to revert back to its inward-oriented and self-absorbed days.

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Leadership Study Mission to Turkey Itinerary Day 1: Sunday, April 14 – Istanbul 6:30 PM8:30 PM

Welcome Dinner with remarks by Henri Barkey

Overnight:

Four Seasons Hotel Bosphorus - Istanbul

Day 2: Monday, April 15 – Istanbul 8:00 AMBreakfast Briefing 9:30 AM Topic: Turkey and the World (focusing on US, EU, and non-Middle East neighbors) Panelists: Barçin Yinanç, Columnist, Opinion – Editor, Hürriyet Daily News Daniel Dombey, Turkey Correspondent, Financial Times Mensur Akgün, Director of the Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) at Kultur University and Professor and former Chair of the Department of International Relations at Istanbul Kültür University 10:00 AM11:30 AM

Panel Discussion Organized by BETAM (Bahçeşehir University Centre for Economic and Social Research) Location: Bahçeşehir University, Office of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Mr. Enver Yücel Topic: The Macroeconomics of Turkey Panelists: Cevdet Akçay, Chief Economist, Koç Financial Services and Yapi Kredi Bank Dr. Seyfettin Gürsel, Director, BETAM Dr. Cengiz Aktar, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences; Chair of European Union Relations Department, BETAM

12:00 PM1:30 PM

Luncheon and Panel Discussion Topic: Minorities in Turkey Panelists: Amberin Zaman, Turkey Correspondent, The Economist

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Heath Lowry, Ataturk Professor at Princeton University and Professor at Bahçeşehir University Etyen Mahçupyan, TESEV Consultant (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), Advisor/Editor for Agos, and columnist for daily Zaman and Today's Zaman newspapers. 2:00 PM5:00 PM

Afternoon Options Option 1 - Small Group Roundtable Discussion: The Investment Scene Panelists: Isak Antika, Managing Partner, Actera Group Ugur Bayar, Chief Executive Officer, Credit Suisse Turkey Option 2 – Visit to Topkapi Palace

7:00 PM9:30 PM

Reception and Dinner with Local Business and Community Leaders Hosted by Sarik and Lale Tara in their private residence

Overnight:

Four Seasons Hotel Bosphorus - Istanbul

Day 3: Tuesday, April 16 – Istanbul 8:00 AMBreakfast Briefing 9:45 AM Topic: Turkey and the Middle East (Focus on: Israel, Iran, Iraq, and Arab Spring) Panelists: Kadri Gürsel, Columnist, Milliyet and Contributor, Al-Monitor Web Site Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Director of the Foreign Policy Program, TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Columnist, Milliyet 10:00 AM11:30 AM

Mid-Morning Discussion Topic: Domestic Politics Panelists: Andrew Finkel, Author and Columnist in Turkey, also reported for CNN Levent Köker, Professor of Law, Atılım University

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Ruşen Çakir, Journalist, Vatan Newspaper 12:30 PM2:00 PM

Luncheon Meeting with Turkish Business Leaders Organized by TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) Topic: The Business Scene in Turkey Speaker: Osman F. Boyner, President of Global Economic Relations Committee, TUSIAD Board Member, CEO of BD Otomotiv, CEO of Boyner Sanayi Mensucat Fab. A.Ş.

2:00 PM5:00 PM

Afternoon Options Option 1 – Visit to Aya Sofya & Blue Mosque Option 2 – Attend afternoon panel discussion organized by Bosphorus University and TUSIAD with Henri Barkey (participating in the panel).

7:00 PM-

Dinner at Leisure (dining in small groups with local guests in restaurants including Ulus 29, Topaz, and Mikla)

Overnight: Four Seasons Hotel Bosphorus - Istanbul Day 4: Wednesday, April 17 – Ankara 7:00 AM Travel to Ankara – Turkish Airlines Flight #2122 Flight time: 1 hour 9:00 AM10:00 AM

Briefing with The Honorable Francis Ricciardone, Jr., US Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey and his Embassy Team Location: Ambassador’s Residence

10:30 AM11:30 AM

Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Naci Koru Location: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

12:00 PM1:30 PM

Luncheon and Panel Discussion Topic: Is Turkey a Model for Democratization in the Middle East? Panelists: Ibrahim Kalin, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Ihsan Dagi, Professor, Middle East Technical University in Ankara and editor of Insight Turkey produced by SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)

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Hon. Suat Kınıklıoğlu, Executive Director, STRATIM (Center for Strategic Communication) and former Member, Turkish Parliament 2:00 PM2:30 PM

Meeting with His Excellency Abdullah Gül, President of Turkey Location: Çankaya Presidential Palace

3:00 PM3:45 PM

Meeting with Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek Location: Ministry of Finance

6:30 PM8:30 PM

Reception with local guests and Council on Foreign Relations Delegation Hosted by The Honorable Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., US Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey

9:45 PM

Travel to Istanbul – Turkish Airlines Charter plane

Overnight:

Four Seasons Hotel Bosphorus - Istanbul

Day 5: Thursday, April 18 – Istanbul 10:15 AMMid-Morning Discussion 11:45 AM Location: TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) Topic: Civil Society (to include women’s issues, journalism/media, NGOs) Brief welcome: Ayşe Yırcalı, Exec. Director of TESEV Panelists: Yavuz Baydar, Columnist, Today’s Zaman and Reader Representative, Daily Sabah Özge Genç, Director of the Democratization Program, TESEV Emma Sinclair-Webb, Senior Researcher on Turkey, Human Rights Watch Nuray Özbay, Deputy Secretary General, KAGİDER (Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey) 12:15 PM1:30 PM

Luncheon Discussion with Ishak Alaton, Chairman of the Board of Alarko Holding and Henri Barkey

1:45 PM5:00 PM

Afternoon Options Option 1 – Visit to Robert College and Small Group Discussion on the Strengths and Challenges of Education in Turkey with

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Headmaster Tony Jones and Trustee Nuri Çolakoğlu, Chief Executive Officer, CNN Turk Option 2 – Visit to Grand Bazaar and Cistern 6:30 PM-

Tour of Private Collection and Dinner hosted by the Demirören Family Location: Private Residence on Asia side of Bosphorus

Overnight:

Four Seasons Hotel Bosphorus - Istanbul

Day 6: Friday, April 19 – Kayseri/Cappadocia 9:50 AM Travel to Kayseri – Turkish Airlines Flight #2026 Flight time: 1 hour 20 minutes 11:15 AM 3:45 PM

Visit to Kayseri (in coordination with TUSKON) (TUSKON, Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey) This visit will include: - Meeting with Kayseri Chamber of Industry (KAYSO) (11:30-12:30) - Brief Tour of Industrial Zone (12:30-1:00) - Lunch and Meeting with Boydak Group Leadership (1:15-2:45) - Boyteks Factory Tour (3:00-3:45)

3:45 PM

Travel to Cappadocia Drive Time: 1 hour 15 minutes

5:00 PM

Arrive Museum Hotel with Dinner at Leisure

Overnight:

The Museum Hotel - Cappadocia

Day 7: Saturday, April 20 – Cappadocia 6:00 AMHot Air Ballooning 7:30 AM 9:30 AM3:30 PM

Visit and Tour of the Ozkaymak Underground City, Goreme Open Air Museum, Lunch at Muti Restaurant and Visit to Red Valley

6:30 PM-

Farewell Dinner Location: Bezirhane Museum Hotel - Cappadocia

Overnight:

Day 8: Sunday, April 21 – Cappadocia/Return to US Chicago Council Leadership Study Mission to Turkey April 14-21, 2013, Trip Report

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Leadership Study Mission to Turkey Delegation List Delegation Leader: Lester Crown Chairman, Henry Crown and Company Chairman, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Delegates Henri J. Barkey Cohen Professor of International Relations and Department Chair, Lehigh University Marshall M. Bouton President, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Rachel Bronson Vice President, Studies, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Janet Crown Founder and Owner, Burn 60 Fitness Studio John DeBlasio Executive Director, GPD Charitable Trust J. Douglas Gray President, Chief Executive Officer and Director, Everett Smith Group, Ltd. Chairman, Eagle Ottawa, Maysteel and Trostel, Ltd. Charles S. Hallab Principal, Baker & McKenzie LLP Josephine E. Heindel Vice President of External Relations, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Mary McCormack Civic Leader Robert C. McCormack Advisory Director, Trident Capital

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Susan Morrison Trustee, Women’s Sports Foundation Timothy Pearce Unsolved Gang Homocide Group, Los Angeles Police Department Owner, RotoComm Steve Robinson Chief Executive Officer, Reimagine Carole B. Segal Co-Founder, Crate & Barrel Founder, Foodstuffs, Inc. Gordon I. Segal Chairman and Co-Founder, Crate & Barrel Adele Simmons President, Global Philanthropy Partnership Leah Joy Zell General Partner and Principal, Lizard Investors LLC

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