How Has Teacher Compensation Changed? Report Prepared for the
National Conference on Teacher Compensation and Evaluation Dan Goldhaber The Urban Institute
[email protected] 1 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
Concern Over Teacher Salaries • “We’re beginning to see a slight improvement in salaries, but it’s a drop in the bucket compared with what needs to be done to hire sufficient numbers of talented teachers. . . When engineering, law, accounting and computer firms need high-quality employees, they’re willing to pay good salaries to attract the best and brightest. It shouldn’t be any different when it comes to educating our children.” – Sandra Feldman, AFT President
2 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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Policy Significance • Teachers matter! – Unmeasured characteristics - Goldhaber et al. (1999), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (1998), Sanders (1997) – Academic Skills - Ehrenberg and Brewer (1994), Strauss and Sawyer (1986), Wayne (2001) – Ferguson (1991, 1998) • Increasing teacher test scores by 1 standard deviation raises student scores by .17 standard deviations
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Teachers’ Skills • On average, teachers have – Lower standardized test scores – Require more remediation in college – Attend lower quality undergraduate institutions • “College graduates with high test scores are less likely to take jobs, employed teachers are less likely to stay, and former teachers with high test scores are less likely to return” (Murnane, et al. 1991, p. 10) 4 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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Average SAT Scores Average Combined SAT Score
1050
1000
950
999
1003
1000
=56**
=60**
=32**
968
999 =31**
943
900
850
800
Individual SAT Public School Teacher
Average SAT of Incoming Freshmen Private School Teacher
Non-Teacher
** Denotes statistically significant differences (p=.05) Data Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond First (1994) and Second (1997) Follow-Ups.
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Teacher Compensation and Shortage Issues • Rising enrollments • Class-size reduction policies • Tight labor market Teacher shortage – May exacerbate teacher quality problems
• Assumption: compensation affects decisions – Compensation must be measured correctly to determine the incentives – Teachers should not be thought of generically 6 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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What Has Happened to Salaries? • From 1980 to 1997 teachers’ salaries increased by 120 percent, but … – Only a 19 percent increase in real terms, while salaries in other occupations increased by 29 percent – Changes in teacher demographics – Tremendous changes in working conditions
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Various Measures of Change in Compensation • Average compensation (salary & benefits) – Over time – Relative to other occupations
• Starting salaries – Over time – Relative to other occupations
• Discussion of structure of teacher salaries relative to salaries in other occupations 8 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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Data • Bureau of Labor Statistics’ National Compensation and Employee Benefits Surveys • National Center for Education Statistics’ Baccalaureate and Beyond • U.S. Department of Education’s Digest of Education Statistics • American Federation of Teachers
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Employer Costs for Employee Benefits $ 10.0 0 $8.0 0 $6.0 0 $4.0 0 $2.0 0 $0.0 0 1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Sourc e: BLS, 1998c
Elem entary and Sec ondary Sc hools
State and Loc al Gov. - W hite Collar
Private - W hite Collar
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Percentage of Employees Who Receive Selected Benefits
97 96
100 90
84
87
85 87
79
76
80 70 60
87
64
59 62
58
62
59
46
50 40
38 31
30
20
20
14
10 0 Paid personal leave
Medical care
Dental care
Life insurance
Retirement package
Source: BLS 1995, 1998, 1999 Teachers
State and local govt.
Sm all private industry
Medium and large private industry
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Average Teacher Salaries $45,000
$43,000
$40,000 $38,000 $35,000 $30,000
$33,000
$25,000 $28,000 $20,000 $15,000
$23,000
$10,000 $18,000 $5,000 $13,000 8
7
6
97
96
-9
-9 19
5 95
94
93
-9 19
4
-9 19
3
-9 19
2 92
91
-9 19
1
-9 19
0
-9 19
-9 89
90 19
8
9 88
87
86
-8 19
7
-8 19
6
-8 19
5 85
84
-8 19
4
-8 19
3 83
-8 19
2 82
81
80
-8 19
1
-8 19
0
-8 19
-8 19
79 19
19
78
-7
9
$0
S ourc e: U.S . Departm ent of E ducation, Diges t of E ducation S tatis tic s 1998 Current Dollars
Cons tant (97-98) Dollars
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Growth Rate in Wages and Salaries 10.0%
9.0%
8.9%
8.0% 7.2% 7.0% 6.6% 6.0%
6.0%
5.0% 4.6%
4.5%
4.3%
4.0% 3.3% 3.0%
2.8%
2.0%
1.0%
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
0.0%
Source: Goldhaber (2001) Private - W hite C ollar
State and Local Gov. - W hile Collar
Elem entary and Secondary Schools
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Summary: Changes in Average Salary and Benefits • Benefit coverage: – Comparable to coverage offered to other state and local employees – Exceeds that offered in the private sector as a whole
• Growth in teachers’ average salaries: – Lagged other sectors in the 1970s & early 1980s, exceeded other sectors during 1980s & early1990s 14 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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Average vs Starting Salaries • Average salaries are driven by degree and experience level only – Average salary can increase w/o increases in starting salary • Shifts in degree and experience distribution can increase average salaries without making teaching a more attractive profession – Shifts in the age distribution can increase average salaries – Evidence of backloading (Lankford and Wyckoff, 1997)
• Starting salaries may be more relevant to individuals considering teaching as an occupation
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Minimum Average Starting Teachers' Salaries 70.0% 69.0%
$30,000 $25,735
$25,598
$25,000
68.0% 67.0%
66.3%
$20,000
66.0% 65.0%
66.1% 66.3% $17,604
65.4%
64.0%
65.1% 65.2% 65.0% 64.9% 65.3%
65.1% 65.1% 64.2%
63.0% 62.0%
$15,000 $10,000 $5,000
61.0% 60.0%
$0 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Source: Digest of Education Statistics (years 1989-1999), AFT (1999a, 1999b) Min Salary as a % of Ave Salary Min Salaries (constant 97-98 $) Min Salaries (current $) 16 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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Ratio of Starting Salaries in Select Occupations to Starting Salaries in Teaching 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1 1972
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1995
1996
1997
Source: Schneider and Nelson (1998) Engineering
Accounting
Sales/Marketing
Business Admin.
Chemistry
Math or Statistics
Economics/Finance
Computer Science
Liberal Arts
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Starting Salaries Indexed to 1978 3
Teaching
2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1995
1996
1997
Source: Schneider and Nelson (1998) Teaching*
Engineering
Accounting
Sales/Marketing
Business Admin.
Liberal Arts
Chemistry
Math or Statistics
Economics/Finance
Computer Science
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Correlation Coefficients
Sales & Marketing
Math/Statistics
Liberal Arts
Engineering
Economics
Computer Science
Chemistry
Business Administration
Accounting
Correlation between Relative Salaries and GDP Growth Rate
-.12 -.37 -.23 -.23 -.28 -.37 -.31 -.44 -.42 (.68) (.19) (.43) (.46) (.34) (.19) (.28) (.12) (.13) 19
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$18,000
17,071
Difference Between Starting Salaries in Teaching and Selected Other Occupations 12,956
14,558
$16,000
10,147
11,067
6,511
4,491
$6,000
5,434
5,457
6,092
6,035
7,060
8,293
9,409 7,436
$8,000
9,809
$12,000
$10,000
11,403
12,354
$14,000
$4,000
1978
1997 S ource: S chneider and Nels on (1998)
E ngineering
A c counting
S ales /M ark eting
B usines s A dm in.
Chem is try
M ath or S tatistics
E c onom ic s/Financ e
Com puter S cienc e
Liberal A rts
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Structure of Compensation in Education • Single salary schedule – 1921 was adopted in Denver, CO & Des Moines, IA – Places teachers on salary lanes based on degree and experience levels only
• Today over 95 percent of school districts use this pay structure – Average salaries may not be a good indicator 21 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
You Can’t Escape the Labor Market • Hedonic wage theory applies (Chambers, 1998) • Sorting occurs along non-pecuniary lines – Graduates of more selective colleges are more likely to teach higher income, higher achieving students – Shortages in particular subject areas
• Shortages vary by: – Region – Subject area – School system demographics 22 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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Math and History Teachers S
Wage
Wage
Equilibrium math wage
S
Single salary schedule wage Equilibrium history wage
D
D employment
Math Teachers
employment
History Teachers
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Important Changes Under the Surface • Labor market differentially rewards skills • Important changes under the surface – Returns to college quality and technical college skills (degree major) have increased • There is an increasing return to graduating from a top college or university (Brewer et al., 1999) • There is an increase in the gap (in entry level salaries) between education and technical majors (Grogger and Eide, 1995)
• Single salary schedule does not reflect these changes 24 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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SAT Score by Sector and Major 1200
1128 1081 1011
=117
=70
987
Combined SAT Score
1000
985
938 =49
=47
800
600
400
200
0
Technical Major
Public School Teacher
Non Technical Major
Private School Teacher
Non-Teacher 25
Data Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond First (1994) and Second (1997) Follow-Ups.
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Average Salary as a Function of SAT (Bachelor’s Degree) 50000
45000
40000
Annual Salary
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000 400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Combined SAT Score Data Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond Second (1997) Follow-Up. Notes: Trendline estimates are based on the full sample of SAT scores and annual salaries. Data points represent average salaries for all individuals who obtained a given SAT score.
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Public School Teachers Private School Teachers Non-Teachers
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13
Starting Salary as a Function of SAT (Bachelor’s Degree) 50000
45000
Starting Salary
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000 400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Combined SAT Score Public School Teachers Private School Teachers Non-Teachers
Data Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond Second (1997) Follow-Up. Notes: Trendline estimates are based on the full sample of SAT scores and annual salaries. Data points represent average salaries for all individuals who obtained a given SAT score.
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Average Salary as a Function of SAT (Masters Degree and Above) 50000
45000
40000
Annual Salary
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000 400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Combined SAT Score Data Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond Second (1997) Follow-Up. Notes: Trendline estimates are based on the full sample of SAT scores and annual salaries. Data points represent average salaries for all individuals who obtained a given SAT score.
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Public School Teachers Private School Teachers Non-Teachers
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14
Starting Salary as a Function of SAT (Masters Degree and Above) 50000
45000
Starting Salary
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000 400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Combined SAT Score Data Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond Second (1997) Follow-Up. Notes: Trendline estimates are based on the full sample of SAT scores and annual salaries. Data points represent average salaries for all individuals who obtained a given SAT score.
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Public School Teachers Private School Teachers Non-Teachers
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Preliminary Analyses Y = β x + αpub + γ ( pub * x) X represents a vector of background characteristics and pub is an indicator for a public school teacher Public School Teachers
Non-Teachers
NS
+
+
+
Sex
NS
+
College Quality Masters Degree Technical Major GPA
NS + NS NS
+ NS + +
Age Experience
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Implications of Findings • Public schools do reward master degrees but do not reward individual SAT, college quality, or technical majors. – e.g. individuals with technical majors estimated to make $4470 more than non-technical majors outside of teaching, but about $2000 less in teaching
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Alternatives to the Single Salary Schedule • Individual-Level Merit Pay Plans – Reward teachers for individual performance
• School-Based Bonuses – Reward schools for collective performance
• Competency / Contingency Pay Plans – Reward individual teachers for acquiring skills • National Board Certification 32 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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Conclusion • How has teacher compensation changed? It has and it hasn’t
– It’s the structure stupid! • Need for more research on the impact of alternative compensation structures on the recruitment and retention of types of teachers 33 THE URBAN INSTITUTE / Washington, D.C.
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