Helsinki Policy Forum. Discussion Papers. Religious Literacy, Foreign Policy & Diplomacy

Helsinki Policy Forum Discussion Papers Religious Literacy, Foreign Policy & Diplomacy September 2016 FORWARD THINKING Contents 03 04 06 09 11 13 ...
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Helsinki Policy Forum Discussion Papers Religious Literacy, Foreign Policy & Diplomacy September 2016

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Contents

03 04 06 09 11 13 20

Foreword by Lord Hylton

Religion and the state in the Arab world by Faisal AbualHassan

Religious Literacy, Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Religious Literacy in a political context by Hassan Annabi

Summary of themes raised in Helsinki Policy Forum Meetings

The challenges of religious illiteracy and radicalism by Dr Ahmad Iravani

Recommendations

Religious Literacy in an International context by Peter Weiderud

Religious Literacy and Policy Making by Faruk Loğoğlu

Violence in the Name of Religion, by Oliver McTernan

The Importance of Terminology by Hamadi Jebali

Biographies

Religious Literacy and Islam in the Middle East by Dr Abd El-Monem Abo El-Fotouh

The Helsinki Policy Forum

25 29 32 37 39 43 46

This report is a collection of essays from different authors and does not necessarily represent the formal position of any participating organisation or government in the Helsinki Policy Forum. Any errors contained in the report are the responsibility of authors alone.

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Foreword By Lord Hylton

T

he Helsinki Policy Forum has done a service by gathering Discussion Papers from a wide range of contributors covering the Middle East and North Africa, together with views from Europe and USA. It can no longer be assumed that religions don’t matter, because they will wither away under the impact of modern scientific thought. On the other hand, it is mistaken to treat them as the root of all evil. We should, I suggest, recognize that faiths do influence behaviour, sometimes positively and sometimes harmfully. It is important also to be aware of the interaction between religious faith and social factors, such as poverty and unemployment. These often deny young people all prospect of a reasonable career and the chance to marry and raise a family. When humiliation and oppression aggravate existing grievances, the result can be explosive, leading sometimes to whole society uprisings and sometimes

There is the deeper level of dialogue between religious and secular perspectives. For this to be successful, it is desirable that the participants come as close as possible to understanding the faith of the other, as well as he or she understands it for themselves. This may sound like a counsel of perfection, but it should still be the aim. At all levels religious literacy cannot be ignored, because it is a powerful tool for understanding behaviour and guiding practical and sensitive policies. Lord Hylton is a Member of the House of Lords and is a trustee of Forward Thinking.

to acts of individual violence. Lord Hylton

Religion is closely linked with personal and group identity. Those whose identity is denied or suppressed will often grasp any available identity, even if they are not normally strongly religious. Equally, those who do believe, may well derive strength from their faith to resist their enemies and oppressors. It seems that religious literacy is needed on at least two levels. People active in the public and international sphere need basic knowledge of what the various faiths teach and what are the sensitivities of their adherents. Attitudes can, of course, vary widely from the tolerant cultural believers to the ultra-conservative, literal and zealot types. HELSINKI POLICY FORUM - DISCUSSION PAPER

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Religous Literacy, Foreign Policy and Diplomacy By Forward Thinking

Background There is an increasing view that, in today’s modern world, religious literacy is an important skill for policy-makers, supporting their ability to engage with difficult and complex challenges. For many people across the world, religious and spiritual values inform the living of their daily lives. However, political and social sciences – the intellectual backdrop to western diplomacy – have often been accused of ignoring the religious dimension in their approach and analysis of political challenges, or misrepresented it, only addressing issues with a religious element through a security prism. In order to explore a new framework that would accommodate religious perspectives and increase religious literacy amongst policy-makers, it is worth questioning (what to some might be) received wisdom. Arguably, the notion of secularism was initially as a market place that created space for freedom of expression and competition of ideas, religious and non-religious. To many, it was a mechanism for diffusing tensions, rather than confronting religion. However, over time the notion of ‘secularist’ developed, and influenced by Marxist ideas about religion. Whereas the idea of ‘secular’ provides space, ‘secularist’ carries notions of exclusion. Such conceptions of secularism became rooted in social sciences.

The risk is that this process has created a form of de-intellectualisation that has removed the wider historical context into which the notion of secularism was born.

Addressing the challenge Religious illiteracy can also exist in religious institutions themselves. There is the notion of what could be termed a ‘two book preacher’ or a ‘two book imam’ – an individual who assumes religious literacy having read two books about the religion, and then tries to assert themselves as an authority within the faith. Policy makers would benefit from the religious literacy skills to differentiate between such individuals and other religious leaders, or between cultural and religious norms. One of the mistaken approaches towards addressing the challenge of how to increase religious literacy amongst policy-makers has focused on the idea that what needs to be done is to teach the religion, for example Islam. This becomes a process of the translation of a series of facts, rather than understanding. The key question is whether a series of tools can be identified that could be recommended to policy-makers to increase their understanding of religion(s), religious communities, and ultimately provide them with a degree of religious literacy that can inform policy-making and react to events as they unfold.

“Religious literacy is an important skill for policymakers, supporting their ability to engage with difficult and complex challenges" 4

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Source: Hieu Le, 2015. CC0 Public Licence

There are many instances one could point to, to highlight the importance of religious literacy for policy-makers. Perhaps none is more timely, than the challenge of understanding the rapid growth of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS/ISIL/Da’esh); its appeal to its supporters and potential supporters; its relation to Islam and other political movements

By sharing this paper, the aim is to draw out the unique experience, insight and expertise of participants in the Helsinki Policy Forum. Participation in the Helsinki Policy Forum comes from across Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, and from across the political spectrum. It aims to cast new light on developing a deeper understanding of the

that reference Islam; and what measures and policies could be adopted that would be most effective at addressing the challenges it poses.

issues through sharing insights, and to probe at our collective knowledge through drawing on learning from others.

The current phenomenon of ISIS poses all sorts of challenges to policy-makers. There is a lack of clarity in the public domain as to the relationship between ISIS and Islam, those who support ISIS and Muslims and Muslim communities.

This paper contains a number of contributions, made by a wide range of individuals, each with a unique understanding of the current situation. Each has shared their own thoughts, reflected on the experience of their society, as well as furthering the debate by questioning some well found assumptions.

It is generally recognised that the majority of Muslims do not adhere to or share the same values, goals or practices as the followers of ISIS; and religious scholars have issued communiqués clearly articulating actions permitted under Islamic law as a way of a rebuttal to arguments made by ISIS justifying their actions.

It is our hope that through this, policy makers will gain better insight into the importance of religious literacy, as well as into the deep impact that religion has had on modern societies.

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Summary of themes raised in HPF meetings By Forward Thinking

O

ver the course of the three Helsinki Policy Forum meetings, participants have implicitly engaged with the question of religious literacy through their discussions on major regional and international challenges. The meetings took place on 2-4 June 2014 in Helsinki, 21-22 October in Madrid, and 17-19 March 2015 in Helsinki. The following is a summary of those issues discussed that address the subject of religious literacy in foreign policy.

Religious/Secular - how to accommodate political Islam The European experience produces a particular analytical framework. Within Europe, the divide between religion and politics (though not as clear as often asserted) is taken by politicians to be an essential means of offering equal space to all groups and recognising essential rights such as freedom of conscience. This has created a degree of uncertainty towards parties in the MENA region that still openly acknowledge a religious reference, due to concerns that they will deny the equal rights of all groups and use religious justifications to exclude rivals and monopolise power. Whilst recognising that non-secular parties often performed well in elections, some Western policymakers still feared that they might use a democratic mandate to then impose laws that came at the expense of the rights of minorities.

Secular actors from the region often hold similar concerns, expressing fears that groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood operate in a secretive manner, have shown themselves unwilling to accommodate the concerns of others or engage in dialogue, have refused to acknowledge their mistakes, and have attempted to devise rules and systems that disenfranchised opponents.

Double Standards It was acknowledged that there is a degree of “double standards” in operation with regards to the West’s approach to Islamist parties, holding them to higher standards than other actors they engage with in the region. Western powers have shown themselves willing to work with nationalists, Socialists and Monarchies, none of whom had succeeded in establishing democracy or meaningful gender equality and yet it is Islamists that were treated with suspicion on these issues, even when specific movements repeatedly expressed their adherence to democratic values. Lacking a nuanced understanding, or a deliberate blurring of the details, also presents a problem. Attempts to confuse or conflate the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya with groups such as Da’esh were unhelpful and ignored the reality on the ground, where Libya Dawn forces had attacked Da’esh fighters in Sirte. There is a need for Western policy makers to broaden their understanding of parties that reference religion through utilising frameworks that may be more familiar.

"There is a need for Western policy makers to broaden their understanding of parties that reference religion" 6

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Just as political ideologies (such as socialism) might inform the values and politics of parties in the West, so can religion inform the values and perspectives of Islamic parties without precluding them from competing within the boundaries of a democratic system. Constitutional Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, could plausibly be compared to the Christian Democrats in Europe. A French protest in support of "the Hero of Tunisia", on 15

Debates over terminology

January 2011. Source: Antoine Walter, Creative Commons

It is an open debate as to whether Islamist parties should consider moving away from the very label Islamist and instead “focus on the real issues of development and freedom.” Some suggested that the label had become a distraction and source of division, splitting societies along Islamist/secular lines. This division is somewhat arbitrary, confusing the political debates with issues of religion, when the real divide in the region was between “those who support democracy and those who do not.”

Frustrated Youth The anger of a frustrated youth was said to stem from a lack of integration, with participants highlighting the continued failure of many European states to effectively engage with their Muslim communities. There is the risk that this anger and frustration, stemming from a lack of opportunity - politically, socially and economically - prevents development and the ability to fulfil aspirations which will feed into the growth of extremist organisations.

Establishing and strengthening a new political culture that prioritises the values of reconciliation, accommodation, and dialogue is essential for reducing political polarisation. Political inclusion and consensus are the only means of ending violence and achieving sustainable stability that is a precondition for long-term economic growth

Marginalised and with few opportunities, some young people, such as those in Libya, were said to have “found dignity through the gun” during the revolution and are reluctant to give lay down their arms, given the few real alternatives for employment or social standing.

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Counter-extremism policies

There is a need to address the structural challenges underlying a regional unrest caused by state breakdown,

Counter-extremism policies should be devised in collaboration with individuals and groups from the MENA-gulf region who have an understanding of the motivating factors and religious justifications. Moderate Islamists may be particularly well equipped to fulfil such a role. Additionally, Islamists may be effective interlocutors with extremist organisations/ individuals, able to convince them to reject violent strategies and instead pursue their aims peacefully. However, the fear of also being labelled “extremist” may deter Islamist organisations from carrying out such a role, unless they had the clear support of the international community

tribalism, the growth of sectarianism and regional and international competition and interference.

In addition, the quality of religious education in much of the MENA region was particularly criticised, with some arguing that improving religious literacy in schools was an important dimension of tackling the growth of organisations such as Da’esh.

International Challenges - Sustainable stability While the international community has a justifiable interest in stability in the MENA-Gulf region it should recognise that sustainable stability requires change and reform, not a maintenance of the status quo. Furthermore, stability should be understood as a condition, not a guiding principle or value for foreign policy. By supporting and promoting democratic values, such as dialogue, inclusion and reconciliation (and conversely opposing and challenging actors who fail to abide by these values) the international community should recognise that they are establishing the foundations upon which real stability and real security can be achieved.

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The tension between a desire for stability, and a recognition of the need for change, has been exploited by some autocratic leaders who have sought to present themselves as the only viable alternative to instability and violent extremism. This willingness to work with autocracies has been reinforced by a tendency to view the region solely through the lens of security, marginalising other considerations. However, the stability offered by these regimes is, arguably, fundamentally “false” as beneath a thin veneer or stability, an array of problems are being generated by the inability of such governments to “offer either real developments, or freedoms.” The illusory nature of this stability was exposed by the uprisings of 2011. Immediately after the 2011 revolutions, it appeared that the international community, and Europe in particular, would re-examine their policies towards the region and realise that their desire for stability was best met by promoting and supporting democratic values and adherence to human rights in the region. More recently, however, there has been a growing tendency to once again prioritise security and a turn to “strong men” who offer stability and a return to the status quo but who in return tightly circumscribe the limits of political activity.  

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Recommendations By Forward Thinking

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ur world, through sheer demographic growth, is seeing an increasing number of religious people. Those unaffiliated with any religion are forecast to drop from 16.4% of the population in 2010, to 13.2%, while the combined share of Christians and Muslims is set to rise from 54.6% to 61.1%. Furthermore, the proportion of the human population on earth attached to the four biggest religions – Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism – is set to rise from 73% in 2005 to 80% by 2050. Predictions of the steady decline of the political influence of religion have been foundational to modern political theories. In spite of the ongoing global influence of religions in political life, it is only in the aftermath of events such as the Iranian Revolution, and the terrorist attacks of the past 15 years that the West has begun to acknowledge the ways that religions and religious influences have been marginalized and too simplistically rendered. Religion’s influence remains vast, despite predictions that religious influences would steadily decline in concert with the rise of secular democracies and advances in science and economic development, though this has largely failed to materialise in several developed economies, most notably the US. Understanding these complex religious influences is a critical dimension of understanding the full spectrum of human interactions in local, national, and global political arenas. In Europe it could be argued that religion, throughout the centuries, was in some way or another identified with power. The Enlightenment in Europe was anti-clerical and, to some, anti-Christian. In the US, the separation of church and state did not signify the separation of church and society.

Data from PEW Research Centre. 'The Future of World Religions'

To the founding fathers, religion was not something to be liberated from, but an aid to liberation. For example, regarding immigration, religion aided immigrants through providing networks upon arrival in the country. In Europe, secularisation led to a diminishing of religion in political life, whereas in the US it led to a flourishing of faith in public life. Religions are collections of ideas, practices, values, and stories that are all embedded in cultures and not separable from them. Just as religion cannot be understood in isolation from its cultural (including political) contexts, it is impossible to understand culture without considering its religious dimensions. Religions are internally diverse, represented by differing sects (e.g., Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant for Christianity) there are differences within sects because religious communities function in different political contexts. Religions are constantly interpreted and reinterpreted by believers.

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Critical to this definition is the importance of

For someone living in western Europe, according

understanding religions and religious influences in context and as inextricably woven into all dimensions of human experience. Such an understanding highlights the inadequacy of understanding religions through common means such as learning about ritual practices or exploring “what scriptures say” about topics or questions. Unfortunately, these are some of the most common approaches to learning about religion and lead to simplistic and inaccurate representations of the roles religions play in human agency and understanding.

to a Eurobarometer poll taken in 2010, the odds of believing in a God are fairly low, with only 27% French, 37% Brits and 44% Germans.

Another challenge is that individuals often harbour a host of embedded assumptions about religion; some of which are conscious and able to be openly interrogated but many that are unconscious and therefore difficult to discern and engage. This is compounded by the fact that these individuals often feel confident about their conscious assumptions about religion when many of those assumptions are profoundly problematic. Related to the point, we can ask why the notion of a Christian Democracy widely

With the importance of our perceived atheism we may sometimes forget the importance of religion to every political context, as even our societies, despite being widely atheist, are built on religious foundations. We should therefore strive to sensitise ourselves to a world in which religion is alive and well, not the world in which we might feel more comfortable. Perhaps we could also expand on our understanding and begin to see religion as much as a source of healing, as of a source of division.

accepted and uncontested in the west, with examples in Italy, Germany, even the UK, and the notion of a Muslim democracy is not, with the example of Turkey.

Protect Your Republic Protest that took place at Anıtkabir on April 14, 2007. Source: Selahattin Sönmez licensed under Creative Commons

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Religous Literacy and Policy Making By Faruk Loğoğlu

Faruk Loğoğlu making a press statement at the Ataturk Airport in 2013. Source: Istanbulolay: 2013

Changes recommended in the working definition of “religious literacy”

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eligious literacy does not require or mean an adherence to any particular faith or belief, but it is the attainment of a level of knowledge regarding the mind-sets, beliefs and practices of various faith traditions, which can have a direct impact on the thinking, behaviour and the political, moral and social decisions of individuals or groups in a given context. Religious literacy is essentially the intellectual backdrop that enables policy makers and citizens to understand and properly analyse the complex and dynamic relationship between religion and politics. In particular, religious literacy should help enable politicians / opinion leaders / intellectuals to delve into the fault lines of their societies and develop relevant policies at the national and international level.

General Observations 1.Historically religion has been a harbinger of conflict and violence within and among organized human entities. Despite claims of peace and tolerance, monotheistic religions in particular, given their ultimately exclusionary nature, have often bred and fed violent confrontations with their internal or external opposites. 2.Modernization and prosperity along with timely interjections of thought and philosophy helped the development of secularism, placing matters of faith and belief in the private domain, separating them from the affairs of the state. 3.The principle of secularism and its practice in different contexts are certainly not uniform. However, in all successful cases of secularism, the end result is the same: religion is not part of the main stream of politics. Put differently, secularism, when successful, harmonizes the co-habituation politics and faith, but keeps them separate.

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4. The more sustainable version of secularism is when

It is therefore misleading to try to establish an organic

state and religion are separated, but religion and society

link between democracy and a particular religion.

remain connected. This is best exemplified by the USA.

Nonetheless, the relationship between political

The more aggressive version of secularism is when

culture and religion is an important one because it

not only the state but also the society is separated

is ultimately the political culture of any given society

from religion where the manifestations of the latter

that sustains its democracy. Religious beliefs and

are challenged on charges of anti-secularism. This

precepts are more assertive ingredients of political

stricter version is exemplified by Turkey and France.

culture in Muslim societies than in others.

5. The virtue of secularism is that it provides a

9. All terrorist organizations are the products, reflections

levelling ground for all faiths and beliefs. It rests on

and manifestations of prevailing political, economic,

the assumption that there is not and cannot be a

social and psychological conditions in any given society.

hierarchy among different religions/faiths/beliefs. In

If this premise is sound, then it follows that the fight

this sense, it embraces an egalitarian stance towards

against Al Qaida, ISIS and others is/should be more

different faiths. Secularism is therefore the neutral

about addressing those conditions and ameliorating

backdrop to pluralism.

them than about weakening and eradicating the terrorists. We must learn to deal with the causes of

6. Chronic poverty, exclusion and hopelessness at

these events, not just the consequences.

one end and prosperity and boredom at the other end breed the search for more, not less religion. For

10. What then are we to do in the light of the above

the poor, religious radicalism is the means of social

analysis?

mobility on earth, for the well-to-do, spirituality is the path of social mobility in the after-life.

• Approach “religious literacy” as a society-wide need.

7. Analysts have often disregarded the role of religion

• Involve and engage international institutions and

as a public force capable of shaping domestic and

organizations in the drive to increase religious literacy

international politics, though this has changed since

on global scale.

the terrorist attacks undertaken by radicals. This has

• Promote secularism by appropriate means in schools

led to the current focus on religion as a tool in the

and civil society.

hands of radical and extremist elements. However, in

• Give equal space to different faiths/beliefs.

the Turkish case, religion has also become an effective

• Explore and study the subject of “political culture”

weapon in the hands of those holding power, abusing

and its relationship to democracy; uncover and

it domestically and in their foreign relations in order

strengthen elements in traditional culture that could

to maintain themselves in power and shape society

be transferred to the political arena in support of

and the world according to their beliefs.

democracy. • Help improve economic and social conditions and

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8. Democracy should be a secular regime by nature

enhance the sense of hope and opportunity for the

and by definition. It rests on the equal participation

younger generation.

of all citizens – which are equal before the law – in

• Religious literacy requires an understanding of how

the political process.

religion is used for political ends by political actors.

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The Importance of Terminology By Hamadi Jebali

Tunisia’s Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali speaks as he announces his resignation, Tunis February 19, 2013. Source: REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi

A

s I imagined and hoped the Helsinki Forum is a space for honest and transparent dialogue between decision-makers and figures of influence. They bring both knowledge and practical expertise from different religions, languages and nations and

Of particular importance today is understanding the religious phenomenon of “Islam.”The goal of religious literacy is to equip decision makers with multiple, and possibly contradictory, understandings and opinions on the role of religion in society and politics. This is

share a common goal: avoiding a clash of civilisations, a spectre that threatens the world, and whose signs are increasingly everywhere. Today there is an urgent need to listen to, and understand, each other in order to reduce divisions and promote coexistence. This entails the intellectual and psychological willingness to accept the other, especially when there is difference, and requires a belief in ‘freedom’ as a common basis for coexistence. Without this belief no dialogue, especially those addressing sensitive issues such as religion, can succeed.

in order to equip them with the knowledge and tools to make more informed decisions and avoid actions that can lead to negative results for the individuals and the peoples involved. In the MENA region, although there is a great deal of debate on the role of religion there is a great deal of analytical confusion, with no clear or common understanding of key terms. As a first step there is a need to define the terms and agree on their meanings before further analysis or conclusions are drawn. The most important terms to define are the following.

Religious literacy and policymaking

• Islamism, Islamists and the difference between Muslims and Islamists

Religious literacy and policymaking is related to questions around religion’s place in society, and its impact on decision-making.

• Separation of religion and politics in contrast to separation of religion and the State

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• Fundamentalism, Conservatism, Political Islam,

We can, therefore, see that Europe’s different

Salafism, Radicalisation, Terrorism, Secularity, secularism, modernity and the progressives Dictatorship and tyranny in contrast to democracy and the rule of law.

approaches to religion stems from its own unique history and context. Europe’s relationship and understanding of religion is closely bound to specific institutions – most obviously the church. In contrast Islam does not recognise any religious “intermediary” like the church. In fact, every attempt to impose a religious institution on Islam (such as al-Azhar) has failed. However, in the MENA region, secular elites have been heavily influenced by European (and particularly French) approaches to religion and have, historically, attempted to directly transpose such models regardless of our own history and culture. Such a forced projection [of the Christian

• Civil society in contrast to religious society and militarized society These are the most common terms in the current world of politics but are rarely defined or understood in objective terms. Instead, too often, each concept is understood through the preconceived conclusions or judgments of individuals. We see that conflict on these terms is in part shaped by differing perspectives on the appropriate role of religion in the life of the individual and in society. Such conflicts are not limited to the MENA region and were manifest in the West during the time of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, with debates over the role of Christianity, and the role of the church leading to different countries adopting different approaches. Today, we find that the ‘French School’, or French Secular Ideology, tends to be more extreme in such distancing to the point of interference in the private matters of families, schools, and streets, along with the prohibition of religion in some areas by state institutions. The only remaining space for religion is within the church’s walls, limited to its ritual mission as a place for worship on a Sunday morning. In contrast, we find the German and Anglo-Saxon approach to secularism to be more moderate and open. It tolerates some role for religion, or the church, in public affairs, with the exception of the State. Further differentiated again is the American ideology which includes “men of religion” in the highest political event - the presidential elections!

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“Such was and is the influence of events in the West on the “elite” class in our countries, that the term ‘vanguard activist’ came to be assigned to every Muslim ‘activist’ ” experience onto that of Islam] has triggered a variety of reactions towards such “extreme” secularism. It led, sometimes, to violence and counter-violence and gave extremists and terrorists (in the name of religion) an excuse to shed blood to “defend Islam”. Such violence has expanded to Western countries and societies, whose people became a victim of the policy of some of their rulers to support such extreme secularism. In this way, flawed understandings of history and religion have contributed to a horrific cycle of violence and misunderstanding, leading to terrorism in the MENA countries, and harming efforts to meet the real needs of people in the region for development, employment, liberty and human rights. It has also led to the ideological polarisation of elites in the East and West.

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Female protestor in Tahir Square, 2013. Source:Hassan Ammar/AP

Extremist secular elites have often allied with oppressive regimes in many countries (military or authoritarian regimes) to protect or promote their ideological project in the face of popular opposition. The Egyptian model is one example of this. After 2011: • There was a revolution made by the people against corruption and tyranny • From the start, the ‘regional system’ (the Gulf States, Israel and some African countries) saw implications of these revolutions for their own security. They decided, to prevent the revolution from expanding. The focus was on Egypt for its strategic importance, then its environs: Yemen, Syria, Libya then Tunisia • The international community (Europe, the U.S, and even Russia), after a period of surprise and time taken to absorb the events, unfortunately decided to enter the equation from the wrong side by siding with the conclusions drawn by those actors within the regional system.

Despite the attempts of some countries to understand the lessons of the past, and not to side again with tyranny, narrow and limited interests won out. When looking behind these actors, the local (Egyptian), regional and international communities appear to be in a strange, even contradictory, alliance. What gathers all these actors onto the same stage is, in reality, the toppling of the nascent democratic experience, by the overthrowing of the Brotherhood that represented the face of this democratic experience. Do the members of this ‘alliance of misfortune’ especially within Europe and America - realise the danger of their new involvement in the suppression of freedom? If unchecked • Either the military coup will result in tyranny • Or terrorism, stemming from efforts to oppose the coup, will result in different form of tyranny.

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I believe the international communities’ decision,

1. The Brotherhood School (Founded by Hassan

driven in part by its mistaken understanding of religion

al-Banna in 1928, Egypt). It initially focused on

in the region, has led policymakers to believe there

preaching and then evolved according to circumstance

is a binary choice to be made between:

into a movement (jamaa’a) whose activities touched all aspects of public and private life: the individual,

Atheism and secularity (which dismisses the conscience

the family, the institution, the street and the State.

of large swathes of the people), or the complete

They see Islam as a comprehensive system. They are

darkness of one interpretation of religion being forced

predominantly peaceful despite some periods of violent

upon the people, regardless of their own aspirations.

tension with the regime. In the era of King Farouq,

Moving towards common definitions

and after Nasser’s coup, they knew a difficult time of tyranny and abuse which led to armed groups splitting off from the movement. The most important of these

We see, therefore, how flawed understandings of

are the movement of ‘Takfir and Hijrah’ (Arabic for

religion and religious actors leads to flawed decisions,

‘expulsion from Islam’ and Migration) and Aymen

which exacerbate the region’s true problems. I return

Zawahiri’s ‘Jamaa-a Mussallahah’ (the Armed Group).

to the urgent need for greater understanding of key

Despite this, the mother movement maintained its

concepts and the more nuance in policymaker’s

peaceful approach and developed its political and

approach, to move us away from collision and towards

social ideology in different ways depending on the

coexistence. Accordingly, in this half of my contribution,

situation of each country (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco,

I will attempt to set out my understanding of four

Jordan, Syria, Tunisia).

components that I consider to be central to the future of the region. Every decision maker working and living

There were particular developments with regards to

in the MENA region must familiarise themselves with

certain key issues such as: freedoms; elections; secret

these components and their mechanisms:

activity; freedom of women; union and societal actions; the nature of the State; the relationship with the

• The Islamists with all their projects

West; and especially the call for the implementation

• The Arab countries, especially those in the southern

of Sharia and Islamisation of the State.

Mediterranean • The seculars

Here, without exaggeration, the Tunisian movement

• The group comprised of Turkey, Iran and Israel

has been the most forward looking and a leader in its view of how to accommodate itself with different

A: The Islamists:

elements of society in applying its ideology to reality and dealing well with local (Tunisia), regional (North

Let us start by defining them: they are an active

African) and international (Europe, Africa and the

societal elite that expands and narrows depending

U.S) dynamics. After Tunisia comes the movement

on the country and their circumstances. They are,

in Morocco, then Algeria, then Kuwait, then Egypt

however, an influential, respected and popular elite,

and Lebanon.

particularly when contrasted with Leftists, Nationalists or other ideologies. They have a popular platform and broadly manifest into six types:

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The central attributes of these movements are their

founded on the idea of Zohd, Arabic for asceticism,

peaceful approach, civilian nature, different levels of popularity, wealth of qualified individuals of diverse intellects, spirit of discipline, and a structure of predominantly institutional work in conjunction with the differing impact of “leadership” within the Islamist parties.

while the word Sufi is derived from the Arabic word Suuf, meaning wool, which alludes to the wearing of woollen clothes out of modesty and the humility of asceticism. They are reluctant to engage in public life, both political and social, and isolate themselves.

2. In this classification we find the Pakistani Islamist Group (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya al-Pakistaniyya) founded by Abu Al Ae’la al Mawdudi. Close to the Brotherhood in its methodology and roots/values, the group is also influenced to by the nature of the Afghani-Pakistani society which is characterised by tribalism, clans, and conservative chiefdoms.

Most of these groups compromise with the ruling regimes and in some cases even support them, as in the case of the military coup in Egypt.

3. Another faction is the Tahrir Party (Liberation) (Taki Eddine Annabhani, Palestine 1948), which is more elitist and seeks elite change, including that of the military. It does not believe in political and social pluralism, nor elections. It focuses on applying the Sharia and establishing the Caliphate. It has not known any evolution/development; neither in quality [of its ideology], nor in quantity [of it support]. It exists in most Islamo-Arab countries but in a very limited way. Its relation with the West are tense. 4. Tabligh Jama-a: This movement was founded in the Indian-Pakistani sub-continent and is influenced by the peaceful traditions of that society. It has a simple ideological and societal approach, focusing on educational preaching and almost prohibiting any political dimension in order to avoid collision with the ruling regimes. It focuses on preaching to Muslims all over the world urging them to return to prayers and to meet in the mosques. In general, it preaches for ethical behaviour.

6. Salafism: largely stemming from Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia. Its ideology seeks a “return” to that of al-Salaf al-Salih - the pious or righteous ancestors - referring to the ideology and behaviour of the Prophet and his companions. This means the “abolition” of time and space. Many acknowledge the ideology of Muhamed Abdul Wahhab. Over time, and as a result of changing situations, Salafism divided into two parts: • Loyalist Salafism (loyalty to rulers regardless of their names and actions): that part which supports the regimes, obeys their orders, and defends them, especially through Fatwas, mosques and TV preaching. It considers criticism of the regime and opposition to it as disobedience to the Imams, or Fitna - sedition. • Jihadist Salafism: it stems from the same source and ideology as the former and started by answering the call for Jihad against the USSR in Afghanistan, later expanding into Pakistan and its surroundings. Its ranks essentially rely on Arab foundations (Gulfis and Maghrebins, then Asians and Africans). It split into several groups, of which, importantly, one was al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden, and later Aymen Zawahiri.

5. The Sufi groups: They are numerous and heavily influenced by their respective contexts. They are all HELSINKI POLICY FORUM - DISCUSSION PAPER

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After the overthrowing of Taliban rule in Afghanistan,

c) This provoked popular and official reactions in these

al Qaeda divided into regional and local groups, including in Europe, the U.S, China and Russia. It benefited from the first and second Gulf Wars, and the American withdrawal from Iraq which led to the emergence of the Zarqawi group. It has returned in a newer ‘version’ as the so-called “Da’esh”, starting in Iraq and the Levant, and which has now expanded to many other places. Al Qaeda is a complicated phenomenon in terms of ideology, practice, organisation and finances; it requires deep and composed scientific and sociological research in order to unpack all its dimensions and causes. This is not our topic here, rather we are concerned with “Islamists” as political parties, associations and methodologies.

countries whereby the doctrinal conflict reached the point of armed collision (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan), and is, unfortunately, likely to accelerate civil conflict

B: Countries: There are four key countries to consider in terms of size and influence in the region:

3. Pakistan: Pakistan is a vulnerable country with a traditional society (tribal and clannish), divided into many tribes and doctrines. The military rules either directly or subversively depending on the circumstances dictated to a large extent by many international powers and interests.

1. Turkey: it has history and experience in the Sunni world. It is the place where the West and East meet; it has a strategic geographic location and is a country

4.Key Arab States: These are essentially Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, however this group lack the necessary elements of political, social and military

with great symbolism - in particular in that it was the location of the last Caliphal State. It is a leading power in terms of ideology and politics, and is rich in modernity, the values of freedom and democracy, and it has had an economic renaissance. This has made Turkey’s role essential in the region.

power. Instead, they are regressing and becoming prey for other local and international powers.

2. Iran: Iran is on a par with Turkey’s features in terms of location, influence, ambition and also development. It also has the requisite elements for acquiring economic and military power. However: a) It made its doctrine (which is different in that it is Shia) the doctrine of the society and the State b) It also made it, to a greater extent, the defining element of its relations and positions, especially towards the Arab world, Africa, and Asia.

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d) It is a conflict that is sadly nurtured by some international interests and powers aiming at weakening the parties involved in the conflict, dividing their unity. This is a narrow goal because the danger will eventually reach everyone. This is what we are witnessing currently

C. Secularists An elitist project that, through their blind imitation of imported ideology and their dependence, to the extent on external connections and assistance, has made them lose credibility within their own peoples. This is especially due to a) their {Secular/Laic} position on the “Sacred” (religion), b) their intellectual and physical attacks on religion, c) the association of this ideology with the colonial era, and the history of both old and modern wars in the region. This has made such a category an object of suspicion and rejected by many, despite its different motives and interests (Liberal, Leftists).

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Islamabad, Pakistan, 2016. Source: Syed Billal Javaid. CC0 Public Licence

The Left itself is significantly divided into Far Left and Socialists and is in regression after losing its central supporter (the Communist camp represented by the USSR). The Liberals are almost the elite of the elite; they rely on the theory of economic liberalism but, sometimes and in some countries, support the theory of secularism towards religion and the Islamist movements. Most of the time they are also the ally, or at least supportive, of the

It provokes questions over double standards and the priority given to narrow self-interest by a considerable number of Western governments at the expense of “the people’s causes” and revolutions for dignity, as in the case of Egypt. Such seemingly hypocritical policies nurture violent reactions and strengthen the extremists’ narrative, used to conduct vindictive operations even in Western countries, which operate under the excuse of defending Islam. This inflexibility

ruling regime, be it military or monarchy, as is the case of Egypt and the military coup. All this feeds into perpetuating radicalisation within the Salafists generally and the Jihadists particularly, in addition to other public reactions.

and ‘remorselessness’ (so that I don’t say extremism) towards Islam and the Islamo-Arab community, generated in the West, has been encouraged and supported by the Far Right parties, the biased media, and the populist force. It has also been spurred on by the socio-economic crises, particularly in Europe. Therefore, we find ourselves in front of a horrific prospect: two opposing extremist fronts, each on a bank and drumming for a destructive war.

D. The International powers: Strangely it is the secularists of the MENA region, in all their variation, that are supported by the international powers - especially France in North Africa - despite their weak culture of freedom and democratic values. This raises doubts about the credibility and sincerity of these international powers and their purported support of freedom and democracy in the region.

Looking ahead we must ask what is the direction of the future – greater confrontation or growing co-operation? This is the essential question that confronts us all. I hope that we will be allowed further opportunities for an in-depth contribution to this interesting debate in service of freedom and peace.

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Religous Literacy and Islam in the Middle East By Dr Abd El-Monem Abo El-Fotouh

Abdel-Moneim Aboul-Fotouh during interview with the Associated Press at his home in Cairo, Egypt, Monday, Nov. 18, 2013: Source: (AP Photo/Amr Nabil)

Introduction:

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efore discussing religious literacy and its impact on framing and rationalising foreign policy and diplomacy, there may be a need to discuss “the stereotypes” used by most politicians to simplify the political crises they face or their way of dealing with them. This is not just an issue of negative “stereotypes” with regards to ‘the other’ but also about “stereotyping” modernity and progress through presenting a readymade framework for the shape of progress, and all this entails in terms of cultural imposition on society. “Islamic texts call for violence”…”Islam is inherently anti-democratic”...“implementation of democracy is linked to implementation of secularism”…

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These are simple examples of some of the prevailing forms of “stereotyping” by most western politicians and maybe even some Arab intellectual politicians when talking about Islam and its relationship with democracy, or democracy and its requirements in our Arab region. There is perhaps another point that must be mentioned before talking about the impact of religion on the politics of people’s affairs, namely that related to injustices in today’s world. The citizens of the Global North see a world full of justice, humanity and civilisation while those in the Global South see a world full of injustice, chaos, and the crushing of humanity.

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Protester waving flag during Tahir Square Protests, 2011. Source: Jonathan Rashad Flickr. Licensed over Creative Commons

Lack of religious literacy among some politicians and diplomats is not the most important issue, of greater importance is how religion is valued in bearing life’s difficulties to those oppressed and deprived of their rights by leaders supported by those politicians, or how it is valued in terms of waiting for the mercy of divine intervention to the poor, destitute and

Da’esh, al Qaeda and others did not attract thousands and tens of thousands of youths by the power of a religious text or a fatwa alone, rather they attracted them in an environment of a country “forcibly raped” for over 70 years by a group of foreign immigrants through intensely racist and sectarian religious speech with the blessings of the world. If we agree

those deprived of their wealth for the benefit of the multinational organisations and corporations from the countries of those diplomats.

that our common goal is to achieve democracy and justice and the preservation of human dignity for all people without exception, skipping over these core points and assuming that religious literacy is sufficient to understand the birth of “Da’esh” and its sisters actually drives us further away from our stated goal.

It is not sufficient to provide religious training for politicians to improve their knowledge of Islam, its doctrines and sects, in order for them to understand the relationship between religion and what is happening within Muslim countries. Those politicians interested in foreign policy must realise that “Da’esh” originated and thrived in a country plagued by criminal rulers unable to control their country without Western material and military support.

Main points: 1) Religious literacy and Clerics: Since the discussion is essentially focused on the MENA region, religious literacy in this context is linked to a large extent with knowledge of Islam itself. Although the issue is more complex than can be explained in a few pages, there is an urgent need to understand the general nature of Islam.

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For instance, in Sunni Islam there are no “clerics.” This category, that exists in Christianity, Judaism or even among those who follow the Shia doctrine, does not exist in Sunni Islam. The relationship between a Sunni Muslim and their God needs no priest or ‘Marja’a’ as intermediary. “Sunni scholars” are no more than “scholars” or “readers” or “Mujtahids/ individuals practicing independent reasoning” or “teachers”; therefore, they have no religious mandate/ guardianship over “Muslims” and correspondingly nor do they have immunity or holiness. Therefore, the person who understands such a general nature of Islam (Sunni Islam specifically) avoids slipping into an illusory assumption that the subordination/submission of some Muslims to Abu Bakr Baghdadi or Ayman Zawahiri, stems from a religious mandate (as it was the case with the Pope of Rome in medieval times, or with Imam Khomeini after the Iranian revolution). In this case, the subordination of these Muslims is essentially political. In the eyes of these Muslims they are following a path that can succeed in responding to the oppression spawned

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“If ‘secularism’ meant ‘pluralism of ideas, accepting the other, rights for equal citizenship rights and rejection of theocracies.. then it and modernity go hand in hand” 2) How can something be judged with regard to religious factors? Religious factors can be an important variable when judging an issue such as the rise of “Da’esh” but it is clearly not the most important variable. On closer examination, the rise of ISIS originates from political causes, and the religious factors are only catalysing or unifying factors. A quick look at the pressures faced by Sunni Muslims in Iraq at the hands of sectarian rule and at the number of crimes committed by the Assad regime, backed by the sectarian support of Iran and Hezbollah as well as the absence of any avenues for a political solution to the crises in these two countries confirms this clearly.

by the rule of these countries, or in fighting the enemies who protect the occupied “Israel” (i.e. the Palestinian territories) and who constantly humiliate the nation (Arabs and Muslims).

There is an urgent need to understand the role of the religious factor in extremism, but in terms of its ability to motivate and mobilize, not in terms of its causal role.

This is just one example seeking to clarify that the required religious literacy is not about being absorbed in the many literal and historical details of religions and the extent of the texts’ impact on the people. Rather, the most important ‘literacy’ is understanding the nature of religions and the relationships emanating between the individuals, bodies, and affiliated entities of that religion.

3) There is no doubt that religion has a strong presence in the MENA region and its influence (even if only morally) on events is much greater than in other regions of the world. Indeed, the interference of Hezbollah in Syria derives from a sectarian religious position, likewise the rejection by most Sunni Muslims of the popular revolution in Bahrain stems from a sectarian religious position as well. However, I must emphasise that such effects and influence stem from political factors, and that solving these political problems can help dissolve and resolve such increasingly growing sectarian positions.

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Child Praying 2015. Source: chidioc. CC0 Public Licence: pixabay

4) Our government does not deal with Religion as a means of understanding the world or a means of domestic or foreign policy, instead, it uses religion merely as a means to secure its authority. Our government is not keen for a “religious revolution” to take place as claimed by some. In reality it is keen to exploit religion in any form (Sufi, Liberal,

If the majority of the people chose for the laws regulating them not to contradict with their religious roots? Or chose to be ruled by a political faction inspired by religious rules in their thoughts and ideas?

or even Salafi) to pull the rug from under the feet of its political opponents who use the same means to attract and mobilise supporters!

rights and rejection of theocracies ruled by clerics or those claiming divine rights” then it and modernity go hand in hand.

5) In order to avoid a superficial discussion, secularism needs a precise definition before discussing its relationship with modernity.

6) Clerics in Europe during the medieval ages were a fundamental cause of reinforcing oppressive regimes and anesthetising people, causing them to abandon their political, economic and social rights. Therefore, the development of European societies depended on the separation of religion in general - and clerics in particular - from the State. This Western experience has no parallels with Muslim societies in this regard. On the contrary, many of the “Ulama” among Sunnis, or the “Imams” or ‘Marj’as” among the Shi’a, were symbolic of the fight against the tyranny of rulers and corruption, wholly unlike the bitter western experience in this regard.

•If “secularism” means a complete political rupture with religion and its aspects, why did secular Turkey fail to develop during 70 long years until it started reconciling politics and religion? •If “secularism” means the complete “neutrality” of religions within the political system, what stops modernity (if it means democracy, pluralism, justice and development.)

•But if “secularism” meant “pluralism of ideas, accepting the other, rights for equal citizenship

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7) There are no Sunni religious institutions similar

and some parties on the Right in the US, Italy and

to those found in the Western or Shia experiences; the institutions that exist in the Sunni world are for no more than religious learning. Sunni Muslims carry a partial appreciation/respect to some of these institutions based on their previous partisan positions in protecting the religion on the one hand and in defending the oppressed and combating colonisation on the other. Therefore, what is required here is not opposition to these institutions or refusal to tolerate them, as the western experience would assume, but on the one, hand a real call for these institutions to be independent from the State in which they operate, and on the other, non-engagement with those institutions that claim to have a say in political affairs. This is to prevent them from deviating from the purpose for which they were established, or from becoming political or authoritarian tools.

other countries, however there is an extreme aversion or suspicion of parties that wish to have the same relationship with Islam.

8) One thesis we have advocated for some time is the separation of what is called the work of “dawa/ preaching” from “political party” work. Any group that wants to undertake dawa, calling on people

11) Religious literacy in its traditional form is not, on its own, a guardian against extremism and violence. The only safeguard against such ideas (in addition to the aforementioned remedying of political and

to commit to the teachings and values of religion, must not practice competitive political party work in any shape or form. Equally any political group that draws upon religion as an inspiration for their vision on political and economic affairs must not exercise dawa upon people in order not to mix up what is “human” with what is “sacred”, and in order not to transform the field of political competition into a field of religious differences distancing politics from its core concern, which is looking after the interests of the people under their responsibility.

economic injustices) is the degree to which the religiously literate person accepts the idea of pluralism and acceptance of the other, and the firm belief that their religious literacy in its entirety is nothing but a product of a human effort and this effort is not sacred in and of itself. This is the real distinction between a religious literacy that attracts its adherents towards extremism and violence, in directions other than resisting the occupier, and the religious literacy that helps broaden horizons and facilitate co-existence with the other.

9) There is no doubt that there are considerable double standards in the criteria that western politicians use to measure different positions. There is continued tolerance or at least an understanding of the relationship that exists between Christianity

The discussion of rational explanations alone for the causes of religious extremism is superficial; the issue revolves essentially around the environment, political circumstances, societal pressures and the psychological sense of defeat.

10) The theory of “black and white” secularism versus theocracy does not dominate Western politicians’ classifications of the nature of Arab or Muslim countries and their relationship with religion, but rather what informs their political ideology is whether their interests in the region are served regardless of how democratic or secular the countries are. Western countries have no problem in accepting theocratic states, either in institutional form or character, as long as they serve their interests. They may also be suspicious, or even reject, real democracy in such [Arab or Muslim] countries, whether secular or not, due to fear of threats to their interests.

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Religion and the State in the Arab World By Faisal Abualhassan

Religion and the State in the Arab World, 1900-2015: A View from the Arabian Peninsula

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he Arab uprisings since 2011 and their subsequent successes, failures, and consequences have put into the spotlight, yet again, the role of the relationship between religion and politics in the Arab world, the so-called incompatibility of democracy with Islam. On one hand, these questions - the role of religion in politics, how to guarantee the voice of citizens in national policies and governance, balancing human rights with national security - are in no way specific to the Arab world. However, decades, if not centuries, of misunderstanding, ignorance, foreign intervention, and exoticizing the region (and Islam in general) as seemingly different or opposite to the socio-political development in the West, have led to both real and imagined differences in the role that states have come to play in the lives of the nearly 350 million citizens of the 22 Arab states.

Islamism, Colonialism and Identity in the Colonial Arab world To begin, a working definition of "Islamism" or "Political Islamism" should be established, for clarity and simplicity's sake, to better clearly explore the underlying questions of religion in politics, religious illiteracy, and the varying nuances and situations across the contemporary Arab world. Islamism is a century's old response to both: 1) religious illiteracy and ignorance across the colonial Muslim world at the dawn of the 20th century and 2) a desire for social reform and transformation.

Faisal Abualhassan. Source: Al Jazeera Licensed under Creative Commons

Political Islamism, then, can be seen as the result of instrumentalisation of religion in socio-political discourses amongst colonial elites as a unifying factor in anti-colonial resistance (see, for example, Michel Aflaq's explanations on the importance of Islam as a unifying factor even amongst the Christians of Arab nationalism.) Following the independence of the various Arab states, however, colonial elites preferred a secular agenda of Arab nationalism to develop the multi-confessional societies of the Arab world, Nasserism and Baathism being the foremost victors.

“Political Islamism, then, can be seen as the result of instrumentalism of religion in socio-political discourses amongst colonial elites”

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Those who remained steadfast to the concept of the

However, they defended the difference between the

"Islamic state" model proposed by late 19th century/ early 20th-century anti-colonial reformers, however, refused to relinquish their desired monopoly over religious discourses on society and politics. They continued to take advantage of poverty and religious and literal illiteracy across the Arab world to maintain their relevance, all the while resorting to any means, often-violent ones, in order to maintain relevance. Such a violent and zealous "any means necessary" survivalism on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Political Islamists has led to stalled sociopolitical, cultural, and religious progress in the region as the secular and nationalist regimes failed to respond to the educational and developmental needs of the Arab people; the same needs all too often taken advantage of by Political Islamists in order to exert "societal pressure" on the secular regimes to comply with the goals of Islamists' agenda.

de facto and de jure situation with the formula "Better one hundred years of the Sultan's tyranny than one year of people's tyranny over each other" to justify the authoritarian and centralized rule of the sultans, effectively serving as a vanguard of thought, and politically as little more than a rubber-stamp religious authority for the sultans. Outside the ivory towers of "pure" religious thought, society, life and politics evolved and progressed and, while all maintaining more or less an overall adherence to the main tenets of the faith, Muslim societies - from Morocco in the west to Indonesia in the east, from the Crimea in the north to Zanzibar in the south - developed and combined regional peculiarities, with the traditions of Islamic mystics known as Sufis, with pre-Islamic traditions into what is often known as "folkloric Islam," which dominated the lives of the working and lower classes in Muslim societies up until the 20th century. Religious literacy, indeed any literacy, was a privilege of the elite, and thus it is no surprise that both secular and Islamist agendas for reform were born amongst the elites.

To understand Islamists' point-of-view, the historical relationship between religion and "the State" must be understood in the regional context. Whereas historically the hierarchical and organized religious establishment that is "the Church" dominated the political theatre in the West - and therefore religious authority's association the elite - since the arrival on the scene of the "Ulema" as a scholarly class in the early centuries of Islam, their sole route to maintain their existence alongside the temporal powers of sultanic dynasties was to relegate themselves to an "ivory tower" wherein Islamic theology and thought in its "purist" form was guarded. The Ulema and their extensive scholarly works, often the cited sources of fundamentalists today, concurred even on the illegitimacy of hereditary rule (ironic given the number of eponymous dynasties which ruled the Muslim world up through the current day.)

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With the arrival of European colonialism and it's shattering the imagined state of Muslim supremacy across the Islamic world (dating to the Islamic Golden Age, which corresponded to Europe's Dark Ages) came an increasingly interconnected world. As a largely colonized people (few places aside from the central Arabian Peninsula, due to its seemingly lack of importance or wealth, in the Muslim world were left uncolonized) "Muslim identity" and other Islam-related discourses were appropriated by new reformers, such as the early Muslim Brotherhood, who decried the Sufis, traditional Ulema, and sultans alike for their co-optation by the colonial powers.

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The nearly-universal experience of colonialism amongst

Those who remained unconverted to this simplified

Muslims allowed for a politicized "Muslim" identity to provide a sort of unified, seemingly universal resistance and opposition identity, a mythological universalism parallel to the empires that dominated them. However, practices amongst the Muslims were far from uniform or universal, and so the early Islamist thinkers and activists set to work on bringing the various folkloric traditions to an end with a mantra of modernism, science, and an "Islamic" (and not a European, or colonial, or monarchical) "state." With the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the abolishment of the caliphate, leadership for the taxes and souls of the Arabs fell to the vying factions of the Arab nationalists and the Political Islamists, whose descendants continue to fight until today.

ideology, became indignant, by effect, radicalizing the few remaining liberal institutions into militantly secular, anti-Islamist establishments (the Egyptian military, the laïcards of Tunisia, the Assad regime, etc.) allowing for a standoff in which there is no room for tolerance or pluralism.

Partially due to the refusal of the Arab nationalist secular regimes to share power with the Political Islamists and the inevitable exposure of unrealistic mantras of their retrograde ideology, but mostly due to the Political Islamists' taking advantage of the religious illiterate masses in the Arab world by spreading their paternalistic and scientific approach to religion (note the controversies they occupy themselves with the most: hijab, beard, prayer locations, numbers of prostrations in the preferred, that is to say beyond the five required, prayers, etc…). In implanting in the consciousness' of the Muslim masses such a haraam/halaal (forbidden/permissible), positivist, modernist Islam, political Islamists refused to yield to natural socio-political evolution, after effectively destroying the philosophical and evolutionary tendencies (resulting in what could be termed a "normative revolution" in orthodox Sunni thought) and have forced Arab and Muslim societies into the stalemate they currently face.

The Exception in the Arabian Peninsula Meanwhile, in the Arabian Peninsula, what is known as Al Wahabbiyah, or the so-called "Wahhabi" movement, was first and foremost a state-formation process, which while similarly instrumentalizing religion to justify its existence and maximize its appeal and unify varying peoples, maintained, unlike the Political Islamists (whose discourses were directly a reaction to colonization,) the nuanced separation of the temporal and religious authorities due to its literalist approach to scriptural interpretation. Unlike the more urban centres in the Arab world, the central Arabian Peninsula remained, until the mid-20th century, a tribal society. Before the "Wahhabi" movement of the 18th century, lack of religious literacy had seen deviations from Islamic practices widespread across central Arabia well beyond the umbrella of "folkloric Islam." Thus was the context of the mise-en-scène of "Wahhabism," which unlike Islamism, was a local, indigenous solution to a local problem, and in which the ruler, in the form of an Al Saud dynast, triumphed over the religious leaders - importantly, it did not aspire to universalism nor socio-political transformation into an Islamised modernity (à la "Islamic State" concept of the Political Islamists,") rather, it sought to modernize Islam.

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A famous account of Ibn Saud, the founder of the Third Saudi State, the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, instructing his Wahhabi Ulema involves the king telling his religious advisors: ‘You, O wise sheikhs, are the crown of my head [both an expression of respect in Arabic, and symbolizing their legitimizing authority]. However, do not forget, if I move my head either way, you either stay on my head or fall down.’ The organic development and evolution of a state in Arabia during the unification of the kingdom between 1902 and 1932 can be understood as the evolution of tribal society governed by customary law into an urbanized consultative monarchy, and neither as an "Islamic State" nor governance model that could be duplicated and exported elsewhere. In the Saudi context, the institutionalization of state agencies and focus on education and development, normalized and countered radical elements (such as the rebellion of fanatics in the 1920's,) even within Arabian Peninsula society. Furthermore, this institutionalization and state-formation in the Arabian Peninsula was completed by the early 20th century, before rapid global communication was a fact of daily life in the region, and before petrol and its financiering capabilities were discovered. The development of an Islamic governance system in Arabia, therefore, was a historical outlier in the history of the relationship between religion and state in the broader Arab and Islamic worlds, and was not, and is not, a system to be reproduced or exported elsewhere. This context explains why, today, the Saudi state invests so much of its resources, diplomatic efforts, and, when necessary, military efforts, towards maintaining and ensuring legitimate regimes that, likewise, promote natural socio-political evolutions and development over radical ideologies that promote social transformation.

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Moving Forward Revolutionary ideologies with goals of social transformation are artificial solutions to problems that no longer exist. Their popularity is only maintained due to religious (and literal) illiteracy. Focusing on development, education, infrastructure and actual religious literacy - instead of on outdated and distracting Political Islamist-monopolized debates over surface issues such as women's veils - is what should be taking place. The concept of an "Islamic State" is artificial and not compatible with 21st century modernity: its origins in colonized society rely upon East/West differentiation that is no longer the reality of the globalized world that the Arab states find themselves nearly after 70 years of independence. Religion is a powerful tool, a tool used, amongst others, by the pragmatic governance systems of the Arabian Peninsula, but also in Algeria, Jordan and Morocco who "do politics" albeit with an Islamic reference, or inspiration; conversely, ideological groups (be they movements or regimes) such as Political Islamists, not only lack internal mechanisms to check the fanaticism inspired by religious illiteracy amongst the masses, but also seek to politicize Islam itself, with the dire consequences we see today of unleashed fanaticism at its most ferocious, i.e., Daesh in Syria. In understanding such important nuances, and that there is no “one size fits all” approach to religion and the state in the Arab and Islamic worlds, foreign policy and diplomacy can better understand that policies encouraging civil society and local, indigenous movements that neither take their direction from foreign powers nor those that espouse radical ideologies of social transformation, will only benefit and ensure a more stable and prosperous future.

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Religous Literacy in a Political Context Offical executive office photograph - Mr. Hassan Annabi. Source: http://nidaa-tounes.org/

By Hassan Annabi

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he discussion surrounding religious literacy today, particularly as it relates to the Muslim World, cannot take place without contextualising it in its socio-historical framework. Moreover, the relationship between religious literacy, foreign policy, and diplomacy has many aspects related to strategies beyond religion in and of itself.

On religious literacy: The definition of religious literacy differs from one country to another in the Arab Muslim World, hence the contradictions and conflicts. For Sunni Muslims, this literacy is based on the Quran, Sunna {the prophet’s tradition} and Ijtihad, the independent reasoning of the Fuqaha {religious scholars} and can be tracked back to the 8th and 9th centuries where the four doctrines emerged (Maliki, Hanafi, Shafiei, and Hanbali). However, starting from the 13th century, the door for independent reasoning was closed and

However, in the meantime, the abolishment of the Caliphate and the fall of Muslim countries under colonialism led to the emergence of anti-Western religious literacy, insular and self-regarding, claiming return to the Salaf-A-Salih - pious forefathers (the development of the Wahabist and the Muslim Brotherhood movements).

the political authorities agreed with the Fuqaha on the prohibition of all tajdid (renewal/revival) in religious understanding, considering it to be Bid’ah {innovation}, and that “all bid’ah is in the hell fire”.

So which religious literacy are we discussing? That which is inspired by Salafism, or that which tries to be coherent with the thought of the universal enlightenment?

In the 19th century, signs of intellectual awakening begun to emerge in certain countries (mainly Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia) leading to something of a renewal in religious literacy and to reforms in the socio-political system. Tunisia seems to be at the forefront of such progress compared to the rest of the Muslim countries (issuing the first law banning slavery and slave trade in 1846, the first constitution in 1861 lifting the stigma of Dhimmis {non-Muslim citizens of an Muslim State} on Jews, first personal status law in the Arab World acknowledging basic rights for women in 1956).

On the relationship between religious literacy and political power: The issue lies in the content of the religious literacy that we demand governments to provide to society, and the young in particular. Unfortunately, today we see most educational systems in the Arab World interested more in the acts of worship, stressing the necessity of respecting the rituals, emphasising Jihad against misguidance and kufr {disbelief}, indifferent to real interaction and failing to advocate for independent critical thinking.

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Therefore, the ideal solution lies in reforming

In reality, matters have become increasingly complicated

the education system so that it focuses more on tolerance and seeing the future with determination, optimism and the rejection of the culture of death and blasphemy.

in our times - the times of globalization. Due to communication and networking technologies and the speed of spreading information, there is no longer only one type of religious literacy in one country and the State is no longer the only influential factor on religious literacy. Public opinion is attracted to different and sometimes contradictory literacies, making it difficult to predict the position the masses will take, particularly when the political system shackles freedom of expression.

This is, nevertheless, insufficient. There must be training/qualifications for preaching Imams and those who give Dawah {proselytize} in order that they have a certain degree of knowledge (knowledge of other religions, proficiency in at least one foreign language, knowledge of movements of philosophy etc.). It is beyond belief that the political authorities empower these imams to religiously “educate” society whilst they lack the simplest literacy levels. Ironically, awareness about the necessity of educating “religious leaders” emerged and developed in non-Muslim countries (for instance Europe), and remains an obsession whilst to this day it is insufficient if not completely absent in Muslim countries.

Therefore, the challenge is less about providing tools for policy makers enabling them to develop religious literacy, and more about decision makers knowing the direction of public opinion so that there are not mere helpless spectators. Decision makers cannot undertake this responsibility without giving scientific research the importance it deserves, and without working closely with civil society in a climate of freedom and respect of basic rights.

Palmyra, Syria. 2009. Source: andrewlambo, pixabay. CC0 Public Domain

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On the relationship between religious literacy, foreign policy, and diplomacy: We should acknowledge that the relationships between the Muslim East and the Christian West remain contaminated by old grudges, only aggravated by the passing of time and the effect of, among others, the nine Crusader wars, colonialism, the Palestinian cause, the invasion of Iraq and the intervention in Syria under the auspices of fighting authoritarianism. All this has deepened the gulf between the two civilisations. This has also led to a confusion among the general public in many Arab and Muslim countries about that which is universal within Western Civilisation (human rights, democracy, gender equality, respect of minorities etc.) and that which is political and context specific in the way the West treats others (colonial policies, double standards depending on interests, ignoring the particularities of other civilisation etc.).

How to escape the vicious cycle? We may seek easy solutions, for example sending religious attachés to embassies with the task of studying the religious practices of their assigned countries, in order to provide the political official with knowledge of reality on the ground.

However, this will not benefit us as long as we treat religion and religious literacy as if they are isolated from politics, economy, and culture. We must review policies in order to rebuild some level of trust; this necessitates finding final solutions to a number of problems that have direct and indirect links with religious literacy: - The Palestinian cause - The use of religious terrorist movements to fight foes (Bin Laden and al Qaeda against Russia, and Da’esh for the Syrian situation) - Taking into consideration immediate interests in dealings with states - The use of double standards when it comes to principles (for instance demonising Syrian leaders whilst turning a blind eye to the crimes and human rights abuses committed on a daily basis in some Gulf States). Hence the importance of the role played by circles of multi-expertise intellectuals, of many nationalities (among these is Forward Thinking) in influencing decision-making.

“However, this will not benefit us as long as we treat religion and religious literacy as if they were isolated from politics, economy and culture” HELSINKI POLICY FORUM - DISCUSSION PAPER

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The Challenges of Religious Illiteracy and Radicalism By Dr Ahmad Iravani

Dr Ahmad Iravani speaking at the WEF, Source: csime.org, 2016

A

ny discussion exploring an issue such as religious literacy and foreign policy requires more reflection than can be outlined here in a few pages. Definitions of the different terms used require agreement because

Challenge of religious literacy/illiteracy

although they may be common in name they may not be in understanding to each person.

Taliban or Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. It appears they have never studied Islam deeply. A considerable number of people living the extremist movement have a background in sciences and usually little, if any, religious learning. The problem we have today is that many of these people are claiming for themselves religious authority. They are rejecting the materials of the clergy and those that the clergy study. They simplify as much as they can. They do not think or reflect. When the humanities are not studied, individuals learn less about reflection and critical thinking and, instead, literal thinking can dominate. They cannot go inside the ocean, as it were, because they are afraid and lack the tools. They fail to delve deeply into issues because they have limited thinking, and therefore, withdraw from scholarly debate.

Discussions around secularisation in Europe need to go beyond just the influence of Marxist thinking. The Vienna Circle in the early 20th Century argued for a kind of kingdom of science and progress. What became known as the Positivist Movement rejected anything that could not be proven. This pushed religion more into a corner and excluded it by claiming everything must be verified to be true. This was in effect an argument against all metaphysics, as irrelevant and useless.

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The challenge of the ‘two book Imam’ or ‘two book preacher’ is a real challenge. Take, for example, the

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However, the important point is that this phenomenon

It is very important that policy makers are supported in

has become a fact of a society that policy-makers cannot ignore. At the end of the day, one has to judge an individual based on the products of their actions, and one cannot deny these groups are being productive. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of Imams and religious authorities who disagree with extremists, but they are less productive and have less impact in terms of their followers.

their ability to deepen their understanding of religious literacy, and for this teaching, and learning, is very important. The story reminds us that developing an awareness of religion and how it influences individuals’ lives and their interaction with society requires due attention to the broader cultural and social literacy that makes reaching out to the masses a lot easier, less elitist and more effective.

In this sense, the Islamic State (Daesh) might have more power than those who have the real knowledge and therefore it would be a mistake to underestimate the power of the ‘two-book preacher.’

The challenges posed by radicalisation

We have a story in Persian about two Imams in a village. One of them was very knowledgeable and learned, and whose knowledge was not just limited to religion. The second lacked a similar depth of religious learning but was very knowledgeable about people and how to communicate or manipulate them. The people of the village were mostly illiterate and there was competition between the two Imams in the village. One day they decided to gather the people of the village and invite the villagers to ask them one question, which they in turn would answer so that the people would decide who was the better scholar. One of the villagers asked, ‘What is a snake?’ The learned Imam began a very detailed explanation of a snake, going into the anatomy, science, mythology and other aspects. Some of the villagers looked confused and lost in the answer. When it was the turn for the second Imam to answer, he drew a snake in the dust. Who did the people believe? The second Imam.

Radicalisation is a complex social, ideological and psychological process that an individual goes through that is not necessarily linear, or does it result in the use of violence. It is important to recognise that it is a case-by-case individual process with both short term and long-term causes and factors. Policy makers should take into account the following factors: • Radicalisation depends on the context and experience of individuals and communities and should not be seen as a singular process. • A particular understanding of Islam is certainly the basis of the self-discovery of many extremists. Although this might be a ‘distorted’ understanding to the majority of Muslims across the world, for those who embrace it, it is an ‘authentic’ and ‘just’ version of Islam. • The line between non-violent radical and extreme readings of Islam and violent radical and extreme readings of Islam is blurred. Not every radical reading of Islam advocates violence.

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In terms of causes of extremism there are a number that should be taken into consideration: • Real or perceived injustices inflicted upon themselves, or the broader Muslim community with which they feel affiliated. • Local governments, with the tacit or active support of Western powers, are usually responsible for perpetrating such injustices. • As a result of globalisation there has been a cultural shift that has left a great number of young and vulnerable young people socially and culturally dislocated, which has resulted in an identity crisis that can be a radicalising force on individuals. • Intimidating counter-terrorism and law enforcement measure, at times, could be mitigating factors in pushing radicals over the edge to violent actions. Any strategies to deal with this phenomenon should partner with Muslim communities in developing and implementing educational and re-socialisation programmes to empower the communities to take the lead without unnecessary and extensive involvement of governmental authorities and institutions. The measures should not in any way compromise the credibility of families, community leaders or Imams. There is an important role for the private sector in creating opportunities for social and economic mobility. There needs to be a concerted effort to redress the negative role played by the media in unfairly targeting the entire Muslim community as a bastion of hatred and radicalism. The media can play a very positive role with long tem impact on educational and preventative measures.

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Changing international context Apart from the importance of deepening policy-makers’ religious literacy and understanding of religion in order to inform how to deal with radicalisation and extremism, there are further challenges that policy makers face at the intersection of religion and politics. The notion of national interest is also being challenged in today’s globalised world, and in this challenge there is an important role for religion to play a part of the solution. Globalisation is making the world more complex with a compression of time and space and increased communication, interaction and interlinking among actors and people. This on-going process, and with it the increased importance of identity and claims of identity across states, borders, creating transnational issues, has called into question the utility of notions such as national, international and fixed loyalties and interests. Rigorously inspired identity politics has added another layer of complexity to state-centred conceptualisation of national interest. Islam has a profound bearing on social, cultural and daily life of individuals and communities. The constant and present role it has on people has the effect of being a source from which people construct meaning, and also a tool to express frustrations and claims. Islam cannot condone authoritarian rule and intolerant societies, as the early history of Islam testifies, advocating justice and individual freedom. The problem of authoritarian rule and the question of freedom need to be addressed, and there are democratic traditions within Islam rooted in Islamic texts.

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As an interconnected world and digital revolution has

In Islam, modernity has been felt in different ways,

brought us all closer together, and as problems and tensions have magnified in the nexus of globalized world and individual state’s interests, the notion of national interest seems to be more problematic. The traditional notion of national interest might be a valuable rhetorical device to justify foreign policy, but globalisation has challenged the notion of borders. The complex problems of our age will not be solved through policies that rely on a demarcation line between ‘we’ versus ‘them’, in which one side holds the source of the problem and the other holds the answer and truth. Rather, common solutions are needed and for that there needs to be inclusive national and international dialogue. In this changing context, there is an important role for religion to play and be part of the solution.

leading some to decrease their emphasis on legal practices of the religion, while their religiosity has increased day by day, or adherence to mysticism has increased.

There are many issues beyond religion that play a role in generating conflict, including identity, borders, water, politics, super-powers, regional powers, proxy wars, and the interests of those financing conflict. All these, and many more, are also factors in various conflicts that may have a dormant sectarian or religious conflict built into it too. It would be mistaken to understand these conflicts only through the religious dimension of the conflict. In discussions of understanding religion, we usually address westerners to understand religion, by which we mean understanding Islam. But policy makers in the Middle East should also appreciate the power of religion in the west and in particular the United States. It is a mistake to think that religion is not relevant in the United States. Modernisation appears to have had some impact on religious practice. However, not in the way that is often thought – that modernisation leads to decreasing importance of religion.

Modernisation in Europe came out of philosophy. However, it was then exported to the Middle East. Which means that the philosophical foundation was never present in the Middle East. Instead they received technological advancement, without the European philosophical heritage. Attempts to export the philosophical heritage, has sometimes been interpreted as a cultural attack in the Middle East. The argument that there is a necessary link between modernisation and secularisation does not hold up when one examines modernisation and how it has played out differently across the world, from Latin America to East Asia. Importantly, the European experience of secularisation is not present in the US. There is a difference between secularisation and pluralism. Modernisation goes beyond secularisation. Many societies are pluralistic but not secularised. Modernisation gives more to pluralism than secularisation. Modernisation helps in the accepting of a pluralistic society. Pluralistic societies face an inevitable challenge of finding laws to reflect its diversity. In an interconnected world, it’s likely that there is a need to recognise more pluralism. This has nothing to do with secularisation.

The Iranian experience Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, for the first time in the history of Islam the clergy are in power. There have been Islamic governments before, but in these instances they were run by lay people, with the Clergy at their side.

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In terms of causes of extremism there are a number

In fact, it is in the national interest of each country to

that should be taken into consideration:

take religion seriously. Take the resurgence of Islam nowadays, and Muslim minorities in Europe. These Muslims are part of Europe, the family of Europe. There is a need to look at Islam and Islamic institutions and develop and build them into society. There is a need to communicate with them better. Government should not interfere with issues of religion because it creates a counter reaction.

Religion played a role in motivating the people to overthrow the Shah who was the embodiment of a country whose ruler was a puppet to global super-powers. Religion played an important role in the liberation of society. It is possible with hindsight to criticise certain actions done in the name of religion, but in the initial days of the revolution and mobilisation of the country, slogans with a religious resonance, such as ‘justice, independence, freedom’ played crucial roles. Some see a contradiction when the words Islam and Democracy are put side by side. Islamic democracy, like any democracy, will have its own colour and essence. It will not be like US or Swiss democracy. Turkey and Malaysia are two examples of the varying nature of democracy.

Recommendations It would be a mistake to ignore religion. Policy makers should take more seriously the power of religion and issues of religion. There is an expression in Farsi, ‘Try to kick someone through the door, and they come back through the window.’ It is impossible to get rid of religion.

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There is a need for a dynamic to be present within communities to deal with challenges, and in my experience that comes from communities interacting with other communities. Community and faith leaders from different faith backgrounds should be meeting and exchanging, creating a better atmosphere. Communication should be two-way and subjective not objective. The minute a community is ostracised and individuals start asking: ‘what do we do with them,’ this will be a disaster. Communities must be involved and seen as part of the solution. At the same time there is a need to recognise that literalism, Daesh, and other challenges, that may appear at first glance to be religious in nature, are part of a far more complex context that need to be understood, in order to formulate the most appropriate policy response.

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Religous Literacy in an International Context By Peter Weiderud

Peter Weiderud, 2010. Source: Fredrik Persson/ TT

Religious literacy is highly commendable for policymakers. The level of illiteracy is very different in different countries, contexts and cultures. In the

Hence there was no reason to understand religion, as it was merely a secondary result of socio-economic change. Religion became less important in industrial

more secular northern Europe policy-makers might easier understand the importance of neutrality in relation to different religions compared to southern Europe, at least as long as the religious expressions are kept to the private sphere.

societies as compared to the agrarian society. And even in post-industrial societies the ability of established religious authorities to dictate to the masses is crumbling away. But, spiritual concerns, broadly defined, are not crumbling away. They are becoming more widespread. Religions are here to stay. But their roles are changing.

A European Christian Democrat might easier understand and discuss Political Islam, compared to a Social Democrat, even if the concrete political expressions are more left. Western policy-makers assumed illiteracy is largely dependent upon the predictions formulated by sociologists in the so-called secularization thesis. During industrialisation one could notice how religion and religious authority lost influence in society. Some drew the conclusion that, as a result of modernization, religion would gradually disappear.

Religions play different roles in different societies. When societies undergo socio-economic development citizens are given objective capability to base their lives on autonomous choice. But even though this trend is global and noticeable in all developing countries, the world is not becoming homogeneous and the imprint of cultural traditions and differences are not disappearing.

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The interaction between traditional norms,

Extremism cannot be assessed without references

modernization, religions, national aspirations, national pride and national humiliation, is increasingly complex.

to distribution of power and social capitol, economic resources and present traditions and traditional values.

Part of the problem is of course that all policy makers are products of their own experiences. Few European Social Democrats have personal experience of religion – they look at it as outside observers. Many Christian Democrats might have experienced religion, but are lacking experience of being poor. So how do you avoid the risk of these issues being discussed from an outside perspective when bringing policy makers together?

This brings us back to the observation of the European Christian Democrat and Social Democrat. The Social Democrat – or the left - is able to understand and analyse the world with a class perspective – a socio economic analyses. But he has difficulties in understanding the importance of identity, and hence religion becomes difficult, threatening or ignored. The Christian Democrat – or political right - understands the importance of identity, but struggles to understand the class perspective.

One key aspect might be a strong and principled focus on the freedom of religion. Freedom of religion and belief, as a human right, includes freedom to, as well as freedom from and freedom to choose religion, which demands treating every human being with the same respect. Religions will not disappear. They are part of society as much as all culture, ethnic and identity-related issues are. The religious expressions are as intertwined in rest of society and as needed in society as language, literature, poetry, music and art are. People are different and have different preferences. Policy-makers have reason to undertake regular encounters with religious leaders and religious institutions. Religious leaders are not almighty, but they have their own and relevant channels to the hearts and minds of citizens. And, policy makers may humbly ask religious leaders to contribute to peace and reconciliation in society.

My observation is that it is important to work with both perspectives – identity and class – to understand the development of Political Islam, and also to be able to lay the foundation for a society built on unity in diversity. Focusing only on identity tends to divide the world into us and them, while purely a class perspective is runs the risk of being patronizing or ignoring some of the fundamental questions that need to be addressed in order to the ensure the respect of human rights – in particular freedom of religion - and democracy. This offers a challenge to all. Those that are strong on ‘freedom to’, often have difficulties with ‘freedom from’, and vice versa. Understanding fully the freedom to choose – treating all traditions with the same respect – is a problem in most societies – Europe as well as the MENA region I am sitting in now. And both are facing the risk of growing intolerance of minorities.

Religious extremism is present in all religions, in various degrees. But extremism is not more representative of religions than Ku Klux Klan is of Christianity as a whole.

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Violence in the Name of Religion By Oliver McTernan

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n the context of the challenge of faith based terrorism, of which ISIS is currently the most notable torchbearer, we are faced with the question of how to understand the phenomenon of faith based violence - the minds and motives of young people for whom faith based violence appeals. The central hypothesis here is that the religious factor in contemporary conflict does matter, and that it should not be dismissed as an epiphenomenon, a proxy for some other cause. Religion needs to be acknowledged as an actor in its own right; failure to address it is failure to address the concerns and interests of a wider constituency.

Oliver McTernan speaking during a conference in Rome: June 2016

Consequently, to curtail the spread of religiously inspired terror will require a greater willingness for self-reflection by both political and religious leaders. Political leaders should acknowledge that religion can be an actor in its own right and should not be dismissed as a surrogate for greed, grievance, protest or political ambition while religious leaders need to reflect critically on their own failure to provide more effective leadership and witness to the fundamental values of their respective faiths. The difficulty in coming to a nuanced analysis is not limited to the, at times, artificially demarcated worlds of religious and political leaders, but also relates to academia; few political and social scientists have either the language or the understanding to analyse accurately what is happening in the world of religion.

Defining religion and the clash of civilisations

It is perhaps more useful to point out that the origins of religion are rooted in the transcendent and point to a reality beyond our world of time and place, accepting that religion is a human construction, part of what Barth describes as ‘a human response to revelation’. Religion is difficult to define in concrete and distinct terms because it is more dynamic that political or academic worlds have hitherto acknowledged. Any characterisation of faith-based terrorism along the narrative lines of a ‘clash of civilisations’ falls foul of portraying civilisations as more homogenised and integrated that they are in reality, failing to convey the depth of diversity and dissonance that is to be found within religion, especially in the Muslim World where there is neither a consistent voice nor unanimity of observance among believers.

How necessary is it to define what is meant by religion given the difficulties in finding a definition that is totally inclusive and reflects how adherents of each religion would describe their own beliefs and practices? HELSINKI POLICY FORUM - DISCUSSION PAPER

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It is Important to acknowledge such diversity of

Claims of ‘apocalyptic nihilism’ and 9/11-style violence

thought and that Muslims can hold dynamically opposing positions on fundamental questions as to the meaning and application of their beliefs in contemporary society. It would be a mistake to look at the Muslim world as a political bloc with a common religious ideology making it a cohesive whole and a threat to alternative civilisations. Such a ‘clash of civilisations’ paradigm also provides Western policy makers with an excuse not to get involved and deludes those wanting to promote liberal democracy globally that the major obstacle to their ambitions are ‘age old ethnic prejudices’.

as a rejection of modernity and globalisation are a partial truth that fails to address the core problem which is how faith-inspired terrorists view their religion. The social injustices, poverty, unemployment and political repression that leave millions dispossessed unquestionably provide a fertile breeding ground for militant groups, but these conditions are not in themselves sufficient to explain why people kill in God’s name.

People either over or under state religion when faced with headlines that link religion and violence; both reactions fail to do justice to the complexity of faith-linked terrorism. On the other hand religion is portrayed as a negative force in a secularised society, on the other we can see the complete disassociation of religion from violence such as that by liberal

The ‘secularisation thesis’ that dominates current political thinking has been shaped by the post-Westphalian and Enlightenment division of religion from politics and the public sphere, seeing the decline of religion as a natural and irreversible process in the face of science as the new paradigm for understanding the world. Religion is framed as a comforting myth but one which has ceased to have an impact on social or political life of modern society. This is partly the impact of Marx, Durkheim and Freud’s psychological

commentators, religious leaders and politicians post 9/11, and in response to ISIS brutality. Secular endorsement of the claim that faith is not to blame for any of the current-day atrocities stems from the deeply ingrained conviction that religion by itself is incapable of inspiring such action, masking over the real cause, which, it would be claimed, is more likely to be a mix of grievance and political ambition. Religious leaders’ repudiation of any link between religion and violence is prompted by fear that such a link portrays a distorted image of their faith however denial of the problem is part of the problem, allowing religious leaders to circumvent the fact that all main faith traditions have a violent and bloody record that must be acknowledged and addressed to avoid repetition.

and socio-economic explanations of religion that hold that secularisation is the inevitable consequence of modernisation; religion is a surrogate for political power and ambition, and is an effective mobilising force. This same secularised and reductionist mind-set prevails in academic and policy-making circles where violent jihad has come to be understood as a ‘mask’ and a ‘political creed’ and the resurgence of Islam is assumed to be a temporary stage in social development that will be reversed with the advance of modernisation. The Treaty of Westphalia may have ended pitch battles over belief but arguably, rather than removing religion from international politics, by domesticating or nationalising it, religion was turned into a powerful social agent used to enforce cultural identity.

Understating and overstating religion

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The secularisation of political thinking

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Equally over-exaggerated is the impact of the Enlightenment; in an age where people are no longer obliged

They are highly selective in the parts of their tradition, heritage and sacred texts they choose to highlight,

to conform to societal norms and expectations, a decline in religious practice does not necessarily relate to a decline in the phenomenon of believing.

have a worldview characterised by an uncompromising dualism between good and bad, and reject relativism and individualism as threats to identity but yet make effective use of modern technology. Religiously motivated conflicts differ from their secular counterparts in the trans historical scope of their goals which surpass all claims of temporal political authority and give the struggle a sense of timelessness.

The religious mind-set is an important factor in and of itself - it is more than a ‘tool for protest’ and a ‘useful marketing ploy’- it is an active and potent factor and people are still sufficiently passionate about their beliefs to die and kill for them. Religion is rarely the sole cause of conflict, but it is central to the meaning of too many to ignore or side-line it. The dominance of the ‘secularisation thesis’ means many find it very difficult to understand that theology and belief can and do shape people’s political judgements Salman Rushdie, writing that ‘the restoration of religion to the sphere of the personal, its depoliticisation, is the nettle that all Muslim societies must grasp in order to become modern’, fails to recognise that many religious people do not understand faith to be a private affair but a total framework for a complete life - the paradigm of separation between church and state is therefore anathema. Far from rejecting modernity many religiously inspired terrorist groups embrace its benefits to further their religious ambitions.

Religious violence and the trans-historical narrative Most fundamentalists see themselves as ‘interpreters of history’ believing they have the knowledge and empowerment to direct the course of events and believing themselves to be the ‘chosen ones’; they are absolute about the truthfulness of their interpretation of divine revelation.

The faith-based terrorist is one who perceives himself to be ‘engaged in a mission of transcendent importance’ and one who is driven by an apocalyptic vision in which he is fighting a cosmic conflict between the forces of good and evil. Religion brings an unwillingness to compromise informed by the belief that their cause is divinely sanctioned, that to compromise is to betray their belief and that they have an exclusive monopoly on truth and goodness. Instilling terror is one way of demonstrating the inability of secular forces to control and secure public spaces and therefore the religiously motivated terrorist can portray the acts as ‘reclaiming spiritual ground’, asserting victory. The struggle is redefined in spiritual terms with the ultimate victory in God’s hands where the feeling of being part of a greater cause matters more than whether the cause is winnable. History across the centuries also gives us numerous examples of religiously inspired violence from all the major religious traditions, substantiating the belief of many that religion is a major factor in communal strife and providing traditions from which today’s activists can draw in order to legitimise their own violence in God’s name.

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An historical overview of the world’s mainstream

While the stereotype of terrorists is as young, poor,

religious traditions highlights how, without exception, each faith community has, in the face of the threat of extinction or the opportunity to expand interpreted its fundamental teachings to accommodate the changing circumstance by sanctioning the use of violence to protect and secure its own sectarian interests.

disenfranchised and alienated young men, there are many cases where this profile is mistaken; the profile of many Palestinian suicide bomber recruits was as middle class, educated and employed while the 9/11 hijackers, and Osama Bin Laden, were middle class Saudis and Egyptians. In such cases the experience of humiliation, whether felt at a personal (e.g. Israeli checkpoints) or group (anger at Western foreign policy) level is key. Religion endows the individual with a sense of honour, personal pride, kinship and identity while violence gives a sense of empowerment, a combination that provides ‘antidotes’ to such humiliation.

In each faith tradition one can find sufficient ambiguity in its founding texts and stories to justify killing for the glory of God. Today’s religious extremists can find their rationale for inflicting terror in the name of God in the ambivalence towards violence that is found in each faith tradition.

Socio-economic factors and the catalyst of humiliation In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, poverty and illiteracy were singled out as the root causes of this new wave of global terrorism. It was said that the deprivation of millions, coexisting with islands of enormous wealth, bred a deep sense of injustice, social alienation, despair and willingness to sacrifice lives among those who feel they have nothing left to gain. The idea that poverty fuels terrorism remains prevalent under the assumption that ‘life is cheap’ in areas of deep poverty, however there is no natural teleology between hardships suffered, the rise of religious fundamentalism and the resort to violence. The complex interplay of economic, social, political and colonial factors, where one group is targeted for privilege or discrimination, or where there is disproportionate hardship, all underpin religious conflict. Religion may not be the sole or prime cause of these conflicts, but it is part of the problem and should be acknowledged as such. Humiliation should be recognized as a central catalyst.

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Final thoughts - technical and adaptive challenges The crisis of faith-inspired violence the world faces today has its roots in the inequality of our global structures and the intolerance inherent in the competing truth claims of the different religious traditions. The problem of inequality and poverty is partly a ‘technical problem’ and partly an ‘adaptive challenge’. The technical problem revolves around concrete economic and policy issues, such as the perceived Western hypocrisy in supporting repressive regimes in the name of stability, and the failure to practice purported ideals of democracy and Human Rights. The adaptive challenge requires a paradigm shift that recognises that the ‘secularisation thesis’ is an inadequate analytical framework through which to understand the realities of religious belief and faith-inspired violence.

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Biographies Dr Osman Faruk Loğoğlu

Mr Hamadi Jebali

Dr Loğoğlu is a former member of parliament for Adana district, representing the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Dr Loğoğlu retired from public service in 2006 after thirty-five years in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs including as Turkey’s Ambassador to Copenhagen, Denmark (1993-1996) and Baku, Azerbaijan (1996-1998). Ambassador Loğoğlu became Deputy Undersecretary for multilateral political affairs in 1998 and then served as Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry from 2000 until his posting as Ambassador of Turkey to Washington D.C., USA (2001-2005). He received his doctorate in Political Science at Princeton University and was a lecturer in Political Science at Middlebury College (1969-1970). He is the author of a book titled İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey and has published articles on foreign affairs in both Turkish and English in various journals. Dr. Loğoğlu served as President of the think-tank the Eurasian Strategic Studies Center (ASAM) for two years (2006-2008) and was the Deputy Chairman of the Turkish National Commission for UNESCO (2006-2010). He was elected a member of parliament for Adana in the June 2011 elections and served as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. From August 2011 to September 2014 Dr Loğoğlu was the Vice-Chairman of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in charge of foreign relations and remains an active commentator on foreign affairs in Turkey.

Mr Jebali served as Prime Minister of Tunisia between December 2011 and February 2013 and was Secretary General of Ennahda until 2014. Mr Jebali became a member of Ennahda’s executive council in the early 1990s and throughout this period, he served as the editor-in-chief of Ennahda’s official weekly newspaper Al-Fajr. The Ben Ali government eventually prohibited its publishing and condemned Mr Jebali to 15 years imprisonment, of which he served 11 years in solitary confinement. In 2006 Mr Jebali was conditionally released. Since the Tunisian Revolution of 2011 and the subsequent legalisation of Ennahda, he has played a leading role in Tunisian politics.

Dr Abd Moneim Aboul-Fotouh Dr Aboul-Fotouh is a founder and President of Misr Al Qawia (Strong Egypt) Party and is a former leading member of Muslim Brotherhood. Dr Aboul-Fotouh left the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011 following a decision to run for president in the 2012 Egyptian presidential election, where he finished fourth. A student activist in the Egyptian university scene during the 1970s, he held the post of Deputy President of the Egyptian National Student Union and was among the key figures that facilitated the entry of members of Islamic groups into the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s. He was arrested in 1981 and was later tried by a military court and was sentenced to five years imprisonment in 1996. After his release, he was elected to the following posts: General Secretary of the Arab Medics Union, Chairman of the Committee for emergency relief and director of all hospitals in Islamic Medical Association in 2004 .

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Mr Faisal Abualhassan

Peter Weiderud

Mr Faisal Abualhassan is a researcher in the Unit for the Study of Contemporary Political Thought at the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh. His commentaries and analysis on political thought and sociology have been published by Al-Jazeera, among other outlets. Abualhassan was born and educated in Saudi Arabia before receiving his M.A at Sciences Po in Paris.

Peter Weiderud is the Director of the Swedish Institute Alexandria, a dialogue institute between Europe and the MENA Region, within the Swedish Foreign Ministry. He acts as Facilitator of The Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process under the Auspices of the Embassy of Sweden (since 2009) and is also President of the Swedish Foundation for Human Rights. Peter was President of the Religious Social Democrats of Sweden 2005-15 and in that capacity also a member of the Executive Committee and Party Board of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden.

Mr Hassan Annabi Mr Hassan Annabi is a member of the Political Executive of Nidaa Tounes. Prior to his political career, Mr. Annabi was active in academia and civil society, serving as Secretary General of the Tunisian Society of Academic Historians, and Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Tunis. In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, Mr. Annabi was appointed as Secretary of State to the Minister of Education in the interim government of Beji Caid Essebsi. He stepped down from this position following the elections of October 2011.

Dr Ahmad Iravani Dr Ahmad Iravani is currently president of the Center for the Study of Islam and the Middle East, and Fellow at The Institute for Policy Research & Catholic Studies at The Catholic University of America where he teaches courses in Islamic Law, Introduction to Islam, and Modern Iran in the Columbus School of Law and the School of Theology. Dr Iravani is also an Ayatollah, after receiving the highest possible degree in Islamic Studies (Ijtihad) in 1997 (Qom), and the First Kharej Degree (equal to a Ph.D.) in Islamic Studies, from the Islamic University in Qom (1992).

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Peter has previously served as: Senior Advisor to the Swedish Foreign Ministers Lena Hjelm-Wallén and Anna Lindh; Director for International Affairs of the World Council of Churches in Geneva; International Director of Church of Sweden; Chief Executive Officer of the European Training and Technology Center in Erbil; and as General Secretary for the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Peter has also served in numerous boards and committees related to arms control, human rights and international affairs. Peter holds a BA in Journalism from Stockholm University and a Certificate in Peace and Conflict studies and Management from the University of Uppsala

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FORWARD THINKING

Oliver McTernan Oliver McTernan is Director and co-Founder of Forward Thinking, a UK-based organization that works to prevent and resolve conflict at a national and global level and to promote understanding between religious and secular society. For twenty-five years he was a member of the Executive Committee of Pax Christi International and was responsible for the movements East-West Dialogue programme, which included an ongoing dialogue with the Soviet communist party. Prior to taking up his present job in 2004, he was senior advisor to the Club of Madrid, a group of former Heads of State and Government who are committed to supporting governments in transition to democracy. He was a visiting Fellow of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 2000-2003 where he researched the failure of peace processes and the relationship between religion and conflict.

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The Helsinki Policy Forum

Helsinki Policy Forum: May 2016. Source: Forward Thinking

Aims and objectives of the Helsinki Policy Forum The Helsinki Policy Forum, established in February 2014, aims to respond to the current context and provide a secure space for an honest exchange of views on the challenges and opportunities facing the MENA/Gulf region, as a whole, and western governments. The Forum has convened four full meetings (Helsinki, June 2014; Madrid, October 2014; Helsinki, March 2015; Berlin, December 2015) and two meetings of its steering group (Chantilly, November 2015 and Helsinki, March 2016). The Forum brings together senior parliamentarians, political leaders, government officials, and financial experts from the Western and Gulf-MENA region. It facilitates an informal discussion aimed at deepening understanding and informing policy-making on identified issues of concern to promote enlightened policy responses to common issues. The objective of the Forum is not to be a talking shop, but a space in which dialogue can lead to action and initiatives to address identified challenges.

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FORWARD THINKING

Structure of the Forum The Helsinki Policy Forum is an integrated part of Forward Thinking’s engagement and is facilitated by Forward Thinking in collaboration with participating governments. The Forum has a grant from the Foreign Ministry of Finland for core running costs covering. It is aimed for the Forum to be a partnership between governments and non-governmental organisations, recognising that any successes that come out of the dialogue will have to be taken forward by governments at the appropriate time to achieve their potential. Further meetings of the Forum throughout the year are hosted by participating governments and facilitated by Forward Thinking. The Forum aims to convene around 35-40 participants from the constituencies outlined above.

“We would like to express our gratitude to the Finnish government for their support to the Forum, both in terms of the core costs and the annual hosting of a meeting and all logistical support” HELSINKI POLICY FORUM - DISCUSSION PAPER

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