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IMMIGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL CITIZENSHIP IN EU

Carlota Solé Professor at the Department of Sociology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) [email protected]

Sònia Parella Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) [email protected]

Abstract Faced with the task of designing a European citizenship in the EU, in this article we reflect on the transition towards a supranational dimension of citizenship in the context of societies, like European countries, that are recipients of migratory flows from different parts of the world, as well as on the obstacles inherent in the configuration of an European identity in connection with such a citizenship. The authors contend and conclude that the key to such a construction process lies in its open nature and in the ability to combine different loyalties. This is why there is a need to overcome the tension between, on the other hand, an inclusive citizenship, based on the ties of permanent residence and not strictly of nationality. This dual dimension enables to include as citizens immigrants who share with the native born collective interests, both material and symbolic, that lead them to feel themselves members of the same political community, on the basis of feelings of belonging compatible with the respective identities of origin.

Key words: Immigration, Citizenship, Collective Identity, European Union

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Introduction

The presence today of more or less permanent migration in Western societies since the late 20th century highlights the need to revise the established relationship between citizenship and nationality and to change traditional institutions, in order to include resident foreign national as political and not merely economic actors. While in the beginning of the modern age, the fundamental tension was concentrated on the need to separate religion from politics, the current moment in history has consequences that are equally profound and far-reaching, in that it questions the historic link between citizenship and nationality. Such a situation raises great challenges for liberal democracy, and demands new ways of thinking about the design of a new concept of citizenship, that is more inclusive, open and cosmopolitan. Indeed, we must be aware of the immense difficulties inherent in this process, which leads, inevitably, to a transformation of the traditional, Marshallian conception of citizenship that has been valid and accepted since 1950. This conception, based on the link between state, nation and citizenship, must be adapted to the increasing presence of resident immigrants, without undermining the principles of democratic practice. We must, then, raise the issue of granting full political rights (citizenship status) not only to nationals of European Union (EU) member states, but also to permanent residents, and thus overcome the current structural division between citizens and foreign immigrants. With the emergence and development of multi-ethnic societies in the EU and the crisis of the traditional link between citizenship and nationality, the debate concerning supranational citizenship has intensified (Soysal, 1994; Bauböck, 1994). The object of the current paper is

3 to discuss the main theoretical contributions to supranational citizenship of a more cosmopolitan and plural character. Nevertheless, the debate surrounding the granting of political rights to immigrants is incomplete if we fail to take into account the obstacles to be faced by the widening of the bases for participation in the processes of political decisionmaking. In the face of the granting of citizenship to immigrants, we must take into account the unfavourable reactions of an autochthonous population that sees its interests threatened. At the same time, we should also consider the apathy of immigrants that may opt not to use such political rights, due both to their subordinated position in the social structure of the host society, and to their refusal to generate a sense of belonging that means having to renounce other kinds of loyalties linked to their identities of origin.

1. The Relation between Citizenship and Nationality

The consolidation of permanent immigration in Western societies leads to the revision of the relation between state and nation and to break this historic link that took root in the 19th century in Western societies. The current co-existence in our societies between people with different systems of rights and duties, due to the simple fact of possessing a different nationality from that of the host society, raises important challenges for the democratic system. How will it be possible to maintain such loyalties based on the exclusion of certain groups that actively contribute to the growth of such societies (through the payment of taxes, social security contributions), but who are unable to vote? Governments legitimate their policies of exclusion/inclusion on the grounds of nationality (Zapata, 1996). With the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the right to vote in municipal elections was granted to all EU citizens, based on the municipal census, and thus the issue of the separation of citizenship and nationality was raised for the first time,

4 questioning the logic of the state. This uncoupling did not include non-EU nationals, and as such a homogenising logic has been applied for some and an exclusionary one for others. Thus, we find ourselves faced with a definite symmetry in the procedures for acquiring European citizenship, a citizenship designed in opposition to the “non-European other” (Zapata, 1999). On the one hand, “traditional orthodoxy” holds that the nature of the link between citizenship, the state and the nation is unbreakable. In this context, if immigrants wish to achieve equality of rights, their only option is to be naturalised through the process of assimilation. For the defenders of this model, while citizenship grants certain privileges (legal, political and economic) to which non-citizens are excluded, the situation is not contrary to liberal principles, since at no time are immigrants denied the opportunity of being naturalised. According to such authors, if political rights could be obtained by the mere fact of permanent residence, the concept of citizenship would be devalued. As such, immigrants, it is argued, would no longer value the acquisition of citizenship as a feeling of belonging and they would lose the feeling of community and the need to establish a minimum degree of shared cultural practices (Shuck and Smith 1985). On the other hand, multicultural pluralists conceive of the link between citizenship, the nation and the state in a wider fashion. They propose that immigrants be granted the same system of rights and obligations as those enjoyed by citizens, without the need to be naturalised and of renouncing their nationality of origin. Belonging to a political community and citizenship, understood as national identity, are not necessarily interdependent nor do they go hand-in-hand. Following the arguments of multicultural pluralism, and with the aim of overcoming the situation of discrimination and the imbalance between obligations and rights that immigrants suffer, they propose a distinction between citizenship and nationality. Thus, the status of citizenship becomes an alternative to nationality, and consists of simply granting

5 all rights, including political ones, to those who possess legal residence. This process of establishing equal legal status for all residents of society breaks with the concept of nationality, based on historical, cultural and emotional elements that lead to arbitrariness, given that citizenship is made to depend on the assimilation of codes and practices of the host society. In a similar line, Thomas Hammar (1985; 1990) claims that the boundary between inclusion and exclusion should no longer be nationality, but rather permanent residence. The main dividing line is no longer the traditionally-accepted one between foreign immigrants and citizens, but rather between immigrants who are resident on a permanent basis and those on a non-permanent one (Hammar, 1990). The author introduces the category of ‘denizens’ to refer to those immigrants who have acquired a situation of permanent residence and virtually all civil, economic and social rights, although they lack the principal democratic one: the right to vote. ‘Denizens’ are distinguished from ‘alien citizens’: immigrants whose residency and work situation come within the legal framework, but who are excluded from the majority of social and political rights. Hammar maintains that the situation of denizens is unsustainable in a true democracy, given that it is a group of persons that is permanently established but that does not belong to the demos. In addition, the author predicts that denizens will be increasingly numerous, outnumbering non-permanent residents, which threatens the stability of the traditional democratic system. In order to overcome this problem, Hammar proposes two options: on the one hand, the granting of political rights for denizens without the need to be naturalised as citizens (the pluralist multicultural option), or, on the other, to ease the requirements for naturalisation (the orthodox, traditional option). For the author in question, the former will eventually predominate, and as such he considers that the adoption of the residency criterion for the granting of full citizenship rights is inevitable and merely a question of time.

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2. Political Rights of Immigrants in the Context of EU Countries

The existence of immigrants without full rights as citizens generates a situation of coexistence between people with different systems of rights and obligations according to their nationality; it limits the extent of their socio-cultural integration; and raises serious challenges for democracy. Throughout this paper, the term socio-cultural integration is used, as opposed to other assimilationist meanings of the concept of integration, with the aim of incorporating the cultural dimension, not contemplated by the functionalist perspective, into the structural one (Solé, 1981; Solé et al., 2002:20-24). In this way, integration comes to be understood as the interpenetration of the members and the cultural elements of two population groups, which leads to a new social structure and a new culture. Carlota Solé (1981), in her analysis, establishes two levels of integration: structural or socio-structural integration, that implies occupational and social integration through membership of class; and a further level, cultural or national-cultural integration, that is reflected in the will of immigrants to claim as their own the ambit in which they feel themselves to be citizens with full rights, while at the same time playing an equal role in a collective political project. Socio-cultural integration requires prior legal recognition of immigrants as citizens, although, as we shall see below, effective participation in institutions and social organisations and the use of political rights do not automatically follow from such recognition. In other words, it is a necessary condition, one that allows for the possibility of culminating the process of integration, although not a sufficient one. Socio-cultural integration of immigrants is not only achieved through recognition of economic, social and cultural rights. Full integration requires that immigrants have the possibility of participating in decisions concerning public life. At present, a paradoxical

7 situation exists, whereby the current laws of the host society are applied to immigrants, whose citizenship rights are not recognised, leaving immigrants with no possibility to decide. The right to vote is considered to be the culmination of the formal recognition of citizenship. Undoubtedly, according to Philips (1993), when immigrants do not participate in the process of political decision making, they are reduced to the category of “political minors”, which generates a symbolic representation of inferiority for excluded groups. This “infantalisation” of immigrants is contrary to democratic principles, and its effects allow us to understand why demands for political representation figure so highly as a means of achieving full sociocultural integration for immigrants. While it is true that legal foreign residents participate in the sphere of the labour market and the Welfare State through work and the payment of taxes, they do not have the right to choose their representatives. Non-naturalised foreigners must obey the laws, but are unable to participate in their drawing up or in their control. As a result, the legal and political dimension must be highlighted in any analysis concerning socio-cultural integration. This implies the recognition of the right to vote and the establishment of channels for participation that allow immigrants not only to access certain social obligations and rights, but also includes participation and co-responsibility in the design, discussion and approval of the laws that all members of the community must obey. In this respect, failure to grant immigrants political rights, denying them the status of citizens even when they have resided for along time in a country, undermines democratic practice (Solé, 2002). The representation of one’s own interests and participation in decision making are the pillars of democratic functioning The arguments put forward by Miller (1981) in identifying the phases of the migratory project undertaken by foreign workers in Western European countries in the post-war period, continue to be absolutely valid for the analysis of current international migratory flows in Europe. The author sustains the thesis of political quiescence to explain the situation in which

8 immigrants live as similar to that of the Lumpenproletariat. Thus, in the first phase of settlement, they behaved as an a-political mass, whose inferior legal status served to maintain the status quo. It was not until years later (the 1970s in Western Europe) that immigration ceased to be temporary and immigrants decided to remain on a permanent basis in the host society, leading to a subsequent emergence of the political dimension of immigration. Immigrants found that, once they had decided to stay, although their rights as economic actors were recognised, as political actors, they came up against a series of obstacles and boundaries that citizens did not, in terms of both legal restrictions and racist attitudes of the autochthonous population. In the majority of constitutions of European countries, political rights relating to active and passive suffrage in general elections are reserved for national citizens of the state. The issue under debate at the present moment in time, is not the right to vote in all elections, but rather in local ones. It is a debate that has been going on for several years in all EU countries. The right of foreign nationals to both vote and stand for election (active and passive suffrage, respectively) can be traced back to the Swiss canton of Neuchatel, where the right was recognised in 1849. Currently, this has spread to other Swiss cantons, on the accreditation of ten years of residency. In another case, in the United Kingdom, citizens of the Commonwealth have the right to vote in all elections. The right to vote in local elections has also been extended to Irish, Dutch, Danish, Swiss, Norwegian and Finnish nationals with long-term residence in Great Britain. In 1975, Sweden passed the law recognising the right to vote in local and regional elections on the condition of three years of residence. In the Netherlands, foreigners with five years of residence achieved the same. However, despite these advances in certain European countries during the first part of the 1980s, since 1985 there has been a drastic reduction in the extension of these rights, despite the active demands made by trade unions, NGO’s and immigrant associations. In Spain, the Constitution is

9 categorical when it states that only Spanish nationals have active and passive suffrage rights. Foreign nationals may exercise such a right in municipal elections, on the condition that, by treaty or law, there is a reciprocal agreement allowing Spanish nationals to do likewise (Sagarra 2002:38-39) 1 . Undoubtedly, according to Pajares (1998), progress in the recognition of political rights must be made both in the framework of each state and in that of the EU. The European Parliament itself had already echoed such demands in several debates in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the EU has already experienced the de-linking of the right to vote and nationality, when it granted the right to vote in local elections to certain non-national residents. With the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the right of active and passive suffrage in local elections was established in all countries of the EU for residents from other EU countries, which obliged many countries to undertake constitutional reform. However, no advantage was taken of such circumstances to extend the right to non-EU national residents. Political rights are not only limited to the right to vote. Other forms of political participation exist that are not directly linked to elections. These are not considered to be alternatives to the right to vote, but rather as complimentary strategies. They represent a further stage in the process of the recognition of the right to vote, which would allow foreign nationals to participate in the drawing-up of laws (through the election of their representatives), that must then be obeyed and respected. Based on Miller’s (1981) typology, four channels of participation can be identified: the extra-parliamentary channel, industrial democracy, the associative channel and consultative councils. The extra-parliamentary channel becomes an important means of obtaining rights, as a consequence of the social pressure brought to bear by immigrants (for example, the pressure brought to bear by the those “without papers” concerning demands for extraordinary processes of regularisation in countries such as France and Spain). Another important channel is that of industrial

10 democracy; that is, the participation of immigrants in trade union organisations, industrial councils and in elections to nominate works councils. A third channel, the associative one, allows the voice of immigrants to be heard through their participation in political parties, religious, humanitarian and civic organisations, immigrant associations etc. In this respect, the promotion of associationalism among immigrants is crucial for the institutionalisation of the channels of representation of their interests. A fourth channel consists of consultative councils, one of the most used by regional and local administrations in order to compensate for the lack of the right to vote. Such a channel has proliferated in countries such as Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. They are local bodies elected by the immigrant population that act as “parliaments”, conveying their proposals to the conventional institutions. In their favour, Andersen (1990), highlights the role of consultative councils as a channel that facilitates the transmission of immigrants’ specific interests. This a good alternative to political participation while immigrants continue to lack full political rights and, undoubtedly, the first step on the road that will inevitably lead to the granting of the rest of full political rights. However, the author himself highlights the risks involved with these consultative bodies, in that they are considered to be an anomaly in the traditional political system. They exist on the margins of the normal democratic process and may even inhibit the autonomous political activity of immigrants 2 .

3. The Risks of Extending Political Rights to Immigrants

The recognition of political rights for immigrants, while, as we have argued above, essential, brings with it not only advantages, but also risks. The extension of political rights may cause a reaction on the part of other groups (the autochthonous population, internal

11 immigrants), who witness the broadening of the bases of participation in the political decision-making process concerning collective affairs, and who fear the loss of the benefits of demands won previously (Solé, 2002; Solé et al. 2002) 3 . This may lead to a reaction against the autochthonous population, which goes to reinforce racist attitudes and behaviour in the medium to long term. At the same time, there exists the risk of divisions along ethnic lines within the democratic institutions of the host society (for example, ethnic sections within trades unions based on class, the emergence of parties of an ethnic basis as opposed to classor nationalist-based parties, etc.). In the face of the possibility of immigrants establishing their own political forces, and of an ethnic vote appearing, the autochthonous population fear that this may go against their own interests and favour those of a foreign country. However, the reality is quite different. Generally speaking, (as with the case of the Turks in Germany, or the ethnic minority vote in the USA, for example), immigrants associations have not been particularly interested in forming political parties, with the votes of immigrants being evenly spread across distinct national political parties (Pajares, 1998; Oswald, 2001). As John Rex (1994) points out, minority parties based on a particular religious or ethnic groups have almost never enjoyed significant success. In any case, it is undeniable that when political rights are recognised, political parties take the specific interests of immigrants into account and that the former are involved in meeting immigrants’ economic, social and cultural necessities, adapting and modifying their political programmes in order to obtain votes. The promotion of political rights for immigrants, turning them into full citizens, may not only produce a certain degree of rejection among the autochthonous population, but also among, at least explicitly, by all if not the great majority of immigrants. Where immigrants exercise the right to vote in those states where they may do so in local elections (Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands), studies reveal high degrees of abstentionism and lack of interest in

12 politics (Rath, 1990). Given the obstacles that must be faced by immigrants to settle on a more or less permanent basis in the society of destination (permits, “papers”, rejection by neighbours, discrimination in the place of work, etc.), they must choose, after Hirschman (1970), between: desisting in the attempt (exit); protesting, with the hope that their voice will be heard by those in authority (voice); and submit and refrain from all reaction (loyalty). In some cases, once immigrants have settled in the host society, they prefer to refrain from taking action, rather than opting for transforming the environment. This situation is due to a question of despondence which leads to inaction (Ahmed, 1997:176). However, this idea of despondence is not irreversible over time, and as such the indifference and passiveness may be turned into an interest in being recognised as citizens and members of a society, and not just as workers. This is translated into acts of protest or in the explicit will to participate at all levels. The facilitation of the procedures for family reunification, to name but one example, provides personal stability for immigrants that undoubtedly influences the decision not to return and in the desire to participate in the host society. Thus, the guarantee of formal rights by the host society is not sufficient. Additional factors that lead to the inhibition or despondence of immigrants must take into account the position that they occupy in the social structure. Their resistance to abandoning the idea of return, their attachment to the culture of origin, their frustrated hopes of the possibilities of better opportunities of access to or promotion in the job market in the place of destination, may lead to reticence on the part of the immigrants to exercise their political rights, even having attained the status of citizens (Hammar, 1993:120-126). The desire to return to the place of origin that immigrants maintain throughout their life inhibits them from making very long-term plans for themselves and for their children. Consequently, they are not unwilling to joining associations that represent their rights as workers (trade unions) or their more immediate interests (municipal associations), but they do show themselves to be reticent when

13 participating in nation-state political life, especially first-generation immigrants. Confidence in the political institutions will also depend on the extent to which immigrants perceive that immigrant associations have access to local power structures. However, these effects must not be used as arguments against the awarding of the right to vote, given that the causes of such disinterest or passiveness are similar to those that explain abstentionism among citizens. In other words, abstentionism can be explained by socio-economic and cultural factors. Indeed, the absence of political participation due to social exclusion is not a monopoly of immigrants. Other groups, such as women and gypsies in some European countries, for example, have possessed citizenship rights for many years, yet they continue to be excluded from many labour, social and political ambits 4 . Overall, the recognition and guarantee of a greater representation of their own interests and the promotion of political participation by immigrants does not automatically lead to the effective use of such political rights, as long as the social and class inequalities that lead to social exclusion are not overcome. (Solé, 2002; Solé et al., 2002). In this respect, both processes, social-economic integration and the recognition of citizenship rights, are interdependent phenomena. The granting of political rights to foreign nationals, despite not meaning an immediate equalisation of opportunities with the autochthonous population, is an indispensable prerequisite. Equality of access to power and to decision making will favour the distribution of the results: rights and wealth. But it is not only a question of access to resources. Given that multicultural societies demand a minimum degree of homogeneity in the framework for coexistence, common values must be established and, ultimately, the rules of the game must be put into place; rules that are open to discussion by all members of society and that are the object of constant renegotiation. The recognition of full citizenship rights for immigrants must be the starting point and not the final destination of the immigration process (Delgado, 1998). Immigrants can only be expected to obey the law if,

14 at the same time, they are able benefit from it (rights and not only duties and obligations) and actively participate in the creation of a “new” society. Such a “new” society must be capable of generating a common space that is the basis for the emergence of a feeling of belonging and of membership of the general community, based on common interests shared by both the autochthonous population and immigrants. When explaining the behaviour of immigrants with regards to the use of political rights, structural factors that refer to the position of immigrants in the host society are not the only factors that have an influence over this behaviour. Studies such as those carried out by M. Fennema and J. Tillie (2001) in the Netherlands, underline the differences between ethnic groups and in culturalist factors. The higher participation levels of the Turks (compared to groups from Morocco, Surinam and the Antilles) can be explained for the main part by the fact that Turkish organisations in Amsterdam reflect patterns of collective action that already exist in Turkey. At the same time, it emerges that many immigrant politicians belong to families that already occupied political posts in their respective countries of origin. Another indicator that emerges from the results of the study is the importance of political culture. A clear example may be found in the lower levels of tolerance that the Turkish community displays in the face of ethnic discrimination, which can be attributed to the fact that they have never been subjected to colonisation, unlike Morocco, Surinam and the Antilles (the latter two having been Dutch colonies). This would explain the greater sense of “parity” and of nonsubordination to the native Dutch. On the other hand, many non-EU immigrants do not possess a political culture of democratic participation, as is understood in the West. The idea of nation or nation-state is alien to their world-view, and their feeling of community often takes precedence over their sense of society or association (Solé, 2002; Solé et al., 2002). For all of these reasons, M. Fennema and J. Tillie (2000:37) conclude that a good deal of the immigrants’ social and political capital seems to have emigrated along with the ethnic groups.

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4. The Challenge of European Citizenship from an Intercultural Perspective

The attainment of citizenship has always been considered to be a step towards the full integration of immigrants in any society. The idea of integration has been conceived of from the point of view of the host society, presupposing that the point of reference or goal of maximum or optimum welfare to be achieved by immigrants was the situation (labour, social and political) of the autochthonous population. This insider vision is characteristic of Western European societies whose cultural identity is well defined, and which played hosts to immigrants from other European countries (mainly the south of Europe), or from neighbouring countries or those with colonial ties, as was the case of Turkish immigrants in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, or the Moroccans and Algerians in France. With the constitution of the European Union and the presence of another kind of immigration, from outside Europe, the insider vision must be recast. Sociocultural integration must also be viewed from the point of view of immigrants, and from the perspective of an intercultural European identity, based on belonging to a political community and compatible with other affiliations or national identities (De Lucas, 2001a). The future of the EU appears to be heading towards the weakening of the nation-state, as a consequence of the process of the transfer of sovereignty to supra-state institutions, a tendency that, at the same time, might make possible the recovery and re-emergence of the local dimension of citizenship. In fact, as Castells (1996) argues, in the network society, in which the individual feels increasingly threatened by the forces of globalisation, one expects local identities, as mechanisms of differentiation, to re-emerge and to act as a counterpoint to supranational identities. The project of European citizenship, according to the logic of member states, involves, in addition to a series of economic and social gains (among which

16 we can highlight the freedom of movement), the loss of sovereignty and of the greater part of the basis of legitimacy. From the perspective of immigrants that are permanent residents in member states, they do not participate in the construction of European citizenship, and as such they do not have the same rights as European citizens. As such, European citizenship will never be achieved until the EU confronts the issues of immigration and of how and to what degree immigrants must participate in the construction of such citizenship (Zapata, 1999). The current problem faced by Europe is how to adapt itself to diversity in order to generate a European identity. As A.D. Smith asks (1992:56) “should we regard a United States of Europe as a new type of ‘supranational’ identity and community?”. The emergence of a supranational EU does not necessarily demand the prior existence of a feeling of belonging to Europe by the EU member states, although the EU will not be stable until a high level of identification is developed 5 . However, the genesis of a European identity should not generate conflicts with the national identities of autochthonous citizens or with other sources of affiliation. Mistakenly, as Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001) argue, the tendency has been to see such identities as incompatible and mutually exclusive, as if it were a question of choice between a single identity among several options. However, the vision comes up against the fact that individuals, in reality, hold multiple, simultaneous identities. People move between identities according to the demands of the situation and of the context (Smith, 1992). Individual identity becomes “situational”, and even optional, in the sense that individuals identify themselves and are identified by others in different ways, according to the situation in which they find themselves. For example, when an individual is outside her country, she tends to classify herself differently from the way in which she would do inside 6 . In this respect, we may talk of “nested” identities, that, in principle, are not in conflict, and that are structured through the coexistence of concentric circles, so that the last includes the first. Thus, an individual may identity herself

17 as a resident of city “a”, while defining her identity as resident of region “A”, which includes city “a”, and that, at the same time, shows a strong sense of belonging to country “Alpha”, formed by region “A”, city “a” and so forth. Authors such as Brewer (1999:190) point out that these different identities can have different roles. Some, those furthest from the nucleus (superordinate) serve to satisfy the need to be included as an individual within a wider group and to make that individual feel that he/she belongs to a community of equals. European identity might be an example of this. On the other hand, other, more local identities, situated at the level of the sub-group, would have as their principle function the differentiation of groups within a larger social category. Along these lines, several studies have explored peripheral nationalisms and have shown that many people define their identities in term both of the nation-state and of their belonging to a particular region. This is the case of many Basque and Catalan in Spain, who define themselves as Basques or Catalans and, at the same time, Spanish or even European (Díez Nicolas, 1999). As such, it is perfectly possible to make different “nested” identities compatible. The same occurs in the United States, where a large proportion of the population defines itself in terms of various “hyphenated” identities, such as Mexican-Americans, Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans. At the same time, an increase has been detected over recent years in the number of immigrants opting for double nationality, a phenomenon that did not occur with the first wave of immigrants, who opted for more assimilationist strategies. In this respect, American identity is not exclusive to any one group, which allows different and eclectic sentiments and life-styles to be included. What different ethnic groups that define themselves as “Americans” have in common is the fact that they feel they are contributing to the economic and social progress of the country, the benefits of which they feel part of, without this meaning that they must renounce their own culture (Ueda, 2002).

18 This set of concentric or “nested” identities becomes polyedric in the new legal and political framework, that is at once supra-state and culturally diverse; in other words, from the double dimension of multiethnicity and multiculturalism. How can Europe achieve a European supranational state and an intercultural European identity? On the one hand, a shared political culture is required, that is reflected in a democratic European constitution, to which the citizens show loyalty. Diversity, on the other hand, would be maintained as historic, linguistic and regional characteristics see their rights protected within the framework and limits of such a constitution. To sum up, any future European identity must revolve around the recognition of citizenship for all, and around a decentralising, flexible force that allows for intermediate loyalties, recognises cultural diversity, and permits bonds to be maintained with the place of origin. In this way, the European citizen would have other poles of identity available, that are based on ethnic, linguistic, historic and local levels of identity, and on different associations in civil society, all of which are compatible with a sense of belonging to European political community 7 As Javier de Lucas (2001b) has highlighted, it is necessary to project European citizenship in terms close to plural citizenship, that demands the recognition by public authorities of the right of minority groups to a cultural identity, as an indispensable condition for the exercise of individual autonomy (Kymlicka, 1996). What model of European citizenship would be congruent with the principle of interculturality. The necessity to define European citizenship undoubtedly constitutes a workable example of the transition towards the supranational dimension of citizenship. According to the thesis of the author, we must review the extent to which it is realistic to expect that a European identity is capable of offering a political connection able to establish bonds of loyalty and solidarity that are translated into a new form of citizenship. While there is no democratic method for determining the limits of any political community

19 (its efficiency will depend on the extent to which they are conceived as legitimate by their members), it must be borne in mind that the project of European citizenship faces special difficulties: it lacks an objectively defined territory, a common past or history, and a single state system (Smith, 1992; De Lucas, 1997; 2001b:102-105). There exist as many differences between Europeans as between Europeans and non-Europeans, in terms of language (Basque, Finnish, Hungarian ...), laws, religion (Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant), and political and economic system. European identity cannot be constructed on the basis of primary identities (race, religion, culture, language), on the identification of etnos and demos, without automatically excluding part of the population that resides on a permanent basis in the EU 8 . Another hurdle that Javier de Lucas (2001b:105-106) highlights and that is directly related to the process of the loss of sovereignty of the EU member states, refers to the moment in which the legal and political characteristics of European citizenship are defined. A series of questions, difficult to resolve, must be taken into account: how to define European citizenship in such a way as to avoid it being a vacuum; what incentives are immigrants to have to participate in such a process; what are the elements that a European constitution must posses; how to ensure control over and transparency of the institutions and citizen participation; how to articulate this entire project in the complex context of the existing political realities. All these questions demand, without doubt, the implantation of models of shared sovereignty. We believe that the incentives for immigrants to achieve a symbolic benefit (citizenship), in addition to material ones, centre on being able to participate in the taking of decisions. The path to a more “cosmopolitan” supranational citizenship is not an easy one, in that it requires the construction of ties of political loyalty that obviate different sentiments of belonging, different political conditions, and different identities of origin. In short, it requires the construction of a demos without reference to an etnos. The difficulties involved in constructing a supranational identity, if no elements are found to substitute those pertaining to

20 national identity, may mean that, in the vacuum left, the opposite effect to the desired one is achieved; that is, that primary mechanisms of identification 9 are strengthened. In our opinion, political participation in decisions that affect daily life leads immigrants to move away from identities based on etnos.

5. Common Interests and Collective Identity: towards Supranational Citizenship

The need to understand sentiments of identity, of belonging to a territory and of rootedness to a given place in objective terms, leads us to make explicit the interests that are derived from their social position - using Dahrendorf’s (1959) terms, and also the incentives and concessions on the part of the autochthonous population and immigrants from outside the EU as citizens of the EU. The construction of supranational citizenship in the EU, with an increasing presence of immigration from different cultures, religions, traditions and ways of managing public life, raises the question

of which interests are common to both

autochthonous Europeans and to immigrants; a key issue for the emergence of a European identity. Common interests may become collective ones in as much as not only do social actors converge around the aim of reaching the same objective, but also that they co-operate in favour of the non-material, intangible and symbolic social “well-being” that citizenship represents. The production of this social good requires the collective action of individuals that have no other alternative but to co-operate in order to achieve it. The collective action undertaken leads to the production of group solidarity, which in turn reinforces the development of a collective identity (Hechter, 1987). Thus, it is the perception of common interests that leads to the development of a collective identity, which, reciprocally, makes the attainment of such interests possible (Tilly, 1978). In this sense, following the arguments of sociologist John Rex (1994), in as much as ethnic groups occupy a given objective position in the social structure in relation to political

21 and economic resources, ethnic mobilisation and ethnic movements may be thought of in terms of the step from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself, within the marxian paradigm of social classes. However, ethnic groups can become more effective political actors than social classes when defending their interests. While social classes must develop their sense of identity, ethnic groups can appeal directly to the sense of ethnicity and ethnic ties as a resource. Consequently, it is much easier for ethnic groups to fight to defend their interests collectively, as long as their pre-migratory identities remain. Unlike classes, ethnic groups begin by being “ethnies for themselves”, that use ethnicity as a resource for their organisation and for their fight for collective interests. From a humanistic point of view, J. Coleman (1990) takes into account the subject, the self in the construction of subjective and objective interests. Marx highlighted this distinction (objective interests of the working class are distinguished from the subjective interests of its components) regarding class consciousness and social change. According to Coleman, from the perspective of rational action, defined as action that provides long-term benefits for the social actor in question, objective interests may not necessarily be limited to those of social class. They might be derived not only from the actor’s position in relation to the means of production, but also from different aspects of the actor’s position in the social system. As such, this wider conception that Coleman (1990:51) presents, not only includes class interests, but also interests associated with age, sex, family size, religion, race and ethnicity. It is a generalisation of the Marxist idea of “objective interests”. Interests derived from ethnicity will become collective ones and will develop into a collective identity, as those who hold them are affected by the same experiences and circumstances, which transforms or changes the interaction (relation) between individuals. The identity of distinct individuals becomes a collective one when it comes to be based on common circumstances with repercussions for social relations. Individuals identify with

22 others who share the same experiences and circumstances, because through shared identity (collective), immigrants can opt for and achieve certain benefits (a social good such as citizenship), which would not otherwise be obtained 10 . It is precisely on this identity that citizenship is constructed. Our proposal for a supranational citizenship refers to the space that includes, and yet is above, current nation-states. Within, the construction of citizenship presupposes the existence of group solidarity 13 . This space is the basis for new political unity across European territory, in which all rights for all persons, under the same conditions, are recognised and guaranteed. Equality of rights and the recognition of rights by the (new) state (of the EU) demands ties to and participation in the life of the political community 11 . The recognition of rights and duties, the belonging or ties to a community and the participation in it in order to contribute to public life, will come about on the basis of the development of group solidarity. In other words, the autochthonous population and immigrants will co-operate in the exchange and cession of private resources and goods in order to have access to collective ones that, at the same time, allow them and guarantee them the attainment of other private goods (Hechter, 1987:17-19). The theory of group solidarity, an alternative to classic theories of academic sociology, has begun to take into account the actions of individuals. It seeks to explain the conditions under which individuals fulfil the conditions (standards) for belonging to a group. It presupposes, in the first place, that actors have certain desires, objectives, values and utilities. Secondly, that such objectives cannot be reached equally by everyone, since humans live in a world of scarcity and, as such, they must choose between various plans of action. Thirdly, that the election of a given plan of action will be rational; that is, actors will choose the course of action that will be the most effective means of reaching their goal. If they have many objectives that are equally attainable, they will choose the plan of action that leads to their preferred or priority objective. In terms of explanation, this theory relies on the objectives

23 being previously specified, and likewise for the structural conditions that limit actors in the search of their goals. From this, we might ask: what induces an individual to follow the standards or norms of the group? Following the standards or norms of belonging is often contingent, given that there may be a conflict of interest between individual and group objectives. In other situations, meeting the norms and standards may not be problematic for individuals (Hechter, 1983:20). The conflict of interest between individual and group may arise when groups try to reach levels of fulfilment that are predictable and consistent for their members. Two determinants explain the variations in the degree to which members fulfil their obligations towards the group: differences in the dependence of members on the group, and the capacity of the group to direct the behaviour of its members (Hechter, 1983:2) The construction of a European supranational and supra-state citizenship implies that we make explicit the conditions of belonging and the objective interests of immigrants and of current nation-states. The immigrants resident in different EU countries, will pursue the common objective of improving their conditions of life. They will develop common interests due to the fact that they share circumstances and experiences, such as the precarious nature of their situation in the labour market and the discrimination which they suffer there, social marginalisation and non-participation in politics. These circumstances and experiences affect the interaction (relation) between immigrants and the autochthonous population. In this process, both groups will cede part of their previous benefits and even privileges, with the aim of achieving the joining together and convergence of interests, of sharing an identity and of pursuing and opting for material and symbolic benefits, such as the social good of citizenship. The attempt to overcome the objective situation of disadvantage with respect to the autochthonous population leads immigrants to wish to attain citizenship status. The autochthonous population, for its part, will admit this possibility as long as their economic

24 interests (the substitution in the carrying out of tasks that are socially less valued although necessary for the productive process) and political ones (potential extension of the electorate) are covered.

6. Conclusions

Overall, the new European identity will emerge as a new, “hyphenated” identity, that is open, compatible with identities of origin and other sources of identification (at the local, regional, national level), for both immigrants and nationals of member states and their respective regions 12 . Such a European identity must be designed to favour and satisfy the needs of the different groups to be included within a larger one (the EU) and within a community of equals, in the sense that it brings with it benefits as well as commitments and obligations. In the face of the challenge of interculturality, if the aim is to define a framework of minimums for cohabitation in the terms laid down by the anthropologist Manuel Delgado (1998), then this will not be achieved by measures that favour the accumulation of groups of immigrants who participate in the sphere of the market, but who are denied political rights. It is not possible to demand that members of a society (immigrants) take on obligations and that they obey the law, without renouncing the privileges of citizenship based on the link with nationality. Only in this way, will such norms and obligations cease to be perceived by immigrants as something “imposed”, and not as something accepted that, and as such, is to be fulfilled on a voluntary basis. Given that the “European identity” concept is still in the phase of construction and at the moment its political and social meaning is still to be clearly defined, the challenge and the occasion can be taken advantage of in order to include different immigrant groups in this process. To revise the conditions for the attainment of citizenship and to give political rights

25 to foreign residents is the starting point from which to create bonds and feelings of belonging, and, in turn, to be able to demand that they obey laws in whose drawing up and negotiation they have participated. But throughout this paper, it has been shown that the recognition of political rights is an indispensable condition, although not enough on its own. Efforts must be made in order to eliminate structural inequalities based on ethnic group, in terms of both their position in the labour market and with regards to access to the resources of the Welfare State (education, housing, health...). Immigrants will be encouraged to materialise their bond with European societies as they realise that there are possibilities for social mobility and that they may

participate in the benefits of economic and social growth to which they directly

contribute, without this meaning that they have to be “assimilated” or renounce their identities of origin. In short, this means sharing a public domain of political culture based on equal opportunities and on the absence of racial and ethnic discrimination, and on the coexistence of different private communal cultures (language, religion, customs...) (Rex, 1986:1994). In the case of European nationals, such a process is met with reluctance. We are aware of the risks that this involves, in terms of the feeling of “threat” and of “competition”, and of the widening of the base of political participation by awarding the right to vote to foreign residents. In this respect, overcoming basic inequalities based on ethnic group or on being an immigrant is fundamental to overcoming the objections that the awarding of political rights to foreign-born residents raises among the autochthonous population. In the short term, the situation must be avoided in which specific interests of immigrants, derived from their unequal position in the social structure, promote the creation of ethnic trade unions and political parties (or ethnic factions within mainstream trade unions or political parties), and which runs the risk of widening of the social split. For this reason, only a less-rigid and lesssegmented social structure with an absence of racial and ethnic discrimination will reduce the risk of ethnic divisions in such institutions as trade unions and political parties. In addition, it

26 will encourage the autochthonous population to further realise that immigrants do not pursue only partial projects, but rather common and collective ones; this will reduce the conflict of interests between both groups.

Notes 1

It is most difficult for foreign nationals to be granted the right to vote on the basis of reciprocity, since, in

addition to technical and legal difficulties, in the majority of countries from which immigrants come from there are few, if any, Spanish residents. At the same time, it may be the case that some immigrants enjoy more political rights than others, regardless of the period of residence (Pajares, 1998). 2

One variant of consultative councils can be found in Spain, in the form of the Forum for the Social Integration

of Immigrants (1995) or the Immigration Councils in several autonomous communities and local councils. The Forum consists of a mechanism for intergovernmental co-operation, designed to be a channel for consultation and dialogue between different levels of public administration, non-governmental organisations and immigrant associations 3

In countries such as France, the parties of the left have usually been reticent and hostile to an independent

ethnic policy, and suggest that immigrant workers identify themselves, above all, as workers (Rex, 1994). 4

In the case of Spain, for instance, it has been shown that the immigrants from within Spain that arrived in

Catalonia in the 1950s and 1960s (above all from the southern and north-western Spain), having been full Spanish citizens all along, have taken a generation in reaching full and effective political participation (standing in local, regional or general elections; being present in the social and political life of the region...) (Solé, 1988). 5

Anthony D. Smith (1992) affirms that national identities and a European identity are not incompatible,

although he does doubt the possibility of generating a collective European identity capable of achieving a strong degree of identification among European citizens, given the reluctance to cast off their respective national identities 6

The concept of “situational identity” has been developed by Okamura (1981).

7

New concepts of citizenship are being put forward to meet the challenge the new forms of pluralism and the

social and political exclusion that has resulted from them, such as “transcultural citizenship” (Bauböck, 1994), “global citizenship” (Falk, 1994), “differentiated citizenship” (Young, 1989) cultural citizenship” (Turner, 1994), and “multicultural citizenship” (Castles, 1994; Kymlicka, 1996). The aim of all of such concepts is to extend the meaning of the classic notion of social citizenship of T.H Marshall (1950), and to explore new meanings, particularly in the area of participation (Vertovec, 1999). 8

As such, those such as the Vatican or the European People’s Party (EPP), who advocate the Christian roots of

the EU as a fundamental pre-political basis, are impeding a project of open European citizenship, that does not exclude and is sensitive to cultural and religious pluralism.

27

9

In addition, the discourse concerning supranational citizenship is not beyond being manipulated. As Javier de

Lucas (2001b) points out, the pro-European projects of countries such as France and Germany hide, in reality, a strategy to gain areas of power within the EU 10

The issue revolves around how to give meaning to the concept of “cosmopolitan” and “intercultural”

citizenship, a term and concept that, by including everything, is less precise in its definition that more restricted concepts. 13

Since the founding fathers of sociology, the group is considered to be the unit of analysis of the discipline. The

individual is an abstraction created by society. Groups precede individuals and conditions them through the process of socialisation. Since the 1980s, in the United States, a school of social thought has developed that breaks with the traditional vision of the group as a unit of analysis for studying society. As an alternative, the basic principle that informs such analysis is that of methodological individualism; that is, it is based on the idea that the explanation of all social phenomena can be reduced to its individual components. The principle of methodological individualism is the starting point for social sciences such as psychology or economics. 11

These three elements make up inclusive citizenship for authors such as Javier de Lucas (2001ª) and García

Añón (2003). 12

The definition of the conditions of belonging to the community must be sufficiently open to allow the future

inclusion of new member countries such as Turkey in 2007, for example.

28

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Biographical note:

Carlota Solé is professor of Sociology at the University Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain). She has publised 23 books and around 150 articles and book chapters on modernization, migrants integration and business organizations and corporatism. In 1990 she was awarded the National Award of Sociology and Political Science by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Madrid, Spain). In 1995, she received the Follet Parker Award by the American Political Science Association. She is also the director of the GEDIME (Research Group about Migrations and Ethnic Minorities), at the University Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain).

Sònia Parella is Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, University Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain). She has publised her Ph. D. Thesis on immigrant women and domestic service in Spain (Ed. Anthropos – Barcelona, 2003), as well as different articles and book chapters on migration, labour market and gender. She is researcher at GEDIME (Research Group about Migrations and Ethnic Minorities), at the University Autònoma de Barcelona.