How new is neo-realism? Word Count: 2863

How ‘new’ is neo-realism? Word Count: 2863 Abstract International relations theory attempts to make sense of international politics, and theory can ha...
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How ‘new’ is neo-realism? Word Count: 2863 Abstract International relations theory attempts to make sense of international politics, and theory can have an enormous effect on the policy decisions that ultimately feed back into the system it attempts to explain. Crucially, it is built on assumptions, and in order for it to be effective these assumptions must be sound and explicit. Realism has represented the historically dominant paradigm in the study of international relations, yet argument within the literature over the past three decades around assumptions about the nature of man and its centrality in IR has hamstrung and divided the realist school as a whole. The systemic neorealism espoused in Kenneth Waltz’s epochal 1979 Theory of International Politics aimed to break from the ‘reductionist’ classical realism of Hobbes, Clausewitz, Carr, Morgenthau, et al., who, for Waltz, placed too much emphasis on assumptions about human nature and state preferences. Waltz, searching for parsimony and a generalizable theory of international politics, looked to jettison these variables and focus instead on a system-level analysis of IR, examining the anarchic international arena and the incentives it generates. Broadly, classical realists acknowledge the importance of assumptions of human nature in their theory, whilst neorealists aim to avoid this. This paper offers a more nuanced examination of both sub-schools, arguing that a conception of human nature that touches base with the classical realist position is present and crucial in neorealist theory, and that whilst classical realists readily reveal a pessimistic conception of human nature, a clear recognition of the effects of the anarchic international structure and the incentives it generates is also present and essential in their collected body of work. Through a re-examination that focuses primarily but not exclusively on Waltz’s Theory of International Politics and Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, the supposed divide at the heart of the school is challenged. Keywords: Classical Realism, Neorealism, War and Peace, Anarchy, Human Nature

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“If any book can be compared to Morgenthau’s ‘Politics Among Nations’ for its paradigmatic function in the discipline of International Relations… then it is Kenneth Waltz’s ‘Theory of International Politics.’” – Stefano Guzzini1

Realism as a school of thought boasts a rich intellectual tradition. The realist conception of political life developed for millennia before being crystallized as a formal, academic discipline in the works of E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, amongst others.2 The classical realism typified by Morgenthau’s 1948 magnus opus Politics Among Nations dominated International Relations scholarship for almost three decades, until Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 Theory of International Politics disrupted its intellectual hegemony. Waltz’s theory divided realism as a general discipline, establishing the supposed classical realist-neorealist divide at the heart of the school.3 This paper will assess the core similarities and differences between the two strands of realism (focusing in particular, but not exclusively, on the works of Morgenthau and Waltz, due to their standing and influence in their respective sub-disciplines4), evaluating the contribution of the neorealist sub-school as a whole, before arguing that, although different in their

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Guzzini, Stefano, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 125 2 Rynning, Sten and Ringsmose, Jens, ‘Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change’, International Politics, (2008) 45, pp. 22, 45 3 Ashley, Richard, K., ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization, 1984, 38(2), pp. 225-230 4 Jordan, Richard et al., “The View from the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada,” (Williamsburg, VA: Program on the Theory and Practice of International Relations, February 2009), available at: http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/publications.php

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approaches, the distance between classical and neorealism should not be overstated. Neorealism is not as ‘new’ as it seems.

Human Nature and Anarchy: Alternate Sources of Conflict? Realism, as a broad, overarching framework, conceptualizes an international arena in which power is the central currency, and a core concern of states.5 In the words of Robert Gilpin, it is “founded on a pessimism regarding moral progress and human capabilities.”6 States are rational, self-interested egoists who are concerned for their security and represent the primary actors in international relations.7 Of central importance is the assumption that the international arena is anarchic; in domestic politics, there exists a hierarchical structure within the state that acts as a constraint on human self-interest, a Hobbesian Leviathan capable of enforcing agreements, settling disputes, and providing order.8 This coercive authority does not exist in international politics, and as such, states interact in an environment in which the use of coercive power is the only truly reliable enforcement mechanism.9 This broad, central framework represents the core, unifying characteristics of the realist “family”.10

The question that is traditionally said to generate the classical/neorealist divide, as articulated by Mearsheimer amongst others, is over the root cause of

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Mearsheimer, John, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (London: WW. Norton, 2001), pp. 17 Gilpin, Robert, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 304 7 Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, pp. 304 8 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 9 Schweller, Randall, & Priess, David, ‘A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate’, Mershon International Studies Review, May 1997, 41(1), pp.6 10 Donnelly, Jack, ‘Realism’, in Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), pp. 30-33 6

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international competition and conflict, and why states seek power. Both subschools broadly agree on the inevitability of conflict. However, classical realists are said to argue that the fundamental source of international conflict lies in human nature, whilst neorealist are said to focus on the incentives provided by the structure of the anarchic international system (hence, ‘structural realism’).11

Classical Realism and the Centrality of Human Nature The centrality of human nature in causing conflict in the classical realist tradition is traceable through millennia; Ruthless Athenian envoys to Melos described in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, the Machiavellian Prince’s clinical, calculating ‘raison d’état’ and the “nasty, brutish and short nature” of Hobbesian anarchy, lacking in a Leviathan, were all realizations of the eternally selfish character of human nature, driven by “competition, diffidence and glory.”12 Modern classical realists such as E. H. Carr continued in this tradition; Carr critiqued inter-war Western idealism, attempting to reinstate the primacy of self-interest and arguing that morality was ultimately “the product of power.”13 Hans Morgenthau articulated the “inevitability of evil”14 and ultimately contested that conflict and war were rooted in the animus dominandi of human nature and

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Mearsheimer, J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 18 Brown, Chris, ‘Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature’ in Booth, Ken (ed.) Realism and World Politics, (London, Routledge, 2010) pp. 148, and Donnelly, ‘Realism’ pp. 33 13 Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001) pp. 65 14 Morgenthau, Hans, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) pp. 191 12

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its lust for power.15 States can seek power as a means to security, but crucially, can also seek glory, conquest, and power as an end in itself.16

This focus on human nature, coupled with distinct methodological grievances, ultimately split Waltzian neorealism from its classical forefathers. Classical realism was historical, and decidedly left the state, (and the human nature it represented), in.17 Morgenthau felt that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” and as such, a clear conception of this nature of man was crucial.18 Thus, “it was of great importance to traditional realists, such as Carr and Morgenthau” to examine the hugely important, independent variable of state preferences/objectives.19 Whether or not states were revisionist, desiring conquest and looking to expand their power, or status quo, content with consolidating and securing their position within the international arena, mattered to classical realists.20 As well as this, Morgenthau later qualified that whilst there is “a rational element in political action that makes politics susceptible to theoretical analysis… there is also a contingent element in politics that obviates the possibility of theoretical

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Stevensen, William R., ‘What’s “Realistic”?’, in Clinton, David W., (ed.) The Realist Tradition and Contemporary International Relations, (New York: Louisiana State University Press, 2007) pp. 7072 16 Van Evera, Stephen, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, (New York: Cornell University Press) pp. 10 17 Ashley, R. K., ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, pp. 227-232 18 Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956) pp. 4 19 Schweller, R. L, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’ in Frankel, Benjamin (ed.) Realism: Restatements and Renewal. (London: Frank Cass, 1996) pp. 91 20 ibid, pp. 91

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understanding.”21 Similarly, E. H. Carr’s historiographical ‘What is History?’ acted as a measured critique of rational positivism in general.22

For Waltz, methodologically, this was overly subjective, running contrary to the rigorous, scientific, positivistic analysis that characterized economic theory (from which he borrowed heavily) and the social sciences in the 70s.23 As well as this, it was fundamentally “reductionist” in character, as a focus on human nature and state preferences represented an ill-judged attempt to understand a whole by its parts.24 The core neorealist objection then, as summarized by Robert Gilpin, was that classical realism was “not well grounded in social theory”, reductionist in nature, and required a more scientific approach.25

Neorealism and the Importance of Anarchy Thus, neorealism turned to a system-level analysis in search of a generalizable theory of international relations. Waltz’s structural realism attempted to “abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities”, criticizing classical realism’s “simple descriptions” of an “infinite proliferation of variables” that exist at the unit-level.26 The state was a “black box”, and what mattered was

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Morgenthau, Hans, ‘The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory’ in Morgenthau, Hans (ed.) Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960-1970 (New York: Praeger,1970), pp. 254. 22 Carr, E. H., What is History?, (London: Penguin, 2008) 23 Ashley, R. K., ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, pp. 227-232 24 Rynning and Ringsmose, ‘Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist?’, pp. 33, and Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979) pp. 60-78. 25 Gilpin, Robert, ‘Political Change and International Theory’ (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 3-6 September 1981), pp. 3, quoted in Ashley, Richard, K., ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization, Spring 1984, 38(2), pp. 231 26 Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979) pp. 99, 65

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polarity: the distribution of power capabilities.27 The only assumption Waltz purports to make is that states seek security, and justifies this as a necessary prerequisite for all other state goals, which must be jettisoned entirely from our theory.28 The primary locus of conflict is then attributed to the structure of the anarchic international arena, which, lacking in the coercive hierarchy found at the domestic level, causes uncertainty over the intentions of other states, creating the security dilemma.29 The power and gains of rational, egoistic, rival states are viewed relatively, interaction is seen by states as largely zero-sum, and given the lack of truly reliable information about other states and their preferences, coupled with concerns for security, distrust is rife, states are structurally incentivized to hedge on security, and conflict is likely.30

Thus, a reductionist focus on the “first image” of human nature and its imperfectability is shunned and a more scientific approach is undertaken, attributing causation primarily to the “third image”, system-level incentives generated by anarchy. Anarchy “generates conflict rather than merely reveals or enacts the existing differences in goals… international politics represents tragedy rather than evil.”31 The neorealist conception of international conflict as a tragedy can perhaps be applied to Thucydides’ famous classical realist dictum 27

ibid, pp. 99 and Taliaferro, J. W., ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International Security, 2001, 25(3), pp. 144 28 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, pp. 126, and Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias’, pp. 91 29 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, pp. 79-101; and Jervis, Robert, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30(2) Jan 1978, pp. 167-214 30 Donnelly, ‘Realism’, pp. 37-40. In reference to information about other state preferences, a more detailed analysis is afforded later in this essay. That state preferences are, at the very least, difficult to communicate in anarchy, is taken as representing a broad, encompassing position of both defensive and offensive neorealism. 31 Jervis, Robert, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding The Debate’, International Security, 24(1), 1999, pp. 49

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that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”32; for neorealists, the strong, like the weak, are compelled to similarly do what they must, given the structure of the international system.

This reformation of the classical realist tradition, incorporating a methodological shift from concerns over human nature towards a more rigorous, scientific focus on structure, represents the fundamental ‘newness’ and core contribution of neorealism. E.H Carr and the classical realism he typified, argued Mearsheimer, did not directly articulate a scientific theory of realism, and neorealist scholars looked to fill this void.33 However, whilst this contribution should not be ignored, we should not overstate the ‘newness’ of neorealism. To illustrate this, it is pertinent to examine the manner in which neorealist structuralism ultimately relies on traditional, classical realist conceptions of human nature and concerns for state preferences to function. The body of work neorealism has produced, encompassing debates over “relative vs. absolute gains, the security dilemma, and balancing vs. bandwagoning” represents a more formal, codified approach to the realist tradition, yet these theories “cannot logically be deduced from the theory’s assumption of security-seeking units.”34

A Minimal Divide: Neorealist Reductionism and Classical Structuralism

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Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, (London: Heinemann, 1923), quoted in Donnelly, Jack, Realism and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 23 33 Mearsheimer, John, ‘E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On’, International Relations, 19(2) 2005, pp. 140 34 Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’ pp. 92

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As Suganami notes, Waltz most definitely does not suggest a “mono-causal thesis.”35 Waltz patently admits that the first-image is important - “the factors included in the first and second images are important, indeed crucial, in the making and breaking of periods of peace – the immediate causes of every war must be either the acts of individuals or the acts of states”36 – but he decidedly omits it in search of generalizability. As such, it is not so much that Waltz rejects classical realist conceptions of human nature and their importance, but considers them an unknowable variable and thus arbitrary in terms of generating theory.37 It is, of course, crucial, but we must attempt to avoid a position for the sake of theory.38

However, Brown is correct in highlighting that Waltz ultimately relies on a conception of human nature that “touches base with the major strands of classical realist thought.”39 The father of neorealism attempted to reconcile his acceptance of the importance of unit-level considerations and his desire to remain faithful to a more structural analysis by distinguishing between “efficient” (immediate causes which directly bring about an instance of war) and “permissive” causes (enabling conditions).40 Waltz affords primacy to the international system as it permits war, yet the efficiency of the unit-level variables is present. In order for this efficient cause to result in conflict,

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Suganami, Hidemi, ‘Understanding Man, the State, and War’, International Relations, 2009, 23(3), pp. 377 36 Waltz, Kenneth, Man, The State and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) pp. 232 37 Brown, Chris, ‘Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature’, International Relations, 2009, 23(2) pp. 264 38 Crawford, Neta, C., ‘Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking Man’, International Relations, 2009, 23(2), pp. 273 39 Brown, ‘Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature’, pp. 265 40 Suganami, ‘Understanding Man, the State, and War’, pp. 376

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however, Waltz’s “structural explanation presupposes the existence and the constancy of the actor’s preferences” and that “only by presupposing homo economicus, a being who wants to survive in his environment and manages to do so by rationally calculating the costs and benefits of alternate actions, can market (anarchy) constraints be understood.”41 In Waltz’s foundation of the neorealist model, the fixed, distrustful, and rational conception of human nature imported from economics is implicit.42 Anarchy alone is not enough to cause conflict, and the efficient cause Waltz qualifies as necessary –state preferences as an extension of human nature – echoes the calculating self-interest of the classical realist tradition.

Neorealist concern for state preferences is more obviously present in subsequent core neorealist works, and best highlighted by examining the defensive/offensive debate the has proceeded to divide the sub-school. Whilst agreed on the core objective of security for states and anarchy as the driver of conflict, they differ when answering the question of how much power states seek.43 Defensive neorealists, like Jervis and Taliaferro, describe “defensive positionalists”; satisfied status quo powers who are, at times, capable of signaling their benign intentions to other states in an attempt to overcome the security dilemma.44 Offensive realists, such as Mearsheimer, “head in the other direction” and argue that the international system is so dangerous, and

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Guzzini, Stefano, ‘Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis’, International Organization, 1993, 47(3) p.444 42 Crawford, ‘Human Nature and World Politics’, pp. 272-276 43 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 18, 44 Rynning and Ringsmose, ‘Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist?’, pp. 25; Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy’, pp. 145-149; Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, pp. 167214

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intentions are so difficult to signal, that revisionism and aggressive behavior constitute the logical policy for states.45

What this fundamentally represents is an analysis and consideration of state preferences and characteristics. Anarchy does not automatically result in tragedy when assuming nothing but a desire for security, and “to redress this error, neorealists must bring the state back in.”46 “Differences in state goals – whether states seek the minimum power required for security or additional power… have to be accorded an equal consideration along with anarchy and the distribution of capabilities.”47 Despite the initial posturing of Waltz, neorealism, as a whole, is forced to recognize that explanatory theories based solely on assumptions of anarchy and a desire for security offer little predictive power. Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” theory represents an attempt to properly inject Waltzian theories of polarity with the classical realist recognition of state preferences/characteristics necessary for structural realism to hold.48 The offensive-defensive literature and neorealism as a whole, although at varying levels, is forced to “revive the classical realist distinction between status quo and revisionist powers” and bring state preferences back in.49 As such, it is of no surprise that Robert Gilpin steadfastly denies Richard Ashley’s acute denomination of neorealism and its members (Gilpin himself named as one of them), and reinstates the “assumptions regarding political life” shared by “all

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Rynning and Ringsmose, ‘Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist?’, pp. 25 Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’, pp. 92 47 ibid, pp. 92 48 Donnelly, ‘Realism’, pp. 42 49 ibid, pp. 43 46

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realist writers”, criticizing the supposed divide between classical and neorealism.50

The argument presented here – that, whilst primacy is afforded to the international system, a conception of human nature relatively consistent with classical realism is present and crucial in neorealist theory – can be inverted to further elucidate the core thesis of this essay; that the difference between classical realism and neorealism has been overstated. An analysis of the most prominent classical realist writers quickly reveals their negative conception of human nature and the causality attributed to it, yet, recognition of the effects of an anarchic international structure and the incentives it presents is also apparent, even if it is not analyzed with the rigour of Waltz and co.

In Thucydides History, “the increasing Athenian greatness and the resulting fear among the Lacedaemonians made going to war inevitable” – a direct reference to structure and an implicit precursor to the formal security dilemma.51 Despite the account of the brutish nature of man in Hobbes’ Leviathan, a crucial permissive force (so much so that it was afforded direct reference in the title of Hobbes’ epochal work) was the lack of a hierarchy or coercive authority in permitting, if not directly causing, conflict. Shimko notes that, despite the primacy placed on human nature, anarchy was still seen as a vital permissive force for Morgenthau. Morgenthau’s approach was “bottom-up” in that it started at the unit-level, but it still, crucially, worked its way up to the third image of anarchy, which was

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Giplin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, pp. 290 Brown, ‘Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature’, pp. 262

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important for Morgenthau because it permitted the animus dominandi of human nature to enjoy free reign.52 As Rynning and Ringsmose highlight, “relative power and systemic forces were always at the heart of classical realism.”

Thus, just as Waltz and his students must ultimately rely on a conception of human nature that is relatively consistent with the classical realist tradition for its causal link between anarchy and conflict to hold, Morgenthau and the classical realism he represents’ pessimistic conception of human nature results in conflict when anarchy prevails. As such, Waltz’s criticisms in Theory of International Politics of the reductionism present in the classical realism typified by Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, (which act as the focal point around which the distinction between neorealism and its classical predecessor swings) are ill judged. Purported neorealist Robert Gilpin is correct in concluding that “the fundamental disjuncture between classical and new realism simply does not hold up under close examination.”53 Neorealism’s ‘newness’, a shift of primacy from the nature of man to the structure of the international system and a methodological movement from an at-times intuitive subjectivity to a more scientific positivism, must be noted, but it should not be overstated; classical realism moves from the bottom-up to eventually address structure, whilst neorealism moves from the top-down to ultimately draw on assumptions of human nature. It is important that we recognize that in doing so, the two sub-

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Shimko, K. L., ‘Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism’, The Review of Politics, 1992, 54(2), pp. 293 53 Gilpin, Robert, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International Organization, 1984, 38(2), pp. 292

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schools ultimately proceed to meet in the middle of the same venerable tradition of political realism.

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