University of Copenhagen Faculty of Social Science Department of Political Science Winter 2009, 10 ECTS

Course title: Governance and Its Impact - The Interrelationship between European and National Policy-Making Lecturer: Morten Kallestrup

European integration and European Court of Justice. Can European Court of Justice be seen as a pro-integrative institution?

Table of content:

1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 3

2. European Court of Justice as the institution of European Union …………….. 4

3. European integration theories and the European Court of Justice ……………. 6

4. The role of a preliminary ruling procedure ……………………………………. 8

5. Doctrines of supremacy and a direct effect …………………………………… 10

6. Conclusions ……………………………………………………………………. 13

Introduction:

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European Court of Justice is a central judicial institution in the European Union (EU). One might wonder how, an organ which is perceived to be outside of executive or legislative power, can influence a development of integration process in the EU. It is known, that European law is a link that connects all member states.

Identical implementation and

understanding of the European Community law is the most important feature of maintaining its fragile structure. An organization which was primarily established to integrate economic systems of European countries, have now spread on the other fields such as trade, agriculture, transport or environmental protection. Was this enlargement of numbers of common policies contribution of European Court of Justice a judicial activity as well? In the beginning the Court was seen only as a court of the law and when the member state lost case it was perceived more as an inevitable consequence of Community law, rather than Court’s prointegrative policy making. Current situations proves that Courts actions can be also analyzed as made by the political institution, and not only the legal one (Rasmussen, 1998: 296). Is it known, that “strong and independed Court of Justice is an essential part of structure of the European Union”. Courts has an “important role […] in the consolidation of democratic structures and upholding the rule of law in the European Community” (Arnull, 2006:4). However, one can also notice, fallowing Hjalte Rasmussen thought, that “the price of too many years of too unmitigated activism will be a decline in judicial authority and legitimacy” of the Court (Rasmussen, 1998:301). The main aim of this paper will be a consideration of distinguishing European Court of Justice as a pro-integrative institution, or a reactive one, which do not have influence on political sphere of the EU? Preliminary ruling procedure, as well as, two main European law doctrines – supremacy and a direct effect - will be the examples of Court actions, upon which I will deliberate on this problem. Firstly, I will present some basic facts about European Court of Justice as a European Union institution and an understanding of integration process in the meaning of integration-through-law theory, among the others. Secondly, as mentioned above, I will concentrate on preliminary ruling procedure and its impact on the case law of European Court of Justice and consequences that it has on integration process. Costa v. ENEL, and Van Gen en Loose cases will be an illustration of emergence of the supremacy and the direct effect law doctrines upon which I will also discuss, if European Court of Justice can be seen as a pro-integrative institution. Choice of these cases is based on the fact, that they are the first signs of the way in which ECJ will develop its case law and interference in the integration process. The Court as I will post below is a complicated institution which cannot be seen only as a judicial part of European Union

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and its impact on policy-making process is much more complex and goes further than ordinary international court jurisdiction.

European Court of Justice as the institution of European Union. The origins of European Court of Justice (ECJ) should be seek in Treaty of Paris, signed on 18th of April 1951, which established European Coal and Steal Community. Article 31 of this treaty stated that the Court “shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty, and of rules laid down for implementation thereof, the law is observed”. In other words it gave the Court a general task to interpret this treaty and to be able to do that was given certain powers, which included to be able to quash acts from the other institutions, hear appeals, impose sanctions and order the Community to pay penalty costs on wrongful acts (Arnull, 2006: 5). But it wasn’t before Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, that ECJ, officially became institution of the European Union. In article 4 it is mentioned among the Assembly, the Council and the Commission as a main power holder, which is responsible to carry out the tasks entrusted to the Community. Its current action is based on Statute, which was annexed to the Treaty of Niece, and Rules of Procedure. Its head office was created in Luxemburg in Villa Vauban, a mansion named after great French military engineer and is located there for this day. European Court of Justice originally consisted of seven Judges and two AdvocatesGeneral. Fallowing the enlargement of the European Union their number has grown to twenty seven Judges and eight Advocates-General. Each member of the EU has an entitlement to choose one Judge. A chosen person is appointed by a common accord of the governments of the member states. This solution is to ensure the case law of the Court is somehow influenced by the legal cultures of each national system and that the authority of the Court is reinforced in member states societies (Arnull, 2006:8). Advocates General task is to deliver legal opinions on the cases brought before the Court in impartial and independed manner. Because of Treaty of Lisbon coming into force, there will be a change in their number. From now on, there will be three additional Advocates General: one from Poland and two nominated by the smaller and medium-sized Member States. Judges as well as Advocates-General hold their office for renewable term of six years, but each three years part of the members of the Courte change (13 and 14 judges interchangeably, and each time 4 advocate general). European Court of Justice can hear cases in six different chambers, depending on the filed, importance and difficulty of the case. It can sits either as a Full Court (27 Judges, on

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three rare occasions1, Grand Chamber (13 Judges, when Member States or an institution that is party to the proceeding so request), the most effective five-Judge chamber and three-Judge chamber, to which most straightforward cases are assigned (Arnull, 2006:8-9). Court gives a single, collective judgment, which is formulated based on consensus which was reached during the open discussion between the Judges. One can notice that roles and functions that European Court of Justice is known for are much more broader than what is said in the treaties. It resembles a national supreme court and as such can be treated as an appeal court from the Court of First Instance decisions. One can perceive it as a constitutional court, defining “the balance between the powers exercised by the member states and those exercised by the Community institutions. (Kennedy, 2006:131). This assumption is a form on the settled opinion that member states have already agreed on the particular rules, and Court is only carrying out their will through the interpretation. It is believed that organization and nature of the ECJ was inspired by French Conseil D’Etat. The procedures of the appeal for annulment and the plenary appeal are examples of that similarity. As a result of this fact in some cases it appears to have an administrative court’s features as well (Josselin, Marcian, 2007:69). Furthermore, ECJ is also identified as an arbitration court, settling conflicts between the institutions, organizations or Member States. The Court has no latitude to do as it pleases in intervening, its actions need to take forms, which were defined and formulated in the treaties. Its main functions limits to “ensuring observance by the member states of their obligation under the Treaties, reviewing the legality of the acts of the Community institutions and guaranteeing the uniform application of the acts of European Community law in the member states” (Kennedy, 2007:132). When establishing ECJ as the institution of the European Union it was decided that ECJ will not have any power of initiative. It cannot decide upon matters which were not brought to it by parts that have such authorization. Moreover, it has little or none competence in the fields of second and third pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy; Policy and Judicial-Cooperation in Criminal Matters)2. Although European Court of Justice in its case law put further its competences and functions, still in the matter of treaties, ECJ is more reactive, than pro-active institution. How can it be seen as a pro-integrative institution then? One need to first understand a term “integration” to fully understand a complexity of this problem.

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Dismissal of Ombudsmen; compulsory retirement of a member of the commission or depravation of his pension rights or other benefits; removal from office of a Member of the Court of Auditors or depravation of his pension 2 This situation applied before Lisbon Treaty was brought into force.

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European integration theories and the European Court of Justice. Political integration in general means that states, which where previously independed and sovereign are transmitting part of their legal power to supranational institutions, or organizations. States are placed under common political authority of institutions, which can make an authoritative decisions legally, binding political organs, as well as natural persons. These decisions binds its constituent parts without the consent of those whom they are applied. One can understand political integration as a process, or as a result of it. (Green, 1969, 9-10). Law and judiciary in this process assure that states, or local authorities, which surrender some powers to the central authority, will not be deprived of another part of it, by the arbitrary decision of supranational institutions. The very essence of law an politics are similar, if not identical. If politics s power, will and authority, then law is an expression of these features in particular form, which made them precise and knowable in define situation (Green, 1969: 19). One can then ask can we conduct political integration without the rule of law? According to Green political integration can only take place in connection and within the framework of law, “political integration really means legal integration” (Green, 1969:21). According to Alter legal integration (expansion and penetration of European law into the national realm) is a process of negotiations between legal and political actors on national and supranational level. (Alter, 2001:44) One can imagine the political integration without courts, but in the same manner that courts are important in the administration of law, they are also significant in the process of political integration. They control and observe the implementation and use of agreed rules of law. In European Union, European Court of Justice plays such a role. According to Jean Pierre Colin’s theory, its is a very powerful institution in this aspect, because its jurisdiction is permanent, obligatory and sovereign (Green, 1969:487). Geoffrey Garret and Barry Weingast, representatives of neo-realism, understands the role of ECJ in political integration through the nature of its judges. In their opinion judges anxiety of non-compliance or a negative political response forces them to mirror national interest. Primary shaper of the political behavior of judges and their decision-making process is then the national-interest. However, this attitude towards ECJ and its role in integration overstates the link between judges and national interest, it was an important corrective to the legalist, who for a very long time denied politics influence completely (Altar, 2001:40). Neorealist in their view of ECJ believe that the Court slavishly fallow the dictate of the most powerful EU countries. Thus cannot be seen as a pro-integrationist institution, fallowing and introducing merely the will of the strongest states, not its own aims (Pollack, 2003:202). Neofunctionalist theory, presented by Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, concentrates on the 6

role of the Court in creating “pro-community constituency of private individuals by giving them a direct stake in promulgation and implementation of community law”. In this way it encourage actors within national legal systems to pursuit their interest and thus promote the legal integration (Alter, 2001:41). Stuart A. Scheingold, as an representative of “functional” theory of jurisprudence, concentrates its analysis once more on the role of judges. In his theory “wise judge is the one who best uses the judicial process to solve the political problem underlying the legal dispute”. He or she is always aware of a underlying political controversy and have a proper solution, which then can be clothed in suitable legal forms. One can notice that Scheingold pays to much attention to what was in the back of mind of the judges when they made a particular judgment. However, Scheingold notice a lack of his theory, for example, in a matter of scope of judges decision-making variants. When judge is too timid or too self-assured, and disregard established rules too far, then his political solution may not work, and in the same time integration process can turn into de-integrative one (Green, 1969:464). Theory, that gives European Court of Justice main role in European integration process, is integration-through-law theory. Joseph Weiler is known to as a scholar who give it the full academic credential, and should be more understand as a Europeanization-throughcase-law (ETCL). This theory treats law, not only as the rules of creating or preventing certain behavior. In this meaning it is as well a connecting tool between its subjects. Its main point claim that communication and integration between member states are through the process of creating and implementing law. EU work is based on rules and regulations, which need to be strictly complied, and through these rules supranational structure of the EU exists. Despite this fact, ECJ was not treated as an equal partner or integration institution until Europeanization-through-harmonization-of-national-legislations

project

had

reached

a deadlock. ETCL relies not on the good will of Member States or the Commission, and because of that emerged as a cornerstone of economic, social, and eventually political integration. Swiftly overcoming the “empty chair” crisis ECJ proved that it is capable of expanding integration on new fields, even in difficult circumstances. ECJ case –law is seen as a more stable and lasting foundations of European integration than inter-state agreement. Furthermore it is believed that it is significant in bringing the deeply rooted needs and interest of population. Although integration-through-law theory maintain a privilege position of Member States it also appeared to be a moderator between “the ‘shortcomings’ of power politics and the (potential) ‘excesses’ of individual claims” and as such emerged as the backbone of European construction. (Vauchez, 2008). 7

One can say that European Union has so-called “magic triangle”: ‘direct effect’, ‘supremacy’ and ‘preliminary ruling’. All these three rules, together allow European Court of Justice to have an huge impact on European integration process. According to Vauchez there is no “no effective European treaties without the supremacy of European law over the law of Member States; no supremacy without direct effect opposable to and by individuals; no direct effect without preliminary rulings ensuring the uniform application of Euro-law throughout the European Union”. One might think without these three pillars European Community would fall apart, because there will be no power to put order in the heterogeneous and mulitlevel European public sphere. (Vauchez, 2008). In this part of my paper I will try to get a closer look, why these three mentioned rules are so important for European legal order, and are they sufficient tools to recognize ECJ as a pro-integrative institution.

4. The role of preliminary ruling procedure. According to Karen Altar, preliminary ruling procedure can be perceived as a loophole, thanks to which transformation of European legal system was and still is possible (Altar, 2001:9). The foundation of preliminary ruling procedure was established in Article 177 EC Treaty, which by Amsterdam Treaty was renumbered Article 234. It states that national court or tribunals can seek request a preliminary ruling procedure from the Court in three cases: (1) the interpretation of the Treaty (2) the validity or interpretation of the acts of the Community institutions and (3) the interpretation of the statuses of bodies created by Council, where those statutes so provide. It is not and appeal procedure, the word ‘preliminary’ means that it is delivered before the final judgment for particular case by national court (Kennedy, 2006:133) Lower national courts have a right to request preliminary ruling in case they are not sure how to interpret community law, or have doubts about its validity in order to enable give a judgment. In contrast highest national courts, from which judgments there is no possibility of appeal, are obligated to submit the question of preliminary ruling, when the case before it raises the question concerning European Community law (Pollack, 2003:162). However, there is no competitive relationship between ECJ and national courts, but more cooperative one. In fact national courts enhance their authority and independence, not only to other courts, but states legislatures and executives as well (Kennedy, 2006:133). Moreover national courts become a allies of ECJ in extending the scope of Community law, which means further development of integration process. Karen Altar, argues that preliminary ruling procedure where firstly established to challenge only the acts of Community law, and that expansion of this procedure on 8

challenging the national laws as well was unintended. In the same fashion, private litigants was not supposed to have a right to challenge national polices and legality of both EC and national laws. Development of the scope of this procedure was established with creating two basic legal doctrines: supremacy and direct effect. Individuals get a chance to bring charges of noncompliance against governments, agencies, businesses, and other private actors in their national courts3. As Clifford and Lacey notice that “for the first time, agreements made in an international treaty were directly enforceable in the signatories' national courts” and that “ECJ had legally integrated Europe”. (Cliffors, Lacey, 2005:401). Considering the objectives of preliminary ruling, Rasmussen, says that although treaties do not spell them clearly out, ECJ case by case manage to articulate three of them: 1) that Community law need to be uniformly interpreted; 2) that Community law need to be uniformly applied, and 3) that this law should be applied by all domestic courts whenever the facts of the case call for it (Rasmussen, 1998:130). Uniform interpretation and application of law certainly ensure the legal integration of European Union and provide background for political one in the future. Preliminary ruling guarantee that law established in the European Union institutions will have the same effect in all circumstances in all Member States. It also gave the Court a possibility to resolve all matters and questions of fundamental importance to the functioning of legal order within European Union (Arnull, 2001:97). In the other words, it ensure that integration process will not only last, but also developed. Activism of the Court, support that it experiences from Commission (in most cases), partnership between ECJ and national courts and the role of private litigants in bringing case before national court were three key elements that allowed ECJ fully use the preliminary ruling procedure, by extending Article 234 and in consequence achieve the constitutionalization of the treaties (Pollack, 2003:188). According to Trevor C. Harley the aims of ECJ can be put into three short points: strengthening the Community, increasing the scope and effectiveness of Community law and enlarging the power of Community institutions (Harley, 1998:79). One have to notice that agreeing with this statement, there is no doubt in seeing ECJ as a pro-integrationist institution. Pollack also notices that by “Court’s preference for further integration is manifested in its teleological method of interpretations” (Pollack, 2003:189). It means that in its interpretation Court sometimes do not fallow strictly literal meaning of the provision, but understand them in broad ends or objectives of the treaties.

3 Although some conditions need to be fulfilled: opportunity for a violation that raises an issues of EC law, some individual or institution need to take advantage of this opportunity, some individual or institution need to take this violator to the court and finally the court must make a reference to ECJ (Clifford, Lacey, 2005: 401)

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One should not forget that preliminary ruling procedure has its weaknesses as well. Power and influence of the Court is often exaggerated, private litigant can lack the ambition, capacity, or will to bring cases before the Court, to ensure their respectable rights. In this case ECJ is helpless, and its reactive nature one more time is evident. Without the power of initiative it can only rely on cases that are brought before it. Many interest groups view challenging before national courts as ineffective and risky. Furthermore because of thinking that “legal challenges threatened to poison mutually beneficial relations that already existed and subject all parties to the potentially unpredictable decision of a court” (Pollack, 2003:103) they preferred to seek support or assistance in European Commission, rather than in ECJ.

5. Doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. If one wants to understand properly two doctrines of EC law: supremacy and the direct effect, one need firstly to comprehend the nature of the treaties, which European Union is based on. According to Robert Dehousse, it should be seen as something more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between contracting states. One should know, that it was inspired by certain “idea of Europe”. Doctrines of direct effect and supremacy was established in consequence of the way in which ECJ view the treaties (Dehousse 1998:37). Transformation of European legal system which gave birth to discussed doctrines, especially through the controversial interpretations of treaties provisions by ECJ, was based on “special” and “original” nature of Treaty of Rome (Alter, 2001:2). European Court of Justice in judgments of the Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL, delivered on the 5

February 1963 and 15 July 1964 respectively, identified efficient

principals and procedures upon which legal order of European Union was established: supremacy and direct effect. Van Gend en Loose was a postal and transportation company importing chemical substance (urea-formaldehyde) from West Germany to the Netherlands, which opposed paying tariff on the import that was charged by the Dutch customs. However company paid this tariff, it objected that it was contrary to EU law and tried to retrieved in the national court. According to article 234, national court decided to made a reference to the ECJ. The court based on these case established the doctrine of direct effect. Ensuring that rights of the individuals can be created under certain conditions by the European Law, and invoked before national courts (Alter, 2001:17). It means not only treaty provisions but also

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secondary legal norms4. The principle of direct effect means that the rules are enforceable in all the member states´ national courts, for states as well as for individuals. Costa v. ENEL case referred to the Italian citizen which opposed to nationalizing the Italian energy company ENEL, and in protest refused to pay his electricity bill. The amount involved (approximately 3$) was inversely proportional to the importance of the consequences of this case (Arnull, 2006:179). Costa v. ENEL served to establish the doctrine of supremacy. It constitute primacy of European Union law above all national legislations, even constitutional once. In other words, when provision of national law is in conflict with EU law, courts are obligated to fallow the ruling of the EU law. Direct effect as well as supremacy were not established in any articles in treaties. Their emergence is connected with teleological reasoning of ECJ, which interpret legal provisions in the light of its purpose, or nature, not the strict literal meaning (Enchelmaier, 2006). These two decision, according to Antoine Vauchez “appear today as the de facto Constitution of Europe encapsulating in themselves all the successive development of EU polity” (Vauchez, 2008). Although one can perceive this statement as an exaggeration, it is certain that without these two rulings, the shape of European Union would be very different from the one we observe nowadays. One should know, that Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL emerged as irreplaceable pillars of European Community legal order, because previous political and legal integration projects were either blocked or failed in collision with reality. Because of that ECJ has had a chance to become and engine for not only economic, but also legal integration (Vauchez, 2008). According to Dehousse, direct effect by providing individuals with the opportunity to challenge the community and national law, alerted the dynamics of the integration process. Individual litigants emerged as a guardians of the integrity of community system (Dehousse, 1998:40). Stacy Nyikos notice that because of the two discussed doctrines community law started to be accessible to the every day citizen. The Court achieved a possibility to reach national audience of decisionmakers free from usual governmental political jargon (Rasmussen, 1998:128). In addition national courts gain much more power, than ever before. In case of Britain, where courts had no power to review of the constitutionality of primary legislation it change whole relationship between the judiciary and the parliament. (Nyikos, 2007:184). Supremacy fallows logically doctrine of direct effect. If individuals rights are supposed to have any meaning, European

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If this regulations were adopted by Community institutions are clear and precisely stated, unconditional or nondependent (their effectiveness is not depended on the adoption of positive legal measures as national level)and must deliberate a certain right for individuals to base their claim (Dehousse, 1998: 38)

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law need to be supreme to national law. In other way around member states would be able to simply avoid their obligation by creating new national rules of law (Alter, 2003:18). One can wonder why members governments as well as national courts are willing to fallow these doctrines? Why national courts, especially the lower once, submit questions of preliminary ruling references in such an extent? Why government agreed upon consequences of direct effect and supremacy, which limit their sovereignty? It is well known that by submitting references, national courts give the Court the opportunities to rule on the cases challenging principle of national sovereignty, which in other way might not have been brought before it (Pollack, 2003:190). In this aspect the Court present itself as a reactive institution, rather than proactive. However, a member government in some perspective can be also seen as a reactive force, only responding and adapting the ECJ decisions, being not able to overturn it or influence them. Despite the fact that states are perceived as a “masters of the Treaty” it turns out that they are unable to control or influence the legal integration process, which is totally in the hand of ECJ. Law language of ECJ provides on one hand a “mask” for its political intentions, and on the other hand “shield” against political attacks. Noncompliance of ECJ decisions, applied by national courts to the case at hand, implies defying not only international court, but also domestic once (Pollack, 2003:192). One can perceive it as an assault on judicial independence. Even though, some attempts to stop national courts from accepting European law doctrines, especially supremacy of law, was conducted. For example, French National Assembly, tried to make it illegal for national courts to “set aside French law for any reason” (Alter, 2001:193). In the similar manner, in Belgium, parliament attempt to subordinate international law to parliamentary control. All of these efforts were fruitless. Moreover politicians realize that intimidating national court can have further political consequences, which can be hardly foreseen. It can as well antagonize other European countries, and weaken the position of one country in bargaining leverage in the Council. (Alter, 2001:194). One can ask why governments did not try to redefine the ECJ’s mandate? The answer is simple. Legal order in the European Union provides relatively easy ways for member states to change laws, provisions or rules in the initial stage of policymaking, but in the same time make it extremely difficult to reform already established policies. One can call it “joint decision trap”, meaning that “EC make policies that member states agree are sub-optimal nonetheless impervious to reform (Alter, 2001:195). One can notice that in the reappointment of members of the ECJ, governments can experience more

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influence and decisive power. However, requirements that each candidate need to face5, effectively limit governments options (Alter, 2001:200). Despite the outcome of cases that challenge EC and national law, rising issues concerning invalidity, unclear meaning of certain provisions, individuals invoking their rights before national courts, or conflicts between national and European law influence the process of integration. ECJ through cases, which are brought before it, is able to expand the reach of EC law into the national domain. By expanding the number of European legal provisions, ECJ creates more spheres in which doctrines of direct effect and supremacy can be applied. Furthermore this process increase the ways in which national actors can draw on European law to challenge national policy. Treaty of Rome was neither intended to become, nor primarily was viewed as some sort of constitution of Europe. One can notice that it happened because of national courts, and their smart usage of discussed doctrines (Alter, 2003:53-54).

Conclusions: First thing that one need to notice, while pondering upon ECJ role in process of European integration, is that during its existence the Court expanded its jurisdiction in several areas which held important meaning for political integration. Some scholars perceive it as a new phase, which fallows simpler steps that were accomplished and easier goals that were achieved. Nowadays, European Union as a international actor, and each of the member states need to face the need to make another steps into further integration, while relinquishing more sensitive areas of national control (Alter, 2003:31). There should be no doubt that European Court of Justice is a pro-integrative institution. With this statement agree not only neo-functionalist theoreticians but, standing on the opposite side, neo-realist scholar as well. ECJ is seen, by both of these theories as a strategic actor for further development of integration within the European Union. Both agree that by crating its case law since 1960s ECJ indeed caused a constitunatlization of treaties, skillfully integrating EC and national laws. One need to mention as well and opportunity for individuals, created by the Court, to challenge the conformity of national laws with the higher EC law (Pollack, 2003:195). In consequence member governments are perceived by some scholars to lost their impact and influence on political integration, which others can recognize

5 For ex ample, candidate for a member of European Court of Justice need to be perfectly fluent in French, know the language of deliberation and have a solid grounding in the European law. Moreover it need to go through complicated political negotiations at the national level.

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as a controversial and not particularly true statement. One should also understand that actions conducted by the Court were supposed to replace weak and malfunctioning legal order, with one that will make it hard for member states to violate European Union law and interpret their position in such a way that will enable them non-compliance with the EC law. One should remember though, that even if judgments of the Court have political implications (advancing integration), they were not guided by political considerations but by, what ECJ perceive as an intent of the Treaties (Green, 1969:472). Another way in which decisions of the European Court of Justice can be seen as the pro-integrative is influence as it has on people awareness of the existence of European law. As was mentioned before, community law started to be accessible to ordinary citizens. It is believed, that this factor will help to establish a greater authority for the central institutions in the European Union. One need to also remember that ECJ has a limited options to pursuit its prointegrationist actions. In the European Community there are still fields that are restricted only for Member States legislation. Even though, member governments delegate with each treaty more powers to the Court, it the same time they present the unwillingness to broaden the scope of ECJ activism on other, than the first one, pillars. For example, issues in the third pillar are completely out of ECJ jurisdictions reach. There are as well some mechanism design to limit Court’s integration in new communitarized issues (for example, preliminary ruling is reserved only for national court from which decision there is no appeal). The Court lacks authority also in any measures related to “maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security” (Pollack, 2003:181). Preliminary ruling procedure, doctrines of supremacy and direct effect become a permanent rules of European Community law, accepted by all actors of the European Union. There is, however, little chance that in the near future the Court will manage to push integration further by creating new doctrines, or interpreting new procedures from articles of treaties. Moreover, nowadays it is observed that ECJ enters the crisis and its future being depends on how it will adjust to the new circumstances, which emerged after Treaty of Lisbon came into force.

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Alter, Karen. 2001. “Establishing the Supremacy of European Law”, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 1-63, 182-208

Arnull, Anthony. 2006. “The European Union and Its Court of Justice”, Second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 3-34, 95-138, 159-267, 273-274

De Burca, Grainne. Weiler, J.H.H (2001). European Court of Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 43-85

Carrubba Clifford C., Murrah Lacey. (2005). Legal integration and use of the preliminary ruling process in the European Union. International Organization, 59(2), p. 399-418

Dehousse, Renaud. 1998. “The European Court of Justice. The politics of judicial integration”, London: Macmillan Press LTD, p. 5- 186

Enchelmaier, Stefan. (2006). Supremacy and Direct Effect of European Community Law Reconsidered, or the Use and Abuse of Political Science for Jurisprudence. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 23(2), p. 281-299

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Kennedy, Tom (2006). The European Court of Justice, in Peterson, John & Stackleton, Michael The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 125 – 145

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Nyikos ,Stacy A. (2007). Courts in Graziano, Paolo & Maarten Vink P. Europeanization: New research agendas, Basinstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 182-194

Pollack, Mark A. (2003). The Engines of European Integration. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 155-203

Rasmussen, Hjalte. (1998). European court of Justice. Copenhagen: GadJura, Thomson Information A/S. p. 57-85, 127-169, 289-389

Rasmussen, Hjalte. (1986). On law and policy in the European Court of Justice. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p.154-176, 229-385, 465-495

Vauchez, Antoine. (2008). Integration-through-law. Contribution to a socio-history of EU political commonsense. EUI Working Papers, 10. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260166

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