I. The Parliament A truly bicameral legislature (like the U.S., but unlike most other countries)
Executive-Legislative Relations in Italy I. The Parliament II. The Executive III. Coalition-Building & Governance in the 1st Republic IV. Dynamics of ...
Executive-Legislative Relations in Italy I. The Parliament II. The Executive III. Coalition-Building & Governance in the 1st Republic IV. Dynamics of the 2nd Republic I. The Parliament A truly bicameral legislature (like the U.S., but unlike most other countries)
lower house: Chamber of Deputies representation by population up to 5-year terms must be at least 25 years of age 630 seats elected by closed-list PR
electoral system (w/ 54% assigned to the plurality coalition from 2005 to 2013)
upper house: Senate representation of regions by population up to 5-year terms (since 1963) must be at least 40 years of age 315 seats elected by closed-list PR composition in practice has been similar
to the C of D, but not identical because the governability clause gave 55% to the plurality winner in each region
Limitations on Party Government Model in Italy
legislative commissions w/ potential autonomy individual members can submit bills most bills are private member bills secret vote opened path to “snipers” anonymous betrayal of party line secret votes made accountability to voters weaker, too use of secret vote has become increasingly restricted final vote (third reading of bill) must now be an open vote
II. The Executive A largely parliamentary E-L system PRESIDENT
must be at least 50 years old 7-year term w/ possibility of unlimited re-election however, until 2013 stalemate nobody was ever re-elected indirect election by electoral college: delegates are Deputies, Senators, & 3 delegates per region secret ballot election has made party discipline more uneven… st takes a 2/3 vote on 1 3 ballots, a majority thereafter all presidents have had extensive political experience powers head of state weak veto (can be overridden by a simple majority revote) rarely used nominates new Prime Minister & accepts resignations an important power when LEG is divided among candidates can call new elections (except in last 6 months of term) an important power when LEG is divided not yet used unilaterally, however
PRIME MINISTER
member of Parliament elected by a majority of each chamber of Parliament 10% of either chamber can call of vote of no-confidence powers head of government chairs the Council of Ministers & its subunits presents all ministerial appointments to the PRES however, has not been able to hire & fire at will controls the submission of all government bills gets to assign the bill to legislative commissions can make certain bills votes of confidence can use power to renegotiate disliked bills from ministers a relatively weak prime minister historically, now stronger in the 2nd Republic dependent on multiparty coalitions comprised of factionalized parties nd until 2 Republic, parties did not present a public candidate to voters as “their” candidate for PM
III. Coalition-Building & Governance in the 1st Republic The DC as the central force DC essential because of informal rule of PCI exclusion (and, after early 1960s experiment, exclusion of MSI)
Coalition Partners Change Slightly Over Time
1950s centrist (DC, PLI, PRI, PSDI) broke up over tensions between left & right wings that were exacerbated by inclusion of MSI during 1960-62 1960s & 1970s center-leftist (DC, PRI, PSDI, PSI) 1980s “pentapartito” (DC, PLI, PRI, PSDI, PSI) slight decline in DC seats from 2/3 to 3/5 of coalition from 41% to 37% of Chamber of Deputies DC decline & PCI moderation increased demands from partners DC’s share of ministries fell