LABOR AND POLITICS IN A DIVIDED MOVEMENT: THE ITALIAN CASE* PETER R. WEITZ German Marshall Fund of the United States,Washington,D.C.

IN the last decade, therehas been a

dramatic change in the political goals and strategyof the Italian labor movement. The two major national labor confederations, previously tied closelyto the strategiesof competingpolitical parties, have broken their partisan ties and have developed joint economic and political goals among themselves.These goals have become part of a common labor strategy.The new political and economic roles of the labor confederationsare reflectedboth in theirchangingties with major political institutions,including political parties and the government,and in a readjustment of relationships between the differentlevels of the labor movement. Collective bargaining and many other traditional trade union functionshave been largelytaken over by the constituent unions of the confederations,while the confederations themselves have turned their attention to issues of national economic and social policy. In the process, labor's formerlyclose ties with political partieshave given way to * The research on which this article is based was supported in part by the Department of Political Science, M.I.T. I am grateful to numerous individuals for guidance in this research, particularly to Donald L. M. Blackmer and Alessandro Pizzorno, who first set me on the path.

direct action designed to pressuregovernmentto adopt legislation and policies favorableto thelabor movement. These developmentsshould not be interpretedas a new formof syndicalism. Syndicalismadvocates direct revolutionary action to break the authorityof the state and to change authorityrelations at the work place. The new labor strategy in Italy, however,is not revolutionary, nor is it antagonistic to political parties. On the contrary,the confederations seek alliances with political parties and othergroups to attain labor's goals. The new "reform strategy" is just that-a strategyto achieve reforms,not revolution.Far frombeing syndicalistic, politics. it is a formof pressure-group The labor movement,however,does not merely act as a political lobby. It relahas no close, well-institutionalized tionshipswith elites in the political or bureaucratic leadership, nor does it have full and exclusive rightsto represent the interestsof wage earners.The Communist,Socialist,Social Democratic, and Christian Democratic parties all maintain independent ties with their working-classconstituencies. Through strikesand other formsof mass mobilization, labor must continually demonstrate that it still has the membership supportit claims.Althoughthis compet-

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LABOR AND POLITICS-THE itive situationis not unique, the Italian case is particularlyinterestingbecause (1) the once badly divided labor movementis in the processof overcomingits divisions,while the political systemitself remains as fragmentedas ever; (2) the labor movement'spolitical strategy containsovertonesof class-basedpolitics in a modern society; and (3) labor's strategyis militant,based on mass action, in a period when mass action almost seems a phenomenon of the past. This paper analyzes the changes that have occurredin the Italian labor movement since 1950 when the presentstructure and divisions of the movement took shape.' It focuses on the emergence of a unifiedpolitical strategyand the impact of this strategyon labor and on the political system.Particularatten'There is no single, complete, up-to-date history of the post-World War II Italian labor movement.A basic source in both Italy and the U.S. is Daniel Horowitz, The Italian Labor Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962). Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: N.Y. School of Industrial

and Labor

Relations,

Cornell University,1961) has a brief section on the postwar labor movement.A recent work by an Italian journalist, Sergio Turone, Storia del sindacato in Italia 1943-69 (Bari: Laterza ed., 1973) is a detailed chronologyof developments. Joseph LaPalombara, The Italian Labor Movement: Problems and Prospects (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957) contains some useful observationson the early CISL and UIL. A number of recent works in Italian have focused on the involvementof political parties in the labor confederations,and vice versa. These works include Cesare Pillon, I comunisti e il sindacato (Milan: Palazzi, 1972), which is best on the interwar years; Aldo Forbice and Paolo. Favero, I socialisti e il sindacato (Milan: Palazzi, 1968); Gian Primo Cella, et al., La concezione sindacale della CGIL: Un sindacato per la classes (Rome: ACLI, 1969); a special volume of Quaderni di rassegna sindacale, No. 33/4 (1972) on unions and parties (sindacato e partiti); Giancarlo Galli, I cattolici e il sindacato (Milan: Palazzi, 1969); and Giorgio Galli, et al., La presenza sociale del PC! e della DC (Bologna: I1 Mulino, 1968).

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tion will be paid to two of the threenational labor conferedations-the General Confederation of Italian Labor (CG1L), which has its ideological and organizationalroots in the Socialist and Communistparties and in the pre-Fascist socialist labor movement; and the Italian Confederationof Labor Unions (CISL), which has been closely associated with certainfactionsin the governing Christian Democratic party and with popular Catholic movements.2 The CISL, it should be noted, was influenced in its developmentby the ideas and resourcesof the labor movementin the United States and by the International Confederationof Free Trade Unions.

The third and smallestlabor confederation, the Italian Union of Labor (UIL), will be dealt with only briefly. The significantchanges in the labor movementhave occurredin CGIL and the CISL, and oftenthese changes have occurred in spite of the opposition of the UIL. The UIL and its memberunions are the least effectivelabor organizations in Italy. During specificperiods, the UIL has been able to play a modest role in the developmentof trade unionism in Italy, but in recent years it has 2A good general introduction to Italian politics can be found in Raphael Zariski, Italy: The Politics of Uneven Development (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1972), although his chapter on the labor movement is based on dated material. See also Norman Kogan, A Political History of Post-War Italy (New York: Praeger, 1966); and Giuseppe Mamarella, Italy after Fascism 1943-65 (Notre Dame, Ind.: Universityof Notre Dame, 1966). On the Italian Economy, the following studies are useful: George Hildebrand, Growth and Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); Lloyd Saville, Regional Economic Development in Italy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967); and Vera Lutz, Italy: A Study in Economic Development (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1962).

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become somethingof an anachronism: few of its member unions can compete with CGIL and CISL unions,and in interconfederalpolitics it has remained closelytied to the politicsof the Republican and Social Democratic parties, which have resisted labor unification and otherchangesin the strategyof the labor movement. During the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the CGIL and the CISL were both closely tied to the goals of opposing political parties. This paper will firstexamine theseties,both formaland ideological, in order to show how they came into conflictwith the development of basic trade union functionsand the need forunifiedlabor political action. I will then explain how the confederations developed the "reformstrategy"to offsetthe increasingindustrialpower of theirconstituentunions and to respond to internalpressuresfor labor unity.Finally,the responseof otherforcesin the Italian political systemto the new labor strategy will be examined.

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istries and public agencies over the termsof employmentfor employeesin the public and quasi-publicsectors. Unlike the labor movementsin Great Britain,Germany,and the Scandinavian countries,the Italian labor movement has been split into competingconfederations which reflectthe major political divisions in the country.No labor confederation,however,has ever been the dominant partner in its relationship with a political party,nor can any single political partyclaim to representthe interestsof most workersin any given category,whetherindustrial or agricultural,blue collaror whitecollar. Reliable informationon union membershipis only now becomingavailable in Italy, but on the basis of confederation claims, of works council (Commissione Interne) elections, and of surveydata, a fewgeneralizationscan be made about supportforthe confederations and confederationsuccess in differenteconomic sectors.Since the early 1950s, the CGIL has claimed a membership of over three million workEarly Political Ties ers,theCISL somethingovertwomillion, and the UIL at least one million. These The Italian labor movementhas been claims are partially reflectedin workspolitical throughout the years since council elections where, in most facto1947. Its leaders have been active in political parties, and the confederations ries, the CGIL has tended to win a majority of the seats. This pattern, have developed positionson virtuallyall issues subject to legislative considera- however,has varied regionallyand by industry; in so-called "White" (i.e. tion. Labor leaders have sat in parliaCatholic) regions of the country, the ment and have held elective local govCGIL has not done as well. ernment offices. They have also participatedin a corporativebody, the The three labor confederationshave National Council for Economy and Lanever claimed to have organized as bor (CNEL), which serves as advisory much as 30 percent of the total work body to parliament. Labor has also forcein Italy, and by 1968 theyhad organized only 31 percent of the insought to influence governmentdecisions throughposition papers, consulta- dustrial labor force.There has recently tions, informal pressure, and other been a greatincreasein industrialsector means. Finally, labor leaders have barunionization, however, particularly in gained collectivelywith individual minthe metal, steel, automobile, and appl-

LABOR AND POLITICS-THE icance industries, and today more than 50 percent of this sector is unionized. The CGIL has always organized at least twice as many industrial workers as has the CISL, and these workers have usually constituted approximately 40 percent of its claimed membership. The CISL, despite its smaller size, has organized more service sector workers than has the CGIL. In recent years, however, the CGIL unions have gained strength in the service sector; in 1968 CGIL unions organized almost as many service sector workers as did the CISL unions. It was the political parties that recreated the labor confederations during the resistance to the German occupation after 1943.3 Both the Communist and Socialist parties developed independent mass organizations from cadres formed at that time or remaining from the preFascist period. Catholic labor leaders were organized in Catholic Action, and then in the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI). For a brief period, all the groups joined in a united labor organization, but within a few years this organization split along political lines. The ACLI became the nucleus of ain independent Catholic labor confederation (the CISL) ; Social Democratic and Republican groups formed their own labor confederation (UIL); and the CGIL remained under the control of communist and socialist labor leaders. This division dates from the late 1940s and remains today.

Political Activitiesof the CISL Although closely tied to the Christian 3Many of the works previously cited deal with this period. See also Giorgio Candeloro, I1 Movimnentosindacale in Italia (Rome: Edizione di cultura sociale, 1950); and Giuseppe di Vittorio et al., I sindacati in Italia (Bari: Laterza, 1955).

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Democratic party (DC) and to the government during the 1950s and 1960s, the CISL, in contrast to the CGIL, claimed to be largely apolitical during that period. It basically accepted the broad economic and social goals of the government, stressing certain policy choices on selected issues but refraining from general prescriptions in major public policy areas. It took a long time for the CISL leadership to understand the accusations of the CGIL that this de facto support of government policies was not "apolitical" and that the type of voluntarism that is called for by American unions would not work in the Italian political and social context. The Christian Democratic party itself is made up of a coalition of factions.4 It is the largest party in Italy in terms of electoral support; since the re-establishment of the republic, it has been either the principal partner in every government coalition or the sole party in power. In the 1972 parliamentary elections, the Christian Democrats received about 12.9 million votes, approximately 39 percent of the votes cast. In contrast, the Communist party (PCI), the second 4The Italian Christian Democratic party has probably been studied less than any major political party in Western Europe. Galli has made a number of contributionsto the understanding of this party in Giorgio Galli and Paolo Facchi, La sinistra democristiana (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962); Il bipartismnoa imperfetto (Bologna: I1 Mulino, 1967); and Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy (New Haven, Conn.: The Yale University Press, 1971). Thierry Godechot, Le parti democrate chretien en Italie (Paris: Librairie G(n6rale de Droit et de Jurisprudence,1964) is a good general introduction. More limited treatmentsinclude Raphael Zariski,"Intra-party Conflictin a Dominant Party: The Experiences of the Italian Christian Democracy," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (February 1965), pp. 19-34; and Alan Zuckerman, "Hierarchical Social Divisions and Political Groups: Factions in the Italian Christian Democratic Party" (Ph.D. dissertation,Yale University,1971).

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largestin Italy, received approximately 9 million votes,or 27.2 percentof those cast. In membershipterms,the Christian Democrats claimed about 1.5 million membersin 1966; the currentenrollmentin the Communistpartyis also about 1.5 million, down considerably sincethe early1950s. CISL leaders in the ChristianDemocraticpartytended to be associatedwith factions,called Rinone of the left-wing novamento in the late 1950s and Forze Nuove since 1964. During the 1960s, this factionwas not only a minorityfaction but also one that frequentlyopposed the factionsleading the party.In 1973 Forze Nuove membersheld about 12 percentof the ChristianDemocratic partyseats in parliament.This faction's power reached its peak duringthe 1960s when it accounted for as many as 17 percent of the delegates to party congresses; this share, however,fell to 10 percent at the 1973 Congress.Actually, fewerthan 20 percentof ChristianDemocratic voters are "workingclass," and fewerthan 50 percentare wage and salaryearners.5 It should be noted that CISL leaders have never been in controlof the Forze Nuove faction,nor have theycommitted all theirresourcesto the faction'sgoals. of the CISL and The secretary-general the leader of the party faction have openly clashed on this subject,6 but CISL leaders have always insistedon a degreeof autonomy. CISL leaders have been active in parliament,largelyin advocatinglegislation 5These figuresare from various Forze Nuove and DC publications; figureson the 1973 Congress representativesand on the social composition of party support come fromJacques Nobecourt's reporting in Le Monde, June 7, 1973; 1966 party membershipfiguresfrom Italia 1967 (Rome: CIRD, 1968),p. 2209. "See CISL, IV Congresso (Rome: 1962).

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they felt would be beneficial to the labor movement.Here a clear contrast exists between CGIL and CISL deputies. The volume of bills introducedby CGIL deputies fell off sharply after 1958,whereasCISL deputies became increasinglyactive.7 The CISL leadership also sought to develop certain neo-corporativistforms of representationand consultation,althoughwithoutmuch success.The Center-Leftgovernmentsformedsince 1962 have all been committed,in principle, to consulting the economic and social interestgroups on major legislative issues, but in practice consultationshave been sporadic and their results never binding on the government.CISL leaders have also participated along with representativesfrom the other labor confederations, management groups, and economic expertsin the corporativist National Council for Economy and Labor (CNEL). The CNEL, however, has not facilitatedagreementamong divergentlabor groups,nor has it brought labor and managementcloser together on major economicand social questions. Basically, while the ruling Christian Democrats and their partnersin coalition governmentshave not been unwilling to allow CISL leaders some latitude in proposing legislation of immediate interestto labor, the partyhas not been open to regular "advice" from CISL leaders on otherissues. As CISL leaders became increasinglyinterestedin broad aspectsof social and economic policy in the 1960s, tensions increased between them and a ChristianDemocraticparty leadershipdominatedby forcesantagonistic to CISL and the rest of the labor movement. 7Antonella Bearzi, "I dirigenti sindacali nell' attivitA parlamentare," Quaderni di Rassegna Sindacale, No. 39, (1972), p. 116.

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representthe distinct interestsof the party's working-classconstituency.In the Communistand Socialistparties,the The political involvementof CGIL whole partypurportedto representthe course. In leaders took a quite different workingclass. CGIL leaders who simulthe early 1950s,theyrelied on mass motaneously held parliamentaryseats did bilization to back their opposition to put forwardconcretelegislativeproposthe Marshall Plan and to the governals from time to time; although their ment's economic reconstruction protrade union constituenciesrepresented gram. Mass mobilization and protest almost as broad a sociological spectrum strikesdiminishedin the late 1950s but as was representedby the total memberwere never repudiated as a useful ship of the parties on the Left, the weapon by the CGIL. CISL leaders,on CGIL leadersdid not seek to assume the the other hand, always tried to avoid role of being the sole defendersof orgausing strikes, even to support their nized labor's interestsinside the Comcollectivebargaininggoals. munistand Socialistparties. The differencesbetween the two The Communistsin particular were groups were not simplythose of means. explicitlyopposed to any faction-formThe CGIL leaders remained closely asing tendenciesby economic or sectoral sociated with the political positions of interestsin the party. Differencesover the parties in which theyheld memberparty strategywere expressed by loose ship, the Communist party (PCI), the internalgroupings,but thesewere never Socialist party (PSI), and from 1963 to permitted to solidify into permanent 1972 the Socialist Party of the Prolefactions.In the Socialist parties,on the tarian Unity (PSIUP).8 They engaged other hand, ideological and personal in broad criticismof the political and factions did and still do exist, and economic system,but except forsupport CGIL activistsare to be found in all of certain reformmeasures,such as the themajor ones. creation of a ministryto control pubCGIL leaders, it should be noted, licly capitalized industry,they refused have been active not only in parliament to participate in, or were excluded but also in political partyleadershippofrom,debates on basic governmentpolisitions. Indeed, between one third and cies until thelate 1960s. two thirdsof the membersof the CGIL A crucial difference between the Committee have held party Executive CGIL and the CISL was theirdifferent leadership posts (central committeesor conceptionsof interestrepresentation. In directorates)since the war. In meetings the Christian Democratic party a sepaof the Communistparty'sCentral Comrate faction in parliament claimed to mittee,CGIL leaders have been active SFor more detail on CGlL-political party rein discussionson labor's bargaining,orlations, see Donald L. M. Blackmer, Unity in and politicalstrategies.Yet, ganizational, Diversity:Italian Communism and the Commuin neither the Socialist nor Communist nist World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1968), chap. 8; and Peter Weitz, "The CGIL parties has the partyofficialresponsible and the PCI: From Subordination to Independfor relations with mass organizations ent Political Force," in Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., French and Italian and labor come from CGIL. Similarly, Comnmunism(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uniin 1970, when a declaration of incomversityPress,forthcoming). The Political Involvementof the CGIL

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patibilitymade it impossiblefor leaders to hold joint officein CGIL and the Communistpartyand AgostinoNovella, then the secretary-generalof CGIL, opted to remain a party functionary rather than a CGIL leader, he was made responsiblefor partypolicy on regional development and international affairs but not for liaison with the CGIL. Parliamentaryrepresentation has been far less important to CGIL activists than to CISL activists. Many CGIL leaders have been deputies, but few of themhave seen theirrole in parliament as representing the interests of the CGIL and its members.In some cases they were recruitedby the Communist party to participate actively and in other cases theirparliamentarypresence was only symbolic.To be sure, the first postwar secretary-general of the CGIL, Giuseppe Di Vittorio,a communist,was active in parliament both in floor debates on general issues and as a proponent of labor legislation,but he was an exception. No other CGIL leader has had his stature and autonomy. Most CGIL activistsin parliamenthave been under partydiscipline,and the few that have been at all active have largelypursued trade union interests,such as pension and insurancecoverage. Notwithstandingthe different degrees of involvementof CGIL and CISL leaders in their respective parties and in parliament,the organizational dependence of the Christian Democratic, Socialist, and Communist parties on the labor organizationshas been almostuniformlyminimal. The parties have simply not been dependent on the labor confederationsfor the central political tasks of recruitment,mobilization,and electoralcampaigns.

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PressuresforChange The basic pressureson the confederations and particularlyon the CISL leadership to modifyestablishedpatternsof political involvementcame fromwithin the labor movement,especiallyfromthe industrialunions, which developed unified collectivebargainingstrategiesduring the 1960s. The promotion of effectivecollective bargaining in Italy is one of the most importantdevelopments in the postwar labor movement.9 During the 1950s, the CGIL and its member unions were systematically excluded from organizing in the factoriesand fromparticipationin negotiationsat the national level. Actually, prior to 1959 there was little genuine collective bargaining; management announced the general terms of national contracts, and the labor confederations,particularly the CISL, usually accepted them. Until well into the 1960s, many CISL leaders simply avoided confrontationswith management. Yet at the same time, curiously enough, the CISL was training a new generationof labor leaders in collective bargainingand organizingtechniquesat a union school establishedin the midl950s in Florence. Many of the activists who came out of thisschool rejectedthe docile attitudesof thepast. The new generationwas particularly active in northern industrial unions, 9The development of collective bargaining in Italy has been traced by Eugenio Guidi, et al., Movirnentosindacale e contrattazionecollettiva 1945-1970 (Rome: Franco Angeli, 1971); and in Gino Giugni, II sindacato fra contrattie riforme, 1969-73 (Bari: De Donato, 1973). In English see Gino Giugni, "Recent Developments in Collective Bargaining in Italy," International Labour Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (April 1965), pp. 273-291; and Guigni, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Italy," International Labour Review, Vol. 104, No. 4 (October 1971),pp. 307-328.

LABOR AND POLITICS-THE where it pushed not only for significant improvementsin the termsof national contractsbut also for the decentralization of some aspects of the bargaining processto regional levels and eventually to individual plants, a development called "articulated" bargaining.'0Local CISL leaders soon learned that to win significantimprovementsin contracts they would have to develop a united front with unions in the other labor confederations.Beginning in 1960 and then accelerating during the 1962-63 national negotiations,CISL union leaders agreed to develop joint strategies with CGIL and UIL unions. This was a first,but crucial,step towardsthe reunificationof the labor movement. As theydeveloped a more criticaland antagonistic strategytowards management, this same group of CISL leaders also became dissatisfiedwith government programs and services, such as low-income housing, health insurance and health services,mass transportation, education, and the fiscalsystemsupposedly intended to pay for these services. Eventually,theyproposed that since the ruling Christian Democratic party was to improve these not moving effectively programs,the CISL should break its ties with the partyand join with the other labor confederationsin order to bring massivepressureon governmentto institutereforms." 1oGiugni,"Recent Developments in Collective Bargaining in Italy." "iThe leading industry in this reunification efforthas been fabricatedmetals. The CISL metalworkers union (FIM) was the first in the CISL federation to be taken over by the new cadres trained at the CISL school. Some information on this change in the CISL is available in Gian Primo Cella et al., Un Sindacato Italiano neglic anni sessanta: FIM/CISL (Bari: De Donato, 1972). See also T. Treu, Sindacato e reppresentanzeaziendale (Bologna: Ii Mulino, 1971); the chapter by Bruno Manghi in La DC dopo

is

primo

ventenio

(Padova:

Marsilio,

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CGIL leaders were preparedto follow the lead of the CISL unions in developing collective bargaining, in part to overcome their isolation at the work place and in national contractnegotiations.12 Therefore, they supported, first,

the local attemptsat joint CGIL and CISL bargaining in 1959 and subsequently the unifiednational bargaining positions in key industrial sectors in 1962. Althoughthe CGIL confederalleadership supportedthe developmentof joint collectivebargaining,it was initiallynot willing to abandon its fundamental opposition to most national economic and social policies initiated by the ChristianDemocrats.But by 1965 its reform goals had been modified sufficientlyto coincide with the increasingly militant position of the new leadership groups within the CISL. Finally, in 1969,a remainingkey question blocking concertedaction betweenthe confederations was resolved-that of severingthe formalties betweenthe labor confederationsand competingpoliticalparties. Pressuresfor more effectivecollective bargaining and for greater independence from the political parties came mainly from leaders of key CGIL industrial unions, and particularlyfrom

1968); and the periodical publications of both the FIM (particularly Dibattito Sindacale, which has been published since 1964) and of the CGIL metalworkers union (the FIOM), Sindacato Moderno. This paper does not deal with the labor confederationsin international politics. F. Roy Willis, Italy Chooses Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), chap. 12, discusses the early antagonism and then later convergenceof CGIL and CISL views on the EEC. However, due in part to the international institutionalsetting,the CGIL and the CISL remain more divided in internationalpolitics than they are in Italian politics. l2Weitz, "The CGIL and the PCI."

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socialists.13Many communists,particularly those who came out of industrial unions,were also eager to develop joint collective bargaining goals and tactics with other unions. Men like Bruno Trentin,who is now secretary-general of the unified metalworkersunion, often discussedthe possibilityof new alliances with their counterpartsin the other labor confederations.14 Although most socialists and many communistswere thereforecommittedin principle to establishingstrongerties with the CISL, therewere disagreementson the acceptable conditionsfor greaterlabor unity. Many communistlabor leaders, for example, were not willing to loosen their ties with the Communistparty and resisteda formalseveranceuntil 1969. In spite of theseproblems,the constituent industrial unions of the several labor confederations gradually succeeded in developing unifiedand effective collectivebargainingstrategiesduring the 1960s. Their leaders urged the confederationsto develop,in turn,more unifiedlegislativegoals by concentrating theirefforts on obtainingkey social and economic reforms.The need for reform was clearly demonstrated in the national political debatesduringthe 1960s, in the programof the Center-Leftgovernment,and in the goals of the fiveyearplan. Expectations of significant reforms increasedwhen the Socilist partyjoined the governmentto formthe Center-Left l3Forbice and Favero, I socialisti e il sindacato, and a number of contributions to the journal Economia e Lavoro in the 1965-69 period discuss the position or the socialists in the CGIL on the five-yearplan. 14B. Trentin, "Le dottrine neocapitalistichee l'ideologia delle forze dominanti nella politica economic italiana" in Istituto Gramsci, ed., Tendenze del capitalismo italiano (Rome: Riuniti, 1962),pp. 97-144.

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coalition in 1963. The confederation leadership in the CISL, along with socialists and some communists in the CGIL, was committedto the successof the Center-Leftand the reformprogram but could do little to ensure their success. Both confederationsparticipatedin a consultativebody established to discuss the five-year plan in 1963, but this body was not reconvened after early 1964. The governmentdraftedthe plan without furtherconsolation with the labor movement,and it was not until the plan was debated in parliamentin 1966 that labor leaders could attemptto influenceits content.CISL leaders did tryto modifysome provisionsbut had to do so without the support of important segmentsof the Christian Democratic party. This finallydemonstrated to the CISL leaders, who had been resisting the call of their own "innovators" to leave the ChristianDemocratic party,the futilityof pursuingimportant social and economic reformswithin the caucus. party'sparliamentary CG1L leaders were split on the plan, largelybecause of theirconflicting party affiliations:the socialists to a party in government,and the communiststo the major oppositionparty.CGIL unitywas only maintained by abstention of its parliamentarymembers from the final votein theChamberof Deputies. Pension Reform A precedent for confederalunity in pursuitof a national political goal was set during the 1967-69 period on the issue of pension reform.Pensions provided a link between collectivebargaining and joint political action to pressure thegovernment. Pensionersare an organizedgroup in the Italian labor movement,and the

LABOR AND POLITICS-THE pension system is publicly controlled. Labor leaders had been seeking major reformsin the systemsince the 1950s. Deputies fromthe CGIL and the CISL had introducedseparate reformbills in parliament,but these bills were never debated. The government repeatedly committeditselfto reformingthe system but took no action. In mid-1967,shortly afterpassage of the five-year plan, which among other things called for pension systemreforms,it looked as if the governmentwere once again about to put offconfronting the problem. At that point, under growingpressure from the rank and file, the confederations presentedtheir own set of reform proposals directly to the government. The proposals were intentionallynot submitted through the parliamentary parties in order to facilitateconfederal cooperation and in the hope that the governmentwould be forcedto take the initiative.Having reached agreementon the substance of theirreformgoals, the confederationsalso reached agreement on tactics. They decided to call a national striketo demonstratesupport for their demands. This was the firsttime in twentyyearsthat the CISL agreed to strikewith the CGIL. Rank-and-file support for pension reformwas one of the main reasons for CISL's willingnessto pressure the governmentwith a strike after years of opposition to the CGIL and to a tactic with which CGIL was closelyidentified. By November 1968, the government had taken no action on the confederation proposals,so anothergeneral strike was called. This strikewas successfulin persuading the governmentto incorporate the confederations'demands in its draft reform bill, but it nevertheless took several more months to obtain a

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concrete governmentproposal. An interimcentristgovernmentundertookno legislation in this area, and it was replaced by a Center-Leftgovernment, led by Mariano Rumor. The Rumor governmentincluded, for the firsttime, a Minister of Labor who had been activelyinvolvedin the labor movementGiacomo Brodolini from the PSI. Althoughat odds with much of the CGIL leadership, he was closer to the labor movementthan past Ministersof Labor had been. During his brief tenure (he died in the summerof 1969), not only was an agreementreached on reformof the pension system,but legislationfor a "Workers'Law" was introducedto guarantee a number of rightsinadequately protectedby the constitution,including the right to organize in the factories, the rightof union organizersto enter a factory,and the right to hold meetings in thefactory.15 WorkerMilitancy By 1969, joint collective bargaining was well establishedin many industrial unions. This was an importantdevelopment because it coincided with the decline of the confederationsas labor's spokesmenin collectivebargaining and 15Maiiyof these rightswere actually obtained by the unions in the 1969-70 contracts,so in fact organized labor was less in need of the "Workers' Law" than it might have been when its contractual powers were far weaker. The discussion of the pension reformis based on a number of sources, including various articles that appeared in the confederation periodicals -Rassegna Sindacale of the CGIL and Conquiste del Lavoro of the CISL-during 1967-69; articles that appeared in Sette Giorni, particularly pieces by Giancarlo Lizzeri in No. 54 and No. 75; Italia for 1968 and 1969 (Rome: CIRD, 1968) and (Rome: CESDI, 1969); the Committee and Parliamentarydebates for the Chamber of Deputies in 1968-69; and newspaper acCounts in Avanti! during January and February of 1969.

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their replacement by the industrial unions.'6 This shiftin the locus of bargainingfunctionsreflecteda corresponding shiftin power from the confederations to the unions. At about the same time,the threemetalworkers unions forbade theirleaders to hold political office and called on the confederationsto follow theirexample. To thesedevelopmentsmustbe added a growingrank-and-file militancy.During 1967 and 1968, workerscalled for higherwages and formore rightsat the work place by an increasingnumber of local and plant-leveldemonstrations and strikes,many without formalunion involvement.In some plants, the protests were organized by groups of students and intellectuals,but by and large the movementdeveloped its own plant-level leadership.The new militancyexhibited a number of importantcharacteristics: workerswith membershipin different unions joined forces; there were attempts to compress and simplifythe wage structureand to seek across-theboard increases; and there were efforts to establishorganizingrightsinside the factory.Although many of the protests were not initially union-led,they were not directedagainst the unions. Union leaders responded quickly by adopting the goals and tacticsof groupsin different factories,and many of the issues raised during the 1967-68 period were made part of national contractdemands in 1969. This increased worker militancy provided both a resource and a l6The role of the confederationsin collective bargaining is not fully resolved. Some confederation leaders sought, during the 1973 contract negotiations, to participate once again in sectoral contracts, which had been negotiated without them in 1969. There are still weaker unions in the confederationsthat rely on confederation support during their contract negotiations.

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challenge to the unions and the confederations. The unions involved in contract negotiations, both national and local, channeled this militancyinto support for bargaining goals, and it became a potentialresourceto be used by the confederallevel of the labor movement in the developmentof a national politicalstrategy.17 Formal Autonomyand Commitment to Unity Both the CGIL and the CISL held quadrennial congressesin the summer of 1969 in which past patternsof political involvementand past economic and social goals came under severe attack. The secretary-generalof the CISL, Bruno Storti,was forced to accept the goals of the "innovators"in the CISL. "7Foranalyses of these rank-and-filepressures for greater union militancy and for organizational renewal, see, among others: Giugni, I1 sindacato fra contrattie riforme,1969-73, chap. 1; and G. Bianchi, Sindacati e Impressa (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1969). For descriptions of the changes that occurred in bargaining,see T. Treu, Sindacato e rappresentanza Aziendale: FIM-CISL (Bologna: Il. Mulino, 1971); G. P. Cella, et al., Un sindacato italiano neglianni '60 (Bari: De Donato, 1972); G. Bianchi, et al., I Delegati Operai (Rome: Coines, ed., 1970). For various perspectives on organizational changes within the labor movement during this period, see Quaderni di Rassegna Sindacale, Nos. 24, 31, 32, 35, 38, 39, and 40 (Rome: CGIL), and G. Bianchi, et al., I CUB (Rome: Coines, 1971). Regular meetings of workers began to occur at the plant and shop levels in 1968; they were recognized as a formal right in the 1969-70 contractsand in the 1970 Worker Law statuteo dei Lavoratori). Worker delegates (delegati, similar to shop stewards) emerged independent of the old Commissione interne structures.The meetings and delegates have tended to replace the Commissione interne since 1969. Initial impetus for these new formsof workerrepresentation came in some factories from student and intellectual groups active in these factories in 1967-68. These outsiders formed CUB (Unified Rank-and-File Committees),which were hostile to the unions in many cases. They were quickly absorbed by the unions in most factories.

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Bruno Storti,and composed largely of In the CGIL, the secretary-general releaders from the servicesector,agriculsigned ratherthan accept formalautontural unions, and southern confederal omy fromthe political parties,which is what the majorityof the congresspartic- offices.Stortiwas able to defeat the inipantsdemanded. surgentsonly by largelyembracingtheir More specifically, a major issue before goals, includinga formalbreak with the Christian Democratic party. Although the CGIL Congresswas whetherto establish the principle that confederation the issueswere not finallyresolveduntil and union leaders could not simultane- some innovatorswere included in the ously hold officein political partydirec- secretariatof the CISL in the springof torates. As noted, the metalworkers 1970, the principle of the Confederaunion had already establishedthis prin- tion'sincompatibilitywith the Christian ciple. On the other hand, most commu- Democraticpartywas accepted,and this nistsin the CGIL were personallycom- importantblock to developing a committed to active participationin their mon strategywith the CGIL was reparty.The majorityof the participants moved. in the Congress accepted the principle Thus, both CISL and CGIL emerged of formalautonomyfromparticipation from their 1969 congresses with the in party leadership but without reject- groundworkforgreaterunityand political independence firmly established. ing political parties per se or political They had accepted the principleof foractivityby individuals. Although CGIL leaders pressed for an expanded politi- mal autonomyfromthe political parties cal role for the labor movement,they and from parliament, and they had explicitly rejected any neo-syndicalist committedthemselvesto developing a suggestionthat the labor confederations numberof joint positionson needed socould replace the political parties.18 cial and economic reforms.This led to Thus, for most CGIL leaders, the 1969 the development of the "reformstratbreak with the political partieswas nec- egy" in late 1969 and early 1970. essary in order to establish a unified The ReformStrategyand Its Impact confederalreformstrategyand was not meant as a rejection of the important In November1969, the threenational role of thepoliticalparties. called a national striketo confederations In the CISL the difficultieswere protestthe lack of low-incomehousing, greater.The activistsfromthe northern and particularlythe failure of the govindustrialunions and confederaloffices, ernment to use its resources to meet termed "innovators,"came to the 1969 housing needs. During 1970, local Congresscalling for an end to the constrikeswere called in many cities and federation'srelationshipwith the Chris- regions to protestthe lack of housing, tian Democratic party and for a clear inadequate public transportation,and, commitmentto major economic and soin some regions,the lack of jobs. Subsecial reforms,in opposition to the Chris- quently, national strikes and protests tian Democratic party if necessary. have focused on health insurance and These innovators were opposed by a health care, taxation, and lack of ecogroup led by the secretary-general, nomic development in southern Italy. This mobilization of the labor move181 Congressi della CGIL, Vol. 8, Part 1 ment to pressforgovernmentsocial and (Rome: editricesindacale Italiana, 1970).

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economic reformhas been called the "reformstrategy." The precise dimensions of this new labor strategyhave never been fullydefined,but some importantcharacteristics have remainedconstant.The confederations have remained fairly unified on the subject of the substance of needed governmentactions,despite theirinabilityto unifyorganizationally.'9Although theyhave soughtthe supportof political parties for their demands, they have soughtit fromall parties and not individually from the parties with which theyhave had special relationshipshistoically. Also, the confederationshave negotiatedtheirdemands directlywith the government,bypassing the parliamentary parties; and they have remained willing to oppose the government,to mobilizemasspressureto supportspecific reformproposals,and, since 1973,to protest the government's economic and social policies in general. The confederations have not sought to become a formalpoliticaloppositionthroughthese activities,except in the sense of proposing policy alternatives.They have not 19During 1970-71, an agenda was established for formalconfederationunification.It was proposed that the existing confederationsformally disband and form a single national confederation. By early 1971, opposition to carryinglabor unity this far had developed in both the CISL and the UIL. A majority in the UIL rejected the idea, and a group that had attractedalmost half of the votes in the CISL General Council also sought to block dismantling the confederation. These developments did effectivelystop formal unification of the confederations, but this did not seriously impair the basic pattern of developing unified goals and tactics by the three confederations.There are large minorities in both the CISL and the UIL that are still uncomfortablein their alliance with the CGIL, but they have not been able to break this alliance. Bruno Storti's leadership of the CISL was seriouslychallenged by such a group, led by his previous deputy Scalia, at the 1973 Confederation Congress,but he managed to retain control of the confederation.

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soughtpublic office, nor have theyexplicitly supported one or another type of governmentcoalition. It is clear, however,thata Center-Leftcoalition is more likely than a minorityChristianDemocratic government or a Center-Right coalition to respond favorablyto the reforms and economic policies that the confederationsadvocate. The goals of the strategyhave various roots. Although there was extensivereconstructionafterthe war, rapid urban migration resulted in a considerable housing shortagein the northerncities, where even today housing is often simply not available despite the increasing ability of workersto pay for it.20 Another key problem is health care. The systemof national health insurance is based on occupational categories and the use of accreditedpublic clinics and hospitals.It is almost universallyagreed that care available in public institutions is poor and access to care throughthe highlybureaucratizedsystemis difficult if not impossible.Urban Transportation is seriously overburdened; housing shortagesand the growthof cities have made existingsystemsincreasinglyinadequate. In addition, the historicimbalance between north and south remains virtuallyunchanged.The confederations have urged more investmentsin the south in negotiationsboth with the governmentand with the managementof semipublicand privatefirms.This tactic of negotiatingwith industryas well as with the governmentreflectsan increasinglysophisticatedunderstandingthatit 2fL'Espresso, September 20, 1970, estimated that approximately three million dwellings were still needed nationally. Despite the existence of two public subsidy programs for housing, only 5 percent of housing built in recent years has been publicly subsidized. In 1973, one of the public housing programs spent less than one third of its budget on actual housing projects.

LABOR AND POLITICS-THE is privateand semipublicenterprises,as well as the government,that hold the key to long-termsocial and economic development. PartyResponsesto theReform Strategy Initially, Communist and Socialist partyleaders hailed the reformstrategy as a bold and importantpolitical development, which had their full support. Communist party leaders had become concerned during 1968-69 that labor strategyhad turned too much on organizational renewal and collective bargaining and not enough on the broad economic and social reformsthe party sought.The reformstrategyallayed the party's fears. Party leaders even suggested in 1969 that the new stance posed a positive challenge to the party, which was urged to seek firmerties to forceson the Left and develop a unified reformstrategyof its own.2' In an indtroductoryaddress to the Communist Party'sWorkers'Conferencein late Febuary 1970, Ferdinando Di Giulio, the party spokesman on relations with the realiunions,praised the confederations' zation that contractualgains could not be isolated from social and economic problemsin societyat large.22 The Socialists found in the reform strategyan echo of their political positions of the early 1960s. Endorsing the reformstrategyprovided them with a means of reestablishingthemselvesas supportersof fundamentalreformsand as allies of organizedlabor afterthe disastrousunificationwith the Social Democraticparty. 21Bufalini,"La Funzione della classe operaia e (del partito," Critica Marxista, Vol. 7, No. 6 (1969), pp. 3-11. 22La Conferenza operaia, 1970 (Rome: Riutiiti, 1970), pp. 19-51.

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The factionalnature of the Christian Democratic party precluded any single responseto the strategy,but at the outset none of the party'sfactionsdirectly attackedthe confederationstrategy.The position of the partypaper, II Popolo, was in favor of the new union stance, although with some qualifications.The party leadership was not prepared for the withdrawalof the CISL fromactive support of the party,but they did not overtlyoppose the move. There was no consistentresponseto the confederation requestsfor directnegotiationswith the government,but slowlythe partyturned its attention from the confederations' overall strategyand goals to the means used to attain these goals (particularly the general strike) and also to the confederations'request for binding agreements on issues that the government had formerly decided autonomously. The Left factions of the Christian Democratic party, which might have been expected to be the strongestsupportersof the reformstrategy,became critical for a number of reasons. Although many in the Forze Nuove supported the substance of the reforms, theyrejected the notion that the political partiesshould be excluded fromnegotiations.Carlo Donat Cattin, the faction leader,also criticizedthe tacticsand especiallythe unityof theconfederations, suggesting that the strategy served largelyas an instrumentof the Communist party.This reflecteda continuedresistence to alliances, direct or indirect, with the communists,which persistsin partsof theCatholic Left. The response of the major economic managers and interest groups should also be noted. Few spokesmen openly disagreed with the call for reforms. Rather, they focused on their own exclusion fromthe formulationof the re-

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formproposalsand on criticaleconomic conditions,which, they argued, had to be confrontedbeforethe reformscould an asbe considered.The Confindustria, sociation that representssmall and medium-sizedindustrialfirms,soughtto revive the idea of tripartite meetings, which had been discussed during the early years of the Center-Leftcoalition, but had neverbeen instituted. Opposition to the confederationstrategy also emergedfromone of the early allies, the Communist party, in late 1970. By then, the reformstrategyand organizational changes in the labor movementwere loosening the ties between the party and the labor movement. At the November 1970 Central Committeemeeting,the partysecretary, Enrico Berlinguer,remindedthe confederations that "the strugglefor the reforms cannot be conducted solely by union action and using the formsavailable to the unions." He argued that other mass organizationsmust also be involved in the search for reformsand should be coordinatedby the party,and parliament must remain the seat of major economic and social decisions.23 The party'spositionon the reformstrategy was furtherelucidated by Di Giulio in early 1973, when he suggestedthat confederationdemands be made much more concrete,more limited,and more closelytied to collectivebargainingthan to the broad economic and social poliThis position, cies of the government.24 although somewhat paradoxical, was a reassertion of the party's primacy in seeking broad social and economic reforms. 23Berlinguer on November 14, 1970, from L'Unita (my translation). The PCI has always defended the autonomy and importance of the parliament. 24Rinascita,No. 3 (January19, 1973).

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Other Obstacles The confederations'strategyfocused initiallyon reachingan agreementwith the governmentitselfand did not anticipate the restof the legislativeprocessthe draftingof a bill, its debate in parliament prior to passage, and the enactment of enabling legislation. The confederationscould demand to be the sole negotiatorswith the government, but once a reformmeasure became an actual bill, it became much harder for the confederationsto influenceamendmentsand debate. Since 1971,the focusof the confederations' strategyhas changed from substantivereforms,which are still called for periodically, to the government's economic policies. In early 1971, there were national demonstrations calling for new governmentpolicies to develop the south, so that workerswould not have to migrateto the northto findwork in cities that were becoming increasingly difficultto live in. This aspect of the labor strategyhas been actively taken up by some unions in theircontractnegotiations with specificfirms,both the industrialfirmsin the semi-publicholding company, the Institute for IndustrialReconstruction(IRI), and with private firms like Fiat. The confederations have also focused their attention and pressureon governmentmacroeconomicpolicy as it affectsinflation, employment, and investment.25 15Thereis no "incomes policy" in Italy. The governmentstill relies largely on monetarypolicy to control prices and inflation. Until the 1969 contracts,there were no dramatic increases in wage and labor costs. Since then, inflation, caused by both domestic and international developments,has increased. Wage increases have been substantial,and domestic prices have risen very rapidly. The confederationshave called on the government to control prices, and recent contracts suggest that the dramatic wage demands of 1969-71 have been replaced with

LABOR AND POLITICS-THE Confederationconcernwith theseeconomic issues has not led, however, to significantinnovations in macroeconomic policy. Basically, the failure of governmentto respondto the call either formajor social reformsor fornew economic policies must be viewed in the broader context of national political fragmentation and immobility.The confederationstrategyof massive popular support for key economic and social issues has not been able to break the stalemate.No major reformshave been proposed by the governmentor by parliament in response to either the labor movementor to other forcesin the societysince 1971. Although tenuous alliances are formed,broken,and reformed to put togethergovernments, thereis inadequate agreement among the intraparty factions that dominate national politics,so thatmajor policyalternatives cannot be developed. The Christian Democratic party,internallydivided on manysubstantiveissues,can achieveunity only on the shared desire of all factions forthe partyto hold power.The smaller parties,which have been in and out of the governmentsince 1962, can rarely agree among themselves,or with the Christian Democrats, on most policy issues.

Conclusions The Italian labor movementhas been transformedin ways that have fundamentallyaltered labor's political role in Italy. The labor movementnow speaks greater attention to nonwage benefits.The confederationscould not, however, accept an "incomes policy" in which the bargaining position of member unions was specificallyconstrained. For these and other reasons, the basic relationship between governmentand organized labor has become more, rather than less, antagonistic in recentyears.

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as a unified and independent force on issues of national importance.It is no longer possible for the governmentand otherpolitical forcesin Italy to take organized labor for granted or to ignore it. By developing a united and aggressive set of tactics independentlyof the political parties,the confederations have been able to put a numberof important issuesbeforethe governmentand labor's constituents.The new strategy, however, has not altered the patternof fragmentation that characterizesItalian politics, nor has the reformstrategyresulted in manynew public policies. The divisions within and between political parties, which impede any but caretakerfunctions of government,have not diminished. For example, the Communists,although they have come to play an increasinglyimportantrole in preserving the governmentcoalition by abstaining on key parliamentaryvotes, cannot formthe electoralalliances necessaryfor removingthe ChristianDemocratsfrom power. Nor, despite recent reiterations of Communist desires to share power with the ChristianDemocrats,have the ChristianDemocratsshown any inclinationto make "historiccompromises." Although the new labor strategyhas thus far had only a limited impact on Italian national politics and policies, it does reflectimportant changes in the labor movementitself. The previously competinglabor confederationshave esa tablished,throughthe reformstrategy, basis forsustainedcooperation.This has not yetled to the organizationalunification of the labor movement,but it does mean that in many nonbargaining as well as bargaining activities organized labor now speaks with one voice, whereas in the past there were often three voices. There are still powerful groups within and outside the labor

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movement,however, that oppose the new strategy.Were they to succeed in upsettingthe new patternsof unityand independent political involvement, it would seriouslyunderminerank-and-file support for the confederations and would certainly doom the confederathat tions to the political ineffectiveness the reform strategywas designed to overcome. Basically, the future of reform remains contingent on the factors that have helped to shape the strategy.If

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general agreementon goals and tactics can be maintained along with rankand-filesupport,the strategywill change only with respect to the nature of specificgoals and tactics.Although the political parties can oppose aspects of the labor strategyand can stand in the way of implementingthe changes the labor movementseeks,theycannot undermine the legitimacy of the strategy,unless they find some way to overcome their own divisions and inaction in areas of needed public intervention.