IPSec Guide. Architecture & Traffic Processing

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IPSec Guide

Architecture & Traffic Processing

V1.0 – March 2, 2005

This document presents the document roadmap for IPSec, as well as a host-tohost architectural model, followed by a sequence of slides illustrating IPSec traffic processing related to this model.

8 pages

IPSec Document Roadmap RFC 2401 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol

RFC 2406 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

Stephen Kent Randall Atkinson Nov 1998

Stephen Kent Randall Atkinson Nov 1998

Uses

Copyright © 2005-2007 Tech-invite.com Joël Repiquet. All Rights Reserved.

RFC 2411

IP Authentication Header (AH)

IP Security Document Roadmap

Stephen Kent Randall Atkinson Nov 1998

Rodney Thayer, et. al. Nov 1998

Uses

Uses Dictate some of the values

Encryption Algorithms RFC 2451

RFC 2410

RFC 2405

ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms

NULL Encryption Algorithm and its Use with IPsec

ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm with Explicit IV

Rob Glenn Stephen Kent Nov 1998

Cheryl Madson N. Doraswamy Nov 1998

Roy Pereira Rob Adams Nov 1998

RFC 2402

Authentication Algorithms

RFC 2407 Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation (DOI) for ISAKMP

RFC 2403

RFC 2404

RFC 2104

Use of HMACMD5-96 within ESP and AH

Use of HMACSHA-1-96 within ESP and AH

HMAC: KeyedHashing for Message Authentication

Cheryl Madson Rob Glenn Nov 1998

Cheryl Madson Rob Glenn Nov 1998

Krawczyk, et. al. Feb 1997

Derrell Piper Nov 1998

Supplements IKE/ISAKMP with respect to Phase 2

RFC 2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) Maughan, et. al. Nov 1998

Provides a framework for authentication and key exchange

RFC 2412

RFC 2409

OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol

Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

Hilarie K. Orman Nov 1998

Dan Harkins Dave Carrel Nov 1998

Uses parts of (but is not dependant on) these protocols

SKEME A versatile Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet Hugo Krawczyk Nov 1995

IPSec Architecture – Host-to-Host Model IPSec Peer A (Initiator role)

IPSec Peer B (Responder role)

Domain-Wide Policy Manager

Policy Agent TCP/IP Applications

IP Filters

Main & Quick Modes Settings

Main & Quick Modes Settings

IKE Copyright © 2005-2007 Tech-invite.com Joël Repiquet. All Rights Reserved.

Policy Agent

IP Filters

IKE

ISAKMP SA

UDP #500

UDP #500

TCP / UDP

TCP / UDP

SPD

SPD SAD

SAD

AH IP

TCP/IP Applications

Security Policy Database Security Association Database

SA SA

SAD

AH

IPSec

IPSec ESP

SA SA

SPD

IP

ESP

IP@ a

IP@ b

Network Interface

Network Interface

IPSec Traffic Processing – 1) Initialisation IPSec Peer A (Initiator role)

IPSec Peer B (Responder role)

1

Policy Agent TCP/IP Applications

3

2

IP Filters

Main & Quick Modes Settings

Copyright © 2005-2007 Tech-invite.com Joël Repiquet. All Rights Reserved.

UDP #500

TCP / UDP

Network Interface

2

3

Main & Quick Modes Settings

IP Filters

TCP/IP Applications

IKE UDP #500

TCP / UDP

SAD

SPD

AH

IPSec

IPSec ESP

IP@ a

Policy Agent

SAD

AH IP

1

1. Retrieve Policy Data from a domain-wide manager (as an alternative: from a local database) 2. Distribute security settings to IKE 3. Fill-in, directly or via the IPSec Driver, the SPD (Security Policy Database) with IP filters (ordered list of rules with selectors)

IKE

SPD

Domain-Wide Policy Manager

IP Connectivity between A and B is a prerequisite

IP

ESP IP@ b

Network Interface

IPSec Traffic Processing – 2) IKE Phase 1 Triggering IPSec Peer A (Initiator role)

TCP/IP Applications

Copyright © 2005-2007 Tech-invite.com Joël Repiquet. All Rights Reserved.

IKE 6

UDP #500

TCP / UDP

SPD 1

3

SAD 4

IPSec Peer B (Responder role) 1. First outgoing "applicative" IP packet 2. The outgoing interface is IPSec-enabled and therefore the packet is passed to the IPSec driver 3. SPD Check returns "secured" 4. Is there an appropriate active SA in SAD? - No 5. Request to IKE for creating the SA 6. IKE starts Phase 1 by sending an ISAKMP message ("HDR, SA") to Peer B 2. "IKE" IP packet passed to IPSec driver 3. SPD Check returns "permitted" (IKE traffic is not to be secured via AH/ESP) 7. Packet returned unmodified by IPSec driver 8. "IKE"Packet sent towards B 9. "IKE"Packet received by B 10. The incoming interface is IPSec-enabled and therefore the packet is passed to the IPSec driver 11. SPD Check returns "permitted" (IKE traffic is not to be secured via AH/ESP) 12. Packet returned by IPSec driver 13. IKE message received by IKE on side B

7

13

UDP #500

TCP / UDP

SAD

SPD 11

AH

IPSec

IP

IKE

5

AH

2

TCP/IP Applications

12

IPSec ESP

ESP

IP 10

IP@ a

IP@ b 8

Network Interface

9 Network Interface

IPSec Traffic Processing – 3) IKE Phase 1 Completion IPSec Peer A (Initiator role)

IPSec Peer B (Responder role) Note: the following exchanges are detailed in another document HDR, SA Negotiation Diffie-Hellman Exchange

TCP/IP Applications

TCP/IP Applications

Authentication

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IKE

IKE

ISAKMP SA

UDP #500

UDP #500

TCP / UDP

TCP / UDP

SPD

SAD

SAD

AH IP

AH

IPSec

IPSec ESP

SPD

IP

ESP

IP@ a

IP@ b

Network Interface

Network Interface

IPSec Traffic Processing – 4) IKE Phase 2 & Secured Traffic Resumption IPSec Peer A (Initiator role)

IPSec Peer B (Responder role)

1. The Quick mode negotiation results in one outbound and one inbound SA, with SPI-a and SPI-b respectively chosen by the initiator and the responder 2. The SAD is updated by IKE on each side 3. On the initiator side, IKE notifies the IPSec driver in answer to its previous request 4. Retrieval of SA parameters in the SAD is resumed for the pending "application" packet

TCP/IP Applications

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IKE

5. Packet is modified with ESP (depending on SA mode: transport / tunnel) and sent back to IP 6. The secured packet is sent towards B 7. The secured packet is received on side B 8. It is sent to the IPSec driver 9. The inbound SA is retrieved from the SPI value in the ESP header. Checkings are performed. 10. The ESP header and trailer are removed and the IP packet sent back to the IP module 11. Payload is sent to upper layers

IKE

ISAKMP SA

1

UDP #500

1 2

Note: the following exchanges are detailed in another document

3

TCP / UDP

1

SPD

SAD

HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni...

5

TCP / UDP

SAD

HDR*, HASH(3)

AH IPSec

AH

ESP

11

10 10

SA SA

SPD

9

5

ESP

UDP #500

2

HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr...

4

IP

TCP/IP Applications

IPSec

IP 8

IP@ a 6

IP@ b 1

Network Interface

1

7 Network Interface

IPSec Traffic Processing – 5) Secured (Outgoing) Traffic IPSec Peer A (Initiator role)

IPSec Peer B (Responder role)

TCP/IP Applications

TCP/IP Applications

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IKE

IKE

ISAKMP SA

UDP #500

UDP #500

TCP / UDP

TCP / UDP

SPD 1

3

SAD

SAD

4

10

AH

2

IPSec

IP 6 IP@ a

SPD

AH

5

12 11

ESP

SA SA

ESP

13

IPSec

IP 9 IP@ b

7

8 Network Interface

Network Interface