Havlish, et al. v. bin Laden, et al. AFFIDAVIT INDEX 1.

Edgar Adamson, INTERPOL Qualifications of the Witness (¶¶ 1-4) .......................................................................2 Affidavit Contents (¶¶ 5-33) ......................................................................................3 . INTERPOL described (¶¶ 5-14) ..................................................................3 . “Red Notices” (¶¶ 15-20) .............................................................................5 . Israeli Embassy and AMIA Bombings (¶¶ 21-31).......................................6 . Iranian “Red Notices” (¶¶ 32-33) ................................................................7

2.

Ronen Bergman, Israeli National Security Analyst/Journalist (redacted) Affidavit Qualifications (¶¶ 1-15)..............................................................................2 Affidavit Summary (¶¶ 16-17) ...................................................................................6 Affidavit Contents (¶¶ 18-80) ....................................................................................7 . Iran and Hizballah (¶¶ 18-28) .....................................................................7 . Imad Mughniyah, master terrorist (¶¶ 29-51; 53; 59; 61; 76) ....................9 . Sudan and Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri (¶¶ 50-69) ............................................14 . IRGC and the Hamburg, Germany cell (¶ 70) ............................................19 . Ahmad Shah Masoud (¶ 71) .......................................................................19 . Sealed Evidence (¶¶ 72-73) ........................................................................20 . Safehaven (¶ 74) .........................................................................................20 . May 14, 2001 Memorandum (¶ 75-76) .......................................................21 . Training Camps (¶ 77-80) ...........................................................................22

3.

Jean-Louis Bruguiere, French Jurist Qualifications of the Witness (¶¶ 1-10) ....................................................................1 Early investigations of Islamist terrorist networks in France (¶¶ 11-21) ..................2 The Iranian Rat Line to the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan (¶¶ 22-27) ..................4 The Beghal case (¶¶ 28-32) ......................................................................................5 Abu Musab ab-Zarkawi and Iran (¶¶ 33-46) ............................................................6

4.

Daniel L. Byman, 9/11 Commission Staff Qualifications of the Expert Witness (¶¶ 1-13) .........................................................2 Bottom Line: Summary of Expert Opinion (¶ 14) ....................................................5 Iran’s Support for Terrorism (¶¶ 15-16) ....................................................................6 Iranian Motivations for Supporting Terrorism and Militancy (¶¶ 17-22) .................7 Specific Motivations Regarding Iran’s Support for Sunni Jihadists and al Qaeda (¶¶ 23-32) ........................................................8 Problems in the Relationship Lead to Quiet Cooperation (¶¶33-40) .........................12 An Alliance of Convenience (¶¶ 41-43) ....................................................................16 Use of Hizballah as a Cutout (¶ 44) ...........................................................................17

Three Types of Support (¶ 45) ...................................................................................18 Travel Assistance (¶¶ 46-50) .....................................................................................19 Safe Haven (¶¶ 51-59) ...............................................................................................21 Training (¶¶ 60-61) ....................................................................................................25 No Rogue Relationship (¶¶ 62-66) ............................................................................26 Conclusion (¶¶ 67-69) ................................................................................................28 5.

Patrick Clawson, Iranian Expert (redacted) Qualifications of the Witness (¶¶ 1-16) .....................................................................2 Iranian Religious and Political Structure (¶¶ 17-28) .................................................8 Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (¶¶ 29-37) ............................................10 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) (¶¶ 38-39) ..................................12 U.S. State Department Judgments about Iran’s Support for Terrorism (¶¶ 40-42) ................................................................................13 U.S. Government Judgments about Iranian Material Support to al Qaeda (¶ 43) ...........................................................................................16 The 9/11 Commission on Iran’s Material Support to al Qaeda Before and During 9/11 (¶¶ 44-47) ............................................................................17 The Words of The 9/11 Commission (¶¶ 48-50) .......................................................19 Al-Zarqawi (¶ 51) ......................................................................................................20 U.S. Treasury Department (¶¶ 52-55) ........................................................................21 Reputable Non-Government Sources Agree about Iranian Material Support to al Qaeda (¶¶ 56-57) .......................................................22 Reputable Non-Government Sources on Iran’s Material Support to al Qaeda Before and During 9/11 (¶¶ 58-65) .................................................23 Iranian Economic Contribution to Terrorism (¶ 66) ..................................................28 Amount of Financial and Material Support: $300 million to $500 million per Annum (¶ 67) ............................................30 Financial Deterrence (¶¶ 68-70) ................................................................................31 Iran in Court (¶ 71) ....................................................................................................33 Punitive Damages Consideration (¶¶ 72-73) .............................................................33 Conclusion .................................................................................................................35

6.

Janice Kephart, 9/11 Commission Staff Introduction and Summary (¶¶ 2-5) ...........................................................................2 Qualifications of the Witness (¶¶ 6-22) .....................................................................4 Foundation for Expert Opinion (¶¶ 23-38) ................................................................8 Successful Travel Was Critical to the 9/11 Operation (¶¶ 39-54) .............................13 Iran’s Facilitations of 9/11 Hijacker Terrorist Travel Was Material Support (¶¶ 55-71) ...........................................................................19 Additional Information Regarding the Importance of Successful Travel To al Qaeda’s Operational Success (¶¶ 72-78) ..............................................26

7.

Clare Lopez/Bruce Tefft, CIA (redacted) Qualifications of Expert Witness: Clare M. Lopez (¶¶ 1-9) .....................................2 Qualifications of Expert Witness: Dr. Bruce D. Tefft (¶¶ 10-17).............................5 Affidavit Summary ..................................................................................................7 The Islamic Republic of Iran: Supreme Leader and Iranian National Policy (¶¶ 18-30) .............................................................................7 Material Support (¶¶ 31-42) .......................................................................................10 The Witnesses (¶¶ 43-50) ..........................................................................................13 Three Ideological Documents (¶¶ 51-54) ..................................................................16 Foundation of the Iran-al Qaeda Relationship (¶¶ 55-57) .........................................18 The Relationship: Modus Operandi (¶¶ 58-61) ........................................................18 Presidential Statements: Ronald Reagan, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush (¶¶ 62-65) ...........................................................................20 U.S. State Department: Annual Reports on Terrorism (¶¶ 66-95)............................22 U.S. Secretary of State (¶ 96).....................................................................................38 CONGRESSIONAL PRONOUNCEMENTS 2005-2008: Congressional Research Service (¶¶ 97-98) ..........................................38 2005: Congressional Hearing (¶99) ..........................................................................39 Judicial Opinion (¶ 100) ............................................................................................39 9/11 Commission Report Credibility of 9/11 Findings (¶ 101) ..........................................................................40 9/11 Commission Staff Discovered a Cache of NSA Documents Detailing Connections among al Qaeda, Iran and Hizballah (¶¶ 102-103) ...40 “Assistance From Hizballah and Iran to al Qaeda” (¶¶ 104-107)..............................41 Verbatim 9/11 Commission Findings and Expert Comments (¶¶ 108-113) ..............43 Senior Hizballah Operative: Imad Mughniyah (¶ 114-115) .....................................46 Facilitating Travel (¶¶ 116-119) ................................................................................48 9/11 Commission Conclusion (¶¶ 120-125) ..............................................................50 Chronological Information Independent of The 9/11 Commission Report .........................................................................................53 1980’s: Usama bin Laden, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Iran: The War Against the Soviet Union (¶¶ 126-128) .........................................................53 Hekmatyar Provides Safe Haven to al Qaeda (¶ 129)................................................55 Specially Designated Global Terrorist (¶ 130) ..........................................................55 Jihad Summit ...........................................................................................................56 1991-92: The Origins of the Usama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri Relationship with Iran, Hizballah, and Imad Mughniyah (¶ 131) .................56 1991: Hassan al Turabi Bridges the Sunni-Shi’a Divide (¶¶ 132-134) ....................56 1991: Iran Visits Usama bin Laden in Sudan (¶¶ 135-136) ......................................57 Usama bin Laden Meets Imad Mughniyah (¶¶ 137-138) ..........................................58 1991-1996: Tripartite Agreement (¶ 139) .................................................................59 1991-1996: al Shamal Islamic Bank and Other bin Laden Businesses in Sudan (¶¶ 140-146) .................................................................59 1992: First al Qaeda Terror Attack (¶ 147) ...............................................................61 1993: Mogadishu and Sudan (¶ 148) ........................................................................62

1993: World Trade Center (¶ 149) ............................................................................62 1993: Lincoln and Holland Tunnel (¶ 150)...............................................................62 1993: al Qaeda Visits Iran and the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon (¶¶ 151-52)...............62 1991-95: al Qaeda and Iran Cooperate in Bosnia and Kosovo (¶¶ 153-157) ...........63 1994-95: al Qaeda Camps in Sudan and Yemen (¶ 158) ..........................................65 1995: “Plan Bojinka:” An Attempt to Assassinate Mubarak; and a Riyadh Bombing (¶¶ 159-161) .............................................................65 1996: Khobar Towers al Qaeda and Iranian Collusion (¶¶ 162-168) .......................66 Personal Relationships.............................................................................................69 Ties Between alQaeda and Iran (¶ 169) .....................................................................69 1995: al Zawahiri and Fallahian (¶ 170) ...................................................................69 Personal Relationships and Other High Level Contacts (¶ 171)................................70 1996: Usama bin Laden Associate Sought Contact with Iranian Intelligence Officers in Afghanistan (¶¶ 172-173) ........................................70 1997: Usama bin Laden Suggests Taliban-Iran Alliance (¶¶ 174-175) ....................71 Iran Forging Alliances (¶ 176) ...................................................................................72 1997: Links between Usama bin Laden, other al Qaeda members, Taliban Figures, and Iran (¶ 177) ................................................................................73 1998: Hizballah/al Qaeda Operatives in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (¶¶ 178-185) .73 U.S. Intelligence Community Recognition of Sunni-Shi’s Cooperation (¶186-187) .................................................................................76 2000: Warnings about al Qaeda and Iran Working Together pre-USS Cole Attack Went Unheeded (¶¶ 188-193) ............................................................77 Saif al Adl: The al Qaeda-Hizballah Link for Military Training before The USS Cole Bombing (¶¶ 194-197) ...........................................................79 2000 to the Present: Hizballah Facilitated al Qaeda Diamond Purchases in West Africa (¶¶ 198-203) ..............................................................................80 1983-2008: Iran’s Agent, Imad Mughniyah and His Relationship with al Qaeda (¶¶ 204-207) ......................................................82 Witnesses—Sworn Videotaped Testimony ............................................................84 Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Abolhassan Banisadr (¶¶ 250-261) ............................................................................95 Guantanomo Bay 2001: Khairhwt, Governor of Herat (¶¶ 262-263) .......................98 September 11, 2001 ..................................................................................................99 2000-2001: Passports/Visas and Importance of Iranian Travel Assistance (¶ 264) .99 2000-2001: Travel (¶¶ 265-271) ...............................................................................99 2000-2001: German Intelligence (¶¶ 272-275) .........................................................102 2001: Massoud Assassination (¶ 276) ......................................................................103 2001-2001: Safe Passage through Iranian Territory for al Qaeda Members Post 9/11 (¶¶ 277-280) ...................................................................................104 2001-2001: al Zarqawi in Iran (¶¶ 281-286) .............................................................105 2002-2009: Lebanon, Safe Haven, and Training Camps for al Qaeda (Salah Hajir) (¶¶ 287-291) ...................................................................................................107 2002-2009: Iran Safe Haven and Training Camps for al Qaeda (¶¶ 292-300) .........109 Counter-Terrorism Chief Cofer Black on Collaboration between

al Qaeda and Iran (¶ 301) ...............................................................................111 2005: Internet Posting (¶¶ 302-304) .........................................................................112 2007: Western Intelligence (¶¶ 305-306)..................................................................113 2004: Arabic News: al-Sharq al-Awsat (¶¶ 307-310) ..............................................114 2007: National Intelligence Estimate: Iranian United Command and Other Evaluation (¶ 311) ................................................................................116 Spain: Judge Balthasar Garzon (¶¶ 312-313) ...........................................................116 2008: U.S. Government Designations (¶¶ 314-317) .................................................117 2009: Treasury Department: Sa’ad bin Laden (¶¶ 318-320) ...................................119 2009: Saudi Arabia Interior Ministry (¶ 321) ...........................................................119 2009: Treasury Department Designation, Mustafa Hamid (¶ 322)...........................120 2009: Treasury Designation, Bahtiyi (¶323) .............................................................121 2009: Hizballah—Iranian Mutual Acknowledgement (¶¶ 324-326) ........................121 Joint Terror Attacks: 2002-2008: Tunisia, Riyadh, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, Yemen (¶ 327) ..................................................................................122 June 2002: Dierba Synagogue Tunisia Bombing: alQaeda Attack with Planning in Iran (¶ 328) .................................................................................123 2003: Riyadh Bombing: al Qaeda Attack with Planning in Iran (¶¶ 329-330)........123 2003: Casablanca Bombing: al Qaeda Attack with Links to Iran (¶¶ 331-332) ......124 November 2003: Istanbul Bombing: al Qaeda Attack with Planning in Iran (¶ 333) ...........................................................................................................124 March 2004: Madrid Train Bombing: al Qaeda Attack with Planning in Iran (¶¶ 334-335) ........................................................................124 September 2008: U.S. Embassy Bombing in Sana’a, Yemen: Involvement By Sa’ad bin Laden in Iran (¶¶ 336-337) ......................................................125 Opium: 2008: Iranian Intelligence and Security Support to al Qaeda, The Taliban, and the Opium Business in Afghanistan (¶¶ 138-340) .............126 2009: After bin Laden Iran Training al Qaeda Fighters to Attack United States across Middle East (¶¶ 341-342) .........................................................127 Common Knowledge (¶ 343) .....................................................................................128 2009: Post-9/11 Links Among al Qaeda, Hizballah, and Iran (¶ 344) ......................128 2009: Army General Stanley A. McChrystal, U.S. Military Commander in Afghanistan Reports that Iranian IRGC-Qods Force Supports the Taliban (¶¶ 345-347).................................................................129 Final Expert Statement (¶¶ 348-353) .........................................................................130 Appendix (¶¶ 354-369) ..............................................................................................132

8.

Dietrich Snell, 9/11 Commission Staff Qualifications of the Expert Witness (¶¶ 1-9) ...........................................................2 Opinion as to Iran’s Material Support for alQaeda and the 9/11 Attack (¶¶ 10-11)..5 Discussion (¶¶ 12-22) ................................................................................................6 . 1993 World Trade Center (¶¶ 12-16) ..........................................................6 . FBI “Penttbom” investigation (¶¶ 17-21) ...................................................8 . Last minute discovery of intelligence reports (¶¶ 19-20) ...........................8

. Ramzi Binalshibh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”) (¶¶ 20-21) ...9 . Analysis, Iran and Hizballah (¶ 22) ............................................................10 Conclusion (¶ 23) .......................................................................................................11 9.

Ken Timmerman, Iranian Expert/Investigative Journalist, Second Affidavit (Public) Qualifications of the Witness (¶ 1) ............................................................................3 The Iran-Palestinian Connection and the Creation of Hizballah in Lebanon (¶¶ 2-26) .....................................................................3 Mughniyah’s Terrorist Records (¶¶ 27-46) ...............................................................9 Mughniyah meets Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri (¶¶ 47-55) .................14 Iran and Hizballah train terrorist for al Qaeda (¶¶ 56-67) .........................................16 The idea of using civilian airliners as weapons (¶¶ 68-80)........................................19 Egypt accuses Iran of training assassins who tried to kill Mubarak (¶¶ 81-83) ........23 Iran’s responsibility for the Khobar Towers attack (¶¶ 84-90) ..................................24 Iran provides financings to Osama bin Laden (¶¶ 91-96) ..........................................25 1996-1998: Iran, OBL, the Taliban, and the Hekmatyar connection (¶¶ 97-107) ....27 2000: Iran courts the Taliban; meets Zawahiri in Afghanistan (¶¶ 108-114) ............29 2000-2001: Iran becomes the al Qaeda travel facilitator (¶¶ 115-119) .....................31 The 9/11 Commission documents (¶¶ 120-129) ........................................................34 Iranian MOIS defector: Iran-al Qaeda meetings in January and May 2001 (¶¶ 130-147) .............................................................35 February 2001: 9/11 Coordinator Ramzi Binalshibh travels to Iran (¶¶ 148-154) ...40 Iran purchases a Boeing flight simulator (¶¶ 155-162)..............................................41 Iran knows the date of the 9/11 attacks (¶¶ 163-170) ................................................43 Iran evacuates al Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan after 9/11 (¶¶ 171-179).........45 French counter- terrorism judge finds Iran tie to al Qaeda (¶¶ 180-185) ..................48 Reports that Osama bin Laden is in Iran (¶¶ 186-189) ..............................................50 Usage of all Iranian state instrumentalities in support of terrorism (¶¶ 190-212) .....52 January 2009 Statement from the U.S. Treasury (¶¶ 213-219) .................................56