Just when it seemed that Turkish politics

The Challenge for Turkey’s True Friends: the AK Party Closure Case and the West JOSHUA W. WALKER* ABSTRACT The recent closure case brought against t...
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The Challenge for Turkey’s True Friends: the AK Party Closure Case and the West

JOSHUA W. WALKER*

ABSTRACT The recent closure case brought against the ruling Justice and Development Party is a direct assault on Turkey’s democracy. For this reason, America should not lose the opportunity to swiftly and unequivocally repudiate the establishment’s attempts to re-assert control over Turkish politics by undemocratic means. The lack of a concrete resolution on the part of the U.S. in regard to the case has already resulted in a credibility gap. Given America’s emphasis on and interest in Turkey’s democracy and attendant reform process, a simple re-affirmation of its commitment to citizen’s choices in free and fair elections would send a powerful message to a country that is on edge. Instead, Turkey is left with ‘friends’ who lack credibility and resolve at the worst possible moment. If the ruling party and its leadership are banned from political life, not only will Turkey lose its credibility in the Middle East as the only indigenous Muslim-majority democracy, the United States will also lose credibility in the world theatre for failing to support democracy in Turkey. Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 2 / 2008

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ust when it seemed that Turkish politics were returning to normal after the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) overwhelming victory in the polls last summer, a new cloud has descended over Ankara. The decision by Turkey’s chief prosecutor to call for the closure of the AKP and a ban on seventy-one of Turkey’s most senior democratically-elected leaders, including Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül, for “anti-secular activities” against the Turkish Republic subsequently became a full indictment.1 Initially dismissed by Turkey’s Kemalist establishment as a purely political move to reign in the AKP, this political crisis now threatens Turkey’s democratic character itself. Judging by any standards, Erdoğan has led one of the most stable and successful governments in Turkish Republican history. The AKP, during its five years in power, has promoted a reformist agenda at home and abroad. Their * Ph.D. candidate in politics and public policy, Princeton University; formerly worked at the Turkey desk at the Department of State, [email protected]

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Banning Turkey’s democratically elected government and leaders is an abuse of justice that will do irreversible harm to Turkey’s democratic process, European dreams, and strategic interests

policy program has included robust private sector economic development, eventual membership in the European Union (EU), and democratic reform, all while trying to reconcile Islam with democracy. Critics accuse the AKP of being slow-moving and disingenuous in their commitment to the reform process. In return for their hard work the AKP now faces the very real possibility of closure on the grounds of a series of public statements and comments that have been circulating in Turkey for far longer than the AKP have been in power. In a country that has experienced four military coup d’etats (one being the “soft” coup in 1998 that forced the closure of the Refah party), and one so-called “electronic coup” that triggered last summer’s early elections, the Turkish Constitutional Court’s involvement is a new twist on an old plotline. However, unlike past interventions, the tone and nature of this constitutional coup d’etat should be far more troubling to Turkey’s outside friends. Banning Turkey’s democratically elected government and leaders is an abuse of justice that will do irreversible harm to Turkey’s democratic process, European dreams, and strategic interests. Therefore, now is not the time for Turkey’s friends to look the other way. Turkey’s domestic politics are a notoriously factitious and complex beast, but it is not acceptable in today’s world for the United States and Europe to sit on the sidelines in silence. Clearly, interfering in a sovereign nation’s domestic debates is not in the interest of either the U.S. or the EU, but when so much is at stake in terms of Turkey’s place in the Middle East, Europe, and globally, outside actors need to express their support for democracy. The attempt to shut down the country’s most popular and governing party is a direct assault on Turkey’s democracy. For this reason, America and Europe should not lose the opportunity to swiftly and unequivocally repudiate the secular Kemalist establishment’s attempts to re-assert control over Turkish politics by undemocratic means. In this case, doing the right thing is also doing what is in both the West and Turkey’s best interest. In the current climate of suspicion and hostility towards the EU, the bloc’s enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn’s warning that accession talks could come to a halt if the AKP is banned has fallen on deaf ears in Ankara. Given how far

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Turkey has come since its original 1959 Proving Turkey’s pessimists application to join the European Ecowrong and standing together nomic Community and the opening of with the country’s people and EU accession talks in 2005, it would be a true democrats should be an shame to see the process stop as a result of a closure case. Therefore while the EU imperative for policymakers in may have had the quickest response to Washington Turkey’s political crisis, it has not been the most definitive or useful. The fact that the EU has lost so much leverage with Turkey in the last few years should serve as a warning to the United States about how important maintaining continual and strong ties with Ankara can be. Rather than heeding this warning, however, America waited considerably longer than the EU to address the issue and opted for a carefully-worded response that came in the form of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s speech at an annual conference held last month in Washington by the American-Turkish Council. In her speech, Rice made only a causal reference to the closure case and attributed it to the problems associated with democracy, comparing Turkey’s “tensions” with the efforts of the United States to resolve its own constitutional problems over time. Emphasizing America’s support for the Turkish people, Rice said, “…Turkish voters will resolve the difficulties before them within their secular democratic context and their secular democratic principles. All that can be asked of a democratic society is to stay true to those principles as it goes through difficult times.”2 The lack of concrete resolution or re-affirmation of Turkey’s democratic process on the part of its long-time ally the United States has resulted in a credibility gap. Increasingly, Turkey views both America and Europe in light of the Turkish adage, “Turks have no friends but themselves.” Given the West’s emphasis on and interest in Turkey’s democracy and reform process, a simple re-affirmation of its commitment to citizen’s choices in free and fair elections would send a powerful message to a country that is on edge. Instead, Turkey is left with ‘friends’ who lack credibility and resolve at the worst possible moment. Given the time lag between events in Ankara and America’s response, stemming the tide of cynicism in Turkey about the administration’s professed support of democracy and utter lack of tangible action may be nearly impossible. Nevertheless, proving Turkey’s pessimists wrong and standing together with the country’s people and true democrats should be an imperative for policymakers in Washington. Recent statements by U.S. officials that emphasize that voters, not courts, determine the future in a democracy, have been welcomed, but are rath119

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Banning the AKP and its leadership will lead to a period of uncertainty and instability

er vague and may be too little too late.3 The firestorm that resulted from these remarks has led to a vigorous internal debate in Turkey about where America actually stands. The fact that these perceptions in Turkey continue to outweigh the ambiguous comments offered by U.S. officials demonstrates that the U.S. has not done enough to actively articulate its unequivocal support for Turkey’s democratic process.4 Making statements about democracy in the abstract is fine in certain settings, but given the critical nature of current events in Turkey, American officials must be more direct and specific in their rhetoric. Actively reiterating unequivocal support for Turkey’s democratically elected government would further both America and Europe’s best interest, and would leave little room for interpretations and perceptions to be manipulated. Even if America’s support for Turkey’s democratic process were unheeded in Ankara, its effects on the financial markets in Istanbul, New York, London, or Tokyo would be welcome and calming. The country’s economy and stock market have already been rocked by the domestic political uncertainty emanating from Ankara. Foreign investors who once brimmed with confidence over Turkey because of its EU accession process and blossoming democracy have been shaken. Given the 30-fold increase in foreign direct investment in Turkey since the AKP came to power, the closure case against the AKP represents a significant economic crisis . Turkey’s stock index dropped 32 % and Standard & Poor cut Turkey’s credit rating from stable to negative after the closure case was announced.5 To make matters worse, continued conflict and unrest in Turkey’s southeastern province and northern Iraq have only been heightened in the prevailing political climate. As analysts and economists continue to emphasize, Turkey’s political environment is in desperate need of stability; strong support from the US would go a long way towards achieving this goal. Therefore it is time for Turkey’s true friends to let their voices be heard for democracy. The AKP clearly speaks for a large portion of the Turkish people who want to see changes made in the approach and character of both their constitution and republic. With a majority of the Turkish parliament and municipal administrations having been controlled by the AKP for the better part of six years now, the structure of the secular Turkish Republic remains firmly intact. The AKP has continually played by the rules set by the secular establishment and relied on Turkish voters to be their arbiters. The AKP’s ability to successfully navigate Turkey’s murky political waters and

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rocky relationship with the military Challenging the AKP’s through compromise and concessions conservative Muslim values and has angered many secularists. The secupolicy-agenda is legitimate at lar establishment’s attempts to not only the ballot box, but not in the circumvent Turkey’s democracy, but its historically close ally, the military, demcourtroom where the Turkish onstrates their desperation. However, people have no voice this latest attempt by the judiciary is far more serious than any previous attempts to “correct” Turkey’s conservative-Islamic tendencies. Banning the AKP and its leadership will lead to a period of uncertainty and instability that could have far more serious consequences than any of the previous military interventions. As many commentators in Europe have indicated, Turkey’s rules on banning political parties are unprecedented in regard to how overarching and nebulous they are. The fact that there have been 18 party closures in Turkey since the introduction of the 1982 constitution demonstrates just how serious a threat this legal maneuver represents.6 The debate over Turkey’s secularism will continue to polarize domestic politics, but should not trump the enormous democratic progress that Turkey has made over the last decade. Attempting to compare this closure case with previous Turkish or even other European cases is tangential and difficult at best. No other governing party that has enjoyed 47% of the popular vote has ever been thrown out of office by the courts. Compounding this fact, Turkey currently lacks a credible opposition that could form a government in the void left by the AKP, and the military seems unwilling to step in given its experience last summer of opposing Abdullah Gül’s nomination as president only to see it backfire. By winning close to half the votes in Turkey, the AKP has demonstrated that it is a mainstream party that knows how to compromise; it has won the right to serve out its time in office. Domestic Turkish politics is a notoriously prickly process in which few outside actors want to become involved, even without trying to pick sides. However, demonstrating concrete and fundamental support for democracy in Turkey should not be seen as a polarizing or partisan effort. Challenging the AKP’s conservative Muslim values and policy-agenda is legitimate at the ballot box, but not in the courtroom where the Turkish people have no voice. The United States and the EU continually offer their positions on a variety of issues that have always been seen as important factors in domestic Turkish politics; therefore now is not the time for ambiguity and paying equal lip service to democracy and secularism. These are not mutually exclusive terms, although in the Turkish context they tend to 121

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The so-called “Muslim democrats” represented by the AKP tend to be far more positive towards the United States in comparison to the “extreme secularists” who advocate an attitude steeped in xenophobic and anti-Western nationalistic rhetoric

be portrayed as being dichotomous and binary. Oli Rehn’s recent statements on “democratic secularism” serve as a useful example of how to break out of the false dichotomy currently being debated in Washington and Ankara.7 The time has come for strong U.S. support for Turkish democracy and pressure to resolve the current political crisis in a quick and unequivocal manner.

Many U.S. officials have argued in private that coming out publicly and explicitly in the way that the EU has in opposition to the closure case will only demonstrate Washington’s impotence. After all, the case remains in the hands of the Turkish courts and is a fundamentally domestic matter. Nevertheless, how America and other outside actors respond remains critical in shaping the current political climate in Ankara and will be remembered far after this crisis is resolved. As America painfully learned throughout the Cold War and continues to learn, silently standing by and not supporting democracy is a short-term ‘solution’ that has long-term consequences. America is already entangled in the current debate whether it likes it or not. The accusations from the opposition against the “imperial” orders coming from Washington to the AKP’s headquarters have been a constant feature of the Turkish debate.8 The indictment’s citation of U.S. officials’ statements and Turkish leaders’ interviews with the American media further indicate just how important the United States remains to this political process.

America’s image in the world has already suffered tremendously from the second war in Iraq; it hit an all-time low in Turkey last summer. Given the U.S.’s emphasis on “public diplomacy” in the Middle East, it is imperative that the United States take the majority side of democracy in Turkey, instead of the side of a minority establishment that hopes to reverse the country’s progress. The current crisis is an opportunity for American diplomacy to win the hearts and minds of the Turkish people who have already spoken with their votes. The so-called “Muslim democrats” represented by the AKP tend to be far more positive towards the United States in comparison to the Sticking up for Turkey’s “extreme secularists” who advocate an democracy is an imperative for attitude steeped in xenophobic and antiany true friend of Turkey Western nationalistic rhetoric. Remain122

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ing on the sidelines will result in losing A Turkey without the an important ally, either in the form of a AKP, and perhaps more more isolated Turkish bureaucracy or a significantly without Prime movement that will grow from the same Minister Erdoğan, will be an socio-economic and grassroots base of the AKP, and whose members will reunpredictable and isolated member U.S. policy during this time. partner for the West in a vitally Turkey is too valuable a partner and an important region of the world ally for the United States to sit idly by as the courts in Ankara ban the AKP. If the ruling party and its leadership are banned from political life, not only will Turkey lose its credibility in the Middle East as the only indigenous Muslim-majority democracy, the United States will also lose for failing to support democracy in Turkey.9 A Turkey without the AKP, and perhaps more significantly without Prime Minister Erdoğan, will be an unpredictable and isolated partner for the West in a vitally important region of the world. Turkey matters to both America and Europe. Its geo-strategic position is critical to their interests throughout the region. Even more importantly, Turkey represents what a truly democratic Middle East might look like. Turkey without its democratically elected party and leaders will be a less attractive partner for the West in the Middle East. Playing partisan politics or favorites with the AKP is not in the interest of any international actor, but sticking up for Turkey’s democracy is an imperative for any true friend of Turkey.

Endnotes 1. For a summary of the indictment and a full link within the article see: http://www.hurriyet. com.tr/gundem/8467042.asp?gid=229&sz=98705 2. For a full transcript of the speech see: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/04/103629. htm 3. In particular Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza’s comments as at a recent gathering in Washington emphasized this point. “Turkish Voters Spoke Twice Last Year, Says Bryza,” Today’s Zaman, May 17, 2008. See also Amb. Wilson’s recent statements during an interview given to Milliyet’s Fikret Bila on May 8, 2008. For an English translation: http://turkey.usembassy.gov/amb_050808b.html. 4. As but one example see Hürriyet’s reaction: “Ne AKP’li ne de karşıyız,” Hürriyet, May 17, 2008. 5. Numbers cited from a recent analysis by Spencer Boyer: http://www.theroot.com/id/46493. 6. As a good example, see Alfred Stepan’s commentary: “Forcibly re-secularizing Turkey will only backfire,” The Daily Star, March 22, 2008.

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7. See “Rehn: Fight is between extreme secularists and Muslim democrats,” Today’s Zaman, May 03, 2008. 8. See Şaban Kardaş, “Democratization once again? Limits of Europeanization,” Today’s Zaman, April 28, 2008. 9. For more, see Joshua Walker, “Re-Examining the U.S.-Turkish Alliance,” Washington Quarterly, Vol.31, No.1, pp.93-109.

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