KOSTELANETZ & FINK, LLP 7 WORLD TRADE CENTER NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10007 TEL: (212) 808-8100 FAX: (212) 808-8108 www.kflaw.com

October 10,2016 The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner New York City Department Police Department One Police Plaza New York, NY 10007

RE:

Procurement Protest Regarding the New York City Police Department's Request for Applications for Furnishing All Goods and Related Services Necessary and Required for: Body Cameras, Related Hardware and Accessories, and Data Storage Solution PIN 056150000980; EPIN 05615N0001

Dear Commissioner O'Neill: I am counsel for TASER International, Inc. ("T ASER"), which submitted an application in response to the above-referenced Request for Applications ("RF A") issued by the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") in connection with the abovereferenced procurement (the "Body Camera Procurement"). TASER has also submitted two procurement protests (Exhibits 1 and 2), which are pending. As you know, on September 30,2016, the NYPD published an announcement in the City Record that a hearing would be held on October 13,2016 regarding a proposed contract between the NYPD and Vievu, LLC ("Vievu") pursuant to the RF A and that the draft contract (the "Contract") would be available for inspection. TASER protests this procurement action. TASER is greatly disappointed by the NYPD's announcement. TASER values its relationship with the NYPD and believes that it can be of great service to the officers of the NYPD and the communities that they serve. T ASER is concerned that the NYPD is making a grave error that will endanger officers and members of the public and undermine the trust that is essential to successful policing. TASER hopes that, through this protest, the NYPD will be able to rectify its decision. TASER notes that, at this point, the procurement process remains shielded in

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 2 secrecy by the NYPD. TASER has submitted requests for access to documents concerning the procurement, Vievu, and its affiliate, Safariland, LLC ("Safariland"). (Exhibit 3). Thus far, TASER has not been afforded access to any materials concerning the NYPD's evaluations, tests (if any), inquiries (including to other police departments and cities, which the NYPD has publicly stated it relied upon) or conclusions. The NYPD has not disclosed any information about Vievu's purported integrity, assuming that the NYPD had even gathered such information. Moreover, TASER has only had limited access to the draft contract (which contains certain Vievu application materials). TASER has been denied permission to copy it or photograph any portion of the draft contract. (Exhibit 3). TASER thus reserves its right to protest further, con-ect information, and supplement its submission when additional information is revealed and offers this protest as an expression of opinions with respect to the limited information made available. T ASER notes that your office has access to information that has been denied to TASER. TASER expects that your office will consider such information in reviewing this protest. All information reviewed and considered should be attached to any decision regarding this protest. TASER submits that the NYPD should not contract with Vievu without first disclosing the information that TASER has requested, affording T ASER an opportunity to be heard with respect to that information, and deciding TASER's protests. Since the NYPD can easily access at least 1,000 cameras, immediately, at no cost, without a procurement process (see Exhibit 4), a brief delay in the procurement process will not affect the NYPD's deployment of body cameras. Background In 2015, the NYPD issued an announcement in the City Record of a City decision that it would not be practical or advantageous for the City to use a competitive bidding process to procure body cameras or related hardware and services for the NYPD. According to the announcement, the City decided that the NYPD had a compelling need for body cameras that could not be timely met through a competitive bidding process and that there were only a limited number of vendors that could meet the needs of the NYPD. Accordingly, the City announced that it would pursue that procurement through a "negotiated acquisition," which is defined in PPB Rule 1-01 (c) as a way of selecting a vendor "through negotiation," instead of competitive bidding. Unlike most other procurement methods, a "negotiated acquisition" must be approved by the City Chief Procurement Officer ("CCPO"), and there are special rules governing it in Section 3-04 of the PPB Rules. Rule 3-04(b)(l) says that an "agency may engage in preliminary discussions with a vendor to explore the feasibility of a proposed negotiated acquisition." Rule 3-04(b)(4) generally requires that the agency "negotiate

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 3 with all qualified vendors that have expressed interest." Rule 3-04(b) says that the Agency Chief Contracting Officer ("ACCO") or a designee must "maintain a written record of the conduct of negotiations and the basis for every determination to continue or suspend negotiations with each vendor." Rule 3-04(b)(6) says that the ACCO must determine that the contract award "is in the best interest of the City and the basis thereof." Finally, Rule 3-04(d) requires that the agency issue a Notice oflntent to Enter into Negotiations and later a Notice of Award. In 2015, the NYPD issued the "Request for Applications" from vendors seeking to be selected through negotiations under the City's "negotiated acquisition" procurement rule. The NYPD said that the procurement would follow two steps: First, the NYPD would review technical submissions. It would then determine whether it would procure a body camera with "on site" storage, "cloud" storage, or "hybrid" storage. Second, the NYPD would request submit pricing information. The RF A stated that the NYPD would award the contract to the responsible vendor whose "products and services" are "the most advantageous to the City." (RFA at 25, section B, "Basis for Award"). TASER responded to the RF A. After the NYPD invited TASER to submit its pricing, TASER timely did so. The NYPD never negotiated with TASER. During the procurement process, TASER submitted two protests, on September 25, 2016, and September 29, 2016, respectively. Those protests (Exhibits 1 and 2) are incorporated herein by reference. The NYPD has not responded to the pending protests. TASER also submitted records access requests, including a request under New York City Charter § 334, which requires City agencies to provide the public with access to contracting documents. (Exhibit 3) Grounds for Protest

In TASER's opinion, the NYPD may not rationally conclude that Vievu's application was "responsive" to the RF A, that a contract with Vievu would be "most advantageous to the City," and that Vievu would be a "responsible" contractor. In this protest, we address numerous issues that should be of concern to the NYPD in its assessment of these three areas: "responsiveness," "most advantageous," and "responsibility." Some of the issues we discuss trigger concerns in more than one of these three areas. TASER also has procedural concerns. First, TASER submits that the NYPD should not have, in the context of a negotiated acquisition, selected Vievu without negotiating with TASER. Second, TASER submits that the product that Vievu has offered may not be procured by the City through a "negotiated acquisition" without violating New York State law.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 4 Perhaps most troubling to TASER, and we believe for the New York City public, is the NYPD' s apparent intention to contract with Vievu without an appropriate field test. We believe that in assessing whether the NYPD's requirements are met and whether a contractor is responsible, the NYPD cannot take vendor claims at face value. The NYPD must conduct tests on a statistically significant sample to test any representations of compliance before deeming an applicant "responsive," deeming the proposed contract "most advantageous to the City," and finding the vendor "responsible."

Vievu's Integrity Issues We do not believe, based on the information that we have seen, that the City can rationally conclude that Vievu would be a "responsible" contractor. See Ridge Transp. Sys., Inc. v. City of New York, 95 A.D.3d 1217, 1220, 945 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (2d Dep't 2012); Ciprietti-Tolisano Associates, Inc. v. Karnovsky, 268 A.D.2d 234, 235, 700 N.Y.S.2d 473,473 (1st Dep't 2000); Nanny's Buses, Inc. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 2008 WL 2090467 (N.Y. Cty., Sup. Ct. 2008); see also A & A Constr. & Renovation, Inc./Parks, Commissioner Adrian Benepe, 10 City L. 31 (Dec. 18, 2003). The information that we have uncovered about Vievu, its affiliate, Safariland, LLC, and its parent, at the very least, warrant further inquiry by the City. The City does not appear to have any history of contracting with Vievu. We have been unable to find any record of any such contract in the City's publicly-accessible, internet databases. In a search of the City's "Transparency Project," the only information we found was that Vievu had responded to the RF A. (Exhibit 5). The database reflected no link to other business entities, no lobbying reports, no VENDEX integrity disclosure filings, and no transactions beyond the response to the RF A. We visited the Mayor's Office of Contracts Services Public Access Center to view Vievu's VENDEX integrity disclosure forn1s. A search of the VENDEX public access terminal revealed nothing for Vievu. We also requested the form from the NYPD (Exhibit 3) without success. The proposed contract award cannot proceed without VEND EX forms. While the City Record suggests that the NYPD has selected Vievu as a contractor, the NYPD cannot have rationally determined that Vievu is a "responsible" contractor, as required by the RF A and the PPB Rules, without first examining its VEND EX questionnaire responses. Moreover, the absence of publicly-available VEND EX responses, particularly before the holding of a public hearing, is a sufficient basis to grant this protest. If the public is denied access to Vievu's responses to the VENDEX questionnaires, the holding of a public hearing is rendered meaningless and a nullity.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 5 Apparent Failure to File New York City Lobby Law Report

From what we can tell from publicly-accessible lobbying databases, Vievu lobbied in New York City for the purpose of securing body camera business here, but Vievu's lobbyist did not report the lobbying to the New York City Clerk. According to "NYC Lobbyist Search" (the City's database), "No match was found for 'VIEVU." (Exhibit 6). Vievu engaged a lobbyist. According to the New York State lobbying database, in about June 2016, before the NYPD announced its selection ofVievu, Vievu engaged Mercury Public Affairs, LLC ("Mercury") for "procurement lobbying." Mercury reported to the State that it expected to lobby New York City's First Deputy Mayor and the City Council's Public Safety Committee. The subject of the lobbying was to be "Body Cameria's [sic] forNYPD." (Exhibit 7). While lobbying can serve a useful function in a procurement that will impact the community, it is generally a crime to lobby in New York City without reporting the lobbying to both the State and the City. Thus, it was important that Vievu ensure that its agent reported its lobbying to the New York City Clerk. Vievu's lobbyist, Mercury, knows the City, does considerable lobbying and is presumably familiar with the City's lobbying disclosure requirements. Jonathan Greenspun, an appointee ofthe Mayor's on the' City Human Rights Commission, and a Mercury Managing Director, wrote a Daily News OpEd just last month predicting the Mayor's re-election. (Exhibit 8). An earlier article reported that Greenspun raised $23,000 for the Mayor's election. (Exhibit 9). An organization with experienced staff would understand the significance of the lobby law compliance. Thus, the absence of any record in "NYC Lobbyist Search" ofMercury's lobbying for Vievu raises concerns about Vievu's integrity. At the very least, it warrants investigation. Apparent Failure to Disclose Investigations and Dispositions in VENDEX

While we did not find VENDEX information for Vievu, we uncovered troubling information about Safariland, LLC ("Safariland"- Vievu's apparent affiliate) and Maui Acquisition Corp. ("Maui"- Vievu's apparent parent). If that information is accurate, the "Safariland Group" the business that controls Vievu- has secured close to $12 million in City business (Exhibit 10) on the basis of false VEND EX responses. The NYPD could not rationally find that Vievu has the requisite integrity if this proves true. The City should not enter into a contract with Vievu without carefully reviewing the historic VEND EX disclosures of entities within Safariland Group.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 6 Based on our inquiry, it appears that, for at least four years- and perhaps moreSafariland and Maui have reported no adverse information on their VENDEX forms. As a result, there are no VENDEX "cautions" for Safariland or Maui (or Vievu). (We have a copy of the VENDEX cautions list from August 2013; Safariland and Maui do not appear in that list.) Given the history of Safariland, we do not believe that Safariland and Maui could have responsibly submitted "clean" VENDEX forms (i.e., VENDEX responses that do not include the kinds of investigations and dispositions that the Mayor's Office of Contracts Services would include as VEND EX "cautions") for the relevant period. The information available to us supports the conclusion that Safariland and Maui submitted false information to VENDEX in obtaining business from the City. A vendor submitting a VENDEX form must disclose information about certain judgments, injunctions, penalties, investigations, and findings for the five year period before the form is submitted. (See, e.g. VENDEX Vendor Questionnaire Form, questions, 12, 15, and 16). These questions are particularly significant because the disclosure of such information generally triggers the City's entry of a "VEND EX" caution against the business. When a City agency discovers that a vendor is the subject of a VEND EX caution, it must justify any decision to do business with the vendor in the Recommendation for Award. The VEND EX "caution" database contains reports of government investigations, judgments, non-prosecution agreements, etc., regarding various companies. A "caution" can warrant a "non-responsibility" finding. Companies that have failed to disclose information sought on the VENDEX forms have been denied City business on that ground. Based on review of records, Safariland was formerly known as Armor Holdings Products LLC ("AHP"), and was a subsidiary of Armor Holdings, Inc. ("AHI"). It was acquired by Maui in July 2012. The domain name "ArmorHoldings.com" redirects to Safariland.com. The history of AHP and AHI was checkered to say the least. We believe that truthful reports about Safariland's history would have triggered VENDEX "cautions" for Safariland and Maui, at the very least. According to a U.S. Department of Justice press release, in October 2008, AHP agreed to pay the United States $30 million to resolve federal allegations that AHP violated the False Claims Act by knowingly manufacturing and selling defective bullet proof vests. The United States said that AHP had sold the vests despite possessing information that the vest materials degraded quickly over time and were not suitable for ballistic use. The Department of Justice said that it would not tolerate its first responders wearing defective bullet-proof vests and that the resolution resulted from an ongoing

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 7 investigation. As part of the resolution, AHP was required to cooperate with the Department of Justice's continuing investigation. (Exhibit 12.) According to court filings and government press releases, AHI was involved in another major investigation under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This international bribery investigation led to the entry of a consent judgment against AHI, which bound AHP, a non-prosecution agreement with AHI, which covered AHP, and Maui's adoption of the consent decree. (Exhibits 12-17). The documents we reviewed indicate that at least until June 2010 and prior to the criminal and civil resolution, AHI and AHP (a/k/a Safariland) were "investigated" within the meaning ofVENDEX Vendor Questionnaire question 15. (See Exhibit 12). In June 2010, AHI filed a brief in a criminal case stating: "For the past three years, Armor has cooperated extensively with an investigation by DOJ and the [SEC]." (Exhibit 12 at 1). We believe that additional inquiries could show that the investigation continued well beyond 2010. According to a non-prosecution agreement issued by the Department of Justice, Criminal Division, AHI and AHP were subject to a non-prosecution agreement for a twoyear period commencing on July 13, 2011. (Exhibit 13: "This non-prosecution agreement applies to Armor Holdings, Inc. and .... Armor Holdings Products, LLC," collectively defined in the agreement as "Armor"). The agreement said "Armor admits, accepts, and acknowledges responsibility for the conduct," which included "corrupt payments to a United Nations procurement official." (Exhibit 13 at 1, Appx. A at 2). Under the agreement, AHI and AHP were subject to restrictions for a "two year term" and additional cooperation beyond that date. (Exhibit 13 at 2). AHI and AHP also agreed to pay the United States a $10.29 million "monetary penalty." (Exhibit 13 at 3). On July 23, 2012, a federal judge approved a final consent judgment resolving a related SEC action against AHI, imposing an injunction that ultimately bound Maui. (See Exhibits 14-17). The SEC complaint alleged that an AHP officer, as an agent of AHI, "participated in a scheme to help" a subsidiary "obtain contracts for the supply of body armor to be used in U.N. peacekeeping missions" (Exhibit 13 at 3) and that "corrupt payments were authorized to be made" to a U.N. official in violation of anti-bribery laws (Exhibit 13 at 1-2). In the consent judgment, AHI agreed to injunctive relief and agreed to pay roughly $2 million in disgorged profits and interest and a civil penalty of$3.68 million. (Exhibit 16 at 4). On July 30, 2012, Maui filed notice of its adoption of the SEC consent decree, making it subject to certain injunctive provisions ofthe decree. (Exhibit 16). Maui noted that AHP "was now known as Safariland" and had been acquired by Maui. (Exhibit 16 at 1). In March 2013, Maui filed its compliance report under seal. (Exhibit 17).

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 8 According to the records retrieved at the Public Access Center, Safariland and Maui did not report this history in VENDEX. According to the data entered into the VENDEX system by the Mayor's Office of Contracts Services from Safariland and Maui's VENDEX filings in September 2012 and their later filings in August 2016, Safariland and Maui both answered "no"- on both occasions- to questions such as 12, 15, and 16. (Exhibits 18-21). A company that produced documents in civil and criminal investigations, entered into a non-prosecution, paid millions of dollars in penalties, was subject to injunctive relief, and acknowledged making corrupt payments to a U.N. procurement official, would have an obligation to disclose such information on VENDEX. At the time that Safariland and Maui filed their September 2012 VENDEX submissions, the resolution ofthe Foreign Corrupt Practices Act matter was particularly fresh. Since the SEC consent decree was only four years old in August 2016, Safariland and Maui's history should have appeared on the August 2016 VENDEX filings as well.

Campaign Contributions Beyond the "Pay to Play" Law Limits There is also evidence of campaign contributions beyond the limits of New York City's campaign finance laws. According to the City's Campaign Finance database, Warren Kanders and his wife Allison Kanders, residents of Greenwich CT, made donations to the campaign of a City elected official in November 2015, and June 2016, respectively, that would appear to exceed the City's limits. According to VEND EX filings, Warren Kanders is the Chief Executive Officer of Safariland and Maui (Exhibits 20-21). He is also the Chaim1an ofthe Safariland Group, which includes Vievu. The City should investigate whether these contributions- totaling $9,990- were made without appropriate disclosures and in a manner designed by the contributors to evade City restrictions. New York City law imposes lower campaign contribution thresholds on business that "do business with the City" so as to insulate government officials from corporations' improper efforts to influence them with campaign donations. The law is designed to prevent companies that do business with the City from such improper influence. Companies doing business with the City must complete a form under Local Law 34 of 2007 and identify the persons who control the company. It appears from the VENDEX information we were able to access that the company and its executive, Warren Kanders, should have been deemed "doing business with the City" through September 2016. A $654,000 contract was registered in March 2011 that ended in June 2011, right before the non-prosecution agreement was signed. In August 2011, right after the non-prosecution agreement was signed, Safariland received a $1.3 million contract that ended in June 2012, right before the SEC consent decree was entered. In October 2012, a month after the "clean" VENDEX forms were submitted, Safariland received another $1.3 million contract that ended in September 2013.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 9 Safariland then received a $1.1 million contract that ended in September 2014. (Exhibit 10). During that time, Warren Kanders, a resident of Greenwich, CT, donated to candidates in the New York City 2013 mayoral race. (Exhibit 22) It seems that, at least by October 2013, he was aware ofNew York City's lower thresholds for companies doing business with the City, since, that month, a campaign returned the $2,100 that he donated in excess of the $400 limit. (Exhibit 22). By the end of2015, Warren Kanders had significant business interests in New York City. First, by that time, Maui had acquired Vievu and was actively pursuing the body camera contract. Second, Safariland remained interested in selling body armor to the City and, in the summer of 2016, did so through an "emergency" procurement process that dispenses with bidding, public hearings, and only requires "such competition as is possible and practicable" and the approval of the Corporation Counsel and the Comptroller. Safariland's $7.3 million contract for body armor began and ended in August 2016, the same time that its 2016 "clean" VENDEX was filed. See Exhibit 22; see also August 4, 2016 Safariland Press Release Announcing $7.3 Million Sale http://www .safariland.corn/news-posts/safariland-group-announces-7-3 -million-saleballistic-eguipment-new-york-city-police-department.html?g=Warren%20Kanders. We have found no reference to Warren Kanders in the City's Doing Business database. According to the City's database, Vievu submitted a "doing business with the City" form around September 2015. (Exhibit 5). While Maui (apparently owned by Warren Kanders) controls Vievu and while Vievu's body camera application proposed a supposed $1 million discount on equipment from Safariland (owned by Maui), Warren Kanders was apparently not listed on Vievu's "doing business with the City" form. According to the City's campaign finance database, on November 18, 2015, while Vievu's application was pending, Warren Kanders made a $4,950 contribution. He was identified as President ofKanders & Company. On June 6, 2016,just a couple of months before the $7.6 million contract was approved, Allison Kanders made a $4,950 contribution. She was identified as a "Homemaker." Warren Kanders is also identified as an intermediary on another $1,000 donation made on May 26,2016. (Exhibit 22). Other than Warren Kanders' contracting interests in New York City, we found no other connection with him and the targets of his donations. The City should look into whether the disclosures and donations were appropriate. Even if there is a basis on which to deem the disclosures and donations lawful, the circumstances are such that the NYPD should question the appearance of impropriety and, consequently, Vievu's responsibility.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 10 Vievu 's Technology Issues

TASER respectfully submits that the NYPD could not rationally deem Vievu "responsive," "most advantageous," or "responsible" without field testing its product, which could have been performed within the bounds of the RF A and negotiated acquisition rules. The field testing work of departments around the country (see, e.g., Exhibits 24-27) demonstrate that an apples-to-apples test, under identical conditions, should be part of any such evaluation. Testing is essential because, while Vievu presented itself as a company that has sold many cameras to many agencies, and that many officers are using Vievu, it was also purporting to offer "next generation" products, apparently released after Vievu submitted its application. If we are only to consider Vievu' s "next generation" products, the NYPD is dealing with a product with relatively little, if any, field history. The concern was noted by the Office of the Ventura County Sheriff: 11 On November 13, 2015, I spoke to a representative from Vie Vu. The representative confirmed that the LE4 model was introduced during the [October 2015] IACP conference. I asked the representative how many law enforcement agencies have purchased and are currently deploying the LE4. The representative explained that there are no agencies currently deploying the LE4 model. The LE4 is currently in a Test and Evaluation phase with two law enforcement agencies. I was unable to locate any reviews related to the LE4 model of body worn camera. The Baltimore Police Department is currently an agency testing and evaluating both TASER body worn cameras and the Vievu LE4. Their test and evaluation period does not end until December 18, 2015. (Exhibit 27 at 11 ). (The Baltimore Police Department selected TASER after the field trial.) Even putting aside the field trial issue, this protest can be granted on the basis of any one or combination of a host of technology issues. At the very least, they merit careful evaluation by the NYPD. The Vievu Camera is Non-Responsive

Vievu did not offer a body camera that meets the NYPD's requirement that the minimum capability ofthe body camera be that of human eyesight. (See RFA p. 10, § 1a). While the NYPD provided that it would consider cameras that have "capabilities

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 11 that exceed that of the human eye," the NYPD expected that the camera "would see what the human eye can see." (Id.) Vievu did not offer that. The selection of a camera that cannot deliver a video of what an officer sees would undermine the purposes of the body camera program. Among other things, the increased likelihood of disputes over disparities between what happened and what was captured would lead to increased tension between the NYPD and the community. There are various problems with the Vievu camera, including the following: -- Field of View

Vievu's field of view does not meet the human eyesight requirement. A camera that has a field of view of less than 13 0 degrees would not see what a human sees. In his book "Physics of the Human Body" (Springer 2007), Professor Dr. Irving P. Herman of the Department of Applied Physics and Applied Mathematics at Columbia University writes that our binocular field of vision- that which we see with depth perception is about 130 degrees. (Exhibit 23). Yet, according to the Vievu proposal, the Vievu camera offered to the NYPD only has a 95 degree field of view. The Vievu camera should thus have been rejected. The problem with Vievu's field of view was noted in the Initial Product Testing Report ofthe Cincinnati Police Department's 2016 Body Worn Camera ("BWC") Evaluation Project (March 3, 2016) (Exhibit 24) (the "CPD Report"). The Cincinnati Police Department explained that, as a result of the narrow field of view of the Vievu LE4 (the product that the NYPD proposes to procure) does not capture the scene: "The narrower field of view of the VIEVU LE4 BWC requires more specific and deliberate placement on the officer to compensate, and cannot capture the entirety of the simulated scenario regardless ofplacement." CPD Report, Category #1. The Sonoma County Sheriffs Office reached the same conclusion, writing that "uniform placement of camera needs constant adjustment to capture images due to the lens very narrow field of view." (Exhibit 25 at 3). The Vievu camera does not meet the NYPD specifications and is not advantageous for the City. -- Image Quality

While the human eye does not ordinarily suffer from "muted" vision or "lens flare," the Cincinnati Police Department found that the Vievu LE4 camera "was very muted for video at all resolutions, specifically under ideal conditions in artificial light" with "very apparent lens flare (from the store lights or sunlight through the windows)." CPD Report, Category #2. TASER believes that the Vievu camera's image quality does not meet the NYPD's needs.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 12 --Ability to Capture Images in Low Light

While the human eye can see in low light, it appears that the Vievu camera does not capture images properly in low light conditions. The Cincinnati Police Department found that Vievu's camera "was significantly more muted during low light testing, specifically drab color palettes and more apparent lens flare" and did not perform well "under extreme low light conditions." CPD Report, Category #3. Similarly, the Sonoma County Sheriff's Office wrote ofVievue, "Low-light video poor; preferred TASER for low-light quality." (Exhibit 25 at 3). The significant difference between what the Vievu camera apparently records and what the eye sees in low light renders Vievu nonresponsive. The Vievu Application Does Not Present a True Cloud-Storage Solution

While the NYPD specifications required a true cloud-storage system, Vievu's application contained no assurance or representation that it will not use a "hybrid" storage, and elements ofVievu's application indicate that Vievu's storage system is not purely cloud-based. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in TASER's September 29, 2016 protest (Exhibit 2), the Vievu application should be deemed non-responsive. The NYPD has required a completely cloud-based storage solution. The original RF A requested responses for two storage options: on premises (local storage) and cloud (non-local storage). The NYPD then issued Addendum #1 on July 24,2015 which allowed for a third storage option, "hybrid." On page 2 of the addendum, the NYPD defined a "hybrid" storage solution as "any storage solution that incorporates both on-site and cloud-based storage components." On November 30, 2015, the NYPD announced its "determination to proceed with a Cloud Based storage solution" and said "only Technical Applications covering the chosen data storage solution [cloud] will be considered." The letter went on to say "Applications for on-site storage and hybrid solutions will not be considered for award." Thus, a system that connects the camera into an on-site computer so that the video can be downloaded from the camera to the computer and then be uploaded to the cloud would be prohibited "hybrid" storage. Similarly, if the camera downloads video into a dock, which then uploads the video into the cloud, the product would be a prohibited "hybrid." Vievu did not affirm that its dock would provide for direct uploading to the cloud. While one page of the Vievu application refers to a "Multi-Dock Automated Download," the application also attaches a Whitepaper similar to the one that was on the Vievu website until TASER submitted its September 29, 2016 protest. (The Whitepaper attached to this protest as Exhibit 28 was swapped out on the internet immediately after TASER submitted its protest to the NYPD.) The diagram in the Whitepaper attached to the Vievu application, like the one attached to this protest as Exhibit 28, shows, at page 3,

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 13 a dock that must be connected to a computer to upload. Moreover, the description of the "VIEVU Solution (Cloud Hosted Evidence Management) at section 2.2.1 of the Vievu application merely states: "VIEVU allows secure upload videos and documents directly from computer or smartphone, eliminating the hassle and maintenance of an on-site storage solution." (Emphasis added.) Elsewhere the application refers to transfer "to cameras." Vievu Was Not Offering a Completely Finished, Field-Tested Product

From the Vievu and field test reports, it seems that there are aspects in which Vievu's product remains a work-in-progress, subject to further development and testing. These raises questions of how Vievu could be "responsive," "most advantageous," or "responsible." If the product remains a moving target, or is not the product used by the government agencies that Vievu cites to support its claim of experience, then the NYPD could be essentially "beta testing" a product on its officers and communities. (A company seeking to work out a product's kinks in one city to sell it to other cities might, as Vievu did, offer a "revenue sharing" pricing option.) -- Dock and Cloud Storage

Vievu's dock and cloud solution present concerns. While Vievu identifies some past deployments in its application, it does not claim to have widely deployed a direct-tocloud dock with a cloud-based storage solution on a wide basis. To the extent the NYPD is assuming that Vievu has, very recently, upgraded its dock so that video can be uploaded to the cloud without first downloading into a cache in the dock or a separate computer, the NYPD will be deploying a product that has not been widely used in real field operations. Indeed, the draft contract even requires Vievu to upgrade its dock and swap out those that are deployed before the upgrade. According to the Cincinnati Police Department, "[t]he VIEVU LE4 BWC dock performance has been problematic: VIEVU BWC videos take significantly longer to upload and in one instance, failed to upload for several hours. The VIEVU vendor representative has been advised that dates and timestamps of recorded VIEVU BWC videos have been off by a few days, or time shifted by one hour or more. The VIEVU LE4 BWC unit must be carefully inserted into the docking station, as the rubber flap on the underside of the unit must be precisely swiveled or the BWC unit will not dock properly." (Exhibit 24, category #8). Thus, even if Vievu can meet some specifications by presenting the NYPD with a recently-upgraded product that provides for true cloud-storage, it does not follow that this new product will be sufficiently glitch-free to render Vievu "responsive," "most advantageous," and "responsible." Indeed, the Cincinnati observed, as it tried to use the Vievu software: "The VIEVU software has crashed repeatedly requiring restarting, specifically when reviewing recorded video (error message of"No Thumbnail- Video is

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 14 corrupt and cannot be played"). (Exhibit 24, category #10). New products and software often bring with them new kinks and bugs. It cannot be good for New York City to be a . . gumea p1g. -- On!OJJSwitch

Perhaps most tellingly, there is a clause in the contract (not found in the RF A) that requires Vievu's delivery of a product with what seems like a post-application product modification: a record, slide on/off switch that can withstand a specific 9-newton force so that "the switch should not be able to be turned on too easily by accident." TASER believes that this reflects the NYPD's attempt to address problem that apparently even existed in Vievu's prior camera model, which, according to the report from the Ventura County Sheriffs Office, caused police departments to address with a "rubber band":

I have spoken to representatives from other law enforcement agencies that tested and evaluated the Vie Vu LE3 camera. A major complaint of this camera system was the slider that activates the camera. The camera has a panel that slides down to expose the lens and activates the camera. With wear and use, the panel apparently slides down on its own and can activate the camera when not intended. Additionally, the camera did not have a pre-record feature. In October 2014, I spoke to VieVu representatives about the apparent design flaw while attending the International Association of Chiefs of Police Expo in Orlando, Florida. I received a response that "some agencies wrap a rubber band around the camera to prevent that from happening." On November 5, 2014 I emailed VieVu representative Kelley Musgrove about the response I received at IACP and to see if there was a remedy to this problem. My email was forwarded to two additional company representatives who never responded to my inquiries. (Exhibit at 27 at 10-11 ). See also Exhibit 25 at 2, 3 (Sonoma found: "The activation switch can very easily be turned on accidentally." "Activation slide-switch known to loosen and slide down on its own. Other agencies have reported these issues."); Exhibit 26 at 5 (LAPD found: "Accidental activations and deactivations"). -- Mounting Clip

This on/off switch issue is similar to the "mounting clip" problem with the Vievu product's LE4 model, according to the Cincinnati Police Department Report, which stated that the "'alligator clip" of the VIEVU LE4 BWC unit. .. is the least secure mounting option, and has not evolved from the previous generation of this BWC system." (Exhibit 24, category #7); cf Exhibit 25 at 3 (Sonoma found: "The clip that holds the device on uniform is flimsy and often falls off uniform during struggles or foot pursuits.);

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 15 Exhibit 25 at 5 (LAPD noted as one of the "cons": "Mounting clip (stability, durability, and screw head causing uniform damage)"). The Vievu Application Did Not Address All of NYPD's Security Requirements

Vievu's application did not address some of the NYPD's security requirements. The RF A contains nine security requirements (p. 14, § 9), including role-based access controls, user grouping, integrating with the NYPD's Active Directory, real-time alerting and monitoring of permission use against NYPD data, control access at layers 3, 4, and 7 of the Open Standards Interface model, real-time code analysis or penetration testing, segregated storage, a Continuity of Operations Plan that guarantees 99.95% uptime and no permanent loss of data, 256 bid AES encryption, multi factor authentication, and FedRAMP certification. The applicant had to demonstrate compliance with each element to be responsive with respect to security. Based on our review of the proposal, we found no reference to the following security requirements: o "Real-time alerting and monitoring of permission use against NYPD data." (RFA, p. 9 § III(B)(1)(b)(9)(1)(ii)). o "The ability to control access to NYPD data at layers 3, 4 and 7 of the Open Standards Interface (OSI) model." (RFA, p. 9 § III(B)(l )(b)(9)(1 )(iii)) o "For all web interfaces, web application real-time code analysis or penetration testing or the ability to conduct such analysis/testing." (RFA, p. 9 § III(B)(l)(b)(9)(1)(iv)) o "A detailed Continuity of Operations Plain (COOP) that guarantees 99.95% uptime and no permanent loss of data. This plan should include both fail over sites and backup plans for individual sites." (RF A, p. 9 § III(B )( 1)(b )(9)( 1)(vi)) o "Support for multi-factor authentication." (RF A, p. 9 § III(B )( 1)(b )(9)( 1)(viii)) In any event, even ifVievu mouthed these words, that would not be sufficient to establish responsiveness or responsibility. While some vendors may say that they provide such security, it does not follow that such vendors actually have the capability to do so. For example, to confirm a vendor's representation of"99.95% uptime and no permanent loss of data," the NYPD must review the vendor's continuity plan, its past representations to other government agencies regarding reliability, and its historical performance logs.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 16

Vievu Was Not Responsive to the Upgrade Requirement Based on our review ofVievu's proposal, we do not believe that Vievu complied with "assumption 1" of the price proposal, that a vendor commit to providing hardware and software upgrades every 30 months. For a five year contract, upgrades every 30 months means one in the 30th month and one in the 60th month. Considering the camera alone, that would mean the initial camera in month one, an upgrade in the 30th month of the contract, and an upgrade in the 60th month of the camera, i.e., three cameras over the life of the contract. While our ability to analyze the application is limited- particularly given the limitations on our access to it and the NYPD prohibition on copying or photographing it, a review of the application reveals that Vievu was only promising two cameras for the five-year contract, one original and one upgrade. This is apparent from Vievu's references to "upgrade" in the singular and valuation of its proposed discount on Safariland equipment, which it calculated as $200 (assuming two cameras). It can be inferred from the manner in which this was calculated that Vievu was only committing to provide two cameras (an original and upgrade) during the five year contract period.

Hidden Costs Undermine Any Finding of "Most Advantageous" Contract An apples-to-apples comparison required the City to consider the higher prices that Vievu would have to charge in order to deliver something technically equivalent to the TASER offering. There are certain elements of a body camera system that TASER does not leave out of an offering because it is not responsible to do so. TASER does not offer a cut-rate "if you don't mind things going wrong" product because the potential harm to the constituents served would be too great to bear. Even when price differential is considered, TASER submits that the inclusion of all the elements needed for reliability is "most advantageous to the City." To the limited extent that the NYPD considered "price" in assessing which contract would be "most advantageous to the City," the NYPD was required to account for all of the hidden costs, including the costs that the City would bear that do not explicitly appear in the vendor's "price" quote. One vendor's "price" is not lower than a second vendor's "price" if the first vendor's system imposes hidden costs on the City that overwhelm the price advantage that the first vendor might claim. A consideration of which system is "most advantageous to the City" must include an analysis of hidden costs that the City will bear if a particular system is selected. TASER submits that the mere fact that Vievu would leave the following elements out of its offer just to bid a lower price is also relevant to Vievu' s integrity and, thus, responsibility as a vendor.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 17

-- Warning/or Auto Delete TASER believes that deleted videos should continue to be retrievable for some grace period even after the human user confirms "delete." For example, TASER's sevenday grace period reduces the risk that the huge costs that can be incurred when something is deleted, and should not be, will actually be experienced by the City. While a product that is less human-proof may cost less to design and make, it is not, in the end, cheaper and is not most advantageous to the City.

-- Ceo-redundant Storage TASER believes that it is irresponsible to store all videos and all video back-ups in a single geographic location. While it may have been permissible to submit an application without gee-redundant storage, as Vievu did, it is not "most advantageous" and a vendor that is willing to expose the City to the risk of loss from a natural disaster, a terrorist attack, or some other incident is not a responsible contractor. To ensure that video storage is "gee-redundant," the cloud-storage provider has to maintain two different data storage sites, hundreds of miles away from each other. By having a copy of the videos in one geographical region and a second copy of the videos in a completely different geographical region, we reduce the risk that a disaster, terrorist attack, or complete regional outage in one area will not destroy the videos or prevent the City from accessing them. Given the importance of the videos, and the risks that seem to intensify over time, gee-redundancy is a basic, data security measure. We do not believe that a price comparison between a product that offers geeredundant storage and one that does not is meaningful. Vievu stated that the cost of providing gee-redundancy would be $2.39 million over the five-year contract. ($7.98 camera/month for 5,000 cameras at 60 months). Given that Vievu did not offer geeredundancy and TASER did, at the very least, that price differential should have been accounted for by the NYPD.

--Immediate Access to Stored Data TASER believes that it is also irresponsible to store the video data in a way that renders it inaccessible for a period of up to 24 hours. While the NYPD may have been willing to entertain pricing on the theory that archived video would not be instantly available and would, instead, be retrievable within 24 hours, it does not follow that a vendor that takes advantage of that approach and offers a lower "price" is offering the cheaper option, let alone the one that is most advantageous to the City. The dangers of requiring the NYPD to wait up to 24 hours to retrieve video are obvious and substantial.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 18 o

Imagine, for example, that the NYPD is attempting to identify and locate a potential terrorist suspect who is about to engage in a terrorist act or flee. Imagine that, as part of that investigation it is learned that, two months earlier, the suspect was caught in an otherwise-uninteresting video that has been archived. Under the Vievu approach, the NYPD might have to wait up to 24 hours while the video is restored from archives.

o

Or, imagine, that the NYPD suddenly discovers that a video, taken several months before may be of use in diffusing tense, community discussions regarding an alleged civil rights violation, which may erupt in violence if not addressed. Under the Vievu approach, the NYPD might have to wait up to 24 hours while the video is restored from archives.

While a law enforcement agency may be interested in learning the pricing associated with such an approach, it is not "advantageous" or "responsible" for a company that delivers body camera solutions to offer it. Vievu stated the cost of providing the immediate access to video (that TASER offers) would be $2.72 million over the five-year contract. ($9.09/camera/month for 5,000 cameras at 60 months). While TASER would not offer such a dangerous, delayed storage-retrieval option, the "price" differential should not have been held against TASER in any price comparison. -- High Definition Video

TASER also believes that it is inappropriate to record in standard definition, when high definition is available. Given the importance of the recording as a law enforcement and community relations tool, recordings should be in high definition to minimize that aspects of events are missed or misinterpreted. High definition video is important to the goal of recording what actually happened. Thus, while the NYPD may have been open to pricing based on standard definition, TASER submits that a company that is able to offer discount "pricing" by limiting its offering to standard definition is not making an "advantageous" offering or acting responsibly. TASER also submits that Vievu may promote Standard Definition as a means of addressing its problems with battery life and recording life. See Exhibit 24, category # 5 ("The VIEVU vendor representative confirmed this locked software setting [requiring the camera to record at 480P] is necessary to provide sufficient battery life: a higher resolution would drain the battery at a faster rate."). As it appears that Vievu in part reduced its "price" by $2.7 million by limiting its storage to Standard Definition video, the NYPD should have, at least, considered this problem, and its cost in its analysis. --Liability

A responsible vendor stands behind its product; a product that is not so supported is not "most advantageous" to the City. Vievu limited its warranty to just one year, restricted the scope of its warranty, and capped all of its liability to the value of the

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 19 contract. Vievu stated that it would demand another $216,000 to provide a longer, more complete warranty. Vievu did not even specify the price that it would demand to remove the liability cap from the cameras, which Vievu directly controls. Things go wrong; lawsuits are filed; insurance limits are exceeded. The costs of a limited warranty and a liability cap are real and significant. They should have been accounted for by the NYPD in its comparison of Vievu and TASER.

-- Data Sharing with Prosecutors' Offices The NYPD apparently did not consider the costs that the City would bear as a result of limitations in Vievu's approach to data sharing. TASER believes that these costs are significant. As we understand Vievu's application, Vievu expects the NYPD to simply give other agencies access to its system or e-mail video links to the other agencies. TASER submits that the former is not realistic and the costs of managing and supervising such use would likely be significant. TASER also believes that it is cumbersome and expensive for an agency such as a prosecutor's office to download and organize video links. Consider a scenario where a prosecutor might need to retain a video significantly longer than NYPD, due to an active case containing that video. With Vievu's product, the NYPD would have to continue to store that video for the benefit of the prosecutor. Under TASER's proposal, that prosecutor would be granted a free, parallel evidence management system where that video could be stored at no cost to the City or NYPD for as long as retention laws required. Further, there would be a chain of custody for that video automatically updated and preserved. With Vievu, the NYPD would either have to manage two distinct parties, each reviewing and maintaining the same video, or else send a link, without any chain of custody tracking, to an external party. Not only does this require unnecessary administrative oversight, but also requires significant time and attention to ensure that evidence is retained properly and that a chain of custody audit is manually updated and preserved; TASER believes that this comes at a significant cost to a City as large as New York and an agency as large as NYPD. The Cincinnati Police Department recognized this hidden cost in the Vievu approach: TASER's software provides the capacity for a free parallel cloud system specifically designed for the prosecutors to manage the retention schedule ofBWC videos necessary for court. VIEVU's software does not provide a parallel cloud system for prosecutor video: all users would share the same access and prosecutors must manually review and change the retention period for videos necessary for court. TASER's parallel software for prosecutors is significantly more advantageous, as the process required for

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 20 prosecutors to manage retention of BWC recordings needed for court (specifically after dismissal or conviction) will require substantial time and effort. (Exhibit 24, category# 10). TASER believes that the NYPD did not quantify, measure, or consider these administrative costs. We believe that, in light of them, Vievu's approach cannot be considered "most advantageous to the City."

--Audio Quality TASER also believes that the NYPD failed to consider the costs resulting from the loss in audio that the NYPD will likely experience in some conditions if it proceeds with Vievu. The Cincinnati Police Department wrote: "The VIEVU LE4 BWC sound quality was more adversely affected by low to moderate wind shear under identical environmental conditions." (Exhibit 24, category #4). TASER believes that there will be instances where the City, even if it secures a lower "price," will experience costs resulting from diminished audio quality. Lower audio quality can lead to differing interpretations of taped encounters, resulting in tensions between the community and the NYPD or lost evidentiary opportunities. When such costs are considered, the Vievu product cannot rationally be considered the "most advantageous."

--Tagging and Renaming of Files NYPD also failed to appreciate the administrative costs that file tagging and naming that the Vievu approach may entail. TASER has a long history of facilitating video file management by linking video files to information from Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems. TASER amplifies this by making it easy for police department to rename video files. We believe that Vievu's approach will lead to costs in these areas. First, while Vievu's application mentioned adding CAD information to video files, it appears to be a newcomer to this and said that it would need to "work with" the NYPD to enable this function. In TASER's view, the NYPD's time is too valuable to be spent working out the appropriate interface with a vendor developing this approach. Significantly, ifVievu fails to successfully "work with" the NYPD to enable its system to communicate with the NYPD's CAD systems, the burden will fall on NYPD officers to do what they have been apparently doing in the cities where Vievu deployed its earlier generation product. From what we know of those systems, officers are expected to manually input information about each video incident. If the NYPD is forced to require officers to perform data entry, the City will lose money (due to the cost of such officers' time) and will be burdened with safety and reliability problems, such as officer

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 21 non-compliance, officer error (e.g. mis-tagging), risks to officers focused on data entry, and unrecorded incidents. Second, even if the CAD connection is successful, if the NYPD uses Vievu, it may bear administrative costs flowing from complications in renaming videos. The Cincinnati Police Department wrote: "VIEVU Solution software does not currently allow users to rename videos or cases: VIEVU case numbers are currently numbered sequentially by the software and require the user to remember or write these numbers down while finding, redacting, and sharing recorded videos." This is a cost that the NYPD did not consider. -- Redaction Tools with Chain-of-Custody Tracking TASER believes that, because of the privacy issues that sometimes arise when body cameras are used, any product must include built-in redaction tools with chain-ofcustody tracking. It is, in TASER's view, irresponsible to sell a system that does not include that element and TASER did not and will not leave out privacy protections simply to cut its price. Vievu's application did not include that kind of privacy protection and indicated that it would charge an additional $1,500 per year per person if a redaction system with built-in "chain of custody" tracking was to be included. Further, Vievu otherwise suggested a third-party solution, leaving it to the NYPD to conduct some other evaluation of a separate redaction tool. TASER submits that this approach is neither "most advantageous" nor "responsible." The NYPD 's Selection of Vievu Without Negotiating With TASER The NYPD unlawfully selected Vievu without negotiating with TASER. The PPB Rules state that, once an agency selects "negotiated acquisition" as its means for selecting a vendor, the agency must "negotiate with all qualified vendors that have expressed interest" and maintain a "written record of the conduct of negotiations." PPB Rule 3-04(b). The NYPD, here, used an approach more akin to an RFP, while shedding the roles that constrain an agency conducting an RFP. TASER was denied the award without first being afforded an opportunity to negotiate. The September 30 announcement was surprising given that the rule governing negotiated acquisitions requires that the procuring "agency shall negotiate with all qualified vendors that have expressed interest" (PPB Rule 3-04(b)(4)). The City's procurement rules define several methods of"source selection," the process of selecting the "source" (i.e., vendor) for the goods or services being purchased. Commonly, this is done by competitive sealed bid (a request for low bids) for goods and services or, in special cases, a "Request for Proposals" (or competitive sealed proposals). In rare situations, the City Chief Procurement Officer may authorize an agency's use of"negotiated acquisition," which the

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10, 2016 Page 22 PPB Rules define as "[a] method of source selection under which procurements can be made through negotiation due to circumstances and subject to conditions, as specified in these Rules, in which it is not practicable and/or advantageous to the City to make the procurement through competitive sealed bidding or competitive sealed proposals." PPB Rule 3-01 (e). This was not a "Request for Proposals" process, where proposals are submitted, evaluated, and scored so that a winner can be selected. This was a "negotiated acquisition" process, where the "source selection" itself was to be "made through negotiation." In order to select Vievu as the source, the NYPD was required to negotiate with all the vendors that expressed interest. PPB Rule 3-04(b)(4). While TASER clearly expressed interest in the procurement, the NYPD never negotiated with TASER. This was a violation ofPPB Rule 3-04(b)(4).

The NYPD's Unlaw(ul "Purchase Contract" As a result of the peculiar nature ofVievu's application (which the NYPD did not make available to T ASER until September 30), the draft contract that the NYPD is now considering is a "purchase contract" subject to N.Y. General Municipal Law§ 103, rather than an agreement exempt from the requirements of that law. As a result, it cannot be executed since the requirements of Section 103 were not observed. Section 103 provides that the City may only enter into a "purchase contract" if it has been procured either through a competitive bid (also known as a "low bid") or a "best value" procurement. See (Exhibit 29). A "negotiated acquisition" process is not a "low bid"; and the NYPD did not follow the "best value" procedures in this procurement. Thus, the question is this: Is the draft contract between the NYPD and Vievu a "purchase contract" within the meaning of Section 103. TASER submits that, while there may be procurements relating to body camera programs that are not governed by Section 103, the draft contract at issue here is a "purchase contract." While Section 103 does not define "purchase contract," one court defined it as an agreements "for the purchase of goods, equipment, work or services" that will benefit the taxpayers. Exley v. Vill. of Endicott, 74 A.D.2d 96, 98 (3d Dep't 1980), modified on other grounds, 51 N.Y.2d 426 (1980). When one examines the Vievu draft contract, it clearly is for "the purchase of goods, equipment, work or services." From the draft contract's pricing, it is clear that the largest elements of the Vievu price are for hardware, followed by storage costs. The licenses are given a zero value in the draft contract. As a result of the draft contract's specific structure, it must be procured in accordance with Section 103 of the General Municipal Law.

The Honorable James P. O'Neill Commissioner, New York City Department Police Department October 10,2016 Page 23

Conclusion

TASER respectfully protests the NYPD decision and submits that the NYPD should reverse its selection of Vievu, withdraw the notice of hearing, and refrain from executing the draft contract with Vievu.

cc:

Frank Bello, Agency Chief Contracting Officer Jordan Glickstein, Deputy Agency Chief Contracting Officer Office of Contract Administration, New York City Comptroller 1 Centre Street, Room 1005 New York, New York 10007 New York City Department of Investigation 80 Maiden Lane New York, New York 10038

VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY

) ) )

ss.:

Andrew Karn, Senior Associate for T ASER International, Inc., states that all of the material allegations of the Protest are within his personal knowledge; and that he has read the foregoing Protest and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true to his own knowledge or review of records, except as to matters therein that are stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, he believes them to be true.

Sworn to before me this

Exhibit List

1) TASER's September 25, 2016 Protest 2) TASER's September 29, 2016 Protest 3) TASER's October 3, 2016 Records Access Requests and e-mail to the ACCO regarding access to the draft contract 4) TASER's October 3, 2016 Field Trial Offer as a Gift to the City 5) NYC Transparency Project Database- Selected Pages 6) NYC Lobbyist Search Database Query 7) New York State Lobbying Database- Selected Pages from Query 8) Jonathan Greenspun, OpEd, Daily News (9/14/2016) 9) Article, Daily News (1113/2014) 10) Safariland, LLC, VEND EX Contract Information- Selected Pages 11) U.S. DOJ Press Release (October 7, 2008) 12) Application by Armor Holdings, Inc. in United States v. Goncalves (June 8, 2010)Selected pages 13) U.S. DOJ Non-Prosecution Agreement (July 13, 2011) 14) Complaint by the SEC against Armor Holdings, Inc. 15) Final Consent Judgment as to Armor Holdings, Inc. in SEC's case against Armor Holdings, Inc. (Filed July 23, 2012) 16) Notification of Successor and Adoption of Final Consent Judgment in the SEC case by Maui Acquisition Corp. (Filed July 30, 2012) 17) Motion of Maui Acquisition Corp. for Leave to File Documents Under Seal (March 26, 2013)

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18) Vendor Questionnaire Information for Safariland, LLC, from VENDEX Vendor Questionnaire Submitted on September 10,2012- Selected Pages 19) Vendor Questionnaire Information for Maui Acquisition Corp., from VENDEX Vendor Questionnaire Submitted on September 10,2012- Selected Pages 20) Vendor Questionnaire Information for Safariland, LLC, from VENDEX Vendor Questionnaire Submitted on August 12, 2016- Selected Pages 21) Vendor Questionnaire Information for Maui Acquisition Corp. from VEND EX Vendor Questionnaire Submitted on August 12, 2016 - Selected Pages 22) Search Results from New York City Campaign Finance Board Contribution Database 23) Professor Dr. Irving P. Herman, "Physics of the Human Body" (Springer 2007)Selected Page 24) Cincinnati Police Department 2016 Body Worn Camera Evaluation Project Initial Product Testing Report March 3, 2016 25) Report of Sonoma County Sheriffs Office re: Body Worn Cameras Pilot Program (20 14) 26) Los Angeles Police Department Body Worn Video Program (March 16, 20 16)

Supplemental Report

27) Request from Ventura County Sheriffs Office (November 2, 2015) 28) Vievu Solution Whitepaper Version 1.0.17.0- (Accessed on the internet on September 29,2016) 29) Professor Ross Sandler, "Three New Rules Ease NYC Contract Process," CityLand, (2/28/20 14)

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