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European Union Politics DOI: 10.1177/1465116505049609 Volume 6 (1): 83–112 Copyright© 2005 SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks CA, New Delhi

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European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy Testing the Impact of National Identity Adam Luedtke University of Washington, USA

ABSTRACT

This article empirically investigates the effect of national identity on public opinion towards European Union (EU) control over immigration policy. The EU has recently gained some control over immigration policy, but has faced strong opposition from reluctant national politicians. This study argues that public opinion is an important factor in explaining such reluctance. I propose a hypothesis of national identity to explain public opinion, positing that those who identify with their nation-states (vis-à-vis Europe) are less likely to support EU control over immigration policy than are those who identify with ‘Europe’. Using logistic regression, this factor is shown to be stronger than support for European integration, opinions about immigrants themselves, and other variables such as economic calculation, political ideology, age and gender.

KEY WORDS


European Union




identity




immigration




nationalism




public opinion 83

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Immigration is a crucial political issue in 21st century Europe. It was identified as one of the top problems facing Europe by 82% of members of the European Parliament (Lahav, 1997). A survey of the British public found that immigration was considered a more important problem than the economy, education, drugs or Europe (BBC, 2001). In a recent Eurobarometer survey, respondents from across the EU ranked the importance of immigration higher than terrorism, pensions, taxation, education, housing, the environment, public transport, defence and foreign affairs (Eurobarometer 60, 2004). Concurrent with the growing political salience of immigration, the member states of the European Union (EU) have taken tentative steps toward building a common immigration policy. Immigration policy cooperation is seen by many as necessary for the EU’s single market, its internal border-free space, and its shared external borders. Especially since the attacks of 11 September 2001, immigration is also high on the EU’s agenda as a security threat that can be mitigated only through common action. These goals were taken seriously by EU leaders who met in 2003 to draft a European Union constitution, despite a decades-long legacy of failed promises and weak cooperation on immigration policy (Papademetriou, 1996). The Convention on the Future of Europe considered extending the EU’s powers in this field, and the resulting draft did, in fact, considerably expand Brussels’ control over immigration. However, despite the (premature) perception of a new consensus on supranationalism, the ‘harmonization’1 of a new EU immigration policy is by no means assured. It was not only the usual Euro-sceptic suspects but also (and most fervently) Germany that insisted on a ‘national veto’ on the numbers of immigrants admitted. Furthermore, many politicians (e.g. Edmund Stoiber, the conservative premier of Bavaria) voiced an intention to use subsequent Intergovernmental Conferences further to trim Brussels’ proposed powers. Thus, after decades of trying by the Commission, Parliament and their allies, and a great deal of contentious politics, the success of an EU immigration policy is by no means assured. This is in spite of the aforementioned perception that such a policy is necessary if projects such as the single market and the Schengen zone are to succeed. The spectacular political divergence between mandate and results presents a puzzle: why has harmonization of immigration policies been so elusive, if such harmonization is seen as necessary for the EU to become a single market with free movement of labour? The answer obviously lies with national politics, since some member state governments have, at various times, blocked harmonization proposals advanced by other member states and by the EU’s governing organizations. From where does this national opposition to harmonization of immigration policies originate? I suggest that some EU citizens have been resistant

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to the idea of granting Brussels control over immigration not because of instrumental calculations regarding perceived strategic gains or losses from immigration cooperation, and not because of their opinions of immigrants themselves, but because the proposed supranationalization of immigration control clashes with historically rooted national identities. To test this hypothesis, I will show who supports harmonization and who opposes it, and what factors stand out about these opposing groups, while attempting to differentiate between identity and instrumental calculation. Remarkably, the prominent literature on immigration policy harmonization does not address the nature of public opinion on harmonization – such knowledge could be crucial for understanding why harmonization has failed politically thus far. Immigration policy harmonization, like most immigration policy in general, is seen as an elite project built by functionalist and technocratic civil servants (in league with business interests) who are insulated from populist hostility (McLaren, 2001; Fetzer, 2000; Guiraudon, 1997; Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994; Simon and Alexander, 1993; Hollifield, 1992). But these assertions, as well as the oft-floated claim that public opinion tends to follow elite opinion over time, fail to explain why a large degree of immigration policy harmonization has failed to materialize in recent years (Geddes, 2003). This puzzle can perhaps be solved by delving into public opinion, to determine the degree to which European publics are supportive or hostile towards giving Brussels increased control over immigration. Some might invoke the ‘democratic deficit’, arguing that it makes no difference what the average EU voter thinks of the need for a harmonized EU immigration policy, since these decisions are made at the elite level, behind closed doors and with very little public input. ‘EU integration constitutes a threat to democratic accountability derived from the empowerment of unaccountable, expert transnational coalitions of national ministers, officials and technocrats’ (Geddes, 2000: 4). However, the EU has taken greater strides towards open and accountable decision-making in recent years, including a push for a greater role for the European Parliament – the EU’s only directly elected body. Brussels has been stung by public criticisms and discouraging referendum results, and its political difficulties have shown that ‘mass attitudes appear to be crucial to the success of new institutions and reforms associated with the process of European integration’ (Cichowski, 2000: 1244). This factor, coupled with the need for national-level politicians to be sensitive to their voters’ opinions regarding European integration, means that explaining voter opinion about integration remains of paramount importance for understanding the future of the Union. Arguments for a linkage between public opinion and European integration are well documented in the literature (Carey, 2002; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Anderson, 1998; Dalton and

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Eichenberg, 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Inglehart, 1977; Shepherd, 1975). On the issue of immigration, understanding public opinion on harmonization is especially important now, given that the draft European constitution, which gives Brussels a high degree of control over immigration policy, must be ratified in public referendums. My study builds on recent work that attempts to demonstrate a link between national identity and support for European integration, while controlling for other factors (Marks and Hooghe, 2003; Carey, 2002; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; McLaren, 2002). But although these studies fruitfully examine opinions about the European Union in general, I argue that a specific focus on opinions about a single policy area – immigration – is also a valuable contribution. Such a focus builds a bridge between the literature on public opinion and the literature on immigration politics, since the latter demonstrates that immigration tends to be a ‘special’, or idiosyncratic policy area as far as both European integration and identity are concerned. In the realm of European integration, immigration has lagged far behind other policy areas in its level of Europeanization, despite its clear link with the single market project and the stated goal of free movement of labour. Other ‘lagging’ policy areas, such as defence or foreign policy, do not have the same clear link with the core single market project. Thus, public opinion about EU control over immigration might diverge considerably from public opinion about the EU in general. In the realm of identity, I argue that immigration is a ‘special’ policy area, because of its links with the actual definition of the nation itself. Immigration policy separates insiders from outsiders. Thus, scholars should understand how national identities in Europe might affect feelings about the nation losing control over immigration. Given the potential importance of public opinion, this article will show who supports a common EU immigration policy and why. Do they consciously support such a policy for ‘rational’ reasons, based on calculated (cognitive) support for economic integration, or is their reaction based on noneconomic, non-calculated (affective) considerations such as national identity? How do feelings towards immigrants themselves affect beliefs about Brussels controlling policy? Very little work has been done, theoretical or empirical, to answer these questions. Therefore, this paper will test the hypothesis that national identity (versus ‘European identity’ or some mixture of the two) can account for the dependent variable in my study: level of support for the harmonization of EU immigration policy. Obviously, this level of support cannot necessarily explain policy outcomes. Nonetheless, I argue that exploring public opinion might allow scholars to learn why immigration policy harmonization has failed to materialize, despite more than a decade of continuous effort by the European Commission and Parliament.

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In addition to testing the national identity hypothesis, I will propose and empirically test several alternative explanations of public support for immigration policy harmonization using survey data. The next section defines the concept of national identity and proposes a hypothesis of how national identity affects public opinion about harmonization of immigration policy. After proposing alternative explanations for public opinion, I introduce my data and lay out my methodological approach. I then present the results of my data analysis on national identity and the alternative explanations in the EU as an entire sample and in all 15 member states as separate samples. The final section concludes.

Conceptualizing national identity What is ‘national identity’? The concept is widely used, yet ‘there is a lack of standard and commonly accepted definitions and measures’ (Christin and Trechsel, 2002: 417). For the purposes of this study I draw on the field of social psychology to define identity, in a social sense, as an affective state of belonging to a social group (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2002; Wenzel, 2002; Brown, 2000; Mercer, 1995). An affective state, as opposed to a cognitive state, is one that can independently generate social preferences, leading to emotional evaluations of social groups. These evaluations can take both positive and negative directions, i.e. ‘ingroup love’ and ‘outgroup hate’, to use extreme terms (Brewer, 1999; Brown, 2000). This definition of social identity can be applied to the concept of the nation and nationalism. Whereas some theorists of nationalism would see national identity as freely and/or instrumentally chosen in a cognitive sense (Hardin, 1995), theorists such as Benedict Anderson (1991: 7) see national identity in an affective sense, as a ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’. Building on the work of Anderson, Tsygankov (2001: 15) defines national identity as ‘a cultural norm that reflects emotional or affective orientations of individuals toward their nation and national political system’. As a norm of belonging and self-definition that is cultural and affective in nature, this theory implies that national identity would hold relatively steady over time, despite instrumental or political incentives for members of nations to drop, add to or modify their national identities. National identity can thus be prior to instrumental calculations, and it ‘explains the occurrence of ingroup bias even in the absence of objective or instrumental causes – for example, conflicts of economic interests’ (Brown, 2000: 748). Some experimental research has shown that, beyond instrumental causes, ‘national identification by itself was the most consistent predictor of xenophobic attitudes, an

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association observed in other studies of inter-nation or inter-ethnic attitudes’ (Brown, 2000: 748). As institutions in their own right, national identities can thus be prior to, or ‘constitutive’ of, citizens, and can shape their preferences. This hypothesis also accords with social constructivism, which seeks ‘to understand how preferences are formed and knowledge generated, prior to the exercise of instrumental rationality’ (Katzenstein et al., 1998: 681). Obviously, sorting out the mutual influence of identity and instrumentality is a challenging business but, if identity is a mere proxy for support for European integration or an instrumental motivation, then it will not be a stronger predictor of preferences than any other variable. However, this paper will ask whether the opposite might be true, and whether national identity, by itself, is the strongest predictor of my dependent variable, support for EU control over immigration policy. What would be the logic of this relationship? Institutions, laws and policies to regulate immigration2 are often said to be based on conceptions of national identity. Indeed, seminal works on immigration politics have explicitly drawn this link (Checkel, 2001; Thielemann, 2001; Ugur, 1995; Hollifield, 1994; Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994; Baubock and Cinar, 1994; Faist, 1994; Wischenbart, 1994; Schnapper, 1994). If national identity means selfdefinition and belonging in the national polity, then immigration cuts to the heart of this concept, because it raises political questions about how the nation-state should be defined. Immigration policy determines who should belong to the nation-state (and who should be excluded), and determines the very nature of that belonging by establishing the criteria for entrance, expulsion, settlement and naturalization. ‘There is a close connection between the ways a polity responds to the challenge of migration and its values, collective understandings and institutions’ (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 1). In postwar Europe, nation-states chose widely differing immigration policies, from the assimilationism of French republicanism and its colonially based immigration policy, to the jus sanguinis ethno-citizenship of Germany and its guest-worker model. Since national identity is embedded in political institutions (Marcussen et al., 1999), many scholars have located the origins of these particular immigration policies in the national identities of their respective countries (Checkel, 2001; Hollifield, 1994; Baubock and Cinar, 1994; Faist, 1994; Wischenbart, 1994; Schnapper, 1994). Therefore, if there is a single policy issue where non-instrumental factors might override instrumental calculation, immigration is an ideal candidate. If immigration is so strongly connected with national identity, then one would expect national identity to be a determinant of public opinion about national control over immigration policy under conditions of globalization

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and/or Europeanization. That is, citizens who identify strongly with their own nation-state will most likely prefer that it retains control over its own particular, historically based immigration policy, despite the countervailing forces of globalization that have pushed immigration policies towards crossnational convergence (Castles and Miller, 1998; Cornelius et al., 1994). The EU provides an excellent test case for national identities being challenged by Europeanization and globalization, because the process of European integration has brought with it new norms and identities that have confronted historically rooted national identities (Risse, 2001). In the case of Germany, Checkel argues that ‘Germany’s historically constructed identity, for some domestic agents, has acted as a filter or block vis-à-vis . . . Europeanlevel norms’ (2001: 197). In the case of the UK, Wallace argues that national identity causes Tory opposition to Brussels: ‘The Conservative Party’s discourse is instinctively that of national identity’ (1995: 50, emphasis added). Although the EU’s single market, which has given the impetus to immigration policy harmonization, is a project of economic integration, some argue that, in matters of immigration, national identity overrides economic considerations, and that people cannot be ‘rational’ when contemplating outsiders and the national polity’s ability to control them (Ugur, 1995).3 Ugur argues that immigration policy is a ‘nondivisible, nontransparent policy issue’, meaning that it cannot be dealt with in the bargaining/compromise manner of most economic negotiations owing to its resonance with citizenship, membership and identity. Thus, ‘immigration in Europe is perceived by societal forces as a threat to established visions of identity and societal integrity’ (Ugur, 1995: 972). For example, much thinking on immigration policy in France is dictated by a ‘Republican consensus’ over values, goals and procedures that is strongly correlated with French national identity (Hollifield, 1994). Those who identify strongly with the French nation-state will not want to give up immigration sovereignty to the EU (Hoffmann, 1993). How salient is collective identity in determining preferences over who should control immigration policy in the EU? As European integration proceeds, one should expect to see changes in identity, leading to changes in public opinion. ‘This emerging European polity impacts upon the way individuals and social groups view themselves and the nation-state’ (Risse, 2001: 200). Identities may be ‘sticky’ (Marcussen et al., 1999), but this does not mean that they are mutually exclusive. Some Europeans might identify both with the nation-state and with ‘Europe’, whereas others would identify with only one or the other. ‘Individuals inhabit multiple worlds simultaneously, interact in various contexts and grow as personalities by developing various identifications in relation to all these contexts’ (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 24). This hypothesis draws on broader theories of constructivism and

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sociological institutionalism, which hypothesize that identity factors can override and/or prevent individualistic, instrumental calculations (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Marcussen et al., 1999; Checkel, 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; McNamara, 1998). When contemplating the possibility of a supranational immigration regime, does rational calculation play a role for the average European voter? The Economist magazine, normally a proponent of rational, instrumental explanations, sees the political difficulty in forging a common EU immigration policy as a problem of ‘balancing the benefits offered by the free movement of labour against voters’ fears, often irrational, about threats to national identity’ (The Economist, 2002: 14, emphasis added). In immigration politics, as in many areas of EU politics, ‘a calculus of identity and appropriateness is sometimes more important to actors than a calculus of political costs and benefits’ (Thielemann, 2001: 1). Regardless of consciously held personal interests or economic costs and benefits, perhaps certain options are ‘off the table’ for those who see themselves as ‘Finns’ as opposed to ‘Europeans’, and one of these options is Brussels having control over who can enter the national space of Finland. Therefore, if my hypothesis is correct, as more and more EU citizens identify with ‘Europe’ (either alone or together with their nation-state), they should become more open to an EU-controlled immigration policy. If I can show that those who now see themselves as ‘Europeans’ (at least partially) are more prone to grant Brussels control over immigration policy than are those who remain identified solely with their nation (while controlling for economic interests and other cost–benefit calculations), then I can demonstrate the political salience of these collective understandings and loyalties.4 H1 (national identity): National identity leads to a preference for the nation-state to control immigration. The more strongly one identifies with one’s nation-state, the more likely it is that one will oppose a harmonized EU immigration policy.

Alternative explanations One obvious potential influence of opinions about EU control over immigration policy is opinion regarding immigrants themselves. But, to derive a testable hypothesis from this theoretical link, one must be aware of the likely or perceived policy effects of harmonization on immigrants themselves – that is, will EU control lead to more immigrants and a more liberal immigration policy, or will it do the opposite? Remarkably, scholarly literature is highly divided on this topic. The intuitive assumption might be that EU control over immigration policy would lead to a more liberal policy, for three possible reasons. First,

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‘globalists’ argue that immigrants are more likely to gain protections, rights and freedoms from the supranational level, because of the forces of economic globalization and/or transnational discourses of human rights (Jacobsen, 1996; Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994). Second, neo-functionalists argue that Europeanization will benefit immigrants because it benefits all ‘exchangers’, through the forces of economic liberalization that eventually spill over into liberalization in other policy areas (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Philip, 1994; Callovi, 1992; Ireland, 1991). And, finally, political entrepreneurship by the Commission and Parliament (which have traditionally been pro-immigrant in their outlook) might be expected to make its mark on policy outputs, despite restrictive national sentiments (Papademetriou, 1996). However, there is an opposing body of literature on EU immigration policy that has empirically demonstrated how the limited steps towards EU control, thus far, have actually resulted in a less liberal immigration policy (meaning fewer rights, freedoms and privileges for immigrants). This body of work is more state centric, and sees the EU’s institutions as part of a rational, intergovernmentalist contract (Moravcsik, 1998). Using a common EU immigration policy, the member states can achieve their restrictive goals, appeasing anti-immigrant electorates (while dodging domestic parliamentary and judicial scrutiny) by cracking down on immigrant rights behind the closed doors of the Council of Ministers in Brussels (Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Guiraudon, 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Geddes, 2000; Joppke, 1999). Tellingly, many immigrant advocacy groups and their allies concur, and thus actually prefer national control over immigration policy, because of the stronger judicial and parliamentary oversights and protections for immigrant rights at the national level (Geddes, 2000; Hix and Niessen, 1996). By the same logic, then, anti-immigrant publics might support EU control over immigration policy, because it would allow for the more effective enforcement of restrictive immigration policies. A loss of de facto sovereignty would be offset by the greater gains to be had in limiting immigration through a ‘Fortress Europe’ policy of tightly patrolled external EU borders (Ugur, 1995). Because of these competing and unclear views of policy implications, both of which invoke strong arguments, I will test opposing hypotheses regarding the effects of opinion about immigrants on opinion about EU control over immigration policy. I will test both arguments in two areas of opinions about immigration: feelings towards minorities residing in one’s country, and the belief that immigrants from outside the EU (so-called ‘thirdcountry nationals’, or TCNs) should have the same social rights as EU citizens. H2a (EU control will expand immigrant rights): The more negatively one feels towards immigrants and/or the more one feels that immigrants should not have

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equal social rights with EU citizens, the more likely it is that one will oppose a harmonized EU immigration policy. H2b (EU control will restrict immigrant rights): The more positively one feels towards immigrants and/or the more one feels that immigrants should have equal social rights with EU citizens, the more likely it is that one will oppose a harmonized EU immigration policy.

Aside from identity and opinions about immigrants and immigration policy, other perspectives would hold economic interests to be paramount, especially considering that not all members of a national polity will have identical interests regarding a unified EU immigration policy. One might hypothesize that blue-collar workers, the unemployed and/or those with low education levels would be against harmonization whereas white-collar workers, the employed and/or the highly educated would support it, since these socioeconomic differences would reflect labour competition arising from an EU single market with free movement of labour. The former group would fear the labour competition arising from an EU immigration regime under which capital and cheap labour could freely move around, potentially putting them out of work, whereas the latter group might perceive more gains from such an arrangement (Fetzer, 2000; Harwood, 1986; Simon, 1987). Borjas (1999) argues that an increase in immigration boosts the supply of labour, thus reducing wages for the native working class. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that low-skill or low-education workers are more likely to oppose immigration, which follows from arguments about labour market competition (O’Rourke, 2003; Mayda, 2003). Working-class voters tend to be the ‘modernization losers’ (Kriesi, 1995; Givens, 2004) who feel threatened by the combined forces of globalization, the EU and immigrants, and who tend to vote for radical Right parties (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Martin, 1996; LewisBeck and Mitchell, 1993). Education is likely to play an especially important role here. ‘Given that most immigrants . . . lack a university degree, higher education should decrease natives’ sense of economic threat’ (Fetzer, 2000: 21). Further, education might be expected to increase tolerance in its own right, regardless of economic considerations (Plane, 2001). H3 (socioeconomic variables): Belonging to the working class, being unemployed and/or having less education makes one more opposed to the free movement of labour, which leads to a preference for the nation-state to control immigration. The ‘lower’ one’s socioeconomic position, the more likely it is that one will oppose a harmonized EU immigration policy.

However, there are other measurable economic interests and preferences besides socioeconomic indicators. If one is trying to demonstrate that a

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calculus of costs and benefits is more important than a calculus of identity and appropriateness, then one must operationalize a cost–benefit calculus that would lead to testable preferences regarding a harmonized EU immigration policy. The entire EU project is fundamentally a project of economic integration, since the single market has been the driving impetus for political integration (Moravcsik, 1998), as well as for a harmonized immigration policy (Papademetriou, 1996; Philip, 1994). Currently the most politically important facet of economic integration is the common European currency, the euro. The euro holds paramount importance for economic integration because of its high visibility and controversy as a ‘flagship’ project. Since support for the euro has been somewhat shaky following its introduction, a rationalist might hypothesize that support for the euro is a good test of support for economic integration in general, including the willingness to give up national control over an area of policy that has both practical and symbolic value (be it currency or immigration policy). The impetus for the EU to regulate immigration has come from the need for the free circulation of labour in the single market, which can be achieved only by open internal borders and cooperative control over external borders. Those EU citizens who understand this linkage, and support the project of economic integration (including the euro currency), will also support Brussels’ controlling immigration policy, regardless of whether they identify with their nation-state or how they feel about immigrants in general. This hypothesis assumes a conscious cost–benefit calculus by EU voters, who are capable of understanding the link between economic unity and a harmonized immigration policy, and it therefore assumes that there will be a pro/anti-EU immigration policy cleavage cutting across nationalities and even national identities (Gabel, 1998). If most Europeans see the EU as a project of economic integration, then those who support the single currency, the euro, will also support the EU having control over immigration policy as a key area of economic unification. If EU citizens support economic interdependence, then they might also be expected rationally to support relinquishing national control over borders, passports, visas and other ‘touchy’ issues, given the gains from trade that would come with the free movement and circulation of labour (Philip, 1994; Callovi, 1992). H4 (opposition to European integration): Individuals opposed to the expansion of the single market project (EU, enlargement, euro) will be less likely to support harmonization of immigration policy.

Other variables also come to mind when trying to explain public opinion about EU control over immigration policy. For instance, is political ideology a factor at all? One might think it obvious that those on the political Right

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would prefer national control over immigration policy. However, this intuition ignores the potentially cross-cutting nature of immigration as a policy issue, since many on the pro-business Right might prefer the liberalization of labour markets and many on the trade union Left might prefer protections for domestic workers and be suspicious of regional integration in this area. Indeed, Sniderman et al. (2000) and Money (1999) find that immigration can be orthogonal to the Left/Right continuum. Thus, the hypothesis that conservatives would favour national control is not beyond doubt and can be usefully tested by my study. H5 (political ideology): Belonging politically to the Right leads to a preference for the nation-state to control immigration. Those on the Left will be more likely to support harmonization of immigration policy.

Perhaps gender plays an independent role in feelings towards immigration policy harmonization, as it does in support for the radical Right (Givens, 2004). Women might feel less threatened than men by the free movement of labour, since most migrant labour in the EU has traditionally been male. Some theorists have found a connection between gender and feelings about outsiders through the mechanisms of marginality and social status, whereby women may feel more affinity with immigrants and thus be less insecure about relinquishing national control over immigration policy (Fetzer, 2000; Myrdal, 1944). H6 (gender): Women will be more likely than men to support EU control over immigration policy.

Finally, age might play an independent role as well. The young might feel more positive towards EU control than do those who are older, since the context for generational outlooks towards fellow Europeans and immigrants has changed considerably since the Second World War. Also, students in the modern education system are often socialized to have ‘more liberal or prooutsider views’ (Fetzer, 2000: 20). H7 (age): As age increases, support for EU control over immigration policy will decrease.

Data and methodology To test these competing hypotheses, I use a set of questions and responses from Eurobarometer 53 (Hartung, 2001). This survey asks a broad variety of questions on EU issues to measure social and demographic characteristics as well as opinions about the EU and other political issues. With a size of roughly

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15,000 respondents, at around 1,000 per country, this sample is representative of the 15 national electorates and of the EU electorate as a whole.5 Regarding the harmonization of immigration policy, public opinion is split somewhat evenly across the EU over whether Brussels or the national governments should have control, with less than a majority in most countries preferring that the EU should gain control. Overall, only 43% of EU citizens support a harmonized EU policy, but the variation across countries is dramatic, with support ranging from 70% in the Netherlands to only 15% in Finland.6 What accounts for these variations? Remarkably, no study has thus far conducted thorough empirical tests on the causes of the variation in public opinion on this issue. As a preliminary test of my national identity hypothesis, I can descriptively compare the above data (support for EU control over immigration policy) with data on identification with the EU and the nation-state. Figure 1 compares countries according to the percentages of respondents who favour EU control over immigration policy and the percentages who say that they identify with their nation only (as opposed to identifying with Europe only, or with both Europe and the nation). I use this self-identification question to operationalize my concept of national identity, following the work of Marks and Hooghe (2003), Carey (2002) and Kostakopoulou (2001). Looking at Figure 1, although the rankings on the two variables do not line up perfectly, Identifying with nation only Favouring EU control over immigration policy 80

Percentage of respondents

70 60 50 40 30 20 10

ly Ita

U K Sw ed en Fi nl an d G re ec e Au st ria Ire la nd D en m ar k G er m an Po y rtu ga l Be lg iu N m et he rla Lu nd xe s m bo ur g Fr an ce Sp ai n

0

Figure 1 Comparison of percentage identifying with nation only and percentage favouring EU control over immigration policy, by country (N = 15,325).

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there appears to be a clear negative relationship between the two factors. That is, a public that tends to identify more exclusively with its nation also seems less likely to favour EU control over immigration policy. Obviously, this initial correlation (although striking) is not enough to prove that national identity is doing the actual explanatory work. To control statistically for the other explanations listed above, and to determine whether national identity has a more powerful impact than other variables do, I will perform binary logistic regression to enquire into the existence of a statistically and substantively significant relationship between national identity and support for an EU immigration policy. I use dummy variables for all explanatory factors other than age, which is coded as an interval variable. To indicate the absence or presence of national identity (H1), I employ two variables: ‘nation only’ and ‘European only’. For feelings towards immigrants (H2), I use binary variables for ‘too many’ and ‘not many’ minorities, and the belief that TCNs should have equal rights. For socioeconomic factors (H3), I add dummy variables for ‘manual worker’, ‘unemployed’, ‘secondary school education only’, ‘university education’ and ‘still studying’. For European integration support (H4), separate variables track opinions about EU membership being a ‘good thing’ and a ‘bad thing’, as well as responses ‘against the Euro currency’, and ‘against EU enlargement’. For political ideology (H5), the model includes variables for Left and Right, and, for gender (H6), male is coded as 1. The full wording of the questions and the coding of the responses can be accessed on the EUP homepage.

Results The dependent variable in the analysis is the belief that immigration policy should be controlled by the EU. The overall analysis estimates the degree to which national identity, feelings towards immigrants, socioeconomic variables, opposition to European integration, political ideology, gender and age have an effect on the probability that an EU resident will support an EU immigration policy, all other things being equal. Table 1 displays the results. The expected direction of the relationship is negative, since national identity is coded as 0 and support for EU control over immigration policy is coded as 1. We can assess the overall fit of the model with the h2statistic, which is statistically significant (p < 0.001). The model predicts roughly 69% of the cases correctly. To deal with heteroscedasticity, I use country fixed effects. It is clear from Table 1 that the coefficient on national identity is statistically significant, with a p-value below 0.001. But 10 of the 16 control variables

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Table 1 Logistic regression model of support for EU control over immigration policy in 15 countries

National identity European identity Not many minorities Too many minorities Equality for TCNs Manual worker Unemployed High school education only University education Still studying EU membership a good thing EU membership a bad thing Against euro currency Against EU enlargement Left Right Gender (male) Age Constant

B

Significance

Exp (B)

–0.486 (0.041) 0.337 (0.098) 0.210 (0.062) –0.112 (0.042) 0.239 (0.041) –0.019 (0.049) 0.122 (0.082) –0.033 (0.051) 0.171 (0.049) 0.160 (0.073) 0.405 (0.044) –0.269 (0.064) –0.463 (0.045) –0.145 (0.038) 0.078 (0.045) –0.052 (0.044) –0.081 (0.037) –0.001 (0.001) 0.659 (0.111)

0.000

0.615

0.001

1.401

0.001

1.234

0.008

0.894

0.000

1.270

0.703

0.982

0.137

1.129

0.526

0.968

0.001

1.186

0.029

1.173

0.000

1.499

0.000

0.764

0.000

0.629

0.000

0.865

0.082

1.082

0.244

0.950

0.027

0.922

0.401

0.999

0.000

1.932

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Country dummies are not shown. Italy is the reference category. The model predicts 69% of the cases correctly.
2 = 2840.7 (d.f. = 32). Log likelihood = 18027.8. Pseudo R 2 = 0.23. N = 15,325.

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are also statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and five even have a p-value below 0.001. Thus, to weigh the explanatory power of national identity against the other variables and determine substantive significance, one must look at the regression coefficients and the far-right column in Table 1 (‘Exp (B)’). This column gives the change in odds (likelihood) of support for EU control over immigration that one can expect from a one-point shift in the respective independent variable. Thus, if one thinks that EU membership is ‘a good thing’, one is roughly one-and-a-half times more likely to support EU control over immigration policy. The most powerful predictors in the model are the numbers that are furthest away from 1. National identity has the largest regression coefficient (in absolute terms), and those who identify only with their nation-state are 1.63 times more likely to oppose EU control over immigration policy.7 Thus, national identity seems to have the strongest predictive power of all the explanatory variables, albeit by a small margin. What about the alternative hypotheses? All three of the variables representing opinions about immigrants were statistically significant at the 0.01 level, though their explanatory power was weak, given the low odds change. Those who feel that there are ‘too many’ minorities in their country are 1.1 times more likely to oppose EU control over immigration policy, while those who feel there are ‘not many’ minorities living in their country are 1.2 times more likely to support EU control. Further, those who feel that TCNs should have the same social rights as EU citizens are 1.3 times more likely to support harmonization. This seems to confirm, albeit rather weakly, H2a, the assumption that EU control is perceived as benefiting immigrants. As for H3, regarding the impact of socioeconomic variables, the hypothesis is not confirmed with respect to employment. Being a manual worker or being unemployed were not statistically significant predictors. This provides disconfirming evidence for theories about perceived labour market competition causing opposition to EU control over immigration, though there was weak confirmation for the role of education. Possessing a university education or currently being a student made one 1.2 times more likely to support harmonization. H4, regarding the impact of support for Europeanization itself, fared the best of all the alternative hypotheses. Opinions toward the EU in general, opposition to the euro currency and opposition to enlargement showed the strongest odds changes after national identity. Opinions about the euro currency offered the most dramatic odds change here, with those who opposed the euro being 1.59 times more likely to prefer national control over immigration policy. Political ideology (H5) and age (H7) were not significant predictors of support for harmonization, but gender (H6) was statistically significant at the

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0.05 level. However, gender (male) showed only a small odds change, at 0.922, meaning that women are 1.1 times more likely than men to support harmonization, lending weak confirmation to H6. Though the odds change for national identity (1.63) was the highest in the model, this cannot necessarily be interpreted as an indicator of relative substantive significance. When comparing the predictive power of the independent variables, all substantive conclusions must be made conditional on the values of other independent variables. To do this, the analysis in Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities that the average respondent will support or oppose harmonization, given a shift in each of the four independent (dummy) variables of interest (national identity, EU opposition, euro opposition, and the belief that there are ‘too many minorities’ in one’s country), and with all other independent variables held at their median value. The ‘yes’ and ‘no’ bars represent values of 1 and 0, respectively, on each of the four dummy variables. Looking at Figure 2, one can see that a change in the national identity variable offers the largest shift in probability of support for a common immigration policy (75% to 65%), though the euro variable is close behind. This offers confirming evidence for H1. Although the evidence shows that national identity affects support for immigration harmonization in the EU as a whole, it does not shed light on the relative weight of the factors within each country that might be driving these opinions. National identity is not a static, monolithic entity. Obviously, the content of national identities varies across Europe and can (over time and across countries) be more or less favourable towards immigration and European integration. Thus, one might not expect national identity to be

1.00 75%

75%

Probability

65%

70%

75%

75% 73% 66% No

0.50

Yes

0.00 National identity

EU opposition

Euro opposition

Too many minorities

Figure 2 Predicted probabilities of support for EU control over immigration policy (from Table 1).

99

Spa

Fra

Ire

Ita

Lux

Net

Por

UK

Aus

Swe

Fin

1001 –0.51 x x x

970 –0.87 x 0.69 x x x x x x x 0.52 –1.1 x x x x x x

1978 –0.58 x x x x x x x x x 0.24 x –0.58 –0.22 x x x 0.01

963 –0.47 x x x x x x x x x 0.78 x –1.1 x 0.53 x x x

945 –0.42 x x x x x x x x x x x –0.92 x 0.40 x x x

987 –0.33 0.66 x x x x x x x x 0.49 x –0.38 x x x x x

954 x x x x x x x 0.48 0.63 x x x –0.61 x x x x –0.02

1046 x x x x x x x x x x 0.40 x –0.65 x x x x x

428 x x x x 0.73 x x x x x 1.0 x x x x x x x

972 –0.41 x x x x x x x x x x x –0.41 x x x –0.31 x

962 –0.82 x 0.47 x x x 0.76 x x x 0.61 x –0.58 x x x x x

1244 –0.61 x x x x x x –0.51 x 0.71 0.48 x x x x –0.48 x x

970 –0.52 x x –0.49 x x x x 0.74 x x x x –0.69 x x x –0.01

975 –0.59 x x x 0.46 x x x x x 0.45 –0.57 x x x 0.46 x x

988 x x x x x x x x x x x x x –0.78 x x –0.53 x

x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Note: ‘x’ = not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

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N National identity European identity Not many minorities Too many minorities Equality for TCNs Manual worker Unemployed High school education only University education Still studying EU membership a good thing EU membership a bad thing Against euro currency Against EU enlargement Left Right Male Age

Bel

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Table 2 Support for EU control over immigration policy: Logistic regression coefficients for 15 individual models using separate national samples

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equally salient in all 15 member states as far as national control over immigration policy is concerned. To understand this cross-national variation in a comparative sense, I will now turn to a 15-nation comparative model that will test the 18 explanatory variables in each of the 15 EU member states as a separate sample. The logistic regression coefficients for the 18 variables, in each country as a separate sample and model, are displayed in Table 2. Where the variable was not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, a dash is displayed. As is clear from Table 2, the results are quite mixed for my national identity hypothesis in some very interesting ways. My hypothesis is boosted by the fact that national identity is significant in more countries than is any of the other variables – it is statistically significant in 11 countries (all but Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Finland). Thus, it appears that national identity is a relatively stable and consistent predictor of feeling towards EU immigration policy across most member states. The most dramatic results are in Denmark, where those who see themselves as Europeans are roughly two and a half times more

Table 3

Comparing the results

Variable

Number of countries with statistical significance

Regression coefficient in EU-wide sample

National identity EU membership a good thing Against euro currency Against EU enlargement Age EU membership a bad thing Equality for TCNs Not many minorities University education Male High school education only Left Right European identity Still studying Too many minorities Unemployed Manual worker

11 9 8 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0

–0.486 0.405 –0.463 –0.145 x –0.269 0.239 0.210 0.171 –0.081 x x x 0.337 0.160 –0.112 x x

Note: ‘x’ = not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

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likely to support a harmonized EU immigration policy than are those who see themselves as Danes only. However, national identity is obviously not the only significant predictor of opinion about immigration policy harmonization in the EU, as the table reflects. Thus, there are factors other than national identity that are driving the attitude towards a Brussels-controlled immigration policy. I do not have the space to speculate on the likely national causes in this article, so further empirical work and case studies within these countries are needed in order to flesh out the rationale for these causal alternatives to national identity, as well as some of the interesting anomalies that can be seen in Table 2.

Conclusion In trying to explain attitudes towards immigration policy harmonization in the EU, this study has clearly shown that national identity and multiple other factors play an important role in driving public opposition to harmonization. Although self-identification and self-definition, through national-level socialization, are having a marginally stronger impact than support for European integration (whether the latter is instrumentally motivated or not), it is clear that the importance of both factors cannot be ignored. Further, opinions about immigrants do have an impact on support for harmonization, though the relationship is weak. This finding might reflect the potential confusion over how Brussels would act in restricting or expanding immigrant rights and freedoms. Regarding my attempt to conceptualize support for European integration as being instrumentally motivated, one could assume that support for European integration is not actually calculated but is instead learned through socialization. Having said that, one could also argue that national identity is actually ‘chosen’ for instrumental purposes. The analysis here brings into question both of these assumptions. If identity were instrumental, then identities would merely be proxies (indirect indicators) for calculated self-interest and/or socioeconomic status, and therefore would have no more explanatory power than these other factors in analysing why Europeans support or oppose the harmonization of immigration policy. Thus, my analysis shows that identity is at least partially non-instrumental when it comes to attitudes about immigration policy, because it has a slightly stronger explanatory impact on these feelings than do socioeconomic status, attitudes towards European integration, and other factors that are often considered to be instrumentally motivated. Additionally, I must emphasize an intriguing area for further research,

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namely, the causal factors responsible for some of the other national anomalies in Table 2. It would be illuminating to explore, for instance, why attitudes towards immigrants were significant in only five countries, and whether some Europeans perceive that EU control would help to restrict immigration flows (in line with H2b). Also, the fact that national identity was not significant in four of the national cases means that further research is required to understand the kinds of motivations for citizens in these four countries, including how instrumentally based they are. Future studies by country specialists could potentially shed light on why citizens from these countries hold ‘unique’ opinions regarding who should control immigration policy in the single market, and whether they are more instrumental in their attitudes for or against European integration. On balance, however, the fact that national identity was significant in more countries (11) than any other variable, and was the (marginally) strongest predictor in the EU sample, means that the hypothesized link between identity and attitudes towards immigration policy control is confirmed. Whether the proposed link between public opinion and immigration policy outcomes will be confirmed, however, is another story, especially given a lack of consensus over what a harmonized policy would mean for immigrant rights and freedoms. But, if the ongoing process of European integration does cause the rise of a European identity among younger generations, as scholars such as Checkel (2001) and Risse (2001) argue, my findings show that public support for an EU-wide immigration policy is likely to grow.

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Appendix Table 4

Descriptive statistics

Variable

N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std. Median Dev.

Harmonization National identity European identity Not many minorities Too many minorities Equality for TCNs Manual worker Unemployed Secondary school only University Still studying EU membership a good thing EU membership a bad thing Against euro currency Against EU enlargement Left Right Gender (male) Age

15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325 15,325

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 42.00

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 99

0.42 0.44 0.04 0.11 0.37 0.65 0.22 0.06 0.26 0.24 0.11 0.53 0.15 0.34 0.57 0.25 0.27 0.48 43.70

0.49 0.50 0.19 0.31 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.23 0.44 0.43 0.32 0.50 0.35 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.45 0.50 17.67

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Nominal associations for independent variables 1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00

0.27 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.32 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00

0.27 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.00

0.03 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.00

0.13 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00

0.01 0.30 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00

0.33 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.00

0.20 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.06

0.07 0.00 0.05 0.44 0.00 0.00

12

13

14

15

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1 National identity

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

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0.17 0.00 Not many minorities 0.07 0.00 Too many minorities 0.20 0.00 Equality for TCNs 0.17 0.00 Manual worker 0.04 0.00 Unemployed 0.03 0.00 Secondary school only 0.15 0.00 University education 0.13 0.00 Still studying 0.10 0.00 EU membership good 0.31 0.00 EU membership bad 0.22 0.00

Luedtke

2 European identity

105

15 16 17

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00

0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02

0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.30

0.13 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.37

0.05 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.00

0.03 0.00 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.05

0.05 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.00

0.05 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00

0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.39 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.13

0.41 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00

0.35 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.67

0.10 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.33 0.08 0.00

0.00 0.82 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.36

0.35 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00

Notes: Cramer’s V values are in bold; p-values are in italics.

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0.32 0.00 Against EU enlargement 0.05 0.00 Left 0.05 0.00 Right 0.02 0.01 Gender (male) 0.06 0.00

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Continued

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Table 5

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Notes I am grateful to Jim Caporaso, Rachel Cichowski, Terri Givens, Karen Litfin and Jon Mercer for their helpful comments and assistance. I also thank Christian Breunig, who generously provided detailed methodological advice. My data (from Eurobarometer 53) were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research URL: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu). 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Although the term ‘harmonization’ might not seem synonymous with ‘EU control’, the term is used this way in the literature on EU immigration politics (Geddes, 2000). Given that non-enforceable, non-binding immigration cooperation has largely been a failure in the EU context, true ‘harmonization’ requires EU control, which is now accepted by all parties in the debate (Papademetriou, 1996). I use the term ‘immigration’ in its broad sense here, to cover the entry, residence, integration and naturalization of humanitarian, economic and political migrants. These theories, of course, would assume that identities are sociologically ‘given’ (constitutive) and cannot be thought of as ‘public goods’ that are ‘chosen’ according to some type of cost–benefit calculus on the part of individuals. It would be preferable also to test the impact of subnational identities for regions such as the Basque country, Scotland or Northern Italy. However, considerations of space and focus do not permit me to carry out this testing. For an excellent analysis of subnational identities and their impact on opinions about European integration, see Carey (2002). However, the survey does over-sample East Germany and Northern Ireland and under-sample Luxembourg. This is not done in other Eurobarometer surveys, but I needed to use Eurobarometer 53 because it contained the relevant questions regarding opinions about immigrants. On this question, I deleted the cases that contained a ‘don’t know’, leaving the N at 15,325. See the EUP homepage for details on coding, deletion of cases and the wording of the survey questions. This number is obtained by dividing 1 by Exp (B), or 1/0.615 in the case of national identity.

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About the author Adam Luedtke is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Washington, 101 Gowen Hall, Box 353530 Seattle, WA 98195-3530, USA. Fax: +1 206 685 2146 E-mail: [email protected]