Effective leadership on process safety in the downstream oil industry Thursday 21 February 2008 One Great George Street, London, UK
In association with
Effective leadership process safety in the downstream oil industry Organised by Energy Institute and UKPIA 8.45
Registration & refreshments
9.15
Welcome from the chair Judith Hackett, Chair, Health & Safety Commission
9.25
Keynote speech – regulators’ approach post Buncefield and Texas City Kevin Myers, Director of Hazardous Installations, HSE
09.55
Keynote speech - industry response Chris Hunt, Director General, UKPIA
10.25
Risk based process safety Matt Siddall, Heads of Refinery Environment, ConocoPhillips
10.55
Refreshment break and exhibition viewing
11.15
Texas City – what’s changed? Paul Kaufman, Chartered Chemical Engineer, BP
11.45
US approach to regulation post Texas City Ron Chittim, API
12.15
Q&A panel session
12.45
Lunch
13.45
Oil & Gas UK - step change in safety programme Bob Kyle, Safety Issues Consultant, Oil and Gas UK
14.15
Responsible Care in chemicals sector Diana Montgomery, Deputy Chief Executive, Chemical Industry Association
14.45
Refreshment break and exhibition viewing
15.15
Industry leadership on safety: what’s needed to deliver effective results Tony Traynor, chair of Process Safety Leadership Group
15.45
Wrap up discussion with panel & audience
16.00
Summary and conclusion
16.15
End of conference Lunch sponsored by:
Biographies Judith E Hackitt CBE Judith was appointed Chair of the Health and Safety Commission with effect from 1 October 2007 for a term of 5 years. Judith previously served as a Commissioner between 2002 and 2005. She was awarded her CBE for services to health and safety. Judith returned from an assignment as Director of the Chemistry for Europe project with the European Chemical Industry based in Brussels. She trained as a Chemical Engineer at Imperial College, London. She has held posts as Director of Business and Responsible Care and as Director General at the Chemical Industries Association (CIA). Kevin Myers, HSE Kevin is a Factory Inspector by background joining HSE in 1976. He has worked in a number of different parts of HSE in London, East Anglia, the South West as a front line regulator (or manager) as well as in HSE's HQ in a range of strategic, policy and other functions. In 1993 he was seconded for three years the European Commission in Brussels working on environmental policy (including the ‘Seveso’ Directive and the Eco Management and Audit Regulation). More recently he was HSE's Chief Inspector of Construction from January 2000 to May 2005. Chris Hunt, Director General UKPIA Chris started his working life as an electrical engineer firstly with the London Electricity Board then joining a company manufacturing and installing television studio lighting but made a complete career change in the late 70’s into the healthcare market, joining a U.S. multi-national in its accounting function and eventually running the sales and marketing operation for one of the company’s business units. In 1989 he joined Elf Oil UK Ltd at its Altrincham office as marketing administrator. He was promoted through the organisation to head its retail division from 1995-7. Chris joined UKPIA as Company Secretary and Commercial Director, initially on secondment from Elf, mid-1997. He dealt with commercial issues facing the downstream industry on behalf of the Association in addition to his responsibilities as Company Secretary. Chris was appointed Director General for UKPIA in March 2004 and heads up the Secretariat in its lobbying activity. Chris has always been a strong believer in pan-industry dialogue and collaboration. Matt Siddall - Health Safety and Environment Manager, ConocoPhillips, Humber Refinery Matt graduated from the University of Birmingham with a degree in Chemical Engineering before joining ConocoPhillips's Humber Refinery in 1993. He has held a variety of positions at Humber Refinery and in London in both engineering and strategy functions. In 2003, he moved into operations shift management before taking up his current post in 2006 of Health Safety and Environment Manager at Humber Refinery with responsibilities for Process and Occupational Safety, Occupational Health, Emergency Response and Environmental issues. Paul Kaufman Paul is a chartered chemical engineer who has worked for BP since graduating from Sheffield University in 1984. He has over 23 years refining experience having held a variety of operations and HSE management roles in the UK and USA, specifically interim HSSE Manager at Texas City after the March, 2003 accident. He held the global role of Refining HSSE Managers network leader, and was a member of the BP support team for the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel lead by former US Secretary of State James Baker III. Paul has recently taken a new role of BP Refining Investigation and Learning Support Leader. Bob Kyle, Safety Consultant, Oil & Gas UK Following an 11 year stint in the RAF, Bob spent 5 years working on control and communication systems for the mining industry in the East Midlands before moving to Aberdeen. Bob has been involved in the offshore oil and gas industry for over 30 years in various technical and safety management roles. He has participated in a wide range of industry
working parties and committees over this time and was an expert witness on Permit to Work systems at the Piper Alpha enquiry. Bob joined UKOOA (now Oil & Gas UK) in 2001 as Assistant Director for Safety and from 2007 works in a semi retired role as Safety Consultant. Bob holds two theology degrees and a HNC in electrical engineering- but promises not to preach today. Diana Montgomery, Director of Business and Technical Affairs and Deputy Chief Executive Chemical Industries Association Diana has responsibility for policy in areas such as trade, HSE, chemicals management, energy, climate change, competitiveness and innovation. She is also responsible for the chemical industry indicators of performance, the Responsible Care programme and for running the CIA’s events programme. Prior to joining the CIA in 2006 Diana has had a total of 13 years experience leading sustainability and environmental programmes for three well-recognised UK brands and a FTSE 30 utility company. She has also managed the corporate responsibility programme for British Gas covering fuel poverty, energy efficiency, diversity, ethnicity and social programmes. Prior to her work with major corporates she gained experience as an environmental consultant and worked in academia assisting in the establishment of a centre at Imperial College. Diana is a Fellow of the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment, a Member of the Royal Society of Chemistry and she has a degree in Chemistry from St Anne’s College, Oxford and a doctorate in environmental management from Imperial College, London. Tony Traynor, INEOS Tony Traynor, an electrical engineer by training, is Operations Director of INEOS Refining at Grangemouth, Scotland. He started his career with ICI in 1969. During this period he held various senior operations and technical roles in the UK and Belgium, spanning different chemicals businesses, including multiple sites regulated under COMAH. He joined the INEOS Group in 2001, following the acquisition of the ICI Chlor business by INEOS.
Health Healthand andSafety Safety Executive Executive
The Regulators’ approach (post Buncefield/Texas City) Effective Leadership on process safety in the downstream oil industry Kevin Myers Hazardous Installations Directorate HSE
Coverage of Presentation • •
Lessons learnt from major incidents
•
The importance of process safety management to achieving sustained business success
•
Critical importance of board level leadership and their responsibility to invest in creating a culture of safety
HSE’s role/strategy
1
Regulating the Major Hazards sector
• • • •
Over 2,000 sites onshore
•
Those that create risks are responsible for their management and control – in collaboration with those exposed
Around 300 offshore oil and gas installations Permissioning regimes 250 inspectors influencing companies to ensure they effectively manage and properly control the risks they create
Incidents, events and inspections • • • • • •
BP Grangemouth refinery, 2001 ConocoPhillips Refinery, 2001 BNG THORP Plant, Sellafield, 2005 Buncefield, 2005 BP Texas City refinery, 2005 Offshore asset integrity report, 2007
2
Offshore Asset Integrity • • • • • •
KP3 – November 2007 Patchy performance Inefficient processes Maintenance of Safety Critical Element Lack of understanding of barriers/degradation Misleading KPIs
Sustained operational excellence • • •
Many common factors relating to management for safety and cultural issues Issues of skills, safety culture, training, competency and leadership have all been to the fore Industry, working together, must take greater responsibility
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Baker Panel’s opening statement
•
“…no illusion that deficiencies in process
•
“..urge .. companies to regularly and thoroughly evaluate their safety culture, the performance of their process safety management systems and their corporate safety oversight for possible improvements.”
safety culture, management or corporate oversight are limited to BP. Other companies……..
Why? • • • • • •
Focus on what can be easily measured Loss of corporate memory Cognitive dissonance Tactical not Strategic focus Devaluing Engineering Fragmentation of functions
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Lessons learned – 7 key elements • • • • • • •
Leadership Process Safety Management Real and dynamic risk assessment Robust management of change Sustainability Well trained and competent people A learning organisation
Swiss Cheese Model of Defence
Hazard
Ideal
Reality
Incident
5
Health Healthand andSafety Safety Executive Executive
Hazard
Incident
Process Safety Management •
Two questions: – Is your plant/installation operating as it should be? – How do you know?
6
Process safety indicators HSE publication HSG254
• •
What can go wrong?
•
What systems are in place to manage those challenges?
• •
Where within the facility will these challenges to integrity be most critical?
What does success look like? What are the critical activities which must work right to deliver the intended outcome?
INFLUENCING DOMAINS Social, Political and Market Context Corporate Policy Influences Organisation & Management Systems Human and Technical Systems
7
Regulatory Strategies •
Intervening at different levels
• •
Focussing on key issues
•
Heat and Light
– Oil and Gas UK – Process Safety Leadership Group – April Conference
Encouraging improved knowledge and experience sharing
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“Effective Leadership on process safety in the downstream oil industry” Chris Hunt Director General UK Petroleum Industry Association February 21st 2008
UKpia
Buncefield – what can we learn? ¾Significance of Buncefield ¾Brief summary of what happened ¾Responses from Govt, authorities, industry ¾Lessons and issues
Focus on the challenge for high hazard industries UKpia
1
Primary inland distribution of oil products in UK
UKpia
The strategic significance of Buncefield • Fed by three incoming long distance pipelines from four coastal refineries; aviation fuel pipeline feed to Heathrow • 30% of fuel supplies to SE England, 10% UK total, 40% aviation fuel into Heathrow • Buncefield contains three “top tier” tier” COMAH sites, operated by – HOSL (the centre of the fire) – British Pipelines Agency (extensively damaged) – BP (south side and only slightly damaged) • HOSL was built 1990, concrete bunds, good automation including overfill protection • Massive explosion on Sunday Dec 11 2005 at 6am, immediate fire engulfed over 20 large fuels tanks, taking 3 days to put out UKpia
2
UKpia Photo: Chiltern Air Support Unit
Consequences • • • • • • •
Fortunately no fatalities or serious injuries Massive off-site damage and business disruption 27 buildings required demolition 68 million litres of firewater used Foam stocks from all over UK, included some PFOS (persistent and was already being phased out of use) Air quality – extensive monitoring but no evidence of plume grounding or health effects Major accident to the environment due to firewater/product entering rivers and aquifers
Far beyond the “Maximum credible accident” of a pool fire at a single tank (Seveso II Safety Report) UKpia
3
What happened? • 300 tonnes petrol (gasoline) overflowed from top of tank receiving from a crosscross-country pipeline • Level gauge stuck, HH alarm failed to produce operator reaction, automatic shutdown also failed • Cascade from tank top, broken flow, dispersed into droplets, formed very large vapour cloud • Cloud drifted OFFSITE across a public road • Explosion centred on office car park • Violence of explosion not understood UKpia
Crown copyright 2007, Health and Safety Laboratory
UKpia
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Crown copyright 2007, Health and Safety Laboratory
UKpia
Responses – several aspects • • • •
Supply continuity in short and long term Government Incident investigation - MIIB Emergency services – reports from Herts Fire Service and MIIB • Regulators and industry
What went well? What can we learn? UKpia
5
Short term supply continuity • UKPIA into action morning of the incident – handled media response/set up industry workwork-teams & liaison with Govt • Buncefield Tankers & Drivers diverted to other terminals; tankers and drivers ‘cascaded’ cascaded’ from other areas • South Coast refinery optimised aviation production into Heathrow; rail feed instigated; road bridging • Supplies to peripheral terminals increased; coco-operation between oil companies to maintain supply (MOU activated by Govt, OFT involved) • Emergency connection to link pipeline feed into Heathrow from North
Minimal disruption to consumers achieved! But longer term problems remain…… remain……..
UKpia
Longer term supply - reduced industry capacity, flexibility and resilience • Two years later deliveries from the BP part of the site still awaiting planning consent – granted Feb 07 • Limited jet fuel supply to Heathrow • Environment and safety suffer from extra tanker miles • Product supply security requires diversity and flexibility – resilience greatly reduced until Buncefield back on stream • Land use planning issues – major hazards, societal risk and the balance of local interests vs. national infrastructure
Product terminals essential to supply consumers, UK is very exposed to any further disruption UKpia
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UK Government response “This must never happen again!” • Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) established, independent of competent authority, to investigate and make recommendations • UK Competent Authorities reviewed standards at other fuel storage sites • Separate review of Land Use Planning and separation distances around major hazard sites
UKpia
Major Incident Investigation Board • • • • • •
Three progress reports (Spring 2006) Initial report (July 2006) Design and Operation of fuel storage (March 2007) Emergency planning and response (July 2007) Explosion mechanism (Aug 2007) Final report expected mid 2008 – Advice to planning authorities – Examination of role of Competent Authorities
UKpia
7
Response from Regulators and Industry • Buncefield Standards Task Group formed spring 2006, chaired by UKPIA, involved regulators and operators • To consider MIIB’ MIIB’s reports and make proposals to improve safety through enhanced standards and improved management of major accident risks • To prevent similar incidents • To demonstrate industry & regulator determination to learn and produce effective solutions
To deliver enhanced standards and a more consistent response to broadly similar risks UKpia
BSTG Working Groups • • • • • •
Definition of sites to which standards will apply Management of operations Design and maintenance of plant and equipment Design and maintenance of control and safety systems OnOn-site emergency response arrangements Bunding and tertiary (site) containment
A wide range of operational and engineering expertise from industry and regulators
UKpia
8
BSTG Initial Recommendations Oct 2006 enhanced industry guidance for:• Pipeline transfers • Tank overfill prevention – Safety margins – Safety systems – integrity of controls
• Valves – fireproof standard – Remotely operated shutshut-off valves
• Containment measures – Fire resistant joints in concrete bunds – Tertiary containment
• Shift handover UKpia
BSTG Final Report July 07 detailed recommendations • Systematic assessment of SILs for control systems • High integrity systems for primary containment • Secondary and tertiary containment • High reliability organisations • Emergency arrangements
Operators have worked on implementing these recommendations to tight deadlines – good compliance UKpia
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But there will be a major ongoing work programme …. • MIIB Design and Operations recommendations of March 29, only partially covered by BSTG’ BSTG’s July report • Competent Authority’ Authority’s new policy on primary, secondary and tertiary containment. Further guidance needed. • MIIB has echoed Texas City concerns from Baker Panel and CSB about industry leadership and culture • Explosion violence is still not understood
Hence Process Safety Leadership Group involves regulators, petrochemical industries and TUs UKpia
Key areas for the next phase -1 Engineer the risks out! • More CCTV and gas detectors • Siting of emergency facilities • New tank top design to prevent vapour cloud formation • More fail safe automatic emergency shutdown • Better level gauge technology and wet testing • Less reliance on operators • Better secondary and tertiary containment and firewater facilities, firewater management UKpia
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Key areas – 2 Sector leadership at the highest level • Directors’ Directors’ understanding of their business risks – COMAH worst case scenarios • How do we know process safety systems are working? – leading indicators? At sector level? • How to share near misses and lessons, and overcome legal constraints • A framework for selfself-assessment to stimulate continuous improvement • Are we as good as other major hazard industries? – – –
Offshore (pilot stepstep-change programme) Nuclear Chemicals (responsible care)
UKpia
“Aligned but not joined” •
The challenge is to work with regulators and industry to create a standard in Process Safety Leadership to which we aspire and to which we commit ourselves to deliver
•
Regulators and operators in EU and USA are keenly interested in the outcomes
•
A huge amount has been done, but there is a lot more to do
•
UKPIA would like more contact with other high hazard industries such as nuclear
Our ambition? – Process Safety is a visible and tangible cornerstone of the Petrochemical Industry! UKpia
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Risk Based Process Safety Matt Siddall Health, Safety and Environment Manager ConocoPhillips Humber Refinery
Risk – are we good judges? A)1 in 2 B)1 in 10 C)1 in 100 D)1 in 1000
1
What does this tell us about risk based process safety? • Process safety risk must be professionally assessed •
Otherwise the frequency of high consequence events will be consistently under-estimated.
• Risk tolerance not always properly calibrated •
People’s understanding can easily drift
• There will be healthy debate!
The 14 OSHA PSM Elements • • • • • • • •
Process Safety Information Process Hazards Analysis
• •
Hot Work Permits
Mechanical Integrity
Employee Participation
Management of Change
•
Operating Procedures Employee Training ATC Contractors
Emergency Planning and Response
• • •
Incident Investigation Compliance Audits Trade Secrets
2
How quickly can you do this process?
What is acceptable? Consequence 4 : single on-site fatality HIGH unacceptable
10-3 marginal RISK
10-6 broadly tolerable
LOW
3
Determining the risk Humber Refinery matrix CONSEQUENCE OF HAZARD FREQUENCY
5 4
3 2 1
Probable
Fairly probable Quite unlikely
Unlikely
Extremely unlikely
6
5
4
3
2
1
Catastrophic+
Catastrophic
Critical
Major
Moderate
Minor
IV
IV
IV
III
II
II
IV
IV
IV
III
II
I
IV
III
III
II
II
I
III
II
II
II
I
I
II
II
I
I
I
I
Risk reduction timeline • • •
Cat IV – immediate mitigation to Cat III
• •
Tracking of overdue items
Cat III – 2 years or one turnaround cycle
Cat II – 5 years or two turnaround cycles / ALARP.
Documented process for deadline extensions
4
Corporate process safety metrics allow resource allocation for risk reduction PHA Actions
Cat IV/III
Cat II
2004
2005
2006
2007
423
248
343
211
Closed
3
327
126
350
Balance
421
341
558
419
Generated
Generated
• Zero overdue • Keeping pace with Cat IV/III
759
616
903
758
Closed
5
26
100
1201
Balance
754
1344
2147
1704 1200
Due Dates For All PSM Items
1000 800 600 400
• Cat II’s starting to become due • Major challenge to manage
200 0 2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
III
2013
2014
2015
II
Issues with Process Risk Assessment •
Site Level
•
High resource demand in first cycle (8-9 man years for PHA’s to end of 2007, RBI’s even more)
•
Risk identification can be much quicker than risk resolution
•
Risk perception and competing priorities
•
Risk reduction rate (resource limited)
•
Strategy for dealing with marginal risk • Organisational distraction?
5
Issues with Process Risk Assessment •
Corporate level
• • • • •
Consistency of risk identification and ranking How to judge where to allocate resource Appropriate metrics What is an appropriate risk reduction rate Board level expectations
ConocoPhillips Approach •
• •
Global Process Safety Leadership Committee
•
Develop and maintain a global process safety program to provide a uniform benchmark for compliance
•
Ensure consistent implementation of process safety best practices
•
Establish performance metrics
Global PSM / MI Audit Team Refining
•
Process Safety Coordinators in the US and
Europe
• Sit on the GPSLC
•
Refining Process Safety Network
6
High Reliability Organisations
7
Effective leadership on process safety
Oil & Gas UK Step Change in Safety Initiative 21st February 2008 Bob Kyle
1
Industry Economic Context 2007Approx figures 3.0 million boe/day £10 billion expenditure £8 billion in tax 70% UK energy needs Half million employed Another 25 years to go
Piper Alpha 1988
A defining moment in offshore safety
2
Step Change in Safety - what is it? • • • •
Partnership of key stakeholders Leadership Team of 30 Full time Support Team of 4 3 Networks of Middle Management, Elected Safety Representatives and Safety Professionals • Delivery Workgroups
3
Step Change in Safety What does it do? • Sharing safety data (SADIE Database) • Sharing good practice –numerous publications on website • Leadership setting example • Workforce involvement • Personal ownership • Asset Integrity
Our Strategic Focus Continuing to Reinforce the Barriers to Prevent Incidents In 2010, the UK is the safest place to work in the worldwide Oil and Gas Industry
Processes
Equipment
People Hazard
Incident
Barriers
Recognise Hazard and Reduce Risk
Personal Ownership for Safety
Asset Integrity
(Barrier 2)
(Barrier 3)
(Barrier 1)
Identifying, Understanding and Dealing with Hazards
Making safety personal by demonstrating commitment and competence throughout the organisation.
Maintaining Hardware to be Safe, Reliable and Efficient
Ownership and Involvement at all Levels Leadership • Communication • Cooperation
4
PRODUCTS SUPPORTING THE STRATEGY
In 2010, the UK is the safest place to work in the worldwide Oil and Gas Industry
Recognise Hazard and Reduce Risk
Personal Ownership for Safety
Asset Integrity
Identifying, Understanding and Dealing with Hazards
Making safety personal by demonstrating commitment and competence throughout the organisation.
Maintaining Hardware to be Safe, Reliable and Efficient
Safety Critical Elements
Ownership and Involvement at all Levels Leadership Communication Cooperation
5
HSE Asset Integrity Programme • Maintenance backlogs • Aging infrastructure • Many installations reached or exceeded design life • Changing ownership of assets • Major release on Brent B Sept 2003 –two men died • HSE launch Asset Integrity Programme (KP3) 2004-2007
HSE Asset Integrity Programme • • • • • •
Targeted Inspection of 100 Installations 33 Duty holders Maintenance Management Systems Safety Critical Elements 17 Inspection Elements Traffic Light Reporting
6
Asset Integrity
7
KP3 – the last 3 years • Joint industry / HSE workshops • Asset Integrity tool kit • £3 billion investment
HSE Asset Integrity Report Underlying Issues • Leaders need to better understand the concept of barriers in major hazard risk control • Engineering Function role and influence needs to be strengthened • Companies need to improve their learning and sharing • Skills shortage issues
8
KP3 – what is happening now • Senior Leadership Education / Training Workshops – pilot 26th Feb • Engineering Authority- workshop 5th March • Good practice sharing – new website area • 3 Industry leading indicators in development • New Skills Academy launched Nov. 07
Enhanced Asset Integrity Website
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It is all About People
10
Responsible Care Dr Diana Montgomery Deputy Chief Executive 21 February 2008
UK Chemical Industry - Vital statistics • £50 billion turnover with £5 billion balance of trade surplus (£/€/$ exchange rates important) • Number employed 184,000 (skills an issue) • Average earnings +25% of national average • Estimated 2007 capital investment + £2 bn
1
UK chemical industry share of gross value added 3% Industrial gases
3% Agrochemicals
3% Dyes &pigments
7% Paints, varnishes & printing inks
2% Basic inorganics 11% Basic organics 1% Fertilisers
41% Pharmaceuticals
7% Plastics & synthetic rubber 1% Man-made fibres 10% Other specialities
11% Soaps, toiletries & cleaning preparations
Main UK chemical sites and the ethylene pipeline grid Merseyside
Grangemouth Teesside Humber
2
Today’s CIA: a snapshot
• Membership organisation - funded by subscription • 140 members, 187 production sites – ranging from all the chemical multinationals operating in the UK to a large number of SME • CIA role is to liase with government on political, economic and legislative issues
Responsible Care
• Voluntary commitment to continuous improvement in health, safety and environment performance • Started in the chemical industry in Canada in 1986 • Successfully used to demonstrate ‘compliance and beyond’ • Measurable improvements in health, safety & environment performance • 53 national associations around the world signed Global Charter
3
Companies commit to Responsible Care
• CEO’s sign the Guiding Principles • Return of annual Indicators of Performance • Self-assessment against the RC Management System • Chemsafe Level 1 • Wider Responsible Care ethic
The Guiding Principles
Written EHS Policy programmes
Product Stewardship
Employee Involvement in objectives integral to business
Resource Conservation
Experience Sharing and best practice monitoring
Stakeholder Engagement in performance monitoring
Cooperation with legislator & regulators
Management Systems
Process Safety management
Past, Present, Future impacts
4
Responsible Care – “A Way of Doing Business” • 14 Cells across the UK with 337 representatives • Experience-sharing; first hand feedback from colleagues in similar operations • Technical discussions and solutions to problems (e.g. self-help group) • Vehicle for liaison to regulators • Latest “best practice” information, support and advice from the major association in your industry • Commitment to ongoing improvement and raising standards
Delivering Results - Environment Agency’s 2007 Spotlight on Business Report • 48% of chemical sites A rated for their operator performance in 2006, up from 42% in 2005 • Over 80% of sites received an A or B rating • Greenhouse gas releases from the chemical sector were down 9% between 2005 and 2006 • Substantial decrease in emissions into air and water • The total waste produced and transferred off site down to all time low
5
Going beyond compliance?
• Responsible Care means always seeking improvement in EHS performance • Measurable parameters & targets • Improvement plans and reviews • Technical advice and support for poorer performers • Learning lessons form incidents and experiencesharing • Engaging with stakeholders • Common ownership by EHS professionals and development of individuals
Beyond Compliance: Voluntary Initiatives
• Chlorine Covenant • Regulation and Recognition • Sector Groups
6
Responsible Care and process safety
RC Global Charter includes the following commitments: ‘Continuously improve and report performance’ “Adopt a management systems approach to implementing RC commitments” and:
‘Implement fundamental features of National RC programmes’ “Develop a set of performance indicators against which improvements can be measured” “Share best practice through information networks”
“Learning Lessons”
Responsible Care and process safety
This translates in practice in process safety terms to: Management playing a key role in the prevention of major process safety incidents, i.e. Leadership Industry developing and adopting process safety performance indicators (PSPIs) So what is CIA doing to promote these…?
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Responsible Care and process safety
1. Management and Leadership: CIA is actively engaged with member companies and other stakeholders
2. Process Safety Leadership initiative: Visits to Board level of a representative sample of member companies to explore the leadership issue?
3. Performance Indicators: CIA cooperation with HSE leading to the publication in 2006 of the guidance ‘Developing process safety indicators’
Responsible Care for the future
• • • •
2050 Vision Performance Metrics Branding External Verification
8
advocacy, authority, action
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Process Safety Leadership Delivering Effective Results Tony Traynor
1
Process Safety Leadership
Å Our industry typically operates in close proximity to the community Å Many of our processes are high hazard with the potential to impact on many of our own people and those communities in the event of a serious incident Å The fundamental basis of safety of our processes is containment Å The nature of many of our processes is aggressive and potentially detrimental to the integrity of our assets and hence containment Å Profound understanding and control of asset condition is critical to continued safe operation
2
Maintaining containment and hence maintaining the basis of safety Requires the organisation to consistently perform well in the following areas Å Defining acceptable operating envelopes for all key aspects of the process Å Maintaining the process conditions within these envelopes Å Understanding the impact of excursions Å Maintaining and testing equipment and protective devices Å Rigorous compliance to procedures Å Professional management of change processes Collectively the management of all these areas can be thought of as Process Safety management
The key to delivering Effective Process Safety Management
LEADERSHIP Å People will look to the leadership and by their behaviours will see what they think is important Å The challenges or lack of challenges will identify their level of interest Å The tolerance of poor performance, practices and unacceptable situations will set the standards Å The allocation of resources will define the priorities It is fundamental that stewardship for Process Safety Management is a line accountability from operation to board level
3
To deliver Effective Process Safety Management the Operations Leadership must:
Å Establish the priority of this Element of Performance by how they behave with respect to it Å Ensure that people responsible for operating, maintaining and managing process plants are clear about their particular roles and accountabilities for process safety Å Establish a culture of openness and honesty which is determined to identify and eliminate the root causes of incidents, failures and unacceptable situations
To deliver Effective Process Safety Management the Operations Leadership must: Å Ensure that the knowledge and experience of all of those responsible for operating, maintaining and managing hazardous processes is such that they understand the basis of safety and their contribution to the control and management of those hazards Å Challenge the robustness of the management process for management of change, trouble shooting and risk assessment Å Establish leading and lagging indicators of the effectiveness of the Process Safety Management system
4
Effective Process Safety Management
LEADERSHIP Å Must recognise the pressures that exist in our Business Å Understand that it is essential that clear messages are given around the priority of this element of our performance Å Make it clear what the right thing to do is when under pressure
Some Examples of how it might look
Å Plant managers feel comfortable putting loss prevention before production Å Work processes and procedures are consistently followed Å Operating teams recognise abnormal deviations and how to respond Å High compliance with Engineering inspection and testing
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Some Examples of how it might look
Å Near misses are highlighted and investigated Å Protective device demand frequency is monitored and investigated Å Change is thoroughly risk assessed by people with the right knowledge and experience
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Notes
