Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

Notes INTRODUCTION 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988) pp. 362-3. Bundy...
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Notes INTRODUCTION 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988) pp. 362-3. Bundy was special assistant for National Security Affairs in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. See Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response (Basingstoke: MacmiUan, 1988) pp. 35-41. Geoffrey McDermott, Berlin: Success of a Mission? (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963) p. 11. Since Berlin was an occupied city, each power had a miUtary commandant in Berlin - in the British case Major-General Sir Rohan Delacombe. McDermott, the senior political adviser, was deputy commandant in Berlin from 2 July 1961. Following this appointment he resigned from the diplomatic service. See Chapter 6, this volume. MacmiUan diaries, 18 February 1952, quoted in Alistair Home, Macmillan Vol. 1:1891-1956 (London: Macmillan, 1988) p. 351. AUstair Home, Macmillan Vol. 2: 1957-1986 (London: MacmiUan, 1989) p. 135. Cabinet review of the opening of the Geneva conference, 28 May 1959, CAB128/33. See F.S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 19451973 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974); Kenneth Morgan, The People's Peace: British History 1945-1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) especially Chapter 5; and Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (Oxford: RIIA, 1975). See Brian White, Britain, Detente and Changing East-West Relations (London: Routledge, 1992) p. 61; John Barnes, 'From Eden to MacmiUan 1955 to 1959', in P. Hennessy and A. Seldon (eds), Ruling Performance (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) pp. 99-100; Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995) p. 5. McDermott is critical, but was an embittered Foreign Office official after resigning from the service and must be read with this in mind. An oral history witness seminar held in London with British participants in the crisis has yielded one of the only witness accounts of the period, pubUshed as John Gearson, 'British Policy and the Berlin Wall Crisis 1958-1961 - Witness Seminar', Contemporary Record, Vol. 6, No. 1 (London: Frank Cass, Summer 1992) pp. 107-77. See Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (London: Macimllan, 1971); Pointing the Way 1959-1961 (London: Macmillan, 1972); and At the End of the Day 1961-1963 (London: MacmiUan, 1973). Hereafter referred to as Home, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2. See for example Michael Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev: The Crisis Years 1960-63 (London: Faber & Faber, 1991).

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Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Bundy, Danger and Survival for example, is very interesting on the nuclear crisis aspects of the Berlin problem, but offers few insights into British attitudes. The main accounts of the crisis are Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), which is best on the British contribution; Jean Edward Smith, The Defence of Berlin (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Honore M. Catudel, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1980). See also Eleanor DuUes, Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), and Curtis Cate, The Ides of August: The Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978). Norman Gelb, The Berlin Wall (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) is a readable account by a journalist. PhiUp Windsor, City on Leave: A History of Berlin 1945-1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) is one of the few British authored accounts, but is a general history of the crisis and does not concentrate on British policy. A recent work which is based on released government papers is Anne Tusa, The Last Division: Berlin and the Wall (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996). Accounts of British post-war foreign poUcy can be found in Northedge, Descent from Power, Kenneth Morgan, The People's Peace especially Chapter 5. Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973; and A. Sked and Chris Cook, Post-War Britain (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979). In the Public Record Office, Kew (PRO) the record groups which proved to be of greatest relevance were the Prime Minister's Office files (PREM11), the Foreign Office correspondence files (F0371), Cabinet Papers (CAB 128/9) and defence-related material (DEFE 4, 5 & 6). All references to documents are from the PRO unless otherwise specified. US records are held by the relevant presidential Ubraries, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, AbUene, Kansas (hereafter DDEL) and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA (hereafter JFKL). State Department and Defense Department papers are held by the National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA) based in Washington DC. Four volumes of collections of US government papers on BerUn have now been published covering the period 1958-1963: FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII: Berlin Crisis 1958-1959 (Washington D C : Government Printing Office, 1993); FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX: Berlin Crisis 1959-1960: Germany; Austria (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIV: Berlin Crisis 1961-1962 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); and FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XV. Berlin Crisis 1962-1963 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1994). The National Security Archive in Washington DC has amassed a major database of declassified material on the BerUn crisis avaUable on microfiche - NSA references refer to orginal documents held in the NSA's BerUn Collection.

Notes

207

1 BERLIN IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17.

Jean E. Smith, Defence of Berlin (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 10-12. Roger Morgan, 'The British View', in Edwina Moreton (ed.), Germany between East and West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 87. See D.C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965) pp. 28-52. On the work of the EAC, see D.J. Nelson, Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma (Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1978). Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London: Coronet, 1989) p. 21. The boundaries drawn up by the Attlee Committee closely resemble those that eventually emerged in Central Europe. See Smith, Defence of Berlin, pp. 15-16 and Nelson, Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma pp. 29-32. Smith, Defence of Berlin, pp. 16-17. When asked to consider the president's idea for US and British forces zones to be swapped, the military planning staff wondered if it was a joke, Nelson, Wartime Origins, p. 33. A major reason for not changing the zones was that they followed logicaUy from planning for the Overlord landings which had assigned the British the left flank and the US the right; Peter Calvocoressi, Total War, Vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1989) p. 562. Moreton, Germany between East and West, p. 88. On Roosevelt's style and the growth of the US government, see David Brinkley, Washington Goes to War (New York: Ballantine, 1988). Robert Murphy argues that Winant, the American EAC delegate, must accept much of the blame for this omission because he claimed that questioning access arrangements would promote Soviet distrust. Murphy accepts, however, that Roosevelt himself believed it was most important to ensure the Russians trusted the West. Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (London: Collins, 1964) pp. 283-7. Smith, Defence of Berlin, pp. 27-8. The Werewolves were armed bands which would operate after the defeat of Germany. It proved to be a propaganda ploy. Calvocoressi, Total War, Vol. 1, p. 564. Smith, Defence of Berlin, p. 39, quoting General Omar Bradley. See also Tusa and Tusa, The Berlin Blockade, pp. 37-43. In an extraordinary message to Stalin, Eisenhower revealed his intention not to aim for Berlin and disclosed the allied order of battle. Whilst his motive may have been to establish Russo-American co-operation, StaUn thought the message a trick, hastened his plans to reach Berlin and told his commanders that the allies were about to mount an offensive for the city; Calvocoressi, Total War, Vol. 1, pp. 563-6. Truman's case is in Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (Bungay, Suffolk: Hodder & Stoughton, 1955). See also John Coleville, The

208

18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, Vol. 2 (London: Sceptre, 1987). Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950) p. 26. On the politics of Germany's post-war administration, see Clay and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors. On British poUcy see Anne Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War (London: MacmiUan, 1990). The French, who favoured decentraUsation, resisted the move, but in summer 1948 agreed to join with the British and Americans to form one poUtical and economic unit, Clay, Decision in Germany, Chapter 9. The British also objected. General Sir Brian Robertson had told Qay that his plan to send a military convoy down the autobahn would lead to war. Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945-1951 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992) p. 351. Tusa and Tusa The Berlin Blockade, p. 206. Although not equipped to carry the atomic bomb. Quoted in Smith, Defence of Berlin, pp. 109-110. Tusa and Tusa The Berlin Blockade, p. 201. Home, Vol. 1, p. 307. On US policy in this period, see Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany - John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (London: Harvard University Press, 1991); and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969). PhiUp Windsor, City on Leave: A History of Berlin 1945-1962 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963) p. 128. Smith, Defence of Berlin, p. 141. On the tortuous negotiations to the Austrian State Treaty, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle for Austria 19451955 (London: Cornell University Press, 1986). See Chapter 7, this volume. Peter Clarke, A Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991) p. 211. Sources on MacmiUan include: Home, Vols 1 & 2; Anthony Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (London: AUen Lane, 1967); George Hutchinson, The Last Edwardian at No. 10: An Impression of Harold Macmillan (London: Quartet, 1980); Emrys Hughes, Macmillan: Portrait of a Politician (London: Allen & Unwin 1962); Nigel Fisher, Harold Macmillan: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982); Harold Evans, Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years 1957-1963 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1981); and Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995). Home, Vol. 2, pp. xii-xiii. John Turner, Macmillan (London: Longman, 1994) p. 7. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer - Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991) p. 475. Home, Vol. 7, pp. 85-90. Clarke, A Question of Leadership, pp. 213, 224. The US refused to support Britain and allowed a run on sterling to go unchecked.

Notes 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55.

56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61.

209

Home, Vol. 2, p. 4. Ibid., pp. 15-21. On the Labour leader, see Phil Williams, Hugh Gaitskell (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979). T.F. Lindsay and M. Harrington, The Conservative Party 1918-1979 (London: MacmiUan, 1979), pp. 194-5. Lindsay and Harrington, The Conservative Party 1918-1979, p. 205. Ibid., p. 206. Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) p. 60. Clarke, A Question of Leadership, pp. 224-5. Ibid., p. 219. Kenneth Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1970), p. 120. Lloyd was eventually dismissed in the 1962 'Night of the Long Knives' when Macmillan sacked half the cabinet. Lindsay and Harrington, The Conservative Party 1918-1979, p. 225. On Suez, see D. Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) who is critical of Macmillan's role, and Home, Vol. 1. See Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) p. 240. Lindsay and Harrington, The Conservative Party 1918-1979, p. 200. Five years before Messina, the Labour government of Clement Attlee had refused to join the Schumann Plan for pooling French and West German coal and steel production. On Anglo-American relations, see W. Louis, and Hedley BuU (eds), The Special Relationship (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986); and C.J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1992). The 1946 McMahon Act prohibiting the exchange of nuclear information between the US and any other country was amended in 1958. See John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984 (London: MacmiUan, 1984, 2nd edition). On nuclear co-operation in this period, see Jan MeUssen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance 1952-1959 (Groningen, The Netherlands: Styx PubUcations, 1993). Home, Vol. 2, p. 146. De GauUe had become the Fourth RepubUc's last prime minister on 31 May 1958 and was inaugurated as the first president of the Fifth Republic on 8 January 1959. See Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982); and Andrew Shennan, De Gaulle (Harlow: Longman, 1993). F.S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (London: George AUen & unwin, 1974) pp. 238-9. Record of conversation, Lloyd and Gromyko, 1 March 1959, PREM11/ 2609. See Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policy for German Rearmament 1950-55 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). On the historical relationship between Britain and the continent, see Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Ashfield Press, 1989).

210 62. 63. 64. 65.

66.

67. 68. 69.

70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

79.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Prime minister's minute, Macmillan to Lloyd, 17 December 1957, F0371/137398 (emphasis added). Home, Vol. 2, p. 120. Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: Columbia University Press, 1975) p. 144. One author notes this was no magnanimous gesture, but was only given 'perhaps because it was so patently unrealistic that one would not have to worry about the possibiUty that it might succeed.' Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America and Europe (London: Yale University Press, 1989) p. 139. Prime minister's personal minute M. 178/53 to Sir WiUiam Strang, 31 March 1953, PREM11/449. Churchill noted that his mind was not closed to the idea of a unified and disarmed Germany as part of a settlement with Russia. Minute, Lloyd to prime minister 22 June 1953. PREM11/449. On Lloyd's career, see D.R. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989). Prime minister's note to Sir William Strang, 6 July 1953 and prime minister's minute to Strang, 31 May 1953, PREM11/449. This policy came in for much criticism, not least from Adenauer's political opponents. In 1990 it was noted that the realisation of reunification could be seen as a 'posthumous triumph for Adenauer' and his patient poUcy of negotiation from strength; Harold James, 'Moscow's weU-trodden path to German unity', The Times, 4 May 1990. D.C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) pp. 128-9. Typical is the Foreign Office view in January 1958: 'This German notion that they can outsmart the Russians, even when the material balance of power is against them, continually crops up in German history.' F0371/137398. Hanrieder, Germany, America and Europe, p. 156. It has even been suggested that Adenauer would have preferred membership of the Warsaw Pact to neutrality, Hanrieder, p. 439, n.42. Foreign Office minute, Hoyer-Miller to G. Harrison, 7 February 1956, F0371/124544. See D.C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965). Hans von Herwarth, Von Adenauer zu Brandt: Erinnerungen (BerUn: Propylaen, 1990) p. 224. For a discussion of the contradictions inherent in Adenauer's position, see Hanrieder, Germany, America and Europe, pp. 131-70. Anthony Eden, Full Circle - Memoirs (London: CasseU, 1960) p. 303. Whether the Soviet proposal was a genuine attempt to reach agreement on the German problem or simply a ploy to undermine the EDC discussions and prevent German rearmament (as was beUeved at the time) remains a topic of historical debate. See Dockrill, Britain's Policy for German Rearmament, pp. 121-2. DockriU notes that it is arguable whether a reunited, rearmed and neutraUsed Germany would have been an attractive proposition for the West. Northedge, Descent from Power, pp. 242-3.

Notes

211

80. Exchange of messages between the prime minister and Bulganin and Khrushchev, January 1957-December 1958, PREM11/2503. 81. On Macnullan's interest in a summit, see MacmiUan, Riding, & Home, Vol. 2, Chapter 5. On Eisenhower's cool response, see PREM11/2327. 82. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p. 287. 83. Taken from a draft reply to Macmillan by Lloyd on German reunification dated 10 January 1958. Although never signed by Lloyd, the contents were discussed with Macmillan and the draft was later sent to Downing St. The author was probably Sir Anthony Rumbold. Direct quotations from this paper appear in position papers on German reunification for the rest of 1958, F0371/137398. 84. Draft reply, Lloyd to prime minister, 10 January 1958, F0371/137398. 85 Report by officials, 5 June 1958, PREM11/2321. 86. Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsman 1952-1967, pp. 467-501. 87. In this speech of 20 February 1946 (two weeks before Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton) Macmillan suggested that Soviet policy was essentiaUy defensive, Home, Vol. 1, p. 306. 88. Lord (Julian) Amery quoted in John Gearson 'British Policy and the BerUn Wall Crisis 1958-1961 - Witness Seminar', Contemporary Record, vol. 6, no. 1 (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 107-77 p. 138. 89. Northedge, Descent from Power, p. 245. 90. The broadcasts were published as George Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (London: Oxford University Press, 1958). 91. ('angeregt' and 'gesteuerf) Schwarz, Adenauer p. 384. 92. See Record of Visit by Adenauer to UK, 16-19 April 1958, F0371/ 137388. 93. George Kennan, Memoirs, Vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson, 1973) p. 243. 94. Kennan details the wave of criticism that resulted from his broadcasts and offers a select bibliography of these. One author calls Kennan's plan an attempt to put the clock back nine years, Watt, Britain Looks to Germany. On American critics, see James Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993) pp. 703-4. 95. Note, Macmillan to Freddie Bishop 6 December 1957, PREM11/1832. 96. PM/58/1 Minute, Lloyd to PM, 2 January 1958, F0371/135627. 97. Comments on British Paper on European Security, 18 April 1958, PREM11/2347. 98. David N. Schwartz, Nato 's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1983) p. 48. 99. Gaitskell's plan is discussed in Michael Howard, Disengagement (London: Penguin Special S175, 1958) and F0371/135628. 100. Bevan and Gaitskell sank so low in Adenauer's opinion that as a result the two were described as 'anathema' to him, de Zulueta to Logan (FO) memo oi: meeting with Dr Ritter of the German embassy, 10 April 1958, F0371/137375. 101. Denis Healey, A Neutral Belt in Europe? (London: Fabian Society, 1957). 102. Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989) pp. 178-80. For the Foreign Office view on his proposals, see F0371/

212

103.

104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis 137078, 7 January 1958 memo by Hancock. Note also Rumbold's comments: 'There is no doubt that the situation in Europe is a shifting one. The point is whether we can or should do anything to help it to shift in the desired direction or whether the forces of history are entirely outside our control.' Adenauer's distrust of the Labour Party was so great that arrangements were made to ensure that during his April 1958 visit, he met members of the opposition to remove any misconceptions, Minute to Ormsby-Gore, PA Rhodes, 3 April 1958, F0371/137385. GaitskeU's attitude to Germany and Germans was said by the then German ambassador to be 'rather cool' (eher kuhl), Herwarth, Von Adenauer zu Brandt, p. 205. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994) p. 600. Record of visit by prime minister to Bonn, 12-13 March 1959, Meeting No. 1, Palais Schaumberg (12 March), PREM11/2676. Catherine Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: Columbia University Press, 1979) p. 145. Memcon, Eisenhower and Adenauer, 27 May 1959, Whitman files, Box 41, DDEL. The German ambassador too beUeved Britain could be reUed upon to stand by Germany in the last resort, Herwarth, Von Adenauer, p. 223. Steel to Foreign Office, No. 658, 26 June 1959, PREM11/2706. Prime minister's minute, Macmillan to Bishop, 31 July 1960, PREMll/ 2983. See Chapter 6, this volume. Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p. 8. Lloyd to Wash No. 8112, 15 November 1958, F0371/137336.

2 THE DEADLINE CRISIS 1. Sir Bernard Ledwidge (deputy commandant, Berlin), quoted in John Gearson, 'British Policy and the Berlin WaU Crisis 1958-1961 - Witness Seminar', Contemporary Record, vol. 6, no. 1 (London: Frank Cass, 1992) p. 129. 2. Quoted in Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-taking and Crisis Behaviour (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982) p. 186. 3. Quoted in PhiUp Windsor, City on Leave: A History of Berlin 1945-1962 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963) p. 200. 4. Harold MacmiUan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (London: MacmiUan, 1971) pp. 571-2. 5. Prime minister's telegram T584/58 to Khrushchev, 22 November 1958, PREM11/2503. 6. Quoted in Windsor, City on Leave p. 201. 7. A common mistake is to ascribe the threat of a separate peace treaty between the USSR and the DDR to Khrushchev's speech of 10 November, or to the note of 27 November. A peace treaty was not specifically mentioned until 7 January 1959 in an East German note to die USSR. However, the essentials leading to it were present in the Soviet note of

Notes

8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

213

27 November. The note is reproduced in Documents on International Affairs 1958, RIIA (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). EUsabeth Barker, 'The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962', in International Affairs (RIIA/Oxford University Press: Vol. 39, 1963, pp. 59-73) at p. 61. The firing into space of the first earth satellite in the summer of 1957 suggested to many in the west that the USSR was winning the arms race with the US and was a public triumph for the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's motives are discussed in Adomeit, Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behaviour; Malcolm Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Jack Schick, The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 (PhUadelpha University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971); Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (London: Praeger, 1974); Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crissi of 1961 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); and Windsor, City on Leave. Slusser is useful for the later part of the crisis, as is Michael Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khruschev: Crisis Years (London: Faber & Faber, 1991). An account based on newly opened Russian records is V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (London: Harvard University Press, 1996). Ulam claims this was the main Soviet objective and that the timing of the crisis reveals the wider context as one in which the USSR was attempting to gain as much as it could from the fast-waning alliance with the PRC; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 619-20. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), also argues the importance of a nuclear-armed FRG in Soviet calculations, pp. 170-2. A useful summary of a number of explanations for Khrushchev's actions is provided by Adomeit, Soviet Risk Taking, pp. 183-94. The domestic dimension in Soviet foreign policy-making is discussed in Christoph Bluth, Soviet Strategic Arms Policy before SALT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, p. 197. Windsor, City on Leave, p. 196. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. Strobe Talbot (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971) p. 453. Macmillan, Riding, p. 544. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlen's Cold War, p. 199. Rome to Foreign Office, No. 332, 28 October 1958, reports speech by Ulbricht on 27 October, F0371/137333. Memo, de Zulueta to prime minister, 11 November 1958, PREMll/ 2706. Memcon, Robert Murphy (deputy under-secretary of state) and Caccia, 10 December 1958, US State Dept 762.00/12-1058 XR762.0221 396.1-PA, NARS. Foreign Office minute, Hancock, 11 November 1958, F0371/137334. Lloyd to Steel No. 2296, 13 November 1958, F0371/137334. Cabinet Conclusions C.81(58) Min 2, 18 November 1958, CAB 128/32. Cabinet Defence Committee 25th Meeting, 13 November 1958, CAB 131/19.

214 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Letter, J.D. Cockcroft to prime minister, 19 December 1958 re discussions in the USSR in November 1959, PREM11/2509. From Moscow Macmillan telegraphed de GauUe stating, '[the Russians] hate and distrust the Germans in particular', prime minister's telegram, 23 February 1959, T101/59, PREM11/2690. Whitney to State Dept No. 2659, 14 November 1958, National Security Archive Berlin WaU Crisis Document Collection (hereafter NSA). Trimble, Berlin to State Dept No. 334, 15 November 1958, NSA. Rumbold (assistant under-secretary, Foreign Office) to Wash No. 8076, 14 November 1958, F0371/137334. De Gaulle's proposed a triumvirate to run NATO to the British on 17 September 1958, PREMll/ 3002. Lloyd to Wash No. 8112, 15 November 1958, F0371/137336. Ibid. Foreign Office to Wash No. 8113, 15 November 1958, F0371/137336 (emphasis added). NSC meeting 386, 13 November 1958, NSA. The State Department had told the British that Pentagon suggestions that 600 planes were ready to mount an airlift had been deprecated by them, F0371/137336. Lloyd to Wash No. 8112, 15 November 1958, F0371/137336. Foreign Office to Wash No. 8113, 15 November 1958, F0371/137336. In October 1954 the Western powers reasserted their rights in Berlin foUowing the establishment of the DDR, which the West refused to recognise. Foreign Office to Wash No. 8113, 15 November 1958, F0371/137336. Sir Bernard Ledwidge, quoted in Gearson, 'British Policy', pp. 129-30. Memo of NSC Meeting 386, 13 November 1958, NSA. Telegram, London to State Dept No. 2752, 19 November 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII Berlin Crisis 1958-1959 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 86. White House telephone calls, Eisenhower and Dulles, 27 November 1958, NSA. See note 4, Telegram, London to State Dept. No. 2752, 19 November 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIIIp. 88. Memo of telephone conversation, Dulles and Eisenhower, 24 November 1958, NSA. Caccia to Foreign Office No. 3152, 20 November 1958, reporting conversation with Hillenbrand, F0371/137335. Letter, Hancock (Foreign Office) to Steel (Bonn), 21 November 1958, F0371/137336. In 1961, Khrushchev indicated to Frank Roberts (UK ambassador) that he was not sure if the DDR authorities could be trusted to handle the control functions in Berlin; Gearson, 'British PoUcy', p. 137. Letter (10132/122), Wilkinson (Bonn) to Hancock, 24 November 1958, F0371/137339. Comment by Rumbold. ReiUy to Foreign Office No. 1519, 15 November 1958, F0371/137334. Comments by Hoyer-Millar (14 November) in Reilly to Foreign Office No. 1489, 11 November 1958, F0371/137335.

Notes 51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71.

215

Jebb to Foreign Office No. 524, 17 November 1958, F0371/137335. Jebb to Foreign Office No. 538, 20 November 1958, F0371/137336. The US embassy reported that Couve de MurviUe had differed with the working level of the French Foreign Ministry, but that their views plus US pressure convinced him to change his mind; Department of State, Crisis over Berlin: American policy concerning the threats to Berlin November 1958-December 1962, Part One: Renewed Soviet Threats Against Berlin and the Western Response, November 1958-April 1959 (Research Project No. 614, 1967), pp. 12-13, NSA. Memcon, Merchant and Joxe, 21 November 1958, NSA. Lloyd to Wash No. 8259, 19 November 1958, F0371/137339. Trimble to State Dept. No. 1083, 20 November 1958, NSA. See also Foreign Office minute, Hancock, 21 November 1958 re David Brace's (US ambassordor to Bonn) report on the reception of the British memo, F0371/137338. FRG note to UK re Berlin situation, plus personal communication for the PM, 22 November 1958, F0371/137338. Foreign Office Submission, Rumbold, 20 November 1958 re reply to ReiUy's request for guidance on what to say to Khrushchev, F0371/ 137337 (emphasis added). Caccia to Foreign Office No. 3178, 22 November 1958, F0371/137336. Whitney to State Dept No. 2799, 21 November 1958, NSA. Steel to Foreign Office No. 1058, 16 November 1958, F0371/137334. State Dept to US embassy Bonn No. 1002, 14 November 1958, NSA. JackUng (Wash) to Hancock, 28 November 1958, reported exchange of letters between Dulles and Adenauer. Quotes DuUes's letter of 25 November, FO371/137340. Steel to Hoyer-Millar, No. 1192, 6 December 1958, reporting Brace's views, F0371/137341. De Zulueta to Brook, 9 December 1958, detailed prime minister's minute of 9 December on Steel's dispatch No. 1192 above, F0371/ 137341 (emphasis in original). ReiUy to Foreign Office No. 1567, 29 November 1958, re latest USSR note, argued it was questionable whether USSR plans would be effected if the West agreed to deal with or even recognise the DDR, F0371/ 137339. Foreign Office Draft, Rumbold, 27 November 1958, F0371/137340. Letter, Hancock to Hood (Wash), 5 December 1958, FO views on BerUn, FO371/137340. Foreign Office minute, Simpson (Foreign Office legal department) to DrinkaU, 25 November 1958, reports conversation with Richard Kearney of State Dept, F0371/137411. Foreign Office minute, 'Questions which the Foreign Ministers must discuss in Paris', Rumbold, 3 December 1958, FO371/137340. Suggested changes to the 1955 Eden plan to make it more acceptable to pubUc opinion. Memo to Lloyd, 28 November, MacmiUan, Riding, p. 573. Paris to State Dept No. 1983, 27 November 1958, NSA; and Macmillan, Riding, pp. 573-4.

216 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92.

93.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis See Home, Vol. 2, p. 118. Memo of telephone call, Eisenhower and Dulles, 27 November 1958, NSA. See also Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower - The President. Vol. 2 1952-1969 (London: George AUen & Unwin, 1984) p. 502. Memo of telephone call, Eisenhower and Dulles, 27 November 1958, NSA. Whitney to State Dept No. 3139, 11 December 1958, State Dept, 762.00/12-1158, NARA. Memcon, Kohler and Manet, 10 December 1958, State Dept 762.00/121058 XR411.6141, NARA. Note by permanent under-secretary, meeting with Hans von Herwarth (FRG ambassador), 6 December 1958, PREM11/2343. Memo by the secretary of state for foreign affairs - Berlin, 5 December 1958, CAB129/95. Foreign Office to Bonn No. 2625, 8 December 1958, PREM11/2343. Caccia to Murphy, 10 December 1958, State Dept 762.00/12-1058, NARA; and Home, Vol. 2, p. 119. Terrence Prittie, Adenauer (London: Tom Stacey, 1972) p. 265; and Charles De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, trans. KUlmartin Terrence (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971) p. 217. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Harvill, 1991) p. 216. De GauUe Memoirs of Hope, p. 217. Report on deliberations of the 'Four Power Working Group on German reunification and European Security', 16 February 1959, Rumbold, F0371/145818. The Western note was delivered on 31 December 1958. Dulles (Paris) to Eisenhower, 14 December 1958, NSA. 'Note from the United Kingdom Government to the Government of the Soviet Union regarding Berlin, 31 December 1958', reproduced in RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1958. Visit of the prime minister to Bonn, 12-13 March 1959, PREM11/2685. Basic Attitudes of German Political Leaders to the German Question, Bonn to State Dept No. 971, 22 December 1958, State Dept 762.00/122258, NARA. The quadripartite working level group of Laloy (France), Grrewe (FRG), Rumbold (UK) and HUlenbrand (US), met in Paris on 13 December, Paris to State Dept, No. 4, 14 December 1958, State Dept 762.00//12-1400, NARA. Steel was told by von Eckardt on 3 January 1959, Steel to Hancock (10130/1), PREM11/2713. Quoted from Steel to Hancock (10130/1) 3 January 1959, PREMll/ 2713. On Adenauer's attitude see also Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann 1952-1967 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1991) pp. 467-502. Adenauer even asked Eisenhower not to receive the Soviet envoy, but was forced to withdraw the request, when the US announced Mikoyan's intended courtesy call, Memcon, Dittmann and Dulles, 14 January 1959, State Dept 762.00/1-1459, NARA.

Notes

111

94. The text of this aide memoire is in JCS (Twining) 9172(59) 7 January 1958, NARA and F0371/145794. Mikoyan met Dulles on 5 January and Eisenhower two weeks later, Memcon, Mikoyan's call on the president, 17 January 1959, NSA. 95. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, pp. 37-40, NSA. 96. Windsor, City on Leave, pp. 205-6. Khrushchev did not expressly threaten to sign a peace treaty with the DDR alone until 17 February 1959. 97. Letter, MacmiUan to Dulles, 8 January 1959, Dulles Papers, White House memo series, Box 7, Folder General 1959, DDEL. 98. DuUes to London No. 6446, 15 January 1959, State Dept 762.00/11559, NARA. See also Foreign Office to Caccia No. 229, 13 January 1959, F0371/145796. 99. ReiUy to Hoyer-MiUar (1035/19/1) 19 January 1959, F0371/145797. 100. Foreign Office comments on above letter F0371/145797. 101. Foreign Office to Caccia No. 229, 13 January 1959, F0371/145796. 102. Caccia to prime minister No. 20, 12 January 1959, F0371/145815. 103. State Dept to Bonn No. 1469, 13 January 1959, portions of the secretary's press conference, NSA. See also Bonn to Foreign Office No. 79, 16 January 1959, F0371/145815. 104. Bruce to DuUes No. 1477, 14 January 1959, NSA. 105. Bonn to Foreign Office No. 79, 16 January 1959, F0371/145815. 106. Telephone caU, Eisenhower to Dulles, 13 January 1959, NSA. 107. Dittmann's meeting with Dulles is reported in Memcon, 14 January 1959, State Dept 762.00/1-1459, NARA. 108. Frank Roberts to Foreign Office No. 6, 13 January 1959, F0371/ 145794. 109. Foreign Office minute, Rumbold, 14 January 1959 - A New Policy about Germany, F0371/145821. 110. Diary entry 16 January 1959, MacmiUan, Riding pp. 580-1. 111. Home, Vol. 2, p. 119. 112. Memo, Kohler to DuUes, 15 November 1958, re caU by FRG ambassador Grewe, NSA. 113. Bruce to State Dept No. 1212, 9 December 1958, NSA. 114. The Iraqi monarchy had fallen in July and the danger of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait led Britain to fly troops to Jordan, in an attempt to bolster the pro-Western regimes in the region. The US sent forces to the Lebanon, and the crisis subsided by November allowing the troops to be withdrawn; John Turner, Macmillan, (London: Longman, 1994) pp. 205-7. 115. Trimble (Bonn) to State Dept No. 1037, 14 November 1958, NSA. 116. Whitney to State Dept No. 2659, 14 November 1958, NSA. 117. Bums, Berlin to State Dept No. 353, 17 November 1958, NSA. 118. Paris to Defence Dept No. 1799, 16 November 1958, NSA. 119. Bums, Berlin to State Dept No. 346, 16 November 1958, NSA. 120. Steel to Foreign Office No. 1082, 19 November 1958, F0371/137335. 121. Caccia to Foreign Office No. 3178, 22 November 1958, F0371/137336. 122. Rome (BerUn) to Foreign Office No. 358, 17 November 1958, F0371/ 137335.

218

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

123. JCS Memo for sec. of defense 1907/157, 24 November 1958, RG218 JCS Box 8, NARA. 124. Twining discussion with Dulles, NATO meeting in Paris, 13 December 1958, Crisis over Berlin - Part One, p. 24, NSA. 125. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, p. 34, NSA. 126. Norstad also told the prime minister that Franz Joseph Strauss (FRG defence minister) had asked for intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to be stationed in Germany. Prime minister's note on meeting with Norstad, 26 November 1958, PREM11/3701. 127. JCS memo for sec. of defense, 24 November 1958, JCS1907/157, NARA. 128. Report by the Joint Planning Staff on Contingency Planning for maintenance of allied access to Berlin, JP(58) 175(Final), 31 December 1958, DEFE6/52. See also Memcon re aide-memoire on Berlin Contingency Plans Handed to British and French, 11 December 1958, NSA. 129. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, p. 20, NSA. 130. Aide-memoire on Berlin Contingency Planning, 11 December 1958, NSA. 131. Quoting Ledwidge, in Gearson, 'British Policy', p. 143. 132. Report by the Joint Planning Staff on Contingency Planning for maintenance of allied access to Berlin, JP(58) 175(Final), 31 December 1958, DEFE6/52. 133. DrinkaU (Paris) to Rose, 15 December 1958, F0371/137347. 134. Norstad to Twining, 23 December 1958, NSA. 135. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, p. 28, NSA. 136. State Dept to Paris No. 2257, 12 December 1958, NSA. 137. Letter, Steel to Hancock (10130/8) 8 January 1959, F0371/145867. 138. Lord Mountbatten to COS Committee, COS(59) 1st, 1 January 1959, DEFE4/115. 139. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, p. 98, NSA. 140. Michael Carver, Out of Step - Memoirs of a Field Marshal (London: Hutchinson, 1989) p. 286. 141. Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (London: ColUns, 1964) p. 532. 142. Bilateral position paper for NATO meeting (16-18 December 1958), 11 December 1958, NSA. 143. Barbour to State Dept No. 641, 12 January 1959, Record of meeting, under secretary of defense Quarles and minister of defense, Duncan Sandys, NSA. 144. Memcon, Kohler (deputy assistant secretary of state) and JackUng, 15 January 1959, NSA. Kohler noted the forces engaged in such an operation would be expendable and the operation clearly involved the risk of war. 145. Memo, McElroy to Secretary of State, 15 January 1959, NSA. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part One, p. 98, NSA. 146. Memo of conclusions of White House conference on Berlin, DuUes, 29 January 1959, Dulles papers: White House Memo series, Box 7, Folder: Geneva; 1959, DDEL. 147. Memo of private conversation, Dulles and Macmillan, 5 February 1959, NSA.

Notes

219

148. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, pp. 102-3, NSA. The British record of the meeting has been withheld. 149. Memcon, Dulles and Adenauer, 7 February 1959, NSA. 150. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, pp. 103-4, NSA. 151. The State Department proposed the naval blockade, memo for the president, Herter, 4 March 1959, NSA. 152. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, pp. 108-10, NSA.

3 THE VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

The trip became known as a voyage of discovery, and is the title of the chapter deaUng with it in, Harold Macnullan, Riding the Storm 19561959 (London: Macmillan, 1971) Chapter 18. Diary entry 16 January 1959, Macmillan, Riding, pp. 580-1. Foreign Office minute, CP. Hope, 2 Febraary 1959: Briefing to News Dept by Rumbold, F0371/143433. Home, Vol. 2, pp. 116-17. Ibid., p. 119. Macmillan to Caccia No. 414, 20 January 1959, F0371/143686. Macmillan, Riding, p. 583. Caccia to Foreign Office No. 178, 21 January 1959, F0371/143686. Telephone call, Eisenhower and Dulles, 20 January 1959, Dulles papers, telephone call series, Box 13, Folder: memo of telephone calls 4 January-15 April, DDEL. Telephone call, Eisenhower and Dulles, 21 January 1959, ibid. Telephone call, Eisenhower and DuUes, 25 January 1959 ibid. See also Foreign Office to Caccia No. 492, 23 January 1959, F0371/ 143433. 'How...the real British position is to be ascertained is a matter on which I am sure the Secretary would be grateful for your thinking.' J.N. Greene (special assistant to secretary of state) to Merchant, 26 January 1959, State Dept, 762.00/1-2659, NARA. Barbour (US Embassy London) to Dulles No. 3861, 26 January 1959, State Dept 762.00/1-2659, NARA. Foreign Office minute, CP Hope, 2 Febraary 1959: Briefing to the news department by Rumbold. F0371/143433. Home, Vol. 2, p. 121. The proposal is in F0371/143433. Cabinet Conclusions 4 (59), 3 February 1959, CAB 128/33 D.R. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989) p. 297. DuUes's telephone conversation with Eisenhower, 20 January 1959, Home, Vol. 2, p. 121. Macnullan, Riding, p. 585. Cabinet Conclusions 11(59) 19 Febraary 1959, Minute 10, CAB128/33. Prime minister's minute, 9 February 1959, PREMl 1/2720. During the war, when Macmillan was attached to Eisenhower's staff in Algiers, Murphy was the general's political adviser and nominally MacmiUan's opposite number. Murphy was deputy under secretary of state for

220

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis poUtical affairs and under-secretary of state from August 1959 until he retired in December. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, Vol. 2 (London: George AUen & Unwin, 1984), p. 510 and prime minister's minute, 9 February 1959, PREMl 1/2720. See Chapter 2, this volume. Macnullan, Riding, p. 587. Memo of telephone call, Dulles and Herter, 6 March 1959, NSA. Macnullan, Riding, p. 588. Ambrose, Eisenhower Vol. 2, p. 514. On the U-2 programme, see Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday - Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (London: Harper & Row, 1986). See Chapter 6, this volume. Diary entry 4 Febraary 1959; Macmillan, Riding, pp. 587-8. Macmillan, Riding, p. 588. Dulles (Paris) to State Dept, 5 Febraary 1959, NSA. Dulles (London) to State Dept, 4 February 1959, NSA; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol. 2, p. 504. Memo of private conversation, Dulles and Macmillan, 5 Febraary 1959, NSA. Dulles (London) to State Dept No. 13, 4 February 1959, NSA. Ibid. Dulles (Paris) to Eisenhower No. 4, 5 February 1959, NSA. Memo for the record, Allen DuUes talk with J.F. DuUes, 20 February 1959, Dulles papers, Sp. Ass. Chron. series Box 14, Folder: Chron. February 1959 (1), DDEL. Not only were the Americans informed before France and the FRG, but NATO secretary general Spaak was told on 25 January. The detaUs of the visit are given in PREMl 1/2705. Prittie suggests that this was due to ineptitude by the Foreign Office, not deliberate deception, as Adenauer suspected, Terrence, Prittie, Konrad Adenauer: A Study in Fortitude (London: Tom Stacey, 1972) p. 268. (Adenauer was right.) Macnullan diary entry (the day after von Scherpenberg's visit), 31 January 1959, Home, Vol. 2, p. 121. Record of talks, von Scherpenberg and Lloyd, 29 January 1959, PREMl 1/2705. Record of meeting, prime minister and von Scherpenberg, 30 January 1959, PREMl 1/2705. Sir Norman Brook (cabinet secretary) to Hoyer-MiUar, 23 January 1959, explains the prime minister asked a number of questions in the defence committee meeting about a European settlement and suggests a study be undertaken by Jebb, F0371/145816. Brook to Hoyer-MiUar, 23 January 1959, F0371/145816. (HoyermiUar's comment on No. 2 is illegible.) State Department Comments on British Paper on European Security, 18 April 1958, PREMl 1/2347. Foreign Office submission by Hancock, 16 February 1959, F0371/ 145818.

Notes 47.

48. 49. 50.

51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

221

Baron Gladwyn said with hindsight he was not particularly proud of it since it considered concessions to the USSR. De GauUe's more uncompromising stance was better, he felt. Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs ofLord Gladwyn (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972) p. 318. Foreign Office minute by Hancock, 'Germany and European Security', 14 Febraary 1959, F0371/145819. Catherine KeUeher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: Columbia University Press, 1975) p. 145. Foreign Office minute, Rumbold, 'A New Policy about Germany', 14 January 1959, F0371/145821. (The paper's antecedents lay in this minute by the under-secretary in charge of the Foreign Office's Western Department.) Foreign Office minute by Hancock, 'Germany and European Security', 14 Febraary 1959, F0371/145819. During DuUes's visit in February, Adenauer asked rhetoricaUy whether anyone knew the date of the coming British elections. Memcon, DuUes and Adenauer, 8 Febraary 1959, State Dept 762.00/2-859, NARA. Steel to Foreign Office, No. 160, 4 Febraary 1959, F0371/145817. Memcon, M Alphand (French ambassador to US) and Robert McBride (State Dept), 8 Febraary 1959, State Dept. 762.00/2-859, NARA. The information came from Herbert Blankenhorn (FRG representative at NATO), referred to as a 'good and reliable informant', Roberts to Hoyer-MiUar, 6 February 1959, F0371/145818. Prime minister's telegram from Adenauer, T67A/59, 11 February 1959, PREMl 1/2708. Steel to Foreign Office, No. 227, 14 February 1959, PREMl 1/2708. Ibid. The German ambassador rarely heard Adenauer criticise Macmillan, only his policies. Interview by author with Herr Hans von Herwarth. Steel to Foreign Office, No. 243, 18 Febraary 1959, PREMl 1/2708. Prime minister's Minute to de Zulueta, 17 Febraary 1959, PREMll/ 2708. On 14 Febraary it was announced that a hernia operation on DuUes had revealed a recurrence of cancer, which eventually proved terminal. Brace to State Dept No. 1898, 1 March 1959, NSA. Sir Frank Roberts, quoted in John Gearson, 'British Policy and the BerUn Wall Crisis 1958-1961 - Witness Seminar', Contemporary Record, Vol. 6, No. 1 (London: Frank Cass 1992) p. 131. Laskey (Foreign Office) to Bishop, 17 Febraary 1959, PREMl 1/2708. Bishop to de Zulueta, 18 Febraary 1959, PREMl 1/2708. 'Basic Attitudes of German Political Leaders to the German Question'. Bonn to State Dept No. 971, 22 December 1958, State Dept 762.00/122258, NARA. See Chapter 4, this volume. Memo to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 18 Febraary 1959, PREMll/ 2708. Draft steering brief for the prime minister's visit to Moscow, 10 February 1959, F0371/143686.

222 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77.

78.

79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann 1952-1967 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1991) pp. 488-9. Aneurin Bevan in House of Commons debate foUowing MacmiUan's return, quoted in Home, Vol. 2, p. 129. See MacmiUan, Riding, pp. 557-656. See also Record of the Visit of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Union 21 February-3 March 1959, PREMl 1/2609 (Hereafter Record of Visit). Home, Vol. 2, p. 122; and Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p. 288. The Observer, 8 Febraary 1959. Press cuttings on the visit are in RIIA Press Collection 1959, Security Files: Macmillan Visit, Box 309, Colindale Newspaper Library (British Library). See below for cabinet's reaction to his trip. Khrushchev had ordered the possibiUty of a summit with the US even before the BerUn crisis; V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushehev (London: Harvard University Press, 1996) pp. 199-200. Sunday Times, 22 February 1959. Interview with M.H. (Fredy) Fisher, former editor of the Financial Times, who as the FT's diplomatic correspondent accompanied Macnullan to Moscow. 'It was a unique opportunity to see the Soviet Union... which was still something of a closed book.' The press corps included on the British side Malcolm Muggeridge for the BBC, Robin Day for ITN and Randolph ChurchiU for the Daily Express. (Adenauer's 1955 trip was technically in wartime as no peace treaty had been signed.) Macnullan, Riding, p. 593. MacmiUan had been in Finland as part of a fact-finding delegation from a government working committee estabUshed by Leo Amery to help organise aid for the Finnish against the invading Red Army. He arrived accompanying Lord Davies, just as the Soviets were beginning to gain the upper hand against the tiny Finnish force, which had humiliated its huge neighbour, Home, Vol. 1, pp. 130-7. Macmillan, Riding, p. 592. Fisher interview. Home, Vol. 2, p. 123. Ibid., p. 128. Record of Visit, p. 11, PREMl 1/2609. Ibid. Ibid., p. 12. The substance of this first meeting is in Macnullan, Riding, pp. 597-9. Record of Visit, pp. 20-2. Khrushchev also claimed he did not beUeve in the concept of small wars using only tactical nuclear weapons and was sure that if war came big nuclear weapons would be used - consequently, the USSR was stockpiling such weapons. This was now complete and they had 'more than enough', aUowing the expensive production of fissile material to be cut. He added that the USSR could already fire IRBMs from mobUe platforms, covering targets in Europe, North Africa and Asia, and was close to placing ICBMs on mobile platforms and hinted he was not in favour

Notes

89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113.

114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

223

of passing weapons or information to the Chinese, Top Secret Annex, Record of Visit, p. 3. Later, he noted (inaccurately) that the USSR had built the first hydrogen bomb, as weU as the first ICBM (correctly); Record of Visit, pp. 22-3. See also Chapter 7, this volume. Record of Visit, p. 20. See also Macmillan, Riding, p. 599. Prime minister's telegram Tl02/59, Eisenhower to MacmiUan, 23 Febraary 1959, PREMl 1/2609. Prime minister's telegram T101/59 Macnullan to de Gaulle, 23 Febraary 1959, PREMl 1/2609. MacmiUan, Riding, p. 602. The speech is reported in The Times and other newspapers, 25 Febraary 1959. MacmiUan, Riding, pp. 605-6. Record of Visit, p. 59. New York Times, 25 February 1959. Macmillan, Riding, p. 606. Telephone conversation, Herter and Eisenhower, 24 February 1959, NSA. MacmiUan, Riding, pp. 607-8. See also Home, Vol. 2, pp. 124-5. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p. 289. Not reported by Home, who reflects the more conventional view of Lloyd, noting Macmillan referred to him as 'poor Selwyn', Home, Vol. 2, pp. 215-16. MacmiUan, Riding, p. 608. Record of Visit, pp. 28-9. Record of Visit, pp. 30-1. Ibid., p. 31. Home, Vol. 2, p. 125. This exchange is not reported in the official record and is based on interviews by Home with MacmiUan. Baron (Tom) Brimelow, quoted in Gearson, 'British Policy' p. 138. Home, Vol. 2, p. 125. Record of Visit, p. 33. MacmiUan, Riding, p. 611. The account is clearly based on the official record. Dean (Moscow) to Hoyer-Millar, No. 374, 26 Febraary 1959, PREMl 1/2609. Record of Visit, p. 36. Macmillan, Riding, p. 616. Home, Vol. 2, p. 126. Based on interviews by Home with Macmillan. In the official record and Macmillan's memoirs mention is only made of the toothache and not any attributed insult. Whether Macmillan recalled the bizaree meeting incorrectly or preferred to be diplomatic is not clear. Record of Visit, p. 37. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p. 283. Home, Vol. 2, pp. 124-6. (Quotes Bishop his private secretary.) Baron Brimelow, quoted in Gearson, 'British Policy', p. 138. Prime minister's telegram Tl07/59, Eisenhower to Macmillan 26 Febraary 1959, PREMl 1/2609. MacmiUan, Riding, p. 619. (His friends had asked him not to go to Moscow.)

224

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

120. Sir Robin Day, Grand Inquisitor (London: Pan Books, 1989) p. 247. 121. Prime minister's telegram T108/59, MacmiUan to Eisenhower, 26 Febraary 1959, PREMl 1/2609. The same message was sent to de GauUe; prime minister's telegram, T109/59. 122. Day, Grand Inquisitor, pp. 247-8. 123. George Hutchinson, The Last Edwardian at No. 10: An Impression of Harold Macmillan (London: Quartet Books, 1980) p. 97. 124. Christian Science Monitor, 27 February 1959. 125. Record of conversation, Lloyd and Kuznetsov, 28 Febraary 1959; Record of Visit, pp. 60-1. 126. The Berlin discussion is only reported in a Top Secret annex to Record of Visit, p. 4. 127. Ibid., p. 61. 128. Ibid., p. 64. 129. Ibid., p. 67. 130. Top secret annex to ibid., p. 4. 131. Ibid., p. 70. The text of the note appears in ibid., pp. 70-4. 132. Jebb (Paris) to Dean (with prime minister in Moscow) No. 383, 27 Febraary 1959, reporting meeting with de Gaulle, PREMl 1/2609. 133. Roberts (NATO) to Foreign Office, No. 116, 28 Febraary 1959 reporting NATO council meeting, F0371/145821. 134. Prime minister's telegram T.l 19/59, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 2 March 1959, PREMl 1/2609. Similar messages were sent to Adenauer and de Gaulle, prime minister's telegram Til8/59. See also Macmillan, Riding, p. 624. 135. Prime minister's telegram T.l21/59, Eisenhower to Macmillan, 2 March 1959, PREMl 1/2609. 136. Macnullan, Riding, p. 624. 137. Record of Visit, p. 42. 138. Ibid., p. 39. 139. Prime minister's telegram Tl22/59, MacmiUan (Moscow) to Caccia, 3 March 1959, PREMl 1/2609. 140. ReiUy to O'Neill No. 36 (10410/16/3), 16 March 1959, re reflections on Khrushchev, PREMl 1/2609. 141. Home, Vol. 2, pp. 127-8. 142. Macnullan, Riding, p. 634. 143. ReiUy to O'Neill, 16 March 1959, PREMl 1/2609. 144. Ibid. 145. Macnullan, Riding, p. 635. Reporting to the cabinet, MacmiUan said that the most significant result was that the atmosphere of crisis had been reduced, C.C.14(59) Min 1, 4 March 1959, CAB128/33. 146. See Chapter 2, this volume. 147. Described as 'quiet enough not to be detected by the pubUc, but serious enough to be picked up by Soviet inteUigence', ordered by Eisenhower in November 1958, Paper summarising state of Berlin Contingency Planning, 18 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. Eisenhower discussed the measures with Macimllan following his trip to Moscow, See Chapter 4 below. 148. ReiUy to Lloyd, No. 35, 16 March 1959 re PM's visit, PREMl 1/2609. 149. Home, Vol. 2, pp. 128-9.

Notes 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159.

225

Baron (Tom) Brimelow, quoted in Gearson, 'British Policy', p. 138. New York Times, 4 March 1959. The Times, 4 March 1959. C.C.14 (59) Min 1, CAB128/33. ReiUy to Foreign Office No. 472, report on visit by Khrushchev to DDR, 12 March 1959, FO371/145807. State Dept InteUigence Report No. 7669 'MacmiUan's Visit to the Soviet Union', 13 March 1959, NSA. Home, Vol. 2, p. 127. Agreed final communique in Record of Visit. Sir Christopher Steel in Prittie, Adenauer, foreword. Steel notes that Adenauer never understood nor admitted the success of the visit. Jack Schick, The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 (PhUadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971) p. 60.

4 THE LIMITS OF BRITISH INFLUENCE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12.

13. 14.

The election had to be called before May 1960. Meeting, Lloyd and Chauvel (French ambassador) 5 March 1959, F0371/145823. Jebb to Foreign Office, No. 85, 3 March 1959, reporting conversation with Joxe (permanent secretary-general, French Foreign Ministry), F0371/145821. Roberts (NATO) to Foreign Office No. 139, 7 March 1959 re conversation with Spaak, F0371/145822. Foreign Office minute, Jebb to Lloyd, 9 March 1959, F0371/145826. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971) p. 637. Record of meeting, Lloyd and Brentano, 13 March 59, PREMl 1/2685. Macmillan, Riding, p. 637. Roberts to Foreign Office No. 166, 6 March 1959, conversation with Spaak, F0371/145822. Foreign Office Brief on conversation between Hoyer-MUlar and von Herwarth, 11 March 1959, FO371/145806. Bonn to Foreign Office, 5 March 1959, report on Free Democrat ideas for a peace treaty. 'As far as we know, no inter-party discussions have taken place on the subject and more surprisingly there have been no discussions in the Bundestag since the Russians first made their Berlin proposals', FO371/145806. Foreign Office minute, Killick, meeting with Moltmann of FRG embassy, 6 March 1959. Re an enquiry about Ormsby-Gore's speech, KilUck noted, 'I had to talk around that one!', F0371/145824. The speech was made on 19 Febraary (Ormsby-Gore was appointed ambassador to the US in 1961.) Hans Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann 1952-1967 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1991) p. 482. Macmillan, Riding, p. 639.

226 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Record of visit by prime minister to Bonn, 12-13 March 1959, Meeting No. 1, Palais Schaumberg 12 March, PREMl 1/2676. Macmillan, Riding, p. 639. Record of visit by prime minister to Bonn, 12-13 March 1959, Meeting No. 1, Palais Schaumberg, 12 March, PREMl 1/2676. Home, Vol. 2, pp. 119, 134. Record of visit by prime minister to Bonn, 12-13 March 1959, Meeting No.l, PREMl 1/2676. Brentano told Lloyd of this in a separate meeting, Record of meeting, Lloyd and Brentano, 13 March 1959, PREM11/2685. Ibid. Record of visit by prime minister to Bonn, 12-13 March 1959, Meeting No. 2, Palais Schaumberg, 13 March, PREMl 1/2676. Steel to Foreign Office, No. 496, 30 May 1959, PREMl 1/2706. Discussions on a possible summit, record of prime minister's meeting with Adenauer, Meeting 2, 13 March 1959, PREMl 1/2685. See Schwarz, Adenauer, pp. 482-7. Record of meeting, Lloyd and Brentano, 13 March 59, PREMl 1/2685. Lloyd (Moscow) to Caccia, No. 415, 2 March 1959, F0371/143687. Memo, Merchant to Herter, 3 March 1959, NSA. White House telephone calls, Herter and Eisenhower, 2 March 1959, NSA. Lloyd to Caccia, No. 1318, 5 March 1959 and reply by Caccia, 6 March 1959, F0371/145823. Caccia to Foreign Office, No. 647, 7 March 1959, FO371/145806. Macnullan, Riding, p. 636. Lloyd to Caccia, No. 1378, 9 March 1959, F0371/145823. Macnullan, Riding, p. 636. Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Herter, 9 March 1959, NSA. Thomson to State Dept. No. 1747, 4 March 1959, NSA. Memo for the president, Herter, 12 March 1959, Whitman files, DuUesHerter series, Box 9, Folder: Herter March 1959, DDEL. Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Herter, 13 March 1959, NSA. Staff notes of meeting, Eisenhower and Herter, 14 March 1959, Whitman files, DDE Diary Series Box 39, Folder: Staff Notes, March 1959 (1), DDEL. Steel to Foreign Office, No. 336, 14 March 1959, PREMl 1/2609. Memcon, Eisenhower, Herter, Merchant and Murphy, 14 March 1959, Whitman files, DDE Diary series, Box 39, Folder: Staff Notes, March 1959 (1), DDEL. See also Houghton (Paris) to State Dept No. 3356, 14 March 1959, NSA. Letter, Hood to Livingstone Merchant 19 March 1959, NSA. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 14 March 1959, Whitmanfiles,DDE Diary series, Box 39, Folder: Staff Notes, March 1959 (1), DDEL. Briefing paper on Berlin, Germany and European Security for prime minister's visit to Washington and Canada, 16 March 1959, F0371/ 145826. Germany and European security COS(59)16 No. 3, 3 March 1959, DEFE4/116.

Notes 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53. 54.

55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64.

65. 66.

227

Briefing paper on Berlin, Germany and European Security for prime minister's visit to Washington and Canada, 16 March 1959, F0371/ 145826. Townsend Hoppes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973) p. 478. Macmillan, Riding, p. 643. Memo of telephone call, Dulles and Herter, 6 March 1959, NSA. Memcon of meeting at Walter Reed Hospital, 20 March 1959, NSA. The British record of the talks have been withheld. The US record has been published in FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII, Berlin Crisis 1958-1959 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 512-29. MacmiUan, Riding, p. 644. Memcon of meeting at Walter Reed Hospital, 20 March 1959, NSA. Quoted in Hoopes, The Devil, p. 478. MacmiUan later complained to his biographer about being forced to watch Westerns at Camp David and how the president rested before and after meals, Home, Vol. 2, p. 131. (This was somewhat uncharitable as Eisenhower had suffered a stroke in November 1957.) Memcon, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 20 March 1959, re reply to Soviet note, NSA. (An odd explanation for World War I, which came about after a period of enormous rearmament by the Great Powers.) Memcon, the president and Macmillan, 20 March 1959, Eisenhower Whitman files, International series, Box 22, Folder: Macmillan visit March 1959 (4), DDEL. Memcon, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 20 March 1959, reply to Soviet note, NSA. Home, Vol. 2 p. 132. Ambrose argues that Eisenhower was fully in charge in all responses to Khrushchev's threats over Berlin, Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, Vol. 2 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 524. Macmillan, Riding, p. 641. A serious concern to many in Britain and mentioned a number of times in the book. Memo to JCS, Arleigh Burke, 7 March 1959, JCS 9172/9105T, NARA. The State Dept commented that, if implemented, the US 'would so depart from reality' that it could not expect international support, since the FRG clearly did not purport to control East Germany, Draft reply to secretary of defense McElroy, 19 March 1959, NSA. Memcon, Eisenhower and Twining, 9 March 1959, NSA. Memo for the president, Herter, 4 March 1959, NSA. Informal notes on meeting in president's office on BerUn, Merchant, 5 March 1959, NSA. The meeting was attended by Twining, McElroy, Herter, Gordon Gray (national security adviser), Richard Nixon (vicepresident), Allen Dulles and Merchant. Memo of telephone call, Dulles and Herter, 6 March 1959, NSA. Memcon, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 21 March 1959, European security, NSA. The DoD had rejected such ideas contained in State Dept paper on a possible Western position for a conference with the USSR, Donald Quarles (deputy secretary of defense) to Herter, 6 March 1959, NSA.

228 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

88. 89.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Memcon, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 21 March 1959, Tactics at Foreign Ministers' Meeting, NSA. The agreed position was contained in 'Agreed UK-US Minute on Contingency Planning for Berlin', 23 March 1959, NSA. The British have not released the record of the talks or the agreed minute. Memcon, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 21 March 1959, Contingency Planning for Berlin, NSA. Agreed UK-US Minute on Contingency Planning for Berlin, 23 March 1959, NSA. Department of State, Crisis over Berlin, Part One, Renewed Soviet Threats against Berlin and the Western Response (Historical Studies Division Research Project No. 614, 1967), pp. 111-18, NSA. The agreed Berlin Contingency Paper, 4 April 1959 is in Memo on Berlin Contingency Planning, 17 May 1960, Office of the Staff Sec, International trips and meetings series Box 11, Folder: May 1960 Summit (4), DDEL. Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response (Basingstoke: Macnullan, 1988) p. 35. John Irwin (assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs) quoted in Memcon of State-Defence meeting on Berlin Contingency Planning, 14 March 1959, NSA. (See Chapter 2, this volume.) Prime minister's telegram T.l67/59, Washington to Bonn No. 801, 23 March 1959, Macmillan to Adenauer, PREMl 1/2676. Germany and European security COS (59) 16 No. 3, 3 March 1959, DEFE4/116. Memcon, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 21 March 1959, European security, NSA. State Dept to Paris, No. 3645, 31 March 1959, reported conversation between Couve and Herter, NSA. Dulles resigned on 15 April and died on 24 May. Memcon, DuUes, Eisenhower and Macnullan, 22 March 1959, Dulles Papers, Chron. Series, Box 17, Folder: March 1959, DDEL. State Dept to Bonn, No. 2223, 24 March 1959, NSA. Brace to State Dept No. 2119, 24 March 1959, NSA. David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1983), pp. 71-2. Brace to State Dept No. 2119, 24 March 1959, NSA. Steel to Foreign Office No. 367, 25 March 1959, re prime minister's message to Adenauer, PREMl 1/2684. State Dept to Paris, No. 3555, 25 March 1959, NSA. The British records of the deUberations of the Working Group in F0371/145836-145856. Foreign Office minute on zones of limitation, Hancock, 15 April 1959, FO371/145503 WG1073/13; and Foreign Office submission, Hancock, 23 March 1959, introduction to report of four power working group, F0371/145827. See Chapter 2, this volume. Foreign Office minute on zones of limitation, Hancock, 15 April 1959, FO371/145503.

Notes

229

90. Macmillan had been interested in a UN solution for a while; Foreign Office minute, J.G. Tahourdin, 5 March 1959 refers to paper prepared at prime minister's request and the role the U N could play in an interim BerUn settlement, FO371/145701. 91. Hancock to Rumbold, 16 March 1959 reporting meeting of the working group, F0371/145843. 92. The ministers' met from 31 March to 4 April, in Washington. According to US documents, Brentano appeared to be speaking on direct instructions from Adenauer which had only arrived as he disembarked his ship at New York, Crisis over Berlin - Part One, pp. 75-6, NSA. 93. Herter and Brentano had a private and frank exchange of views later. The American noted that the FRG's attitude put the US in a difficult position since they had publicly asserted that Berlin could only be settled in the context of the general German problem, now the focus would have to be on Berlin alone. Memcon, Herter and Brentano, 4 April 1959, NSA. 94. Caccia to Foreign Office, No. 908, 4 April 1959, reporting conversation with Herter during which he gave a comprehensive account of his talk with Brentano, F0371/145845. 95. Schwarz, Adenauer, p. 469, argues this anti-Berlin tendency had dissipated somewhat by 1959. 96. Memo of telephone call, Eisenhower and Herter, 4 April 1959, NSA. 97. Report of the Four-Power Working Group 13-23 April 1959, F0371/ 145850. 98. The unresolved issues of the working group are discussed in Crisis over Berlin - Part One, pp. 86-91, NSA. 99. HiUenbrand (Bonn) to State Department, No. 2349, 19 April 1959, NSA. 100. Whitney to State Department, No. 5530, 22 April 1959, NSA. 101. HUlenbrand 'obviously did not believe' Hancock's assurances that none existed. Introduction to Working Group Report, Hancock, 24 April 1959, FO371/145850. 102. Introduction to Working Group Report, Hancock, 24 April 1959, FO371/145850. 103. Crisis over Berlin - Part One, pp. 92-3, NSA. 104. To forestall FRG objections to national boundaries, the formulation 'such geographic areas throughout the world as may be agreed by the four Powers and other states concerned' was used, Crisis over Berlin Part One, p. 93, NSA. 105. Report of the foreign ministers' meeting in Paris, 29-30 April 1959, F0371/145851. 106. Introduction to Report of the foreign ministers' meeting in Paris, 29-30 April 1959, F0371/145851. See also CAB128/33. 107. Spaak had been kept abreast of British thinking for some time, exchanging views with Roberts. In January 1959 he sent a memo on Germany and Berlin to the British for comment, proposing among other things a free and united, but neutral and denuclearised Germany. This was too much for the British, who recommended instead limitation of arms, but his ideas were described as 'excellent' overall, F0371/145691.

230

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

108. Record of conversation, Lloyd and Spaak in Paris, 29 April 1959, F0371/145852. 109. Foreign Office submission, Rumbold to Lloyd, 29 April 1959, F0371/ 145503. 110. Prime minister's telegrams T207/59, Khrushchev to prime minister, 14 April 1959, PREMl 1/2875. A non-aggression treaty had been proposed in Moscow. 111. Prime minister's telegram T220/59, Macmillan to Khrushchev, 28 April 1959, PREMl 1/2875. 112. Prime minister's telegram T227/59, 30 April 1959, Adenauer to Macmillan: 'An exchange of letters with Khrushchev at this time seems to me a bad idea', PREMl 1/2713. 113. PM59/49 top secret minute, Lloyd to prime minister, 1 May 1959, PREMl 1/2875. 114. Prime minister's telegram T232/59, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 5 May 1959, PREMl 1/2875. 115. State Dept memo, Woodbury WiUoughby to Merchant 'Future Tactics vis-a-vis the UK on the Berlin Question', 10 April 1959, NSA. 116. Dulles gave Herter a memo dealing with the problems in Anglo-American relations, Memcon, Herter and DuUes at Walter Reed Hospital, 24 April 1959; DuUes Papers: Sp Ass Chron Series, Box 14, Folder: April 1959 (1), DDEL. 117. There is no hint of such intent let alone discussion in Moscow in the British records. 118. 'The UK Government Position On The BerUn Situation', InteUigence Report No.7996, 9 April 1959, State Dept Bureau of Intelligence and Research, NSA. 119. Not to return until the Kennedy administration anyway. 120. The Americans had been probing the British for any secret plans they had up their sleeves. Lloyd said there was no such plan, but given the opportunity of a private meeting with Herter, he did have 'an idea at the back of his mind', Record of conversation, Herter and Lloyd in Geneva (Top Secret), 22 May 1959, F0371/145831. The State Dept history makes no mention of this meeting. 121. Record of conversation, Herter and Lloyd in Geneva (Top Secret), 22 May 1959, F0371/145831. 122. Strauss's profile by the Foreign Office stated the Bavarian was thicknecked, burly, noisy and talkative, with a 'somewhat uncouth manner' although 'this failing is improving' it added. He is a hard drinker with a good sense of humour, the report concluded, and very good company, PREMl 1/2704. 123. PubUc opinion was cited as grounds for rejecting an FRG request to amend the WEU treaty to allow production of the Hawk anti-aircraft missUe with France, Italy and the Benelux countries. In cabinet, it was argued that the public's expectation was for Geneva to limit armaments in Europe and the Hawk, although defensive, could be adapted to offensive use. Eventually, although not in favour, Britain did not stop it as she had been encouraging the FRG to enter into such joint ventures, CAB128/33.

Notes

231

124. Cabinet review of the opening of the Geneva conference, 28 May 1959, CAB128/33. 125. The State Dept noted that the UK had 'no illusions that... a [summit] meeting will reduce all, or even most, of the East - West tensions'. 'The UK Government Position On The Berlin Situation', Intelligence Report No. 7996, 9 April 1959, State Dept Bureau of Intelligence and Research, NSA. 126. During Geneva Macmillan was so concerned to appear reasonable, he called for a paper to be prepared on Berlin, on the 'minimum arrangements we can accept', which should be 'frank and take no account of other government's views', FO Minute, Thomson to Hoyer-Millar, 17 June 1959, FO371/145706. 127. Memcon, Eisenhower and Adenauer, 27 May 1959, Whitman files, DDE Diary series, Box 41, Folder: Dictation May 1959, DDEL. 128. The British files relating to the conference are in FO371/145864-145890. The State Dept history covers the conference in: Crisis over Berlin Part Two: The Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May-Aug 1959 (Research Project No.614^B, Jul 1969) NSA. See also FRUS 19581960 Vol. VIII 129. Ulbricht claimed that the fact of there being two German delegations at Geneva amounted to de facto recognition of the DDR. Delacombe (Berlin) to London, No. 141, 16 May 1959, F0371/145865. 130. Lloyd to Macmillan No. 9, 10 May 1959, re allied insistence on a square table: 'I think we must support them... [but] it is not going to be easy to handle our allies on this let alone the Russians.' F0371/145864. 131. Lloyd to Macmillan No. 13, 11 May 1959, F0371/145865. 132. The plan is in F0371/145829. 133. The delegations' official statements are in FO371/145810-145813. 134. D. R. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989), p. 291. 135. Rumbold to Hoyer-Millar, 16 May 1959, F0371/145866. 136. Geneva to Foreign Office, No. 87, 22 May 1959, F0371/145866. 137. In Washington, the foreign ministers' met briefly with Eisenhower, record of conversation with the president, 28 May 1959, F0371/145867. 138. Lloyd to Macmillan, No. 148, 3 June 1959, FO371/145701. 139. Murphy, a staunch critic of British policy in November 1958, assured Lloyd he was not anti-British and more in sympathy with UK policy on Berlin than they thought, Lloyd to prime minister, No. 121, 29 May 1959, F0371/145867. 140. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 28 May 1959, Whitman files, DDE Diary series Box 41, Folder: Staff Notes May 1959 (1), DDEL. 141. Reilly to Foreign Office, No. 859, 31 May 1959, F0371/145867. See also Crisis over Berlin, - Part Two, pp. 20-1, NSA. Eisenhower's message is in F0371/145869. 142. Macnullan to Lloyd, No. 47, 4 June 1959, F0371/145868. 143. Lloyd to Macmillan, No. 159, 4 June 1959, F0371/145868. 144. Reilly to Foreign Office, No. 901, 12 June 1959, F0371/145871. 145. V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Krushchev (London: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 200. 146. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, pp. 30-1, NSA.

232

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

147. Lloyd to MacmiUan, Top Secret, No. 203, 9 June 1959, F0371/145869; and Crisis over Berlin, - Part Two pp. 31-2, NSA. 148. The article appeared in The Times, 1 June 1959. 149. See Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, pp. 292-3; and Home, Vol. 2, pp. 215-16. In Febraary 1958 though, Macmillan had just suffered the resignation of his entire Treasury front bench in the 'little local difficulty' and poUticaUy could not afford another departure. Lloyd was moved to the Treasury in the summer of 1960 and was sacked (to his great surprise) in 1962 in the 'Night of the Long Knives' reshuffle. 150. Message, Eisenhower to Herter, 2 June 1959, Whitman files, DDE Diary series Box 42, Folder: Dictation June 1959, DDEL. 151. DUlon to Herter (Geneva) No. 90, 9 June 1959, NSA. 152. Herter (Geneva) to State Dept No. 105, 11 June 1959, NSA. 153. Lloyd to prime minister, No. 206, 10 June 1959, F0371/145869. 154. Ibid. 155. Crossman had referred to him as 'only an office boy to Eden'; quoted in Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p. 207. 156. See Chapter 3; and Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p. 289. 157. Lloyd to Foreign Office, No. 234, 16 June 1959, F0371/145871. The cabinet agreed on 15 June that if the foreign ministers' meeting broke up without agreement, the UK's alUes should be told they beUeved this did not preclude a summit, CAB 128/33. 158. Dillon to Herter (Geneva) No. TOCAH 99, 12 June 1959, NSA. 159. The exchange took place on 12 June, Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, pp. 39-40, NSA. Herter informed Eisenhower, after the event, that he had proposed it 'on the spur of the moment', Herter to Eisenhower, 12 June 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII, pp. 892-3. 160. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, p. 41, NSA. See also FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII, pp. 894-5. 161. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, p. 42, NSA. 162. Memcon, Eisenhower and Dillon (later joined by Caccia), 16 June 1959, Whitman files, DDE Dairy series Box 42, Folder: Staff Notes 16-30 June 1959 (2), DDEL. 163. Memcon, Eisenhower and Dillon (later joined by Caccia), 16 June 1959, Whitman files, DDE Dairy series Box 42, Folder: Staff Notes 16-30 June 1959 (2), DDEL. 164. Letter, Eisenhower to Macmillan, 16 June 1959, Crisis over Berlin -Part Two, pp. 42-3, NSA. 165. Whitney to State Dept No. 6595, 17 June 1959, Whitmanfiles,DuUesHerter series Box 9, Folder: Herter June 1959, DDEL. 166. Letter to Eisenhower, delivered on 23 June 1959, Crisis over Berlin Part Two, pp. 55-6. (The French, on whose territory World War I had been fought and who had endured occupation during World War II, did not argue this case.) 167. Caccia to prime minister, No.1504, 1 July 1959, F0371/145876. 168. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 27 June 1959, Whitman Files, DDE Diary series Box 42, Folder: Dictation June 59 (1), DDEL. 169. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 24 June 1959, Whitman FUes, DDE Diary series Box 42, Folder: Staff Notes June 59 (1), DDEL.

Notes

233

170. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, pp. 74-6, NSA. 171. MacmiUan noted 'time is vital to our plan', Macmillan to Lloyd, No. 585, 23 July 1959, F0371/145888. 172. This was communicated in a note on 23 July along with a draft message from Macmillan to Eisenhower, Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, p. 11, NSA. 173. Herter-Lloyd meeting, 23 July 1959, Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, pp. 77-8, NSA. 174. Herter - Lloyd meeting, 24 July 1959, Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, p. 78, NSA. 175. Lloyd to prime minister, No. 340, 23 July 1959, F0371/145888. (The US documents suggest that Herter had this conversation with Lloyd on 26 July.) 176. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 27 July 1959, PREMl 1/2675. See Crisis over Berlin, - Part Two, NSA. 177. Eisenhower agreed to Herter informing Lloyd of a possible exchange of visits, which confirms the British record, Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 10 July 1959, Whitman Files, DDE Diary series Box 43, Folder: Staff Notes July 59 (4), DDEL. 178. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, pp. 58-9, NSA. 179. Ibid., pp. 80-1. 180. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965) pp. 406-8. Ann Tusa supports his explanation in her, The Last Division: Berlin and the Wall (London: Hodder & Stoughton) p. 177. 181. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 10 July 1959, Whitman Files, DDE Diary series Box 43, Folder: Staff Notes July 59 (4), DDEL. 182. See FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII, pp. 1029-47 on the rather confused question of the invitation. Dillon told Herter on 23 July that after disputing that he had agreed to an unconditional invitation, Eisenhower had been referred to a talking paper which he had approved, and accepted that no condition had been stated, p. 1046. The talking paper has since never been found. 183. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, p. 81, NSA. 184. FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII, p. 1033. The vice-president visited Moscow to open the US exhibition at the Sokolniki Fair, where he had spirited exchanges with Khrushchev. See Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Arrow Books, 1978) pp. 206-14. 185. 'In a way we are inclined to consider a Khrushchev visit to this country of greater importance than a 4-power summit meeting', Dillon to Herter, 23 July 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII, p. 1046. 186. Macmillan to Lloyd, No. 585, 24 July 1959, F0371/145888. 187. MacmiUan letter to Eisenhower, 27 July 1959, Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, pp. 78-9, NSA. 188. Memcon, Eisenhower and Dillon, 27 July 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. VIII, p. 1076. 189. Memcon, Eisenhower and Dillon, 27 July 1959, Whitman files DDE Diary series, Box 43, Folder: Staff Notes July 1959 (1), DDEL. 190. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, pp. 80-3, NSA.

234

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

191. Eisenhower to Macmillan, Prime minister's telegram T423/59, 29 July 1959, PREMl 1/2675. 192. Lloyd to Macmillan, Nos. 364 and 367, 29 July 1959, F0371/145888. 193. Prime minister's telegram to Lloyd, T420/59,30 July 1959, PREMl 1/2675. 194. Extract from Prime minister's telegram to Lloyd, T409/59, 27 July 1959, PREMl 1/2866. 195. Lloyd to MacmiUan, No. 367, 29 July 1959, F0371/145888. 196. Minutes of a special cabinet meeting in the prime minister's rooms at the House of Commons, CC(59)49, 29 July 1959, CAB128/33. 197. Draft message to Eisenhower, prime minister's telegram T421/59 for foreign secretary, 30 July 1959, PREMl 1/2675. 198. See Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, pp. 269-306. 199. Lloyd speculated this was not a reasoned decision by de GauUe, but simply that he liked disagreeing with every proposal put to him, Lloyd to prime minister, No. 367, 29 July 1959, F0371/145888. 200. Prime minister's telegram to Eisenhower, T424/59, 30 July 1959, PREMl 1/2675. 201. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, p. 85, NSA. 202. Prime minister's telegram T427/59, Macnullan to Lloyd, 31 July 1959, PREMl 1/2675. 203. The West's last proposals on 28 July offered UN mediation on 'propaganda' in Berlin and a review of the interim agreement after five years. 204. This is even concluded by the State Dept historian, Crisis over Berlin Part Two, p. 94, NSA. 205. Crisis over Berlin - Part Two, p. 91, NSA. 206. Lloyd to prime minister, No. 311, 20 July 1959, F0371/145882. 207. See Chapter 5, this volume. 208. FO minute, Drinkall, re conversation with Froment-Meurice, 1 August 1959, F0371/145886. 209. Lloyd to Macmillan, No. 364, 29 July 1959, F0371/145888. 5 W I N N I N G T H E ELECTION 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way 1959-1961 (London: MacmiUan, 1972) p. 61. Prime minister's telegram T455/59, Macmillan to Lloyd, 4 August 1959, PREMl 1/2987. Forein Office memo, Killick, 5 August 1959, reported the German ambassador as saying that de Gaulle indicated this to Adenauer, PREM11/2687. Prime minister's telegram T446/59, 3 August 1959, PREMl 1/2687. Prime minister's telegram T470/59, Adenauer to PM, 7 August 1959, PREMl 1/2687. MacmiUan, Pointing, p. 67. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969) p. 402. Macmillan, Pointing, p. 79. Department of State, Crisis over Berlin - Part Two The Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May-August 1959 (Historical Studies Division:

Notes

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

235

Research Project No. 614-B, July 1969), p. 81. See Chapter 4, this volume. See Chapter 4; and Eisenhower, Waging Peace, Chapter 17. Letter, Khrushchev to prime minister, re Germany and Peace Treaty, 12 August 1959, F0371/145813. Note for the prime minister, de Zulueta, 30 November 1959, notes, 'you may wish to ask the President to tell you exactly what he did agree with Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David'. PREMl 1/2987. Home, Vol. 2, pp. 146-7. Department of State, Crisis over Berlin - Part Three: From the End of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Meeting to the Abortive Summit Meeting, August 1959-May 1960 (Historical Studies Division: Research Project No. 614C, October 1969) p. 1, NSA. The official was Martin HUlenbrand (office of German affairs), Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 3. Eisenhower visited Bonn 26-27 Aug 1959. Memcon (with deletions), Eisenhower and Macnullan, 29 August 1959, Whitman files, Int meetings series, Box 3, Folder London visit AugSep. 1959, DDEL. Memcon, Adenauer and Eisenhower, 27 August 1959, FRUS 19581960 Vol. IX, Berlin Crisis 1959-1960: Germany; Austria (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 19. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 3. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 418. Memcon, Adenauer and Eisenhower, 27 August 1959, FRUS 19581960 Vol. IX, p. 23. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 4-6. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 5. Memcon, Herter and Brentano, 27 August 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, p. 18. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 6. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 419. He had last visited in May 1952 when he left SHAPE to stand as president. De Zulueta noted that there was a danger of reaching a modus vivendi with the Russians, 'opening a dam before having prepared containing walls behind it'. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 20 August 1959, PREMl 1/2687. Ibid. Draft Foreign Office brief for the cabinet in advance of Eisenhower's visit, GEN965/13, Rumbold, 18 August 1959, FO371/145708. Memcon (with deletions), Eisenhower and Macmillan, 29 August 1959, Whitman files, Int meetings series, Box 3, Folder London visit Aug. Sept. 1959, DDEL. See also Memcon, Macnullan and Eisenhower, 29 August 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX,pp. 26-9. The British record of the discussions has been withheld. Foreign Office background briefs for the visit have been released - with the exception of the brief on Berlin and Germany. Macmillan's report to the cabinet on the talks is in Cabinet Conclusions (59) 50th meeting, 1 September 1959, CAB128/33. Top secret minute, Lloyd to Home, 9 November 1959, F0371/145834. A note detaiUng the topics discussed by Eisenhower and MacmiUan has been released, dated 29 October 1959, PREMl 1/2675.

236 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 1. Ibid., p. 8. Harold MacmiUan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (London: MacmiUan, 1971) p. 748. The 'chat' was carefuUy rehearsed by the two men, who discreetly checked their notes during the broadcast, Michael CockereU, Live From Number 10 (London: Faber & Faber, 1988), pp. 66-8. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 423. D.E. Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959 (London: Macnullan, 1960), p. 41. GaitskeU, quoted in Philip Wilhams, Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979) p. 519. State Dept InteUigence Report No. 7669, 'MacmiUan's Visit to the Soviet Union', 13 March 1959, NSA. The Queen agreed to a dissolution on 7 September 1959 fixing the poUing day as 8 October 1959. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 8. Ibid., p. 9. Prime minister's telegram T507a/59, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 4 September 1959, PREMl 1/2675. Home, Vol. 2, p. 151. See pp. 144-52 for an account of 1959 election. See also Butler and Rose, British General Election of 1959. For an account of the visit see Michael Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (London Harper & Row, 1986) The secret service said they could not ensure the Khrushchev's safety in the amusement park. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 11. See pp. 11-22 for account of the talks. Memcon, Eisenhower and Khrushchev, 26 September 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, pp. 35-41. The historian notes certain remarks made on the morning of 27 September apparently refer to a private meeting between the leaders on the evening of 26 September for which the records are missing; Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 18. (The question arises of whether even the state department history is authoritative on this period?) Ibid., p. 57 (emphasis added). In his summary of the talk with Khrushchev, the only area where Eisenhower appears to have given way was in agreeing that the US would not seek to make the occupation status in Berlin permanent, Memcon, Eisenhower, Herter and others, 27 September 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, p. 45. Memcon, Eisenhower, Herter and others, 18 December 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, p. 133. (Begging the question what the foreign ministers had been doing in Geneva for nine weeks.) Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 18. I am grateful to Dr C. Bluth for his help on this aspect. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 19-21. See also Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 434-49. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 22.

Notes 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79.

237

Adenauer told Brace that if Dulles were aUve, Khrushchev would never have been invited; Brace diary entry, 30 September 1959, FRUS 19581960 Vol. IX, p. 56. Caccia to Foreign Office, No. 2065, 28 September 1959, PREMl 1/2675. In his message to Adenauer, the president stated, 'You wiU have gathered that no detailed negotiations of any kind have.. .taken place.' Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 23. Prime minister's telegram T541/59, Eisenhower to prime minister, 30 September 1959. Prime minister's telegram T542/59, PM to Eisenhower, 1 October 1959, PREMl 1/2990. Butler and Rose, British General Election of 1959, p. 32. Covering notes by Caccia and Herter report certain paragraphs in cables are to be treated as personal between the two leaders and wUl be sanitised from the State Dept and Foreign Office records. The meaning remains clear, however. Covering note to prime minister's telegram T542/59, PM to Eisenhower, 1 October 1959, PREMl 1/2990. Caccia to Lloyd No. 2103, 2 October 1959, PREMl 1/2990. Newspaper cutting, 5 October 1959, PREMl 1/2990. Home, Vol. 2, p. 146. On the magnitude of Macmillan's victory, see Butler and Rose, British General Election of 1959. Home, Vol. 2, p. 152. Ibid., p. 217. Brief for the prime minister in advance of Eisenhower's visit, 20 August 1959, CAB130/166. Letter, Caccia to prime minister, 9 October 1959, PREMl 1/2986. MacmiUan was resting at Birch Grove and the Americans were told he would look into it the following week, Foreign Office to Caccia No. 4415, 10 October 1959, PREMl 1/2996. Prime minister's telegram T549/59, prime minister to Caccia, 12 October 1959, PREMl 1/2996. MacmiUan, Pointing, p. 93. Prime minister's telegram T550/59, Caccia to PM, 10 October 1959, PREMl 1/2996. Caccia to Lloyd, No. 2156, 11 October 1959, PREMl 1/2990. Prime minister's telegram T563/59, PM to Caccia, 16 October 1959, PREMl 1/2996. Foreign Office to Caccia, No. 4434, 12 October 1959, PREMl 1/2996. Prime minister's telegram T565/59, Eisenhower to prime minister, 16 October 1959, PREMl 1/2996. Jebb to Foreign Office No. 307, 20 October 1959, PREMl 1/2996. One French idea was that since the US was behind in the missile race, they wished to gain a trace in the Cold War to catch up, even at the expense of concessions in the political field. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 16 October 1959, DDE Whitman files, Diary Series Box 45, Folder: StaffNotes October 1959 (1), DDEL. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 22 October 1959, PREMll/ 2996.

238

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

80. Macnullan, Pointing, p. 92. 81. Prime minister's telegram T381/59, prime minister to Lloyd, 22 October 1959, PREMl 1/2679. 82. Ibid. 83. Macnullan notes in his memoirs that at the time of the meeting there was a growing hostility among many people in the UK towards Germany, MacmUlan, Pointing, p. 98. 84. Lloyd to Steel, No. 1911, 14 October 1959, PREM11/2714. 85. Steel to Lloyd, No. 947, 23 October 1959, PREMl 1/2714. 86. The Next Five Years - Manifesto of the Conservative and Unionist Party, October 1959, Conservative Party Office Library, Smith Square, London. 87. Prime minister's memo to de Zulueta, 24 October 1959, PREMl 1/2714. 88. Note, Lloyd to prime minister, re Paris meeting, 14 November 1959, PREMl 1/2990. 89. Note, Bishop to de Zulueta, 17 November 1959, PREMl 1/2714. 90. Prime minister's talking points for Adenauer visit, de Zulueta, 18 November 1959, PREMl 1/2714. 91. The British and Americans had exchanged papers in October and had held discussions on 5 November 1959 in Washington. 92. The Auswartige Amt told the British that the ChanceUor beUeved Eisenhower had secured a long-term moratorium agreement from Khrushchev at Camp David and that they were trying to disabuse him of this impression. Lloyd to Bonn, No. 2081, 6 November 1959, PREMl 1/2990. 93. Record of conversations at Chequers, 18 November 1959, PREMll/ 2714. 94. Meeting of officials and foreign ministers at Downing St, 18 November 1959, PREMl 1/2714. 95. Record of meeting at Chequers, 19 November 1959, PREMl 1/2714. 96. Macnullan, Pointing, pp. 99-100. 97. Letter No. 1042, Steel to Hoyer-MUlar, 27 November 1959, PREMll/ 2714. 98. Lloyd to prime minister, Memo PM/59/125 re discussion with French ambassador, 4 December 1959, PREMl 1/2714. 99. Caccia to Lloyd, No. 2253, 22 October 1959, FO371/145709. Discussion papers were exchanged on 22 October. The British paper has been withheld, but is summarised in Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 34, and has now been released in the US, Memcon, Hood and Merchant, 22 October 1959 NSA. 100. Lloyd to Caccia,'No. 4587, 3 November 1959, FO371/145709. 101. Foreign Office to Wash, 21 October 1959. 'Possibility of reaching an interim agreement about Berlin', in Memcon, Hood and Merchant, 22 October 1959 NSA. 102. Lloyd to Caccia, No. 4587, 3 November 1959, FO371/145709. 103. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 34-5. 104. Prime minister's Minute M421/59, prime minister to Lord Home, 5 November 1959, FO371/145710. 105. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 35.

Notes

239

106. 'Possible Proposal on German Reunification and US Troop Withdrawal', Crisis over Berlin - Part Three p. 33. 107. Foreign Office Brief for Lloyd visit to Paris, 11-12 November 1959, FO371/145710. 108. Foreign Office minute, Rumbold, 12 November 1959, FO371/145710. 109. Letter, Cecil Lyon, Paris to Livingstone Merchant, 21 October 1959, NSA. 110. The letter, dated 23 October, (requested by Herter on 27 August) was not delivered until 6 November, Crisis over BerUn - Part Three p. 35. 111. Ibid., p. 36. 112. Hood to Rumbold, 8 December 1959, reports that working group was Umited by the French representative being given no latitude to agree to anything, FO371/145508. 113. The meeting was held on 29 November 1959. 114. MacmiUan, Pointing, p. 100. 115. Prime minister's telegram T381/59, prime minister to Lloyd, 22 October 1959, PREMl 1/2679. 116. Note for the prime minister, de Zulueta, 30 November 1959, PREMl 1/ 2987. 117. Top secret record of meeting at Chequers, 29 November 1959, PREMl 1/2996. 118. Note to the prime minister on European problems, de Zulueta, 27 November 1959, PREMl 1/2679. 119. Record of meeting at Chequers, 29 November 1959, PREMl 1/2679. 120. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 30 November 1959, PREMll/ 2990. 121. Briefing paper for prime minister's meetings with Eisenhower and de Gaulle, de Zulueta, 8 December 1959, PREMl 1/2987. 122. The suggestions were in a briefing paper to the prime minister. Top secret briefing paper on Paris summit for prime minister, de Zulueta, 14 December 1959, PREMl 1/2987. 123. Top secret briefing paper on Paris summit for Prime minister, de Zulueta, 14 December 1959, PREMl 1/2987. 124. See Chapter 1, this volume. 125. Interview with PhUip de Zulueta in Home, Vol. 2, p. 35. 126. In May 1959, the US Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act, allowing Britain to buy component parts of nuclear weapons systems, leading to the purchase of the Dreadnought nuclear propulsion plant. The UK's own liquid-fuelled missile programme, Blue Streak, was not proving a great success in 1959 (and was cancelled in Febraary 1960). This spureed discussions on the possibility of Britain buying the Skybolt missUe in late 1959 and agreement in principle was reached in March 1960. 127. The press had been speculating on a US troop withdrawal from Europe, firmly denied by Herter, Memcon, Herter and the ambassadorial group, 8 December 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol.IXp. 122. 128. Macmillan's memoirs devote a chapter to the Western summit, Eisenhower's less than one page. Macmillan, Pointing, Chapter 5. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 508-9.

240

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

129. Note for the prime minister, de Zulueta, Points to raise with Presidents de Gaulle and Eisenhower in Paris, 17 December 1959, PREMl 1/2987. 130. Memo for the president, Herter, re president's talk with MacmiUan, undated (December 1959) Eisenhower, Whitman files, DuUes-Herter series, Box 10, Folder: Herter December 1959 (1), DDEL. 131. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 42. 132. The Western summit was to prepare for the full summit. Since Adenauer would not be attending it, he was invited to join the three leaders for discussions concerning Berlin and Germany. 133. Record of meeting at the Elysee, 19 December 1959, PREMl 1/2991. 134. Ibid. 135. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 45. 136. Herter told Lloyd, Adenauer was trying to pin the West down to a position of complete rigidity. Record of conversation, Lloyd and Herter, 20 December 1959, PREMl 1/2987. 137. MC-70 was a NATO plan to raise 30 divisions, agreed in 1957, but was never achieved. 138. Record of meeting at the Elysee, 19 December 1959, PREMl 1/2991. 139. Record of meeting at Rambouillet, 20 December 1959, PREMl 1/2991. 140. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 47-8. 141. Ibid., p. 50. 142. Record of conversation between prime minister and Eisenhower, US embassy Paris, 20 December 1959, PREMl 1/2675. There is no official record of the discussions during the car journey, but it is discussed in, prime minister's minute to Lloyd M520/59, PREMl 1/2997. FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX also has no record of this conversation. 143. Prime minister's minute to Lloyd M520/59, PREMl 1/2997. De GauUe was not aware of the bilateral meetings. 144. Record of meeting at Rambouillet, 20 December 1959, PREMl 1/2991. 145. March to the East. 146. Top secret record of conversation in Palais d'Elysee between prime minister and de Gaulle, 21 December 1959, PREMl 1/2991. 147. Home, Vol. 2, p. 219. 148. Record of conversation at breakfast, Macnullan, Eisenhower, Herter and Lloyd, 21 December 1959, PREMl 1/2987. 149. Record of conversation, Lloyd and Herter, 21 December 1959, PREMl 1/2987. 150. Prime minister's minute to Lloyd M506/59, 22 December 1959, PREMl 1/2991. 151. Ibid. 152. Prime minister's minute M507/59 to chanceUor of the exchequer, 22 December 1959, PREMl 1/2996. 153. Prime minister's minute to Lloyd M506/59, 22 December 1959, PREMl 1/2991. 154. To make matter worse, there was no official record of the talks and their conclusion, State Dept memo, White to Merchant, 6 January 1960, NSA. 155. Prime minister's minute to Lloyd M522/59, 24 December 1959, PREMl 1/2997.

Notes

241

156. Prime minister's minute PM 134/59, Lloyd to prime minister, 31 December 1959, PREMl 1/2996. 157. Letter, Hoyer-Millar to Jebb, Paris, 19 January 1960, PREMl 1/2997. 158. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 26 Febraary 1960, PREM11/2997. 6 DISASTER I N PARIS 1. 2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

Eisenhower had served his maximum two terms. Khrushchev agreed to attend the Paris summit on 30 December, Department of State, Crises over Berlin - Part Three: From the end of the Geneva Foreign Minister Meeting to the abortive summit meeting August 1959 (Historical Studies Division, Project No. 614-C, October 1969), p. 51. NSA. Letter, Rumbold to Jebb, 13 January 1960, FO 371/154083. Herter asked Caccia for the UK's position on the terms for an interim settlement in October 1959 and a paper was sent on 21 October. The British position matched that of the US except that the UK envisaged all-German discussions. Lloyd was displeased that anything had been committed to paper and given to the Americans, but when the US asked in Febraary 1960 whether the paper still represented the UK position, the Foreign Office said yes, F0371/154085. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 57. Thomson to State Dept, No. 1773, 1 January 1960, NSA. See Chapter 5, this volume. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 57-9. Ibid. Foreign Office brief, The Future of Anglo-American Relations, PUS Dept, 5 January 1960, F0371/152112. Jebb (Paris) to Ramsbottom, 19 Febraary 1960, F0371/152112. Jebb retired in August 1960. Note to prime minister, de Zulueta, March 8 1960, PREMl 1/2986. Prime minister's minute, Lloyd to prime minister, PM/60/12, 15 February 1960, PREMl 1/2998. Ibid. Hoyer-Millar to Lloyd, Note for discussion with prime minister on his forthcoming trip to Paris, 26 February 1960, F0371/152096. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 8 Febraary 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary series, Box 47, Folder: Staff notes, Febraary 1960 (1), DDEL. France exploded her first atomic device in the Sahara on 14 February 1960. Notes of discussions, prime minister and de Gaulle, 12-13 March 1960, F0371/152096. Points discussed with de Gaulle at Rambouillet, 12-13 March 1960, PREMl 1/2998. Letter to HM The Queen from prime minister reporting talks with de Gaulle, 14 March 1960, PREMl 1/2998. Discussions between the Pentagon and the MOD on a replacement for Britain's nuclear deterrent were beginning following the cancellation of the Blue Streak.

242 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35.

36.

37. 38. 39.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Lloyd to Jebb, 13 June 1960, FO371/152097. Home, Vol. 2, p. 223. Prime minister's telegram T235A/60, Eisenhower to Macmillan, 19 March 1960, PREMl 1/2994. Foreign Office to Caccia No. 716, 19 Febraary 1960 re new US text proposed in working group. In it the Foreign Office informed Caccia that the text was interesting, but he should not show too much interest lest it 'annoy' the French and Germans, F0371/154085. The visit was from 14-17 March 1960. Memo, Herter to Eisenhower, re visit of Adenauer to US, 13 March 1960, NSA. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 14 March 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary series Box 48, Folder: Staff Notes - March 1960 (3), DDEL. The proposal was made in a speech to the National Press Club on 16 March 1960, but was not discussed in the talks with Eisenhower, Summary of visit of Adenauer, (14-17 March), 18 March 1960, NSA. Letter, Herter to Lloyd, 19 March 1960, Herter papers, Chronological series Box 8, Folder: March 1960 (2), DDEL. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 71. The talks are discussed in: Memcon, Eisenhower and Adenauer, 15 March 1960, NSA; Memcon, Herter and Adenauer, 15 March 1960, Office of the staff secretary, Int trips and meetings series, Box 11, Folder: US-USSR Summit (3), DDEL; and Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 68-71. See also FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, Berlin Crisis 19591960 Germany, Austria (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 225-45. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 17 March 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary series Box 48, Folder: Staff notes March 1960 (2), DDEL. Telephone caUs, Eisenhower and Macnullan, 21-23 March 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary series Box 48, Folder: Telephone calls March 1960, DDEL. See also Record of Telephone call between prime minister and Eisenhower, 21 March 1960, PREMl 1/2994; and Home, Vol. 2, fn 15, pp. 652-3. Draft message, prime minister to de Gaulle, 23 March 1960, PREMll/ 2994. See also Memcon, Eisenhower, Herter and Dillon, 25 March 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary series Box 48, Folder: Staff Notes March 1960 (1), DDEL. The record of the Berlin discussions has been deleted from the official record of the prime minister's trip to America, PREMl 1/2994, but is in FO 371/152128. The talks are also detailed FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, pp. 258-62. During the visit, Macmillan's private secretary was told by Eisenhower's staff that if things in Cuba did not improve the US was considering a 'Korea-type operation', Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 30 March 1960, PREMl 1/2994. Record of conversation, Prime minister and Herter, 28 March 1960, F0371/152128. Ibid. Memcon, Eisenhower, Herter and DiUon, 22 April 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary Series, Box 49, Staff Notes, April 1960 (1), DDEL.

Notes 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

243

Lloyd to prime minister, 25 March 1960, PREMl 1/2994. Memcon, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 28 March 1960, NSA. Ibid. Record of meeting at Camp David, 28 March 1960, F0371/152128. Memcon (with deletions) Macmillan and Eisenhower, 28 March 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary Series, Box 48, Staff Notes, March 1960(1), DDEL. Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and BerUn, 9 April 1960, in record of the foreign minister's meeting in Washington, 13 April 1960, PREMl 1/2992. Briefs for foreign ministers' meeting in Washington 12-14 April 1960, F0371/153783. Record of conversation, Macmillan and de Gaulle at Buckingham Palace, 5 April 1960, PREMl 1/2978. Memcon, Eisenhower and Norstad, 11 March 1960, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, pp. 214-16. Eisenhower told Herter that the interpreter had made mistakes before and he was very clear that he had mentioned it, Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 17 March 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary series Box 48, Folder: Staff notes March 1960 (2), DDEL. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 73. Letter, Herter to Lloyd, 19 March 1960, Herter papers, Chronological series Box 8, Folder: March 1960 (2), DDEL. Memo by JM Gibbon, MOD, 11 April 1960, re possible visit by General Heusinger, FO 371/154171. Later in 1960, Heusinger was appointed chairman of the NATO military committee and the invitation could no longer be put off. Hoyer-Millar reluctantly agreed that he should be invited, but added in pencil in the margin of the Foreign Office memo, 'even though he was standing next to Hitler when Stauffenberg's bomb went off. Memo by KRC Pridham, 1 December 1960, F0371/154171. Memcon, Eisenhower and MacmiUan, 28 March 1960, Whitman files, Int Series, Box 23 Folder: Macnullan visit - March 1960, DDEL. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 79. Memo of a conference, Eisenhower and Norstad, 11 March 1960, NSA. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 74. Ibid., pp. 75-7. Prime minister's minute, prime minister to Lloyd, Ml 14/60, 20 April 1960, PREMl 1/2992. A paper on the West's summit objectives from Herter had done Uttle to clarify the U S position and was regarded as 'wooUy' by the British, N o t e to

59. 60. 61. 62.

prime minister, de Zulueta re Herter letter, 27 April 1960, PREMl 1/2982. Prime minister's minute, prime minister to Bishop Ml 18/60, 21 April 1960, PREMl 1/2992. Memcon, Eisenhower and de Gaulle, 24 April 1960, Whitman files, DDE Diary Series, Box 49, Staff Notes, April 1960 (1), DDEL. Crisis over Berlin, - Part Three, p. 81. Top secret note to prime minister on Tactics at the Summit, de Zulueta, 6 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992.

244 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73.

74. 75.

76.

77. 78. 79. 80.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Herter and Lloyd agreed that an interim agreement based on the 28 July 1959 offer should be aimed for. Synopsis of state material reported to the president, 29 April 1960, Whitmanfiles,DDE Diary Series, Box 48, Folder: Briefings April 1960, DDEL. Paris Summit Conference, May 1960, FO Brief No. 3: Germany and Berlin, FO371/154089. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 92-4. Ibid., pp. 92-3. Herter spoke in Chicago on 4 April and Dillon in New York on 20 April. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 93. The Western leaders would point out in Paris that the Soviet's Sputnik flew over the West every day. The most complete account of the U-2 incident may be found in Michael R. Beshloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (London: Harper and Row 1986). See also Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965) pp. 543-59; and Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (London : Andre Deutsch, 1994) pp. 469-90. The British record of the U-2 summit is in PREMl 1/2992. Beschloss, Mayday, p. 10. Ibid., pp. 22-32. Top secret note to prime minister on Tactics at the Summit, de Zulueta, 6 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. (MacmiUan's biographer claims MacmiUan first heard of the loss of the U-2 on 7 May after a speech by Khrushchev.) According to MacmiUan's memoirs, Khrushchev reported the shooting down of a US plane on 5 May and ReiUy reported it the same day from Moscow. See Home, Vol. 2, p. 225. ReiUy to Foreign Office, 5 May 1960, reported a violent speech by Khrushchev on the U-2, PREMl 1/2984. The British and the Americans found the affair very suspicious. Moscow embassy reported that the wreckage produced by the Soviets appeared more consistent with a crash landing than a descent out of control from 60,000 ft, Moscow to Foreign Office No. 631, 11 May I960, PREMl 1/2984, Btsehbii details th§ various theories oa the loss of the U-2, but concludes 'the mystery wiU probably linger', Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 355-63. Macnullan, Pointing, pp. 195-7. See also Home, Vol. 2, pp. 224-7. The Commonwealth conference, then underway in London, had been thrown into disarray over South Africa's future membership of the organisation. Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 146-7. Home, Vol. 2, pp. 225-6. Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way 1959-1961 (London: MacmiUan, 1972), pp. 197-200. This point could not be laboured since the British had not always practised what they preached. The Crabb incident of 1956, during the Khrushchev and Bulganin visit to Britain, had been highly embarrassing and much publicised. Apparently contrary to direct instructions by

Notes

81.

82.

83.

84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

99.

245

Eden, a navy diver had attempted to inspect the hull of a Soviet destroyer in Portsmouth harbour. His headless body was later found at sea, after which denials and counter-denials circulated. It was assumed the KGB removed Crabb, but some argued he died of a heart attack. Macnullan (foreign secretary) 'strongly' advised Eden to say nothing. Home, Vol. 1, pp. 384-5. Khrushchev told Macmillan later that year that he was sure the prime minister would never have sent a U-2 over the USSR, but if he had, he would have found a better excuse. Record of trip by prime minister to UN Sept-Oct. 1960, record of conversation, prime minister and Khrushchev, New York, 29 September 1960, F0371/ 152109. V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Krushchev (London: Harvard University Press, 1966) p. 204. They also note that for the U-2 to enter Soviet airspace on May Day was an added insult. Memcon, Eisenhower, Nixon, Herter, Merchant and others, 10 May 1960 NSA. Nixon doubted whether the Russian would stop talking about it so easily. Eisenhower added he would suggest that Khrushchev and he talk privately about it. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, p. 205. The proposals are in PREMl 1/2992. Foreign Office submission, Rumbold to Lloyd, 13 May 1960, Foreign Office371/l 54089. If this new memo is to be regarded as the Soviet position, it 'represents in our view a change for the worse'. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 94-7. The foreign ministers reviewed the Soviet proposal in Paris on 14 May. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 98. The meeting was on 15 May. Record of Western summit at Elysee, 15 May 1960, F0371/153787. Record of a meeting, prime minister and Khrushchev, 15 May 1960, F0371/153787. Memo, ReiUy to Lloyd, 17 May 1960, F0371/153787. Record of a meeting, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Eisenhower at the Elysee, 15 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 100-1. Statement by Eisenhower in record of a meeting, Macmillan, de GauUe and Eisenhower at the Elysee, 15 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. Statements by the prime minister in record of a meeting, Macnullan, de Gaulle and Eisenhower at the Elysee, 15 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. Lloyd to Herter and Couve de Murville in Record of a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay, 18 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. Home, Vol. 2, p. 229. Memcon, Eisenhower and Herter, 24 May 1960, discussed press reports of spUt between president and prime minister, DDE Diary Series, Box 50, Staff Notes, March 1960(1), DDEL. See also minutes of US cabinet meeting, 26 May 1960, where Eisenhower spoke 'in detail' about the prime minister's 'co-operative attitude', NSA. Prime minister's telegram T354/60, Lloyd (Washington) to prime minister, 1 June 1960, reporting comments by the president, PREMl 1/2995.

246

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

100. Home, Vol. 2, p. 231. 101. Prime minister's telegram T332/60, prime minister to home secretary reporting morning's meeting, 17 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. 102. Home, Vol. 2, p. 228. 103. Herter to State Dept, No. SECTO 19, 16 May 1960, NSA. 104. Record of a meeting, MacmiUan, de Gaulle and Eisenhower, 17 May 1960, F0371/153788. 105. Eisenhower stated later, 'MacmiUan wanted no part of any appeasement attitude and that his only interest had been in holding the door open for a few more hours, something that would facUitate his handling in Parliament of the expected collapse', Minutes of cabinet meeting, 26 May 1960, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, pp. 514-15. 106. Herter to State Dept No. CAHTO 10, 19 May 1960, NSA. 107. Memcon, Kohler and Grewe (FRG ambassador), 17 May 1960, NSA. 108. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, pp. 107-8. 109. Jack Schick, The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971) p. 121. An alert to test long-range communications facUities had been carried out on 15 May, but was not thought to have affected the summit's outcome, Memo of discussion at NSC meeting, 24 May 1960, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, p. 507. 110. This was proposed by Herter. Record of a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay, 18 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. 111. Memcon, Eisenhower, Herter and others, 8 March 1960, NSA. 112. Paper summarising state of Berlin Contingency Planning, 18 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. See also Herter to State Department No. SECTO 40,18 May 1960, tripartite working group paper on contingency planning, NSA. 113. Ibid. 114. The British had argued from the start that economic counter-measures would be ineffective andriskedaUenating the non-aligned states - the only plausible action they claimed was military preparations for war to impress on the Soviets and uncommitted of the West's serious intent, Memcon, Working Group on Non-MUitary Measures in the Event of Soviet Obstruction to Allied Access to Berlin - First Meeting, 9 June 1959, NSA. 115. Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 109. 116. Memcon, Herter and Lloyd, 16 May 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, p. 455. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 105. 117. Record of a meeting between MacmiUan, de GauUe and Eisenhower, 18 May 1960, F0371/153788. 118. Extract of prime minister's conversation with Eisenhower, 18 May 1960, FO371/152097. 119. Record of a meeting of the four-power working group on Germany and Berlin, 19 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. 120. Home, Vol. 2, p. 231. 121. Ibid. 122. Telegram, Herter to State, 18 May 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, pp. 497-8. 123. PhiUp de Zulueta, quoted in Home, Vol. 2, p. 231.

Notes

247

124. De Zulueta's memos to the prime minister at the time ascribe no blame to the US for the failure. 125. Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 127. 126. Note to prime minister, de Zulueta, 19 May 1960, this conclusion is underlined by Macmillan, PREMl 1/2992. 127. Minutes of US cabinet meeting, 26 May 1960, NSA. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part Three, p. 104. 128. Note to prime minister, Freddie Bishop, 19 May 1960, PREMl 1/2992. 129. Prime minister's minute Ml77/60, prime minister to Lloyd, 24 May 1960, PREMl 1/2988. 130. Herter (Paris) to State Dept, 18 May 1906, NSA. 131. Record of tripartite meeting, 1 June 1960, FO371/152098. 132. MacmiUan, Pointing, p. 213. 133. Foreign Office brief on tripartite consultations, 14 June 1960, F0371/ 152100. 134. Foreign Office Memo, 21 June 1960, FO371/152100. 135. Prime minister's Minute No. 268/60 (Secret and Personal) Macnullan to Bishop, re his paper of 8 July on external relations, 31 July 1960, PREMl 1/2983. 136. See David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983) pp. 77-81. 137. Prime minister's minute M316/60, prime minister to Norman Brook, 21 August 1960, mentions article in The Times which refers to the Bundeswehr trying get nuclear weapons. 'It seems to me that this is a very extraordinary and perhaps rather sinister episode.' PREMl 1/2939. 138. Home, Vol. 2, p. 256. 139. Note to foreign secretary from prime minister, 29 June 1960, PREMl 1/ 3334 (emphasis in original). 140. Note by prime minister to Tim Bligh (prime minister's new private secretary), 16 September 1960, PREMl 1/3334. 141. The cabinet had been reshuffled at the end of July 1960. Amory, the chanceUor, retired from politics and Lloyd, somewhat surprisingly, replaced him at the treasury. Lord (Alec) Home was given the Foreign Office. 142. Note, JW to Tim Bligh, 19 September 1960, PREMl 1/3334. 143. His biographer ascribes it to a sense of weakness, Home, Vol. 2, p. 256. 144. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970 (London: Harvill, 1991) pp. 350-1. Lacouture notes that de Gaulle admired but did not like England. 145. Record of conversation between Macmillan and de Gaulle, 5 April 1960, PREMl 1/2978. 146. Foreign Office Memo: Britain and the Six, 14 June 1960, F0371/ 153116. 147. On 31 July 1961 Macmillan announced Britain's application to join the EEC. 148. Foreign Office to Bonn No. 1262, 27 July 1960, reports message from ChanceUor to prime minister delivered by ambassador on 25 July, F0371/154065. 149. Steel to Foreign Office No. 719, 3 August 1960, F0371/154065.

248

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

150. Steel to Foreign Office, No. 690, 28 July 1960, FO371/154065. 151. Prime minister's minute PM60/95, Home to prime minister, 8 August 1960, F0371/153982. 152. Steel to Foreign Office No. 734, 8 August 1960, FO371/154066. 153. Letter, Adenauer to prime minister, 21 October 1960, PREMll/ 2263. 154. Steel to Foreign Office No. 719, 3 August 1960, FO371/154065. 155. Prime minister's minute PM60/95, Home to prime minister, 8 August 1960, F0371/153982. 156. Record of visit by prime minister and foreign secretary to Bonn, 10-11 August 1960, F0371/154067. 157. Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995) p. 139. 158. 'It seemed most important to prevent any Soviet miscalculation regarding US capacity to react with vigor and speed even during an election campaign'. Department of State, Crisis over Berlin - Part Four: Developments During the Final Phase of the Eisenhower Administration, Jun 1960-January 1961, (Historical Studies Division: Research Project No. 614-D, Febraary 1974), NSA, pp. 64-65. 159. The allegiance of the 'non-aligned' states periodically preoccupied Macnullan during the crisis. 160. Macnullan, Pointing, pp. 269-81. 161. Macmillan also met Eisenhower, but an accurate account of their discussion is not possible given the large number of deletions in the US record (the British record has been withheld), Memcon, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 27 September 1960, Whitman files DDE Diary series, Box 53, Folder: Staff Notes September 1960 (1), DDEL. 162. Prime minister's telegram T590/60, prime minister to Home, 24 September 1960, PREMl 1/2980. 163. Record of trip by prime minister to UN Sept.-Oct. 1960, record of conversation, prime minister, Eisenhower and Menzies at the White House, 2 October 1960, FO371/152109. 164. Foreign Office submission, Shuckburgh, 5 October 1960, reports conversation with Couve de Murville, F0371/153987. 165. Foreign Office submission, Shuckburgh to Hoyer-MiUar, 20 October 1960, F0371/153988. 166. Home to Dixon (Paris), 9 December 1960, states that UK is a long way from having anything for our allies on Berlin. F0371/153916. 167. Foreign Office Memo, Lord Privy Seal to prime minister re discussions with Merchant, 18 August 1960, US against a tripartite summit, as only acceptable reason for one was Berlin and this might prompt a response from Khrushchev, FO371/152103. Murphy had been succeeded as under-secretary of state for political affairs by Livingston Merchant. 168. The pressure exerted by the DDR and USSR on West BerUn and the aUied debate in this period is discussed at length in Crisis over Berlin Part Four. 169. Sir J Bowker (Vienna) to Foreign Office, No. 328, 6 July 1960, sends message from Dr Kreisky (Austrian foreign minister) regarding the

Notes

170. 171.

172. 173. 174. 175. 176.

249

memo. Home replies on 8 July advising Austrians to ignore it, F0371/ 153983. Crisis over Berlin - Part Four, p. 66. Report by Whitney on talk with Macmillan, Synopsis of state and inteUigence material reported to the president, 12 October 1960, Whitman files, DDE Dairy series Box 53, Folder: briefings October 1960, DDEL. Ibid. Whitney stated that British support for economic sanctions was 'dim'. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part Four, pp. 36-7. Foreign Office brief for prime minister's visit to Rome, November 1960, FO371/154089. Foreign Office minute, D.R. Hurd, 5 December 1960, reports conversation with Charles Driver of Anglo-Portuguese Agencies who approached the Foreign Office with the information, F0371/153990. Letter, Dean Rusk (secretary of state) to John F. Kennedy, 28 January 1961, NSA. Crisis over Berlin - Part Four, p. 69.

7 THE WALL 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Home, Vol. 2, p. 296. Roberts to Foreign Office No. 1822, 26 Dececember 1960, PREMll/ 3996. The issue which Khrushchev was referring to was resolved at the last moment on 29 Dececember with the signing of the Inter-Zonal Trade Agreement. Caccia to Hoyer-Millar, 30 December 1961, PREMl 1/3326. See PREMl 1/3326; and Home, Vol. 2, pp. 273-308. Prime minister's minute M436/60, prime minister to Home, 22 December 1960, PREMl 1/3325. Memo, Norman Brook to prime minister, 20 January 1961, PREMll/ 3325. In April 1961 Macmillan proposed to Kennedy that he offer aid to the French nuclear programme in return for a promise to stop causing trouble in NATO and of wholehearted commitment to the aUiance. Kennedy refused. Prime minister's minute to Kennedy, 28 April 1961, FO371/161206. Prime minister's memo on future policy, 29 December 1960-3 January 1961, PREMl 1/3325. Ibid. * Germans, in particular, never yield to force of arguments, but only to the argument of force.' Ibid. Prime minister's memo on future policy, 29 December 1960-3 January 1961, PREMl 1/3325. Adenauer's planned visit to Britain was delayed due to flu in late December, Steel to Foreign Office No. 1259, 28 December 1960, PREMl 1/3345. Home to Ministry of Defence, 19 January 1961, PREMl 1/3358. Home, Vol. 2, p. 286.

250 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis Memo, 22 Febraary 1961, Visit of Adenauer to London, PREM11/3345. Letter, Rusk to Kennedy, 28 January 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIV Berlin Crisis 1961-1962 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office 1993), pp. 3-4. Memcon, Rusk and Brentano, 16 Febraary 1961, NSA. Position paper for discussion with von Brentano, 16 Febraary 1961, NSA. Memo for Henry Kissinger, R.W. Komer, re People to see on Berlin/ Germany problem, 10 March 1961, NSA. Kissinger acted as a special consultant to the NSC during the summer of 1961 and helped prepare a number of papers on Berlin, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Cambridge, MA:) Houghton Mifflin, 1965) Chapter 15. Memo for the record, Carl Kaysen, 3 July 1961, NSA. Notes on Berlin Military Planning, undated (Febraary 1961?) NSA. Meeting between Kohler and Hood, 9 Febraary 1961, F0371/161197. Department of State, Crisis over Berlin - Part Five: Developments during the Early Phase of the Kennedy Administration and the meeting with Krushcher Vienna January-June 1961 (Historical Studies Division: Research Project No. 614-E, Febraary 1970), p. 9. Ibid., pp. 10-11. Ibid., p. 12. On Acheson's involvement in the crisis see Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson - The Cold War Years 1953-71 (London: Yale University Press, 1992) pp. 108-153. Memo for the president, Acheson, 3 April 1961, White House private office, Box 127a Folder: UK Security Folder 2, JFKL. Ibid. Ibid. Memo for the President, Bundy, 4 April 1961, White House private office, Box 127a Folder: UK Security Folder No. 2, JFKL. The meetings were held 4-6 April. Most British records of these talks have been withheld. Macmillan's memoirs do not deal with the substance of the talks. At Kennedy's request the two leaders held an unscheduled meeting (their first) at Key West a few days earUer. Visit by Adenauer to London, 22 February 1961, PREMl 1/3345. On 23 April, Khrushchev told the German ambassador, Hans Kroll, that he would sign a peace treaty with the DDR, but not until after the FRG elections in September or perhaps not until after the CPSU Congress in October, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol.XIV, p. 55. Memcon, Rusk and Home, 4 April 1961, NSA. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) p. 380. The British record of this meeting has been withheld, but has been reproduced in FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIV, pp. 36^40. FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIV, p. 37. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part Five, pp. 14-16. Record of meeting on Kennedy's yacht Honey Fitz, 6 April 1961, CAB133/244. Crisis over Berlin - Part Five, p. 18. Rusk to Caccia, 21 April 1961, NSA. Ibid.

Notes 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

251

Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 375. Memcon, Adenauer and Rusk, 12 April 1961, NSA. Memcon, Tripartite meeting 7 May 1961, NATO Ministerial Meetings, 8-10 May, NSA. State Dept, 'Talking points reviewing conversations between President Kennedy and Khrushchev', June 1961, NSA. Prime minister's telegram T237/61, PM to Caccia, 24 April 1961, PREMl 1/3316. Ibid. State Dept Scope Paper for president's meeting with Khrushchev, 23 May 1961, NSA. Beschloss argues Khrushchev could not but demand satisfaction over BerUn in 1961; Michael Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev: The Crisisyears 1960-1963 (London: Faber & Faber, 1991) p. 232. Memo for the president, Bundy, 29 May 1961, NSA. Ibid. State Dept background paper on line of approach to Khrushchev, 1 June 1961, NSA. The US record of the talks is in Memcons 4 and 5 June 1961, Meeting between the president and Khrushchev, NSA. See also Beschloss, Crisis Years, pp. 211-36; Crisis over Berlin - Part Five; FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIV. A copy of the aide-memoire is in F0371/160535. Memcon, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 3 June 1961, NSA. Mason (NATO) to Foreign Office Nos 39 and 41, 6 June 1961, PREMl 1/3316, and Memcon, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 4 June 1961, NSA. See also Crisis over Berlin - Part Five, p. 46. Home, Vol. 2, p. 303. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 376. No record of the private meeting has been released by either side. Macmillan's briefing paper on Berlin for the meeting has been withheld. One source is 'Note of Points made during the Private Discussion between President Kennedy and prime minister MacmiUan at Admiralty House on June 5, 8 June 1961, White House Private office files Box 127a, Folder: UK Security Folder 3, JFKL. PM (W)(61) 2nd meeting Item 2, April 1961, PREMl 1/3321. Memo for the Chairman JCS, Roswell Gilpatric, 29 May 1961, NSA. Record of conversation at Admiralty House, 5 June 1961, F0371/ 161201. Caccia to prime minister, 7 July 1961, quoting Acheson, PREMl 1/3616. Memo from State Dept, re Kennedy talks with de Gaulle, 31 May-2 June 1961, FO371/161206. See also FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIV, pp. 806. This was their only meeting. Record of meeting in secretary of state's room (London), 5 June 1961, quoting Bundy, FO371/161200. Theodore Sorensen, C. Kennedy (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965) p. 558. Kennedy to prime minister, 10 June 1961, PREMl 1/3328. Department of State, Crisis over Berlin - Part Six, Deepening Crisis over Berlin: Communist Challenges and Western Responses June-September

252

66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94.

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis 1961 (Historical Studies Division: Research Project No. 614-F, April 1970), pp. 6-7. NSA. See FRUS 1961-1963 Vol.XIV, pp.111-17. Memcon, Rusk and Home, 14 June 1961, NSA. See also Shuckburgh (in Wash) to Foreign Office No. 1454, 14 June 1961, FO371/160536. Foreign Office Submission, Shuckburgh, 22 June 1961, Notes for secretary of state's meeting with prime minister, FO371/160536. Thomson to Rusk, 19 June 1961, NSA. Brace diary entry, 16 July 1961, reporting telegram to Washington, NSA. Note by Hoyer-MUlar, 6 July 1961, FO371/161206. Diary entry 25 June, quoted in Home, Vol. 2, p. 310. Letter, Acheson to Truman, 24 June 1961, NSA. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 384. Memo for record, discussion at NSC meeting, 29 June 1961, NSA. See also The Acheson Report, 28 June 1961, NSA. Rusk, reporting HUlenbrand, claims the delay arose because a White House staffer put the report in his safe and went on holiday for two weeks, Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (London: Penguin, 1990) p. 222. National Action Security Memorandum 58, 30 June 1961, NSA. Foreign Office submission, Shuckburgh to Home, 22 June 1961, FO371/160536. JCS Talking Paper on the Berlin situation (sanitised), 24 June 1961, NSA. Memo, 5 July 1961, USG Sharp to Secretary of the Navy - BerUn Planning, NSA. Notes on BerUn military planning (unsigned), Febraary 1961, NSA. Covering note on Henry Kissinger's memo on BerUn, 7 Jul 1961, NSA. SIOP = Single Integrated Operational Plan, the aU-out nuclear attack on the USSR. Memo for Bundy, Carl Kaysen, 3 July 1961, NSA. Factual run-down on Newsweek story by JCS, undated (July?), NSA. See also Memo for record, discussion at NSC meeting, 29 June 1961, NSA. Roberts to Foreign Office No. 1235, 3 Jul 1961, PREMl 1/3603. See also Roberts, pp. 214-17. Harold MacmiUan, Pointing the Way 1959-1961 (London: MacmiUan, 1972), pp. 389-90. Sir Frank Roberts in John Gearson, 'British Policy and the BerUn WaU Crisis 1958-1961 - Witness Seminar', Contemporary Record, Vol. 6, No.l (London: Frank Cass, Summer 1992), pp. 164-6. Macmillan, Pointing p. 390; and Crisis over Berlin - Part Six, pp. 4-5. See MiUtary Choices in Berlin Planning, White House, 13 July 1961, and Memo for the president, Bundy, 19 July 1961, NSA. Memo for Bundy, Henry Kissinger, 15 July 1961, NSA. Memo of discussion in the NSC, 13 July 1961, Bundy, NSA. Memo for the president, Bundy, 19 July 1961, NSA. Crisis over Berlin - Part Six, pp. 11-14. McCloy to Rusk, 29 July 1961, NSA. On the missile gap, see Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (London: Macnullan, 1986).

Notes

253

95. The situation, whilst stiU ambiguous at the beginning of 1961, had become clear in the autumn as reconnaissance flights backed by satellites began to offer excellent pictures of the USSR. In October 1961, the US deputy secretary of defense, Roswell Gilpatric, explicitly claimed that the US had a second-strike capability at least as extensive as the Soviets first-strike capability. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Macmillan: London, 1989, 2nd edition) pp. 227-8. GUpatric later said that his speech was designed to convince the USSR that the US was ready to take on any threat in the Berlin area, Beschloss, Crisis Years, p. 329. 96. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982) p. 299. 97. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear, pp. 264-6. (A series of tests began in September 1961 including one of 60 megatons - this despite the fact that no delivery vehicles for such a weapon existed and its destructive power would not be substantially greater than one of 10 megatons.) 98. Record of prime minister's visit to the Soviet Union, p. 20, PREMll/ 2609. See Chapter 3, this volume. 99. Kennedy to Macmillan, 20 July 1961, Folder: Macmillan correspondence 7/1/61-8/16/61, JFKL. 100. Prime minister to Kennedy No. 5036, 23 July 1961, FO371/160546. 101. Memo for Bundy - Berlin Crisis and Civil Defence, Kaysen, 7 July 1961, NSA. 102. Kennedy to Macmillan, 3 August 1963, Folder: Macmillan correspondence 7/1/61-8/16/61, JKFL. 103. Equivalent to the population of Israel or New Zealand, David Childs, The GDR: Moscow's German Ally (London: George Allen, 1983) p. 64. 104. Crisis over Berlin - Part Six, pp. 77-80. 105. Foreign Office minute Killick, 14 July 1961, FO371/161206. 106. 'I am sure our right line is to sit tight and say and do as little as possible at this stage.' Prime minister's comments, 11 July 1961, PREMl 1/3616. 107. MacmiUan, Pointing, p. 389. 108. Brace, diary entry, 16 July 1961, reporting telegram to Washington, NSA. 109. Dixon to Foreign Office No. 245, 13 July 1961, PREMl 1/3337. 110. Memcon, Strauss and Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer and others, 14 July 1961, NSA. 111. Acheson to Truman, 4 August 1961, NSA. 112. Norstad to Wash, 19 July 1961, reports meeting with Blackenhorn, NSA. 113. Foreign Office minute, Home to prime minister, PM/61/109, 3 August 1961, FO371/160542. 114. Note by Shuckburgh, 9 August 1961, FO371/160543. 115. Record of conversation, Home and Rusk, 5 August 1961, F0371/ 160541. 116. Shuckburgh to Brook, 15 August 1961, FO371/160496. 117. Home to prime minister No. 432, 6 August 1961, FO371/160541. 118. Prime minister's minute 247/61 prime minister to Home, 31 July 1961, FO371/160542.

254

Harold Macmilllan and the Berlin Wall Crisis

119. For Secretary's minute, PM/61/107 Home to prime minister, 3 August 1961, FO371/160542. 120. Kenneth Young, Sir Alec Douglas Home (London: J.M. Dent, 1970) p. 124. 121. Foreign Office note, Killick, 24 August 1961, report of meeting between Rusk and de Gaulle, 8 Aug, FO371/160543. See also Memcon, Rusk and De Gaulle, 8 August 1961, NSA. 122. De Gaulle had been elected in 1958 on a platform of retaining Algeria. 123. Memcon, Rusk and Adenauer, 10 August 1961, NSA. 124. KUUck to Martin, 9 August 1961, FO371/160502. These concerns increased following the Wall. In the same file see Steel to Foreign Office No. 793,16 August 1961, who notes that the greatest danger would come if East Grerman insurgents gained a part of the inter-German border. No arms and ammunition could be given to them, of course, but exceptions for food and medical supplies might have to be made. 125. Rusk to foreign ministers, Record of quadripartite meeting at Quai d'Orsay, 5 August 1961, FO371/160542. 126. Ibid. 127. Ibid. 128. Jack Schick, The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971) pp. 154-5. Schick perhaps goes too far in claiming the British saw tactical nuclear weapons as a substitute to a probe - they were against all forms of miUtary action. 129. Letter A.A. Acland to P. de Zulueta re Home's views on BerUn, 15 August 1961, FO371/160543. 130. See, for example, Honore M. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1980) pp. 200-5. 131. Mc George Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988) p.368. 132. Home to Shuckburgh, 19 August 1961, FO371/160543. 133. Memo for the president, Bundy, 11 August 1961, NSA. 134. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 11 August 1961, PREMll/ 3320. 135. Crisis over Berlin - Part Six, p. 73. 136. For Secretary's minute PM/61/117 Home to prime minister, 10 August 1961, FO371/160543. 137. Various units of East German forces were involved: Volkspolizei (PoUce), National Volksarme (Army), Grenzpolizei (border poUce), Freie Deutsche Jugend (youth movement), and Betriebsampfgruppen (factory-based TA units). 138. Lightner (Berlin) to State Dept, No. 186, 13 August 1961, NSA. 139. The British were approached by the Norwegians in BerUn six days before closing of the boundary, who asked if they had heard anything about the East Germans having planned to close the boundary between East and West Berlin the day before, Sir Bernard Ledwidge in Gearson, (British Policy), p. 168. Rusk was told about the Soviet move at a baseball game, Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (London: Penguin Books, 1990) p. 223. V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Krushchev (London: Harvard University

Notes

140. 141.

142. 143. 144. 145. 146.

147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154.

155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164.

165.

255

Press, 1996), p. 251 argue that Khrushchev also surprised his subordinates. Crisis over Berlin - Part Six, pp. 74-5. State Dept memo, Ausland to HiUenbrand, 18 July 1961, re Discontent in East Germany, NSA. Ausland concluded that if refugee flows continued the East Germans would have to act, possibly involving the complete division of the City. The refugee problem is summarised in Crisis over Berlin - Part Six, pp. 77-81. Steel to Foreign Office No. 781, 14 August 1961, FO371/160509. Sir Bernard Ledwidge, in Gearson, 'British Policy', pp. 160-1. Crisis over Berlin - Part Six, p. 75. SACEUR to COS, 14 August 1961, reports Soviet troop deployments around BerUn appear designed to support DDR police action against refugee movements, FO371/160510. On the first hours in Berlin on 13 August, see account by Brigadier Richards (British assistant provost marshal in Berlin), in Gearson, 'British Policy', pp. 149-59. Steel to Foreign Office No. 291, 16 August 1961, FO371/160510. Foreign Office to Washington, No. 5541, 16 August 1961, PREMll/ 3343. Caccia to Foreign Office No. 1938, 15 August 1961, FO371/160510. US embassy, Paris to State Dept, No. 832, 16 August 1961, NSA. Delacombe to Steel No. 13, 29 August 1961, FO371/160523. Home, Vol. 2, p. 312. Prime minister to Kennedy No. 5634, 18 August 1961, FO371/160511. Letter, Steel to Shuckburgh (10149) 21 August 1961, stated that The Times correspondent warned him that the British public was indifferent to Berlin and tended towards neutrality. Shuckburgh notes in margin, 'I'm afraid he is not far wrong', FO371/160511. Roberts to Shuckburgh, 23 August 1961, FO371/160548. Record of conversation with US ambassador, 15 August 1961, F0371/ 160544. Letter Acland to de Zulueta re Home's views on Berlin, 15 August 1961, FO371/160543. Note to the prime minister, Brook, 28 July 1961, PREMl 1/3815. Note to the foreign secretary, Shuckburgh, 27 August 1961, F0371/ 160513. Foreign Office to Wash No. 4208, 27 August 1961, FO371/160544. Letter, Steel to Shuckburgh, 29 June 1961, reports views of Globke, F0371/160536. Macmillan, Pointing, p. 394. Prime minister's note of telephone conversation with Home, 25 August 1961, FO371/160544. Home, Vol. 2, p. 312. Macmillan qualified this shortly afterwards and sent Kennedy an explanation, prime minister to Kennedy No. 5877, 27 August 1961, F0371/160547. He notes in his memoirs 'It was undoubtedly a "gaffe"', Macmillan, Pointing, p. 395. Prime minister to Kennedy, No. 5877, 27 August 1961, FO371/160547.

256

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166. Caccia to Foreign Office No. 2161, 30 August 1861, reports content of Adenauer letter to Kennedy, FO371/160547. 167. Foreign Office to Wash No. 6284, 7 September 1961, reports conversation between Bruce and prime minister, F0371/160549. 168. Letter, Steel to Shuckburgh, 25 August 1961, FO371/160548. 169. Foreign Office minute, Killick, 23 August 1961 (plus comments by Shuckburgh) FO371/160548. 170. Prime minister to Eisenhower, 6 September 1961, FO371/160549. Eisenhower had referred to this following the collapse of the Paris summit, claiming that he and other military commanders had 'pled' for a miUtary occupation capital at the junction of the Soviet, US and UK zones, but had been told 'to keep quiet, this was political', FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. IX, Berlin Crisis 1959-1960: Germany; Austria (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 434. As the man who decided not to head for Berlin in 1945 as it was merely a prestige poUtical target, this was perhaps somewhat disingenuous of Eisenhower. 171. Foreign Office minute, Shuckburgh, 6 September 1961, reporting comments from de Zulueta, FO371/160548. 172. Foreign Office minute, 13 September 1961, FO371/160499. 173. Home to prime minister No. 2414, 15 September 1961, reports lunch with Kennedy, FO371/160551. 174. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 300-1. 175. Record of tripartite meeting, 14 September 1961, FO371/160551. 176. Kap\an,Wizards of Armageddon p. 303. 177. Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989) pp. 205-6. 178. See below on December 1961 Bermuda meeting. 179. Macmillan, Pointing, pp. 399-400. 180. Foreign Office briefing note, Killick, 23 September 1961, Rusk's first meeting with Gromyko, FO371/160553. 181. Record of Home's talks with Gromyko, 25 September 1961, F0371/ 160553. 182. Wash to Foreign Office No. 1498, 25 September 1961, Home to PM, FO371/160553. 183. Record of conversation between Home and Stevenson at UN, 19 September 1961, F0371/160552. Not the only bizaree intervention by the former presidential hopeful. After the WaU was buUt Stevenson told the British that the border was not closed to prevent refugee flows, but to give the DDR forces a clearer field of fire against invading Western troops, Dean to Hoyer-MUlar, 7 Oct 1961, F0371/ 160523. 184. Wash to Foreign Office No. 1498, 25 September 1961, Home to prime minister, FO371/160553. 185. Home to Wash No. 7190, 5 October 1961, FO371/160555. 186. Steel to Foreign Office No. 1035, 6 October 1961, FO371/160555. 187. Foreign Office to Wash No. 7295, 9 October 1961, FO371/160555. 188. Home to Wash No. 7190, 5 October 1961, FO371/160555. 189. Record of conversation, prime minister and Kennedy, 6 October 1961, FO371/160555.

Notes

257

190. Hood to Foreign Office No. 2752, 13 October 1961, FO371/160557. 191. Brief for Cabinet meeting, 25 October 1961, FO371/160557. 192. PubUc statement by foreign secretary in Brighton, 11 October 1961, FO371/160557. 193. Record of conversation between Home and FRG ambassador von Etzdorf, 23 October 1961, FO371/160558; and Hood to Foreign Office No. 2822, 23 October 1961, reports comments by FRG ambassador to amb group in Wash, FO371/160589. 194. Foreign Office Submission, Shuckburgh to Home, conclusions from my visit to Bonn, 22 October 1961, FO371/160559. 195. Foreign Office to Wash No. 9979, 29 December 1961, FO371/160582. 196. AUied miUtary traffic retained the right to enter East Berlin. 197. Home to prime minister, PM/61/146, 27 October 1961, F0371/ 160560. 198. Beschloss, Crisis Years, p. 334. 199. Prime minister's minute M346/61, prime minister to Home, 4 November 1961, PREMl 1/3612. 200. Delacombe to Foreign Office No. 712, 22 December 1961, F0371/ 160572. 201. Delacombe to Foreign Office No. 714, 23 December 1961, F0371/ 160572. 202. Foreign Office memo, Ashe to Shuckburgh, 29 December 1961, F0371/ 160572. 203. Foreign Office note, Killick, 10 November 1961, FO371/160564. 204. Home to Wash No. 8711, 27 November 1961, account for Kennedy of the prime minister's talks with de Gaulle, F0371/160565. 205. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 1 November 1961, PREMll/ 3357. 206. Record of telephone conversation, prime minister and Kennedy, 9 November 1961; also, prime minister to Kennedy No. 8253, 12 November 1961, FO371/160562. 207. Kennedy to prime minister, T647/61, 23 November 1961, F0371/ 160564. 208. See PREMl 1/3337-3338. 209. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta, 17 November 1961, PREMll/ 3338. 210. Home, Vol. 2, pp. 314-19. 211. Note to the cabinet from prime minister, 27 November 1961, F0371/ 160565. 212. Record of conversation, Home and Rusk, 19 December 1961, F0371/ 160567. 213. The British record of the meeting is in PREMl 1/3782 and CAB133/299. See also Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961-1963 (London: MacmiUan, 1973) pp. 142-8. 214. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta (Bermuda), 19 December 1961, PREMl 1/3782. 215. De Zulueta to Samuel, 15 January 1962, reports prime minister's views on report of military subcommittee of ambassadors group in Washington, PREMl 1/3804.

258

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216. Note to the prime minister, de Zulueta (Bermuda), 19 December 1961, PREMl 1/3782. 217. Paper to the prime minister, Freddie Bishop, 29 November 1961, PREMl 1/3477. 218. Note to the prime minister, Norman Brook, 20 December 1961, summary of our discussion yesterday, PREMl 1/3782. 219. The Nuclear Test Conference in Geneva had just been suspended and the Soviets had recently carried out their 100 megaton test. 220. Record of meeting, prime minister and Kennedy, 21 December 1961, FO371/160569. 221. Note to the prime minister, Norman Brook, 2 January 1962, re results of your meeting with Kennedy, PREMl 1/3782. 222. Prime minister's telegram T5/62, 5 January 1962, prime minister to Kennedy, PREMl 1/3782. 223. Brace to Rusk, No. 2295, 12 December 1961, NSA. 224. Prime minister's telegram T32/62, Adenauer to prime minister, 23 January 1963, the chancellor had in mind a blockade of Soviet shipping in the event of access to West Berlin being denied, PREMl 1/3804. Macmillan's reply T45/62, 6 Febraary 1962, said it was very complex. 225. Home, Vol. 2, p. 314. CONCLUSION 1. 2. 3.

D.C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965) p. 139. Prime minister's minute (secret and personal) Macmillan to Bishop, re his paper of 8 July on external relations, 31 July 1960, PREMl 1/2983. Henry Kissinger referred to Britain's post-war transition from 'power to influence' in his address to the Britain and the World conference, The Times, 30 March 1995.

Bibliography PRIMARY MATERIAL Great Britain Unpublished Official Documents: Public Record Office, Kew CAB128/129: Cabinet meetings and memoranda, 1957-62 CAB131: Cabinet Defence Committee meetings and memoranda 1958-61 CAB 133: Prime minister's international meetings 1958-62 DEFE 4, 5: Chiefs of Staff meetings and memoranda, 1958-63 DEFE 6: Reports of the Joint Planning Staff 1958-62 PREMll: Prime minister's office 1953-62 F0371: Foreign Office general political files 1956-62 Colindale Newspaper Library, British Library Newspaper Cuttings Security Files, RIIA: The Observer The Times Sunday Times Financial Times Christian Science Monitor The Manchester Guardian The Daily Telegraph New York Times Printed Sources Documents on International Affairs 1958 (London: RIIA, 1962) Documents on International Affairs 1959 (London: RIIA, 1963) Documents on International Affairs 1960 (London: RIIA, 1964) Documents on International Affairs 1961 (London: RIIA, 1965) Documents on International Affairs 1962 (London: RIIA, 1966) Documents on International Affairs 1963 (London: RIIA, 1973) Cmd.1552, Germany No. 2 (1961) Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of BerUn (HMSO) Germany German Federal Archives, Koblenz Militar Archiv, Freiburg Auswartiges Amt, Bonn Zwischen Archiv, Bonn Bundeskanzler Amt Files, Former DDR Archive, Potsdam 259

260

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United States of America Unpublished official documents: National Archives and Records Administration, Washington (NARS) RG 59: State Department Decimal FUes 1958-62 RG218: Joint Chiefs of Staff FUes 1953-62 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston (JFKL) National Security FUes White House Private Office FUes 1961-62 Correspondence Files 1961-62 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene (DDEL) DDE Diary Series (Whitman Files) 1957-61 John F. Dulles Papers 1952-59 The See ley Mudd Library, Princeton University, N.J Adalai Stevenson Papers National Security Archive: Berlin Crisis Collection Nuclear History Project - Document Collection Published Document Collections Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960 Volume VIII: Berlin 1958-1959 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1993) Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960 Volume IX: Berlin 1959-1960: Germany; Austria (Washington DC: USGPO, 1993) Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963 Volume XTV: Berlin 1961-1962 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1993) Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963 Volume XV: Berlin 1962-1963 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1994)

Crisis Crisis Crisis Crisis

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268

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Index Acheson, Dean, 19, 169, 170, 172, 174, 178, 181, 198, 208n Kennedy, views on, 175-6 Adenauer, Konrad Berlin, policy on, 82-3, 84-5, 92-3, 162, 167 Berlin, proposes free city, 114, 115-16, 144 Berlin, true position unclear to allies, 46, 186 Britain, visit to, 123-4 British, reliability judged on DDR recognition and disengagement, 26, 30 confederation, shocked by Dulles' ideas for, 47 deadline crisis, 34, 36 and disengagement, 24-5, 26, 29-30, 90-2 Eisenhower visits, 113-14 and de Gaulle, 44-5, 62, 80 identifies FRG with West, 14-15, 23 Kennan lectures, angered by, 27 and Kennedy administration, 182, 187, 189, 194, 195 Labour Party, distrustful of, 29-30, 63-4 and Macmillan, 96, 98, 109, 122, 123-6, 132-3, 160-1, 203^* Macmillan, lack of rapport with, 3, 83 Macmillan, visit to Moscow, 57, 59, 61-2, 63-5, 70, 77-8, 79, 81-3 and Norstad Plan, 147-8 and Rambouillet summit meeting, 132-3 and UK, 31-2, 41, 44, 54, 55, 63-5, 90, 199-204 US disengagement from Europe, concern over, 24-5 and U-2 summit, 149, 151 see also FRG Adomeit, Hannes, 212n, 213n Air Corridor Agreement (1945), 11 Airlift, 36-7, 38, 48-9, 175-6 see also contingency planning Alsop, Joseph, 59, 177 Ambassadorial Group, see under contingency planning Ambrose, Stephen, 59, 216n, 220n, 227n

Amery, (Lord) Julian, 21 In Amory, Heathcoat, 128 Attlee, Clement, 209n German occupation, plan for, 8-9, 10, 207n Austria approached by USSR to act as intermediary, 162 Austrian State Treaty Macmillan, sees as important precedent, 14, 27 Barker, Elisabeth, 213n Bartiett, C.J., 209n Basic Law Berlin, status as Land under, 13 Baylis, John, 209n Bay of Pigs, 173 see also Cuba Berlin blockade, 5, 12-14 deadline crisis, 21, 33-6, 43, 74, 76 deadline crisis, Soviet motives in, 35-6 discussed at Vienna, 173-4 and disengagement, 31, 85, 92 Eisenhower, discusses in UK, 115-16 Eisenhower, accepts situation abnormal in, 117-19 escape route, used as, 179-80, 184-5 and Geneva meeting, 91, 92, 108-9 harassment in, 14, 33, 162-3, 192-3 Jebb, study on, 62-3 Kennedy, policy on, 168-70, 176-7, 178 Macmillan, less important than EEC to, 123 Macmillan and Kennedy, discuss, 196-7 morale sinks in, 185-6 Moscow, discussed by Macmillan in, 68-74 Rambouillet, discussed at, 132-3 UN, discussed by Macmillan and Khrushchev at, 161-2 U-2 summit, 139, 144, 145, 146, 151, 152-3, 156 Wall crisis, 1-2, 179-80, 183-90 Wall crisis, antecedents of, 7-15 Wall, plan to blow up, 193

271

272

Index

and Western peace plan, 95, 99 Beschloss, Michael, 205n, 213n, 220n, 236n, 244n, 251n, 252n, 253n, 257n Bevan, Aneuran, 21 In Dulles, concerned by views of Bevan, 86 Bevin, Ernest, 13 Bligh, Tim, 128 Blue Streak, 141 see also nuclear deterrent Bluth, Christoph, 213n Brandt, Willy, 162, 194 Brentano, Hilmar von, 92-3, 98, 108, 114, 124-5, 147, 168, 171 Greneva, criticises West's proposals at, 127 UK, upset by brief on Berlin, 41 Brimelow, (Baron) Tom, 76 Brinkley, David, 207n Brinkley, Douglas, 250n Brook, Sir Norman, 128, 166 reports on British over-reach, 26 Bruce, David, 175, 193, 197 Brussels Treaty, 194 Bulganin, Nikolai, 25 Bull, Hedley, 209n Bundestag Berlin, meeting in threatened by Khrushchev, 161-2 see also FRG Bundy, McGeorge, 169, 196, 205n, 206n Kennedy, focus on West Berlin defended, 183, 255n Burke, Arleigh Berlin, favours tough policy on, 87 Butler, D.E., 236n, 237n Butler, R.A., 17 Cabinet (UK), 3 leadership of Western world, rests with Britain cabinet concludes, 77, 83 Caccia, Harold, 43, 44, 84, 103, 120 Eisenhower, passes secret message to before UK election, 119 Macmillan's visit to Moscow, Dulles informed of, 57 UK, will not be atomised for Berlin he says, 86 Calvocoressi, Peter, 207n Camp David, contingency planning, reviewed by Eisenhower and Macmillan at, 88-9, 90, 103

Khrushchev, visit to, 104, 113, 117-19 Khrushchev visit to, allies uneasy over, 121, 127, 128, 133-4 Carver, (Lord) Michael, 218n contingency planning, discussed in Washington, 52 Cate, Curtis, 206n Catudel, Honore M., 206n, 254n CDU, 29 UK, attacked by Adenauer speech to, 64-5 Checkpoint Charlie, 192-3 Chequers Jebb memorandum, meeting at discusses, 62-3 see also Jebb Childs, David, 253n Chiefs of Staff (UK) disengagement, pass plan for, 85 ground action, impractical along autobahn, 176 Churchill, Winston S., 7, 8, 11, 210n, 21 In Berlin, appeals to Roosevelt to make it prime objective, 10 and German reunification, 22-3 USSR seeks contact with, 20, 27 Carlton, D., 209n Clarke, Peter, 208n, 209n Cockerell, Michael, 236n Cold War, 15,20 Clay, General Lucius Berlin accepts oral access agreement to, 11 and Berlin blockade, 12-13 Kennedy, emissary of, 185, 193, 208n Coleville, John, 208n contingency planning Acheson, proposals for, 169-70 allied discussions, 48-54, 59-60, 87-9, 94, 145, 154-5, 170-1, 174, 180, 189, 196 FRG, involved in, 139-40 Macmillan, concerned by US plans, 43-4, 46, 87-9 UK, considers options for in deadline crisis, 36-7 UK, rejects detailed planning, 175-6 Wall, not put into effect following, 185 Conservative Party, 17-18, 24, 238n disengagement, reference in manifesto, 123 Home, emphasises Western rights at conference, 192

Index Cook, Chris, 206n Council of Europe, 8 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, 208n Cuba Kennedy, distracted by, 168 and Berlin, 198 see also Bay of Pigs Cuban Missile Crisis, 1 Czechoslovakia and disengagement schemes, 27, 29, 63, 85, 89, 92, 93, 94, 146 Danubian Federation, 8 Day, Robin, 224n Defense Department contingency planning, 49-54 see also JCS Deighton, Anne, 208n Delacombe, Major-General Sir Rohan, 193-94, 205n Denmark, 146 Dillon, Douglas, 104-5, 149 disengagement Adenauer and, 24-5, 26, 81, 124-5 Kennedy administration, consider, 168-9, 183 Kennan, appears to support idea, 27-8 Labour Party and, 29-30 Macmillan and, 24-5, 60-1, 62-3, 85, 88, 89-90, 124-5, 130-1, 196 MOD/FO plan for, 28-9 and Moscow visit, 69, 74, 77, 80-1 and Norstad Plan, 146-7 and UK, 24-5, 26-30, 43, 45, 91-2, 123-6, 191 UK, drops link with reunification in plans for, 85, 89-90 Dittmann, Herbert, 47 division probe Acheson recommends, 169-70 JCS favour, 53 see also contingency planning Dockrill, Saki, 209n, 210n Drang nach Osten, 134 Dulles, Allen, 47 Dulles, Eleanor, 206n Dulles, John Foster, 44,45,46, 51, 67, 79, 85-6, 141, British resolve, questions it to Adenauer, 54 DDR, believes USSR will transfer Berlin access control to, 38, 40 DDR officials, considers dealings with, 42-43

273 Germany, suggests confederation in, 46-8 and Macmillan, 53-4, 57, 59-60, 86, 90 UK, paranoid over its policy, 96-7

East Germany (DDR/GDR), 14, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41 agency principle, 42-3, 48-9, 60, 88-9 and Berlin Wall, 184-5 Berlin, calls for situation to be normalised in, 33-4 Berlin, ministries prepared for relocation from, 146 FRG, considers de facto dealings with, 189 and Geneva conference, 98-9 and Kennedy administration, 168, 170 public support, put at 5 per cent, 47 refugees, flee from, 179-80 UK, consider recognition of, 32, 38-9, 41-2, 73-4 UK, proposes de facto dealings with, 5, 32 UK, warned over recognition of by Adenauer, 64 USSR, peace treaty with, 46, 69, 72, 73-4 see also Germany and Ulbricht, Walter EDC, 21, 24 Eden, Anthony, 7-8, 20, 21, 210n and Dulles, 141 reunification, Eden Plan for, 24-5, 31, 32, 74, 125 EEC, 109, 120, 128, 132, 134, 199, 203, 204 and EFTA, 31-2, 36, 122-3 Macmillan, links to future of NATO, 124, 129-32, 157-60 EFTA, 19-20, 128 Macmillan, misjudges appeal of to FRG, 31 EEC, dispute with, 3, 31-2, 122, 142, 145, 199, 203, 204 related to Berlin, 36 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 233n, 234n, 235n, 239n, 245n Adenauer, fear of British weakness noted, 31 Adenauer, seen as too rigid, 37 Berlin, accepts situation abnormal in, 117-18 Berlin, astonished by British brief on, 40-4

274

Index

Berlin, role in Second World War, 10-11 Berlin, shows flexibility on, 115-16, 117, 118, 121-2, 133 contingencies, rejects JCS plans, 53, 59-60 contingency planning, reviews with Macmillan, 87-9 economic embargo, suggests, 54 Europe, visit to, 113-17 and Geneva conference, 99-100 Khrushchev, invitation to, 5, 79, 84, 91, 102-9, 111-13, 117-19 and Macmillan, 16, 17, 20, 40, 59-60, 79, 83-90, 99-100, 102-8, 112-13 Macmillan, asked for help in arranging summit, 120-1 Macmillan, does not help in election, 119 Macmillan, irritated by his electioneering, 84 Macmillan, offers to meet before Moscow, 58 Macmillan, visit Moscow, 57-8, 59-60, 69, 70, 72, 75 NATO triumvirate, link with tripartite Berlin planning, 40 and Norstad plan, 147 and tripartitism, 133-7, 143 and U-2 summit, 150-5 see also United States Elbe River, 10 European Advisory Commission, 8-10 European security zone (neutral belt), 5 see also disengagement Evans, Harold, 208n extended deterrence, 1 FRG, 13, 21 British motives, distrustful of, 26, 62, 89,144 Bundestag, accepts role in West Berlin, 15 contingency planning, unaware of existing plans, 48 deadline crisis, response to ambiguous, 45-6 East European uprisings, feared likely to support, 29 Eisenhower, visit by, 113-14 Kennedy administration, assessment of, 181 Macmillan, FRG kept in dark over Moscow trip, 61

and nuclear weapons, 37-8 shows flexibility post-Wall, 192 and UK, 30, 31-2, 43, 56, 59 US nuclear weapons, deployment of in, 35, 37 Western defence, importance to grows, 23, 26 Western peace plan, objects to, 92-4, 108 see also Adenauer, Konrad and Germany Finland, 67 Fisher, Nigel, 208n Flexible Response, 1, 176 Foreign Office (UK), 8, 33 against airlift, 38-9 Bonn, warned about UK public opinion, 81 Berlin crisis, seen as way to curry favour with de Gaulle, 37 Berlin, drafts defeatist brief on, 38-41 Berlin insurance cover, USSR withdrawing from, 163 and DDR recognition, 115 and disengagement, 62-3, 92, 95 Europe v. US, 120, 131, 140-1, 159-60 German reunification, asked for real view on, 25-6 puts 'spin' on US reaction to Moscow visit, 58 NATO policy, rebukes Macmillan over, 158-9 representative in Berlin unsure of policy, 2 four occupying powers in Berlin, 1 agree to Greneva foreign ministers conference, 5, 74 co-operation between breaks down, 12 USSR calls on to prepare peace treaty, 33-4 France, 1 , 2 , 8 , 9 , 10, 11,21, 113 and deadline crisis, 37, 54 and disengagement, 90 irritate Herter at Geneva, 108-9 Khrushchev, suspicions over Camp David talks, 127 Macmillan, Moscow trip, 61, 64, 80 NATO triumvirate, French interest in linked to Berlin, 38 questions British resolve, 41, 109 UK, report Adenauer's fears over, 125 UK, tempted by alliance with, 120, 123-4 UK entry into EEC, vetoed, 129

Index US contingency plans, rejects, 50-1 and Wall crisis, 172, 182, 186 see also de Gaulle, Charles Frankel, Joseph, 205n 206n Free City Adenauer suggests for whole of Berlin, 114 mentioned by Macmillan at Paris summit, 152 revived following Wall, 186 USSR proposal for West Berlin, 68, 74, 99, 145-6, 151 see also Berlin Freedman, Lawrence, 253n Gaitskell, Hugh, 212n proposes neutral belt in Europe, 29-30, 21 In outmanoeuvred by Macmillan, 17,116 Galbraith, Professor J.K., 167 Gates, Thomas, 154 de Gaulle, Charles, 20, 34, 209n, 214n 216n and Adenauer, 44-5, 62, 80 appears resolute, 174, 181-2, 186 champions FRG's cause, 83, 201-2 and German reunification, 133 disassociates himself from probes to USSR, 191, 192, 195 EEC, UK application to join, 32, 129, 200 and Eisenhower, 113,116-17 firmness contrasted with UK, 31, 98 hosts U-2 summit, 151-5 Khrushchev, certain he does not want war, 74 Khrushchev, summit with, 101, 108, 112, 121, 148 and Macmillan, 16, 45, 64, 80-1, 96, 129-31, 142-3, 159-60, 194-5 and tripartitism, 133-7 tripartitism, agrees to summit in return for, 122 see also France Gearson, John P.S., 205n, 212n, 214n, 218n, 221n, 223n, 225n, 252n, 255n Gelb, Norman, 206n general election (UK, 1959) influence on Macmillan's Berlin policy, 2-3, 107, 116, 117, 119, 120 Geneva Foreign Minister Conference (1959), 5, 91, 98-102 Western preparations for, 91-8

275

undermined by Eisenhower's invitation to Khrushchev, 102-9, 111-12 German reunification, 5 Acheson sees as only solution to Berlin problem, 169 Adenauer and, 92-3 Berlin, beacon of hope for, 15 British, attitudes towards, 22-30, 63-6 Churchill, views on, 22-3 discussed at Rambouillet, 133-4 and European security, 23-5 and Macmillan, 22-3, 25-6, 85 UK, believes France against, 80, 148 US, plan for, 91-2 Western plan leading to, 9 3 ^ , 125 Germany, 1, 7-15 British policy towards, 4-5, 21-30, 31-2, 36-43, 63-5 fear of, mainstay of Soviet policy, 6970 Kennedy administration, propose new approach to, 168-9 Macmillan, ambivalent towards, 2, 31 neutralisation, proposed by Gaitskell, 29-30 neutralism, tendencies towards, 21-3, 61, 63-5 and Rapacki Plan, 27-8 see also FRG and East Germany Gilpatric, Roswell, 193 Globke, Hans DDR, plan for dealing with, 82-3 Great Britain Berlin, at odds with allies on, 4 Berlin policy, 3, 30-3, 79-80, 83, 148-9, 171, 184-6, 191-2 committed to European defence, 5, 21-2 concerned over Camp David meeting, 128 considers nuclear free Germany as part of Berlin deal, 51 contingency planning, 48-54, 87-9, 169-70, 182 and deadline crisis, 36-43 detailed military planning, refuses to undertake, 174-5, 195-6 and disengagement, 26-30, 43, 62-3, 92, 94-5, 97-8, 147, 201 and EEC, 3, 19-20, 31, 33, 122-3, 128-32 Eisenhower visits, 113-16 emphasises weakness of West's position in crisis, 5, 38-43

276

Index

Europe, public attitudes towards, 2, 19-20, 31-2 European policy, 120-1, 122-3, 12831, 134-5, 141-2 firm on West's right to stay in Berlin, 39 FRG, told of brief on Berlin, 41-2 Greneva, at odds with allies at, 99-100 and German reunification, 22-30 and Grermany, 21-30, 31-2, 62-3, 95, 123-6 Grermany, public attitudes towards, 3, 24, 27-8, 31, 44, 64-5, 97-8, 147 in Macmillan era, 19-21 in state of transition, 21 and Kennedy administration, 169-71 proposes West deal with DDR, 38-9 and recognition of DDR, 39-40 role in crisis, changed by arrival of Kennedy, 172, 181, 186, 190, 1967 sense of noblesse oblige, 2 US contingency plans, startled by, 502 and US, 2, 96-7, 102-10, 126, 129-31, 134, 140-1 USSR, harassment by in Berlin, 162-3 U-2 programme, 150 see also Macmillan government Gromyko, Andrei, 74, 178 denigrated by Khrushchev, 68 Macmillan, Moscow visit, 20-1, 58, 70, 74 Geneva, conference, 99, 108 US, talks with post Wall, 189-91, 192, 196 see also Khrushchev, Nikita and USSR Grose, Peter, 244n

and Norstad plan, 147 summit, without agenda suggested by CH, 102-3 USSR, attacked by CH in advance of U-2 summit, 149 Hershberg, James, 21 In Herwarth, Hans von, 210n, 212n Heusinger, General Adolf not invited to UK, 147 Home, Sir Alec Douglas Berlin, policy on, 160, 162, 171-2, 181, 182, 183, 185, 188, 193, 196 Lloyd, replaces, 18, 159 Macmillan, shares views on detente 2 Gromyko, talks with, 190 US, visits with Macmillan, 169-70, 174 Hoppes, Townsend, 227n Home, Alistair, 4, 205n, 208n, 209n, 210n, 21 In, 216n, 217n, 219n, 220n, 222n, 223n, 224n, 226n, 227n, 231n, 235n, 236n, 237n, 239n, 240n, 242n, 244n, 245n, 246n, 247n, 249n, 251n, 255n, 258n Howard, Michael, 21 On, 21 In Hoyer-Millar, Sir Frederick, 128, 141-2 Germans, ambivalent towards, 23-4 Macmillan, rebukes over NATO, 159 NATO and Germany, comments on, 62 Hughes, Emrys, 208n Hungary, 29, 94 Hutchinson, George, 208n, 224n

Hagerty, Jim, 118,119 Hanrieder, Wolfram, 210n Harrington, M., 209n Healey, Dennis, 212n Gaitskell Plan, drafted by, 29 Hennessey, Peter, 208n, 209n Herter, Christian, 82, 84, 91, 96-7, 104, 105, 108, 113, 121, 139, 153, 154 Berlin, new approach to, 127 Bonn, visits with Eisenhower, 114 de Gaulle, requests private meeting with Herter, 134-5 Geneva, proposes demarche to break deadlock at, 100 Herter Plan, 65, 99

James, Harold, 210n Jebb, Gladwyn, 221n Berlin study, 62-3 French, allows unease over US policy to go unchecked, 127 Johnson, Lyndon B. visits Berlin, 185-6 JCS, 9 autobahn option, agrees with COS views on, 176 Berlin, favour trial of strength over, 49-50 contingency planning, overruled by Eisenhower on, 60, 154 and nuclear war planning, 177

ICBM, see also nuclear weapons IRBM ban, on possession in Central Europe considered, 89, 92, 93, 95 see also nuclear weapons

Index Jordan strategic airlift capacity, UK weakness in revealed by crisis, 49 Kaplan, Fred, 253n, 256n Kelleher, Catherine M., 210n, 212n, 221n Kennan, Greorge, 131 Reith lectures, 27-8, 21 In Kennedy, John F., 1, 17, 165, 168, 176, 177, 1 8 3 ^ Berlin, decides policy on, 177-8, 179, 180, 183 Eisenhower, contrasted with, 189 and Khrushchev, 172-3 Khrushchev, performance against contrasted with Macmillan, 77 and Macmillan, 191, 195-7, 198 and nuclear war, 176-7 Vienna, stunned by, 173-4 Wall, flexibility following, 188 see also United States Kennedy administration, 1, 165 Berlin, approach to, 6, 190 Berlin, reviews policy, 168-9, 178, 182-3, 189 FRG, attempts to get to be less rigid, 191-2, 198 missile gap, revealed by, 69, 178-9, 193 nuclear war, planning, 188-9 Khrushchev, Nikita, 3, 100, 213n Berlin, motives for attacking, 35-6 Camp David, visit, 102-9, 117-19 deadline, crisis, 31, 33-6, 43 deadline, imposed at Vienna passes without incident, 197-8 deadline, withdraws original in talks with Macmillan, 71 deadline, withdraws second after Eisenhower undertakings, 118 Kennedy, reacts violently to Berlin policy of, 178, 184 Kennedy, Vienna meeting with, 172-3, 174 Macmillan, meets at UN, 161-2 Macmillan, secret exchange of messages with, 95-6 Macmillan, visit to Moscow, 57-8, 67, 68-74, 75-6, 77 nuclear devastation, threatens UK with, 177 peace treaty, repeats threat to sign, 149, 173 pragmatism, revealed, 46, 192 and U-2 summit, 146, 148, 149, 151-4

277

western divisions, exploited by, 32 see also USSR Kissinger, Dr Henry, 168, 212n, 258n kommandatura, 10-12 Konev, Marshal Ivan S., 185 Kozlov, Frol, 103, 104, 105 Kuznetsov, Vasili Lloyd, holds secret meeting with in Kiev, 73-4 Labour Party, 17, 107, 203 DDR, calls for recognition of, 24 disengagement, interest in, 29-30 Lacomme, Major Greneral Jean, 193-4 Lacouture, Jean, 216n, 247n Lamb, Richard, 205n, 208n, 212n, 248n Ledwidge, Sir Bernard, 209n, 212n, 214n Lightner, Allen, 193 Lindsay, T.F., 209n Lipschitz, Joachim, 193 Liveoak established, 88 FRG, shown plans by, 139-40 Kennedy administration, proposes expansion of remit, 171 see also contingency planning Lloyd, Selwyn, 2,18, 61, 81-2,91,95, 978, 123-4, 125, 132, 209n Adenauer, SL against favouring de Gaulle over, 38 Berlin, sets out starkly UK policy on, 32 contingency planning, 38-9, 51 DDR, recognition of, 38 deadline crisis, 36-7 disengagement, proposes study into, 28 European policy, 141-2 Greneva conference, 99, 100-1, 104, 107-8 German reunification, advises Churchill against, 22-3 Macmillan, encouraged to be open with US by SL, 96 Macmillan, bolstered by SL, 72,101-2, 106-7 Moscow, visit to, 59, 67-74 and summit diplomacy, 25, 181 USSR, threatens with US military power, 70 and U-2 summit, 154-5 Louis, W., 209n Mackintosh, Malcolm, 213n

278

Index

Macmillan, Harold, 2, 205n, 209n, 21 In, 212n, 215n, 216n, 217n, 219n, 220n, 222n, 223n, 224n, 225n, 226n, 227n, 234n, 235n, 237n, 238n, 239n, 244n, 246n, 248n, 252n, 255n, 256n, 257n and Adenauer, 3,25, 30,45,48, 55, 612, 81-3, 109, 123-6, 132-3, 160-1,

167, 197, 199-204 Adenauer, counts of his fondness too much, 48 Acheson presentation, distressed by, 170 advises Kennedy pre-Vienna, 172 at UN, 161-2 behind defeatist brief on Berlin, 39 Berlin, accepts core Westernrightsexist in, 194 Berlin blockade, 13 Berlin, policy, 4-5, 30-2, 84-5, 86-7, 103, 121, 123-4, 152-3 Berlin policy, influenced by election, 107, 116 Berlin, reaffirms UK determination to stay in, 34 Berlin, refuses to send extra troops to, 186 biography, 4, 57, 77, 82, 113, 198 career of, 15-19 chooses US over America, 136 Clay, annoyed by, 193 deadline crisis, reaction to, 36-43 debates with dying Dulles, 86 disengagement, interest in, 26-30, 32, 60-1, 62-3, 183 and Dulles, 42-3, 53-4, 59-61, 86, 90 and Eisenhower, 20, 59-60, 69, 70, 72, 75, 79, 83-90, 95-6, 102-10, 112-13, 120, 121, 144-5 EEC, danger of greater than nuclear war, 32 European policy, 3-4, 19-20, 31-2, 612, 113, 120-1, 122-3, 128-37, 1412, 144-5, 157-60, 194-5, 199-204 faces re-election, 80, 98,101-2,105-10, 111-13, 117, 119, 120 Franco-German rapprochement, miscalculates, 166-7 and de Gaulle, 121, 122-3, 126, 129, 134-6, 142-3, 157-8, 166-7, 187, 194-5 Grand Design, 158-9, 167-8 and Geneva, 100-2 Grerman reunification, 22, 25-30, and Grermany, 22-32, 97-8

happiest in foreign affairs, 17-18, 127-8 and Kennan lectures, 27-8 Khrushchev, exchanges secret messages with, 95-6, 113 Khrushchev, believes he wants to get off the hook in Berlin, 46-7 and Kennedy, 165-6, 167, 169-71, 173-4, 175, 179, 186, 189-90, 191, 195-7, 198, military preparations, refuses to countenance, 6 memoirs, 4 NATO, ideas on reorganisation, 28, 128-31, 157-60 nuclear weapons, aid to French programme, 129, 136, 142-3 nuclear weapons, concerns over FRG acquisition of linked to Berlin, 37 politically secure in foreign affairs, 1819 slow to appreciate shift in strategic landscape, 30, 108 and summit diplomacy, 27, 43-4, 57-8, 75-6, 79-80, 82, 83-4, 91-100,102, 109,112-13,120-1,204 trade balance, more important than Berlin, 135 US contingency plans, concerned about, 53-4, 59-60, 180 US, special relationship with, 20, 96-7, 105-10, 119, 134-5, 140-1, 202 USSR, favours negotiations/detente with, 2, 20-1, 26-7, 177, 181-2 USSR, policy on, 20-1, 25, 26-7, 84-5, 201-2 and U-2 summit, 150-5, 156-7 Wall, reaction to, 186-8, 191, 194 Macmillan government contingencies, concern over US plans, 49-50 Kennan, Reith lectures, 27 Berlin, Khrushchev's threats to, 36-7 Grermany, public opinion towards, 98 Berlin, crisis seen as distraction, 1 Macmillan's visit Moscow, 5, 30, 31, 4, 55, 56-78 agenda for, 66, 67-8 Adenauer, invites Macmillan to visit before, 61-2 Berlin discussions, 68-74 Eisenhower, invites Macmillan to visit before, 58 stands firm on Berlin, 68, 71-2, 77

Index suspension of deadline, Macmillan saved by, 75 toothache incident, 72-4 views on Khrushchev, 68, 75-6 own qualms about, 59 Makins, Sir Roger, 128 Malinovsky, Marshal Rodion, 152 Melissen, Jan, 209n MC70, 133 Mikoyan, Anastas, 46, 66, 74 MOD (UK), airlift, concerns over, 49 disengagement, prepares plan for, 28-9 objects to staff talks with French, 157 Morgan, Kenneth, 205n, 206n, 207n Moreton, Edwina, 207n Mountbatten, Lord Louis ground action, argues against, 51-2 MRBM, 158 see also nuclear weapons Murphy, Robert, 207n, 208n, 218n Khrushchev, invitation to, 104-5 British, rude about, 52 contingency planning, supports JCS position, 59 Murville, Couve de DDR, tells UK it should have been recognised, 41 France, overseas commitments emphasised, 182 and Greneva, 100-1 UK, disagrees with that mobilisation means war, 54 US contingency plans, rejected, 51 and U-2 summit, 153 see also France McCloy, John, 178 McMahon Act, 209n McDermott, Geoffrey, 205n McElroy, Neil, 53 McNamara, Robert, 169, 178-9, 189 NATO, 30, 35, 37, 48, 62-3, 74, 80, 124, 171, 195, 204 future organisation, UK links to Berlin, 3 Berlin, committed to defend, 14 and disengagement, 51, 85, 95 FRG, defence plans of dependant on, 23, 65 Kennan, strategy contradicted by, 28 Macmillan, ideas for reform, 28, 124, 128-32, 141-2, 158-9 naval blockade

279

Eisenhower, left cold by plans for, 88 US Navy, dismisses plans for, 176 USSR, considered as reprisal against, 54, 87-8, 175-6 see also contingency planning Navias, Martin, 209n Nelson, D.J., 207n Nitze, Paul, 178, 189, 256n Nixon, Richard, 105, 233n Norstad, General Lauris, 43, 158 and contingency planning, 49, 50, 51, 88 inspection zone, Plan for, 146-7 Wall, argues against violent reaction to, 185 Northedge, F.S., 205n, 206n, 209n, 21 In nuclear demonstration attacks proposed by US, 50-1 nuclear deterrent British, 141, 144, 157-8, 195, 204 delivery system, de Gaulle welcomes UK help with, 142-3 Berlin, linked to, 3 French, UK considers helping with, 129, 194-5 Kennan, questions value of, 28 nuclear tests French, first, 182 French, plans for linked to opposition to summit, 121 and Macmillan's Moscow visit, 67, 69 US, resumed, 189 nuclear war casualties in, UK estimates, 83, 87, 177 casualties in, US estimates, S7, 179, 188-9 impossible, over stamping of documents De Gaulle agrees, 81 public concerns, in UK, 175, 179, 189 nuclear weapons and Germany, 27-8, 35, 37, 38, 51, 64, 90, 195 use, De Gaulle speaks of, 187 use, in crisis considered, 88, 189 and USSR, 178-9 Oder-Neisse Line British views on 187-8 recognition of, FRG offers for Berlin deal, 61, 64 recognition of, considered, 148, 168, 186 Off-shore Islands dispute, 35-6 Option D, see contingency planning

280

Index

Ormsby-Gore, David, 81 Paris agreements, 21 Philips, Morgan, 119 Pleshakov, C , 213n, 222n, 23In, 245n, 254n Poland, 27, 29, 34, 63, 85, 89, 92, 93, 94, 146 Polaris, 157 Potsdam Conference,. 11, 34 Powers, Gary, 150 PRC Berlin crisis, rift with USSR possible factor in, 35-6 Prittie, Terrence, 216n, 220, 225n Protocol on Zones of Occupation, 10 Quadripartite Agreements, 1,34 West stands by, Macmillan tells Khrushchev, 68-74 RAF, 48-9 Rambouillet Western summit, 110, 131-8 Rand Corporation, 188-9 Rapacki, Adam nuclear free zone, plan for, 27-8, 38, 63, 88, 94 RB47, 157 refugees, 14, 179-80, 184-5 Reilly, Sir Patrick and Macmillan Moscow visit, 57, 75-6 Khrushchev, notes as having much to lose in a crisis, 41 DDR, USSR may not want a peace treaty with, 100 Reuter, Ernest, 12 Roberts, Sir Frank, 158, 166, 177 Robertson, Greneral Sir Brian, 208n Roosevelt, Franklin D., 8, 9, 207n Eisenhower, backed on not making Berlin prime objective, 10 Rose, Richard, 235n, 236n, 237n Rumbold, Sir Anthony, 21 In, 212n Rusk, Dean, 166, 168, 171-2, 174-5, 181-3, 188-9, 190, 252n, 254n Russo-German alliance fear of, 8, 21^1, 26 Sampson, Anthony, 208n Sandys, Duncan, 28-9 SchelUng, Thomas, 188-9 Schlesinger, Arthur, 175, 250n, 251n Scherpenberg, Hilmar von Moscow trip, not told of while in London, 61-2

Schick, Jack M., 78, 156, 206n, 213n, 225n, 246n, 254n Schwartz, David N., 21 In, 228n, 247n Schwartz, Thomas Alan, 208n Schwarz, Hans-Peter, 208n, 21 In, 216n, 222n, 225n, 226n Shennan, Andrew, 209n SIOP, 176-7 Sked, A., 206n Skybolt, 157 Slusser, Robert M., 206n, 213n Smirnov, Andrei, 34 Smith, Jean Edward, 206n, 207n, 208n Sorenson, Theodore C , 25In Soviet Union, see USSR Spaak, Paul Henri FRG, unease over stance on Berlin, 48, 95 Lloyd, secret talks with, 97 SPD (FRG) Gaitskell plan in line with policy of, 29 Stalin, Joseph, 7, 11, 12-13, 207n State Department Berlin, advisor in suggests avoiding trouble, 49 DDR, UK probed on recognition of, 43 Oder-Neisse line, plan to recognise, 126-7 and Kennedy administration, 168-9, 175-6 UK, assessment of, 52, 97, 172 and U-2 summit, 139 war, alternatives short of proposed, 54 Steel, Sir Christopher, 36, 48, 125, 184, 191 Stevenson, Adalai, 190 Strang, Sir William, 210n Strategic Air Command, 130 Strauss, Franz Joseph, Berlin, accused of not having thought through, 181 Stromseth, Jane E., 205n, 228n Taylor, General Maxwell, 186 Tehran Conference, 8 Thomson, Llewelyn, 41, 175, 178, 192, 196-7 Macmillan, Moscow visit seen as helpful, 84 Eisenhower, undertaking to Khrushchev, 117-18, 139

Index Thorpe, D.R., 210n, 21 In, 219n, 222n, 223n, 231n, 232n, 234n tripartitism, 129, 132-7, 141-2, 143, 157-8 Truman, Harry S., 10, 11, 12-13, 208n Turner, John, 208n, 217n Tusa, Ann, 206n, 207n, 233n Twining, General Nathan, 87 general war, argues US should ignore risk of, 50 Ulam, Adam, 213n Ulbricht, Walter, 3 3 ^ , 36 see also East Grermany UN Khrushchev speech to, 161-2 United States, 1, 10 Adenauer, uncertainty over policy in a crisis, 45 Berlin, flexibility on, 126-7, 128, 1456, 188 Berlin, Kennedy reviews policy, 168-9, 172-3 Berlin, moratorium considered, 103 Berlin, UK brief on, 40-2, 44 contingency planning, four stage plan proposed, 50-1, 52 deadline, crisis, 36, 39-40 defence, co-operation with UK, 20, 129, 134, 141, 157-8 disengagement, UK plan rejected, 62 EEC, UK view rejected, 132, 142 Eisenhower administration, end of 160-1 harassment, by USSR in Berlin, 192-3 invitation to Khrushchev, misunderstanding over, 104-5 Macmillan-Adenauer talks, confused over, 85 Macmillan's electioneering, concern over, 119 Macmillan's Moscow visit, views on, 57, 77, 83-4 reunification, plans for, 91-3 and UK, 96-7, 126, 129-30 and U-2 summit, 144, 150 and western peace plan, 93-5, 99 see also Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Kennedy, John F. Kennedy administration USSR, 1,3,9, 10, 11, 14 armed forces, cuts in suspended, 177 Berlin, campaign of harassment in, 162-3, 192-3 Berlin, motives in raising issue, 35-6

281

Berlin, Western position in attacked, 33-5 deadline, crisis begun, 34, 43, 46, 49 deadline, withdrawn during Macmillan visit, 71 deadline, abandoned after Khrushchev visit to US, 118 deadline, reimposed at Greneva, 101 disengagement, UK hopes for interest in, 26-7, 130 Geneva conference, accepts, 74 German peace treaty, proposes, 24, 33 and Kennedy administration, 169, 173-4 Macmillan, policy of sought, 66-8 and UK, 20, 25, 26 and U-2 summit, 149-51 see also Khrushchev, Nikita U-2 Eisenhower, refuses to step up flights, 60 incident, 149-50 Khrushchev, position made difficult by, 150-1 summit, 2, 138, 146, 150, 151-2, 153-4 Voyage of Discovery, 56-79 see also Macmillan, Harold Watson, General Albert, 193-4 Watt, D . C , 207n, 210n, 21 In, 258n Werewolf, 10, 207n WEU, 21-2, 130 White, Brian, 205n Williams, Philip, 209n, 236n Winant, John, 207n Windsor, Philip, 206n, 208n, 212n, 213n, 217n World War 1 and Macmillan, 2-3, 16, 86-7 World War 2, 3, 7-11, 65-6, 153 working group, 62 Geneva meeting, prepares for, 91-2, 93-4 U-2 summit, prepares for, 139, 143-4 WTO, 64, 85 Young, Kenneth, 209n, 254n Zhukov, Marshal Georgi, 11 Zubok, V., 213n, 222n, 231n, 245n, 254n Zulueta, Philip de NATO, ideas for reorganisation of, 128-31

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