CENTRE D’HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE OTTOMANE CENTER FOR OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

EUROPE AND THE ‘OTTOMAN WORLD’ • EXCHANGES AND CONFLICTS (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries) Edited by Gábor KÁRMAN and Radu G. PĂUN

THE ISIS PRESS ISTANBUL

FRONTIER ELITES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE DURING THE WAR FOR CRETE (1645–1669): THE CASE OF ALI-PASHA ČENGIĆ Domagoj Madunić

To the most Illustrious and Excellent noble, known for every honour and worthy of every praise, Sir Antonio Bernardo, Governor-General in Dalmatia and Albania, a bow and warmest salutations. After the fortunate victory of Your Excellency, who has, accompanied by his potent army, come to (aid) the noble City [Kotor], where Your valorous prudence made Your enemies retreat shamefully, with furled banners, and shame on their faces, whom the Lord, the Holy Virgin and the glorious St. Trifun had not permitted the fulfillment of their desires […].1

This is an excerpt from a letter received by Antonio Bernardo, Venetian governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania, in September 1657, at the end of the unsuccessful two-month Ottoman siege of the Venetian town of Kotor, whose defence he personally supervised. At first glance this may seem a typical letter, written in flowery Baroque style, congratulating the Venetian commander on this victory with characteristic invocations of God, the Virgin Mary and a local town saint, St. Trifun. However, what makes this letter more interesting is that it was written by Ali Pasha Čengić, governor (sancakbey) of the subprovince (sancak) of Herzegovina, one of two commanders in charge of the besieging force; a commander who moreover, by his own testimony, did practically everything in his power (short of attacking the forces of the other sancakbey) to undermine the success of this siege: from sabotaging artillery to revealing the plans of attack to the defenders. The intriguing personality of Ali Pasha Čengić, member of one of the most prominent families of Bosnian Ottoman lords,2 and his conduct during 1 “All Ill[ustrissi]mo et Ecc[ellentissi]mo nobile sapiente di ogni honore, et honorata laude degno Sig[no]re Antonio Bernardo G[e]n[er]al di Dalmatia, et Albania inchino, et molto cara salutatione. Doppo felicita la vittoria di V.E. la quale si porto bene in quella nobil Città con sua potente Armata, et sua prudenza valorosa facendo ritirare vergognosamente li vostri nemici con bandiere in sacco, et con faccia vergognosa, alli quali Dio, la Beata Vergine, et il glorioso San Trifone non permisse di adempire il suo desiderio [...],” Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVe) Senato, Dispacci, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar (PTM) b[usta] 482. [letter] num[ber] 134. (Cattaro, 13. Ottobre 1657), the attachment to the letter. 2 The Čengić family gained popular fame in the latter nineteenth century through the epic poem “Smrt Smail Age Čengića [Death of Ismail Čengić Ağa],” published in 1846 by the famous

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the Venetian-Ottoman war over Crete has already drawn significant attention from historians. To date, the most detailed study remains that of Montenegrin historian Gligor Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje u mletačko turskim ratovima XVI do XVIII vijeka (Yugoslav Lands in the Venetian–Ottoman wars in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries).3 Working from extensive Venetian archival materials, Stanojević provides a very detailed account of Ali Pasha’s activities before and after the siege of Kotor in 1657. His work was further expanded by the well-known Serbian historian Radovan Samardžić, who enriched Stanojević’s research with Ragusan archive material. Several studies have been written about the Čengić family as a whole, yet so far Ali Pasha Čengić personally has not been the subject a separate study.4 Moreover both authors, like most others, dealt with Ali Pasha Čengić in the context of national narratives, constructed around the theme of the liberation wars of the Croatian, Serbian or Montenegrin peoples from the Turkish yoke. As such these historiographical works commonly take “our people” (with changing national denominators) as the main historical agent, and even more problematically, at the same time back-project nineteenth- and twentieth-century national categories onto early modern realities and identities, often resulting in a one-sided and distorted interpretation of historical events.5 Not surprisingly, in these historical accounts Ali Pasha, in addition to being a Turk (that is an enemy and oppressor), is depicted in even more negative tones: as a traitor to the Empire who served his Venetian masters for money and personal gain,

Croatian poet Ivan Mažuranić. Composed in the age of Croatian national revival, Mažuranić’s poem, inspired by an actual event – the death of a sancakbey of Herzegovina in an ambush by Montenegrins in 1840, as an act of vendetta – and written in the modern Croatian language, celebrated the genre of epic folk literature and the struggle of the Yugoslav peoples for liberation from the Turkish yoke. The person of Ismail Ağa stands for “Turkish oppression” and the famous verses which Mažuranić puts into Smail Aga’s mouth: “’Harač, rajo, harač!’ riče, Harač, harač, il još gore biče!’” [‘Harac, reaya, harac!’ he growls, ‘Harac or it will be worse!’],” became an integral part of popular national historical discourse not only of the Croats but also of the Serbs and Montenegrins. 3 Gligor Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje u mletačko turskim ratovima XVI–XVIII vijeka [Yugoslav lands in the Venetian–Turkish Wars 16th–17th centuries] (Belgrade, 1970). 4 Radovan Samardžić, “Kandijski rat (1645–1669)” [The War for Crete 1645–1669], in idem, Istorija Srpskog Naroda [History of the Serbian people], vol. 3, part 1 (Belgrade, 1993), 336– 424. Other works of importance on Ali Pasha Čengić include: Balázs Sudár, “A hódoltsági pasák az oszmán belpolitika forgatagában (1657–1665)” [Pashas from Ottoman Hungary in the turmoil of Ottoman politics 1657–1665], Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 124 (2011): 896–897; Hamdija Kreševljaković, Čengići: prilog proučavanju feudalizma u Bosni i Hercegovini [The Čengić dynasty: a Contribution to Research on Feudalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Sarajevo, 1959). 5 For a good survey of the historiography on the Habsburg–Venetian–Ottoman frontier zone on

the Eastern shore of Adriatic, see Wendy C. Bracewell, “The Historiography of the Triplex Confinium: Conflict and Community on the Triple Frontier, 16th–18th Centuries,” in Frontiers and the Writing of History, 1500–1850, ed. Steven Ellis and Raingard Esser (Hannover and Laatzen, 2006), 211–228. The only exception to the model of writing described above are studies by authors of Bosnian Muslim provenience, such as Hamdija Kreševljaković, previously mentioned.

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gain, and who was even by Turkish standards extremely venal, greedy, corrupt and cruel toward his Christian subjects.6 Yet was it really so? The present article attempts to offer another interpretation by moving away from the national narrative and positioning the case of Ali Pasha Čengić into another conceptual context, that of the frontier, of borderlands located on the edges of empires. The frontier in this case is the western fringe of the Ottoman Empire in the Dinaric mountains, bordering the Republic of Venice and the Habsburg Empire; the area also known as the triple frontier or triplex confinium.7 The frontier is not just a boundary area between two or more states. It is a zone of marches, semiautonomous militarised political entities, and of separate military/administrative units whose fortifications mark the frontier’s limits. But above all, the frontier is the space of shared military, social and economic patterns on both sides of the boundary line, where life is governed by interactions (either peaceful or violent) with the zones across the boundary. More than anything else, this transitional character of life on the frontier influences the specific mentality of the inhabitants. As such, it can be said that the frontier constitutes a world in itself, with its own rules, where life differs from life in the state’s interior.8 By reconstructing the world of Ali Pasha Čengić, this paper will attempt to shed some light on the events that led an Ottoman sancakbey to put himself so openly on the Venetian side.

6 A classic example of such an evaluation is Radovan Samardžić writing that: “Ali Pasha Čengić, the local sancak bey, was even by Turkish standards extremely greedy, corrupt and cruel. He allowed the Venetians to bribe him, to that extent that he worked more for them than for the sultan, however he was still an overly burdensome lord to his Christian subjects.”, Samardžić, Istorija, 375. Compare also the similar assessment by Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 217, 237. 7 In recent decades, research on this frontier has made significant progress mainly thanks to the project “Triplex Confinium”. See: Drago Roksandić, Triplex Confinium, ili o granicama i regijama Hrvatske povijesti 1500–1800 [Triplex Confinium, or concerning the border and regions of Croatian history, 1500–1800] (Zagreb, 2003), especially 229–242 with an extensive bibliography of the works produced by the project. See also: Egidio Ivetić and Drago Roksandić, eds., Tolerance and Intolerance on the Triplex Confinium: Approaching the “Other” on the Borderlands Eastern Adriatic and Beyond, 1500–1800 (Padua, 2007). For a position of this particular borderland in the wider context of the Ottoman frontiers, see Alfred Rieber, “Triplex Confinium in Comparative Context,” in Constructing Border Societies on the Triplex Confinium, ed. Drago Roksandić and Nataša Štefanec (Budapest, 2000), 13–29. 8 For further discussion concerning the classification of frontiers and a survey of the methodological/theoretical approaches, see Daniel Power, “Frontiers: Terms, Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and Early Modern Europe,” in Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700–1700, ed. Daniel Power and Naomi Standen (London, 1999), 1–12; Mark L. Stein, Guarding the Frontier: Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe (London and New York, 2007), 13–17. See also Andrew C.S. Peacock, “The Ottoman Empire and Its Frontiers,” in The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. Andrew C.S. Peacock (Oxford, 2009), 1–30.

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Historical Context: The Adriatic Theatre of Operations during the War for Crete (1645–1669) When war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire broke out anew in 1645, after almost seventy years of peace, no one could have predicted that it would last for more than two decades. Indeed, the opening events of the war all pointed to the possibility that this conflict would not last long. After successfully landing forces on Crete, taking the Republic by surprise, the Ottomans went from one victory to another. By 1648 almost the entire island, with the exception of the town of Candia and a few strongholds, was in Ottoman hands.9 However, in Dalmatia the situation was rather different. Initial successes by the Bosnian army in 1646 were followed by two campaigns full of military failures, which in March 1648 culminated in the loss of the famous fortress of Klis, seat of a sancakbey. As a result of Venetian military operations in 1647–1648, almost the entire sancak of Klis, the central region south of the Dinaric mountains dividing Dalmatia from Bosnia, was completely destroyed and depopulated, while the neighboring sancak of Lika to the west was heavily devastated.10 This had serious strategic consequences for the conduct of military operations in this region. The Ottomans lost all logistical bases south of the mountains, and the nearest that could be used to launch the campaign against the Dalmatian towns was Livno in Herzegovina, further from the coast. This in turn resulted in a significant increase in the Bosnian army’s marching time, and shortened its operational campaign timeframe. However, the most serious consequence of this success of Venetian arms, and the high losses among the Ottoman frontier lords, was the rebellion of the Empire’s Christian subjects on the frontier. Some, like the semiautonomous regions of Poljica and Makarska, rose in arms and openly proclaimed their allegiance to the Republic, accepting Venetian protection.11 Others, like the semi-nomadic Morlacchi inhabiting Ottoman Dalmatia and

9 For the opening of hostilities and the first Ottoman campaigns resulting in the conquest of Crete see: Ekkehard Eickhoff, Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen: Umbruch in Südosteuropa (Stuttgart, 1988), 17–28, 40–59; Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia, 1991), 104–148. 10 For a more detailed account of these events see: Feruccio Sassi, “Le Campagne di Dalmazia durante la Guerra di Candia (1645–1648),” Archivio Veneto 20 (1937): 211–250; 21 (1937): 60– 100; Gligor Stanojević, Dalmacija u doba kandiskog rata [Dalmatia in the age of the Candian War] (Belgrade, 1958), 109–111, 118–120; Samardžić, Istorija, 344–357. 11 Makarska was the first Christian community on this frontier to defect to the Venetian side, accepting a Venetian governor in August 1646. Although Poljice engaged in negotiations with the Republic from the beginning of the war, it waited for Venetian forces to capture the fortress of Klis before openly declaring for the Republic; see Stanojević, Dalmacija, 99–100, 114, 121; Samardžić, Istorija, 346–347, 363–364.

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Lika, migrated in tens of thousands to Venetian-controlled lands.12 On the southeastern zone of the frontier, the Republic was less successful. The Venetian attempt in 1649 to initiate large-scale rebellion among Albanian Christians failed,13 resulting also in a quieting of the tribes in Herzegovina and Montenegro, which by that time were only waiting for the appearance of some substantial Venetian force to rise in arms. Despite this failure, the Republic’s influence among the tribes of Herzegovina and Montenegro remained very strong and until the end of the war the Ottomans were forced to devote significant resources to keep them pacified. At the same time, the Venetian forces reached their limits with these conquests. The Venetian expedition to Albania in 1649 ended without any significant gains for the Republic, and when in 1654 the operation to capture the fortress of Knin, recently rebuilt by the Ottomans in the centre of Dalmatian hinterland, ended in complete failure, it was a clear sign that the Ottomans had regained strategic initiative in this theatre.14 In 1654–1657 the Republic committed the majority of its forces to the Aegean in an attempt to close the Dardanelles and force the Empire to conclude some kind of a peace agreement. However, the great Venetian victories at sea backfired. The destruction of the Ottoman fleet in 1656 brought a change of government in Constantinople, yet not with the results the Republic was hoping for. The new regime headed by Köprülü Mehmed Pasha turned its attention to the Republic’s possessions in Dalmatia, well within reach of Ottoman land forces.15 12 On the Morlacchi rebellion/migration, see: Stanojević, Dalmacija, 113–118; Domagoj Madunić, “Capi di Morlacchi: Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian defensive System in Dalmatia and the Formation of the Morlacchi Elite (1645–1669),” in Türkenkriege und Adelskultur in Ostmitteleuropa vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert / Anti-Ottoman Wars and the Culture of Nobility in East-Central Europe, 16th–18th centuries, ed. Robert Born and Sabine Jagodzinski (forthcoming). 13 The entire operation was envisioned very ambitiously. Its goal was to bring the war deeper into the Ottoman hinterland by initiating wholesale rebellion among Christians in the wide area stretching from Herzegovina to Ohrid, acquiring for the Republic the new regnum of Albania. The Venetian expeditionary force that sailed from Zadar in December 1648 also carried the five Catholic bishops whose seats were in the Albanian lands and the so-called Sultan Yahya, alleged son of Sultan Murad III and pretender to the Ottoman throne. For more on the Venetian expedition to Albania; see: Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 211–213; Marko Jačov, Le guerre VenetoTurche del XVII secolo in Dalmatia (Venice, 1991), 89–90. For more on Sultan Yahya, see: Peter Bartl, Der Westbalkan zwischen spanischer Monarchie und Osmanischem Reich: Zur Türkenkriegsproblematik an der Wende vom 16. zum 17. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden, 1974), 179–199; Franjo Difnik, Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji [History of the Candian War in Dalmatia] (Split, 1986), 209–210. 14 The attack on Knin proved to be greatest Venetian defeat on this front. Out of a force of around 6,000, the Republic lost some 1,400 men. For more on this battle, see: Jačov, Le guerre Veneto-Turche, 107–110; Stanojević, Dalmacija, 134; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 475. num. 120. (Zara 26 Aprile 1654), attachment number 14, dated 1654. 10. Aprile, Zara. 15 On the four battles in the Dardanelles, see: Setton, Venice, 182–189; Christoph K. Neumann, “Political and Diplomatic Developments,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 3, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge, 2006), 49–50; Eickhoff, Venedig, 135–141, 148–160.

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Rumours of the young sultan personally leading the army to Dalmatia fortunately proved false,16 yet the campaign of 1657 still proved to be one of the most critical in this theatre. For the first time, the Ottomans almost simultaneously launched attacks against two Venetian strongholds, Split and Kotor, dangerously stretching the already weak Venetian forces in Dalmatia. Yet poor coordination and political factors (to be discussed in more detail further on) prevented the Ottomans from achieving any success.17 On the other hand, the Ottoman success in breaking the blockade of the Dardanelles during 1657 gave the central government free hands for the next campaigning season. Throughout the entire winter and spring of 1658, the Senate received disturbing news of massive Ottoman preparations for the deployment of the Empire’s forces in Dalmatia.18 Fortunately for Venice, at the last moment the Ottoman army was diverted to the north, to deal with the Porte’s vassal György Rákóczi II, prince of Transylvania. Rákóczi’s intervention in Poland as Sweden’s ally (without the Porte’s prior blessing) and his subsequent refusal to yield the principality provoked full-scale Ottoman intervention with the goal of deposing this troublesome vassal.19 For the next seven years, the Empire’s entanglement in Transylvanian and Hungarian affairs which escalated into open war with the Habsburgs, tied down the majority of the Empire’s resources and resulted in a lack of military action in Dalmatia. The Empire’s limited military commitment on the Dalmatian front also continued throughout the last four campaigns of the war, when the Ottomans concentrated all their efforts on eliminating the last Venetian stronghold on Crete and bringing this war to an end.20 Yet the lack of major encounters in Dalmatia after 1648 brought no reduction in the level of everyday violence. As the years passed and both sides begun to show signs of exhaustion, warfare degenerated into a closed circle of skirmishes, forays, raids and counter-raids. From year to year, military operations closely followed the changing seasons. With the coming of St. George’s day the army of Bosnian sipahis would assemble at Livno and begin their slow move toward the coast. Every year, the same script would be followed: fields would be pillaged, crops burned, and occasionally a half-hearted attack on some Venetian stronghold would be attempted. Then with the com16 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 54. (Trau, 16. Ottobre 1656). 17 For more concerning the events of 1657, see: Stanojević, Dalmacija, 136–138; idem, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 243–251. 18 Already in March 1657, the governor-general in Dalmatia received letters from the Republic’s representative at the Porte that Dalmatia was destined as the main target for the campaign seasson 1658; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 483. num 163. (Zara, 10. Marzo 1658), attachment: Leterra da Segretario Ballorino. 19 Katalin Péter, “The Golden Age of the Principality (1606–1660),” in History of Transylvania, vol. 2, ed. László Makkai and Zoltán Szász (Boulder, 2002), 140–144. 20 For more on the epic siege of Candia, see: Setton, Venice, 193–228; Eickhoff, Venedig, 230– 264.

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ing of St. Demeter’s day, the Bosnian army would disband, and the raiding season for the Venetian irregulars would begin. As the years passed, the casualties mounted on both sides. However, probably the worst consequence of the prolonged war on this frontier was the breakdown of social order, the spread of chaos, anarchy and the loss of respect for laws and property at all levels of society: from simple raya who became highway robbers, to beys and ağas who increased tax pressure on their subjects beyond all measure. The situation was not helped at all by a series of pashas in Bosnia more concerned with extortion and filling their own purses than with waging war. This concludes the sketch of the wider historical context in which the actions of Ali Pasha Čengić should be positioned.

“I am Cengi Alai-Bey of Herzegovina and everybody knows me…”21 Originally from Egil in Azerbaijan, the Čengić family (taking its family name Cengi from its supposed estate at C’angri north of Ankara) came to Bosnia in the mid-sixteenth century, where they established their power base in the sancak of Herzegovina. By the first half of the seventeenth century the family was completely naturalised and connected by marriage ties to other influential clans in the region, becoming one of the most powerful families in the eyalet of Bosnia.22 Of Ali Pasha Čengić little is known before the beginning of the war for Crete. As a dignitary, we know that he maintained good relations with the Republic of Ragusa, and – as was customary in these parts – invited them to send representatives (with gifts) to his wedding23 or informed them of the birth of his son.24 When the war between the Empire and the Venetian Republic started, Ali Pasha dutifully answered the call to arms, as every other Ottoman lord most likely did; the first reports of his activities date from summer 1648, when as alaybey of Herzegovina (commander of the sancak’s sipahi cavalry) he joined the Bosnian pasha’s army assembling at Livno. The first contact between Ali Pasha and the Venetian representatives was to say the least curious, and speaks much of his character and of how he understood his position. When in March 1648 the fortress of Klis surrendered to Venetian forces after 21 “Io son Cengi Allai Bei dell’Ercegovina e tutti mi conoscono…,” ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 467. num. 460. (Zara, 25. Agosto 1648.), attachment: Lettera scritta da Alli Bei Cengijch. 22 Safvet Bašagić beg, “Najstariji ferman begova Čengića” [The oldest ferman of Čengić beys], Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja u Bosni i Hercegovini 9 (1897): 437–452. 23 Državni Arhiv Dubrovnik (henceforth DAD) Acta Sanctae Mariae Maioris (henceforth ASSM), vol. 1942, B 23, 5 (no date and numeration). For this and other archival references from the Ragusan state archives, I would like to thank my dear colleague Vesna Miović. 24 DAD ASSM, vol. 1942, B 24, 16 (no date and numeration). Although in the early phase of his life he did not hold the honorary title “pasha”, in this article I refer to him with this name as customarily used in historiography.

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half a month of siege, the defenders were granted honours of war and all allowed to leave freely, with the exception of six Ottoman lords who were to remain as hostages and be exchanged for twelve Venetians in Ottoman captivity.25 Accordingly in July, Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo sent Fra Vincenzo Maduncich to the Bosnian pasha in Livno as his representative, tasked with finalising the terms of the prisoner exchange. When in August Fra Vincenzo returned from the camp of the Bosnian pasha, he presented Foscolo with a rather surprising letter written by Ali Pasha Čengić, alaybey of Herzegovina. The letter was nothing less than an offer for a local cease-fire, with a promise of mediation in concluding peace between the Republic and the Porte. “For the last three years nothing has been done in these parts but fight, and nothing else is seen but fighting, subjects perishing, some made slaves and some put to the sword, and all other kind of ravages,” wrote Ali Pasha. Čengić went on to inform the governor-general that he had been approached by the Ottoman lords from Lika, representatives of the merchants’ community and many others, and asked to send this letter expressing their wishes that everything should return to the state as it was ab antico. Yet there was one condition to Čengić’s call to the governor-general to dispatch a person authorised to open cease-fire negotiations: that the Republic should immediately return the newly conquered and refortified fortress of Klis, and all other captured strongholds in the sancak of Lika. The governorgeneral dutifully informed the Senate of this event, stating that this offer is “more ridiculous than worthy of any attention,” but that he had nevertheless answered with all sincerity and in a formal manner, stating firmly that Klis was now a possession of the Republic and would remain so.26 The Senate approved his conduct, agreeing that: “La lettera scritta da quel truco col motivo di pace non si vede, che habbia alcun fondamento;” nevertheless instructing him to continue listening for anything that might be said in this regard and inform them accordingly.27 In spite of the Senate’s dismissive tone, subsequent events in Constantinople, the deposition and execution of Sultan Ibrahim and the change of government in the Empire,28 might indicate that Ali Pasha’s offer was not entirely groundless. Soon after the deposition of Sultan Ibrahim, rumours started to circulate in Sarajevo and Ragusa that peace was to be concluded

25 For more on negotiations and contact concluded between the Venetian commander, GovernorGeneral Lunardo Foscolo and Mehmet Mustaibegović, sancakbey of Klis, see: Difnik, Povijest, 178–192; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 466. num. 389. (Di Galea Salona, 7. Aprile 1648), attachment: Scrittura con Turchi di Clissa. 26 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 467. num. 460. (Zara, 25. Agosto 1648), attachment: Lettera scritta da Alli Bei Cengijch. 27 ASVe Senato Rettori, R-21, f. 54v, Adi 5. Settembre 1648. 28 Setton, Venice, 152–153.

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with the Republic.29 And indeed, in March 1649 Foscolo received a letter from the Venetian bailo in Constantinople through the Bosnian pasha, which informed him that the Ottomans were showing willingness to open peace talks. The letter was also accompanied by another one from the Bosnian pasha, who wrote to Foscolo that the imperial courier was on his way with orders to suspend the hostilities.30 Additionally, it became obvious in the following years that Čengić was not without protectors at the Porte; specifically in 1650, when he was appointed as sancakbey of Herzegovina, and even for a 31 short period as pasha of the eyalet of Kanizsa (in 1651). All this could indicate that Čengić’s offer represented a probe, initiated by some power or pressure group, intended to test the Venetians’ disposition. Be that as it may, Ali Pasha’s main concern as sancakbey was to pacify the Christians in his domain, stirred by the arrival of the Venetian expeditionary force in the bay of Kotor and by the capture of the Ottoman stronghold of Risan in February 1649. Most problematic was the community of Nikšić, a leading tribe among the Christians of Herzegovina, who at the arrival of the Venetian force rose in arms and captured the small town of Grahovo.32 Čengić, at that time still only alaybey of Herzegovina, skillfully used news of the prospective peace and wrote a warning letter to the Nikšić chieftains.33 Ali Pasha addressed them as “antichi amici,” who had always been “in amore et amicitia” with his late father, expressing his understanding for their current transgression, yet warning them to “think hard, because they know very well how long is the arm of felice Gran Signore and his ministers, the grand viziers, and that not even the Re Christiano can defeat him […] Open your eyes,” Čengić goes on, especially now, when peace between the Empire and the Republic is at hand, “your lands are in the lowlands and it does not require more than two or three thousand horse and foot to destroy them.”34 Čengić’s actions, combined with the meagre performance of Venetian forces, shook the

29 See, for example, ASVe Senato Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 542. (Cattaro, 1. Marzio 1649), attachments: Avvisi di Ragusa di quelli Signori; Avvisi di Saraevo. 30 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 544. (Cattaro, 6. Marzo 1649), attachments: Copia del Capitolo Contenuto nelle lettere dell’Ecc.mo Bailo; Lettere di Bassa di Bosnia; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 545. (Cattaro, 7. Marzo 1649). 31 His first decree to the Ragusans dates from August 1650, so he must have been appointed a short time before. In this ferman Čengić still does not use the title of pasha, but in another from January 1651, his name is recorded as ex-governor of the Kanizsa eyalet and governor of the Herzegovina sancak, and he also uses the title of pasha. Vesna Miović, Dubrovačka Republika u spisima namjesnika Bosanskog ejaleta i hercegovačkog sandžaka [The Ragusan Republic in the decrees of the Bosnian pashas and sancakbeys of Herzegovina] (Dubrovnik, 2008), 240. 32 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 212. 33 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 544. (Cattaro, 6. Marzo 1649). 34 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 544. (Cattaro, 6. Marzo 1649), attachment: Lettera di Allai Begh Cenglijich, e di quelli da Castel Nuovo scritta alli Nixichi.

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resolve of local Christians, who refrained from openly joining the Venetians in their attack on Podgorica.35 After his appointment as sancakbey, Čengić pursued pacification of Christians in his region even more vigorously. He demonstrated that his intentions were serious by not holding back from use of force when necessary. The policing operation conducted against Nikšić, which had refused to provide him with the customary gift after his appointment as sancakbey, turned into an exceptionally bloody skirmish, even by local standards, with more than two hundred persons on both sides killed or wounded. However, his tactics worked: facing relentless pressure, the Christians backed down and conceded to his demands that they provide him with a gift. Moreover, the Christians of Nikšić were soon reconciled by Čengić’s mediation with the Muslim lords from Herceg-Novi and Risan, and as a guarantee of their good faith consented to send hostages to Herceg-Novi. In the course of a single year and with skillful use of the carrot and stick strategy (where the carrot was appeals to old family allegiances and ties), Čengić managed to eradicate Venetian influence in the region under his control.36 What alarmed the Christian tribes even more was that he started to rebuild some of the ruined forts and guard towers, and to garrison them, all with the aim of establishing firmer control over the land.37 The next year, 1651, Čengić also demonstrated the skills necessary for survival in the Ottoman political arena. After receiving news of his deposition, Ali Pasha left for Constantinople, where by paying 20,000 silver coins and twenty-five slaves to the Grand Vizier he not only managed to keep the office of sancakbey of Herzegovina but was also charged with governance of the nearby province of Montenegro.38 Most probably in order to cover these expenses, after his return from Constantinople Čengić imposed heavy taxation on Christians in his domain. Not surprisingly, the worst-hit was the community of Nikšić, from which (as a sort of punishment for rebellion) Čengić demanded harac of 5,000 Reali in 1652 and 1653.39 In summer 1652, Čengić dutifully joined the army of the Bosnian pasha, again on campaign in Dalmatia, leading a thousand men from his sancak, where for an entire season he was engaged in rebuilding the fortresses of Zadvarje and Knin in Dalmatia, destroyed by the Venetians in the previous years.40 All in all, so far the conduct of Ali Pasha was no different from that of any good and faithful Ottoman lord, who followed and executed imperial orders, blockaded Venetian at35 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 212–216. 36 Ibid, 217–218. 37 Ibid, 219–220. 38 Ibid, 221–222. 39 Ibid, 232. 40 Stanojević, Dalmacija, 130. See also ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 473. num. 125. (Zara, 17 Agosto 1652), attachment: Costituto di Durac Spachia Dulimenovich, 17. Agosto 1652. Zara.

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tempts to open commerce (by ordering seizure of goods which they attempted to export through Ragusa),41 kept his Christian subjects in obedience with a firm hand and dutifully participated in military campaigns.

Sancakbey of Herzegovina and ‘Confidente’ of the Republic of St. Mark Then in 1653, a curious event took place: Ali Pasha Čengić made contact and engaged in active correspondence with Vincenzo Bolizza, a noble from the Venetian town of Kotor. The Bolizza (Grbičić) family was wellknown in the region and its members were held in high esteem by the Venetian government. In the course of the first half of the seventeenth century three of its members were given the title of cavaliere di San Marco and two brothers (Francesco and Vincenzo) were charged with the important task of maintaining a courier service for the transfer of diplomatic letters between Venice and Constantinople. The family also enjoyed great respect among the Christians under Ottoman rule, with whom they kept up active correspondence throughout the war.42 As such, the Bolizza family acted as the gateway between the Republic of St. Mark and the wider hinterland of the bay of Kotor. Almost all correspondence with the chieftains of the Christian tribes and local Ottoman lords went through them. Moreover, both Vincenzo and Francesco Bolizza were engaged in what the Venetians called a “guerra sporca” and would today be labelled “black ops,” that is: intelligencegathering, organising liquidation of the enemies of the Republic in Ottoman lands, sabotage of military facilities and similar activities. Indeed, Vincenzo Bolizza could be called the Venetian spy-master in the region. Taken out of context, Ali Pasha’s actions may seem strange, yet a closer look at the historical developments just beforehand renders them perfectly logical. The war was entering its eighth year, and war-weariness was more than visible among the local Ottomans. Their casualties in the first years of the war were very heavy and numbered in the thousands of dead and captured, including two sancakbeys, a feat of which the Venetian commander, Lunardo Foscolo, was rather proud. Even shortly before Čengić’s decision to contact 41 One of the first decrees (dated 18 August 1650) of Ali Pasha Čengić as sancakbey of Herzegovina was to renew the imperial order prohibiting commerce with the Venetian Republic, ordering the kadis of Mostar, Nevesinje, Ljubinj, Cernica and Konjic to confiscate all Venetian goods exported through Ragusa; see Vesna Miović, Dubrovačka Republika u spisima namjesnika Bosanskog ejaleta i hercegovačkog sandžaka [The Ragusan Republic in the decrees of the Bosnian pashas and sancakbeys of Herzegovina] (Dubrovnik, 2008), 130. 42 In this study I have opted to use the Italian spelling of the family name as found in contemporary documents, instead of the Slavic Bolica. For more on this notable family from Kotor, see: Lovorka Čoralić, “Kotorski plemići iz roda Bolica – kavaljeri Svetog Marka,” [Kotor nobles from the family Bolica – Knights of Saint Mark], Povijesni prilozi 31 (2006): 149–159; Paolo Preto, I servizi segreti di Venezia: Spionaggio e contraspionaggio ai tempi della Serenissima (Milan, 2010), 241–242.

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the Venetians, in November 1652 at the end of the campaigning season, Alaybey Filipović, the head of another influential Ottoman family, was captured in an insignificant skirmish by Venetian Morlacchi irregulars and imprisoned in Verona. News about the fate of this famous Ottoman lord quickly spread on the frontier.43 Additionally, loss of territories in Dalmatia forced numerous sipahi and other timar holders into exile, flooding the nearby lands in search for shelter at the estates of their relatives and friends. At the end of 1652, the Republic welcomed the Porte’s invitation to send its official representative, ambassador Giovanni Capello, to open peace talks with the Empire. With the arrival of the Venetian ambassador, the conviction that peace was imminent spread in the region. The ambassador entered the Empire through Herceg-Novi, and on his voyage inland was greeted by Sancakbey Čengić, through whose lands he was passing. In such an atmosphere of hope, Čengić used the passage of ambassador Capello through his lands as the occasion to establish contact with Vincenzo Bolizza.44 Ali Pasha gave Bolizza a pure-bred Arabian horse, and Vincenzo in turn responded with an equivalent gift. In March 1653, writing from Zadar, Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin informed the Senate that Vincenzo Bolizza had “contratta amicitia, et confidenza con Ali Bassa Cenghijch Sangiacco d’Hercegovina.”45 From that time, through the mediation of Vojvoda Petar, the principal chieftain of the Nikšić tribe, Čengić kept friendly and most cordial correspondence with Vicenzo Bolizza in Kotor and with the governorgeneral in Zadar, regularly asking for supplies of sugar, candies, soap and other commodities.46 Seen in the local perspective, his conduct was nothing out of the ordinary. By 1653, other Ottoman beys from the frontier regions had also established contact and maintained friendly relations with the Republic’s representatives. Some became Venetian informers (or, as the Venetian sources called them, confidente47) in order to protect their estates from raids, or to ensure better treatment in case of capture; others had even more personal reasons, such as for example Achmet Spahia, one of the principal beys from Solin, who provided intelligence to the Republic to further negotiations for the ransom of his children, captured by Venetian Morlacchi.48 The true motives of Ali Pasha Čengić will remain unknown; however, his attitude to the war at hand was unmistakable. During 1653 Ali Pasha 43 Stanojević, Dalmacija, 130–131. 44 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 228. 45 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 474. num. 17. (Di Spalato, 4. Marzo 1653); see also the attachment: Lettera del Sangiaco d’Hercegovina scritta al Cav.re Bolizza. 46 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 229. 47 For a typology and classification of the persons in the Republic’s service, see: Preto, I servizi segreti, 41–50. 48 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 471. num. 12. (Trau, 24. Marzo 1651); num. 101. (Zara, 20. Aprile 1652).

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Čengić went to Constantinople for the second time, and after the collapse of peace talks he returned home rather disappointed. In December 1653 he wrote to Bolizza, stating that this war “has over time become outdated,” and called for the opening of trade between Kotor and its hinterland, urging Bolizza to convince his superiors that the Republic should send him a representative with whom all details of an agreement could be clarified. It seems that this time, Čengić’s initiative was well received. In January 1654 the Venetian envoy sent from Kotor, Francesco Zifra, found Čengić with an entourage of 5,000 men demonstrating his power and forcing another “gift” of 3,000 reali from local Christians. Although Zifra came as personal envoy of Francesco Bolizza, not as the official representative of the Republic, his arrival represented an important step in development of the relationship between Čengić and Venice.49 Ali Pasha Čengić’s talks with Zifra strayed from the topic of free trade in the region, and combined subtle threats with requests for material gain. It seems that the young Sultan had made no great impression on Ali Pasha Čengić, who openly said to Zifra that: “at the moment the Empire is ruled by a weak Sultan who more resembles bostangi than a ruler,” and that to make peace, the Republic need only bribe the grand vizier and a few other ministers; he also offered his services for this task. Additionally, Ali Pasha also asked for expenses for his trip to Constantinople, where he claimed to have advocated the interests of the Republic. Finally, Čengić complained to Zifra about the gravity of his situation, since the pasha of Bosnia and the sancakbey of Shkodër had for some time been pressuring him to attack the Venetian stronghold of Perast in the bay of Kotor. So far, claimed Čengić, he had been able to excuse himself with the bad weather, yet in spring he was not sure he would be able to ignore these commands any further; thus he sent a clear message to the Senate about what could happen if his favors were not obtained.50 The Senate advised caution and instructed Governor-General Dolfin to attempt to appease Čengić with some moderate gift, “quattro o cinque vesti di quella qualita, che giudicasse conveniente.”51 Still, in spite of all professions of love and friendship toward the Most Serene Republic expressed in his letters so far,52 Ali Pasha’s actual conduct turned out to be not that peaceful. When in March 1654 Venetian forces attacked the Ottoman fortress of Knin in Dalmatia, among the 5,000–6,000 strong Ottoman relief force that routed Venetian attackers was a contingent led by Ali Pasha Čengić; on this occasion he even suffered a wound to the 49 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 232–234. 50 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 233; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 475. num. 106. (Zara, 9. Febrario 1653), attachment: Relatione di Franceso Zifra da Nixichi; num. 111. (Di Galea Sebenico, 2. Marzo 1654). 51 ASVe Senato Rettori, R-28, f. 46v, Adi 18 Marzo 1654. 52 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 234.

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leg.53 Then in May, despite all previous assurances, Ali Pasha assembled a war party and launched an attack against the Venetian port of Perast. Although the attack came as a surprise to the Venetians, it was executed halfheartedly and was largely a consequence of pressure put on Ali Pasha by other Ottoman lords, mainly the ağas from Herceg-Novi, who for years had demanded the destruction of this nest of corsairs.54 In the end, this operation did not much influence the relationship between Čengić and Venice. The Republic’s officials continued to maintain friendly correspondence with him, and if anything, it only brought him more esteem in their eyes.55 Unfortunately, the attack did not stop further raids by these Christian corsairs; it could even be said to have intensified them. Over previous years, a veritable small war had been fought between two nests of corsair, Christian Perast and Muslim Herceg-Novi, a war that brought raids and destruction beyond the Bay of Kotor and from which the Republic of Ragusa, in fact the neutral party in this war, suffered greatly. Venetian irregulars, hajduks from Makaraska and Kotor Bay, considered Ragusa, a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire, as a legitimate target, and also used its territory to launch attacks on the Ottoman lands in Herzegovina. The Ottomans in turn accused Ragusans of complicity with the hajduks in allowing them free use of the Republic’s territory. When Ali Pasha was again in Constantinople in the winter of 1654–1655, defending himself against the accusations of overtaxation which had caused his deposition and seeking reappointment as sancakbey with grandiose promises to recapture Klis if given command in Herzegovina, at home the situation deteriorated.56 During the spring of 1655, Venetian hajduks conducted a series of daring raids which resulted in open conflict between the ağas of Herceg-Novi and the Republic of Ragusa.57 Frustrated by Ragusan passivity in preventing these raids, some of the Ottoman lords from Herceg-Novi turned to highway 53 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 475. num. 114. (Zara, 29. Marzo 1654). 54 Historiographical views on the Ottoman attack on Perast in 1654 differ greatly. On the one side, some, such as Serbian historian Radovan Samardžić, see the year 1654 as crucial in the history of Kotor Bay. According to Samardžić, in 1654 a large-scale migration of Christian outlaws from Herzegovina, the so-called hajduks, took place to the Bay of Kotor, and the attack represented a major Ottoman military operation conducted with the aim of pacifying the hajduks. On the other side, Gligor Stanojević claims that no migration took place around 1654 and considers this a minor episode, one of many similar that took place during this war. This defence of Perast, over the centuries, became more famous than its actual importance. For more, see: Samardžić, Istorija, 377–389; Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 234–235. 55 In February 1655, Čengić asked the Venetian representatives in Kotor for some fancy gifts he owed to the new Bosnian pasha; the Senate, to keep him well-disposed toward the interests of the Republic, approved this request; see Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 237–238; ASVe Senato Rettori, R-28, f. 329r, Adi 27. Febraro 1654. mv. 56 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 238; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 477. num. 40. (Zara, li 3. Giugno, 1655). 57 Samardžić, Istorija, 379–380.

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robbery, and under the pretext of taxation plundered merchant caravans from Sarajevo heading for Ragusa, practically closing Ragusan trade. Additionally, in February 1656, several ağas from Herceg-Novi officially accused Ragusans at the Bosnian pasha’s court of complicity in the Christian attacks on their lands, demanding high financial recompense for the damage to their estates.58 However, indiscriminate robbery of the caravans heading for Ragusa backfired, provoking the anger of the influential merchant community of Sarajevo, which although initially well disposed toward the Herceg-Novi ağas, were by June 1655 demanding their heads. Moreover, such robbery also supplied the Ragusans, who had started an active diplomatic campaign, with excellent arguments to accuse the lords of Herceg-Novi of being no more than brigands, both in Sarajevo and at the Porte. It did not take long for Ragusan envoys at the Porte – with excuses that the Republic was afraid of sending harac to the sultan because of these outlaws, and with appropriate distribution of gifts – to obtain imperial commands ordering the return of stolen Ragusan goods and the arrest of the offenders. From April 1655 to July 1656, several such imperial commands were issued,59 with either the sancakbey of Herzegovina (at that time Ali Pasha Čengić once more) or the pasha of Bosnia charged with their execution.60 This entire affair was, as far as Ali Pasha was concerned, rather inconvenient. Some of the accused Herceg-Novi notables were his relatives, and he did all he could to protect them and reconcile them with the Bosnian beylerbey. On the other hand, the activity of the Ragusan envoys at the Porte brought unwanted central government attention to his domain, while Čengić was treading on dangerous grounds by protecting officially declared outlaws. When in June 1656 another large caravan was “taxed” on its way to Ragusa for no less than 6,000 reali, the Ragusan government ordered a levy of 800 men to deal with the outlaws responsible; pressed from all sides, the Bosnian pasha was finally forced to make a move.61 In August 1656 the pasha unwillingly begun his slow progress from Livno to Herceg-Novi. This also provoked a reaction from the Venetian side, which carefully monitored all Ottoman preparations. The Venetian command was alarmed by the size of the pasha’s entourage and above all by rumours that the Ragusans had offered him as many guns as were needed for the attack on Herceg-Novi. The danger that the pasha could use the forces at his disposal to attack Venetian Kotor,

58 Ibid, 381. 59 Vesna Miović, Dubrovačka Republica u spisima osmanskih sultana [The Republic of Ragusa in the acts of the Ottoman sultans] (Dubrovnik, 2005), 297. 60 For more on the role of the Bosnian pasha and the sancakbey of Herzegovina in Ragusan diplomacy, see Vesna Miović, “Beylerbey of Bosnia and Sancakbey of Herzegovina in the Diplomacy of the Dubrovnik Republic,” Dubrovnik Annals 9 (2005): 37–69. 61 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 14. (Sebenico, 19 Giugno 1656).

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instead of Herceg-Novi, moved the Venetian governor-general to gather his forces and head for Kotor.62 However, the entire affair was quickly over: the Bosnian pasha destroyed two or three towers belonging to the most incriminated outlaws and reconciled with the rest through the mediation of Čengić, and then left. Meanwhile Ali Pasha, aiming to prevent similar dangers in future, initiated negotiations with the Republic’s representatives in Kotor for a local ceasefire, with the goal of suspending the raids and forays in the area. In August, Vincenzo Bolizza and Ali Pasha Čengić met in person in the presence of a dozen Ottoman notables, exchanged gifts and concluded the terms of a ceasefire based on the agreement that no offensive actions would be undertaken unless explicitly ordered by the ruling powers; these terms were to be presented to the pasha of Bosnia and to the Senate. According to the report compiled by Bolizza, Ali Pasha openly stated in the presence of other Ottoman lords “che se ben vi sia guerra tra communi Prencipi, si potrebbe pratticare tra confinanti buona intelligenza, quiete e divertimento delle Hostilita per terra, et per acqua con deviamento de Legni Corsari à benefittio de gl’uni, et de gl’altri sudditi.”63 In spite of all the polite rhetoric and professed good intentions, the main motive of both sides in this peace initiative remained to pursue their own interest. Ali Pasha aimed to deflect unwanted central government attention from his domain, while the Ottoman lords needed a free hand to pacify the Christians of Montenegro, who at that point had refused to pay tribute for years.64 On the other hand, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo aimed by this action to secure Kotor from possible Ottoman attack, so that he could concentrate his forces on the defence of Dalmatia. Establishing some form of peace in the Bay of Kotor would have also brought another important benefit: the opening of trade with the Ottoman hinterland, which would have brought badly needed grain and food supplies to the Venetian possessions in the Adriatic (especially important that year because an outbreak of plague in southern Italy had temporarily closed this traditional grain market).65 Additionally, while these negotiations were going on, Bernardo at the same time maintained an active correspondence with the chieftains of Nikšić attempting to organise a sudden takeover of Herceg-Novi. Thus it should come as no surprise, that in spite of the “best intentions” of all interested parties, this cease-fire was short62 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 36. (Zara, 23. Agosto 1656). 63 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 37. (Dalla Galera nel Porto di S.a Croce di Ragusi, 31. Agosto 1656), especially the attachments: letter of Vincenzo Boliza to Governor-General Bernardo and his report written immediately upon his return to Kotor; num. 41. (Cattaro, 15. Settembre 1656). 64 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 40. (Cattaro, 11. Settembre 1656). 65 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 39. (Cattaro, 4. Settembre 1656). The plague in Puglia continued until the end of the year, preventing the import of grain from that market; see num. 58. (Trau, 30. Ottobre 1656).

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lived. Especially so since forces beyond the control of local parties had been put in motion, and the attention of the Ottoman government was already focused on these peripheral provinces.

The Siege of Kotor in 1657 When in June 1656 the Venetian fleet crushed the Ottoman navy in the engagement known as the “Third Battle of the Dardanelles,” it precipitated the fall of the government and gave impetus to the rise of a new and energetic grand vizier, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. Soon very disturbing news started to reach Dalmatia that the new government wanted to avenge this defeat on sea by a victory on land, and that Dalmatia had been chosen as target for a major military campaign for the following year.66 According to news reaching Venice, the Ottoman plans were most disturbing. For the campaign of 1657, the plan was to attack simultaneously several places along the coast: Zadar, Šibenik or Split in Dalmatia, and Kotor to the south. Parallel to the extensive military and logistical preparations, the Ottoman government also changed key commanders on these frontiers. Seydi Ahmed Pasha was appointed as Bosnian beylerbey with extraordinary powers, an experienced warrior but out of favour with the new regime in Constantinople.67 Ali Pasha Čengić managed to keep the post of sancakbey of Herzegovina, in spite of Ragusan attempts to arrange his arrest because of his protection of the Herceg-Novi ağas.68 However his kinsman Jusufbegović, sancakbey of Shkodër, was not so lucky. Unlike Čengić, who had proved rather skilful in the political intrigues of the Empire and managed to avoid deposition more than once, Jusufbegović was deposed in spite of a gift of 3,000 scudi sent to Constantinople. The Porte 66 The news arriving in Dalmatia was spectacular. First, in October 1656, rumours had it that for the next campaign the sultan was planning to send the grand vizier personally, and that the Tatar khan had offered 120,000 soldiers for the occasion in exchange for 300,000 ducats; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 48. (Spalato, 6. Ottobre 1656). Soon, even more alarming rumours were heard, that the young sultan had expressed the wish to personally lead an army against Dalmatia next year; yet he was dissuaded by the new grand vizier; see num. 54. (Trau, 16. Ottobre 1656). 67 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 77. (Sebenico, 22. Genaro 1656 mv.); Samardžić, Istorija, 382–383. On his person, see Anton von Gévay, Versuch eines chronologischen Verzeichnisses der türkischen Statthalter von Ofen (Vienna, 1841), 32–33; Sudár, “A hódoltsági pasák,” 893–895. 68 Ragusan envoys at the Porte managed to obtain an imperial order against Ali Pasha Čengić, because of the protection he had given to the beys of Herceg-Novi. In December two kapicis arrived in Herzegovina to arrest him and bring him to Constantinople. However, Čengić managed to dodge this arrest by taking shelter before their arrival, and the kapicis were not able to find him. Thus, only his son Kadri Bey was arrested and entrusted to the custody of the Bosnian pasha. In the end, this episode passed without any consequences for Ali Pasha Čengić, who remained firmly in position; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 67. (Sebenico, 9. Decembre 1656).

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appointed of its own choice as sancakbey of Shkodër: Mehmed Pasha Varlac (Varlaz in the Venetian sources), a former Janissary ağa, and charged him with the attack on Kotor.69 However, Jusufbegović was not ready to acknowledge deposition. Aiming to meet the new sancakbey by force of arms, he started to assemble loyal followers and even called upon his Christian subjects to join him. Following the well known maxim that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” Jusufbegović turned to the Venetians. In January his lieutenant and one of his kinsmen arrived personally in Kotor to ask for the Republic’s support in this affair.70 According to Venetian sources, Jusufbegović openly told the courier who brought him the imperial command ordering him to cede the post and depart to Constantinople, that he would do neither; what is more, that he was ready to use his scimitar against anyone who sought to depose him.71 Venetians were quick to jump on this opportunity and offered Jusufbegović, whom they had tried to poison only three years earlier,72 protection and asylum in Kotor. The Republic even went as far as to put a price on the heads of both the new sancakbey Varlac and his main supporter in the region, Cafer Ağa, a renegade previously known as Conte Voin Tujčević.73 By April 1657, Jusufbegović had assembled several thousand men and was heading to meet the new sancakbey in open field. Near the town of Alessio in Albania, their vanguards met in a short skirmish resulting in dozens of dead.74 In order to put an end to this conflict, the new Bosnian beylerbey, whose trust Ali Pasha quickly won over,75 asked Čengić to mediate and ar69 Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 239. In Turkish sources, he is referred to under the name Hisim Mehmed Pasha. For this reference, as well as for insightful comments on the draft of this paper, I am very grateful to Balázs Sudár. 70 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 72. (Sebenico, 4. Genaro 1656 mv.). 71 “[…] ad’ ogni modo le [Jusufbegović] sono arrivati ordini espressi del Gran Sig.re, spediti con un Spahi, e perché debba ceder la carica, et venirsene alla Porta. Il Giusuf Begovich con tutto ciò ha ricusato interpidamente di obedire, risponendo ne voler ceder la carica, ne volersi portare à Costantinopoli, anzi che haverebbe impiegata coraggiosamente la sua Scimitara molto ben agguzzata contro chi voleva deponerlo dal Sanzaccato,” ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 91. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1657). 72 Preto, I servizi segreti, 310. 73 The Republic offered an award of 100 gold coins for the head of the renegade Cafer Ağa, and 200 gold coins to whoever killed the new sancakbey, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 97. (Zara, 8. Maggio 1657). The Venetians held the renegade Voin to be one of the main initiators of the Ottoman attack, crediting him with convincing the Porte to start this campaign. For more on his person, see: Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 215, 243, 245–249, 252; Samardžić, Istorija, 387. 74 “… risponendo ne voler ceder la carica, ne volersi portare à Costantinopoli, anzi che haverebbe impiegata coraggiosamente la sua Scimitara molto ben agguzzata contro chi voleva deponerlo dal Sanzaccato,” ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 91. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1657). 75 Already in February, Čengić headed for Sarajevo where the new beylerbey was expected, with the aim of personally meeting him; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 86. (Zara, undated letter).

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range some form of reconciliation between the two.76 Čengić was successful and soon they agreed to a cease-fire. Yet Governor-General Antonio Bernardo was not ready to let this opportunity slip away so easily. He instructed Bolizza to contact his “friend” Ali Pasha, who in Bernardo’s estimate was “huomo venalissimo, che per danari senza alcun riguardo e solito di prevaricare facilmente contro il servitio, e comandamenti Regij” and attempt to convince him to act as a disruptive element and deepen the conflict. Additionally, Bernardo also instructed Bolizza to hint to Čengić about the possibility of assigning a desirable stipend if he were ready to become a confidente of the Republic.77 It seems though that the Venetian offer came too late. By the beginning of May, Jusufbegović gave in to pressure and accepted his deposition.78 However, as it turned out the conflict was only temporarily muted, not resolved. Both Jusufbegović and Ali Pasha, whose estates Varlac had plundered because of his support given to his relative, continued to nurture ill feeling toward the new sancakbey and only awaited the right opportunity to get rid of him. Alarmed by the extensive Ottoman preparations and the multitude of clear signs that Kotor was to be the target of Ottoman attack in the summer, Bernardo personally left for Kotor and corresponded with Christian chieftains in its hinterland. Bernardo used all of his skill and influence in an attempt to sway them to openly side with the Republic in the coming fight: from expressing readiness to attack Herceg-Novi, which the Christians of Herzegovina had sought to capture from the beginning of the war, to flattery and offering stipends. Bernardo even offered an award of 2,000 gold coins to the tribe willing to capture and bring to Kotor an Ottoman artillery train, or 1,000 gold coins for its destruction. Yet the results were far from satisfactory: the Montenegrin clans joined the ranks of the Ottoman army, the Christians of Herzegovina mainly remained passive, while the Christians of northern Albania (the Klimenti, Kuči and Piperi), in spite of their promises of support, waited for news of the outcome of the struggle under the walls of Kotor.79 Although the Republic failed to initiate rebellion among the Christians in Kotor’s hinterland, Bernardo’s diplomatic efforts yielded unexpected fruits, compensating for this failure: the Republic managed to enlist Ali Pasha Čengić to its cause. The prospect of being free of the new threat in his domain, Sancakbey Varlac and his supporters, and the promises of support and material gain finally lured Čengić to the Venetian side. Yet Ali Pasha’s arrival 76 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 91. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1657). 77 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 94. (Zara, 17. Aprile 1657). 78 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 97. (Zara, 8. Maggio 1657), attachment: lettera scritta dall Albanese liberato dell’ Ecc.mo s.re Antonio Bernardo Prov.re Gnal spedito da sua Ecc.za per avvelenare il Sanzacco di Scuttari, e Voin nominato Zafer Aga rinegato. 79 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 101. (Budua, 9. Giugno 1657); Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 247–248. See also the correspondence between Governor-General Bernardo and the Christian chieftains, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 101. (Budua, 9. Giugno 1657), attachments numerated 1–10.

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in Kotor, at the invitation of Vincenzo Bolizza, to personally confer with the Governor-General and to establish “una vera amicitia”, was prevented by a sequence of events set off by Bernardo’s departure from Zadar.80 The Governor-General’s arrival in Kotor prompted the Bosnian pasha, who by June had already gathered significant forces in Livno, to attempt to capture Split by a daring surprise attack. Not waiting for his forces to assemble in full, and leaving heavy siege artillery behind, the pasha rushed toward Split, arriving in front of the city gates on 13th June 1657. However, his gamble did not play out. It did not take long for the Venetians to rush reinforcements to the threatened town through its unblockaded port. When on 20th June Governor-General Bernardo arrived in person at the head of a naval squadron, to the sounds of drums and trumpets, and flying a multitude of unfurled banners, all aimed at creating the impression that he was leading a much larger force than was actually the case, Ottoman morale broke down; the pasha judged that the opportunity was lost and decided to withdraw.81 Having lost 500 men without achieving anything, the pasha attempted to find at least some compensation in plundering the large nearby village of Bosiljina. Unfortunately for him, the attack on this populous and well-fortified village turned into one of the most embarrassing Ottoman operations in this theatre of war. The inhabitants put up stiff resistance to buy time for the women and children to be evacuated by sea, causing heavy and completely unnecessary casualties to the Ottoman force. Meeting with such unexpected opposition, the pasha in the end even ordered light artillery brought up to speed the conquest. Having finally subdued the village, the Ottoman army retreated to Livno, devastating the countryside of the community of Makarska along the way. The morale of the Ottoman force was very low and the pasha’s reputation suffered greatly. In spite of heavy casualties – Venetian sources mention the improbable figure of almost 1,000 men, most of them frontier sipahis – there was only some meagre plunder to show for the entire operation.82 This otherwise insignificant military operation was to have important consequences. After this failure, not wishing to risk any new loss of reputa80 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 101. (Budua, 9. Giugno 1657), attachments numerated 11–13. 81 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 103. (Di Galera sotto Budua la notte di 16 venendo li 17 Giugno 1657); num. 104. (Spalato, 20. Giugno 1657). On the attack on Split, see also: Grga Novak, Povijest Splita [History of Split], vol. 2 (Split, 1961), 1093–1106. 82 Stanojević, Dalmacija, 137; Jačov, Le guerre Veneto-Turche, 118–121; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 105. (Zara, 22. Giugno 1657). For Bernardo’s reports on the attack on Bosiljina, see ibid, num. 106. (Spalato, 1. Luglio 1657). The attack on the village of Bosiljina also became one of the best remembered events of this war, with the participation of women in the village’s defence assuring the fame of the event. The motif of the heroic women of Bosiljina who fought against the Turks was recorded by Venetian contemporary chronicles, and even more importantly it entered epic folk songs and poetry; thus its memory was kept alive for a long time; see: Andrija Kačić Miočić, Razgovori ugodni naroda slovinskog [Pleasant talks of the Slavic people] (Zagreb, 1862), 288–290; Difnik, Povijest, 243–247.

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tion and the potential wraith of the Porte, the Bosnian pasha remained passively in Livno for the duration of the entire 1657 campaign, securing his alibi by conducting several smaller raids.83 In the meantime Sancakbey Varlac, appointed as commander in chief of the attack against Kotor in 1657 and with Ali Pasha Čengić under his command, gathered his troops and on 30th July arrived in Kotor Bay. Ali Pasha dutifully answered the call to arms, yet as it turned out he was following a different agenda than his superior. Unlike the sancakbey of Shkodër, who arrived leading 5,000 men, Ali Pasha brought barely 1,000 men from the sancak of Herzegovina, half of whom were Christians. Before leaving Nikšić, Ali Pasha sent a letter to Governor-General Bernardo justifying his actions as a necessity, done under pressure, since his enemies had made accusations at the Porte against him and Jusufbegović that they were principally to blame for Kotor not being captured. Čengić also notified the governor-general that he and his men would form a separate camp, and asked to be treated as friends.84 Bernardo showed understanding for Ali Pasha’s situation. After informing the Senate of his firm belief in Čengić’s good intentions toward the Republic, and expressing high hopes of the benefits that could come out of this affair, he sent a trusted agent to Ali Pasha with a gift of 100 gold coins. Through this courier Bernardo first excused himself for sending such a small amount (pleading the insecurity of the roads at the time) and, secondly, communicated to Čengić his proposed future course of action. The governorgeneral approved of Ali Pasha’s plan to camp separately from the troops of Sancakbey Varlac, and urged him to attempt to position the latter’s forces so they could be most exposed to the fire of Venetian guns, assuring him that he and his men would be preserved. As for Čengić, Bernardo asked him to attempt to ensure that guns would not be firing directly at the city wall, or that they would be loaded with insufficient gunpowder so that the cannon balls 83 The pasha’s use of artillery in attacking a simple village, and the heavy casualties suffered in the attack, were looked upon with scorn by the Venetians. In his letter to Ali Pasha Čengić, Governor-General Bernardo did not miss the opportunity to lament the pasha’s military “prowess”: “Il vostro Basso di Bossina ha perso più di mille de voi combatenti sotto una nostra villa chiamata marino overo Bosciglina et si siamo maravigliati che lui in persona sia stato con tanto pezzi di canone contro una villa per che li veri guerrieri non vano sotto le Ville con canoni se non sotto la Città et cosi non doverebbe tratar l’honor del Gran s.re et perder tanta gente per una sol villa di dieci case se bene più ha abbruggiato alcuna Capane havendo Noi in fazza sua caduto fori dalla d.(et)ta villa tutto il popolo di donne et putti et lasciato solamente pochi homeni per difender sino l’ultimo sangue come valorosamente hanno fatto,” ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 108. (Cattaro, 12. Luglio 1657), attachment: Lettera scritta dall Ecc.mo S.re P.re Gen.le Bernardo al Sang.co Cengich. 84 Ali Pasha Čengić wrote to Bernardo upon his departure for Kotor: “giuro a V.E., che il Ser.(enissi)mo Prencipe, et lei conoscerebbero qual buon amico le sia il Cenghich, et io non vengo levato dal comando di Herzegovina ma per non poter far di meno, mi bisogna capitar contro Cattaro,” ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 112. (Cattaro, 19. Luglio 1657), attachment: Tradutione della lettera scritta in serviano all’Ill.(ustrissi)mo et Ecc(ellentissi).mo sig.(no)re Antonio Bernardo Prov.(vedito)re G(enera)l in Dalmatia et Albania Dal s.(igno)re Alli Bassa Cenghich di Herzegovina. ricevuta sotto li 17 lug.(li)o 1657.

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would lose much of their impetus before hitting the wall. If Sancakbey Varlac put his own gunners in charge of the artillery, Bernardo suggested that Čengić should eliminate them, either in the confusion of battle or in an ambush. In any case, the Governor-General urged Ali Pasha to sabotage the Ottoman artillery by any means possible, “questo e il tempo opportuno di farci conoscere il vostro affetto, et di raguagliare del tutto destintamnete con ogni solecitudine diligenza,” he wrote at the end of his letter.85 And indeed once the attack had begun, almost everything went according to the script devised by Bernardo, who could report to the Senate with some satisfaction that “whether by accident or due to the actions of Čengić,” the shots fired did no damage at all, either missing the walls completely and falling into town, or having too little impact to cause any damage.86 The Christians in Ali Pasha’s retinue served as couriers between him and the Governor-General in the town, bringing news of planned Ottoman attacks and reports on the state of morale in the Ottoman camp.87 Misfortunes continuously befell the Ottomans for the entire duration of the siege. Already by 21st August, only one heavy siege gun and four smaller pieces were operational, all the rest having either been hit by Venetian counter-fire88 or suffered “accidents” and burst (for which Čengić took credit).89 Additionally, fifteen sacks of gunpowder mysteriously caught fire, an incident for which Čengić also claimed credit, assuring the Governor-General that soon all the cannon would be neutralised.90 Although Čengić failed to fulfill this promise, since Sancakbey Varlac increased guards around the artillery, nevertheless Ali Pasha had fully demonstrated his worth. When the Senate warned Bernardo “that the Turks cannot be trusted, since they are infidel by nature,” he responded by stating that the siege had already lasted for more than twenty days and that to the amazement of all, no breach had yet been made in the walls, attributing this to the actions of Čengić. What is more, added Bernardo, it was Čengić

85 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 112. (Cattaro, 19. Luglio 1657), and attachment: Risposta alla sop.ta lett.ra dell’Ecc.mo Sig.re Prov.or Gnal Bernardo al Cenghich Bassa di Herzegovina espedita sotto li 18 luglio 1657 col confidente espresso. 86 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 116. (Sebenico, 6. Agosto 1657); num. 118. Zara (14. Agosto 1657). 87 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 132. (Cattaro, 4. Ottobre 1657). 88 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 121. (Liesena, 21. Agosto 1657), and the attachments to the letter. 89 In his letters to Governor-General Bernardo, Ali Pasha Čengić took credit for disabling three Ottoman cannons; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 125. (Di Galera dalle Bocche di Cattaro, 28. Agosto 1657), attachment: Lettera di Cav.re Vi.o Bolizza a Ecc.mo S.re Antonio Bernardo P.re Gnal. 90 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 126. (Cattaro, 29. Agosto 1657), attachment: letter of Ali Pasha Čengić to Vincenzo Bolizza dated 28th August 1657.

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who had put his trust in him, since in his letters he had openly “impegnandosi col suo proprio sigillo di trattar fatti di fellonia à pregiuditio del suo Re”.91 As the weeks passed, morale dwindled in the Ottoman camp, situated in hostile territory and surrounded by Christian tribes. Sancakbey Varlac’s attempts to bring up fresh reinforcements from Albania also failed, his couriers being captured by local Christians and handed over to the Venetians. Varlac, growing more and more desperate, contented himself with devastating the countryside, and put all his trust in the arrival of the Bosnian pasha.92 However, Seydi Ahmed Pasha was following his own agenda. His progress from Livno to the Bay of Kotor was extremely slow; the pasha spent significant time extorting money from the regions his army was passing through. When the pasha finally arrived at Herceg-Novi on 24th September (after thoughtfully pillaging most of the Ragusan Republic’s eastern parts) it became clear that he had no intention at all of risking another siege.93 At the council of war held in the Ottoman camp, the Bosnian pasha allowed himself to be persuaded by Ali Pasha Čengić, Jusufbegović and their supporters that the attack held no prospect of success.94 So it was that after more than two months, on 4th October, the Ottoman army started its retreat without even once attempting to storm the town’s walls.95 Under such circumstances, when one of the principal commanders and a significant part of the ağas were openly hostile to the commander-in-chief, and with the Bosnian pasha more concerned with the political implications of a defeat and with filling his own purse, one could say that the attack was doomed to failure before it even started. Ali Pasha Čengić had two simple goals. First, by sabotaging the attack, to cause dissatisfaction at the Porte with the new sancakbey and thus bring about his deposition; second, by demonstrating his usefulness to the Republic of St. Mark, to further his negotiations for a yearly stipend. After this failed attack, the star of the new sancakbey of Shkodër faded. Over the next two years his support at the Porte waned, until finally in February 1660 Jusufbegović again managed to take control of the sancak of Skhodër.96 The other goal, the Venetian stipend, remained out of Ali Pasha’s reach despite the fact that he had more than fulfilled the Governor-General’s expectations. In the middle of the siege, aware of his value to the Venetian side, Čengić asked for a gift of 1,000 gold coins and the Senate’s

91 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 123. (Liesena, 24. Agosto 1657). 92 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 127. (Cattaro, 11. Settembre 1657). 93 Samardžić, Istorija, 388. 94 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 131. (Dalla Galera dal stretto delle Catene in Canal di Cattaro, 30. Settembre 1657), and the attachments to the letter. 95 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 132. (Cattaro, 4. Ottobre 1657). 96 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 486. num. 284. (Zara, 28. Febrraio 1659. mv.).

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assent to his yearly stipend;97 yet once the siege was over, his negotiating position weakened considerably. The chronic shortage of cash experienced by the Venetian side,98 combined with the political upheaval caused by the failed siege of Kotor, prevented final approval of his case. Negotiations concerning his stipend dragged out over the following years, the final outcome being that the issue was never satisfactorily resolved.

Ali Pasha and the Republic in the Years after the Siege of Kotor (1658–1664) Never again did Ali Pasha take such active steps in support of the Republic in wartime. Immediately after the end of the siege, mutual accusations erupted among the Ottoman commanders. On one side were the Bosnian Pasha Seydi Ahmed, Čengić and Jusufbegović; while on the other was Sancakbey Varlac, who blamed all of them for the failure of the attack.99 In the following months, one by one, the main actors of this peculiar event left the scene. The first to disappear from the historical stage was Varlac’s main supporter in the region, the renegade Voin or Cafer Ağa: he was killed by the son of Vojvoda Ilijco, leader of the Albanian Christian tribes, who brought his head to Kotor and collected the bounty set by the Venetians for his death.100 The rebellious Jusufbegović was called to Edirne in February 1658. Rumours reaching Venetians concerning his fate, that he was to be either decapitated or reinstated, proved false.101 Instead Jusufbegović was appointed sancakbey not of Shkodër, where his family power base was located, but of the nearby sancak of Ohrid.102 Seydi Ahmed Pasha entered popular memory as one of the most corrupt and autocratic of the Bosnian pashas, whose rule was marked by extortions, lawlessness and arbitrariness such as was rarely ever seen again. He remained at the head of the Bosnian eyalet until March 1659, when he finally left the region (to the great relief of both Muslims and Christians) and went north to take over the more prestigious office of pasha of Buda.103

97 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 123. (Liesena, 24. Agosto 1657), attachment: letter of Ali Pasha Čengić to Governor-General Bernardo dated 23. August 1657. 98 In a period of more than six months (August 1657 – January 1658) only 20,000 ducats arrived in Dalmatia; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 154. (Spalato, 14. Gennaro 1657 mv.). 99 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 136. (Cattaro, 4. Novembre 1657). 100 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 161. (Zara, 21. Febraro 1657. mv.), attachment: Lettera di Cav.re Bolizza et di altri, che avvisano la morte data à Voino rinegato. 101 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 483. num. 163. (Zara, 10. Marzo 1658); num. 167. (Zara, 19. Marzo 1658). 102 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 483. num. 176. (Zara, 25. Aprile 1658). 103 For the assesment of Seyvid Ahmed’s rule in Bosnia, see Radovan Samardžić, Veliki vek Dubrovnika [Ragusa’s great century] (Belgrade, 1983), 147–170.

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As for Ali Pasha Čengić, the accusations that he was a traitor and that the Latins had bought him followed him till the end of his life, resulting in his absence from the region for more than four years. In February 1658 news arrived in Zadar of changes in the sancak of Herzegovina. This time Čengić could not avoid deposition and in April the new sancakbey was appointed.104 Nevertheless, Ali Pasha Čengić did not fall from grace: he was granted the 105 title of pasha of Eger and was commanded to join the pasha of Buda’s troops on campaign against Prince György Rákóczi II of Transylvania, who by refusing to abdicate had provoked an Ottoman punitive expedition against his principality.106 For months Ali Pasha Čengić cut all communication with the Venetians, and only sporadic news of his fortunes in Transylvania came south, picked up by the network of the Republic’s informers and confidential agents in Sarajevo, Belgrade and Ragusa. In August 1658, a messenger from the north arrived at Ali Pasha’s home in Herzegovina bringing the first news of Rákóczi’s victory at Pálülés (Romanian Păuliş), close to Lippa (Rom. Lipova). According to the news brought by this courier, in the Transylvanian prince’s victory over the force led by the pasha of Buda in July 1658, Ali Pasha’s oldest son Kadri Bey was killed, his brother captured by the Hungarians and Ali Pasha himself heavily wounded.107 The news about his brother and son proved to be false, while it seems that Ali Pasha’s good conduct during the battle made an impression upon his superiors. In the following months Ali Pasha’s star was on the rise: he was first appointed captain of Yanova (Hung. Jenő/Rom. Ineu),108 and in September 1658, beylerbey of Temesvár (Rom. Timişoara).109 In the meantime, news concerning Ottoman preparations for the 1659 campaign began to reach Dalmatia. After quelling a rebellion in Asia, the Empire was finally free to turn its attention to this front. For 1659, the Porte planned a repeat of events from 1657, yet this time with the grand vizier leading the attack on Zadar and Sancakbey Varlac, supported by no fewer than

104 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 157. (Zara, 14. Febraro 1657 mv.); b. 483. num. 176. (Zara, 25. Aprile 1658). 105 In his letter to Nikola Zrinski (Miklós Zrínyi), dated 24th May 1662, Ali Pasha (at that time pasha of Kanizsa) gives the list of his previous positions, and claims that before his posts in Temesvár and Yanova, he also held the title of pasha of Eger; see Augustin Theiner, ed., Vetera Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium historiam illustrantia maximam partem nondum edita ex tabulariis Vaticanis deprompta et collecta, vol. 2, A Clemente VII. usque ad Pium VII. (1524– 1800) cum additamentis saec. XIII. et XIV (Zagreb, 1875), 164. I am grateful to Balázs Sudár for calling my attention to this source. 106 Péter, “The Golden Age,” 146–147. 107 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 483. num. 205. (Spalato, 11. Agosto 1658). 108 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 484. num. 216. (Spalato, 22. Ottobre 1658). 109 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 484. num. 231. (Curzola, 6. Febraro 1658. mv.); Sudár, “A hódoltsági pasák,” 897. See also Joseph Hammer, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, vol. 6 (Pest, 1830), 35–36.

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twelve sancakbeys of Rumelia, charged with the attack on Kotor.110 In the midst of this gloomy news, in April 1659 Governor-General Antonio Bernardo received a letter from Ali Pasha. Characteristically, Čengić proposed using his newly acquired influence and contacts (claiming that the new Pasha of Bosnia, Melek Ahmed Pasha, was his “sworn brother”) to divert all Ottoman forces to the north, if the Republic was ready to send him 10–12,000 silver reali. In this letter, Ali Pasha warned the governor-general: “Considerate, come possa esser meglio per voi, se volete, che questo anno l’essercito contro di voi non venga; mandatomi intiero un miglaro e mezzo de cecchini, per dar alli Serathia.”111 Čengić also sent his son Kadri Bey back to Herzegovina, who in his name requested from Bernardo several specific gifts (mainly luxury goods such as velvet, or furniture of Italian manufacture) and a token of recognition of friendship towards his father, who was such a good friend and did everything in the interests of the Republic.112 Such grandiose offers of great favours, combined with requests for gifts, were typical for Ali Pasha and did not depart much from his previous offers from 1648 or 1657; yet this time they came from a beylerbey, and his high position demanded that they not be dismissed lightly. The campaigning season in Dalmatia passed rather uneventfully even without any intervention from Čengić, yet the Republic deemed it wise to maintain good relations with this Ottoman lord. Thus by November 1659 Governor-General Bernardo had gathered all the items from the list of gifts provided by Čengić’s son, and after the Senate had given its blessing, sent them via Vincenzo Bolizza to Ali Pasha’s home in Herzegovina in December 1659.113 In the following years, contacts between Čengić and the Venetian governors in Dalmatia became rare and infrequent. In March 1660, Antonio Bernardo, who dedicated much of his energies to nurturing warm relations with Ottoman lords in the hinterlands and Christian chieftains, was replaced by Andrea Corner, who did not follow such a policy. Moreover, once appointed pasha of Temesvár, Čengić entered the higher spheres of Ottoman political life and his relationship with Republic of Venice also changed. Events in the south became of secondary importance; he was now playing a bigger game. Čengić’s activities in the turbulent years between 1659 and 1662 are mainly obscure: it seems that he remained pasha of Temesvár till early 1660,114 was 110 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 485. num. 248. (Spalato, 18. Aprile 1659). 111 ASVe Senato, Dispacco, PTM 485. num. 248. (Spalato, 18. Aprile 1659), attachment: Letter of Ali Pasha Čengić to Governor-General Antonio Bernardo. 112 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 485. num. 248. (Spalato, 18. Aprile 1659), attachment: Letter of Kadri Bey to Governor-General Antonio Bernardo, received in Kotor on 28th April 1659. 113 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 486. num. 268. (Spalato, 16. Novembre 1659); ASVe Senato, Rettori, R-34, f. 309v–310r (Adi 5 Decembre 1659). 114 The last confirmed mention of him as beylerbey of Temesvár is the letter to him from Gábor Haller, captain of Várad (Rom. Oradea) from late September 1659, Magyar Országos Levéltár

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later appointed to a province in Asia, but was soon recalled to Europe due to increased hostilities along the Ottoman-Habsburg border.115 More regular contacts with the Republic’s representatives were reestablished only during the spring of 1662, when Čengić arrived in Sarajevo in the role of serdar, entrusted with the command of this southern battlefield. Though Ali Pasha was charged by the Porte with conducting attacks against Venetian possessions in the Adriatic (most probably Split),116 it soon became clear that he was not willing to repeat the mistake of many of his predecessors and risk his luck against fortified Venetian strongholds. Instead Čengić chose the community of Makarska as the target of his attack.117 From his point of view, this region represented a perfect choice. Not only were its defences very weak compared to other Dalmatian towns, but it was also one of the communities that at the start of the war had risen in rebellion against Ottoman rule and defected to the Venetian side. Moreover, for the entire duration of the war, Makarska functioned as a base for Venetian hajduks, who raided the sancak of Herzegovina heavily, resulting in a bloody feud between this community and neighboring Ottomans. Thus Čengić could count on wide support from the local beys for the attack on Makarska; and also, equally important, he could justify this attack to the Venetians as a necessary operation against pirates and robbers, or the pacification of rebels and outlaws, not as an act of hostility against the Most Serene Republic. In May 1662, Čengić wrote a letter to his good acquaintance Cavaliere Vincenzo Bolizza, informing him that he had orders to attack Venetian strongholds in Dalmatia, yet, because of the warm affection he held for the Republic, he would do all he could to divert his forces toward Transylvania; he closed his letter with the veiled threat: “Credo che il publico habbi particolar cognitione di queste mie buone operationi, e ne att[en]do la ricompensa.”118 Čengić’s return to Bosnia coincided with the arrival of a new governor-general, Girolamo Contarini, who demonstrated more inclination toward “frontier diplomacy” and maintaining good relations with nearby OttoMagyar Kamara Archívuma E 190 Archivum Familiae Rákóczi 31. d. nr. 7743. For this reference, as well as for those from the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv and for his help with Hungarian literature and contemporary chronicles, I am greatly indebted to my dear friend Gábor Kármán. The additional data he tracked down, as well as his constructive and friendly suggestions, were of immense help when preparing the final version of this essay. 115 Sudár, “A hódoltsági pasák,” 897. Čengić’s return to Europe from Asia can probably be dated to spring 1661. In a letter from April 1661, Vincenzo Bolizza informs the GovernorGeneral about the Ottoman preparations for the upcoming season and mentions that “amico Cenghich” was with the Ottoman army in Belgrade; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 488, num. 71. (Spalato, 9 Aprile 1661). 116 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 488, num. 126. (Zara, 27 Aprile 1662), attachments to letter with news from Ottoman lands. 117 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 488, num. 127. (Zara, 4. Maggio 1662). 118 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 5. (Spalato, 8. Giugno 1662), attachment: Letter of Ali Pasha Čengić to Vincenzo Bolizza (received in Kotor on 9th May 1662).

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man officials than had his predecessor. However, the Republic had no opportunity to demonstrate its gratitude, since a few days later a confidential agent from Sarajevo informed the Governor-General via Ragusa that Čengić had been recalled to Edirne. It seems that Ali Pasha was attempting to avoid conducting any kind of military operation at all, and had sent “friendly” letters to the leaders of Makarska, probably asking for tribute and submission to Ottoman rule. Unfortunately for Čengić, his letters were intercepted by some of his enemies and sent to the grand vizier, resulting in his deposition. Rumours that this time Ali Pasha would lose his head for sure, proved wrong again.119 His next post was that of pasha of Kanizsa, and, probably in recognition for his good services, at some point Čengić was given Pécs in Hungary as arpalık. In August 1662, both Governor-General Contarini and Cavaliere Bolizza received cordial letters from Ali Pasha, written from Kanizsa in Hungary, reassuring them that he was still in the grand vizier’s favor and again asking for some gift in recognition of his services.120 Čengić spent the rest of the 1662 campaign in Hungary, where he was engaged in fighting the forces of the Croatian–Hungarian magnates Zrinski and Batthyány. The death of Vincenzo Bolizza in August 1662 temporarily interrupted further communication between Ali Pasha and the Republic,121 and it was not until the pasha returned to the south in winter 1663 that more regular contact was reestablished. In February 1663 Governor-General Contarini and Ali Pasha Čengić exchanged warm letters, full of expressions of friendship, via Nicolo Bolizza, who had taken over his uncle Vincenzo’s role.122 The occasion for revival of contacts was, as always, Ottoman preparations for an attack on Kotor next summer. In his usual manner Ali Pasha hinted that he could be of great help on this occasion, especially in regard to his position as (future) sancak of Herzegovina, and as commander charged with the closing the Bay of Kotor. His offers fell on fertile soil and in April 1663 the Governor-General recommended to the Senate that it would be very useful to maintain good relations with this Ottoman lord and proposed that a collection of luxury gifts be sent to Čengić, including two expensive suits: one of Damascus silk and another of velvet.123 119 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 5. (Spalato, 8. Giugno 1662), attachment: Copia di lettera scritta da Ragusa a Spalato da Hebreo Confidente (dated Ragusa 16th May 1662). 120 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 17. (Spalato, 16. Agosto 1662), attachments: Lettera del Bassa Cenghijcj scritta al P.re Gl. Contarini; Lettera del Bassa Cenghijcj scritta al K.re Bolizza; Sudár, “A hódoltsági pasák,” 897. 121 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 15. (Spalato, 16. Agosto 1662). 122 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 53. (Zara, 18. Febraro 1662. mv.), attachments: Lettera scritta da Ali Bassa Cenghijch all’ Ecc.mo S.r Gl. Contarini; Copia di Lettera scritta in risposta dall’Ecc.mo S.r Gl. Contarini ad Ali Bassa Cenghijch. 123 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490. num. 68. (Zara, 22. Aprile 1663.), and attachment: Copia di lettera d’Ali Bassa Cenghijch (received in Kotor on 8th Aprile 1663). It seems that the actual appointment of Ali Pasha to the sancak of Herzegovina did not occur before May 1663: the

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Unfortunately for Čengić, an escalation of hostilities in Hungary interrupted the deal. The beginning of a new war between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs again directed the majority of Ottoman forces to the north, removing the threat to Kotor. Yet this time Ali Pasha was not ready to let the opportunity slipping by and decided that the Venetians needed more convincing, and that the time was right to settle some unpaid debts. Accordingly Čengić was exceptionally active in the campaign season of 1663. First, during June and July Čengić led a 2–3,000 strong force on a raid against Dalmatia, pillaging the districts of Trogir and Šibenik, but refraining from doing any serious damage.124 Ali Pasha’s actions caused him no loss of standing with the Governor-General, who even went as far as to justify Čengić’s actions to the Senate (probably quite rightly) as a way for him to avoid joining the main Ottoman army in Hungary, under the pretext of being engaged in the conduct of military operations in Dalmatia.125 However, Ali Pasha directed the majority of his efforts at bringing the region of Makarska back under Ottoman rule, and thus neutralising this nest of Venetian irregulars once and for all. In early August 1663 Čengić was again ready; he had gathered 5,500 men and went on a raid against Makarska. In spite of numerical superiority, the Ottoman force failed to achieve any concrete results. Moreover, because of support from the Venetian navy, present in nearby waters, the defenders managed to inflict significant casualties on the Ottomans.126 This setback did not discourage Ali Pasha, who began to gather an even stronger force and in September had at his disposal in Livno a host of 6–7,000 men. At same time he dispatched letters to the chieftains of Makarska, inviting them to return to the rule of the Gran Signore, promising them amnesty and security, otherwise threatening that “we shall take your sisters and wives, and their sufferings will fall on your souls.”127 The Venetians watched all these actions carefully, and alarmed by Ottoman preparations, Governor-General Contarini reminded the Senate of instruction of the Ragusan Senate to its envoys bringing the customary gifts to Ali Pasha on the occasion of his appointment is dated 19th May 1663; see Miović, Dubrovačka republika u spisima namjesnika bosanskog ejaleta, 240. Although after having been a beylerbey it would have been a demotion to return to the rank of sancakbey, this was not the case with Ali Čengić, as he received Herzegovina as a mütesarrif: this solution of giving smaller provinces to former beylerbeys to administer was a relatively common method of finding a place for pashas currently without vilayets of their own; see Sudár, “A hódoltsági pasák,” 896. 124 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490, num. 80. (Zara, 24. Giugno 1663); num. 83. (Zara, 6. Luglio 1663); num. 85. (Spalato, 7. Luglio 1663). 125 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490, num. 87. (Spalato, 25. Luglio 1663). 126 Venetian reports put the number of dead at 150 and wounded at 250, yet these figures seem to be too high. ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490, num. 93. (Spalato, 27. Agosto 1663). 127 “[…] le sorelle, e moglie vi si prenderanno, e li torti, che si faranno ad esse, saranno sopra l’animo vostro,” ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 99. (Spalato, 13. Settembre 1663), attachment: Lettera di Ali Bassa Cenghijch scritta alli capi di Primorie. See also: num. 95. (Spalato, 3. Settembre 1663).

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his proposal to send gifts to Čengić in September 1663.128 Contarini also wrote a personal letter to Ali Pasha accompanied by two expensive pistols, assuring him of the friendship of the Republic.129 In response Ali Pasha justified his attacks on Makarska as necessary operations against the main source of all the problems on this frontier, the hajduks. Čengić warned the GovernorGeneral to restrain these irregulars from attacking Ottoman lands, since otherwise they would draw the main Ottoman army to this front the next year and he would not be able to stop it. Moreover, aware of the Republic’s military weakness in the region, and with such a host at hand, Čengić judged the moment right to raise the stakes. In his letters to the governor-general, he also asked for repayment of 17,000 reali which he had supposedly given as a bribe to the Bosnian pasha during the siege of Kotor in 1657, claiming that the late Vincenzo Bolizza knew all the details of this affair. Contarini decided to buy time, and assured Čengić that after all relevant information was collected, the matter would be resolved.130 In the meantime, the Ottoman force left its base in Livno and went on the march. The Venetians closely watched the movement of this host from day to day, but not until the very end was its designated target clear: Split, Šibenik, Zadar or some other stronghold.131 So far Čengić’s strategy was working well. His operations in Dalmatia at least gave the appearance of conducting proper military operations against the enemies of the Empire; at the same time he managed to advanced his cause with the Republic’s rulers, and although it was highly unlikely that a sum as high as 17,000 reali could be obtained, luxury gifts and some lesser compensation were at hand. From Knin, Čengić took his forces westward and united with the force of the Captain of Bihać, aiming to attack the estates of the Croatian magnate Count Petar Zrinski. The reputation of both Zrinski brothers (Petar and Nikola) as enemies of the sultan and the chief troublemakers on the frontier more than justified this move. Yet Ali Pasha’s luck had run out. Near Otočac in Croatia, the Ottoman host was ambushed by 4,000 men led by Petar Zrinski and almost completely destroyed. In the end Čengić returned to Livno leading only small a portion of his force (“reliquie della rotta”), also suffering great family loss in this encounter; one of his sons was killed, while his brother was captured and held prisoner by Petar Zrinski.132 128 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 102. (Spalato, 23. Settembre 1663). 129 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 104. (Spalato, 14. Ottobre 1663). 130 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 104. (Spalato, 14. Ottobre 1663): Lettera di Ali Bassa Chenghijch scritta all’Ecc.mo s.re P.re Contarini. 131 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 106. (Spalato, 15. Ottobre 1663); num. 107. (Spalato, 19. Ottobre 1663); num. 108. (Spalato, 19. Ottobre 1663). 132 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 109. (Spalato, 21. Ottobre 1663.); num. 110. (Spalato, 31. Ottobre 1663). According to another Venetian source it was his brother who died, and his son the bey of Bihać who was captured; see Sudár, “A hódoltsági pasák,” 897.

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This defeat caused Ali Pasha great loss of reputation, very much weakening his position and providing his enemies with an occasion to begin the campaign to depose him.133 In November 1663, Čengić sent a new letter to Contarini along with an expensive Bulgarian vase as a return gift for the pistols. Yet despite everything, the tone of Čengić’s letter did not change. He insisted again that Venice restrain the hajduks, and demanded restitution of his 17,000 silver coins spent during the 1657 siege. Ali Pasha was well aware of the precariousness of his situation and the dangers he was facing. He badly needed either cash, which could be used to buy good will and protection, or some results he could present to the grand vizier (as for example pacification of the Venetian irregulars), whose invitation to Belgrade he was expecting any day. While negotiating with the Governor-General, Čengić was also actively trying to appease his superiors, sending letters to Belgrade promising the capture of Klis next season.134 Throughout the entire winter of 1663–1664, Čengić kept up a lively correspondence with Governor-General Contarini, either through letters or (from January 1664, when he deemed it too dangerous to put his words on paper) through trusted Christians who acted as his messengers. Čengić fed the Venetians information on the Ottoman preparations and an alleged conspiracy between some of the frontier beys and the Venetian Morlacchi, aiming not only to return the Morlacchi to Ottoman rule, but also to capture two Venetian fortresses, Klis and Gripe near Split, by treason. Čengić was willing to provide names of the conspirators only after he had received the money he was due. In the end, Ali Pasha also asked for six hunting dogs from Venice, most probably to test the limits of Venetian compliance with his demands.135 Despite the support of Governor-General Contarini, who actively advocated appeasing così stimato commandante and urged the Senate to dispatch not only the gifts already approved, but also “qualche moderata summa di denari,”136 the affair was never settled. In February 1664, escorted by çauses, Čengić left for Belgrade. Conflicting rumours about his fate circulated (Čengić had been killed, confirmed as pasha of Bosnia, etc.) until March 1664, when it was confirmed that he had again been given command of Kanizsa in Hungary.137 In April the gifts approved for Ali Pasha by the Senate finally arrived from Venice and Governor-General Contarini immediately 133 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 110. (Spalato, 31. Ottobre 1663), attachment: Scrittura sopra la rotta ricevuta dal Cenghijch. 134 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 119. (Spalato, 22. Decembre 1663). 135 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 125. (Spalato, 26. Gennaro 1663. mv.): Constituito del mezzo aspedito da Ali Bassa Cengich. 136 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 122. (Spalato, undated). 137 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 125. (Spalato, 26. Gennaro 1663. mv.); num. 130. (Spalato, 11. Febraro 1663. mv.), attachment: Due relationi sopra la Morte di Ali Bassa di Bossina; b. 492, num. 137. (Spalato, 29 Marzo 1664).

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contacted his son, at that time alaybey of Herzegovina.138 However, it was too late: a few days later Čengić’s son informed the Governor-General that his father had been executed at the sultan’s command.139 Thus Ali Pasha Čengić, who for almost sixteen years had been a dominant figure on this frontier, finally met his end. Although Ali Pasha proved to be skilled in playing the game of Ottoman politics – he managed to avoid deposition several times, even conspiring with the enemies of the sultan in order to get rid of his political enemies – in the end he failed to prevent a serious military blunder from causing his downfall.

Conclusion The case of this controversial Bosnian potentate well illustrates the complexities of the Empire’s frontier. Undoubtedly, the prospect of material gain was an integral part of the relationship between Čengić and Venice, and the Venetians were well aware of this. In January 1664 Governor-General Contarini warned the Senate to have no illusions concerning the true dispositions and motives of Ali Pasha Čengić, since “l’ottima volontà sua e fondata solamente in la venalita, sul interesse, e se si allienara dalla confidenza un cosi auttorevole ministro, stimo gran discapito al servitio.”140 But this paper has attempted to show, through detailed reconstruction of Ali Pasha’s historical context, that he was also moved by other motives than simple material gain, and that we should not see this Bosnian grandee only in black and white, judging him simply a traitor. Above all, Ali Pasha Čengić should be seen as a landed lord for whom dynastic interests came before anything else. As the war between the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire that had began so well for the Ottomans progressed from year to year, casualties among the Ottoman frontier elite mounted. Even before the war the landed incomes of the Ottoman elites on this frontier were below the Empire’s standards,141 but in conditions of protracted warfare, with their estates frequently raided and plundered, many were facing complete material ruin. With no prospect of imminent victory and peace, it should come as no surprise that some concluded that their dynastic/family interests diverged from those of the Empire they served, and decided to seek their own means to ensure survival in what was becoming an endless conflict.

138 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 492. num. 142. (Spalato, 20 Aprile 1664). 139 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 492. num. 143. (Spalato, 27 Aprile 1664). 140 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 122. (undated). 141 See Kornelija Jurin Starčević, “Krajiške elite i izvori prihoda: Primjer jadranskog zaleđa u 16. i 17. stoljeću” [Frontier Elites and Sources of Incomes: The Case of the Adriatic Hinterland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries], Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju 55 (2005): 246–247.

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During this war, Venice developed a vast network of informants and confidential agents on the Ottoman side, such as they never had before or since. These included not just the Empire’s Christian subjects but also large number of Muslims from all social strata. Some were motivated by pure need for survival, as for example the sipahi Hasanbeg Vlahović from Duvno, who offered a yearly tribute of 100 reali (in grain) and undertook to act as a Venetian informer in exchange for protection of his estates from the Venetian irregulars’ raids.142 Many cooperated with Venetians to help free their relatives from captivity. Finally, some did so for pure material gains, for example the janissary ağa from Shkodër who passed diplomatic correspondence between the Senate and its bailo at the Porte. Cavaliere Vincenzo Bolizza maintained a lively correspondence with a range of Ottoman officials covering the area from Herceg-Novi to Sarajevo and Belgrade. These Venetian confidants included captains of fortresses (Zadvarje, Herceg-Novi), janissary ağas (Herceg-Novi, Shkodër), a kadi (Herceg-Novi) and also a scribe at the court of the Bosnian pasha in Sarajevo, who for years kept the Republic well-informed about Ottoman plans and the Imperial orders arriving in his office. Moreover, there was no shortage of candidates willing to enter the Republic’s service. For example when in July 1663 the Captain of Zadvarje, Hasan Bey, was executed on charges of being a Venetian confidant (by none other than Ali Pasha Čengić),143 his brother, who inherited the post, offered his services to the Republic.144 In November 1663, the Republic even went as far as to enlist an ağa from Čengić’s household as its informer, who kept the 145 Governor-General well informed concerning the pasha’s actions. Nothing testifies so vividly to the crisis of Ottoman rule in this region as that so many members of the local elites were willing to cooperate with the Republic. Still the two most important Venetian “acquisitions” were without doubt Ali Pasha Čengić and his kinsman Jusufbegović. The case of the latter even more aptly illustrates the effects of protracted warfare on local frontier elites. Until the events of 1656 and his deposition, Jusufbegović was warlike and aggressive, faithfully serving the Empire in its war with the Republic. In the eyes of the Venetian government, he was one of their principal enemies in the region. However the events of 1656 pushed Jusufbegović into Venice’s arms. Until the end of his life, despite promises given at the Porte, Jusufbegović never embarked on another attack on Kotor, limiting his actions 142 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 23. (Spalato, 18. Settembre 1662). Under similar conditions, in 1659 Governor-General Antonio Bernardo accepted under the Venetian protection no fewer than 28 villages: b. 486. num. 268. (Spalato, 16. Novembre 1659); num. 278. (Spalato, 9. Gennaro 1659. mv.); ASVe Senato Rettori, R-34, f. 307r–v, Adi 5 Decembre 1659. 143 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490. num. 87. (Spalato, 25. Luglio 1663). 144 Moreover, as the final act of irony, the luxury vestments that arrived for Čengić, were instead used as gifts for the Captain of Zadvarje; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 492. num. 144. (Trau, 5. Maggio 1664). 145 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 113. (Spalato, 28. Novembre 1663.)

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to simple raids and policing operations against rebellious Christian communities in Montenegro and Albania. The Republic did not object to such behaviour and maintained warm relations with him. In January 1667 Jusufbegović, at that time holding the rank of beylerbey, requested the Republic to send him a good doctor (the petition was also supported by the Bishop of Kotor and the young Cavaliere Bollizza), which was done in July 1667.146 When Jusufbegović died in January next year, Governor-General Antonio Priuli informed the Senate with great regret of the death of this Ottoman lord, who was “tanto ben disposto verso gl’ affari di V[ostr]a Ser[enit]ta, e professava tutta la confidenza col Cav[allie]re Bolizza.”147 As for Ali Pasha Čengić, his conduct also matches the pattern of many other Ottoman notables from the region, who at the beginning of the war eagerly took up arms but whose enthusiasm waned as the conflict dragged on. His relationship with the Republic can best be described as a double game, in which both sides attempted to play the other. On the one hand he professed friendship and good will to the Republic, feeding the Venetians with news from Constantinople or the region, although they would have acquired this anyway through their extensive network of informers. His statements of how he had refused orders to attack the Bay of Kotor (before 1657), or Dalmatia (after 1662) were true more often than not, yet this refusal resulted from his loss of faith in the meaning of this war, and here too he was not a unique case. On the other hand, Čengić as sancakbey ruled his Christian subject with an iron hand. By use of force and threats of violence he not only imposed heavy taxation (thus securing his own material base), but was also rather successful at suppressing any Venetian influence in his lands. Although it is true that he was reluctant to attack fortified Venetian towns, truth be told, the resources at his disposal in 1663 were such as to make any other military commander think twice before embarking on such a risky operation. On the other hand, he had no problems in pursuing Venetian irregulars and attacking their strongholds (Perast in 1654 and Makarska in 1663, to mention just the main military operations). Apart from his actions during the siege of Kotor, which can undoubtedly be labeled as open treason (it must also be noted that he was not the only Venetian ally in the Ottoman camp, and that for many the attack on the Venetian stronghold figured more as a sideshow to the internal power struggle), in the end it can still be argued that, despite everything, Čengić served the Empire till his death. Moreover, one can even argue that Čengić was only temporarily pushed to extreme actions by central government meddling in local affairs. After the siege of Kotor, Čengić dutifully continued to support the Empire’s military enterprises in the north, in Hungary, where he served faithfully (even more than in his own 146 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 497. num. 236. (Di Galera in Porto di Curzla, 4. Agosto 1667). 147 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 498. num. 36. (Zara, 4 Febraro 1667. mv.).

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own domain) for almost four years and managed to enter the higher ranks of Ottoman provincial administration.148 As for the accusations of excessive greed, we need only remember that the theme of “Turkish venality” was a common national stereotype in Early Modern times, and that Ali Pasha managed to escape numerous attempts to depose him from the post of sancakbey and later that of beylerbey. We can only guess the expenses this caused him,149 which he had to compensate somehow. Further, his behaviour was always that of a great lord, courteous and lavish in exchange of gifts and demanding what he felt was due to him. Ali Pasha pursued not wealth per se, but wealth as a means for achieving an ulterior goal, which his Venetian “friends” referred to as grandeza. Although certainly not in the same category as for example Seydi Ahmed Pasha (one of Köprülü’s principal rivals for the post of grand vizier), seen in a local perspective, the cursus homorum of Ali Pasha Čengić is rather impressive: starting as an alaybey, he easily acquired the title of pasha and became sancakbey of Herzegovina, yet only his departure for Transylvania (in 1658) and his conduct on the battlefield there catapulted him into the higher echelons of Ottoman state administration. In the last few years of his life, before his illfated return to the Dalmatian front, he held the post of governor in some provinces of the Empire (Eger, Temesvár, Kanizsa). As this study has shown, Čengić never managed to secure a yearly stipend or obtain any sizeable sum of money from the Venetians. For him the relationship with the Republic had a different value: the Serenissima was more a source of luxury goods of western manufacture than of material wealth. Yet even more importantly, his contacts with the Republic should be seen in terms of dynastic or family diplomacy, a part of the lifestyle befitting a great lord. Naive offers of mediations from 1648 and later to conclude peace between Venice and the Empire are best understood in that light. Maintaining diplomatic relations with the Republic of St. Mark served primarily to increase Ali Pasha’s status among the other Ottoman lords on the frontier, as

148 Ákos Barcsai, the prince appointed by Köprülü Mehmed in place of György Rákóczi II, accused Ali Pasha Čengić of conspiring against him with his deposed predecessor; see his letter to the grand vizier (13 April 1659); see Sándor Szilágyi, ed., Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek történeti bevezetésekkel [Documents of the diets of Transylvania, with a historical introduction], vol. 12, 1658–1661 (Budapest, 1887), 236. Although the chronicler János Bethlen, one of the leading Transylvanian politicians of the age, did not find this unimagineable (cf. János Bethlen, Erdély története 1629–1673 [The history of Transylvania 1629–1673], ed. József Jankovics (Budapest, 1993), 40–41), we have no specific data which would support this claim. Barcsai referred to a lively correspondence between Ali Pasha and Rákóczi, which was then prohibited by Köprülü Mehmed; see Simon Reniger’s report to Emperor Leopold I (Constantinople, 21st February 1659), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Staatenabteilungen Türkei I. Kt. 131. Fasc. 64. Conv. E. fol. 35. 149 In 1651, according to news circulating in the region, Čengić had sent 20,000 reali and 25 slaves to Constantinople in to prevent his deposition. Even if these figures are overestimated, they serve as a good illustration; see Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 221.

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did having the ear of the governors-general from whom favours could be asked, such as freeing certain prisoners or sending gifts for his friends. Although Ali Pasha served in several battles, garnering wounds as well as taking prizes worthy of good tales (Ali Pasha allegedly captured a stallion from beneath the son of György Rákóczi, which he then sent to Herzegovina in January 1661 as a gift for his son Kadri Bey)150 he never considered himself a warrior. His vision of himself as a lord is best described by his statement to a Venetian envoy in 1654, to whom he said: “We Turks acquire position either through the nobility of blood, or through the profession of arms. I have met the first condition.”151 As if he knew that in the end, war would be his doom.

150 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 486. num. 268. (Spalato, 9. Gennaro 1659 mv.). 151 Stanojević, Jugoslavenske zemlje, 233.