THE INDONESIA

-

PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER:

IRIANESE NATIONALISM AND SMALL STATE DIPLOMACY

R.J. May

(Ed.)

Working Paper No

2

Department of Political and Social Change

Research School of Pacific Studies Australian National University

August

1979

Nationa l Library o f Austra l i a Cat a logui ng-i n -public ation entry

The Indone s i a - Papua New Guinea border (Work i ng p ape r ; no . 2) Inc l ude s bibliographi ca l re ference s ISBN 0 908160 33 x 1. Indone s i a - Foreign re lations - Papua New Guinea . 2. Papua New Gui nea - Fo rei gn re lations - Indone s i a . I . May , Rona ld J . , ed . ( S eri e s : Austral i an National Uni ve r s i ty , Canberra . Re sea rch S choo l o f Pac i fi c S tudi e s . Dept . o f Pol i ti c a l and Soc i a l Change . Work i ng paper ; no . 2 IS SN 0157-2776) 32 7'.598'095

C

0

N T E N T S

i

Pref ace A h i s tori c a l pe rspective Peter Ha s t i ngs

1

Probl ems of i n ternationa l borde r s wi th pa rt i c ular re ference to t he c urrent r e -negoti ation o f the I ndone s i a - Papua New Guinea agreement conce rning admi n i s tra t i ve border a rrangements J . R . V . Pre scot t The ' Jusuf Li ne' :

12

beginnings o f a more frui t ful pha s e ? Rex Mor time r

33

Doe s I ndone s i a have expansion i s t de s i gn s on Papua New Guine a ?

J . A . C . Mack i e

Papua New Gui nea perceptions on the border ; pres sure s a nd po l i c i e s .

i nternal

Kwas i Nyamekye and Ra lph Premda s

Livi ng wi th a l i on . f e e l ings

80

a ' po l i ti ca l nec e s s i ty' again J . M . Herl ihy

Appendix I

65

Pub l i c at_ t i tudes and privat e R . J . May

Border deve lopme n t :

42

108

Agre eme n t be tween the governme n t o f

Aus tra l ia

( a ct i ng o n i ts own beha l f and o n

be ha l f o f the government o f Papua New Guinea ) and the government of Indon e s i a conc erning admi ni s trative border arrangement s as to the border be tween Papua New Guinea and I ndone s i a Appendix I I view

We s t Papua Nat iona l i sm�

125

an i n s i de 131

Re ferenc e s

140

Contributors

142

Figures 1

page

The bo rde r area

fa c i ng

1

Ma ri time boundari e s southwe s t o f the I ndone s i a -Papua New Gui nea border 3

17

Marit ime boundar i e s nor th o f the 20

I ndone s i a -Papua New Gui nea borde r

4

Aus tra l i a - I ndone s i a n bounda ry agreement 23

of 197 3

5

The Fly River

25

6

Mea nder s on the F ly River

26

Pho tograp hs Jacob Prai and We s t Papua n freedom figh ters . I ri anese re fuge e s about to return to I ndone sia Camp for I r ianese re fuge e s at Ok sapmi n

be tween

64-65

PREFACE

In 19 7 7 , roughly coi nc i dent wi th I ndone s i a ' s national e lections , a re s urge nce o f We s t Papuan nationa l i s t act i vi ty in I ri a n Jaya resulted in an e s ca la ti ng ser i e s o f confrontations between OPM

1

s upporters a nd

I ndone s i a n a uthor i ti e s , and a sub s tantial moveme n t o f I ri anese re fuge e s i nto Papua New Gui nea .

I t i s impo s s ible to ver i fy the

con f l i c ti ng reports of what happened i n I rian Jaya in thi s period but i t s e ems c e rta i n that seve ra l hundred I r iane s e , and some I ndone sia n troop s , were k i l l e d ;

many more I ri anese fled the i r vi l la ge s , seeking

temporary or permane nt a sy l um i n Papua New Gui nea . Although the Papua New Guinea government s tood fi rmly by i ts accep ta nce of I ndone s i a n sover e i gn ty i n I rian Jaya , border inc ursions by I ndone s i an troop s , Papua New Gui nea ' s acceptance o f I rianese re fuge e s , a nd I ndone sian sugge s tions that Papua New Guinea wa s a dopting a doub l e s tandard on the I ri an Jaya que stion , a l l p l aced s trai n s on the re lations between the two count ri e s.

Al so , growi ng

popular s uppo r t among Pap ua New Gui neans for the i r Me lane si an brothers i ncrea sed the sa li ence o f We s t Papuan nationa l i sm i n Papua New Guinea's dome s ti c pol i ti c s;

gove rnment po l i c i e s wi th respect to I rian Jaya

bec ame a campai gn i s sue in Papua New Gui nea's na tional e lections in 1 9 7 7 and conti nued to be a source o f contention in the early months of the s econd par l i ament. Towards the end o f 1 9 7 8 there was a s c a l i ng down o f I ndonesian mi li tary ope rat ions and subsequent announcement o f a more conci liatory pol i cy towards the Irianese di s s idents .

Soon a fter, the I ndone sian

and Papua New Gui ne a governments succe s s fully comp leted di scus sions pre l i mi na ry to the renegotiat ion of the 1 9 7 3 a greement on admi n i s tra tive border arrangements. Agai n s t thi s background, a group o f peop l e wi th some knowledge o f the I r ian Jaya i s sue was brought toge ther wi thin the Austra l i an

1

Organisasi Papua Merdeka ( F ree Papua Movemen t ) . Throughout thi s vo l ume , unl e s s otherwi s e s tated , ' OPM" i s used broadly to de scribe the various fact ions of the We s t Papua na tiona l i s t movemen t .

ii

Na tiona l Unive r s i ty to rev iew re cent events and a ttempt a n a s s e s sment of future pro spect s . S eve n of the e i ght papers pre sented to the two day semi nar are reproduced here wi th only mi no r edi toria l change s . The othe r , on the the OPM , wa s not ava i lable for public ation a t the time th i s vo lume went to pre s s;

however we have i nc luded , a s appendi x

I I , a doc ume nt on We st Papua nationa l i sm c i rc ulate d by the Pa c i fic People ' s Ac tion Front (a fac tion o f the OPM ) in 1 9 7 6 . We are grate ful to Jan Grocott , Vi rginia Mathe son , Han s Gun the r and the Aus tra lia n Nationa l Uni ve r s i ty SOCPAC Printery for thei r contributions t o the publication o f this set o f papers a n d

to

Mark

Baker and Wantok Pub l ications I nc . for permi s sion to reproduce the photographs i nc l uded betwe en page s 64 a nd 6 5 .

R . J . May

Abbreviations HAD - House of A s s embly Debate s ( Papua New Gui nea ) (prior to 1 9 7 5 )

NPD - National Par liamentary Debate s ( Papua New Gui nea ) OPM

-

Organi sasi Papua Merdeka

( see footnote p . i )

141°,

140°

143°

142°

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Jayapura

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Warise Jafi

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SANDAUN (West Sepik)

• Amanab

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l INDONESIA

�tana

Mind

Merauke

•Fneda

I• Atbalmin prospect I r--. �� T1falmin prospects · - - -� efomin I OA . . ) I k Ted1 prospect n boundary in the Beagle Cha nnel provide examp les of pos i tiona l boundary di sputes .

In terri toria l a nd pos i tiona l di sputes

s uc ces s for the c l a imant s ta te wi l l i nvol ve a change in the pos i tion o f the boundary and therefore the t rans fer of some terri tory from one c ountry to another .

The amount o f terri tory i nvol ved would usua l ly be

les s in the c a se of a po s i tiona l di spute tha n in the c a se o f a ter ri tor ial di spute . Governmen ts wi l l normal ly f i nd i t :roc>s t convenient to apply certai n functions , relating for example to immi gra tion a n d trade , a s c lose to the internationa l boundary a s pos s ible .

Sometimes the na ture of these

func tio ns or the manner in which they are app lied may gi ve a nei ghbouri ng coun try cause for grieva nce .

Di sagreemen ts o f thi s kind can be ca l led

functiona l boundary dispu tes .

Iraq's occas ional i n terference wi th

Iranian shipp i ng on the S hat t-el -Arab and Benin ' s c losure of boundary c ro s s i ng po ints i n to Togo in Octobe r 1 9 7 5 typefy such boundary di sputes. Bec ause boundaries are l i nes they wi l l of ten i nter sect d i s crete resources s uch as rivers or a n o i l field whi c h the count ries on both sides of the boundary wi l l wi sh to use . a

Con f l i c t over the use of such features form

separate category of resource boundary disputes .

The qua rrel

be tween India a nd Bangl adesh over the diver s ion of Ganges water s a t the Farraka Barrage i s representa tive o f thi s kind o f boundary di spute. In resource and functional boundary di sputes the c la ima nt s tate can

be s uc ces s ful wi thout a ny a lteration in the location o f the boundary ; i n each.c a se what i s sough t i s an agreed set of regulations which wi l l a lleviate the admi ni strative problem .

14

Terri torial boundary disputes. Ter r i tor i a l boundary di sputes c a n be d ivided i nto two mai n c la s ses .

F i r s t there are lega l d i sputes when the c la imant country

i ns i sts tha t the ter r i tory desi red is improper ly owned by i ts nei ghbour . The Phi lipp i nes ' abandoned c la im to par t of Sabah a nd Kampuchea's c laim to the t emp le of Preah Vihear i n Tha i la nd , which wa s uphel d by the I nternat iona l Court of Justi ce i n 1 96 2 , were both terri torial c l a ims based on lega l grounds .

Secondly , there are a l l the other ca ses when

a country a s serts that i t would be more appropria te i f part o f i ts Uganda ' s c laim

nei ghbour ' s territory pa s sed to i ts own sovereignty .

to Tanzania ' s Kagera Sa l i ent a nd the Argenti ne ' s c l a im to the Fa lkland I s lands a re typ i c a l o f thi s large group of terri torial boundary di sputes . There are ma ny grounds on whi ch countries wi l l make c laims agai ns t the ter r i tory o f nei ghbours ;

the argumen ts wi l l be ba sed i n hi s tory , i n

geography , i n economi c s , and i n ethnology .

U sua l ly the c la im wi l l be

buttres sed by a s many d i f ferent arguments a s pos sible .

For example ,

A fghani stan ' s per s i s tent territor i a l c la im to parts of wes ter n Paki s tan , which i s thi nly vei led a s support for a separate s tate o f Pushtuni s tan , ha s at lea s t four strand s .

F i r s t there a r e the lega l

and moral arguments that Afghani stan was forced to s i gn the 1 8 9 3 agree­ men t , whi ch produced the Durand Li ne , under dures s.

Secondly , hi s torica l

arguments are dep loyed to demonstra te that Afghani s ta n o nce r uled over a rea s of wes t Pak i stan , and i t i s true tha t the Durrani Emp i re control led some of the c la imed area for seventy-s i x year s prior to 1 8 2 3 , when Peshawar wa s lo s t .

The third set o f a rgumen ts i s ba sed i n the wi tnes s

o f ethnologi s t s that Pathans in A fghani s ta n a nd Pak i s ta n form a s i ngle c ul tura l group .

Fi na l ly , i t i s a s serted on geographi ca l ground s that

the proper boundary of the Afghani s ta n up lands l i es c lo ser to the I ndus River, along the Sula iman Range . Al though i n mo s t ca ses when terri torial di sputes

originate the

c la imant s tate genui nely hopes a nd expec ts to a cqui re add i tiona l terri tory , there are ca ses when terri tori a l c la ims are made to serve some domest i c or internationa l pol i cy .

Pres i dents Nkrumah a nd Ami n ,

at d i fferent times , have made c la ims a ga i n s t Togo and Ta nzania respec ti vely , when it wa s obviously useful to di s tra c t a tten tion from

15

p res s i ng dome s ti c problems o f an economic and pol i ti c a l nature .

When

the Phi l ippines c l aimed parts o f nor thern Sabah it was sugges ted by some observers tha t the chief des i gn wa s to delay the formation o f Ma l ay s ia . When the border between I ndone s i a a nd Papua New Gui nea i s cons idered there does no t appear to be any likely terri torial c laim from ei ther side .

The agreement between Aus tral i a a nd I ndonesia on

12 February 1 9 7 3 fi xed the boundary in a c lear manner which does not a l low any territorial c la ims .

However , i t should not be a s sumed that a

c la im could not be manufac tured by ei ther s i de i f changed pol i ti ca l c ircums ta nces warranted i t.

Once i t was fashionable t o c la s s i fy boundaries

into two ma j or c l a s ses cal led a r ti ficial boundaries and nat ural boundaries . Art i ficial bo undaries i nc luded those whi ch did no t correspond wi th any o f the ma j or divi s ions o f the phy s i c a l or cultura l landscape , whi le na tura l boundaries were di s tingui shed by thei r coinc i dence wi th river s or wa ter sheds or l i nes o f triba l separation .

The fa shion wa s abandoned

because i t wa s recogni zed that i t wa s s ti l l necessary to selec t a spec i fi c l i ne wi thin the ri ver or the water shed or the front ier between two tribes . Thi s rea l i zation under lines the point that in the vic i ni ty of a boundary there wi l l be other l imi ts which wi l l be more or les s obvious .

Some wi l l concern the phy s i c a l landscape of plants , geol�gi cal

s truc ture and hydrology , whi le other s wi l l rela te to human occupance and i nc l ude di f ferences in language , sys tems of land tenure , and patter ns o f trade .

Beca use the present boundary formed by the two meridians and

the F ly River do not correspond consi s tently wi th pos s ible physical and human divi s ions i n the border i t would be po s s ible for ei ther country , by empha si zing one o f these di viding zones , to c a l l for a rec ti fication of the boundary .

It could be argued by Indones ia , for examp le , tha t

the admi ni s tra tion o f the border woul d be simp l i fied i f more o f the boundary wa s made to coincide wi th river s , which form promi nent fea tures in the landscape .

Thi s a s ser tion could then be extended to the sugges tion ° that the bo unda ry abandon s the meridian 14 0 ea st when it i nter sec ts the Alice River , and that that river is then fo l lowed by the boundary

to i ts conf luence wi th the F ly River and then the F ly River to boundary marked MMl l ( see fi gure 4 ) .

16

The example j us t c i ted i s ent i r e ly hypoth e t i c a l but it does i l lus trate the ea se wi th which estab l i shed l i nes can be chal lenged i f a country feel s that there are c ompe l l i ng reasons to do so .

Tho s e

rea sons mi ght i nvo lve t h e des i re to provi de a n externa l focus for nationa l sentiment or the des i re to take advan tage of the weakened condi tion of a ne i ghbour or the de s i r e s imp ly to show di splea sure wi th some po l i c i e s and atti tudes be i ng adopted by a nei ghbour . It must a l so be re cogni zed that population di s tri but ions sometimes change , and i f a li e n set tlement occur s on a s i gni fi cant sca le acro s s a boundary i t can later provide the ground for a demand to redraw the bounda ry.

It wa s the ma j or immi gra tion o f Chi l ean workers to the

guano and nitrate fields o f southern Bo l ivia which s trengthened Chi l e's determination to acqui re that a rea . A wi s e gove rnment wi l l prepare for a l l eventua l i ti e s , and because it i s eas ier to col lec t evidence in periods o f cordial re lations i t would seem sensible for both Indone s i a and Papua New Gui nea to accumula te any evi denc e whi ch they mi gh t need to rebut any terr i tori a l c laim . Murty

( 1 96 8 ) ha s p rovi ded a ve ry i nteres ting ac coun t of the problems

of col lec ting and i nterpreting evidence concerni ng the location o f tradi tiona l boundar i e s i n the S i no-Indian border .

The di spute be tween

India and China and be twe e n the Argenti ne a nd Chi le have shown the importance whi ch the contendi ng part i e s a ttach to maps showi ng the a l i gnmen t they favour .

A portfo l i o o f maps der i ved from archives and

modern sourc e s would be a use ful weapon in the armoury of a ny country wi shing to re fute t erri torial c l a ims. While there appea rs to be no present ri sk of e i ther s i de maki ng a territor i a l c laim on land , the s i tua tion i n the water s southwest o f the mouth o f the Bensbach River is less certa i n.

The pre s ent po s i tion

is that Papua New Gui nea ha s i nheri ted a seabed boundary wi th Indone s i a whi ch was drawn i n two sec tions b y tha t count ry and Aus tra l i a.

A sho rt

sec tion o f boundary mea suring 2 2 nautical mi les from the mouth o f the Ben sbach Ri ver wa s sett led in the 1 9 7 3 agreement

( see B l -B 3 i n f i gure 2 ) .

The lo nge r continuation , mea suring 1 3 2 nautica l mi les , wa s drawn as the seabed boundary between Indone sia and Au stra l ia in May 1 9 7 1 .

That segme nt

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24

p roblems fo r commerc i a l use.

The thalweg i s the l i ne o f the deepes t

conti nuo us channel i n the river.

Whi le thi s l i ne wi l l al so change i t

does mean that countries o n bo th s ides wi l l b e able to c laim navigation rights for thei r c i ti zen s. Turning now to the boundary between I ndones i a and Papua New Guinea i t seems that the only s cope for a po s i tiona l boundary di spute concerns the section of the Fly River used for the internati onal boundary.

The meri dians north and south o f the Fly River have been

marked by ten and four monumen ts respectively.

The maximum di s tance

between any two markers i s the 56 nauti cal mi les between monument s MMll an d MM12

( see fi gure 4 ) .

S uch a di s tance would me an tha t i t would be

di ffi cult for a fa rmer to know exactly where the boundary l ay i n the intervening area , but i t i s understood tha t a l l ma j or track s have been si gnposted and the exact location of each adj acent vi l lage has been computed .

Modern s urvey techni ques would make it a comparatively

ea sy matter to fi x more monument s on the l i ne i f that was deemed essen ti a l.

The 1 9 7 3 agreement def i nes the boundary along the F ly

Ri ver as the wate'P7JX1y , which i s shown in paren theses to The d is tance be tween monument s MMl O and MMll ,

be

the thaZweg .

whi ch mark the termini

o f the s ec ti on of the Fly River whi ch forms the boundary , i s 34 nauti ca l mi les , but the course of river wi l l be much longer because it meanders wi dely over the f l at , marshy p lain ( see fi gure 5 ) .

Maps o f

the region show very c learly the abandoned meanders a long the river ' s course , and i n some ca ses the boundary has moved a s much a s 3 . 5 ki lometres when the neck o f a meander was breached ( see the meander marked B on fi gure 6 ) .

The map evi dence suggests tha t the Fly River

has an uns table course whi ch makes i t uns ui table for use as an inter­ national boundary.

I f the border in the vi c i n i ty o f the river ever

became i n tens i vely used i t would prove to be a very di fficult line to 1 moni. tor. The maps s uggest that the r i ve r contains few i s l ands whi ch

1 Duri ng di scussion o f Dr Pre scott ' s paper it was observed that the F ly River could be i ntensively used i f p l an s went ahead to explo i t the Ok Tedi copper-go ld depo si t in the S tar Mountai n s o f Papua New Guinea and to transpo rt the ore by barge down the F ly . An early feasibi l i ty s tudy has recommended the breachi ng of meanders to fac i l i tate navi gation . ( Ed . )

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on

the F l y R i ve r

( Ne t h e r I a nd s ser i es , I 9 5 6 , 1 00 , 0 00 )

27

wi l l reduce the problems caused , but i t would be neces sary to examine large scale a ir -photographs to confi rm thi s point .

Funetiona, l boundary dispute s . A functional boundary di spute i s crea ted when one coun try ' s authori ties dec i de that nationa l interes ts have been adver sely and un fairly a f fected by the ac tivi ties of a neighbouring country a long the boundary .

These activi ties wi l l obvious ly be concerned wi th movemen t

acro s s the boundary o f people , or s tock , or goods , or i dea s , a nd the complaint can take two ma j or forms .

I n the f i r s t case the p l a i nt i f f

sta te mi ght cons ider tha t i ts neighbour i s unrea sonably inter fer ing wi th trans -boundary movement s .

For examp le , Pak i s tan , i n reta l i ation aga i n s t

Afghani s ta n ' s support for the Pa than seces s ioni s t movement , required Powi nda herder s to produce certi f i c a tes o f hea l th for their a nima l s be fore admit ti ng them o n their a nnua l tra nshumance movemen t to the I ndus p la i n s a t the beginning of wi nter .

I t proved impo s s ib le to

sati s fy thi s new regula tion and the Powi nda s and their herds had to wi nter in Afghani s tan .

More recently Tanzania ha s prevented Kenyan

lorr ies from opera ting between Kenya and Zambia a long the road s through the wes t o f Tan zania .

Tanzania c la ims tha t thi s heavy tra f f i c

i s damaging i ts un sea led roads ;

Kenya bel i eves that Tanzania i s

unwi l l i ng to see Zambia ' s dependence on D a r es Sal aam reduced . The impo s i tion o f tar i f f s i s another devi ce by which one country can hi nder tra ns -bo undary tra de ;

wh i le the wi thholding o f work -permi ts

is one method of obs truc t i ng immigration into a coun try . I n the second case the p l a i nti f f count ry mi gh t be di s s a ti s fied beca use i t s nei ghbour i s not preven ting i l lega l trans -boun dary move­ ments .

For example , in the l a s t yea r the export ea rnings of bo th Uganda

and the Centra l African Emp ire were serio us ly reduced because diamonds , cotton, cocoa and cof fee were smuggled out and sold in nei ghbouri ng countri es .

Countries might a l so comp l a i n i f a nei ghbour fa i l s to en force

hea lth s tandards whi ch res ult in anima l or human di seases bei ng intro ­ duced acro s s the bo undary , or fa i l s to prevent a flood o f refugees into the plainti f f ' s part o f the border .

Some of the mos t serious func tiona l

28

bounda ry di spute s a r i s e when one country fai l s to prevent i ts border be i ng used as a ba se for di s s idents attack i ng the author i ty acro s s the boundary .

S uch at tacks may be launched a s mi l i tary campa i gns i n

the s tyle o f the POL I SARIO raids into Ma ur i tania from Algeria , o r they may s imp ly be propaga nda a ttack s by ra dio t ransmi t ters . Func tional bo undary d i spute s have no t a ttracted the inter e s t o f scho lar s t o the same e xtent a s terr i toria l o r pos i tiona l di spute s . Thi s s i tuat ion may b e due e i ther to the prompt settleme nt o f mo s t · func ti onal di spute s or to the fac t tha t serious a nd pers i s tent func tional d i sputes occur only be twe en ho s t i l e countr i e s wh ich d i splay the i r a n tagoni sm i n more obvious a nd o f ten more threa teni ng ways .

I t seems

l ikely that the cha nce o f func tional di sput e s deve loping wi l l be greate s t when the tra f f i c acro s s the boundary i s ma i nly i n one direc tion , whe ther i t is l ega l or i l lega l .

Thi s i s be cause i n such si tuat ions there wi l l

b e l i ttle or no oppor tuni ty for ret a l i a tion b y the pla i n ti f f sta te . I f there i s a flouri shing tra f f i c in both direct ions a cro s s the boundary any country which cons ider s i ts e l f to be adver se ly a f f e c ted by i ts nei ghbour ' s ac tions i n the bo rder can adopt simi l a r mea sures .

The

i n troduc t ion of new regulations or the more s tringent app l i cat ion o f e xi s ti ng rul e s which precip i ta te func tional di spute s , wi ll o f ten b e made for sound s tra tegic or economi c rea sons �

Howe ver , i t i s a l so po s s ible

tha t they may b e introduc ed or i ntens i fi ed in order to show di spleasure wi th the pol i c i e s or at ti tude s of a neighbouring country . Whi l e i t i s po s s ible to speculate inte l l i gen tly about the po s s ibi l i ty o f territorial or pos i tiona l di spute s deve lopi ng by s tudying the texts o f treat i e s , large scale maps and a i r photographs , and by applying c urrent and deve loping rul e s about the con s truc tion o f mari time boundar i e s , there a r e no sub s ti tute s for rigorous f i e l dwork i n i denti fying f uncti ona l di spute s .

From conver sa tions wi th peop l e

fami l iar wi th the border a n d from pre s s and radio reports i t appears that the problem mo s t l ikely to pro duc e func tiona l di spute s concerns the f l i ght o f di s s i dents from I r i an Jaya into Papua New Guinea .

I t doe s

no t appea r tha t the number s invo lved would crea te serious logi s tic probl ems for the author i ti e s o f Papua New Guinea , a s the mo vement of re fugee s i n to Tha i l and and into Bangladesh have for the governments o f

29

those countri e s .

I t therefore seems po s sible tha t I ndonesia wou ld be

the p lai nti ff s ta te on one of two ground s .

The I ndone sian admi ni s tration

mi ght ar gue tha t o f fi c i a l s in Papua New Gui nea should pr event di s s idents from cros s i ng i n to their country so that I ndone sian mi l i ta ry swe ep s aga i n s t s uch group s could be more e f fe c t i ve .

Al terna tive ly i t might

be ar gue d that the o f f i c ia l s of Papua New Guinea should be more d i l i gent in s toppi ng di s s i dents from re-entering I ndone s i a a fter a soj ourn in Papua New Gui nea . Any resea rch programme seek i ng to e s tab l i sh the exi s tence o f func tiona l di sp ut e s , o r the likel ihood o f a ny deve loping , would need to col lect i n forma tion on the numbe r o f c ro s s i ng poi nts ; acro s s each po i n t ; border ;

the tra ffic

the e xte nt o f trans -boundary la ndholdings i n the

the po s s ibi l i ty of any par t o f the border experiencing rapid

economi c deve lopment ;

a nd the regulations governing border a c ti vi ti e s

and the manner i n which they are app l i ed .

The fact tha t Dr Mochtar has

des cribed the pre s ent a greeme n t a s ' very rudimentary ' sugge s ts tha t the re are func tional problems whi ch I ndone s i a seeks to a l leviate .

Resource boundary disputes . No t a l l trans -boundary resourc es wi l l provi de po s s ible caus e s o f re source bo undary di sp u te s .

For examp le , i t i s un l ike ly tha t a

va luabl e , pure s tand of hardwood s whi ch s traddled the boundary would cause any di fficult ie s , provi d i ng the exac t posi tion of the boundary wa s known .

The mi ning of ore bodi e s in the border wi l l only ca l l for

coopera tion and discuss ion when the cons truc tion of sha fts and ga l l eri e s mi ght produce dra ina ge o r flood ing problems for a mi ne o n the o ther s i de of the boundary .

The mo s t common source of resource boundary

di sputes are wa ter bod i e s , such as lake s or river s , which mark or cro s s the boundary .

Two ma in c a s e s can be di s tingui shed .

F irst there

are tho s e s i tua tions where the boundary is drawn through the lake or a long the r i ver

In that case each s tate ha s equa l a c c e s s to the same

s tretch of the river or lake for navi gation , fi shi ng , wa ter supp l i e s and ir rigation .

It i s usua l for treat i e s produc ing such boundari e s to

s tipulate tha t each side ha s equa l r ights to use the river or lake , bu t tha t such use mu s t no t be to the de triment of the other user .

Pla i nly

any coun try wh ich a l lowe d a breakwa ter to be con s truc ted in to a river without consultation wi th its nei ghbour runs the r i sk of foment ing

30

a di spute i f the a ltered f low o f the water begi n s t o erode the nei ghbour ' s bank .

Equa l ly it would be aga i ns t the terms of the gene ra l c lause

de s cribed above if one country a l lowed deve lopmen ts a long a tributary of a boundary ri ver to po l l ute tha t boundary river and perhaps spo i l the f i shing for peop l e on both ba nk s . The second s it ua tion ar i s e s when the r i ver ba s i n i s divi ded by the boundary a nd the s ta te s have suc c e s s i ve use o f the waters .

In such

a s i tua tion the down s tream sta te can adver s e ly a f fec t the up s tream country by bui ldi ng a dam which f loods back in to the nei ghbour ' s terri tory .

S uch f lood ing wi l l reduc e the nei ghbour ' s capac i ty to

use that land . ing

in

The con s truc tion of the Aswan Hi gh Dam resul ted i n flood­

the S udane se border and the Egyptian government agree d to share

the c o s t o f resettl i ng tho se vi l l a ger s who se lands wer e inunda ted . The downs tream country can be adver s e ly a f fe c ted i f the ups tream s ta te bui lds a dam which a l te r s the regime of the r i ver or d i verts large vo l ume s for irriga tion , which reduc e s the f low in the lower sec tions . When Kariba Dam wa s bui l t i t wa s nec e s sary for wha t are now Zambia and Zimbabwe Rhode s i a to guarantee a mi nimum f low a long the Zambe zi i n to Mozambi que .

Many interna t iona l a greements have been reached to

deal wi th the succ e s s ive owner ship of rive r s ;

the I ndus Waters Agreement

shows tha t even countri e s which e xhibit a high leve l of mutua l susp i c ion , s uch a s I ndia a nd Paki s tan , can reach a sa ti s fa c tory sol ution to thi s k i nd o f problem . The other obvious re source whi ch could create prob lems i s a hydrocarbon deposit of na tura l ga s or crude petrol eum .

Such a depo s i t ,

given the right s truc tural condi tions could be tapped from e i ther si de of the boundary . Fo r thi s reason mo s t c urrent seabed boundary agreements requi re consultation be twee n the parti es if a ny hydrocarbon depo s i t i s found to s traddle the boundary .

I n some c a s e s th is con sul tation i s

requi red for a ny depo s i t found wi thi n a set di stance o f the boundary . Once aga i n , it wo uld only be po s s ible to ana l yse the r i sk o f resource bo undary di spute s in the vi c i n i ty o f the I ndone s i a -Papua New Gui nea boundary a f ter deta i l ed f i e ldwork to e s tabl i sh the economi c activiti e s i n the bo rder wh ich might damage bo undary rivers or the use

31

o f a common ore body o r hydroc a rbon fi e ld .

1

I n pursuing thi s fi � ldwork

i t wo uld be neces sary to look beyond the bo rde r in some case s . e xamp l e ,

For

it is po s s ible tha t a p rogramme of e xten s i ve fe ll ing of timber

i n the headwate rs of the S epik River on the I ndone s i an s i de of the boundary could i n c re ase the rate o f run - o f f to a leve l whi ch would have consequences for the lowe r rea che s of the rive r remo te from the border .

Conc lusions . Thi s review o f the four type s o f boundary di spute s sugge sts a numbe r o f conc lusions re garding the I ndon e s i a -Papua New Gui nea borde r . Fi rst , the only po s si bl e , inune di ate te rrito r i a l boundary di spute concern s wa te rs and perhap s the se abed southwe st o f the Bensbach Ri ve r . I ndone s i a ha s a fai r ly strong argument tha t Papua New Guinea should no t be a l lowed to pro fi t at I ndone si a ' s e xpense by ba s i ng the common mar i ti me boundary on Turu Cay , a sma l l , i sol ated i s land be longing to Austra l i a whi ch tha t country only use s to c l a im a zone o f te rri torial wate rs 3 nauti c a l mi le s wide .

Se condly , the re i s unl ik ely t o be any te rri tor i a l di spute

on land unl e s s the re i s a drama t i c wor s e ni ng o f rel ations between the two coun tri e s .

S uch a c la i m wo uld have to be ba sed on the hi s tory and

ethnography of the bo rde r , and both admi n i s trations would be wi se to co l l e ct as much i n formation as i s nec e s s a ry to re fute any cla i ms whi c h mi ght b e made .

Thi rdly , the central cour se o f the Fly Ri ve r , whi ch forms

part of the i nte rnational boundary , repre sent s the only probable cause o f a posi tiona l boundary d i sp ute .

It would only ari se i f that part of

the val l ey was s ub j e c t to more i nt e n si ve e conomi c deve lopment .

Four thly ,

the nature of any functional or re source boundary di spute s wi l l be e stab l i shed only by de tai led f i e l dwork . The present apparent functional di spute is re l ated to the f l i ght o f pol i t i ca l di s s i dents from Indon e s i a t o Papua New Guinea a n d the i r activi t i e s i n the border .

The o n l y probable

re source di spute is likely t o concern tho se rivers whi ch a re shared or divi de d by the two countri e s . 1

In the course o f di scus s ion of Dr Pre s cott ' s paper re ferences we re made to the po s s i bi l i ty of re source boundary d i spute s ari s i ng from Po s s ible poi n ts e xp lo i tation of the Ok Tedi copper - go l d depo s i t . of contention i n c l ude river po l l ution associ a ted wi th the propo sed mi ning opera tion and e f fe c t s down s tream o f sugge s ted breaching o f meande rs o f the Fly Ri ver ( s ee footnote p . 2 4 ) . There i s a l so the po s s ibi l i ty of other ore bodi e s in thi s area extending to both sides o f the borde r . ( Ed . )

32

Given the undeve loped nat ur e o f much o f thi s border i t i s s urpr i s i ng tha t the e xi s ti ng a greement ha s not worked sat i s fac tori ly , i n view o f the

provi sion which i t mak es for j oin t consul ta tion a t

various l eve l s o f governme nt .

Papu a New Gui nea , a s the sma l ler c ountry ,

wo uld be wi se to ensure that a l l o uts tanding que s tions are c l eared up dur ing the pre se nt negotia tio n s , even if thi s i nvo l ve s conce s s ions in a number o f ma tter s .

THE BEG I NN I N G S

' JU S UF

L I NE ' :

OF A MORE

F RU I TF UL P HAS E ?

R e x Mo r t im e r

I ndonesia ' s approach to the problem o f secur i ng and de fus ing i ts border wi th Papua New Guinea underwent a ma j or reapprai sa l in 1 9 7 8 , re sul ting i n the adoption o f more f lexible po l i c i e s towards the I rianese population and more spe c i fica l ly the armed di s sidents o f the OPM .

The

new po l i c i e s have impor tant imp l i c a tions for I ndone sia ' s rela tions wi th Papua New Gui nea , a nd thi s paper wi l l try to unrave l the rationa l e behi nd Jaka rta ' s po l i cy revi s ion , e xamine the likely impa c t on Papua New Guine a , and a s s e s s the longer term p ro spec ts for the suc c e s s of the new approach . From Indone sia ' s point of vi ew , the border si tuation a nd a t tenda nt problems had been deteriora t i ng s teadily for s e vera l years prior to mi d 1 9 78 .

The roo t o f the problem , i n Jaka rta ' s eye s , lay

acro s s the border in Papua New Guinea .

Despi te the Papua New Gui nea

government ' s forma l adhere nc e to the border agreement rea ched wi th 1 I ndone s i a in 1 9 7 3 , bor der contro l s were not working e f fective ly to limi t the ac tivi t i e s o f the OPM gueri l la s , who we re able to c ro s s vi rtua l ly a t wi l l to e vade I ndone s ian operations agai nst them , e s tabl i sh more or l e s s permanent ba se s inside Papua New Gui nea terri tory , and ma intain a courier and in te l l i gence network , a l l o f whi ch toge ther contributed s i gni fica ntly to the ir abi l i ty to hara ss Indone sian patro l s a n d i n s ta l la ti ons .

Beyond the border management i s sue i tse l f , the Papua

New Gui nea gove rnment wa s unable or unwi l l i ng to re spond as Indone sia wi shed to reque s ts for the re turn o f pol i tical refugees seeking sanc tuary ins ide Papua New Guinea borde r s , or for fi rmer re s train ts upon the po l i ti c al activi t i e s o f I rianese re s idents o f Papua New Gui nea . l

The agre ement i s rep roduc ed as appendi x 1 to thi s vo lume .

34

La rge ly a s a re sult o f the se de l i nquenc i e s o n the par t o f Papua New Gui ne a , mi l i tary uni t s of the OPM wer e growi ng bo lder a nd more s uc c e s s ful in the i r attacks upo n I ndone sia n authori ty .

Ear ly in 1 9 7 7 1 F o r se�eral they ambushed an I ndone s i an patro l , k i l l i ng seven soldie r s .

mo n ths of the same year , they provided l eader ship to a ma j or upr i s i ng by tribe smen i n the Baliem Va l ley , which requi red energe t i c mea s ure s for 2 i ts s uppre s sion . Thi s in turn wa s fol lowed by acts of sabo tage a gai n s t the Fre eport

copper mi ne a t Ternbagapura a n d i t s p ipe l i ne to the south 3 coa s t of I rian Jaya . Fina l ly , in May 1 9 78 , an OPM uni t ambushed a nd kidnapped member s of an I ndones ia n negot i a ti ng mi s s ion , k i l l ing two o f them and ult imately forc i ng the author i ti e s to under tak e a humi l i at i ng 4 e xerc i s e in order to ga i n the re lease of the r ema i nder . The se inc i dents no t only indicated a new level o f bo ldne s s on the part o f the OPM but a l so gave the r ebe l s i nternationa l pub l i c i ty on a s c a l e unknown s i nce the ' Ac t o f Free Cho i c e ' in 1 9 6 9 , an opportun ity wh ich the OPM was able to c ap i ta l i ze upon wi th new a nd more e f fe c tive propaga nda out l e ts ba sed i n Por t More sby a nd regular ly provi ding the media wi th i ts news a nd vi ews .

The po s s ibi l i ty could not be di smi s s ed

i n Jakar ta tha t a cont i nua tion of thi s trend in rebel ac tivi ty would cause I ndo nesia o f f i c i a l embarra s sme nt over seas a nd even a ttra c t material suppor t for the rebel c ause from revo lutionary regime s in Asia or A fr i ca .

Comi ng so c lo se ly on top o f the unhappy Ea st Timor a f fair ,

the s e pro spects were di s tinctly unwe lcome to Jakarta . Although I ndone sia regarded Papua New Gui n ea n pol i c i e s a s the key to the border co ntrol probl em - and co nsequenti a l ly to the reduc tion

1 2

Confide n tia l information from I ndone s ia n o f f i c i a l sourc e . Hami sh Mc Dona l d ,

' Looking Back at Irian Upr i s i ng ' , Sydney Morning

Hera ld 7 December 1 9 7 7 . 3 4

Ibid. John Wa ugh ,

' I rian Jaya Rebe l s Ki ll Two o f the ir Ho s tage s ' , Sydney

Morning Hera ld 2 Augu st 1 9 7 7 .

35

o f OPM s trength a nd mobi l i ty - Jakar ta wa s aware o f the d i f f i c ul ti e s fa ced by the Papua New Gui nea gover nme n t a nd henc e o f the need for re str a i n t and patience on it s par t in secur i ng the k i nd of cooperat ion requi re d to improve the s i tuation .

It we l l knew tha t large number s o f

the po l i ti ca l pub l i c i n Papua New Guinea wer e fearful a nd suspici ous o f I ndone s ia , tha t they r e s en ted the for c ible absorption o f I r ia n Jaya , a nd tha t they e spoused a my s tique o f ' Me la ne s i a n uni ty ' which made them 1 highly sympathe tic to the rebe l cause acro s s the border . I t wa s a l so ful ly aware of the fragi le charac ter of the Somare coa l i t io n gove r nments be tween 1 9 7 2 a nd 1 9 7 7 , the formidable problems which tho se gover nme nts faced i n the tra n s it ion to a nd consol idat ion o f i ndep e ndenc e , a nd the ma nn er in wh ich i n ternal c o nf l i c ts te nd ed repea tedly to become embroi led with the I r i a ne s e i s sue . I n thi s context , de spi te c o n s i derable irr itat i o n wi th Papua New Gui nea fai l i ngs , the mo s t impor tan t fac tor for Jakar ta wa s tha t Papua New Gui nean leader s , i n particular Somare a nd the for e ign mi ni s ter Sir Maori Kiki , s trove to pac ify a n ti I ndone s i a n e l ements in cabi n e t a nd co ns ta n tly re i terated their de terminat i o n to preve n t the use o f the border a nd Papua New Gui nea ter r i tory general ly by OPM guer i l la s a nd their I r i a ne s e sympathi zers resident in Papua New Gui nea .

While the se effo r ts

resul ted i n lit tle po s i t ive ac tion , they provided I ndon e s ia wi th lever s to keep pres sur e upon the Papua New Gui nea gover nme nt to live up to i ts promi s e s .

More cruc i a l ly , they e nabl ed Jaka r ta to adhere to a

pol i cy o f suppor ting gover nmen ta l s tabi l i ty in Papua New Gui nea .

I have

no doubt that if the Papua New Gui nea gover nme n t had opted for ope n o r covert hos t i lity toward s I ndone s ia , the lat ter wo uld eve n tua l ly ha ve sought to crea te trouble for it by a comb i na tion of exter na l hara s smen t a nd i nte r nal d i sruption , but th i s would have be e n undertak e n faute de

m�eux .

I ndone s ia ' s be st approach ha s a lways l a i n in consol ida ti ng

gover nme n tal capa c i ty in Papua New Gui nea , s i nce effec tive border ma nag e ­ me n t , a nd deriva tively the pac i f ication o f Ir ia n Jaya , dema nd stable 1

For a more exte n s ive treatme n t of Papua New Gui ne an attitudes toward s I ndone si a a nd the I r ia n e s e , se e Mor timer ( 1 9 7 6 ) .

36

admini s trative and mi l i tary pr e senc e s o n both si des o f the border . I ndonesia ' s commi tment to th i s approach wa s demo n s trated from the out s e t o f Papua New Gui nea ' s independenc e b y the l evel a nd s i ze o f i ts diploma tic representat ion i n Por t More sby , a nd ha s been con f i rmed many time s s inc e then by a s suranc e s to the Papua New Gui nea governme n t and to Aus tra l i a , who s e good - o f f i c e s Jakar ta ha s u sed frequently to sor t out d i f f i cul t i e s wi th Papua New Gui nea and have i ts requirements transmi tted qui e tly but po i n te dly . I ndones i a ' s pat ience bega n to be rewarded wi th the re tur n of the Somare governme nt wi th an enlarged ma j ori ty in July 1 9 7 7 .

Mr Somare ' s

authority a nd s e l f -confidence had a lready been enhanc ed by the suc c e s s ful purge of the ' le f t wing ' e xec utive of the Pangu par ty in 1 9 7 6 , and the so l ution ( for the time be i ng at l ea s t ) of the country ' s mo s t vo la t i l e i s sue - tha t o f regiona l unr e s t - through the i n troduc t ion o f provinc ial governments .

Fo l lowi ng the 1 9 7 7 e lection , he began to a c t far more

dec i s ively a s pr ime mi ni ster , a s s i s ted i n the sphere o f fore i gn rela tions by the able a nd ambit ious Ebia O l ewa le .

( Like mo s t Papua New Gui nea n

po l i ticians , Mr O l ewa l e ha s a pa s t hi s tory o f oppo s i tion to I ndone s i a on the I r ia n i s sue , b u t - a ga i n typ ica l ly - onc e i n o f f i c e he ha s imp l emented governmen t po l i cy energe t i c a l ly . ) As far a s we can j udge wi thout direct a c c e s s to the records , the ini tial breakthrough leading to Jakar ta ' s changed approach to the Irian Jaya problem appea rs to have come dur i ng ta lks held amo ng Papua New Guinean, Aus tra lia n a nd I ndone s i a n o f f i c ia l s in December 1 9 7 7 .

Both

Somare a nd O l ewa le had been convi nced for some time that Papua New Gu inea had to do something to s tem the deter iora ting border si tua tio n , wi th i t s potential for serious di scord with I ndone s ia a nd escalating in ternal confl i c t in Papua New Gui nea i tse l f .

They we re a l so o f the op in ion , 1 a s we re Aus tra l ian o f fic i a l s whom they consulted , tha t the po sition

1

The extent o f Austra lia ' s role i n the border i s sue cannot be ful ly known wi thout a c c e s s to For e i gn Affa irs and diplomatic f i l e s , but many sourc e s ( i nc luding confidential i n formation pa s s ed to me ) i ndica te that it has been co nsiderable . One would l ike to know the consi dera tions behi nd Tom Cr i t c h l ey ' s tra n s fer from Por t More sby to Jakar ta .

37

of the gover nment wa s now s trong enough t o enable i t to a c t upon i ts verba l under tak i ngs to t i ghten up on border cont ro l s and OPM ac tivi ti e s inside Papua New Gui nea .

The ir d i spo s ition to a c t may we l l have been

s timulated by the reve l a tion o f the lack o f governmen ta l coordinat ion and po s s ibly more se rious probl ems - di s c lo s ed by the so -called ' D iro 1 Affa i r ' : The new l evel o f Papua New Gui nea - I ndone s ia n cooperation on the border wa s vivi dly revea led i n June 1 9 7 8 when Papua New Gui nea defence forc e s fo r the f i r s t time under took large sca le opera tions fully coordinated wi th an I ndone sian of fensive aga i n s t the Ir ianese rebe l s . The j oi n t operat ion resul ted i n a s i gni ficant weake ni ng of rebe l capac i ty ; although the guer i l la s narrowly avo ided being trapped be tween the two armi e s , and suffered few di rect casua l tie s ,

thei r force s were d i sper s ed

and vi tal s upp l i e s captured or des troyed , thei r sanctuari es i n Papua New Gui nea we re overrun a nd rendered uns a fe for the future , and a number o f fri e ndly vi l lage s in I r i a n Jaya were s avage ly puni shed .

Jus t a s

important a s the opera tion i ts e l f wa s the dennn stra tion i t provided that Papua New Gui nea ' s new hard l i ne aga i ns t the OPM wa s po l i ti c a l ly viable . Desp i te prote s ts i nside a nd out side

par l i amen t , the Somare government

wa s able to carry through i ts po l icy wi th no more conc e s s ion to i ts cri ti c s than an e xpre s s ion of concern at I ndone si an violations o f Papua 2 New Gui nea terri tory dur i ng the mi l i tary opera tions . I n the l i ght of this e xper i e nc e , the Papua New Gui nea government

1

2

Brigadi er-Genera l Di ro , commander - i n-c hief o f the Papua New Gui nea De fenc e Force s , had ta lks wi th OPM leader S eth Rumkorem in the la tter part of 1 9 7 7 , apparently wi th the knowledge of the mi n i s ter of defence but not that of Mr Somare or the ma j or i ty o f cabi ne t . Genera l Diro ' s carpeting over the a f fa i r , and h i s vi gorous ripo s te ( backed up by Papua New Guinea and Aus tra l i a n of ficer s under hi s command ) created a mi nor cr i s i s in Por t More sby at the time , revea li ng deep divi s ions i n cabinet and the top leve l s o f the a dmi n i s tra tion . See i s sues of the Post-Courier October 1 9 7 7 . For an account of the operations a nd their re sult s , see Far Eas tern

Economic Review 4 August 1 9 7 8 .

38

wa s abl e t o enforce more po s i tive sanc t ions aga i nst rebe l a c t i vi ty i ns ide Papua New Gui nea . Re fuge e s were now scruti ni z ed more r i gorously a nd ac ti ve opponen ts of I ndone s i a among border cro s s ers were re turned to I ndo ne s i an c u s tody .

I n September c ame the mos t drama ti c event o f a l l -

the arrest o f OPM l eader Jacob Prai a nd two a s so ci a t es at Vanimo , j u s t acro s s the. border from Jayapura . De sp i te a renewed wave o f prote s ts , the Papua New Gui nea gove rnment aga i n s tood f i rm and held Pra i in gaol for 1 nearly s i x mon ths unti l he wa s granted a sylum i n Sweden . I n the same period , the permi ss ive a tti tude t owards I r ia ne s e po l i ti c a l agi ta tion aga i ns t I ndone s i a i n Papua New Gui nea wa s rep laced by close s urve i l lance and s tern i n j unc tions to the o f fenders .

The e xtent o f Papua New Gui nea ' s

new e f fec tivene s s a ga i n s t the OPM - and hence i ts u s e fulne s s to I ndone s i a could be mea s ured by the s tate o f mi nd among OPM suppo rters i n Por t More sby by the end of 1 9 7 8 .

Defea ti s t and rent by feuding fa c ti on s ,

the i r animus a ga i n s t the Papua New Guinea gover nmen t wa s so i ntense that 2 there wa s wi ld ta lk among them o f terror i s t a t tacks upon the ir ho s ts . By year ' s end , the n ,

the Papua New Gui nea governme nt had given

I ndone s i a s ubs tanti a l evidenc e bo th o f the s incer i ty o f i ts de s ire to coopera te

in sani t i z i ng the border and o f i ts capac i ty to do so �

It

i s i n thi s l i gh t tha t Jakar ta ' s new l i ne i n I r i a n Jaya mus t b e appra i sed . The fir s t i ndica tion o f the change wa s co nta i ned in spe eches del i vered by the I ndone s i a n defence mini s ter , General Jusuf , on suc c e s si ve days in November 1 9 7 8 , the f i r s t one in Jayapura and the second in South Sulawe s i .

Jusuf announced that I ndone s i a would de s i s t from i t s direc t

a s saults upon I r ia ne s e culture and a l low the peop l e to adj us t more s l owly to the norms o f I ndone sian c i vi l i zatio n .

At the same time , he

s tated that in futur e the OPM rebe l s would be treated as the mi nor nui sance they co n s ti tute d in fac t . ma j or operations aga i n s t the rebe l s ;

I ndone sia would no longer engage i n ins tead , i t would con f i ne i ts

mi l i tary a c t ivi ti e s to routine border patro l l i ng and secur i ty duti e s , leavi ng the gueri lla s e i ther to ro t in the j ungl e or a ccept in thei r own good time the generous c l emency terms Indone s i a wa s prepa red to o f f er 3 them .

1

For a br i e f summary of the Prai a f fa i r , see Far Eas tern Economic

Review 2 3 March 1 9 7 9 . 2 3

My own sourc e s .

Far Eas tern Economic Review 2 4 November 1 9 7 8 .

39

Pre s s comment on the Jusuf i ni t i a tive ha s tended to conc en tra te upon the defenc e mi ni s ter ' s ' new broom ' a nd per so na l qua l i ti e s .

Wi tho ut

de roga ting from Jusuf ' s a c c omp l i shments , however , i t is c l ear from the background we ha ve surveyed that Jakar ta ' s po licy revi sion is the c ulmi na tion o f tho s e events , and represents no t merely modi f i ca tions i n the trea tment o f Irianese but a ' pay-o f f ' to Papua New Gui nea for i ts cooperat ivene s s of the pa s t year .

I f a l l goe s we l l under the new

di spe nsation , Papua New Gui nea should not be c a l led upon to undertake fur ther ma j or mi l i tary opera tions embarra s s i ngly a sso cia ted wi th I ndo ne sian o f fensive s ;

there should be l e s s border cro s s i ng by OPM ef fec tive s , a nd

l e s s nec e s s i ty for the la tter to s e t up ba s e s on Papua New Gui nea so i l . Papua New Gui nea ' s re sponsibi l i ti e s wi l l be more routine i n charac ter , concentrated upon border p a tro l l i ng and the check i ng o f I r ianese a c tivi ti e s i nside Papua New Guinea .

I n tur n , a lower Papua New Gui nea

pro fi l e on the Irianese i s sue should modera te dome s ti c oppo s i tion in thi s area . I ndone sia ' s ga ins wi l l be no l e s s sub s tanti a l i f the pol i c y works .

Havi ng abandoned i t s a ttempts to achi eve to ta l contro l in Ir ian

Jaya , mo de rated i ts a s saults on Irianese l i feways , and se ttled for a rea l i s ti c a s s e s sme nt o f i ts na tiona l i nter e s t a nd OPM ma rgina l i ty , i t wi l l suffer fewer manpower l o s s e s , save a good dea l o f unne c e s sary expense , and s ti l l in terna tiona l di squi et abo ut i ts rul e in Irian . For both parties , the new policy opens up the prospec t o f expanded re lations upon a more cons truc tive ba s i s a nd wi th l e s s r e s i s tance from cri ti c s and sceptic s i n bo th camp s .

Already last December , fore ign

mi ns ter Kusumaa tmad j a ' s vi s i t to Por t More sby , where he confirmed Jusuf ' s i nterpre tat ion o f the new l i ne i n I rian Jaya , appears to have gone o f f 1 we l l . In Ja nuary thi s year , di scussions began on a new border agreement to rep lace the e xpiring one o f 1 9 7 3 , a nd pre l iminary repor ts sugge s t tha t on thi s oc c a s ion po s i tive programme s fur deve lopme nt a long the border 2 are be i ng di s cussed .

1

Far Eastern Economic Review

2

Ibid.

2 3 March 1 9 7 9 .

40

I t s ti l l r ema ins to be seen whether the new l i ne wi l l s tick , however .

I n the long term , I ndone s ia can probably count upon i nduced

demographi c cha nge s � n I r i a n Jaya to consol idate i ts po s i tion in the provi nc e .

On pre sent trends , i nuni gration i nto the provi nc e from o ther

par ts o f I ndone sia wi l l wi th i n a decade overwhe lm the i ndi genous i nhabi tants in the co�s ta l areas a nd provi de the c entra l author i t i e s wi th a power ful 1 loya l i s t communi ty to r e ly upon for the ma i nt enance of contro l . The hi nterland wi l l rema i n a source of i n s tabi l i ty , but wi th I ndone s ia able to bui l d up a local (mi xed imrni gra n t and I riane se ) c iv i l ia n a nd mi l i tary peacekeep i ng forc e a nd wi th improved logi s ti c s , troub l e there can probably be conta i ned if not e limi nated .

( I rian Jaya ' s h i ghlands are

not a s cruc i a l for I ndo ne s i a a s tho s e ea s t o f the bo rder are for Papua New Gui nea . ) I n the med ium te rm , however , trouble for the new di spensation could c ome from e i ther s i de of the border .

In I r i a n , the rebe l s are

down but not out , and i f they can overcome thei r po l i ti c a l di sabi l i ti e s a lways , i n my opi nion , the i r mo s t s erious weakne s s - they could onc e more capi ta l i ze upon I rianese d is enchantment wi th I ndone s i an economi c , c ultural and demographic mode s o f domi na tion .

One parado x of the k i nd

of pol i cy now adopted by I ndon e s i a i s that the more i t succ eed s in the s hort run , the more i t tends to bree d laxi ty and comp lacency among tho se on both s ides of the border who are responsible for the rout i ne patro l l i ng and secur i ty whi ch the poli cy a s s ume s to be a cons ta nt ac companime nt of i t .

Another problem is tha t hi gh level po l i c i e s are

o ften admi n i stered wi th con s i derabl e unevenne s s by subo rdi nate s , and a s a r e s ul t hi gher exp e c ta tions are sha ttered by arbi trarine s s - a frequent rec ipe for revo l t .

In othe r words , an OPM revi ta li zed by I r ianese

di scontent a nd a uni fi ed na tiona l l ibera tion front i deo logy could rebui ld i t s sha ttered ba se s , communications and i nte l l i genc e i n an a tmo sphere re ndered more co nduc ive by the very approach de s i gned to remove i t s s ting . I f tha t happened - and i t i s a real ri sk i nvo lved i n tre new l i ne -

then

the pre Jus u f si tua tion would be res tored , only wi th conc e i vably greater

1

See Garnaut and Manning ( 1 9 74 ) .

41

OPM gueri l la potenti a l , a nd Papua New Guine a - I ndo ne s i a n r e lations wo uld onc e more c ome under s tra i n . The other poi n t o f vul nerabi l i ty for the new po l i cy l i e s i n the . que s tion mark s that hang over Papua New Gui nea ' s future s tabi l i ty .

At

the rnom�n t , sys tema t i c breakdown there doe s not appear to be a serious cause for concern but gradua l ly r i s i ng graphs o f anomi c di sorder in Port More sby and , more c ruc i a l ly , the H i ghlands , do cons ti tute danger s i gna l s . What make s the H ighlands a par t i c ularly sensi tive spo t i s a combina tion o f geography and economi c s :

i f the Hi ghla nds decide they do no t want

to be ruled , then they cannot be rul e d , a nd i f they cannot be ruled the count ry fa c e s an a c ute economi c cr i s i s from the lo s s of vital export i ncome .

I n s uch a c i rcumstanc e , Papua New Guinea ' s reso urc e s would be

so l e ly concentra ted upon s urviva l , and gre a t swa the s of the coun try not j us t the border - would be wide open to dis sident activi t i e s o f diverse kinds , o f whicn the I rianese vari ety would doubtl e s s be we ll repre sente d . Needl e s s to say , a combination o f both sources o f de s tabi l i zation wo uld repre sent the ' wor s t case ' tha t the new I ndone s i a n pol i cy mi ght confront .

I ndonesia ha s obviously wei ghed

the f i r s t po s s i b i l i ty in the

balance be fore adopt ing i ts new approac h , howeve r , a nd the hi s tory o f the OPM to dat e s ugge s ts that i t ha s more than an even chance o f working . That be ing so , and the p e s s imi s ti c s c e na ri o for Papua New Guinea be i ng more remote and in any case l e s s amenabl e to po l i cy deter�i nation , Jakarta may we l l f e e l reasonably con f i de n t tha t i t has embarked on a frui tful new pha s e both in Irianese a ffa i rs and in i ts re la tions wi th Papua New Gui nea .

DOES

I NDONE S IA HAVE

DE S I GNS

E XPAN S I ON I S T

O N PAPUA NEW GU I NEA ?

J .A . C .

Ma c k i e

Thi s paper had i t s origins i n a talk I gave a t the Uni ver s i ty o f Papua New Gui nea shor tly a fter the S ept ember 1 9 7 8 Wa i gani semi nar , i n wh ich I at tempted to an swer some o f the comments I had encountered there to the e f fect that I ndone s i a ' s for e i gn pol i c i e s were inherently e xpansi oni s t and tha t her s tra i ned relat ions wi th Papua New Gui nea over the va rious border inc idents of 1 9 78 we re a s i gn tha t she a spired to domi nat e a nd perhap s ultimate ly to annex Papua New Gui nea . Comments o f thi s k i nd were u sua l ly ba s e d on three types o f argument .

According t o o n e o f the s e , the pre s s ure the I ndone sian

government wa s then putting on Papua New Guinea to cooperate mi l i tarily wi th her i n tryi ng to seal the border aga i n s t the I r i a ne se d i s s i dents s e eking re fuge on the e a stern s ide o f the border wa s to be seen as mer e ly the first i n a serie s o f deman ds whi ch , unl e s s re si s te d from the outset , would culmi nate eventua l ly in the comp l ete subj ugation o f Papua New Gui nea .

My own feeling wa s - and sti ll i s - tha t

I ndonesia ' s obj e ctive s here we re and are merely limi ted ones to do with her border problems ;

there wa s no rea son to bel i eve she ha d

limi tl e s s and si ni s ter de s i gns for the ul t imate annexation o f Papua New Gui nea as a whole .

I coul d wel l und er s tand that many peop le in

Papua New Guinea who felt strongly that the Me l a ne sian inhabita nts o f I ri an Jaya we re their blood brother s we re unsympathet i c even towards I ndo nesi a ' s l imi ted goa l s of c l o s i ng the bo rde r agai nst OPM e lements who were tak ing advantage o f the oppo rtuni t i e s for easy sanc tuary it provided ;

but tha t in i ts e l f wa s not an adequa t e reason

for i n fe rring that I ndone s i a had expansioni st ambi tions .

To meet

thi s obj ection , c ri ti c s of Indone s i a ' s po l i c i e s c i te d one form o r other o f the a r gument that her e xpans ioni st appet i te s had a l ready bee n amply demons trated by the Timor epi sode , by the ' confrontat ion ' o f Ma laysia in 1 9 6 3 - 6 6

( re ferred to herea f t e r s i mp l y a s

konfrontasi )

43

and by the earlier campaign to gain control o f I rian Jaya over the year s 1 9 5 0 -6 2 . I t i s th i s second argument - about the conc lusions to be drawn from the hi s tori cal record regardi ng the suppo sedly ' e xpan sioni s t ' chara �ter o f her foreign po l i ci e s - whi ch con s ti tutes the central theme of thi s paper .

If one look s only a t thi s sequence of event s ,

three epi sode s invo l ving the use o f force around I ndone si a ' s border s , apparent ly directed towards the acqui s i t i on o f terri tory , i t i s very easy to draw the conc lusion that thi s i s evi dence of terr itorial expansioni sm .

Yet when we e xami ne the motivat ions and po l it ical

dynami c s be hind each o f the se epi sodes we find that crude territor ia l expans i oni sm , a s defi ned be low , ha s playe d li ttle or n o p a rt i n bri ngi ng them about .

A t thi s poi n t , howe ver , we mus t de fine ' e xpan sioni sm '

a little more preci se ly .

I am i nterpret i ng it to mean a de s i re to

annex addi tional terri to ry e i ther i

for the sake o f more lebensraum ( l ivi ng space ) or re source s ( oi l , copper , t imber , et c . ) ;

ii

for the sake o f demonstrating the nat ional power s o a s

iii

to intimidate ne i ghbour s i . be ca use o f an ideology of nationa l greatne s s , power and vi gour , a s i n the case o f Mus solini and Hitl er ;

iv

for irredenti s t reasons

( to re cover part s o f the national

terri tory which have been lo st in pa st wa rs ) , or v

be cause o f a be l i e f that the na tion has a hi storic mi s s ion to reestabl i sh it s anci ent or mythical bounda ri e s , a s in the ca se of Ru s s ia ' s pan S l avic t e ndenc i e s in

the

late

19th Cent ury None of the se obj ec tive s ha s played any s i gn i fi cant part in mo tivat ing I ndone sia ' s fore i gn po l i c i e s s i nce i ndep endence , in my op inio n , wi th the pos sible e xcept ion o f the l a s t two ( and I would even query that ) . I wi l l later give some attention bri e fly to th i s la st hypothe s i s , however , for s eve ra l arti c le s have be en wri tten , wi th ti tles like ' The Po ten tial for I ndone sian Expansioni sm '

( Gordon 196 3 - 64 ) to explain

her fo re ign po li cy obj e c tive s in the konfrontasi epi sode and the se have gai ned wi der c i rculation t han they de serve .

They we re ba sed

44

on the Indonesia Raya , or ' Greater I ndone s i a ' , theory tha t the count ry ' s leaders have constan tly nurtured i rredentist a sp i rations to re draw the i r nat i ona l bounda ri es in a ccordance wi th the h i s tor i c bounda ri e s o f anc i e nt Srivi j aya and Maj apahit .

I n my s tudy o f the

c ause s of konfrontasi , however , I found thi s theory utte r ly erroneous 1 and i rrel evant . It seems to me equa l ly i rrelevant a s an e xp lana tion o f the i nva s ion o f Time r , a lthough the Timer a f fa i r revived many o f the o l d fears that I ndone s i a ha s a n omi nous appeti te for addi tiona l territo ry .

And i t i s even le s s r e l evan t , I thi nk , to In done sian

a ttitude s to Papua New Guinea , for rea sons I wi l l outline at the end o f the pape r . A third type o f argument , whi ch one mos t frequently encounter s among radi c a l c ri ti c s _ o f t h e I ndone sian governmen t , i s o n e I wi l l c a l l the ' ana logy wi th fa s c i sm ' argument - tha t i s , the propo s i tion that e xpans i oni sm tends to be an i nherent s tructura l fea ture of mi l itary or authori tarian or avowedly fa sc i s t regime s .

Henc e , s i nc e

I ndone s i a undeniably ha s a h ighly authori tari an , army-ba sed governmen t , there i s a prima fac i e pre sumption that her forei gn po l i c i e s are expansioni st and a ggre s s i ve i n much the same way as we re Mus so l i ni ' s or Hi tler ' s or tho se o f pre -war Japan , ei ther because o f a mi l i ta r i s t i c a nd imperi a l i s t i deology o r for more comp l e x soc i o -po l i ti c a l reasons . Thi s k i nd of ana logy i s absurdly fa r- fetche d , however .

The Suhar to

regime may be a uthori tarian and i n some respe c t s even repre s s i ve , but to c a l l it ' fa s c i s t ' i n any but a pe j orative sense is a sheer mi suse of the term .

Yet th i s k i nd of hypothe s i s ha s some a f f i n i t i e s wi th

what mi ght be categori z e d a s

' di versioni s t ' or ' i nstabi l i ty ' theo r i e s

o f the dynami c s o f I ndone sian fore i gn po l i c i e s , which a l so achi eved qui te wi de currency at the t ime of the konfrontasi ep i sode and cannot be e ntire ly di smi s se d out of hand . Closely ak i n to thi s approach i s one o f the more plausible ( but in my opi nion mi sl ead ing ) recent expl anat ions o f the Suharto

1

For a ful ler di scus sion o f the Indonesia Raya theory and the Ma laysian propaga nda use o f i t , see Ma ck i e ( 1 9 7 4 : 2 1-4 , 3 2 6 - 7 and the re ferenc e s cited there i n ) .

45

governmen t's forei gn pol i c ies , p u t forward i n 1 9 76 b y Rex Morti�er ( Mo rtimer 1 9 7 6 ) whi ch could almost be c a l led a 'neuros i s theory' o f I ndones ian later .

national sel f a s serti veness , to whi ch a l so I wi l l return

But before we go any further , i t wi l l be help ful to look more

c lo sely at the parti c ul ar c a ses whi ch are commonly hel d to be evidence of Indonesi a ' s 'expansioni s t' appeti tes .

From these I think i t

wi l l become c lear that the search for exp lanatory hypotheses i s a good dea l mo re c omp lex than i s implied by the word ' expansioni sm ' i n any me an i ngful sense .

The Irian Jaya Claim The basi s o f the original I ndonesi an c l aim to I rian Jaya i s so 1 wel l known tha t i t i s hardly neces sary to go i n to i t at any l ength . I ndones i a maintained that a s the successor s tate to the former Netherl ands East I n dies her nationa l terri tory should embrace the who le o f what had formerly been the Nether lands E a st I ndies , inc ludi ng I ri an Jaya whi ch had p revious ly been con s i dered an integral part o f the former co lony ( a lbei t one o f the mo s t neglec ted and l i ttle­ developed parts ) .

The Dutch i n s i stence on retaining po s session o f

wha t they c a l led 'Dutch New Guinea ' a t the time o f the 1 9 4 9 Round Table Con ference negoti ations l eading to I ndonesian independence , for reasons of Dutch domestic po l i ti c s and wounded amour propre , c reated a dead lock whi ch wa s broken only by the unsa ti s fac tory compromi se dec i sion

to postpone further negotiations on the i s s ue unt i l 1 9 5 0 .

I n the course o f tho se negotiations nei ther s ide would budge - and a s the status quo favoured the Dutch , they c l ung o n grimly t o thei r colony unti l mounting I ndone s i an p re s s ure s , mi li tary as wel l a s diplomati c and economi c , coup led wi th dec lining i n ternati ona l support for the Dutch , fina l ly compelled them to s urrender their ho ld on the colony i n 1 96 2 .

1

The bes t account o f the early s tages o f the I ri an Jaya c ampai gn i s Bone ( 19 5 8 ) ; for the final stage s , see Mackie ( 19 7 4 : 98 - 10 3 ) .

46

The rat iona l e beh ind I ndone s i a ' s case wa s per fec tly s tra i ght forwa rd :

her c l a im to I r i an Jaya der i ved from the c entra l

princ ipl e s of nat i ona li sm a nd a n ti coloni a l i sm upon whi ch her revo l ut ion a ga i nst the Dut ch had been fought .

To abandon the c l a im

would have been to deny tho se p r i nc ipl e s at a time when the very uni ty o f the frag i l e new s tate depe nded o n ma i nta i n i ng the pri nc ip l e o f nat ional i sm a s paramount i n t h e fac e o f potenti a l ly s e c e s sioni s t regiona l d i s s ident moveme nt s .

I ndone sians be l i eved that in pursuing

the ir c l a im to I rian Jaya they were me re ly try i ng to ga i n co n trol over terri tory that shou ld have been re cogn i z ed as rightfully thei r s from the out set .

The Dut ch we re thought to be holdi ng on to We s t

New Gui nea for n o bet ter re a so n than to use i t a s a ba s e from whi ch they could subve rt and fra gme n t the new Republi c o f I ndone s ia , e spec i a l ly by s tirring up t rouble i n the Moluccas and other eastern i s lands of the archipelago �

I t i s worth not i ng , i n cidenta l l y , that

it wa s not unti l five or six years a f ter 1949 that the Dutch began to ta lk seriously about ' s e l f-determi nation ' for Wes t New Gui nea and not unti l 1 9 5 9 - 6 0 that they embarked upo n the i r ' c ra sh programme ' to c reate a New Guinea e l i te rapidly i n the hope o f frus trat i ng the I ndone s ians by rush ing We s t New Gui nea to i ndependence .

The

Dutch put great empha s i s on the rac i a l di f ferences between I ndone s i ans and the Me lane sian i nhabi tants o f We s t New Gui nea , but I ndone s ians regarded thi s as i rrel evant , s i nc e they themselve s were ethnically heteroge neous and they did not regard rac i a l a f fini t i e s a s the determi ni ng cri teria of t he ir nat ionhood . I ndone s ians o f a l l po l i t i c a l per s ua s ions were uni ted in suppor t o f the c la im to I rian Jaya .

( The stronge s t i n i ti a l proponents o f

the c l a im we re , i n fac t , the mos t pro Dutch a nd conservative gro up o f l eaders at the Round Table Conference negot i a tions , the Federa l i s t s , not the Republicans . )

No one ever pub l i c ly deni e d the ri ghtne s s o f

thi s c l a im , a s f a r a s I know , a l though there were ma j or d i f f erenc e s between the parti e s about the mos t e ffective tactics for pursui ng the c l a im .

As time passed the more radical par ti es became i ncr e a s i ngly

mi l i tant i n the promi nence they gave to thi s i s s ue and the l engths they were wi l l i ng to go to pre s s i t , whereas the more anti communi s t ,

47

pro We s tern par t ie s and opi nion leader s c lung to the be l i e f tha t mo dera tion a nd persua s ion wou ld i nduce the Dutch to make conce s sions . Th i s did no t happen , however , and the la tter group were outmanoeuvered by the radi c a l s i n 1 9 5 7 when , a f ter seve ra l e f forts to wi n suppo rt i n the UN had fai led , the radi c a l s sei zed the i ntiative , at Pre s i dent Sukarno ' s i n s t i gation , and ' took over ' all Dutch p l antat ions , bus i ne s s enterpri s e s and bank s i n I ndone s i a and nat iona l i z e d them soon a f ter . But the Dutch mere ly dug the i r toe s i n harder a nd i t took the threat o f mi l i tary i nvasion o f I rian Jaya i n 1 9 6 1 - 6 2 to force them ( largely at the i n s ti gat i on o f the US gove rnment ) to abandon the s trugg le and negotiate a compromi se s et tl emen t . It would be i nappropriate to say that ' expan s ioni sm ' was a fac tor i n the I ndone s i a n campa i gn for We s t I r i a n , in my vi ew , ei the r i n re spe c t o f the arguments u s e d or o f t h e ba s i c po l i ti ca l dynami c s which impel led I ndone s i a i nto what wa s b y 196 2 a n undeni ably a ggre s s i ve , confrontative po l i ti ca l s tra te gy for put ti ng pres sure on the Dutch . The s tyle o f the campaign i n i ts fina l s tages wa s certai nly hi gh ly emoti ona l , the po l i tic a l atmo sphere almo s t feveri sh;

the i ssue lent

i tse l f to a form of mobi li z a tion pol i t i c s whi ch Pre si dent Sukarno and the I ndone sian Communi s t Party explo i ted very e f fe c tively fo r the ir own dome s ti c advantage , whe reas the Army leaders found thems el ve s ba dly outmanoeuvered .

That l e s son wa s not lo s t on the Army leaders ,

however , fo r when the confl i c t wi th Ma lay s i a loomed up a year or so later they took good care not to lose the po l i ti cal i n i tiat ive on an i s sue wi th s trong nationa l i s t appeal and so they pl ayed an important part i n get ti ng the camp a ign of konfrontasi agai n s t Ma laysia s ta rted . But by tha t time the pol i ti c a l tensions a nd i n s tabi l i ty o f the late Sukarno era were s tart i ng to e xert a qui te unique i n f l uence on both the fore i gn po l i c i e s a nd the dome s ti c pol i t i c s of I ndo ne s i a .

Konfrontasi I ndone s i a ' s ' con frontation ' of Malaysia in the yea rs 1 9 6 3 -66 provi des the s tronge s t ammuni tion for a dvoc a te s o f the expansioni s t theory , but an e xp lanation given i n the se terms alone i s serious ly

48

mi s l eadi ng , i n my opi nion , a nd the real dynami c s o f the campaign have 1 to be sough t e l sewhere . I ndon e s i a never a s serted any c laim to the terr i tory of the northern Borneo s tates who se i ncorporation i n to the Ma lay s i a federat i on she wa s prot e st i ng ;

her argume n t was tha t the

pro j e c t wa s a neocoloni a l i s t s trategem , ma s ter -mi nded by the Br i t i sh to enable them to ma i ntai n the i r i nt er e s ts there , and tha t the peop l e o f Borneo and S i n gapore were b e i ng s teamro l lered agai n s t thei r wi l l i nto the wider Ma l aysian federation . There wa s a good dea l o f evi dence i n favour o f tha t propo s i tion , a l though I bel i eve tha t overa l l the pro Ma l ay s i a c a se· wa s much s tronge r on nearly a l l ac counts .

The whol e

epi sode wa s a c urious , ha l f-hear ted a ffair , a mix ture o f threats , propaganda , low l eve l borde r ra i ds and reconna i sanc e i ncur s ions into Sarawak and Ma laya , at tempts to ferment dome s ti c oppo s i ti on to the Mal ay s ia n government , coupled with diploma t i c a nd economic pres sure s which se emed to have a vari ety o f ob j ec tive s and mo t i vat ions , few o f them at a l l c l ear t o ou t sid e observe r s .

Konfrontasi wa s very much a per sonal campa ign of Pre si dent Sukarno ' s , a l though both the Armed Forces l eader s and the PKI suppor ted it enthu s i a s ti c a l ly in the early s tages

( though much l e s s who lehear tedly

later o n, when the co s ts and r i sk s we re greater ) .

And it undoubte dly

served a va ri e ty of purpo ses which Sukarno found conveni ent - for e xamp l e , ma inta i ni ng an a tmo sphere of cri s i s and e xterna l threat , so tha t ca l l s for nat ional uni ty and so l i dar i ty wi th the leadership were more ea s i ly j u s ti fi ed ;

simp l i fy ing the j ob of bal anc i ng l e ft and

r ight wi ng forc e s in the government and i n the country ;

enabli n g him

at time s to divert a ttenti on from pre s s i ng dome s ti c i s s ue s by stre s s i ng the primacy o f the confl i c t wi th neoco lo ni a l i s t enemi e s at home and abroad ;

provid ing apparent j us ti fication for hi s ideo logi ca l doctrines

o f i nevi table con f l i c t be tween the ' New Emerging Force s ' and the old e s tabli shed forces of neoco loni a l i sm and imperia l i sm .

Ther e i s

something to be said for explana t i ons o f the c ampaign i n terms o f i t s

1

I have summari zed the strengths and weakne s se s o f the var ious i nterpr eta ti ons of thi s epi so de i n Mackie ( 1 9 74 : 1- 1 1 , 3 2 6 - 3 3 et

passim) .

49

' diversi onary ' va lue , a t a time when the nati ona l economy wa s i n dec l i ne and po l i t ic a l tensions mounti ng , but they too t end to be gro s s ly ove r - s i mpl i f ie d , a ltho ugh in a mo re r e f i ned form there i s 1 somethi ng in them .

_ Konfrontasi wa s , i n a very real sense , an e xtension i nto the fore i gn a f fai r s sphere o f the b a sic i n s tabi l i ty o f Indonesian dome s ti c pol i t i c s at that time .

Yet o n several o c c a s i ons when he ha d to

make d i f fi c ult cho i c e s in domestic po l i ti c s , Sukarno did make them and on severa l oc c a s ions he sca led down the i n te ns i ty of confronta tion when c i rcumstanc e s made i t pr ude nt for him to do so . theory cannot be c a rried too far . e xplana ti on o f the who le a f fai r , ideo logical factor .

So the diver s ionary

A more fundamenta l el ement in the in my view , i s the rel evance o f the

The struggle a ga i n s t Ma laysia se rved ,

in e ffect ,

to va l i date the doc tri ne o f the New Emerg i ng Forc es and at the same time that doctrine created the imperat ive to engage in the struggle , for othe rwi s e the ideology would · 'have been ho llow and me aningl e s s . All Sukarno ' s speeches on the i s sue s tre s sed the ideo logi c a l factor , never the Indone sian Raya theme or the appea l to hi s toric greatne s s I n sho r t , the whol e epi sode wa s very much an out growth of the rather unique pol i t i c a l and ideological c l imat e preva i l i ng in I ndone s i a in the early 1 96 0 s .

The only sense in which i t could be

categor i zed a s ' expa nsioni s t ' wa s i n terms o f the s tyle and methods adopt ed , not the obj ec tive s or mot i vat ions - for examp le the genera l ly a s se rtive , some time s truc ulent c la ims made by Sukarno for the univer s a l i ty o f hi s doc trine o f the New Emerging Forc e s a s applying to a l l Thi rd World countr i e s .

I t must a l so be admi tt ed that i f I ndone sia had

succe eded at tha t po int in the decoloni zat ion proce s s in ove rthrowi ng the Malaysian federation , she would undoub te dly have be en cock o f the roo s t in Southea st Asia .

Sukarno certa i nly a spired to a leader ship

role , not only in that region but in the Third Wo rld genera l ly ( though wi thout much suc c e s s ,

1

in the f i na l ana lys i s ) .

But the

The bes t e xpo s i tion of the ' d iver s ion ' theory i s given by Dona ld Hi ndl ey ( 1 9 6 4 ) .

50

e xp lanat ion for thi s impulse i s be tter seen i n terms o f what Kahi n ( 1 9 6 4 : 2 6 0 - 1 ) has c a l le d ' the powe r fu l , s e l f-ri ghteous thrust o f I n do ne s i an nationa l i sm ' , derived from the sense o f pride i n thei r revo l ut ionary struggl e for i ndependence , tha n a s ' Greater I ndone si a ' doct ri ne s or an i deology o f terri tor i a l e xpansion remi n i scent o f Mus solini ' s or Hi tler '· s demands for more l and .

East Timar Even l e s s ,

in my opi nion , can the c ampai gn to i nco rporate Ea st

Timer be categori zed or e xp l a i ned a s simp ly a mani fe station of expans ioni st I ndone s i an mot ivations i n that unhappy a f fa i r are murky

appet i te s .

and comp le x , not at a l l as easy to i denti fy wi th pre c i sion - or to de fend on legal and moral grounds - a s in the previous c a s e s e xamined . But it i s no t di f f i cult to d i s c e rn the ma j or fac tors imp e l l i ng the Suharto gove rnme nt to be come i nvo l ve d in the way i t did .

Certa inly

the re coul d be no c l aim here , as the re wa s i n the case of I ri a n Jaya , on the gro und tha t th i s te rri tory had been part o f the former Nethe r land s E as t I n di e s .

No r wa s i t po s s ible a fter Apr i l 1 9 7 4 , a s i t mi ght have

been prior to the over throw o f the S a l a za r-Cae tano regime i n Portuga l , to make a case on the grounds o f l iberat ing Ea st Timer from c oloni a l rule o f a s i ngu larly mi serabl e , debi l i ta t ing character .

The I ndone s i an

case wa s , i n s tead , argued mai n ly on the ground that the peop l e o f Ea st Timer wanted incorporation into I ndone s i a , tha t the Timor e s e pa rty favouring i ncorporat ion , Apodeti , had substanti a l popu lar support , but was s eve re ly handi capped by the s trong a n ti I ndone s ian propaganda c ampaign e a r l i e r ma i ntai ned by the Portugue se colonial authori t i e s and later by Freti l i n .

I t seems hi ghly dubious that Apodeti re a l ly did

have very wide sp read popular support i n i t i a l ly , but tha t is hardly s urpri s i ng in vi ew of the sus tai ned a n ti - I ndon e s i an propaganda to whi ch the population had been sub j ec ted ( and the i nabi l i ty to put a contra ry case i n the appropriate la nguages , Por tugue se or Teturn or regional d i a l e c ts , s i nce Bahasa I ndone s i a wa s l i ttle under s tood i n the co lony ) .

During the s i x months be fo re I ndone s i a n mi l i tary i ntervention

i n Timer at the e nd of 1 9 7 5 , the In done s i ans tri e d to engi ne er a pol i ti c a l formula on the ba si s o f consultations

( musjawarah ) between

the Po rtugue s e authori ti e s and the t hree ma j o r Timore se pa rti e s , whi ch

51

wo uld have resulted , they hoped - wi th the a i d o f a li ttle ' gentle pre s s ure ' - i n a de c i s ion to seek i ncorporation in I ndone s i a .

But the

o utbre ak o f fighting betwe e n the UDT and Fre t i l i n fac tions i n July wre cked any hope s of thi s and soon re sulted in the mi li tary vi ctory o f the Fret i l i n fo rce s , whi ch we re b y tha t time the factio n mo st s trongly commi tted to an independent Ea s t Timar and the mo s t uncompromi s ing ly anti I ndone s ian .

( UDT had by that time swung ove r towards a p ro

I ndone s i an s tance . )

Thi s created a si tua t ion in which the I ndone s ian

government had to de cide e i ther to acqui e s ce in a Fret i lin vi cto ry and the e s tab l i shment of an i ndependent , strongly anti I ndone sia n regime in East Timar , or to inte rvene mi l i tari ly in the civi l war the re .

The

S uha rto government opted for the latter choi ce , sending in I ndo ne s ian troop s covertly in Octobe r-November and then invading overtly in 1 De cember . The legal and moral r i ghts and wrongs o f the se actions a re a ma tter o f cont rover sy whi ch i t would be i nappropriate to enter into he re .

But the que s tion o f I ndonesi a ' s unde rlying moti va tions i s a

que s tion o f a di f fe rent orde r . Why d id the I ndone s i ans feel i t mattered s o much t o them t o prevent Ea s t Timar be comi ng i ndependent? The ir mi l i tary i ntervention did no good to I ndone s i a ' s i nternat iona l reputation an d appear s to have be e n co s t ly to he r armed force s in bo th li ve s and re sour ces .

Why , then , could they not have acqui e sced in a

Fret i l i n vi c tory? I suspe c t tha t the ba s i c answe r boi l s down to the propo s i tion that as time pa s sed I ndone s i a ' s key pol i cy makers simp ly found thems elve s more and more commi tted by the i r own rhetori c and the i r ini tial po l i c i e s to the ultimate incorporation o f E a s t Tima r ;

hence they e i ther had to

pr e s s on towards tha t goal at any c o st or accept a humi lia ting defeat whi ch might have been serious ly damaging to the i r own dome s t i c po l i ti c a l

1

I know o f no good ac coun t o f the I ndone sian s i de o f the Timar a f fai r . A use ful s urvey of events in Timo r stre s s i ng the ro le o f the Portugue se , i s Ni col ( 1 9 7 8 ) . A s trongly anti I ndone s i an , p ro Freti l i n ve rsion i s given by Jo l i f fe ( 1 9 7 8 ) .

52

pre stige and i n f l uence .

But be fore we look i nto that exp la nat ion more

c lo se ly it is worth not i ng seve ra l predi spo s i ng factors which wer e c ertai n ly relevant . The mo st impo rtan t wa s the fear tha t East Timar mi ght become a ne s t o f �ommuni s t inf luence ,

' another Cuba ' on her doorstep .

The

charge s tha t Freti l i n leaders wer e commun i s t s or p ro Chi nese were wi ldly e xagge rated but they seem to have be en widely be l i eved in I ndone s i a .

Even i f they we re not , i t was c l ear that an i ndependent

East Tima r would have had to look overseas for e conomi c a s s i s tance and perhap s a l so po l i ti c a l support from some quarter , s i nce the economy was hardly viab le and the po l i ti ca l struc ture rudime n ta ry , and Chi na or Rus s i a se emed l ike ly to be the obvious c andida te s for such a ro le . Moreove r , the possibi l i ty tha t even a non communi s t indep ende n t Eas t Timar might provi de a haven for I ndone s i an communis t e xi l e s o ut si de Indone s i an cont ro l wa s alarming e nough ,

for i t would be hard to preve n t

thei r i n f i l tration from the re i nto o ther p a r t s o f the archipe lago . A second consideration frequently me ntioned wa s the fear o f s e c e s s i oni st sentiment i n o ther parts o f ea stern I ndone s i a i f Ea s t Timar •

we re to s ucceed i n ma i ntai ning an independent exi s tence . The e ffects on the I ndone sian s i de of the i s land would have been di s turbing , to say the least , and perhap s e l s ewhere too .

Ever s i nce the 1 9 5 0 s whe n

regi ona l i s t moveme nts thre atened the terri tori a l i ntegri ty o f the young nation , I ndone s i a ' s leaders have been sensi tive to the danger s o f s e c e s s ioni s t sentiments i n the outlying regio n s o f the archipe la go .

I

do ubt i f the re i s currently a s much r i s k o f sece s s ioni sm or terri to ri a l d i s i ntegrat ion a s i s o ften sugge sted , f o r the centrali zing o f the l a s t two decade s have been very powe r ful .

tendencies

But it i s probably

true to s ay that I ndone sia ' s national uni ty is sti l l a ra ther brittle creation , wh ich mi ght not s tand up to any serious blow to the authori ty o f the centra l government .

I f any part o f the country were ab l e to

de fy centra l authori ty on a ma j or i s sue and get away wi th i t , the cha i n reac tion e l sewhere could b e qui te di s a s tro us .

Tha t k ind o f consideration

probab ly e xerted gre a t we ight on the mi nd s o f the government ' s po l i cy mak e rs thro ughout the Timer a ffai r .

53

Two other background con si dera tions were also , I be l i eve , important .

One was the i n c l i nation to be l i eve tha t Apode ti real ly

did repre sent the true vo i ce of the Timorese peopl e .

I ndone s i ans

re fe rred to Freti l i n , not ent i re ly wi thout j us t i fi c a tion , as the ' Eura s i ans ' party ' , as a cote rie o f par t-Portugue s e , urban , educated leaders wi th no sub s tanti al fol lowi ng among or rapport wi th the bulk o f the vi l lage population .

They i nevi tably compared them wi th s imi lar group s o f

f i rst gene ration leader s o f the anti coloni a l movements i n I ndones i a , mo st of whom later dri fted away from the mai n s tream o f I ndone s i an nationa l i sm ;

i n fac t , I ndone s i a ' s Euras i a n s tended to be e i the r pro

Dut ch or highly ambivalent towa rds the na tiona l i s t cause dur i ng the s truggle for i ndependence , so the ir nationa l i s t credenti a l s were suspec t . I n the ci rcumstance s I ndone s i ans we re hi ghly s ceptical that the Fre ti l i n leaders re a l ly represented the true vo i c e o f E a s t Tirnore se nationa l i sm . The i r suspi c ions o f Freti l i n were later exacerbated by the col lusion o f the radi cal Portuguese o f ficers , Ma j ors Mota and Jona ta s , i n advanc ing the Freti l i n cause during 1 9 7 5 , whi ch was remi ni scent of Dut ch patronage of the ' puppet ' Federa l i s t s in 1 9 4 8- 4 9 .

UDT , on the other hand , had

ini ti a l ly spoken out in favour of mai nta i ni ng Portugue se rule and a gainst immediate i ndependence , so i t was c learly a ' reac tionary ' rather than a ' progre s s ive ' force .

So the hi stori c i s t ca ste o f mi nd wi th

whi ch I ndone s i ans approached the se matter s would have i nc l ined them towards Apodeti even though i t could show sub s tan ti a l popular support . in that a s s e s sment i

l i ttle po si ti ve evi dence o f

Thi s i s not to say tha t they were right

i t i s , howe ver , to poi n t out the ba s i s o f Indone sian

perceptions of the matter , which is wha t we mus t be concerned wi th here . The other consideration tha t p robably p l ayed a part , a l though rather speculative and intangible , was the general be l i e f that pr evai led throughout the fi ft i e s and s i xti e s that sooner or later Portugue se Tirnor would be l iberated from co loni a l rule - and it wa s commonly a s s umed that thi s wo uld take the form o f becomi ng part of I ndone s i a , e i ther wi th Indonesian he lp or wi thout . Portugue se Tirnor was seen a s an outda ted anoma ly , l ike Goa be fore 1 96 1 .

But a lmo s t n o attention was

ever give n ( e xcept mome ntari ly , in a very de sultory fashion , in 196 3 ) to the que stion o f when or how thi s would happen , no r we re the imp l i cations o f the a lterna tive out come

( the eme rgence o f an i ndependent East Tirnor)

54

ever se riou s ly con s i dered .

I n short , the principle o f a n ti coloni a l i sm ,

which wa s a centra l p lank o f I ndone s i a ' s fore ign po l i cy i n the 19 50s , crea ted a pre suppo si tion that i t would be ' na tura l '

for thi s te rri tory

to form part o f Indone s i a , j us t a s S uka rno once rema rked tha t ' even a chi l d can see that We s t I ri an is part of Indone sia ' .

I am not s aying

that thi s · i s a va l i d , incontrovertible line o f reasoning , but I thi nk it wa s p robably qui te i nf l ue nti a l i n shap ing the a tt i tudes and expecta tions of Indone s i a ' s leade r s prior to 1 9 7 4 .

In fac t , if the

Suha rto gove rnme nt had mounted a c ampaign to a s s i st i n the l iberation of East Timar from Por tugue se rule pr ior to 1 9 7 4 , j us ti fying thi s on the ground that it was a l so he lping to over throw Portugue se colon i a l r u l e a n d he lp the freedom fighters o f Ango la a n d Mo zambique , i t would a lmo s t certai nly have won wi de spread i n te rnat i ona l support and le ft the Freti l i n leaders no op tion but to s i de wi th In done s i a .

Suharto

mus t have sub sequently regre t ted tha t he had been too cautious and re strained to embark on such a cour s e ,

for once the revo l ution o f Apr i l

1 9 7 4 i n Por tuga l had occurred the ba l l was a t Fre t i l i n ' s feet , not Jakarta ' s .

To c laim tha t I ndone sia ' s a t ti tude towards Timar wa s a

grasping and cove tous one seems to me ,

in the l i ght o f the se c ircumstance s ,

qui te mi s l eading . F i na l ly , we should noti c e c ertain a spec ts o f the dome s t i c po l i ti cal dynami c s o f the Timer epi sode whi ch i nd i c a te ,

I be l i eve , that

expans ioni sm in a crude sense was not a signi fi cant e l eme nt in Indone sian motivat i ons .

The initial re action o f the F ore i gn Mini s ter , Adam Ma lik ,

wa s , i ndeed , di s t i n c tly ' dove - i sh '

r

He we nt so far as to a s sure Jo se

Ramo s Horta , a Fre t i l i n l eader , that I ndone s i a made no c l aim to Ea s t Timar and would seek c l o s e r e l a tions wi th i t ' a fter independence ' . But thi s early vi ew wa s soon modi fied a s the ' hawk s ' in Jakarta began to e xpre s s concern at what the y saw a s a dri ft towards the le ft in Timer , para l l e l i ng the course of the revo l ution in Port uga l in i ts fi r s t year .

Jaka rt a at th i s time s t i l l regarded the Por tugue se

gove rnment a s the key factor de termi ni ng the course of events in Timer . By the beginning o f 1 9 7 5 i t wa s be l i eved by many observers tha t Indone s i an troop s mi ght be sent in to Timer at any time .

There wa s a fl urry o f

55

apprehension among Austra lian o f f i c i a l s i n February , but in the fol lowi ng month the I ndone sian gove rnmen t gave c l ear i ndi cations tha t i t had de cided agai nst a mi li tary i nvasion a nd was re lyi ng i n s tead on the po l i t i cal negoti a tions be twee n the three mai n parti e s tha t were to take place at Macao l a ter in the year . beginning to woo

The Indone sians we re now

(or buy over ) the UDT leader s a s the latter fe l t

the mse lves i ncrea singly under threat from Freti l i n and the l e ft Portugue se o f fic e rs in control in Di l l i .

Suharto wa s c l early re straining

his ' hawk s ' as long as he c ould in the hope tha t a po l i t i c a l - dip lomati c s trate gy would work towa rds I ndone s i a ' s ends .

But a fte r the outbreak

o f the ' c ivi l war ' in Timar in July-�ugus t , it must have become incre as i ngly di f f i cult for him to re s train the hawk s and maintain any hope tha t a po l i tical solution would work , so the determi nation o f po l i cy finally swung over i n to the hands o f the mi li tary , for b y thi s time I ndone sia wa s too deeply commi tted to achieving i ts goa l s to ba ck away . I t should be remembered tha t i f Suharto had fa i le d to prevent the eme rgence o f an independe nt East Timar once the Indone s i an government had commi tt ed i tse l f to incorporation , he wo uld have be en highly vulne rable to the cha rge tha t th i s kind of thing would neve r have happened in Sukarno ' s days ft

Pre c i sely because Suharto ' s fore i gn po l i c i e s

we re so di f ferent from Sukarno ' s , una s se r tive , low-keyed , commi tted to good-ne i ghbourly re lations wi th the ASEAN countri e s , there wa s muted cri t i c i sm from the former radical -nationa l i s t fri nge o f the po l i ti cal pub l i c i n I ndone sia that he wa s subordi nating the country ' s intere sts too much to the goa l o f pre senting an ima ge o f moderation and re spons ibi l i ty to the We stern c redi tor nations .

Po l i tical comment

wi thin I ndone sia wa s di stinc tly muted in 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 , for the crackdown on di s sentient opi nion fol lowi ng the ' Ma lari ' rio ts duri ng Prime Mi n i s te r Tanaka ' s vi s i t i n January 1 9 7 4 wa s ve ry severe .

But pre c i s e ly be cause

the regime ha d be en shaken by the mi ld e xpre s s ions o f cri ti c i sm tha t occurre d in late 1 9 7 3 , there wa s a good dea l o f nervousne s s about arousing fresh crit i c i sm ove r new i s sue s .

I t i s hardly surp ri sing ,

in tho se cir cum s tance s , tha t there wa s a lmo s t no overt oppo si tion to the government ' s pol i c i e s on Timar , even though there seems to have

56

been no th i ng l i k e the wi de spread popular suppo rt that the re was over I r ian Jaya .

In 1 9 7 5 , moreove r , the development o f the Pe rtami na cri s i s

was creati ng new di f fi cult i e s for the governme n t and mak ing i t eve n l e s s wi l l ing t o run ri sk s o f leavi ng i t s flank s exposed to c ri ti c s o f any hue , whe the r radi c a l or nat iona l i s t .

The fa c 4 too , tha t the Timer

cri s i s occurred soon a fter the fa l l o f S a i gon , when the genera l s i n Jakarta we re mos t s ensi tive to wha t they pe rceived a s communi st threats to the region , must have he lped to s trengthen the hands o f the hardli ners and undermi ne the advocate s o f moderation .

By the latter pa rt o f 1 9 7 5

Suharto h a d li ttl e cho i c e but t o g o a long wi th hi s hawks un le s s h e were prepared to t ake very considerable ri sk s of incre a s i ng his vu lnerabi l i ty to dome s tic cri ti c s , both wi thin the armed forc e s and out s i de them .

Are we j us ti fi ed , then ,

in a s serti ng tha t ' e xpan sio ni s t ' e l ements

have p layed no par t in the shaping o f Indone s i a ' s po l i c i e s towards her neighbo ur s ?

I am incl ined to answer :

' Ye s ;

the primary mo tiva ting

force s behind her fo reign pol i c i e s could not be des cribed as expansioni s t i n any substantial respect ' .

One c ould even go furthe r and l i s t a

s er i e s o f opportuni ti e s Indone sia has not taken since 1 9 4 5 whi ch , i f she rea l l y had been determi nedly ben t upon expan sion or aggrandi zement of her influence ove r her ne ighbour s , she could ea si ly have e xploi ted to her advantage - for examp le the si tua tion crea ted by the race riots o f May 1 9 6 9 in Ma lays ia , the Mus lim in surgency in the so uthe rn Phi lippine s , to me ntion only the mo s t obvious . I t may be possible to de f ine ' expansi oni sm ' a c co rding to some more complex formu la

and app ly i t to the I ndone sian case , but I have

not yet seen thi s done in any convi ncing fa shion . The nea re s t approach to a care ful ly formulate d theory is Rex Mo rtime r ' s 1 9 7 6 art i c le

(Mortimer

1 9 76 ) i n wh ich he put great empha s i s on the country ' s po ten ti a l i ns tabi l i ty and the i nhe rent weakne s se s o r incapac i ty o f i ts government , seeing va rious factors in tha t si tuation a s ' nudging I ndone s i a towa rds a more as s ertive regiona l ro le ' .

In do ne s i a was

Mortimer exp l i c i t ly re cogni zed tha t

' not an ac tively expans ioni s t power ' , but he portrayed

her l eader s a s bordering on the neuro t i c ( the art i c l e i s studded wi th words like

' hy s te rica l ' ,

' obse s s ive ' ,

' tense ' ,

' hypersensi tive ' and

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' frustrated ' ) i n the i r preo ccupation wi th the i r country ' s regiona l influence , parti cularly i n the a ftermath o f t he commun i s t vi c tories in I ndochina i n the previous year .

Hence he regarded them a s i nte n sely

conce rned wi th the stabi l i ty o f Papua New Guinea a l so . �ortime r ' s theory se ems to me vulne rable on three main grounds . Fir s t , I n done s i a ' s ' re giona l ro le ' since 1 9 6 5 has not been at a l l ' as sertive ' or ' obs e s s i ve ' , as i t was unde r S uka rno . oppo s i te .

Qui te the

Secondly , the empha s i s on the ' hysteri c a l ' , neurot i c '

cha racter o f I ndone sia n po l i t i c s i s gro s s ly exaggerated .

Thi rdly , in

the three y e ar s that have p a sse d s i nce t ha t arti cle was wri t ten , the course o f eve n ts has no t borne out the pre di ctions Mo rtime r the n made . I n stabi l i ty ha s no t si gni fi cant ly incre a s e d i n I ndone s i a , her government has re sponded rathe r sensibly a nd coo l ly to the eme rge nce o f a powe rful Vie tnam a s a pot e nt ia l riva l for pol i t i c a l i n fl uence in So uthe as t Asia , no t hy ste r i c a l ly at a l l , whi l e its hand l i ng of re lations with Papua New Gui nea has not con formed wi th the pa t tern Mortimer adumbrated .

One mi ght j us ti fi ably ask whe ther the unde rlying theory

on whi ch Mortime r wa s then re lying wa s wrong , or whether hi s data was e rroneous - or both? Mo rtimer began hi s arti c l e wi th the va lid observa tion that we should not take it for granted that the S uha rto government ' s economi c moderation , rationa l i ty a n d peaceableme s s towards i t s nei ghbours during the years 1 96 6 - 7 6 would continue i nde fini t e ly .

B e ca use o f the Timor

a f fair and the collap s e of the Pertamina empire , I ndone s i a seemed in 1 9 7 6 ' to be facing another hi ghly uns tab le period in he r short and s tormy hi story a s an independent sta te . '

I t would be a mi s take , he

argued , to put too much stre s s on the Suha rto government ' s re l i ance on dip lomat i c me thods and good-ne i ghbourly cooperation throughout the previous de cade ,

for the Timor a f fai r i s then e xp l i c able ' only as a

momentary abe rrat ion ' , where a s he saw i t a s merely one o f the fac tors whi ch ' tipped the sca l e s i n favo ur o f regional interven tioni sm ' and a mo re a s se rtive regiona l ro le .

Bo th the theory and the pre sentation o f

the facts began to go a stray a t thi s po in t o f the argument , i n my view . Con s i der the fo l lowing cruc i a l paragraph :

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I ndone s ian intere s t s have be e n and rema i n primari ly tho se of i nternal securi ty and enhanced regiona l i n f luence . The se intere sts are perceived in a rathe r tense , and at time s o f c ri s i s , hys teric a l manner b y a po l i tical c l a s s which ha s been continua l ly frus trated by the gul f be tween i t s ambi tions and i ts c apaci ty ; hyper-sensit ive to the i ntractable problems of national se curi ty ; prone to regard obs tructions to i t s a spirant regional hegemony a s the re sult o f ma levo le n t p l o t s agai nst i t ; and f o r the past ten years obs e s sive about the dangers of communi sm bo th to i ts securi ty and i ts regional ambi tions . I ndone s i a ' s concerns are not nove l one s for any s tate to pursue , but they are concentrated upon wi th an unusua l degree of fixity and i n te n s i ty . . . . ( Mortimer 1 9 7 6 : 5 1 - 2 ) Qui te apart from the highly coloured termi no logy used here and the re l i ance on wha t i s vi rtua l ly a neuro s i s theory of national s e l f ­ a s se rti vene s s

( the a s sertivene s s be i ng s e e n a s ak in

t o S ukarno ' s ,

though ' the targe t o f I ndone s i a ' s frustrations ha s changed ' ) , I think we mus t que ry Mortimer ' s a s s ump tion here tha t an ' enhanced ' regiona l influence i s seen a s a prima ry interest by the Suharto government or that it i s ' frustrated by the gul f be twe en i t s ambi tions and i ts capaci ty ' , the ambition be ing ' a spi rant regional hegemony ' . i s the word ' enhanced ' added the re?

But why

The entire sentence i s s lanted to

convey an impre s s ion of a s s e rt ivene s s in her regional fore i gn po l i c i e s which i s s imp ly n o t warranted b y the reco rd .

Even i f it i s true tha t

some I ndone s i ans s ti l l talk about the ir country ' s regional ro le in a way that mi ght j usti fy the use of tho se terms

( and neither Pre si dent

Suharto nor hi s two fore i gn mi ni s ters has be en inc l i ned to do so to any degree ) , I ndone si a ' s who le po l i cy towards the bui lding up of ASEAN i s te s timony to the fac t tha t her actions ove r the la s t twe lve ye ars have been dire c ted large ly towards calmi ng the fears among he r ne i ghbours that Pre s i dent S ukarno ' s po l i c i e s arou sed .

Mortime r ' s theory mi ght

have seemed tenable i f I ndone sia ' s gene ral s re a l ly had been a s serting a more mi l i tan t ro le o f regiona l leadership o f the anti communi s t nations agai n s t Vietnam , b u t so f a r they have been ve ry res trained o n that s core , f a r le ss voc a l than out si de comme n ta tors swayed mo re by the i r tidy theor i e s about re giona l powe r struggle s than the a c tua l evidence o f what I ndone si a ' s leade r s have said a n d done abo ut the communi st threat from Vie tnam .

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The re i s n o doubt tha t I ndone si a ' s genera l s a r e pro found ly anti communi st in the ir internal po l i c i e s and it is arguable that the pr e sent poli ti cal system is potent i a l ly far more un stable than it appears on the sur fa ce be cause o f i ts fai lure to in stitutionali ze ge nui ne ly repre sentative insti tutions .

But to j ump from tho se premi s e s to the

conc lusion that the pre sent regime i s bent upon the same sort of drive fo r regional i n f lue nce a s S uka rno was , or that ' s etba ck s wi l l feed res entment and inc linations to a s sertive ne s s , e spe c i a l ly i f the pre sent in ternal divi sions in the state are in te n s i fi e d ' seems to me simp ly not suppo rtable by what we know abo ut curren t Indon e s i an po l i ti cal behaviour . On ly by dinging to

a

ve ry me chani s t i c theory o f expansi oni sm a s an

outgrowth o f i n stabi l i ty can one j us ti fy such reasoning .

The re cord

o f the Suharto gove rnment ' s fore i gn po l i cy certain ly doe s not j us ti fy i t , despi te a l l the hyperbo le , eva si vene s s and wor s e that has characte riz ed i ts handling of the Timor a f fai r . Mortime r ' s accoun t o f I ndone s i a ' s l us t fo r re gional domi nance doe s not rely di rectly on the analogy -wi th- fas c i sm argumen t , al though I think both re st upon the a s s ump tion tha t autho ri tarian regime s are pote nti a l ly un stable

(be ca use by de fi ni tion unrepre se nta tive - al though

it i s que sti onable whe the r more repre sentative po l i tical systems are s i gni ficantly more s table ) , so the re is l i kely to be some sort o f l i nk betwe e n the po l i ti c s o f dome stic in st abi l i ty and the po l i ti c s o f e xternal a s s e rtivene s s , pa rti cularly i f frustrations ove r the fai l ure of dome s t i c po l i c i e s rea l ly are gene rating neuro ti c atti tude s and i rrationa l i ty .

But that has not been the case of Indone s i a in the

1 9 7 0 s . Her leaders have fe lt they have been achi eving results , despi te a l l the c ri ti c i sms that ha ve been direc ted a t the i r po l i c i e s . actions s eem to me to betoken a good de a l o f confidence

Their

{wi thin the

authori tari an framework o f the po l i ti ca l sys tem , admi ttedly ) rathe r than a sense o f inse curi ty and hysteria .

Be fo re concluding , I want to comment br ie fly on the 7ndonesia

Raya ' theory of I ndone sian expa nsioni sm and o f fer some gue s s e s about the likel ihood of a re currence of that stream o f fore i gn po l i cy thinking .

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I had t o e xami ne the influence o f the se do ctrine s c lo s e ly in 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 when I wa s trying t o analyze the c au s e s o f konfrontasi a n d I have di s cus sed the mat ter more ful ly in my book on tha t sub j e c t ( t1!acki e 1 9 7 4 ) . Advocate s o f the 'Indonesia·

Raya ' theory o f e xpan s ioni sm , like Bernard

Gordon , re lied mai nly on two sources of evidence .

One was the wri ting

and spee che s of the I ndone sian po l i t i c i an-poe t-hi s torian , Mohammed Yamin , who wa s a great advocate o f ' Indonesia

Raya ' and i nc l i ned to wax

e loque n t on the theme o f I ndones i a ' s histo ric greatne s s in the days o f S rivi j aya and Ma j apah i t , when I ndone sian la ngua ge , trade and cultura l i n f l uence a l l e gedly exte nded a s far a f i e l d as Madaga s car to the we st and Cambodia to the north .

Yamin was a maverick , non -party mi ni s ter

i n s eve ral o f Suk arno ' s cabi nets and had a ce rtai n a ffinity of tempe rament and style with S ukarno , inso far a s both we re romanti c s and rhetori c i ans wi th a s trong sense o f I ndone si a ' s hi s tori c desti ny . He p l ayed an active part e arly in the campaign to recover I ri an Jaya . B ut ne i the r he nor hi s i deas p layed a ny grea t part in the

�onfrontasi campai gn , for Yami n died shortly be fore i t began to deve lop and S ukarno never made use o f the h i s to ric appeal to ' Indonesia

Raya ' theme s in hi s spe e che s on the s ub j e c t o f Malaysia .

Nor did a ny

o ther I ndone sia n pub l i c fi gure t ry to s tep i nto Yamin ' s shoe s i n orde r to explo i t the theme for i ts po l i tical mi leage , a rather s i gn i fi c an t piece o f evidence which advocates o f the ' Indonesia Raya ' theory ove r looked .

Pre s umably the re wa s not much mi leage in i t .

Yami n was

ve ry much sui generi s and hi s po li tical i n fluence depended mo re o n hi s pro ximi ty t o S ukarno than the i ntri n s i c appeal o f his do c trine s .

1

The o ther p i e ce o f evidence used in support o f the ' Indonesia

Raya ' theory wa s the debate that took place in June 1 9 4 5 in the Prepa ratory Commi ttee for I ndone sia n I ndependence on what the future bo undari e s of independent I ndone s i a should be . part in thi s debate , argui ng that

Yami n p layed a promi nent

' the area s whi ch should be inc lude d

in I ndone s i an territo ry are those whi ch have given birth to I ndone s i an people ;

the mothe rland o f a peop l e wi ll be trans formed i nto the

terri tory o f a S tate ' .

1

See Mack ie

Thus I ndon e s i a should con s i s t not only o f the

( 1 9 7 4 : 2 1- 2 3 ) .

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the former Ne the rl ands I ndie s , i nc lud i ng We st New Gui nea , but a l so the who le of Timar and Nor th Ebrneo and Ma laya , i nc luding the four nor the rn s tate s of Ma l aya whi ch the Japanese ha d trans ferred to Thai land .

Suka rno suppo rte d Yami n ' s formulation ( a l though on rathe r

di f ferent grounds ) aga i nst the more caut ious arguments o f re a l i sts l ike Mohamme d Hatta and Haj i Agus S a li m ; the day when it came to a vote .

and the Yamin-Suka rno vi ew carried

But the debate had no pra c t i c a l

cons eque nce s , for when the I ndone s i an leaders pro cl a imed the i ndependence o f thei r co unt ry in Augus t 1 94 5 , they were so hard-pre s s e d by events that they ne g l ec ted even a commi tme n t they had earl i e r given a group o f Ma layan revol utionari e s to i nc lude Mal aya in the anti coloni a l s truggle .

Twenty years later the Malay s i ans quoted the 194 5 debate s

extensive ly for p ropaganda purpo se s as evi dence o f I ndone s i an te rri to rial ambi tions

( Depa rtment o f I n formation , Malay s i a 1 96 4 ) but that a sse rtion

doe s not really s tand up to serious cri t i cal s crutiny . I t i s not i nconce i vable , o f cour se , that at some po i n t i n the future another Yami n or S ukarno wi l l eme rge in I ndone s i a and try to explo i t national i st sentiments on the bas i s of an appeal to hi s toric gre a tne s s .

The teaching o f I ndone s i an h i s tory and I ndone sia n patrioti sm

in the schoo l s , mi li tary academi e s and i ndoctrina tion cours e s almo st certainly continues to i n corporate some e l ements o f Y arni ne sque fantasy about the past whi ch could in appropri ate c i rcumstances be nurture d 1 as the bas i s for a k i nd o f revi va l i s t movement . But one could say tha t of mo st countri e s in the world . last re fuge of s coundre l s .

P atriot i sm , they s ay , is the

Logi ca l ly , howe ver , the weakne s s of theori e s

abo ut e xpans ioni st tende nc i e s which a re ba sed on predi ctions abo ut how a count ry rrri g ht one day rea c t i s that they can ne i ther be con fi rmed nor re futed by tes tible evi dence .

That be i ng the case , they are

vi rt ua l ly use le s s . My own gue s s i s that I ndone s i a , l ike Ch i na and Vi e tnam , wi l l conti nue t o b e concerned to ensure that deve lopments she con s i ders adve rse to he r interests wi l l not o c cur around her immedi ate periph e ri e s .

1

An i n triguing re cent mani fe station o f thi s sort o f subterranean surviva l o f ' Indonesia Raya • sentime n t is Rahasia ( 1 9 7 5 ) .

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She wi l l a l so , no doubt , seek to p l ay a prominent part i n the po l i t i c s o f the ASEAN re gion .

But the se a r e perfec tly legi timate ob j e c ti ve s ,

provi ded they are pursued by legi timate means .

They are not i n

themse lve s evidence o f a de s i re fo r aggrandi s ement o f e i ther power o r terri tory .

The re may i ndeed b e a sp ec t s o f Indone s i an nati ona l i sm and

o f the style of I ndone s i an po l i ti c s whi ch outsider s fi nd repugnant or fri ghtening , but to i n fe r tha t thi s is evidence of a ggre s s i ve i ntent i s to ove rsimpli fy absurdly . One could ea si ly imagine a sta te o f po l i ti c a l i nstabi l i ty deve loping , in whi ch Sukarnoesque po l i c i e s o f mi li tantly radi cal nat iona l i sm and a s sert ive foreign po l i c i e s could conce ivably re cur , the imp l ic ations of whi ch could be a la rming for Austra l i a and Papua New Gui ne a .

But the dynami c s o f that k ind o f

po lit i c s enta i l somethi ng very di f ferent from the dynami cs o f c rude ' e xpans ioni sm ' .

I t has been put to me that e ven i f my re j ection of the appropri atene s s of the term ' expan s ioni sm ' is accepted , we can ha rdly be s urpr i sed i f many people in Papua New Gui nea feel apprehe nsive about the i r country ' s future when they contemplate Indon esia ' s forei gn po l i cy re cord .

For she ha s on occasions had no compunc tion about

re sorting to force and pursuing po l i c i e s whi ch could be des cribed a s both i ntervent ioni st and aggre s s ive .

Moreover , she ha s been inc l i ned

to c laim that what happens in neighbouring count ri e s is a ma t te r o f dire c t concern to h e r and she mi ght d o s o y e t again i f the re i s any collapse of gove rnme ntal autho rity in Papua New Guinea whi ch Indone sia regarded a s po s i ng some poten tial thre at t o her .

Parti cularly i f

Indone s i a herse l f subside d back i n to a n era o f po l i t i c a l and soc ia l ins tabi l i ty remini scent o f the late Sukarno era , t he po s s ibi l i ty of a reve rsion t o more a s sertive , i nterventioni s t foreign pol i c i e s could not be ruled out o f con side ration . Whi l e the se points can hardly be deni ed , I think there are several s trong re asons for be l i evi ng that Papua New Guinea is mo st

unlikely to be come a target for Indone s i an aggre s sion . epi sode s we

All

the other

have been con sidering he re had to do wi th the proc e s s

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o f decoloni zat ion and the redrawi ng o f the frontier s c rea ted by co lonial i sm .

The c l a ims made t o I rian Jaya and Ea st Timor were to

that e xtent sui generis.

(Konfrontasi wa s a l so in part a response to

the decoloniz ation proc e s s , but in that c a se no c laim was made to Sarawak or Sabah . )

Neither i n I ri an Jaya no r in Ea s t Timor had the

de coloni zation proce s s been comp leted a nd i nt erna tional recognition through the UN achieved fo r a new and i ndependent s tate i

no r was there

in ei ther case , much e ffective inter nat i ona l suppo r t fo r such a n outcome , fo r the pri nciple o f s e l f-determi nation cannot a lways be susta i ned in the cour se of the deco loni zation proce s s , as Bouga i nvi l le and Papua Be sena have di scove red .

But once the indepe ndence of a

former co lony has be e n achi eved a nd reco gn i z ed in ternationa l ly , cha l le nge s to i ts sove rei gnty are quit e a nother mat ter .

Moreover , a s

time pa s se s , the ne w map o f the po st coloni a l wor l d tends to achi eve fi rme r accep tance .

To that extent , the c a s e of Papua New Guinea i s

radic a l ly di f ferent from that o f I ri an Jaya and Ea st Timor .

Papua

New Gui nea ha s been granted recogni tion as an independent , sovereign s ta te quite exp l i c i tly by I ndone s i a and the re st o f the wor ld , so it wo uld be e xtreme ly di f fi cult a nd embarra s s i ng for her to go back on tha t .

President Suha r to ha s vi s it ed Papua New Gui nea , a s we ll as

both I ndones i an fo reign mini sters and numerous other o f f i c i al s .

The

government ha s c learly come to a c c ept the s ta tus quo there and a s time pa s s e s the l e s s likely it be come s tha t thi s wi l l be cha l lenged . ( Conc e i vably , i f Papua New Gui nea had crumb led into anarchy or a seri es o f seces si oni s t movements in 1 9 7 5 , imme d i ately a fte r independence , Indone s i a might have been di spo sed to in tervene to r e s tore order and centra l authori ty , but even that is very dubioUS i

Mortime r i s probably

corre c t in his beli e f that Jakarta would have expected Australia to per form that ta sk fo r her . )

As anyone who ha s ever canva s sed the

ma tte r in Jaka rt a wi l l atte s t ,

I ndone sia n o ffi cial s give very little

attention to Papua New Guinea and ba s i c a l ly j us t do not want to be bother ed with addi tional probl ems , worry and expense in tha t quarter . I r ian Jaya and Timor have a lready caused them more than enough a lready . They have required special f ina nc i a i allo cations , which i s a cause o f

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re sentment in other provinces .

Un l e s s there is a reve rsion to qui te

se rious i n s tabi l i ty and i rrationa l i ty i n I ndone s i an po l i ti c s , a s in the l ate S ukarno era , I see no reason for Papua New Gui nea t o fee l vul ne rabl e t o annexationi st de s i gn s in Jakarta . .

Ja cob Pra i and We s t Papua n freedom f i ghter s

( photo : Mark Bak e r )

I ri ane s e re fuge e s abo ut to ret urn to I ndone s i a . ( photo : Judy Kapa i th )

Camp fo r I ri anese re fuge e s a t Ok s apmi n .

(photo : Wantok P ub l i c ation s )

PAPUA NEW GU I NEAN P E RC E P T I ON S I NTERNAL P RE S SURES

AND

ON

THE

BORDE R ;

P OL I C I E S

Kwa s i Nyameky e and Ra lph R . Premdas

The P apua New Guinea-I ndone s i a bo rde r has been a source o f some fric tion between the two countri e s s ince P apua New Guinea ' s independence in 1 9 7 5 .

I n June -July 19 7 8 , to demons trate tha t it s incere ly sought

I ndone s ian friendship , Papua New Guinea c o l l aborated with I ndone s i a in a mas s ive mi l i tary ope ration a long the border to uproot and de s troy the 1 OPM . The Papua New Guine a gove rnment wa s pre s sured by I ndone s i a to act against the OPM .

Caught be twee n an e thni c bond commi tting it s emotions

to support the Me l ane s i an freedom f ighte r s on one hand , and a c le ar need to promote its national se curi ty against an I ndone s i an menace on the other , the Papua New Guinea gove rnment had to make the extreme ly di f f i cult de c i s ion whe ther or not to e l iminate the OPM from operating in its te rritory .

I t cho s e to e xpe l the OPM .

The incident tri ggered o f f

popular demon s trations a n d a c t s o f di s approval a gainst the Papua New Guinea government , e spe c i a l ly s ince I ndone s i an soldiers ventured into Papua New Guinea terri tory in pursui t of the freedom fighters , de s troyed 2 vi l lage s , and pre c ipi tated a f lood o f re fugee s into P apua New Guine a . Engaging in a j o int borde r ope ration with I ndon e s ia to e l iminate the OPM was a ma j or fore i gn po l i cy de c i s ion by the Papua New Guinea government .

I t entai led e normous r i sk s by incurring popular d i s approval

and was premi sed on the proposi tion tha t it would win the friendship of its powe rful n e ighbour the reby , a t least temporari ly , e l iminating a ma j or

1.

Baker , 'Papua New Guinea Launche s Drive Against Rebel s ' , Sydney Morning Hera ld 6 June 1 9 7 8 ; also ' Rebel Hunt S teps up • , Pos t- Courier 2 1 June 1 9 7 8 .

2.

' Papua New Guinea Row on Rebe l s ' , Age 8 July 1 9 7 8 ; a l so Colleen Ryan , ' P apua New Guinea Gove rnmen t Attacked ove r I ndone s ian Ra ids ' , Austra lian Financia l Review 7 Ju ly 19 7 8 .

S e e Mark

66

source o f mala ise be twe en I ndon e s i a and Papua New Guinea .

In reaching

thi s cruc i a l de c i s ion , the P apua New Guinea governmen t made a c a lculated gamb le that its action would promote national security , to whi ch i t had as cribed gre ater priori ty ove r the more e l usive and dangerous course of ignoring the use of its terri tory by the OPM guerri lla s aga in st I ndone s i an pre s ence in I ri a n Jaya . The purpose of thi s art i c le i s to de s c ribe the sources o f inte rnal pres sure e xerted upon P apua New Guinea fore i gn po l i cy dec i s ion makers .

O f nece s s i ty , howeve r , thi s mus t be sketched aga in st the l arge r

background of the con fl ic t .

Consequently , we have supp lied some genera l

pre l iminary obs e rvations about the OPM and it s activi t i e s in Papua New Guinea , about the I ri an Jaya re fuge e s in P apua New Guine a , and about P apua New Guine a ' s intere st s in relation to the borde r .

�e &M The OPM i s the direct o f fshoot o f Dutch e f forts to instiga te the formation of a nuc leus of We st P apuan d i s s idents to f i ght for the exc lus ion of I ri an Jaya from an independen t I ndone s i a .

But when the

cause of e s tabl i sh ing a s eparate Dutch co lony or c li ent- s tate fai led , and I ri an Jaya was for a ll practical purpo ses turned over to I ndone s i a o n 1 5 August 1 9 6 2 , many o f the Dutch trained anti - I ndon e s i an di s s i dents continued activity on the ir own in itiative to free the territory and make i t an independent sove re ign s ta te .

Th i s moti f has provided

continuous j us t i f i ca tion for the exi s tence o f the OPM s i nce it s forma tion in 1 96 3 .

' The A c t o f Free Choi c e ' w a s so devi sed by the

I ndon e s i an s that the outcome of the musyawarah ba l lot was cast .

was guaranteed be fore a

OPM activi s ts c a l l the exe r c i s e ' T he Ac t of No Choice ' .

The OPM has two se gme nts .

One segment , based outs i de I ri an Jaya ,

i s almo s t entirely engaged in pol i ti c a l and propaganda activi ties .

The

other s e gment , based wi thin I ri an Jaya and areas conti guous to the P apua New Guinea- I rian Jaya borde r , is both mi li tary and po l i ti c a l in purpo s e . The mi l i tary arm i s o ften called the Tentara Nas ional Papua or TNP . Howeve r , we sha l l use the term OPM to re fer to the rebe l movement as a who le .

67

S ince it was formed in 1 96 3 , the OPM h a s witne s s e d the gradua l and e f fec tive conso l i dation of I ndone s ia n control o f I rian Jaya .

Large

numbers of non I r iane se from the Mo luc ca s , Sulawe s i , and Java migrated to I ri an Jaya so that by 1 9 6 9 , when ' the Ac t of Free Cho ice ' occurred , a subs tanti al part of the terri tory ' s urban popu lat ion , concentrated in the provincial capital Jayapura , w a s n on Me lane s ian .

A prograrrme o f

I ndone s iani zation pro ce eded systema ti c a l ly in a l l gove rnment , cu ltura l , and educational institution s .

Many I rianese part i c ipated in the se

change s , b ut were alarmed b y the progres s ive loss o f thei r Me l ane s ian identity as we l l a s the sub j ugation o f I ri an ese in all walks o f l i fe to I ndone s i an pe rsonne l .

The

S uharto re gime added a po li tico-mi l i tary

repre s s ive dime ns ion to I ndone s i an control ove r I ri an Jaya ,

limi ting

meaningful local parti c ipation in col lec tive dec i s ion mak ing . From a l l o f the s e sources , then - ' forced incorporation ' , ' cultura l imperi a l i sm ' ,

' lo s s o f land ' ,

' po l i tical repre s s ion ' , and so

on - the OPM gathe red suste nance and support from frus trated I riane se . At various time s the OPM sought s e l f-determination only for I rian Jaya , but on other occas ions it envi s aged i ts libe ration e f forts as part o f a pream t o e s tab l i sh a n independent Me l an es ian Federation encompass ing not only I ri an Jaya and P apua New Guinea but also the So lomon I s l ands , New Hebride s , F i j i , and New Caledonia .

P apua New Guine a ' s independence

in September 1 9 7 5 encouraged the OPM to be l ieve that it too could achieve indepe ndence from its colonia l mas te r .

I ndeed , the OPM , viewing

an independent Papua New Guine a a s an important a l ly to promote I rian Jaya ' s i ndependence ,

libera l ly uti liz ed P apua New Guinea terri tory to

e s tab l i sh bas e s from whi ch attacks again s t the I ndone s ian pre sence in I rian Jaya were launched . The OPM ' s active gue rri l l a force has never been ve ry large . Controversy about it s pre c i s e s i ze range s from 20 , 000 trained guer i l las ( the fi gure from the OPM) to 2 , 000 .

Mo st re l i able sources accept a more 1 Vi l lage s conti guous to mode s t fi gure of 400- 600 hard core gue rr i l la s .

1.

Mark Baker , ' P laying the Number Game ' , Age 2 6 September 1 9 7 8 ; see al so Peter Hastings , ' I ndone s i ans I rr itated at Aus tra l i an Atti tudes ' , Sydney Morning Hera ld 2 9 July 1 9 7 8 .

68

the border , o n e ach s ide , have demonstrated steadfast support for the activi t i e s of the OPM troop s mo st of whom are indi s tingui shably dre ss ed l ike ordinary vi ll agers .

The OPM in Papua New Guinea .

Attacking I ndones ian instal lations and

soldiers requi red the OPM to secure a so urce of re spite beyond the pursuit of the we l l equipped I ndon e s ian counte r- in surgency force s .

Thi s

they obtained not on ly from the ir thick j ungle hideouts but also by cro s s i ng the borde r i nto P apua New Guinea terri tory .

Cons equently , a

substant i a l amount o f OPM ac tivity has tended to concentrate around the borde r , partic ularly the northern s e c tor not far from Jayapura and Vanimo .

To the gue rri l l a s , the borde r , lacking c l ear demarcation lines

and poorly guarded , i s a seamle s s web through whi ch a flow o f men , medic i ne s , and sma l l weapons move .

While mos t o f the gue rri l la s '

s upp l i e s of food and weapons appear to come from thei r own e f forts and from s uppo rte rs on both s ide s o f the borde r , other k inds of support , particularly i n formation , and morale and pol itical direct ion , appe ar to be obtained through a network o f s e c ure contacts e s tab l i shed partly in Papua New Guine a .

About 10 , 000 I ri anese re fugees , mos t sympathe tic to

the OPM but legal ly pledged not to support the movement , re s i de in 1 . From var ious parts o f Papua New Gui nea , mainly i n Port Mo re sby . .

the s e re fugee s a ma j or source of the OPM ' s external a s s i stance flows to the border .

For in stance , the ' S outh P ac i f i c News Agency ' whi ch i s the

propaganda mouthp ie ce of ' the Provincia l Revo lution ary Governme nt of We s t P apua New Guinea ' , i s se cretly located i n Port Mo resby .

However ,

i t is di fficult to eva luate how s a lient externa l a s s i s tance i s to the surviva l o f the moveme nt . Unti l re cently , the OPM force s have l imi ted the i r activi tie s to ambushe s o f I ndone s i an patro l s and use of s abo tage , terrori sm , and kidnapping .

S ome o f thi s has a lready occurre d .

I n 1 9 7 7 the OPM

c l a imed tha t it was re spons ible for s abotage that dis rupted opera tions of the l arge American owned Freeport coppe r mine in I ri an Jaya .

In

February 19 7 8 , nine I ndone s i an o f f i c i a l s inc luding the provi nc i a l

1.

The o f fi c i a l e s timate i s 2 , 000- 3 , 000 ;

c f . p . 98 be low ( Ed . )

69

gove rnor o f I ri an Jaya and senior mi li tary a n d inte l l i gence o f fi cers were ki dnapped by the OPM .

The ho s tage s we re used to demand a ' round

table ' con ference with I ndone s i a to di s c us s the independe nce of I rian Jaya .

Eve n Papua New Guine a , whi ch has unt i l re cently turned a blind eye

to OPM activi t ie s with in Papua New Guine a , has been threatened with te rrori s t ac tion i f i t doe s not de s i s t from behaviour host i le to OPM activi tie s wi th in Papua New Guine a . Unde r I ndon e s i an pre s s ure , the P apua New Guinea government has agreed to c l ean up its s i de o f the borde r .

The OPM leade r and deputy

we re arre s te d and gao led by the Papua New Guinea government for i l legal entry in S eptember 1 9 7 8 . conflict .

A l l thi s a tte s ts to a new phase in the borde r

The I ndone s ians do not take the OPM for grante d any more .

Pre s i dent S uharto has reque s te d tha t the p rime mi n i s te r o f Papua New Guinea demons trate h is commi tme nt to I n done s i a ' s territorial integrity by taking action against the OPM .

The prime min i s ter ob l i ged him during

June-July 1 9 7 8 when the Papua New Guinea De fence Force laun ched a large anti OPM operation on the P apua New Guinea s ide of the border .

Papua New Guinea po licy towards OPM.

J ak arta ' s preoc cupation wi th

ensuring that Port Mo re sby doe s not adopt a pro OPM po li cy s tems from its sens i tivity towards the OPM and i ts be lie f tha t Port More sby i s secre tly sympathe ti c towards the moveme n t .

A pro OPM po l i cy would

comp l i cate Jakarta ' s abi l i ty to cope wi th the group ' s activi s ts . sanctuari e s would become ava i lab le ;

S a fe

weapons could reach the d i s s idents

through Papua New Guine a , and Port Mo re sby mi ght provide the group wi th the external vo i ce i t has sought for so long .

For the se reasons ,

Jakarta has obta ined Port More sby ' s con t inuing re a f f i rmation tha t I rian Jaya i s a part of the state o f I ndone si a . I n the communique i s sued a fter Mr S omare ' s 1 9 7 7 state vi s i t to I ndone s i a , both heads of s ta te pledged tha t the i r re spe c tive countrie s wou l d not b e used t o conduc t activi t ie s aga i n s t the othe r ,

and during

h is s tate vi s i t in May 1 9 7 8 P apua New Guinea ' s Fore i gn Affairs mini s te r , Mr Olewale ,

' a s sured h is counterpart that the Governme nt of P apua New

Guinea wi l l take firm and e f fec tive me asure s to sa feguard th is

70

pledge ' .

1

Afte r h i s re turn , Olewale even s ta te d that I ndone s i a was

s uspic ious o f Papua New Guinea ove r the I ri an Jaya i s sue and maintained tha t ' We do not wan t I ndone s i a to interpre t that we condone OPM . . . ( There fore ) , we must now take deci s i ve ac tion aga in st the people work ing 2 . against In d one s i a ' . Thi s pledge was honoured in July 1 9 7 8 when , for the .

first time , P apua New Guine a sent mi l i tary forc e s to patrol the borde r , and again in S eptember , when Papua New Guine a arre s te d and gaoled the l e ade r of OPM and h i s deputy .

Although Port Mo re sby maintained tha t i ts

July borde r ac tion was not the j oint border patrol favoured by Jak arta , it undoub tedly he lped Jakarta ' s attempt s to track down the d i s s idents because i t denied them acce s s to their s anctuar i e s on the P apua New Guinea s ide for some time .

Thi s i s the sort of unambiguous ly pro

Jakarta pos ture tha t the S uharto regime wants Port More sby to adopt .

It

has di spe l led the view that Port More sby has a dua l borde r po l i cy wi th Jakarta . One of Jakarta ' s ob j e c tives in it s borde r relations with Port More sby is to avoid the growth o f a s i ze able I ri ane se community in Papua New Guine a .

The re i s fear that the I ri anese communi ty has a lready grown

too large and mi gh t open up channe l s o f commun i cation for the OPM .

In

addi tion , it might b e able t o inf luence Port More sby ' s border po l i c i e s give n the s trong e thni c bond wi th P apua New Guinea .

Conseque ntly ,

Jakarta ' s po l i cy has bee n to persuade Port Moresby to re turn mo s t of the I r i ane s e to I ri an Jaya on the grounds tha t they are innocent vi l l agers caught up in the borde r game being conducted by OPM .

Jak arta bel ieve s

that mos t o f the se people cannot b e c l a s s i fied a s pol i t i c a l re fugees . The re i s mutua l de s i re on both s ide s to re solve the re fugee i s s ue .

Apa rt from the · co s t , P apua New Guinea has to wei gh the

humanitarian a spects of the problem .

The o ff i c i a l Papua New Gu inea

1.

Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Officia l Visit of his Exce l lency Niwia Ebia Olewa le, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Papua New Guinea to the Repub lic of Indonesia, 1 3- 2 1 May 1 9 78 .

2.

' I ndone s i a i s S uspi c ious ' , Pos t- Courier 2 6 May 1 9 78 .

71

pol i cy has been to se cure Jakarta ' s a s surance o f sa fe conduct be fore returni ng tho se I ri anese who expre s s a wi sh to re turn home .

Conce rning

I ri anese permi s s ive re s i de nt s , Jakarta ' s interest has been to ensure that they do not use P apua New Guinea as a base for anti I ndone s i an activi tie s .

At a pre s s con ference during his 1 9 7 7 state vi s i t to

I ndone s i a , the Papua New Guinea prime min i s te r , Mr Somare , admi tted tha t the re were about 500 OPM members l iving in the country .

I t would seem

that Jakarta ' s po l i cy on I r i anese re s idency in Papua New Guine a i s mo tivated b y a de s i re t o preve nt known OPM members cros s ing the borde r and conducting activi t ie s that might harm re lations between the two countri e s .

Evidence of thi s po licy was given by the first secre tary o f

the I ndone s i an Embassy i n Port More sby , when h e undiploma ti c a l ly called on the Papua New Guinea gove rnment to seek

re a f f i rmation o f loya lty

from ten natura l i ze d ex- I ri anese c i ti zens named in the de fac to government o f We s t P apua in Apr i l 1 9 7 8 . Jakarta i s mos t concerned about the invo lvement of the UN H i gh Commi s s ioner for Re fuge e s

in a matter it regards as an inte rnal affair .

Some senior o f f i c i a l s in Jakarta mai ntain tha t i f a strict de finition o f a re fugee i s app lie d , mos t o f the peop le in the re fugee c amps would not qua l i fy to be there .

Th i s i s , o f course , a lega l i stic approach to an

unmanageable po l itical problem. De spi te the se di f f i cultie s , Jak arta remains hope ful tha t wi th goodwi l l on both s ide s the re fuge e s c an be kept unde r reasonable control and that rel ations wi th Papua New Guine a ove r the borde r c an be s tabi l i zed .

But growing e conomi c di spar i t i e s between Papua New Guinea

and I ri an Jaya could comp l ic ate thi s po lic y .

Pre s s ure cou ld be expe c ted

to bui ld up for I ri anese to come to Papua New Guine a in search o f be tte r j obs .

I f thi s happened , the notion of ' Me lane s ian brotherhood ' would

face i ts mo s t critical te s t , and the like ly in flux o f I ri ane se into Papua New Guinea in search of j ob s would put borde r re lations betwe en

the two countri e s in a more complex e nvironment .

72

Papua New Guinea ' s interests . The P apua New Guine a - I r i an J aya border i s more than j us t an i rri tant to Papua New Gui ne a .

I n some ways the intere sts around thi s

borde r can b e j ust i f iably c l a s s i fied a s vital .

With ove r 200 , 000

troops , I ndone s i a has As ia ' s third l arge s t army .

Ve ry recently th i s was

dep loyed to invade and a cqui re E a s t Timar in de fiance o f United Nations prote s ts tha t the mi l i tary incurs ion wa s i l lega l .

Very sensi tive to

regional se c ce s s ioni s t movements wh ich thre aten to rend a sunde r it s fragile fab r ic a t i ts e thni c se ams , I ndon e s i a c ou ld e as i ly overreact t o OPM operations if they we re e nlarged a n d made e f fective .

C l early , Papua

New Guine a ' s interest in th i s context i s at l e a s t to do nothing to aid the OPM freedom f ighte rs l e s t I ndone s ian rage be turned aga in st the fledgl ing Papua New Guinea de fence forc e s of only 3 , 500 troops .

A

friendly I ndone s i a i s much l e s s cos t ly to re late to than a hos ti le one .

1

Even Aus tra li a , much be tter prepare d than P apua New Guinea mi l i tari ly to con front I ndone s i a , has chosen a course of friendship l aden wi th fore ign a id rather than e ngage I ndone s i a in cool or host ile re lation s . I n opting for a pol i cy tha t doe s not a i d the OPM , the P apua New Guinea government e xposes i t s e l f .

P o l i t i cians who are ove rtly

sympathetic to the OPM wi l l probably win much popular suppo rt from a maj o rity o f the country ' s e l ite who have been brought up during the ' con frontation ' pe riod to dete s t and fear ' expan sion i s t ' I ndone s ia . The re a re such po l i ti c i ans both in the governmen t and in the oppo s i tion . Thi s would be a ve ry dangerous cha uvin i s t game s ince n at iona l i s t pas s ions stirred t o support ' Me l ane s i an Brothers ' acro s s the border are l ike ly to trigge r a much l arge r and dangerous re spon se from the I ndone s ians .

Thi s po litical problem points up the need for I ri an Jaya

border pol i c i e s to be forged j ointly by both .

1.

For a de tai led expo s it ion o f the rationale for the Papua New Guinea border po l i cy see Somare ' s s tatement in Draft Hansard 7 August 1 9 7 8 page s 9/1/1- 3 ; a l so see O lewale ' s statement in Draft Hansard 17 Augus t 1 9 7 8 page s 2 1/ 7/ 2 - 3 .

73

I n e f fect , opting fo r a po l i cy o f neutral i ty t o the OPM enta i l s foregoing the temptation t o mobi l i se dome s ti c anti I ndon es ian pre j udice s in na tional po l i ti c s .

I n turn , the P apua New Guinea c i t i z enry may we l l

have t o ac commodate i ts e l f t o secre t dip lomacy o n the bo rde r i s sue s o a s to minimi se the chances o f uns crupulous po lit i c a l outbidder s seek in g to use the borde r prob lem to promote pe rsona l po l i t i c a l intere s ts .

In

fo l lowing th i s po l i cy , the re wi l l b e no e scape from periodi c criti c i sms of the Papua New Guinea gove rnment that it is permitting itse l f to be ' bullied ' or ' blackma i led ' by its mi l i ta ri ly superior n eighbour .

What i s

l o s t in face i s compensated for b y buying hard international security , un le s s Papua New Guinea ' s compromi s e s on the OPM c ause are inte rprete d by the I ndon e s ians a s a s ign o f weakne s s and tak en as an invi tation to intervene indi rectly in the po l itical li fe o f P apua New Guinea .

In

suppress ing ove rtly i ts s upportive l inkages t o the OPM , the P apua New Gu inea government wi l l take a c alculate d gamble tha t the mi lita ry regime in I ndone s i a wi l l not go furthe r by demanding that poli tical freedoms in Papua New Guine a be curta i l e d . Papua New Guine a ' s bo rde r intere st s are a l s o re l a ted to the re fugee problem.

Already the re are ove r 10 , 000 re fugee s in Papua New

Guinea ( s ee p . 6 8 ) .

The 1 , 000 to 1 , 300 re cent re fugees require about

K2 , 000 da i ly to maintain . the

UN ,

cost .

Thi s can be partly o ffset by sub s idies from

but the re fugee i s sue goe s we l l beyond the immediate i s s ue of The long run dangers a r e bo th e conomic a n d pol i t i c a l .

o f re fuge e s

A st ream

would enta i l compe tition with Papua New Gu inean c i ti zens

for j obs and s e rvi ce s .

Al ready some o f thi s has been experie nced .

The

Papua New Guinea gove rnment has an ongoing in ter est in up l i fting the mate rial we l l -be ing o f it s own c i t i zens be fore d i s tributing it s s c arce re sources to its ' Me lane s i an Brothers ' .

Many o f Papua New Guinea ' s

el ite who s trongly e spouse a po l i cy of a iding the OPM are yet to cons ider seriously the e conomi c rami f ications in the event that the ir pro OPM s entime nts led t o a uni fi ca tion of Papua New Guinea a n d I ri an Jaya .

P apua New Guinea i s much more advanced e conomi c a lly tha n I rian

Jaya .

Even within Papua New Guinea strong j ea lous i e s are i n f l ame d over

regional inequal i ty in the d i s tribution o f commercial and agricultura l proj ects .

One c an envis age the sort o f turmo i l that wou ld engul f the

74

entire nation i f a l l Papua New Guinea provinces had to sacri fice l arge parts of the i r budget to a s s i s t the I rian Jaya provinces to ' catch up ' . On a much sma l l e r scale the growth o f the re fuge e popula tion may eventua l ly le ad to a

back lash agains t the pre sent pol icy make rs who

mus t so lve unemployment di fficulties concen trated mos t heavi ly among Papua New Guine an s choo l leavers and urban migrants . On the po l i ti c a l front , the growth of a re fugee population could be more e xplos ive .

The I r i ane s e re fuge e s in Papua New Guine a today

provide a maj or source of support to the OPM .

Not only do they

c ommuni ca te OPM grievance s to P apua New Guinean s , many of whom quicky turn agai nst the As i an menace , but they deve lop an uncompromi s ing body of popular opinion wh ich mak e s dec i s ion mak ing on the bo rder i s s ue ve ry d i f fi c ul t .

P apua New Guinean dec i s ion make rs may b e exposed to

po l it i c a l pre s s ure to support the OPM from a voc i fe rous I ri anese-derive d urban population , many o f whom have intermarried with P apua New Guineans .

I f the Papua New Guinea governmen t seeks to ignore the

demands o f thi s sma l l group , it c an face blackma i l in the form of lost vote s , demons trations

and even terrori st threats again s t Papua New

Guine a governmen t insta l lation s . Thi s s cenario i s not unrea l i s ti c .

When the Papua New Guine a

government announced in 1 9 7 7 that i t was demanding that the OPM e l iminate i ts ba s e s from Papua New Guinea terri tory , certain OPM di s s idents announced that they would un leash te rror i s t attack s aga in st the P apua N e w Guinea government .

The s ame sort o f threat was made when

the P apua New Guinea g ove rnment a nnounced that it was not returning to the I ri an Jaya j ungles OPM leaders who were arre sted and gaoled in P apua New Guine a . F i na lly , P apua New Guinea , as part of a regional bloc of pro We s tern countrie s ,

is not l ike ly to win friends from it s powe rful

regional neighbours who may view the OPM a s a threat to regional s tabi l i ty .

Papua New Guine a ' s economy is intimate ly depe ndent on

Aus tral i a for aid , trade and fore i gn inve stment .

Aus tralia provide s

annua l ly about $A2 2 5 mi ll ion or 3 5 per cent of the Papua New Guinea

75

budge t .

Aus tra l i a doe s not wi sh t o engage I ndone s i a i n a n unne c e s s a ry

con f l i c t .

I ndeed , i t has care ful ly evo lved a workable peace ful e conomi c

and po l itical neighbourly a rr angement with I ndone s i a .

I t i s extreme ly

doub t ful that Austra l i a would a s s ist Papua New Guinea if it should be attacke d by I ndon e s i a because P apua New Guinea refused to re strain or e liminate the OPM on i ts s i de of the border .

Aus tra l ia mus t calcula te

its own gains and lo s s e s from supporting P apua New Guinea in such an engagement .

Papua New Gu inea wi l l face not only I ndone s i an hos t i l i ty

but powe rful Austra l i an and US e conomi c and pol i tical pre s sure s should it seek to i n f l ame the borde r , invi ting hos t i le forei gn force s to penetrate and di sturb the stab i l i ty of the region .

Papua New Guinea ' s border po licy :

interna l pressure s .

P apua New Guinean po l i cy o n the border i s a calcul ated consequence of complex factors , some internal

others exte rna l ,

converging on the centra l de c i s ion make r s , the National Se curity Counc i l .

Some fac tors support the adopted pol i cy , others are opposed .

Thi s part of the paper tri e s to i denti fy , c l a s s i fy and evaluate the interna l pre s s ure s .

As in mo s t po l i cy cho i ce s , an adopted pos i tion i s

rare ly without amb i gui tie s and contradict ion s . The four main inte rna l pres sure s a f fe c t ing the de c i s ion makers re spon s ible for the P apua New Guine a- I r ian Jaya borde r are :

(i)

the

' Me l ane s ian Brothers ' pres sure wh i ch cap i t a l i z e s on ethnic bonds ;

(ii)

the ' inte l lectual- ideologi c a l ' groups whi ch oppose the I ndone s i an regime and i ts al leged expans ion i s t de s i gns ;

( iii)

the ' pragma t ist s ' , a

variety of people and inte rests arguing for a c conunodation with I ndone s i a i n the l ight o f Papua New Guinea ' s e conomi c and mi li tary capabi l i ti e s ; ( iv)

the p ar l i amentary oppo s i tion wh i ch in st itution a lly oppo s e s the

ruling gove rnment ' s pol i c ie s .

'Me lanesian Brothers ' .

A s i gni fi cant segment of tho s e individua l s and

groups who oppose th e Papua New Guinea government ' s recogn i tion of I ndone s ian te rritorial sove re i gnty over I r ian Jaya are motiva te d by sub j e ct ive s entiments a s s e rting fraternal and e thni c links betwe en the Me lane s i an re s i dents on both s ide s of the bord�r .

Emotional and

76

uncompromi s ing , thi s pre s s ure derive s i t s support mainly from educa ted Papua New Guineans , vi l lagers near to the border , Unive r s i ty student s , I r i ane s e re fugee s , and a number of par l i amentarian s .

They are not

organiz ed a s a cohe rent group tha t can be readily mob i l iz ed for quick ac tion , but they consti tute a large se ctor of the population that inf luences gove rnment po l i cy , and they expre s s thei r op inions fairly e ffec tive ly . The students from the two nationa l univers i ti e s ,

for example , are

among the mo s t h ighly e ducated persons in Papua New Guinea .

The y have

mounted s everal demons trations on behal f of the I r i ane s e against I ndone s ia ' s actions i n I ri an Jaya and E a s t Timor .

Many pub l i c servants

abandoned the i r desks and part i c ipated in the s e demon s tration s .

S e veral

pa r l i amentarians , such a s Tony Bai s , Mi chae l Pondros , John Noe l , Roy Evara , Jame s Mopio , from both government and oppos i tion benche s , have expre s sed s trong views against the government ' s pol icie s towards the OPM .

Togethe r , the se pro OPM supporte rs con s t i tute a formidable body o f

opinion , we ll p l a c e d and h i gh ly regarded , c ap able of structuring the collective op inion and s entiments of P apua New Guineans in regard to the borde r .

Thi s mas s -based , emotiona l and i n f luenti a l pre s s ure point

worri e s the government mos t , lest its views be pe rmi tted to be come government po l icy , tri gge ring open ho s t i l i ty between P apua New Guinea and I ndone s i a .

The inte l lectua l-ideo logica l anti Indonesian foPces .

Th i s group i s anti

I ndone s i an partly because of the repre s sive regime that has ruled I ndone s i a s ince S ukarno ' s ove rthrow and partly because o f the Suharto regime ' s e conomi c deve lopment s trategy under whi ch fore ign mul t inational corporations are given a free hand in I ndones i a .

F urther ,

it be l ieve s

that I ndone s i a has expansion i s t de s i gns on Papua New Guine a , as wi tnes sed by the events in East Timor .

Pre s sure from th i s source come s

mainly from local and fore ign unive r s i ty students , l e c turers , j ourna l i s ts , and arti s ts , mainly res ident in Port More sby .

Compos ed of

wide ly respe cte d and except ional ly able persons such a s Be rnard Narakobi an d John Kasaipwa lova , thi s group is much sma l l er than th e first but share s some of its arguments .

It is articulate but only sporadic in i ts

77

outbur sts agai nst the government .

Several fore i gn unive r s i ty lecture rs

and j ourna l i s ts , mo s t ly from Aus tral ia and New Zealand , pl ay a sma l l supportive rol e in col laboration wi th l ike minded local inte l lectua l s . Thi s group lacks direct a c c e s s to the government dec i s ion makers and depends heavi ly on the ma s s med i a for its impact .

The Pragmatists .

The se i nd ividua l s we i gh the e conomi c and mi l itary

costs i nvo lved , and argue that P apua New Guinea should pursue a pol i cy of non interfe re nce in I ndone s i an a f fairs .

Whi le they are sympathe tic

with the ir ' Me lane s ian Brothe rs ' acro s s the borde r , they argue tha t coloni a l i sm wa s re spons ible f o r the boundary a n d Papua New Guinea now 1 has no choice but to comp ly with the h i s torical facts of li fe . They urge that avai lable time and resource s be used on more pre s s ing nationa l i s sues such a s rural deve lopmen t and unemployment , and warn that I ndone s i a is too powerful to antagon i ze .

The pragma t i s t s note

wi th anxiety that the l ack of re straint in expre s s ions by group s oppo sed to I ndone s i a ' s contro l o f I ri an Jaya wi l l probably trigger ' prophet i c ful fi lme nt ' a n d bring about p re c i s e ly wha t was t o b e avoided , I ndone s i a ' s acqu i s it ion of P apua New Guine a . The pragmatists are ve ry few , gene ral ly quiet , but strate g i c a l ly p l aced in the de c i s ion making system to formulate po licy on the border . They are compo sed o f high ranking members of the Papua New Guinea pub l i c s ervi ce , overseas advi sers t o the Papua N e w Guinea fore ign o f fice , senior o f f i cers of P apua New Guinea ' s de fence and inte l l i gence organi z ation s , and many c abinet members o f the Somare government . Because of thei r po s it ion , they c anno t agi tate on the street s .

They are

genera l ly privy to s e cre t information on the borde r and , consequently , find thems e lve s unab le to speak out in publi c .

They tend to advocate

se cret diplomacy on the border , no con sultation wi th the par l iamentary oppo s i tion , l imited di s tribution of in formation to the parl i ament , and practically no consultation with the broad base o f the P apua New Guinea citi zenry .

1.

Thi s i s the argument expre ssed by the gove rnment in 1 9 7 8 . footnote 1 on p . 7 2 .

See

78

The par liamentary opposi tion .

The Na tional P arty , the parl iamentary

oppos i tion party led by I ambakey Okuk , has endeavoured to e xploit the government ' s handling o f the borde r i s sue .

I n a maj or s tatement , the

oppo s i tion criticiz ed the gove rnmen t for i ts fai lure to in form the people about events on the borde r and c a lled on it to consult with the 1 oppo s i tion to formulate j oint pol i c i e s on the border . The oppo s i tion ha s also demanded that the government invi te the UN to patro l the 2 border and settle the i ssue . I t has seve re ly cri tici z e d the government for i ts hos t i l ity to the OPM , arguing that i ts fore i gn pol i cy s logan ' Friends to a l l and enemi e s to none ' has been contradi cted by gove rnment 3 attacks on the OPM . . The oppo s i tion has c rit ic iz e d the gove rnment further for mi shandl ing the border i s s ue .

S everal oppos i tion par l i amentarians have

e xpre s sed strong support for the OPM , though whe the r as individual sentiments or o f f i c i a l oppo s ition viewpo ints is not c le ar .

P art of the

con fus ion stems from the fact that the oppo s it ion is a coal it ion o f three s eparate parti e s .

The oppos i tion h a s e xpre s s e d sentimental

conce rn fo r the OPM , but has not e xpre s s e d any conce rted or sys tematic oppos i t ion to the spec i fi c po l ic i e s adopte d .

Eva luation for the future . P apua New Guinea ' s relations with I ndon e s i a ove r the border are rep lete with potentia l ly de stab i l i z ing e lement s .

The current

equ i l ibrium could be e a s i ly upset by a variety o f internal factors in e i ther P apua New Guine a or I ndone s i a .

I n P apua New Guine a , a new

government more re sponsive to popul ar demands to support ' our Me lane s i an Brothe r s ' may a s s i s t or at le a st tole rate OPM activit ies within P apua

1.

Se e ' Re - Th ink on Fore ign Po l i cy ' , Pos t- Courier 9 June 1 9 7 8 .

2.

' Apologi se - Gui se c a l l to I ndone s i ans ' , Pos t- Courier 2 1 June 19 7 8 .

3.

see Okuk ' s statement in Draft Hansard 7 August 1 9 7 8 page 10/ 1/ 2 .

79

New Guinea .

Con trad ic tion s and amb igui t i e s wi l l continue to bedevil the

government .

I n human rights , P apua New Guinea c an be accused o f

coope rating wi th a repre s sive mi l i tary reg ime that s e e k s t o des troy a s e l f- determi nation moveme nt w i th legi timate c l a ims to a separate home l and .

Furthe r , the prevai ling pol i cy c an have grave dome s t i c

repercus s ion s .

T o maintain the current pos ture tha t seeks to

depo l i ti c i ze the borde r i ss ue by l imi ting the ava i labi l i ty o f in fo rmation t o ordinary c i t i zens , the Papua New Gu inea gove rnment wi l l have t o conduc t s ecre t dip lomacy t o solve ongo ing prob lems .

Thi s could

provi de she l ter on nationa l se cur i ty grounds for government incompe tence and undermine the long run operation o f P apua New Guinean democracy , under whi ch c i t i zens must be kept in formed and mus t be a l lowed to parti cipate in the formulation o f re levant de c i s i on s . Whi le unde rtaking to e xpel the OPM from it s terri tory part ly to sati s fy i ts regional ne ighbours ' need for security and s tabi l i ty , P apua New Guinea has ye t to bargain for an exp l i c i t quid p ro quo guaranteeing that i t would not be invade d or mi l i tari ly hara s s ed by I ndone s i a . Conce ivab ly ,

the OPM , ' wh i ch i s today treated with ho s t i l i ty by the P apua

New Guinea gove rnme nt , may be needed in future if an attack by I ndone s i a should eventuate .

I n open war fare the OPM , with it s popular support in

I ri an Jaya , could provi de a buffer against I ndone s i an incurs ions or , at leas t , enl arge the scope o f the I ndone s i a n undertaking to mi l itar i ly acquire a l l of the New Guinea i s l and . po ss ibi l i ty c annot be r e j e c ted .

Al though highly un l ikely , the

L IV I NG W I TH A L I ON .

PUB L I C ATT I TUD E S

AND

P RIVATE F E E L I NG S .

R.J.

May

Ove r the years the Papua New Gui nea governme n t ha s made abundantly c le ar i ts unqua l i fied a cceptance of Indone s i a ' s sove re i gnty i n I ri an Jaya and o f the coro llary , that Indone s i a ' s action aga i n s t di s s i dent e l ements i n the province i s a ma t te r o f interna l po l i cy and no t a conce rn of Papua New Gui nea .

At the same time , there ha s been

wi de spread recogni tion o f a n underlying con f l i c t be tween Pap ua New Guinea ' s o ffi c i a l po l i cy , d i c ta ted by the pol i tic a l rea l i ty of the s i tua tion , and the fundamental sympathi e s of Papua New Guineans for the i r Me lane s i an nei ghbours , symp a thi e s whi ch have been made exp l i c i t on occasion eve n by the prime min i s ter and suc ce s s i ve forei gn min i s te r s . The re i s no doubt tha t , wi thout a f fec ting i ts accep tance o f I ndone s i an sovere i gn ty i n I r i an Jaya , the Papua New Guinea governmen t has , ove r time , e xe rc i sed varyi ng de gre e s o f di l i gence i n i ts admi n i s tration o f the bo rde r and I ndone s i a ' s recogni tion o f th i s fac t ha s brought ten s ions i n the re lations be twe e n the two countri e s . Our obj e c t he re i s to de scribe Papua New Guinea ' s handling o f the borde r i s sue ,

i n a hi s to ri c a l context , and to exami ne some of

the dome s t i c po l i ti c a l force s which a f fect o ff i c i a l po l i cy , parti cularly i n relation to the events of 1 9 7 7 and 1 9 7 8 .

The co lonia l legacy .

1

Unti l we l l into the 1 9 6 0 s , wi thin Papua New Guinea the concern over the We st New Gui nea i s s ue was largely tha t of Austra lian colonial o fficia l s and an a lre ady s lightly pa rano i d expatriate bus i ne s s and p lanter communi ty .

1

A more deta i led a ccoun t of the period up to 1 96 9 i s to be found i n Ve rri er ( 1 9 7 6 chap t er 1 1 ) , from whi ch thi s sec tion ha s drawn Al so see Ha s luck ( 1 9 7 6 chapter 3 0 ) for an ' i n s i de ' vi ew of the period .

81

The conc e rn o f Austral ian o ff i c i a l s was for the mo st pa rt .a re flec tion of the Aus tralian governmen t ' s atti tude toward We st New Gui nea .

Up ti l l the end of the 1 9 5 0 s thi s atti tude wa s domi na ted by

Austra lia ' s perception o f the importance o f the i s land to Aus tral ia ' s securi ty .

The Aus tra lia n gove rnment s upported Ho l l and in i ts denial

o f Indone s i a ' s territorial claims to We st New Guinea , it e s tabli shed a n umbe r of new patrol po s ts in the bo rde r a rea s , and i t entered into agreements for adminis tra tive coopera tion between Dutch and Austra lian o f fi c i a l s in the two territori e s , par ti cularly in ma t ter s o f j o int concern s uch a s hea l th and quarantine . The announc eme nt in 1 9 5 9 tha t Aus tra lia would re cogni ze any peace ful agreement be twe e n Hol land and I ndone sia on the We s t New Gui nea i s sue gave the first indication of a change in po l i cy in favour of Indone s i a , anti c ipating Australia ' s acceptance o f the trans fer o f soverei gnty in 1 96 2 .

Notwi ths tandi ng th i s , re la tions be tween Austra lia

an d I ndone s i a continued t o deteriorate during the fi r s t hal f o f the 1 9 6 0 s and Aus tra l i an fe ars of a po s s ible Indone sian inva sion of Papua New Guinea re sul te d in a

drama ti c increase in defe nce spending in Papua

New Gui nea and a s ubs tant i a l outlay on a i rst rips , wha rve s and o ther i n fras truc ture in the borde r areas . The immediate impact of the tra n s fer o f sove re i gnty wa s an i n flow of We st Papuan nationa l i s ts in to Papua New Gui nea .

As far a s

po s s ible the Aus tra l ian admin i s tra tion dea lt wi th the se c ro s s ings a s though they we re tradit iona l moveme nts a n d encouraged the bo rder c ro s se rs to return , but a sma ll n umb er wa s granted permi s s ive res idency . Wi th the growi ng re s i s tanc e to I ndone sian rule in We st New Gui nea from 1 96 5 , movement into Papua New Gui nea increa s ed sha rp ly .

The re wa s ,

mo reover , a number of borde r inc idents as I ndone si an patro l s pur sued I ri anese acro s s the borde r .

The Aus tralian re sponse ha s been we l l

s umma ri zed by Ve rri e r ( 1 9 7 6 : 3 6 6 - 7 ) Along wi th the trouble s in WNG as a whole , the Aus tra lian Gover nme nt played th is down [a nd ] , from 1 9 6 7 , to avoid embarra ss ing I ndone sia , took a to ughe r l i ne on border cro s s ing even of the traditiona l kind which had been to lerated in the past .

82

She add s Cont rary to o f fi ci a l pub l i c s tatements the ma j ori ty o f I ri anese who c ro s sed the border in 1 9 6 8 a n d 1 9 6 9 undoubted ly di d so f o r p oliti cal rea son s , j ust a s mo st o f them were undoubtedly sent back for po li tical reason s . I n addi tion there i s no doubt tha t I r i a ne s e d i s s i dent aci tivi ty directed aga ins t I ndone s i a had a bas e i n the bush camp s on the Aus tra l i an side of the i nternationa l border . One result was a number o f borde r i n c i dent s o f potenti a l ly serious proportion , and yet ano ther wa s the c reation o f lia i son arrangements between Aus tral i a a n d I ndone sia to re so lve them . The a nxi e ti e s o f the expatri a te population duri ng the 1 9 5 0 s and e arly 1 9 6 0 s are recorded i n the page s o f the South Pacific Pos t (which mai ntai ne d a regular covera ge o f e vents i n We s t Irian throughout the 196 0 s ) and the deba te s of the Legi s lative Counc i l .

They urged

s upport fo r the Dutch po s i t ion unti l it became obvious tha t thi s was a l o s t cause and they used the spec tre o f an I ndone sian inva s ion to gai n s upport for a Me lane sia n Federation and for propo s a l s tha t Papua New Guinea become a seventh sta te o f Austra l i a . Paradoxi c a l ly , con s i dering the re la tive l eve l s o f soc i a l and e conomi c deve lopment in the two terri tori e s , in 19 6 2 there was not in Papua New Guine a , as there wa s in Wes t New Gui ne a , a conspi cuous nationa l i s t e l i te .

Hence the reaction from wi thin Papua New Guinea to the trans fer

o f soverei gn ty i n that year wa s a lmos t entire ly an e xpatri a te rea c tion . Howeve r i n January 19 6 2 de le ga te s to a loc a l gove rnment coun c i l conference i n Po rt More sby p a s s e d a re solution agai n s t an I ndone sia n takeover o f We s t New Gui ne a i

i n June 1 9 6 2 John Gui se to ld Papua New

Guinea ' s Legi s lative Counc i l tha t hi s e l e c torate had a sked him to expre s s concern over the fate o f We st New Gui nea and tha t he suppo rted an immedia te re fe re ndum i n We s t New Guinea , and in Augus t ( fo l lowing a me e t i ng of the South Pac i fi c Commi s s ion ) Gui se wa s one of three Papua New Guinean s i gnatori e s to a l e t ter sent to the secretary-general o f the Uni ted Nations critici zing the UN ' s handl i ng o f the que s tion . During the second hal f o f the 1 9 6 0 s the s i tuation changed qui te pro foundly i

indeed Verri e r ( 1 9 7 6 : 36 9 ) ha s sugge sted that the We st

New Guinea di spute was a cata lyst in the eme r gence o f Papua New Guinean national i sm in the 1 9 6 0 s and ha s commente d furthe r ( Verrie r 1 9 7 6 : 2 0 0 )

83 tha t I n the unpre cede nte d f lurry o f a ct ivi ty which took place i n PNG [ i n the 1 9 6 0 s ] large ly because o f Aus tral i a ' s own fears o f I ndone sia , tho se fears were firmly implante d i n the mi nds o f PNG ' s fir s t e l i te where they were to remai n when for Austral i a they had gone . I n a re vi ew of Aus tra lian admi ni s tration i n Papua New Guinea from 1 9 5 1 to . 196 3 forme r Te rri tori e s Mini s ter Has luck ha s wri tten ( 1 9 76 : 3 7 2 ) , ' My impre s s i on wa s tha t mos t of the i ndi genous peop le in o ur Territory who were a t a l l aware o f the events were anti - I ndone sia n i n sentiment ' . I n 1 96 5 , wi th I riane se re fuge e s f lowi ng i n to the Sepik a nd We s tern Provi nc e s i n large numbe rs , and Aus tra l i a n o f fi c i a l s putti ng pre s sure on them to re turn , na tiona l member s of the fir s t House of As sembly appealed fo r sympathe tic con s i deration of I r i anese pleas for a sylum 1 and demanded a c lear po l i cy on the re fugee i s sue . One o f the mo s t promi nent spoke smen for the I r i anese was the member for Upper Sepik Open , Wegra Ke nu .

Kenu , from Yako vi l lage

(where the Admi ni s tra tion

had recently p urcha sed land for the reset tl ement of re fugee s ) , had been to s choo l in Ho l l andi a and had re la tives on both sides of the border .

Other s inc luded Paul Langro ( member for We s t Sepik Open , who

later became deputy leader o f the oppo s i tion and oppo s i tion spoke sman on fore i gn a ffai r s ) and Gui se , who had become l eader of the e l e c ted members o f the House .

I n the same year , Gui se and Un i ted Party leader

Ma thias Ta liman , a ttendi ng a UN meeting in New York , spoke wi th the UN secretary-general and demanded tha t the ' Ac t of Free Cho i c e ' be a true re ferendum (Ve rrier 1 9 76 : 38 5 ) . As the ' Ac t of Free Cho ic e ' approached , ac tivi ty a long the borde r inten s i fi e d .

By the end o f 1 9 6 8 about 1 2 00 re fuge e s were

repor ted to have c ros sed and over 2 0 0 were granted permi s s ive re sidency . In November 1 9 6 8 , i n response to repeated que s tioning of Admin i s tra tion po l i cy on the bo rde r (principal ly by forme r mi s s iona ry , Percy Chatte rton ) the secretary for law to ld the Ho use tha t i n vi ew o f the rapid bui ld up of Irianese camp s on the Papua New G uinea side of the borde r over the pa s t few we ek s ,

' toge ther wi th indi ca tions that the camps were

fo c a l po i nt s for po l i ti c a l a c t i vi ty ' ,

1

See HAD I ( 6 ) : 9 2 4 - 5 ,

the Admi ni s tration had i n fo rmed

3 1 Augus t 1 96 5 .

84

the refugees tha t they must return to the I ri an Jaya s i de o f the borde r ; near Sekotchiau a shelter had been des troyed 'owi_ng to i ts i nsanitary 1 . cond i. tion '. Five day s la ter the member for Ea s t Sepik Regiona l , Mi chael Soma.re , moved 'Tha t thi s House exp res ses its sympathy wi th the p l i gh t o f the Wes t I ri a nese refugees i n the Terri tory a n d urges the Admi ni s tration to treat .them wi th every con s i dera tion ' . Somare wa s suppo rted by Cha tterton but o f fi c i a l member s at tacked the mot ion as implyi_ng c ri ti c i sm o f the Admi ni s tra tion ' s a lready liberal po l i cy a nd it was 2 defea ted . I n June there was a further debate on the I ri an Jaya s i tuatio n , occas ioned by an o f f i c i a l s ta tement fol lowing border vio la tions by 3 I ndonesian troop s at Wutung and Kwari . Cha t ter ton s uc ce s s fu l ly moved an amendment to the s ta tement , expres s ing di smay tha t the UN wa s 'not prepared to i n s i s t on the holding o f a genuine a c t o f free choice ' a nd reques ting the Aus tra l i a n government to transmi t the motion to the

UN .

During the debate a number of members expres sed sympathy wi th thei r Melanesi a n brother s but , i nteres ti ngly , their i re wa s di rected not so much a t Indonesia

( severa l spec i fi ca l ly sa i d they had no di spute wi th

I ndone s i a ) as at the UN ;

members were quick to poi n t out that though

the . UN had thought f i t to criti c i ze the conduc t of the elec tions i n Pap ua New Gui nea i n 1 9 6 8 i t wa s consp i c uous ly si lent o n the denial o f free choice to the I ria nese . I n May 1 9 6 9 about five hundred students , church leaders and others s �aged a march through the s treets o f Port Moresby , fol lowi ng a forum at the Uni ver s i ty of Papua New Gui nea ( UPNG ) , and a petition wa s presente d to the Administra tor p rotes ting _aga i n s t the Aus tra lian qovernment ' s tac i t support of Indonesia . Afte r the 'Ac t of Free Choice • there were numerous comp la i n ts ,

1

HAD ! ! ( 3 ) : 5 8 9 - 9 0 , 20 November 1 968 .

2

See HAD ! ! ( 3 ) : 6 7 1 -4 , 2 5 November 1 968 .

3

See HAD I I ( 5 ) : 1 1 3 1 - 3 , 1 34 2 -6 , 1 4 3 6 -4 4 ; 1 7 , see Goode ( 1 9 7 0 ) .

26 and 2 7 June 1969 . A l so

85

expre s s ed i n the House of Assembly a nd through l e tter s to the Po st­

Courier , tha t the Aus tra lian admi ni s tration wa s p utti ng pre s sur e on re fugee s to re turn to I r ian Jaya . The reaction of Papua New Gui neans to the We s t New Gui nea que sti � n in th i s p er i od wa s a comp l e x of a t l ea s t thr ee e l eme nts .

In

the f i r s t place there wa s a genuine sympathy for the po s i tion of these fel low Me lane s ian p eopl e ; in 1969 ,

a s no l e s ser p er son tha n Micha el Sornare said 1 Th.:i_ s syrnpa thy i ncrea sed a s ' We are the same people '

the evidenc e of I ndone sian repr e s s ion in I ri an Jaya mounted a nd a s a growi ng number of I r iane se took up r e s idenc e i n Papua New Gui nea and brought s tor i e s of repr e s s ion a nd per s ec u tion .

Secondly , the way in

which not on l y the Dutch b u t a l so t h e Uni ted S tate s , Aus tra l i a a nd in tur n the United Nations capi tulated t o I ndone s ia ' s di splay o f truculence caused concern among the more thoughtful members of Papua New Gui nea ' s e l ite .

Thi s wa s p ungently expre s sed by Cha tter ton a t the UPNG forum

in 1 96 9

( a s recorded in Ni laidat 2 ( 2 ) ) :

' I f the Uni ted N a tions rats

in We s t I r ian now , it may we l l be that i n a few year s time i t wi l l r a t in Ea s t I ri a n . '

I t wa s a l so a r e c urrent theme in comme nts in the

House of A s s embly a nd c l early lay behi nd some early Papua New Gui nean suppor t for s eventh s ta tehood .

F i na l ly , e xpr e s s ions of suppor t for

s e l f-de termi na tion in West New Gui nea wer e evidenc e of the emergi ng na ti onal i sm in Papua New Gui nea dur i ng the 1 9 6 0 s .

By expr e s s i ng sympa thy

for the I ri anese - par ti cularly whe n o ff i c ia l po l icy wa s ac tive ly to 2 discourage such expr e s si on - and by c r i ti c i zing Aus tra lia for i ts lack of mora l fortitude , Papua New Gui neans wer e serving not ice on the Aus tralian colonial regime of the ir own demands for s e l f -determi na tion . Even a t thi s s ta ge , however , Papua New Gui nean sympa thy for the

1 2

HAD I I ( S ) : l 346 , 25 June 1 9 6 9 . Th i s wa s par tic ular ly evident dur ing the June 1969 House of Assembly deba te . Shortly befor e , Papua New Gui nea n MHAs vi s i ting Aus tra lia had spoken about the comi ng ' act o f f r e e c ho ic e ' i n I r i an Jaya and had been publ i c ly rebuked by Exte rna l Terri tories Min i ster Bar nes ( s ee South Pacific Pos t 23 May 19 69 ) .

86

p l ight of the I r i ane se wa s not wi thout r e s erva tion .

I n 1 9 6 5 Kenu

( 1 9 6 5 - 6 6 : 10 - 1 2 ) had expres sed some fear s about the inf low of people from We s t I r ia n ;

in 19 6 8 Somare , whi l e e xpre s s ing sympa thy for them ,

said ' we mus t put them i n d i f ferent areas so tha t they ca nno t plan 1 unr e s t ' , a nd in 1 9 7 0 the member for Maprik Ope n , P ita Lus , to ld the House ' We· do not wa nt the se refugee s to come here a nd make trouble . '

2

More s i gni fica ntly , a t the UPNG forum i n 1 9 6 9 Albert Maori Kiki d i sappo i nted s tudents by refusing to commi t the Pa ngu Pat i on the We s t Irian que stion , s tres s i ng the need , on s e c ur ity grounds , to s ee I ndon e s i a a s a fr i end , a nd i n the House of As s embly Pangu member Tony Vouta s spoke of the need to ma i ntain a stable government in I ndone s ia even a t the expense of ' the human r ights of the mi nority i n We s t Iri a n . •

3

The Irian Jaya ques tion in pos t independence Papua New Guinea . Although forma l r e spons ibi l i ty for Papua New Guinea ' s for eign po l i cy rema i ned wi th the Austra l ia n gover nme nt unti l Papua New Gui nea ' s i ndependence i n S ep tember 1 9 7 5 , i n prac tic e the Somare government began to have a subs ta ntial say in pol i c y formula tion from its acc e s s ion to office in 1 9 7 2 . On the que s tion of Irian Jaya , as for e sha dowed in the comments o f Kiki and Vout a s the coa l ition gover nment did no t seek to cha nge the broad po licy of the Aus tra lian governmen t - indeed there were s trong s ugge s tions in 1 9 7 2 and aga i n in 1 9 7 3 tha t the Somare government was taki ng a much tougher l i ne on Iriane s e re fuge e s tha n had the colonia l 4 admi ni s trati on be fore i t . Re sponding t o que s tions about hi s governmen t ' s dec i s i on i n July 1 9 7 2 to deport e i ght Ir ianese border cro s s er s , Somare was quoted as sayi ng tha t a c c epta nc e o f I rianese refuge e s wi th OPM 5 sympathi e s could a f fec t r e lations wi th I ndone s i a ; Au stra l i a n Externa l

1

HAD I I ( 3 ) : 6 7 1 , 2 5 November 1 96 8 ·

2

HAD I I ( l 2 ) : 3 7 0 9 , 19 November 1 9 7 0 .

3

HAD I I ( 5 ) : 14 39 , 2 7 June 1969 .

4

S ee , for examp le , Age 2 1 August 1 9 7 2 and 2 3 July 1 9 7 3 .

5

A ge 2 1 August 1 9 7 2 ; a l so see Post-Courier 1 7 , 1 8 and 2 5 Augus t 1 9 7 2 and Sydney Morning Hera ld 1 8 August 1 9 7 2 .

87

Terri tor i e s Mi ni ster Peacock , who se approva l o f the deporta ti on wa s required , wa s repor ted to have comme nted ' I t i s their country and 1 they are e ntit led to determine who r e s ide s there . • I n February 1 9 7 3 Somare , on beha l f of the Aus tra lian government , s igned an agre ement wi th I ndone sia which de fi ned the location of the border .

The re wa s l i t tl e debate on the subs equent author i z ing

legi s l ation , the sole d i s s enting vo i c e be ing tha t of Langro who wa s poi ntedly remi nded by Somare ' that we have a population of only 2 . 5 mi l l ion people whi l e I ndonesia ha s abo ut 10 0 mi l l ion peopl e .

When we see such

a big population i n the c ountry border ing our s we mus t not create any 2 A fur ther agreement , on admi ni s tra tive di sputes wi th I ndone sia . • border arrangements, wa s sig ned i n late 1 9 7 3 .

Thi s cover ed such ma tter s

a s tradi tiona l land r i ghts , tradi tiona l movement , he a lth , quarantine a nd pollution , and lia i son arrangement s , which had been the subj ects o f early agreements , and a n important new provi sion , the obl i ga tion of both parti e s to prevent the use of the ir r e spec tive terri tor ies 3 for ho s t i l e activit i e s a ga i n s t the other . Dur i ng the ear ly 1 9 7 0 s border cro s s i ngs conti nued ,

though on

a much reduc ed scale , and the number of I r iane se gra nted permi s s ive res id ency i nc rea sed .

However , wi thi n Papua New Guinea popular inter e s t

i n the Irian Jaya si tuat ion se ems to have dimi ni shed a s peop l e bec ame more preoccup i e d with ma i nta ining i nterna l harmony and wi th the general bus i ne s s of preparing for i ndepe ndence .

In o f f i c i a l s ta teme nts ,

which provided the f i r s t outl i ne s of the country ' s ' univer sa l i s t ' foreign poli cy , par ti cular re ferenc e wa s made to the fr iendship and under standi ng wh ich exi sted be twee n Papua New Guinea and Indone sia and it wa s acknowl edged tha t ' I ndone sia ha s shown under s tandi ng in our 4 ro l e of granting permi ss ive res idence to Irian Jaya re fuge e s .

1

Austra lian Financia l Review 18 Augus t 1 9 7 2 .

2

Se e HAD I I I ( l S ) : 18 3 1- 3 , 1 8 4 0 -4 , 1 8 , 1 9 June 1 9 7 3 .

3 4

The agreement i s reproduced be low a s appendix 1 . Address by the then Chi e f M i ni ster (Mr Micha el Somar e ) to the Australian I n stitute of I nt ernat ional Affa ir s , Me lbourne , June 1974 ( quot ed in Departme nt of Foreign Affa i r s a nd Trade 1 9 7 6 : 1 7 ) .

88

But whi l e i n o ff ic i a l s ta tements the Papua New Gui nea governme nt wa s unr e s erved in i ts expr e s s ions of fr i e ndship towa rds I ndone s ia and its a c c eptance o f I ndone sia n sover eignty ove r Irian Jaya , i n s tateme nts out s ide diploma ti c c i r c l e s the cons tant re fer ence to the relative s i ze of populations a nd a rmed for c e s and to ' s l e eping giants ' and ' l ions '

and the occas iona l acknowledgement of Me lane s i an brotherhood ,

l e f t l i ttle doubt tha t Papua New Guinea ' s po s i t ion wa s dic tated by The si tuation wa s no t improved by 1 I ndone sia ' s inva s ion of Ea s t Timer in 1 9 7 5 .

e xpedienc e ra ther than sympa thy .

I t wa s p erhap s thi s conf l i c t be tween expedi enc e and sympathy tha t promp ted Kiki , a s Mini s ter for Defenc e , For e ign Re l a tions a nd Trade , i n 1 9 7 3 to i nit ia te ' s ecret diplomacy ' d e s i gned ' to mediate be twee n the rebe l s and the I ndones ia n Gover nme nt and br i ng about condi tions whe re the two could have come toge the r fo r con struc tive cons ideration of the mea ns of pea c e ful reintegra tion o f the rebel groups ,2 i nto the I r i anese community . Over a period of year s , wi th the ble s s ing of the I ndonesia n government , Papua New Gui nean mi ni s ters and se nior o f fi c i a l s ta lked wi th rebe l leader s from overseas and from the bush but they were unable to br ing the I ndone s ians and the Ir ia ne s e to the conference tabl e , largely , a c cor ding to Kik i , because of divi s ions wi thi n the rebel movement . In 1 9 7 6 the po si tion of Ir ia ne s e refug ees aga in came in to promi ne nce .

In February the Dutch based Revo lutionary Provi s iona l

Government of We st Papua

( RPG ) i s s ued a r elea se c la imi ng tha t 5 , 0 0 0

( la ter the fi gure became 1 5 , 0 0 0 ) I ndone s ia n troop s wer e invo lved i n

1

Papua New Gui nea ' s o f f i c i a l conc ern over Indone si an int er vention in Ea s t Timer wa � e legantly stated by K ik i in a speech to the U N General As s embly in S ept ember 1 9 7 6 ( Depa r tment o f For eign Affa i r s and Trade 1 9 7 6 : 4 7 - 8 ) . After Somare s vi s i t to I ndone sia in Janua ry 1 9 7 7 , however , the gover nment adopted a more conc i lia tory l i ne , descr ibing the Timer si tuation ' e ntirely as a domes tic ma tt er of Indone s ia ' (Austra lian Foreign Affairs Record Janua ry 1 9 7 7 : 4 7 ) and in Dec ember 1 9 7 8 i t oppo sed a UN r e so l ut ion supporting sel f -determination for Ea s t Timer . For an a c count o f popular reac tion , see Samana ( 1 97 6 ) . � demonstr a tion organi z ed by the Women ' s Action Group c a l l ed on the governme nt to take a s tand aga i n s t ' third wor ld impe r i a l i stic domi nat ion ' (Post-Courier 9 December 1 9 7 5 ) �

2

See Post-Courier 2 3 February 1 9 7 6 � on the negot ia tions .

Thi s wa s the fir st publ i c s ta tement

89

an o f fensive near the border i n which napalm had been used a nd 1 6 0 5 vi ll ager s k i l led , a nd tha t Aus tr a lian of ficers of the Pac i fic I s lands 1 Regiment had cooperat ed i n sea l i ng the border . The r epor t was promptly denied by both Kiki a nd Somare a nd by the De fenc e Depar tme nt but Somare wa s c learly angered by the pub l i c i ty it had re ce ived and to ld a pre s s con ference tha t the government would pro secu te Papua New Gui neans ca ught a c tive ly s uppor ting I ria n Jaya freedom f i ghter s and deport Ir iane se permi s s ive res idents suppor ting them .

' We do not recogni ze rebe ls ' , 2 he said , ' We recogni ze I ndone sia ' s sove rei gnty • . In re sponse to thi s , 3 a spok e sman for the I ri anese commun i ty i n Port Mo re sby i s sued a s ta tement saying that ' The threats o f Government action a ga i n s t di s s idents

mus t no t go uncha l lenged ' , tha t the Ir ianese may be forced to seek Commun i s t a i d , and tha t they would make representa tions to the UN High Commi s s ioner for Re fugee s .

However , a f ter Kiki had accused the group

of breaching the condi tions o f the i r res idency and threa tened depor ta tion 4 the communi ty ' s spoke sman re trac ted and the sub j ec t wa s dropped . La te r i n the same year the re fugee i s sue a ga in became a poi nt o f conte ntion , thi s time as the re sult of an I ndone s ian pre s s repor t . I n Dec embe r , shor tly be for e a p lanned vi s i t to I ndone sia by Somare , Papua New Guinea ' s Nat iona l Broadca sting Commi s s ion re layed a report from the o f f i c i a l I ndone sia n newsagency Antara ( apparently emana ting from the I ndone sia n emba s sy i n Port Moresby ) tha t talk s had begun between the Papua New Guinea and I ndone s i a n gove rnme nts over the extradi tion

of five hundred Irianese r es idents in Papua New Gui nea .

Although the report wa s denied by Soma re ,

the subj e c t wa s ra i s ed a s

a matter o f pub l i c impor ta nc e in the Na tiona l Par l i ament where seve ra l speake rs c ri ti c i zed I ndone s i a and the UN , re ca l led the i nva s ion of

1

See Po st-Courier 1 8 February 1 9 7 6 .

2

Post-Courier 2 0 February 1 9 76 .

3

According to the Pos t-Courier 24 February 1 9 7 6 a community organi za tion ha d been e s tabli shed earl i e r for propo sed round table talk s wi th the I ndones i an and Papua New G ui nea gove rnments and repre sented about 2 0 0 people .

4

Pos t-Courier 26 February 1 9 7 6 .

90

Ea s t Timar , a nd demanded i ndependence for I r ian Jaya .

The member for

Maprik Open , P i ta Lus , told the House . . . the Uni ted Nations is not do ing its j ob to recogni ze I thi nk i t i s made up o f l a zy the We s t Ir ian cause . I f only thi s country could send me to the bugge r s ! Uni ted Na tions . . . I would te l l the Uni te d Na tions to giye We s t Irian i ts freedom and the member for Manus , Mi cha el Pondro s , sai d ' i f we cannot reach any agreement , we should go to war . '

Nor were I ndones ians l ikely to

have taken much comfort from the a s surances o f Kiki tha t ' The Wes t I rianese are o ur ne i ghbour s and friend s 1 i ntention o f se l ling our brothers . '

The Governernn t ha s no

Re lations be twe en the Papua New Guinea government and the I ndones i an emba s sy in Port More sby were s ti l l a l i ttle unea sy when i n Janua ry 1 9 7 7 the head o f the RPG , Bri g-General S e th Rurnkorem , c ro s sed i n to Papua New Gui nea and wa s f lown to Port More sby for ta lk s wi th the I ndone sian emba s sy ' exp re s s ed concern about the 2 Government maki ng ava i lable fac i l i ti e s to the rebe l s . • And re la tions the gove rnmen t ;

betwe en the Papua New Guinea governmen t and I rianese di s s idents were not improved fo l lowi ng repo rts tha t the l iberation movemen t would use 3 te rrori sm i n the Pac i fi c to gain recogni tion for i ts cause . Re lations betwe en Papua New Gui nea and Indone sia ove r the border conti nued to deterio rate from around May 1 9 7 7 when hundreds of I r i ane se began cros s i ng into the We s tern and Wes t S epik Provi nc e s .

The movemen t

o f I rianese acro s s the bo rder wa s known to be a s soc ia ted wi th an i n ten s i fication o f confl i ct between OPM sympathi sers and I ndone si an mi l i ta ry forces in the pe riod leading up to Indone s i a ' s nationa l 4 e l ections . But when Kik i e xpre s s ed conc ern at the border s i tuation

1

See NPD I ( l 8 ) : 2 4 00 - 10 , 9 December 1 9 7 6 .

2

Po st-Courier 6 , 1 0 January 1 9 7 7 .

3

See Post-Courier 2 9 Apr i l 1 9 7 7 . The report wa s subseque ntly deni ed (Post-Courier 3 May 1 9 7 7 ) .

4

Se e , for e xample , Canberra Time s 3 1 May 1 9 7 7 .

91

I ndone sian For e i gn Mi n i s ter Ma lik to ld him , c urtly , tha t the recent ' triba l fi ghti ng ' in Irian Jaya wa s a dome s t i c a f fa i r and tha t I ndone s i a wo uld not to lerate tho se who at tempted to explo i t the triba l 1 c la she s for po li ti ca l purpo s e s . At the e nd o f May 1 9 7 7 the re we re reported to be over two hundred refugee s at Suk i in the We s te rn Province and several hundred more a t other po i nts a long the border . There were a l so repor t s that a Papua New Guinean vi l lager had been shot by an I ndonesia n patro l on the Papua New Guinea s ide of the border .

2

The gove rnment thus found i tse l f i n the uncomfortable po s i tion o f having to reas sure I ndone sia that it wa s not provi ding

a

harbour

fo r opponents o f the I ndone sia n regime , whi l e a t the same time at tempting to me e t the cons iderable local pre s sure s

( i nc l udi ng pre s sure

from the repre senta ti ve o f the UN High Commi s s ion fo r Re fugees ) to dea l sympa thet i c a l ly wi th the border cro s sers a nd not to let i t s e l f b e pushe d aro und b y I ndone s i a - and thi s a t a time which the Post­

Courier ( 3 June 1 9 7 7 ) de li cate ly re ferred to a s ' the sens i ti ve pre­ e lection pha se ' . I n June the secretary o f the Department of Fore i gn Affa i rs and Trade , Tony S i agur u , told reporte r s tha t the re fuge e s had returned to I rian Jaya a fte r be i ng tol d of Papua New Guinea ' s po l i cy on 3 border cro s s i ngs . I rianese sympathizer s , howe ver , susp ec ted tha t undue pre s s ure had been put on the refuge e s and Langro , as deputy leader o f the oppo s i tion , i s sued a s ta tement accusing the Somare 4 government o f appeasemen t . Duri ng the en sui ng e lec tions the Soma re government wa s frequen tly a ttacked for i ts hand ling of the Irian Jaya i s sue ; Noe l Levi

among tho se who took up the i s s ue were Lan gro , Pondros ,

( forme r De fence se c retary who was a succe s s ful candidate

i n New Ire land ) and John Jaminan ( forme r head o f the securi ty

1 2

3 4

See

Poat-Courier 8 , 1 3 , 15 June 1 9 7 7 .

See Post-Courier 30 May 1 9 7 7 . The reports were subseque n tly de n ied by inte l l i ge nce source s . See Pos t- Courier 2 June 1 9 7 7 .

Sydney Morning Hera ld 1 June 1 9 7 7 .

92

i n te l l i gence branch who was a succe s s ful candi date in the E a s t Sepik e l e c torate o f Yango ru- S aus s i a and be came , for a whi le , oppos i tion spoke sman on for e i gn a ffair s ) . Nor di d Somare fi nd , on hi s re turn to o f f i ce i n Augu st , that the i s s ue had gone away .

During the se cond ha l f of 1 9 7 7 and early

1 9 7 8 it became abundantly clear tha t what Malik had di smi s sed a s ' tribal c l a she s ' was in fact a s e r i e s o f wide spread con frontations between I ndone s i an troop s and I ri anese d i s s i den ts .

I t wa s in thi s

c onte xt that i n November 1 9 7 7 the Min i s te r for De fence , Donatu s Mola , 1 i n formed Parl i ament tha t Re cently gove rnment po l i cy has been t o take a toughe r l i ne wi th a l l borde r cro s sers . Peop l e who ente r Pap ua New Guinea i l l e ga l ly can now expect to be a rre ste d and may be put i n gao l or handed ove r to I ndone s i an author i ti e s . During 1 9 7 8 thi s si tuatio n became mo re . comp l e x and the governmen t found i tse l f sque e zed on three sides :

by the I ndone sians , who sought

a f i rm commi tme nt aga i n s t I ri an e se rebe l s ;

by an i ncreas ing ly voc a l

grou p wi thi n t h e coun try whi ch demanded sympa thy towards I r i ane se free dom fi ghte r s ;

and by OPM le ader s , who thre a tened mi l i tant action

agai n s t Papua New Guinea if it a ttemp ted to c lo s e the border . I n Apri l the gove rnment was embarras s e d by the pub l icati o n o f a n OPM pre ss release nami ng the membe rs o f the newly appoin ted mi ni s try of the de facto gove rnmen t of We st P apua .

Of the e i ghteen

name s on the list six we re P apua New Guinea c i ti zens , two were p e rmi s s i ve re s i de nts , and two were serving gao l sentence s for i l le ga l e n try b u t had given no ti c e o f the i r i ntentions t o app ly for political asylum .

I n a statement pending a full enqui ry , the Mini s ter for

Fore i gn Affai rs and Trade , Ebi a Olewa le , s a i d that he vi ewed the ma tte r wi th the ' utmo st gravi ty '

and threa tened to canc e l the en try permi ts

' we wi l l oppose any minori ty which seeks to invo lve 2 Papua New Gui nea in the dome s t i c a ffai rs of Indone s i a ' , he sai d . of tho s e named ;

However thi s di d not p revent the I ndone s i an embas sy from maki ng

1

NPD I I ( 4 ) : 3 8 1 , 10 Novembe r 1 9 7 7 .

2

Post-Courier 19 Apri l 1 9 7 8 .

93

s trong repre sentations to the governmen t and ca l l ing o n the named rebe l s to declare the i r loyalti e s ;

moreover I ndone sia n fi r s t

secretary S i re ga r wa s reported a s a c cusin g Papua New Gui nea of havi ng do uble s tandards a nd saying ' I f we wanted to invade Papua New 1 Guinea we would do it now when Papua New Guinea i s weak . ' The Indonesians a l so reque s ted tighter contro l s over j ourna l i s ts .

Olewale

reacted sharp ly to the se pr e s sures and wa s repor ted to have a sked 2 the Indonesian amba s sador to consider r epos ting S i r e gar . I n the week fo l lowi ng publi c a tion o f the OPM cabi net l i s t i t wa s announc ed tha t Olewa le , Mona and De fence Force Commande r Diro had he ld ta lks in Port More sby wi th OPM leaders Jacob Prai and S e th Rurnkorem .

Pra i and Rurnkor em were to l d to remove camps wi thi n the 3 We s t Sepik Provi nc e or have them burnt . Ac cordi ng to the Po st-

Courier ( 2 8 Apr i l 1 9 7 8 ) ,

' They were to ld PNG did not wa nt to a c t

a ga i n s t "other Me lane s i ans " , but , a t the same time , the Government could not a f ford a fa l l out wi th I ndone s ia . '

Jour na l i s t Mark Baker

described the ultimatum as ' the s tronge s t s tand PNG ha s ye t taken a ga i ns t the gueri l la s ' but reported tha t i t had been firmly re j ec ted . In May Olewa le made an o f fi c ia l vi s i t to I ndone s ia . I ndone sia n o f fi c i a l s s uc c eeded i n commun i c a ti ng the ir doubt s about the s trength of Papua New Guinea ' s commi tment to i ts obl i ga tions under the 1 9 7 3 . 5 border arrangements and at the conc lus ion of his vi s it Ol ewa le to ld repor ters that Papua New Guinea wa s now mounting ' cons tant patro l s ' 6 along the border .

1

Post-Courier 19 , 2 6 , 2 8 Apri l 1 9 7 8 .

2

Sydney Morning Hera ld 2 May 1 9 7 8 .

3

See Post-Courier 2 8 Apr i l 1 9 7 8 , 1 May 1 9 7 8 and Age 2 9 Apri l 1 9 7 8 .

4

Age 2 9 Apri l 1 9 7 8 .

5

See Post-Courier 2 6 May 1 9 7 8 ( ' I ndone s i a

6

Sydney Morning Hera ld 1 8 May 1 9 7 8 .

i s susp ic ious ' } ..

4

94

Ac tiv i ty a long the border further i ntens i f i e d in l a te May 1 9 7 8 fo l lowi ng the k idnapping of I ndon esia n offic i a l s by a rebe l group so uth of Jayapura .

At the e nd o f the month the Post-Co7.-Wier ( 3 1 May

1 9 7 8 ) repor ted tha t a large s c a l e I ndone s i a n mi l i tary operation wa s i n progre s s .

Short ly a f ter , Somare announced h i s government ' s dec i s ion

to dep loy addi tiona l troops a nd po l i c e a long the nor thern sec tor of 1 the boundary i n order to prevent rebe l s from cro s s i ng ; ac cording to Olewa le , a ny rebe l s e nco untered by Papua New Guinea border patro l s they would be to ld to go 2 back and i f they refused they would be arr e s ted . However , a l though

wo uld b e dea lt wi th i n a ' Me l anes i a n Way ' :

there was l i a i son be twe en the two governments , Papua New Gui nea fi rmly 3 re s i s ted repeated I ndone s i a n reque s ts for j o in t patro l s . In the fo l lowi ng week s there wa s a t l e a s t one ma j or border i nc ur s ion by a n I ndone s ian patrol whi ch wa s reported

to have raided

a Papua New Guinea vil lage and des troyed garden s , bri ngi ng an o f f i c i a l 4 Ear ly i n July I ndone sian prote s t from the Papua New Gui nea govP-rnment . operations e scalated ; vi l la ge s were s tra fed and plastic bombs dropped . i n the border area .

In Papua New Gui nea the governmen t e xpre s s e d to

the I ndone s i a n ambas sador i ts fear s for the sa fety o f Papua New Guinea c i ti z ens near the border but reque s t s to I ndone s i a to confine bombing rai ds to an area no t l e s s than 8 km from the border were re fused . Consc ious of the po s s ibi l i ty o f an a c c i denta l c l a sh be twee n I ndone s i a n and Papua New Guine an patro l s , the Papua New Gui nea governmen t began wi thdrawi ng i ts troops from the area .

Once aga i n hundreds o f I ri anese

vi l lagers moved acro s s the border i n to Papua New Gui nea .

1

At a mee ti ng

By mi d June Papua New Guinea had about 5 0 0 army and police per sonne l i n the border area . Ac cordi ng to Sydney Morning Hera ld reports ( 14 , 2 1 June 1 9 7 8 ) I ndone sia had four ba tta l ions ( about 2 8 0 0 men ) p lus po l i c e parami l it ary uni ts and other anc i l lary force s in Irian Jaya , wi th about 7 0 0 men pa t rol ling the border .

2

Post-Courier 13 June 1 9 7 8 .

3

See Post-Co7.-Wier 1 2 ,

4

See Post-Co7.-Wier 2 2 , 2 3 June 1 9 7 8 ; Age 2 2 ,

1 3 , 2 1 June 1 9 7 8 . 2 5 July 1 9 7 8 .

95

o f the UPNG law fac ulty Papua New Gui nea wa s de scr ibed a s ' s lowly 1 entering a s ta te of war wi th I ndonesia . • In Sep tember the I ndone sian hos tages we re relea sed a nd I ndone sia be gan to scale down i ts mi li ta ry opera tions , but no t be fore there had be e n some s train in Papua New Gui nea ­ Indone s i an re lations and a con s i derable s timulus to an ti Indone sian 2 fee l i ng out s ide the government . On top of thi s , the arr e s t o f Pra i a nd Otto Ondowame i n the Sandaun (We s t Sepik ) Province in late S ep tember came as a bo nus to I ndone s ia but provi ded an addi tiona l headache

for the Papua New

Guinea government - e spe c i al ly when the per s i s tent Si regar a nnounc ed ( i ncorrec t ly , as i t turned out ) tha t I ndonesia would seek the ir extradition 3 to s tand tr i al for trea son . I n November 1 9 7 8 a s tatement by I ndone sia ' s De fenc e Mi ni s ter , Ge nera l Jus uf , gave notice o f a shi f t i n I ndone sia ' s po licy towards Iriane s e di s s idents ;

under a new ' smi l i ng po l i cy ' it would not be 4 nece s sary for the army to p ur s ue rebe l s . I n De c ember the new polic y wa s outl i ne d to Papua New Gui nean mi ni s ter s dur i ng an o f f i c i a l vi s i t to Papua New Gui nea by I ndone s i a ' s Forei gn Mini s ter , Mochtar Kusurnaatrnadj a , who prai sed the Papua New Guinea gove rnmen t for its Te s tra i nt and good

1 2

3

Post-Courier 7 July 1 9 7 8 . Thi s account o f the events o f mi d 1 9 7 8 di f fers somewha t from the interpreta tion of Ha s ti ngs ( above p . 4 ) . If in fa ct the I ndone sian ' overki l l ' wa s inte nded to provoke Papua New Gui nea ' s cooperation (as Ha s tings sugge s ts ) , and wa s not s imply a r e sponse to the May ki dnapp i ng , it was a dangerous p loy of dubious e f fec t , s i nc e Papua New Gui nea ' s eventua l re sponse wa s to wi thdraw i ts troops and s i nce i t con s i derably e xacerba ted anti Indone sian sentimen t . Circums tanc e s surroundi ng the c apture o f Prai a nd Ondowame rema in somewha t my sterious . Pra i c l a ims to have entered Papua New Gui nea i n the be l i e f tha t the government wanted to talk to him . ( On five previous occas ions he had vi s i ted Papua New Gui nea wi thout a visa and wi th the government ' s knowledge . ) Prai be li eve s there may have been a plot to remove him from leader ship ( s ee Age 1 Dec ember 1 9 7 8 ) . Levi c laims they were ' captur ed by Aus tra lian and Indone sia n inte l l i gence operative s ' ( Our News 2 1 ( 4 ) 2 8 February 1 9 7 9 ) . The two were re fused pe rmi s s ive r e s i dency i n Papua New Gui nea and , wi th three other OPM leaders , were eventua l ly granted a sylum in Sweden in March 1 9 7 9 .

4

Far Eastern Economic Review 24 November 1 9 7 8 ; 12 December 1 9 7 8 .

Sydney Morning Hera ld

96

leadership ' in coopera t i ng wi th I ndone s ia . 1 Wi th the s c a l i ng down of mi l i tary ope ra tions and a c erta i n am::> un t of goodwi l l generated b y Mochtar ' s vi s i t , relations be tween the two countr i e s at the o f f i c i a l level seem to have improved .

After

Mochtar ' s vi s i t the two governments commenced di s cus sions pre l imi nary . The f i r s t round o f to the renewa l of the 1 9 7 3 border agreemen t . d i s cus s ions wa s comp l eted i n Ma rch wi thout s i gni ficant dis agreement . The a t.no sphere of re newed cordi a li ty even survive d the pub l i c a tion i n February 1 9 7 9 of a doc ume nt purporting to be a p la n for a n I ndon e s ian takeover of Papua New Guinea .

Papua New Gui nean s e c ur i ty experts

d i smi s sed the document a s a fake and there appears to have been 2 vi r tua l ly no public di s c us s ion o f i t . On the o ther hand re l a tions be tween the Papua New Gui nea governmen t and both OPM le a d e r s a nd the Irianese commun i ty i n Pap ua New Guinea appear to have deterio r a ted markedly dur i ng 1 9 78 .

I n part thi s wa s

the i nevi table conseque nce o f the gover nment ' s tougher a tti tudes towards border cro s s i ngs a nd towards vi s ible s upport for the OPM wi thi n Papua New Gui nea .

But i t a l so re f l ec ted the d i f f i c ul t i e s o f dea l i ng

wi th a movement sharp ly divi ded wi thi n i ts e l f a nd o f comi ng to t erms wi th a l eadership which , at lea s t verba l ly , looked i ncreas i ngly towards 3 terror i sm . After the capture of Prai and Ondowame severa l membe rs of the gover nment rece ived threa ts of vio l enc e and at a cabinet mee ting i n Wewak , usua l ly a ve ry ca s ua l a f fa i r , mi ni s ters we re heavi ly guarded by po l i c e wi th arrnali te ri fl e s .

Al so , the removal of two I r iane s e

re fuge e s in an OPM ra i d on the re fugee camp a t Yako in Apr i l 1 9 7 9 bro ught a very strong reaction from Somare , who s a i d the inc ident could 4 . . lead to a harde ning of the government ' s atti tude towards the separa t i s ts �

1

Se e Sydney Morriing Hera ld 1 1 , 1 5 December 1 9 7 8 .

2

See Nation Review 1 February 1 9 7 9 and Pos t -Courier 8 ,

3

See , for e xample , Post-Courier 2 9 Apri l 1 9 7 7 , 2 , 3 May 1 9 7 7 , 2 7 September 1 9 7 7 , 1 0 November 1 9 7 7 ( but see 14 November 1 9 7 7 ) , 2 3 October 1 9 7 8 and Age 1 3 June 1 9 7 8 .

4

Canberra Times 4 Apr i l 1 9 7 9 .

12 February 1 9 7 9 .

97

I n retro spec t , the n , t h e pri ncip a l outcome s o f the in tens i fi ed act ivi ty along the border i n 1 9 7 7 - 7 8 seem to have be en , fi r s t , the demon s tration o f a firm commi tment by the governme nt to preventing the use o f Papua New Guinea a s a ba se for d i s s i dent act ivi ti e s and to di s couraging l arge sca le movement acro s s the border , whi le a t the same time tak i ng a firm s tand a ga i n s t I ndone s i an pres sures on ma tter s o f day to day po l i cy ;

s econdly , the deteriorat ion o f re lations between

the Papua New Gui nea gove rnment and the OPM and i ts supporters , and , thirdly , an apparent growth of popul ar s upport for the Irianese which ha s i ncreased the sa li e nce o f the border i s sue in Papua New Gui nea ' s 1 domestic po l i ti c s . I t i s to the l a s t o f the se tha t we now turn .

Domestic pressures on the Irian Jaya issue . I n recent yea r s there ha s be.en an i ncre a s i ng popular awarene s s i n Papua New Gui nea o f ' the I r i a n Jaya p roblem ' and growing sympathy for ' our Me lane s ian brother s ' .

I n some c a s e s , inc luding p ubl i c

s ervants and member s o f the government , s uch sympa thy i s influenc ed by per sona l contacts wi th I r ianese a nd i s o f ten l i nked wi th antipathy towards I ndone s ia or wi th a fee l i ng of resentment that Papua New Gui nea ' s po l i cy i s dicta ted by I ndo nes ia or Aus tra l i a . mo s t par t i t i s a vague and large ly uni nformed sympa thy .

But for the To di smi s s

the suppor t for I ria ne se fr eedom f i ghter s simply a s evid ence o f ' Indophobia ' i s to gro s s ly ove r s impl i fy the complex of sentiments on whi ch it draws . Notwi th sta nding the widespread sympathy for the I rianese , i t i s unl ikely tha t dome s ti c pre s s ures coul d br i ng about any radi cal shi f t i n Papua New Guinea fo reign �o li cy .

They could , however ,

a f fec t the qua l i ty of Papua New Gui nea ' s re lations wi th Indone sia an d they could have a con siderable e ffec t on dome s ti c po l i ti c s 2 e specially i f there i s truth in the recent repor t that the gover nmen t

1

2

i nd i c a tor of thi s i s the numbe r o f time s I r ian Jaya or I ndone s ian-Papua New Guinean relations occur in the Pos t-Courier a s a news item or i n l e tter s to the editor . Annua l figure s a r e a s fo l lows : 1 9 7 2 , 2 6 ; 1 9 7 3 , 4 0 ; 1 9 7 4 , 8 ; 1 9 7 5 , 11 ; 1 9 7 � 5 0 ; 1 9 7 7 , 7 1 (of which 61 were a f ter 1 May ) ; 1 9 7 8 , 2 2 0 . ( Sourc e : Post-Courier i ndexe s , IASER , Por t More sby . )

A c rude

Sydney Morning Hera ld

25 May 1 9 7 9 .

98

i s c urren tly prepar i ng legi s la tion to s top c i tiz ens actively s upporti ng the Irian Jaya gueri l la moveme n t . I n vi ew o f thi s it i s worth havi ng a c lo s er look at the compo s i tion of the ' I r ia n Jaya lobby ' .

The Irianese communi tu .

Nobody seems to k now how many

I r iane s e -born people there ar e in Papua New Guinea or where they l ive . 1 The usual e s timate of Iriane s e r e side nts i s about 2 , 0 0 0 to 3 , 0 00 , of 2 whom 2 1 7 have b e e n granted Papua New Guinea c i ti zenship . Some of the s e migrated from We s t New Gui nea be fore 1 96 2 ;

the

r e s t are e i ther refugees with the s ta tus of permi ss ive res idence (or c i ti zensh�p ) or p eople who have s lipped acro s s the border and taken up r e s i dence i n vi l lage s o r towns but are techni c a l ly i l legal immigrants . The number i n the latter ca tegory (par ti cularly i n the Wes t a nd Ea s t S epik Prov i nc e s ) i s po s s ibly qui te large . I n broad terms the government ' s po lic y on border cro s s ing ha s 3 not cha nged s i nc e 1 96 2 . Peop l e c ro s s i ng the border are requi red to r epor t to one o f the s everal pa trol pos ts a long the border and s tate the i r rea son for c ro s s ing . common i s sago maki ng )

I f the i r p urpo se i s ' tradi tiona l '

( the mo s t

they ar e norma l ly a l lowed to s tay unti l they

have f i n i shed wha t they came to do and are then expec ted to r eturn acro s s the border .

I f they apply for po l i tical a sylum they are held

unti l a dec i s ion i s taken and then e i ther gran ted permi s sive re s i dence 4 or to ld to r e turn . I n a l l other c a s e s they are to ld to return . If 1 2

3

4

Nyamekye a nd Pr emda s p ut the figure a t 10 , 000 ( s ee above p . 68 ) . Thi s f i gure i s sub j ect to confirma tion . I n Dec ember 1 9 76 , 1 5 7 I ria ne s e were granted c i ti zen ship a n d in June 1 9 7 7 another 6 0 . I n November 1 9 7 8 it wa s reported tha t the government wa s impos i ng a fre e ze on ci ti zenship to I r i anese (Post-Courier 13 November 1 9 7 8 ) . For early e xp lana tions of thi s pol i cy see HAD I I ( 2 ) : 3 5 9 -6 0 , 4 Sep tember 1 9 6 5 ; I I ( 3 ) : 58 9 - 9 0 , 2 0 November 1 9 6 8 ; I I ( 5 ) : 11 3 1- 3 , 1 7 June 1 9 6 9 . Al so se e van der Ve ur ( 1 9 6 5 -66 ) . The government ' s po l i cy wa s s umma ri zed a s fo l lows i n 1 9 7 3 : ' I n general the Papua New Gui nea Governme nt wi ll not recommend permi s s ive r e s idenc e for i l le ga l mi grants from any other country unle s s ther e i s c lear evidence that they would suffer e xtreme danger or ha rdship if re turned to the i r home land ' . (Post-Courier 20 July 1 9 7 3 . )

99

they refus e , they a r e arres ted a nd cha rged a s i l lega l mi grants , a f ter whi ch they may be depor ted .

In prac tic e , however , the admi n is tra tion

of thi s pol i cy ha s var i ed considerably . For mo s t of the 1 960s a nd ear ly 1 9 7 0 s permi s s ive res ide ncy seems to have be en granted fair ly readily , though border patro l s were o f te n very pro f i c i e nt a t ' e scorting ' border On numerous occas ions group s o f people 1 have been a l lowed to s tay i n temporary camp s un ti l the cond i tions cro s s e �s back to the borde r .

whi ch caused the i r move have abated ;

whi l e i n such camps they have

be en given food a nd medi c a l a ttention .

I n at lea s t one i n s tanc e , in

1 9 7 7 , the Papua New Gui nea gove rnment ha s sought I ndone sia ' s a s sura nce tha t those re turning wi l l not be harmed .

I n the pas t it would seem

tha t po l i tic a l a sylum ha s been granted fa i r ly readi ly to tho se who could p laus ibly c laim tha t they would suffer persecution i f they wer e re turned to Indone s ia , b u t i n the r e cen t c a s e s o f Prai , Ondowame , Maury and I ndey the government wa s obvious ly re luc tant to grant a sylum to people who s e pre sence could pre j udic e rela tions wi th I ndone s ia . There i s no e xtradition treaty be tween the countri e s .. Those granted permi s s ive r e sidence mus t accept two condi tions : that they wi l l set tle wherever they and their fami l i e s are di rec ted ( i n pra c tice , where j obs are ava i l able away from the border ) , and tha t they wi l l ' never directly or i ndirec tly ge t i nvo lved in po litical a c tivi ties which caused

[ them ] seeki ng for a sylum in Papua New Gui nea'

(Verr ier 1 9 7 6 Appendix F ) .

The f i r s t of the conditions ha s had the

e f fec t o f di s tributing the I rianese communi ty fa i r ly wide ly throughout the country and mo s tly in towns

(par ticula rly in Manus - whe re in the

1 960s and 1 9 7 0 s la rge number s o f permi s si ve re sidents we re accommoda ted temporari ly - and Port Moresby ) . ve ry strict ly e n forced .

1

The second condi tion ha s not been

The c ircums tance s o f ga ining permi s s ive

At present there are three ho lding camp s , at Yako and Ok saprni n in the Sandaun (We st Sepik ) Provi nc e and Weam in the We s tern Provinc e . The re ha s be en ta lk of e s tabli shing ano ther camp at Wabo in the Gul f Province . In 1 9 7 7 - 7 8 the co s t of ma in ta ining r e fugees a t the se camps wa s quoted variously a t between K8 0 0 a n d K2 0 00 per day ..

100

re s i de ncy vir tua l ly ensure that the Ir ianese communi ty wi l l be antipathet i c , if not ac tively hos ti l e , towa rds I ndone s ia a nd even without engaging in formal po l i ti c a l ac tivi ty some I ria ne s e are likely to fi nd sympathe ti c voi c e s among their Papua New Gui nean neighbour s ( one promi nent Papua New Gui nean spoke sman for I r i a n Jaya ha s j o i n t bus i ne s s ·i nteres ts wi th Iriane s e ) .

Ma ny I ri anese now ho ld s enior

po s i tions i n government , priva te e nterpr i s e a nd the church a nd the re is no doubt that some have used thei r posi tions to pub l i c i ze the gri evanc e s of the I r ianese peop l e .

Moreover s i nce 1 9 6 2 the I r i a ne s e

corranun i ty h a s provi ded an e ffec tive underground c hanne l for OPM propaganda and the exi s te nc e of l i nk s between I r ianes e in Papua New Gui nea and the OPM orga n i z a tion i n I ria n Jaya and over seas was evidenc ed , to everyone ' s embar ra s sment , by the r e l e a s e of the de fac to We s t Papuan cabinet in 1 9 7 7 ( though some o f tho s e named d i s c l a imed a ny i nvo l veme nt ) .

I n the mid 1 9 7 0 s there wa s an I r i a ne s e communi ty

organi zation wi th in Papua New Gui nea ( see fn .

3 p . 38 ) but i n 1 9 77 there

were factions wi thin the communi ty re f l ec ting the divi s ions wi thin the i nternationa l movement .

I n January 1 9 7 8 an organi zation c a l l i ng i ts e l f

the South Pa c i fi c Group oppo sed a n o f fi c ia l ly sanctione d vi s i t by Jouwe .

1

However the government ha s prevented ove rt e xpre s s ions o f support for OPM , and for those Ir ianese tempted to expre s s ope nly the i r oppo s i tion to I ndone s i a the threa t of deporta tion ha s provided a power ful di s i ncentive , and one whi ch the government ha s not he s i ta ted to employ . Moreove r , a s a result o f the confronta tions between the gove rnme nt and the Iriane se communi ty during 1 9 7 7 a nd 1 9 7 8 i t i s l ikely tha t in future the gove rnment wi l l exerc i se even ti ghter contro l over them .

The border vi l lages .

2

For the mo s t par t the bo rder area i s not

heavi ly popula ted , but where there are conc entrations o f popul a tion there are usua l ly tradi tiona l ties , soc i a l or economi c , betwe en Iriane s e and Papua New Guinean vi l lage s .

1 2

See Post-Courier 1 2 , 2 4 , 2 5 ,

Hence when Irianese began t o cro s s

30 January 1 9 7 8 .

The pos i tion of the bo rde r vi ll age s i s di scussed in more de tai l in He rlihy ' s paper .

101

into Papua New Guinea a f ter 1 9 6 2 they wer e genera l ly we l l rec e i ved e spe c i a l ly s i nc e many o f the border vi l la ge s saw themselve s a s s tanding t o gai n from a s so c i a ted border deve lopment plans .

It is

no coinc idenc e that the mo s t promi nent early spokesman for the I riane s e ( apar t from Gui se ) wer e Ke nu a nd Langro and the expa tr iate member - for the Madang- S epik spe c i a l e l e c torate a d j o i ni ng the border ) .

( a l l from e l e c torates

It is di f ficult to say whe ther the scale of

recent acti vi ty a long the border and frus tra ted expectation of deve lopment in the border areas have dimini shed thi s sympathy .

However Diro i s

quoted a s sayi ng i n Apr i l 1 9 78 tha t support among Papua New Gui nea ns near the border i s so s trong tha t no mi l i tary campai gn by Papua New Gui nea aga i n s t the guer i l l a s could s uc c e e d ( Sharp 1 9 7 7 : 1 0 5 , quoting . the ABC ) and reports o f opera t ions i n July 1 9 78 tended to con f irm th i' s .

1

Among other evidence o f loca l suppor t for the freedom fighter s , in December 1 9 7 8 a le tte r appeared i n the Post-Courier s i gned by ' the Bush Peop l e , Bewani ' which a sked the government to retur n Prai a nd 2 Ondowame to the We s t S epik a nd on the UPNG c ampus the We s t Sepik Students ' As soc iat ion ha s ma i ntai ned an ac tive inter e s t i n the border i s sue . The sense o f bro therhood appears to extend in to the Ea s t Sepik Provi nce where , i t seems , a numbe r o f i l legal border c ro s sers have set tled over the years .

I n la te 1 9 7 8 -early 1 9 79 there wa s in the

Ea s t Sepik a cargo c ulti sh movement , in whi ch ' freedom f i ghters ' s tripes and epaulettes were bei ng so ld to vi l lagers for amounts rangi ng from K2 to K 2 0 , though the reasons for acqui ring the i n s i gnia were no t c l ear .

(A s imi lar movement had been evident in the Wes t S epik in

the e ar l y 1 9 7 0 s . )

Ea s t S ep ik po l i ti c ians Tony Bai s a nd John Jaminan

have taken up the cause o f the Irianese r e fugees in the second parliamen t an d i n e ar l y 1 9 7 9 , when di f fi culty wa s being experi enced i n finding a home for

Prai and Ondowame , Ba i s said over the NBC tha t hi s vi l la ge

would p rovide them wi th a home .

1 2

See Sydney Morning Hera ld 1 3 July 1 9 7 8 .

Pos t-Courier 2 0 December 1 9 7 8 .

102

The e xi stence o f such local symp a th i e s may ra i se n e w problems for the national gove rnme n t as powers are progre s s ive ly trans ferred to provi ncial gove rnment s .

The pos s ible s i gni fi cance of thi s i s

i ndicated by the fac t that Langro , havin g l o s t hi s seat i n the National 1 Parliame n t , is now p rovi nc i al s e c re tary of the S an daun Province .

The Church .

The church e xe rc i s e s a strong i n fl uence over

pub l i c opinion i n Papua New Guin e a .

On the I rian Jaya que s tion i ts

concern ove r human rights i s perhap s re i n forc ed by sympathy for a p redomi nantly Chri s ti an movemen t i n a predominantly I s lami c s tate . Havi ng been re lative ly qui e t on the sub j e c t s i nc e 1 96 9 1 recently several church bod i e s have made s trong s tateme nts on the I ri an Jaya que stion .

I n June 1 9 7 7 the National Catho l i c Coun ci l cal l e d on the

I ndon e s i an gove rnme n t ' to re frai n from a c ts of savage ry agai n st 2 Me l ane s i an s in I ri an Jaya ' . I n Oc tober 1 9 7 8 the Me l ane si an Coun ci l o f Churche s

( MCC )

( which repre sents the Angli can , Bap ti s t , Catho l i c ,

Lutheran and Uni ted Churche s and the Salvation Army ) e s tab l i shed a Corruni tte e on Me lane si an Re fuge e s to pro tec t the rights o f I ri anese re fuge e s and to rai s e pub li c awarene s s ;

soon a f te r i ts e s tabli shment

the corruni ttee cri tici zed the governmen t ' s handl in g o f re fuge e s in the We s t S epik .

I n February 1 9 7 9 the MCC to l d the governmen t no t! to

deport P rai and Ondowame , that s uch ac tion would be unchr i s t i an . Al so , in

3

re cent month s the Wantok newspaper , the nation ' s

weekly p idgin newspaper p ubli shed under the d i re c tion o f a board compri s i ng repre sentati ve s of the Catho l i c , Angl i can , Lutheran and Uni ted Church e s , has mai ntained a close and sympathe tic cove rage o f the I ri ane se re fugee problem.

1

4

Thi s po int was brought out during di scus s io n by Bi l l S tandi sh .

2

Post-Courier 1 June 1 9 7 7 .

3

Se e repo rt i n vlantok 17 February 1 9 7 9 .

4

See , for e xamp l e , 9 De c embe r 1 9 7 8 ( ' Jacob Prai na We s I ri an ' ) , 2 0 January 1 9 7 9 ( ' Tarangu Prai ' ) , 1 0 February 1 9 7 9 ( ' Fri dom Pai tman ' ) , and 1 7 February 1 9 7 9 ( ' Mipe la i no laik indai ' ) .

103

Students and inte l lectua l s .

I n 1 9 6 9 the then recently e s tabl i shed

Po l i ti c s C l ub a t UPNG became the f i r s t predomina ntly Papua New Guinean organi zation (apart from the House of A s s embly ) to take up the Ir ian Jaya cause .

Par tic ipant comme ntator Davi s ( 1 9 7 0 : 2 9 5 ) compared Papua

New Gui ne an s tuden t invol veme n t over I r i a n Jaya at thi s time to Aus tralian s tudent i nvo lveme nt over Vie tnam , though the former proved to be relative ly short l ived . I ndone sia ' s inva s ion of Ea s t Timer provided ano ther occa sion for an anti I ndone sian demo nstration by s tude nts and in prese nting p e titions to the I ndone sian emba ssy and the Papua New Guinea governme nt 1 . re f erence wa s made a l so to the demand for freedom by the Ir iane se . During 1 9 7 7 and 1 9 7 8 s tudents aga i n ide nt i f ied wi th the ir Melanes ian bro ther s and critic i zed the governmen t ' s handl i ng of the i ssue ;

in

July 1978 there wa s another march on the I ndone s i a n emba s sy and in 2 November s tude nts offered a s s i s tanc e to Prai and Ondowame . O ther notab le expre s s ions of suppor t for the freedom f i ghter s have come from John Ka saipwalova , Bernard Narakobi an d Utula Samana . Ka saipwa lova , former s tude n t and vi l lage l eader , poe t , playwright and bus i ne s sman , wrote in an artic le in the Post -Courier ( 2 8 July 1978) ,

' a s a na tion we are but da nc i ng foo l s for I ndone sian fore ign

policy ' but he we nt on to sugge s t tha t ' we thr ee bro ther s '

( Papua New

Gui nea , I ndone s ia and Irian Jaya ) s i t down toge ther to argue our d i f ferenc e s .

Shor tly a f ter , and a lmo s t p rophe tic a l ly , Ka saipwa lova

pre sented a new play ,

' My Brother , My Enemy ' , the subj ec t of which i s

the cap ture and incar cera tion o f an OPM l eader who ha s cro s s ed into Papua New Gui nea . Although the play is e s s ential ly a sa tire aga i n s t the Papua New Guinea governme n t , the I ndonesian amba s sador felt moved to wa lk out o f the fi r s t performa nc e . Na rakobi , lawyer ( former chai rman of the Law Re form Commi s s ion ) ,

1

2

For an ac count o f the s tudent prote s t ( dur ing which a rep l i ca o f the I ndone sian f l a g wa s tramp le d ) s e e Samana ( 1 9 7 6 ) .

Post-Courier 26 June 1 9 7 8 ; 10 , 1 1 July 1 9 7 8 ;

2,

10 November 1 9 7 8 .

104

writer , phi lo sopher a nd pro spective Ea s t Sepik p o l i tic ian , ha s on a number o f recent occasions at tacked the gover nment for no t suppor ti ng 1 the Iriane s e freedom fi ght ers and recently pre s ented a peti tion o n the s ub j e c t t o vi si ti ng US amba s sador Andrew Young .

Young i s repor ted ,

i n a gove rnme n t news le t ter , to have said that he ' would bring the mat ter to group s which are sympathetic to the We s t I r ian c ause to bring i t up at the Uni ted Nations for d i scus sio n . •

2

Samana , a provi nc ial o f fi c i a l and former s tudent leader , who had take n an active part i n the 1 9 76 demonstration ove r Ea s t Timer , wa s a rre s te d i n December 1 9 7 8 when he at tempted to hand a pet i tion to Mochtar ;

he wa s at the time he wa s arre s ted a membe r of the o f fi c i a l

we l comi ng party i n Lae . The vol ume o f pro I riane se letters to the Post Courier

(and

according to the paper ' s edi tor tho se publi shed repr e s ent only a frac tion of tho s e received ) sugge st s that the vi ews expre s s ed by Churche s , s tudents and the i ndividua l s mentioned here are represe n tati ve o f a grea t ma s s o f popular s entiment .

Par liamentary opposi tion .

Between 1969 and 1 9 76 I r i a n Jaya

wa s not a promi nent i s sue in dome s ti c po l i ti c s .

Apart from que s tions

by Langro , Chat te rton and Pondro s , the s ubj ect was s e l dom rai sed and whe n it wa s there wa s no sys tema t i c di f ference of opinion between government and oppo s i tion .

As we have not e d , howe ver , the government ' s

handl i ng o f the border s it uation became a s i gni fican t i s sue duri ng the nationa l e l ect ions in 1 9 7 7 and it ha s been a recurring subj e c t for que s tion and deba te in the second parliament . Although Langro wa s a casua l ty o f the e lection hi s conc ern over governmen t pol i cy on I rian Jaya ha s been taken up by severa l new member s o n both sides of the Ho use - notab ly Levi , Jami na n and Ba i s as we l l a s by Gui se , Pondro s , the present oppo si tion leader Iambakey

1

See , for examp l e , Po st-Courier 28 June 1 9 7 8 , 24 July 1 9 78 ; Canberra 2 1 July 1 9 7 8 . Al so see hi s wa rni ng aga i n s t ' I ndone sian imper ia l i sm ' , Po st-Cou:Pier 9 Dec ember 1 9 7 5 .

Time s 2

Papua New Guinea News letter 4 7 , week ending 4 May 1 9 7 9 .

105

Okuk , and Papua Be sena membe r Jame s Mop i o . d o not appear to have come up

To dat e oppo s i tion member s

wi th any p lausible a l terna tive policy

but , e special ly under the new con frontationi s t s tyle of oppo s i tion pol i t i c s p ursued by Okuk , they have been qui ck to make pol i tical cap i ta l o u t o f the I rian Jaya i s sue , accus i ng the government o f be i ng weak in it s de�l i ngs wi th I ndone s i a and wrong i n i t s dec i s ion t o deport Prai 1 and his c o l l eague s .

The army . Towards the end of 1 9 7 7 much public i ty wa s given to the fac t tha t Defence Force commande r- in-chi e f , Ted Dire , to a cabinet meet i ng and rebe l leaders .

reprimanded

wa s sununo ned

for havi ng ha d contact wi th

I t wa s even reported that there wer e demands from wi thin

cabi net to remove Di re from the pos it io n o f commander -in-chi e f but that the se demands we re overruled when i t became c lear that the Defence Force 2 s tood firmly behi nd Diro . Then i n December 1978 a senior o f fi c er of the De fence Forc e , Lt - Col . Tom Poang , wa s forced to re s i gn because o f h is i nvolvement i n negotiations betwe e n the OPM and an arms dea ler 3 from Sene ga l for the purcha se o f weapons . I n both c a s e s personal antagoni sms s eem to have p layed some part i n the government ' s handl i ng of the s i tuati on but the i nc ide nt s have rai s e d que s tions abo ut the extent o f accord betwe e n the government and the army

4

and lent

we i ght to a common ly held vi ew that the r e i s a good deal o f antipathy towa rds I ndones ia among army o f fic e r s .

1

See e special ly Draft Hansard 7 , 1 7 Augus t 1 9 7 8 . Ok uk ' s own po si tion ha s fluc tua ted . Up ti ll Octobe r 1 9 78 he appeared mo st ly a s a champion o f Iri ane se re fuge e s ( e . g . see Post-Courier 9 June 1 9 7 8 , 7 July 1 9 7 8 , 2 0 Oc tobe r 1 9 7 8 ) but at the end o f that month he ret urned from Indone sia wi th glowi ng reports of Indonesia ' s admi n i s tra tion o f I r ia n Jaya and Ea s t Timer (Po s t-Courier 1 November 1 9 7 8 ) . S i nce then howeve r , hi s posi tion seems to have shi ft ed again ( for e xamp le see Papua New Guinea News letter 46 , week ending 27 April 1 9 7 9 ) .

2

See Pos t-Courier 30 September and 6 , 1 0 , 1 2 , 1 4 October 19 7 7 .

3

See Sydney Morning Hera ld 19 De cember 1 9 7 8 .

4

It i s a l so notable that i n October 1 9 7 7 Po lice Mini ster Patter son Lowa ( formerly Di ro ' s second-in -command ) sugge s ted that ' border patro l s rightly be longed to the po l i c e , not the army ' ( Hiri Oc tobe r 1 9 7 7 : 3 ) .

106

F i na l ly , a bri e f word might be said about I ndone s i a n i nt e l l i genc e operations .

It i s gener a l ly acknowl edged in Papua New Gui nea that

I ndonesia ha s an e f fici ent inte l l i gence network wi thi n the country , some o f who se membe r s are I riane se ' re fuge e s ' .

Among the country ' s

e ducated e l i te it i s wide ly be l i eved that in a number o f i n s tanc e s ( some include Poang ' s di smi s sa l and Prai ' s arr e s t ) the Papua New Gui nea governmen t ' s hand ha s been forced by i nte l l i gence pa s s e d o n to it by the I ndone sians .

Whether or no t thi s is true is l e s s impo rtant than the

fac ts tha t the be l i e f is wi dely he ld and that it ha s ha d the e ffec t o f i nc rea s i ng Papua New Gui nea ' s s usp i cions o f I ndone s ia ' s i ntentions .

To

thi s e xtent I ndone s ian inte l l i gence operations wi thi n Papua New Gui nea may we l l prove , in the long run , to be counter produc tive .

The same

might be said of at tempts to buy goodwi l l through dip lomatic ho sp i ta l i ty and other means .

Conc lusion . Deve lopme nts a long the border in 1 9 7 7 and 1 9 7 8 not only s trained relat ions between Papua New Gui nea and I ndone s ia ;

t hey l ed to a

coo li ng o ff in re lations betwe en the Papua New Gui nea government and the I r ianese and they c reated new tensions in Papua New Guinea ' s dome s tic pol i ti c s . Whethe4 in the medium term , I ndone sia ' s ' smi l i ng po l i cy ' i n I r ian Jaya , toge ther wi th the recent defect ion and deportation o f OPM fi e l d l eade rs , wi l l bring about a new cordi a l i ty in re lations between the two countri e s , and whether Papua New Gui nea ' s popular concern over the i s sue wi l l be sustai ned , r ema i n to be seen (my gue s s e s are respectively a heavily qua l i fied yes, and no ) .

I n the meantime ,

it i s

un likely - even with a change o f government i n Papua New Gui nea (whi ch a l so seems unl ikely in the near future ) - that Papua New Gui nea wi l l i ni tiate any change i n i ts pol i cy o n I ri an Jaya , though i t might respond to dome s ti c pre s s ure s to at tempt to resume the unwe lcome and probably hop e l e s s ro l e o f mediator betwe en the I ndone s ian gover nment a nd the 1 rebe l s .

1

Cf .

Draft Hansard 7 August 1 9 7 8

p.

1 1/1/1 .

10 7

I n the shor t term , what may p rove to be a more s i gni ficant outcome of the events o f 1 9 7 7 and 1978 is the obvious irritation whi ch OPM s uppo rt wi th in Papua New Guinea ha s caused Somare .

The reconc i l iation

o f publ i c a tti tudes and private fee l i ng s ha s a lways posed a de l i cate prob lem for the Papua New Gui nea governme nt , and it wi l l conti nue to do so .

I f Somare proceeds with heavy handed me a sures to suppre s s

expre s s ions of popular support for the I ri a ne s e h e may b e courting po l i tical d i s a s ter .

A

BORDER DEVELOPMENT :

' POL I T I CAL NECES S I TY '

J .M.

AGA I N

He r l i hy

Mo s t spe akers at thi s semi nar have been cautious ly op timi s t i c about the re cent gove rnment-to-gove rnme n t rappo rt a n d the propo sed new borde r agreement be tween I ndone s i a and Papua New Gui ne a .

From what has

been sai d , e spe c i a l ly wi th regard to rebel activi ty , it is fai rly c lear that the re sponse wi thi n the borde r zone i ts e l f wi l l be a cruc i a l determi nant o f the succe s s o r fai l ure o f the new gove rnme n ta l i ni t i a t i ve s . I n thi s context two a spects o f the p ropo sed new approach are parti cularly s i gn i fi cant :

f ir st , the ' hard l i ne ' taken by Papua New Gui nea aga i n s t

rebe l sympathi ze rs , a n d s e condly , the i ssue o f borde r deve lopment . Thi s paper out l i ne s bri e fly ,

for the Papua New Gui nea s i de o f the

border , some of the s i tuationa l fac tors like ly to a f fect vi l lage re sponse to gove rnment i ni tiative s and to i n f luence governmental cap a c i ty to i n s t i tute e f fe c tive cha nge wi thi n the borde r zone .

On the bas i s o f

the s e factors i t i s sugge sted that achieveme n t o f governme nt ' s obj e c tive s wi th regard to the communi ti e s i n the vi c i n i ty o f the border wi l l be a comp l e x and cos tly task , the di ffi c ulti e s of whi ch could we l l outwe i gh the time and resource s the Papua New Gui nea government i s able to dive rt to i t .

Previous expe ri ence and pre sent cons tra i nt s i ndi cate

a hi gh p robabi l i ty that the current conc ern for border deve lopment wi l l b e a tran s i ent phenomenon which survi.ve s only as long a s the border i s a nationa l po l i ti c al i s sue . The relevance o f a borde r deve lopment programme to the pre sent po l i t i c s of the border depends large ly on the va lidi ty o f seve ral a s sumptions .

The se a re , first , that a de c l i ne i n rebe l activi ty , whi ch

i s confi ned to a relati ve ly sma l l area , wi l l ease the i n ternational and i n ternal t e nsions now a s soc i a ted wi th the borde r ;

secondly , that

sympathy and support for the rebel movement among bo rder communi t i e s wi l l show an i nve rse corre l at io n wi th deve lopme nt o f the area ; tha t governme nt

thirdly ,

wi l l be abl e to supply the type and qua n ti ty o f i nputs

ne ces sary to imp lement an e f fective deve lopment programme ;

and four thly ,

that the bo rde r corrnn u ni ti e s wi l l be able and wi l l i ng to take advantage o f the programme . Though th i s paper concentra tes on each i s deba t able .

th e

l a s t two a s sump ti ons ,

1 09

The border zone . The term ' border zone ' i s used here to refer to the 3 2 km ( 2 0 mi le ) quaran ti ne strip or cordon sanitaire whi ch para l l e l s the ac tual borde r acro s s Papua New Gui nea , a nd withi n whi ch border con s i derations have a di rect impact on the dai ly l i ve s of the people even though many have l i ttle knowle dge o f or i n te re s t in the pol i ti c a l i s sue s i nvo lved .

The terrain wi thi n the cordon sanitaire var i e s from

the lowland swamp s o f mo st o f the We s tern Province , through the i nacce s sible central cordi l lera to the S epik Ri ver lowlands , the Bewani and bo rde r range s , the swampy a l luvi a l reache s of the Neumeyer Pla i n , and acro s s the Oenake Mounta i ns to the coasta l lowland s near Vanimo . Average population den s i ti e s for the two border p rovi nce s , at an 2 2 e stimate d 0 . 8 2 persons per km for We stern Province and 2 . 8 per km for Sandaun (We st S epik ) Provi nce in 1 9 7 6 , are very low .

Dens i t i e s a long

the Sandaun s i de of the cordon sanitaire on a breakdown by census divi s ion 2 range from 0 to 4 persons per km for mos t o f the zone wi th approximate ly 2 6 per km in the Amanab are a , but due to the di spersed sett lemen t pat tern and uneven d i s tributi on the se figure s are merely i ndicative .

Physi cal

and demographic charac teri sti c s a re re f l e c ted i n marked cultura l di f ferenc e s between borde r communi ti e s , whi ch inter a lia i nhibit acro s s ­ the -board p lanni ng for the border zone .

With the po s s ible e xception

o f the Wut ung-Vanimo peop l e , mo st border communi ti e s have in common the i r i so lation from each othe r and from o ther areas of Papua New Gui nea , re lat ive ly low s tandards of l i ving and e conomi c oppo rtunity , and a hi story o f admi n i s trative neg lect and unre l i abi l i ty whi ch has l e ft deep but us ua l ly hidden resentme nts . Mos t tradi tional commun i c ation and trade route s ,

for the border

zone , such a s they were , ran east-we s t rather than north-south , so tha t for a number o f commun i t i e s conta c ts acro s s the borde r we re more important than l i nkage s on the same s i de .

Though some vi llager s a s

a re sult sti l l have k i nship t ie s a nd land or hun ti ng rights on both

s i de s of the borde r , the i r

range

is

fai r ly l imi te d .

Fo rma l l i nkage s

inland on the Papua New Guinea s i de around the ma i n cro s s i ng points o f the Bewani -Ki lime ri area rarely extend beyond a few k i lometre s . more e xte n s i ve , and of far greater po l i t i c a l s i gni fi cance , are the

Far

110

re s i due o f contac ts e s tab l i shed through previous excha nge s and movement to and from Hol land ia and a loo s e ident i fication o f mutua l i nte re s t i n the di f fi c ul ti e s tha t bo th s ides o f the bo rde r have e xpe r i enced as a re sult of the manoe uvre s of the i r re spe c t i ve governments . De sp i te the apparent contigui ty be tween cro s s -bo rder sympathi e s and the ' Me l ane s i a n brotherhood ' theme on whi ch some members of the educated el i te , i n c ludi ng parl i ame ntari ans , have based the i r support for the I ri anese cause , the lat te r i s of l i t t l e importance on the bo rde r .

Many

vi l l agers in fact regard such e l i te articulation of border i s sue s a s po l i tical opportuni sm .

As the 1 9 7 7 e le ct ion

re sults demons tra te d ,

the I ri an Jaya s i tuation per se ha s very li tt le e l e c toral pull by compari son wi th pragma t i c paro chi a l conc e rn s . A large p roportion o f border commun i ti e s i s bas i ca l ly hunter­ gatherers .

Though the ma j ority , e spec i a l ly i n the mounta i n s , a l so

c ul t i va te sma l l garde ns , and a l though the swamp dwe l lers depe nd heavi ly on natural or cultivated s tands o f sago , cul tivation usua l ly i s regarded as a se condary activi ty ( see a l so Ge l l 1 9 7 5 : 16 ) .

Thi s me ans

that c a sh c ropping , the ma i n e l ement o f Papua New Guinea deve lopment p rogranune s , i nvo lve s a double tran s i tion :

f i r s t to permanent or semi

pe rmanent subsi s tence cultivation and secondly to p roduc tion for the monetary economy .

I t has a l so re s u l ted in a re l a ti vely high degree

of i ndi vidual i sm .

As i n other are a s of the S epik , vi l lage e l ders can

a dvi s e and e xhort , but cannot control 1 97 7 ) .

( Thurnwa ld 1 9 1 6 ; Huber

Mobi l i zation fo r a conununa l activi ty i s di fficult a nd i n frequent .

E spe c i a l ly i n areas whi ch operate on a narrow surviva l ma rgi n , we l fare matters s uch a s care fo r the s i ck a nd e l derly are usually a personal or fami l i a l concern rather than a conununa l re spons ibi l i ty , and those wi thout imme di a te re lative s may be le ft to fend for themse lve s . Notable among the c ultura l fac tors whi c h rei n force i sola tioni sm and i nhibi t deve lopment in the border area are a mu lt ip l i c i ty o f l angua ge s , the domi nance of s i ster excha nge mari ta l a l l i ance , and , for Ki lime ri in parti cular , sangwna , a form of a s sault sorcery . The S epik provi nce s con tai n approxima te l y one thi rd o f Pap ua New Gui nea ' s l i s te d language s .

The population to language ratio i s

111

about ha l f the ave rage for the re s t o f the coun try , and drop s to approximate ly 5 0 0 spe akers per l anguage i n the bo rder area ( Laycock 1 197 3 : 54-5 ) . In 1 9 7 5 - 76 a samp l e o f Ki l i me r i peop l e had very l i ttle con ta ct and no fami l i a r i ty wi th nei ghbouring l i ngui stic patterns,

though

96 pe r c ent o f ma l e s and 7 5 per cent o f fema l e s cou ld commun i cate to some e �tent in p idgi n .

Except iona l ly low l eve l s o f l i tera cy ( on ly 4

per cent o f the Ki l ime ri samp l e coul d read or wri te even at an e lementa ry leve l ) me ant that e f fecti ve communi cation had to be by word of mouth , but oral i n formation f lows wer e severely restr i cted by the phy s i ca l and cultural i so l ation and by the pauc i ty of governmen t patro l l i ng an d out s i de contact . S i ster e xchange marriage i s a lmo st enti r e ly endogamous , di s sociated from the cash e conomy , and e n forc e s the dependence o f youn g peop l e a s a who le o n the i r vi l lage e lder s .

Under s i ster (or

daughte r ) exchange a man who wi she s to marry must p rovide a fema le re lative as wi fe for a mal e member o f the fami ly or clan from whom he seeks hi s wi fe .

Though the sys tem tradi tiona l ly was fai rly flexible ,

the resul tant soc i a l structure i s one charac teri zed by o l der me n ma rri ed to one or more young wive s , young me n o ften marri ed to wi dows many years the i r senior , poor marital cohe sivene ss , and a very narrow spread o f k i nship ties .

In the Ki l ime r i samp l e al l adu lts had married wi thin the i r

own area , about fi fty p e r cent to someone from the same vi l lage and the bulk of the remai nder into a ne i ghbouring vi l lage .

As mo s t vi l la ge s

conta i n l e s s than 1 5 0 peop l e , marriage -derived contacts are very c lo s e ly cons trained .

Vi l l age r s are the re fore ve ry limi ted in the ex ten t to

whi ch they can sub s ti tute k i nship obl i gations fo r cash to ga i n a c c e s s t o deve lopment opportuni ti e s out s i de the i r range .

When oppo r tun i s ti c

vi l lage rs near Bewani station be gan to impo se such cha rge s a s land rents for s chool chi ldren ' s food garden s , many Ki l ime ri vi l lagers were unable to uti l i z e the school .

S imi lar probl ems aro se when they wi she d to use

land outside the cordon sanitaire to gra ze cattle , a s the rent demanded wa s equa l to fi fty per cent of the be a s t ' s sale va lue

( then eq ui valent

to approxima te ly $40 per annum for about two he c tares of unimproved �asture ) .

1

The Ki lime ri data quoted i n thi s paper i s drawn from fi e ldwork carr i ed out b y the author between 19 7 5 a n d 1 9 7 7 .

112

Though wa rfare wa s a re current pre contact ha z ard , border vi l lages on the whol e do not have the tradi tion of endemi c viol ence tha t characteri zed othe r parts o f Papua New Gui nea .

Poss ibly as a

re sult , ve ry few have be come ac tively i nvo lved in the OPM guer i l l a camp ai gns o r e xhibi t e d s igni f i can t i ntere s t i n mi l i ta ry de fence o f the On the other hand , cove rt violence through sanguma re tain s a

border .

s tro ng ho ld , though sanguma practi c e s va ry along the border from the ritua l i zed e xe cution of the Ki l imeri to the

' death threat ' or mag i c

forms fami l i ar i n othe r parts o f P apua New Guinea .

Ki l imeri vi l l agers

c laim that , un ti l the suppre ssi on of warfare , sanguma wa s a ' la s t re sort ' method of soc i a l cont ro l , rare ly used , but tha t now ' we are a fra i d to ta lk s trong , we are a fra i d to t ry anything new , i t i s sanguma that ho lds us back ' .

Whi l e sanguma i s o ften used as an ex ros t rat iona l i zation

for i nac tivi ty , i ts i nhibi tory e f fect on soc i e ta l cohe si ve ne s s , entrepreneurial i nnovat i on and re sponse to externa l s timuli i s a ma j o r p roblem for deve lopment o f the are a .

E stimate s o f the s trength o f

sanguma a c tivi ty b y gove rnme nt , mi s s ion a nd other obs erve rs i n 1 9 7 6 range d from ' very l i tt le ' t o attributed re spons ibi l i ty for about e i ghty per cent of deaths in the area , a range matched only by the wi l dly fl uc tuating e s tima te s of support for the OPM .

As the vi l lage re sponse

to o ff i c i a l d i s couragement o f i nvo lvement i n sanguma or OPM activi t i e s ha s been a marked reluctance t o di scus s e i the r , articulated vi l la ge opi nion provides a ve ry unre l iable i ndicator , and the actual st rength o f the se two impo rtant var i able s for the new bo rde r pol i cy i s sti l l unknown . For mo s t o f the bo rde r area , p roblems of i solation and acce s s a r e compounde d , and capa c i ty for deve lopmental respons i vene s s and s e l f­ help reduced , by ve ry serious leve l s of ma lnutri tion . A s tudy in 1 9 6 2 i denti fied nutri tiona l de f i c i e nc i e s i n the Bewani area whi ch were more severe than tho se of the Wos e ra and other known problem areas of Papua New Guinea

( McLennan n . d . ) , but i t s find i ng s were not fo l lowed up . A 1 decade later other s tudi e s , based primari ly on c l i n i c re cords , found

1

A compari son of vi l lage data wi th c l i n i c records i n 1 9 7 6 i nd i ca t e d tha t the latter undere s timated the degree of ma lnutri tion , largely as a re sult o f poor or i rregular c l i n i c a t tendance , the la ck o f concern among many vi llage rs about nutri tional de fic i enc i e s , and the t endency of some mothe rs to hi de ma l nouri shed chi l dre n from hea lth sta f f to avo i d cri ti c i sm or i nter ference .

113

tha t ma lnutri tion wa s a p roblem for the ma j or i ty o f i n land border s tations , wi th an average for the provi nc e a s a who le o f 6 3 ma lnouri shed chi ldren per 100 at tendi ng c l inic s , a nd in some areas up to e i ghty to ni nety per cent o f chi l dren under two yea r s ma lnouri shed ( Sa l fi e l d 1973 : 25 ;

Kor te 1 9 74 ;

Kor te a nd Kamki l ak ai 1 9 7 5 ) . I n the Ki l imeri area

the poor nutri tion and genera l hea lth care wa s reflec ted i n 1 9 7 5 - 7 6 in One thi rd o f the se deaths wa s among a crude dea th rat e o f 3 . 8 per c e nt . 1 women of chi l d be aring age . Over one third of chi ldren died before they reached maturi ty , wi th 6 9 per cent of chi ld deaths i n the under six months age bracket and 83 per cent under two year s .

To some extent

the high morta l i ty wa s di sgui s ed by a relative ly high bi rth ra te , 6 . 7 per cent , which he ld the rate o f natura l increa se , 2 . 8 per cent , at approximate ly average leve l s for the count ry , but the re sultant agesex s truc ture made survi va l , and deve lopme n t , a much more a rduo us ta sk than in mo st parts of Papua New Guinea .

Though improveme nt o f nutri tion

ha s been a pere nni al aim of the We s t Sep i k admi ni s tra tion a nd recently ha s be come a nat i onwi de deve lopment prior i ty , for the border area i t ha s prove d very di f f i c ult to impl ement .

Partly thi s ha s been due to

the spasmodic and o f ten i nappropriate nat ure of o f f i c i a l attention to the problem , partly to the ma j o r d1.ang e s i t ha s required to the exi s ti ng subs i s tence system , and partly because ma lnutri tion i s the norm and there fore is not perc e i ved by vi ll ager s as a problem .

Border deve lopment . The early phase .

Though border i s s ue s , i nc l udi ng border

deve lopment , have been a recurrent governme ntal concern for mos t o f thi s century , the border i s s ti l l one o f the mo st backwa rd a nd admi ni s trat i ve ly neglec ted area s of Papua New Gui nea .

I roni cally thi s

can b e attributed , to a large e xtent, to o f fi c i a l preoccupation wi th the pol itical rami f i cations of border admi ni s tration , whi ch ha s re sulted i n short term dec i sion mak i ng a nd i nat tent i on to the problems and local i di osyncra c i e s reported regula rly by f i e l d s ta ff .

Of f i c i a l

di fficulti e s i n re conc i l i ng ob served n e e d s wi th avai lable re sourc e s

1

DDA , Page i , Patrol Report 2/ 7 5 - 7 6 .

1 14

have c reated a marked gap between po l i cy ob j e c t i ve s and pra c t i c e .

In

1 9 4 7 the then di s tr i c t o f f i c er stre s s ed the importance o f border deve lop­ me nt for ami cab l e bo rde r po l i t i c s and the need for ' conti nua l urging to improve the i r li vi ng and health cond i tions ' , but felt unab l e to 1 dive rt s taff to the area . I n later years government o ff i c i a l s regularly evaded th� logi s ti ca l d i f fi c ult i e s of c a sh c rop deve lopmen t by announcements tha t they

would conc entrate on improvement of sub s i s tenc e , an even

more d i f f i c ult ta sk and rarely fo l lowed through . The i nhibi t i ng e f fects on border deve lopment o f the governme nt ' s po l i cy probably commenced with the trans fer from German to Aus tral i an control a fter Wo rld War I .

Thi s reduc ed the S epik area from a propos ed

' centre for future agri cul tura l deve lopment ' to a periphe ral admi n i s trative di s tri c t .

(Whittake r et a l � 1 9 7 5 : 2 6 3 )

The we s tward spread o f

deve lopme nt a l demons tration e f fects from the o n l y s i gn i f i cant cent re , at Aitape , wa s a lmo s t enti rely s topped a fter the wa r by the remova l o f a l l settlers o n the coa s t betwe en Ai tape and the border i n a n at tempt by the di s tri ct o f fi ce r to prevent i l l i c i t communciation , vi a the Dutch , between German settlers and the i r home country ( Rowley 1 9 5 8 : 4 2 ) .

Un ti l

Wor l d War I I European i n f l uence on the border area came mai nly from Ne the rlands New Guinea , though a border surve i l lance po s t , op ened at Vanimo in 1 9 1 8 , p rovi ded ( when sta f fe d ) desultory supervi s ion of trade and contac t acro s s the bo rde r .

Re s tri ctions on borde r moveme nt tightened

a fter World Wa r I I , when a patrol o ffi cer was po s ted to Van imo ' mainly to prevent I ndone s i a ns from cro s s i ng the border ' .

At the same time rumours

that the Dutch i ntended to e s tabl i sh a c i ty at Ho l landi a tri ggered propo sa l s fo r deve lopment of the New Gui nea s i de ,

[ borde r] vi l la gers

' otherwi se they

may tend to pre fer the Dut ch admi n i s tration to o u rs . •

2

The po s s ibi l i ty o f an I ndone s i an takeover in the We s t brought fu�ther re s tric tions .

Though the Aus tra l ian governmen t in the 1 9 5 0 s o f f i c i a lly

favoured ' s ide -by- s i de ' deve lopment o f West and Ea s t New Gui nea ( Ha s luck 1 9 76 : 3 6 2 ) , a 1 9 5 3 repo rt of pro j e cted I ndone s i an activi ty in the Dutch territory wa s fo l lowe d in 1 9 5 4 by a dire c ti ve that ' native s from acro s s the bo rde r , or vi l lage s now regarded a s under Dut ch i n fluence were no t 3 ' permi tted to enter emp loyment I on the Au stra l ian si' d e . 1 2 3

Sub-di s trict o ff ic e

( S DO ) , Wewak , fi le 30/2 - 2 3 ,

12 May 19 4 7 .

Ibid. Department of Di stri c t S ervi c e s and Na tive Affa i r s 3 1/ 1 - 14 0 7 , 6 De cember 1 9 5 4 .

( DDS

&

NA ) , fi le

NLB

115

A fte r the trans fer o f control over Nether lands New Gui nea to I ndones i a i n the early 1 9 6 0 s , the Austra l i an admi ni s tra tion mounte d a ma s s i ve deve lopment programme a long the border .

New patro l po s ts we re

opened , s choo l s and health centres bui lt , loca l gove rnmen t counc i l s i ntroduce d , and a n i nt en s i f ie d ' po l i ti ca l educati on ' campa i gn commenced . Money was poure d i nto the area to win the support of local peo l e who in many ca s e s had e xhibi ted a pre ference for the material be ne fi ts o f Ho l l andia under the Dutch .

As a re sult , o n e patro l offi cer comp l a i ned , 1 the people a fte rwards expected to be paid for everythi. ng . At th e same time , however , an i n s truc tion to border o f fi c i a l s that ' border s urve i l lance i s to be mai nta ined a s a priority over a l l othe r activi t i e s '

2

ensured that borde r deve lopment wa s e f fe c tive ly s ubordi nated to po li tical cons i derations .

For some t ime o f fi c i al a t tention focussed on the sma l l

commun i ty o f S ekotchi au ( later Skoti aho ) , whi ch was the centre o f mos t movement acro s s borde r tribal lands i n the early t o mi d 1 9 6 0 s a n d whi c h shrewd ly p layed o ne gove rnment agai n s t t he other to con s i derable mate r i al advanta ge . I n the late 1 9 6 0 s the ve riphe ral border vi l lage s be ga n to comp lain o f the i r exclusion from border deve lopment and admi ni s tra tive attention . Di rect bene fi ts , s uch a s e ducation and health fac i l i ti e s , and flow-on bene fits such as i ncome e arni ng oppo rtuni ti e s from the Bewani pa tro l pos t , acc rued mai n ly to the nineteen per cent of the admi ni strative area in i ts immedi ate vi c i n i ty .

Vanimo and the border po st s were a

poor subs ti tute fo r Ho l land ia as a source o f trade goods and had i ns uf f i c i ent attractions to . overcome the di stance constraint .

At the

same ti me vi l l agers b ecame more sensi t ive to the in feriori ty o f thei r catechi s t s choo l s a n d unre a l i able hea l th fac i l i ti e s vi s-a-vi s the new ' certi fi cate ' primary s choo l s and governmen t hea lth centre s , and uti l i z ati on of the former de c l i ned .

Re sen tme nts grew a fte r an order

tha t shotgun s , the mo st cove te d po s s e s s i o n of a hunting communi ty , we re 3 to be kept to a mi nimum on the border . They i nten s i fied when cash cropp i ng activi t i e s , whi ch had been encouraged in pa rti c u lar through

1 2 3

Div i s i on o f Di stri ct Admi n i s t ra tion

(DDA ) , Wewak , pa tro l repo rt 5/6 9 - 7 0 .

Di s trict Commi s s ioner ( DC ) , Wewak , fi le A 2 - 2 - 1 0/ 3 7 6 , 6 Septembe r 1 96 3 . DDA , Wewak , f i l e 6 7 - 3- 7 ,

5 Ap ri l 1 9 6 5 .

1 16

the mi s s ion network and by the new coun c i l s , were di s couraged by gove rnment o f f i c i a l s .

' Be e xtreme ly wary on the i nt roduc tion o f crops ' ,

the di s trict commi s sioner advi sed h i s staff i n 1 96 3 ,

• I do not want

the se peop l e to ge t a ca sh- c rop i de a , we wi l l ne ve r ge t the stuff out . •

1

Admini strative p roblems in the area we re compounded by a very rapi d t urnove r of s ta f f , spasmodi c use of border s tations as

' e xi le '

or trai ning po sts for ' di f fi cult ' o r inexperi enc e d o f fi c er s , and e sp e c i a l ly in re cent years by the youth and i nexpe ri ence of many i ndi genous o f fi c i al s .

De lays in departmental funding , i rregula r

avai labi l i ty o f s ta f f , and the burden o f o f fi c e obl i ga tions were re flec ted regul arly in pos tponement of pat ro l s .

I n addi tion , the simp l e

logi s t i c s o f p a tro l l ing a large , spars e ly populated a r e a meant tha t ove r a g i ven p e rio d the c li e n t cove rage whi ch s t a f f i n the borde r area could achieve wa s l e s s than ha l f the national average .

The subsequen t

l ump i ne s s o f admi n i s trative ope rations created a vi c ious cyc le of dimi n i shed government e ffe ctivene s s at vi l la ge leve l a n d dimi n i shing vi l lage e nthus i a sm for governmen t i n te rvention .

At the same time a

number of factor s , inc luding lack o f po l i t i c a l sophi sti cation , scarc i ty o f a l ternative sourc e s o f deve lopment a s s i stance , and o f f i c i a l di s courage ­ men t of vi s i tors to the sensitive border area , meant that powe r was i ncrea s i ngly concentrated i n a narrow admi ni s trative spe c trum .

The cordon sanitaire .

The ma j or government- ini ti ated cons tra i n t

o n economi c deve lopment o f the bo rder area , both for governmen t o f f i c i a l s a n d for vi l lager s , undoubtedly ha s b e e n the cordon sanitaire .

The bulk

of the population within the border z one l ive ten or more ki lometres away from the a c tual border , and have l i tt l e cont a c t wi th the border patro l po sts or comprehension of border i s sue s .

Due to the land tenure

system , for all practi cal purpo ses the s e vi l lagers are locationa lly bound i nto a s i tuation from whi ch they gain li tt le i f any advanta ge but as a re sult of wh i ch they sub s i di ze deve lopmen t e l s ewhere .

The y bear a

large part o f the co s t s o f quaranti ne p rotec tion for crops and herds i n o ther areas o f Papua New Guinea , and s i nce the I ndone s i a n si de ha s no equiva lent arrangement they a l so provi de a buffer zone whi ch enables I ndone sia to evade respon sibi l i ty for containme n t o f i ts commun i cable

1

DDA , Wewak , fi le 6 7 - 3 - 8 ,

12 July 196 3 .

117

di seases an d p e s ts .

I nc i de ntal ly , thi s has ea sed the border s i tuation for

the Papua New Gui nea and the I ndone s i an gove rnments by reduci ng the potenti a l for con fli c t between them .

In addi tion , mai n tenance of the

quaranti ne s trip has a l lowed agri cultural and he a lth s ta f f on the Papua New Gui nea s i de to avo i d the expense a nd d i f fi c ulty of regular fie ld patro l s · and acti ve quaranti ne s upe rvi sion .

I t ha s a l so provided a

blanket e xcuse fo r negl e c t of borde r deve lopment .

Vi l lagers have been

to ld that i n the abs ence of cash c rop and li ve s tock pro j ects regular vi si ts by a gri cul ture staff are superfluous , but tha t a s s i stance would be forthcomi ng whe n they e s tab l i shed e conomi c a l ly viable p ro j e c ts . When the I ndon e s i an takeover aborted move s , be gun in the early 1 9 5 0 s , to e stabl i sh uni form quaranti ne regulations and procedure s on both s ide s o f the bo rde r ( H a s l uck 1 9 7 6 : 3 6 0 ) , contro l s on the Papua New Guinea s i de were t i ghtened .

The e ffects of the cordon sanitaire were

thus felt mo s t severe ly at a time when the borde r deve lopmen t programme and the ac c e lerated pace o f cash c rop and pa s tora l deve lopment i n other pa rt s o f Papua New Gui nea had arous ed wide spread i ntere s t i n the e conomi c a spects o f deve lopment among bo rde r vi l lage s .

Re sponsibi l i ty

for the zone devo lved primari ly upon the Department of Agricul ture , S tock and F i she r i e s

(DAS F , later DPI ) , a spe c i a l i st and somewhat

a utonomous department , s i ngularly i l l -att uned to the po li ti c a l needs o f bo rde r manageme nt but by vir tue o f i ts control over quarantine and s tock movemen t a powe r ful po l i ti ca l force i n the area .

Con fus ion i n

DASF rank s for some time led t o a seri e s o f con fli c ti ng di rect ive s a s to what could an d could no t b e grown or k ept wi thi n the zone , a s a consequence of whi ch vi l l agers he s i tated to a c cept fi e ld sta f f gui dance . F urthe r con fusion aro s e from po l i cy con fl i c t s , as when DASF propo sed to al low pig and poultry proj ects , though i n general po l i cy and sta f f tra i ni ng i t di s coura ge d the se be c ause o f their low e conomi c re turns , need for close supervi sion , and use o f foodstuffs required for human con s umption .

Many vi l la gers came to regard the zone as a ' tota l

deve lopment ban '

( We s t S epik Provi nce 1 9 7 6 : 16 ) .

Re cogni tion in the 1 9 7 0 s o f the futi li ty o f a ban on cattle and coffee , whi ch could be control led , whe n di sease could be carri ed by

1 18

dogs , p i g s , deer and peopl e , who se border cro s sings could not be po l i c ed , led seve ra l o f fi c ia l s and po l i ti c ians to pre s s for a re laxation of the po l i cy .

A number o f a lternat ive s was moote d , i nc l uding e s tabl i shment

of sent i ne l he rds and re a l i gnme nt of the perimet e r , but were rej e c ted by agri cul ture and health o f fi c i a l s i n Port More sby . Quoting i n te rnationa l precedent ,. DAS F advi sed tha t they con s i dered that twenty mi les wa s the minimum acceptable for a cordon sanitaire and tha t p re ferably the zone 1 should be wi denea . Thi s i n tran s i ge n ce refle cted adv� r s e ly on vi l lage relations wi th othe r o f f i c i al s , in parti cular Divi s ion of Di stri c t Admi ni s tration ( DDA )

fi e ld sta f f , who were fore.e a t o j usti fy a

gove rnme nt stance whi ch many pe rsona l ly opposed .

Though there have been

some indi cations recently tha t Papua New Gui ne a , Indone s i a a nd Aus tra l i a , for various reasons , see certain advantage s i n a syndi cated approach to the quarant ine problem , there i s l i tt l e evidence to date that thi s wi l l re sult i n s i gni fi cant improvemen t of the s i tuation for border communi t i e s , or a dimi nution o f the potenti al o f the cordon sanitaire to become a ma j or po l i ti ca l i s s ue i n the long term .

The Ki limeri samp le .

2

For the Ki l i meri , a s fo r much o f the border

pop ul ation , regular cash e arning activi ty i n the mi d 1 9 7 0 s was a lmo s t non e xi sten t . plantings cultivars

Though si xteen per cent o f the samp l e reported copra

( two thirds of whi ch were i mmature ) and thre e per cent had such a s cocoa , chi l l i e s , co f fee or spi c e s , mo st ly i n very

sma l l quanti ti e s and o ften the unt ended remnant of experime nts

many

years earl i e r , none had rece ived any re turn from the i r ho ldi ngs .

Two

c l aime d a share i n a cow or dome st i c a ted feral p i g and ten in a trade­ s tore , though i n seve n o f the ten cases the s tore was tempo rari ly or permanen tly c lo se d , and the rema i ning three we re repor ted a s ' j ust starti ng ' and at the time of the 1 9 7 5 - 7 6 survey had done li ttle if any Twenty-seven pe r cent o f the samp l e kept chi ckens , whi ch 3 ori gina l ly had fi lte red i nto the area from Ho l landi a , but the se were

bus ine s s .

gene rally regarded a s the nuc leus o f an economi c en terp r i s e and too

1 2 3

DAS F , Port More sby , fi le 1 - 14-1 0 3 , See fn . 1 on p 1 1 1 . DDA , Ai tape , patro l report 6/4 8 - 4 9 .

2 7 Decembe r 1 9 7 2 .

1 19

va luable for dome s ti c con sumption .

Vi l l age r s could not a f ford to

purcha se chi ckens from each other , as the standard asking pri ce wa s based on DASF charge s for imported breedi ng stock and many owners feared an o f fi c i a l rebuk e i f they s e t thei r own price .

Three me n in

1 9 7 5 - 76 h ad sold poul try to p a s s ing gove rnment patro l s , whi ch was enough to mai ntai n the a sk i ng price and gene ral i ntere s t .

To ta l i ncome fo r

the a rea from a l l the se source s i n twe lve mon ths wa s $ 3 4 , whi ch amoun ted to an ave rage of $ 5 . 6 7 for the six income earne rs , or approxima te l y nine c e n t s per capita for the samp le . The only other s i gni fi cant non-wage source o f in come , used by about twenty p e r cent o f the samp le , was the in frequent sale o f game , sago grub s or othe r wi l d p roduce at the neare st s tation .

Some border

area s , s uch a s Ok sapmi n , whi ch produced European vegetable s , and Green Ri ve r , whi ch at o ne stage started a rice proj e c t , re ceived occasiona l a s s i s tance wi th mark e t ing i n Wewak or Vanimo from patro l o f fi cer s o r mi s s ionari e s , but thi s wa s di s continuous , hi ghly persona l i zed and heavi ly subsidi zed .

Though a wide var iety o f income earning activi ti e s

have been propo sed or te s te d a long the border , in par t i cular by concerned gove rnme n t o f fi c i a l s and mi s sion personne l , the di ffi culti e s o f acce s s , h i gh fre i ght cos t s ,

st a f f turnove r and loc a l pre ference s

gave s uch attempts a re lative ly brie f average l i fe . By fa r the mo st important contribution to the area ' s income was wage s .

From World War I I unti l the end o f the contract labour

period i n the 1 96 0 s , wage labour on p lan t a tions provi ded a steady trickl e of goods and cash for the area , an e scape from the hardships of the home envi ronment and a much more re l i able source o f i ncome than the dubi ous deve lopme nt pro spe c ts o f fe red on the bo rde r .

As

thi s source dried up , the hori zon for wage mi gration narrowed and employment re lated move s out s i de the We s t Sepik dropped from approximately 8 0 per cent to 5 0 per cent of total movemen t betwe en 1 9 6 5 and 1 9 7 5 . More men be gan to compete for the few j ob oppo rtun i t i e s c lo s e r to

home .

For a few years they were able to earn enough fo r the i r

b a s i c needs from p redominantly casual labour in Van imo or at gove rnment , counc i l or mi s s ion centre s nearby , but these sourc e s a l so

120

dimini shed in the 1 9 7 0 s .

New nationa l i s t i c regulations i mpo s e d by the

Nationa l I nve stment and Deve lopment Author i ty { N I DA ) drove Go ldore Timber Company , the We s t Sepik ' s large st private employe r , out o f the provi nce .

I nc re a s e s in the ba s i c wage made othe r employe r s more

s e l ec tive , and the loc a l i z a tion of pub l i c se rvi ce po si tions fo l lowed by general financ i a l stringe n c i e s a fter 1 9 7 4 se ve re ly reduced the amoun t of money re lea sed to the ca sua l or unsk i l l ed l abour force .

At

the s ame t ime , mone tary requireme nt s for counc i l rate s , education a nd purcha se o f trade store goods i ncrea sed .

Acqui s i tion o f sa leable ski l l s ,

ei ther through forma l education or i n forma l channe l s such a s j ob e xpe ri ence , had neve r be en �i gh and be came much more di fficult as the employmen t s i tuation tigh te ned acro s s the coun try and the national e duca tion sys tem was adj usted to limi t the number s o f unemployed dropouts .

The post 1 9 7 5 pha.se .

I n 1 9 7 5 - 7 6 4 9 per cent o f to ta l cash

i ncome fo r the Ki l ime ri samp l e came from the earnings of two un sk i l l ed laboure r s .

A furthe r 3 3 per cent came from ca sual labour , rare ly o f

more than two week s ' duration , and from qua si wage sourc e s such a s s tipends and a l lowance s .

S i nce the samp l e had an annua l median and

modal per capita cash income of zero and an annua l mean per capita cash i ncome o f only $ 5 . 4 2, for mo s t vi l lagers even the lowe s t wage or stipend repre sented enormous riche s . p ropo rtion ,

Thi s wa s refle cted in the ve ry high

79 pe r cent , o f adu lt ma l e s be tween age s 2 0 and 4 5 . who i n

the previous year had active ly , albe it unsucce s s fully , sought emp loymen t . By compar i son , ve ry few were p repared to walk the same di s tance to rece ive medi c a l t re atment , and none had done so to seek advi ce o r a s s i s tance from gove rnment o f fi c i a l s . Unti l the inve s ti gations into the Star Mountain copper depo s i ts in the l ate 1 96 0 s , gove rnment o f fici a l s regarded the timber stands o f the Vanimo and Pua l Rive r area a s the We st S epik ' s main hope for ma j o r e conomi c deve lopment .

De spi te the po l i cy shi ft to rura l improvement ,

vi l lage parti cipation and equa li zation fo r l e s s deve loped are a s , whi ch oc curre d unde r the f i r s t Somare gove rnment , by 1 9 76 o f f i c i a l hopes for the We s t Sepik once aga in rested on po s s ible timber and copper p roj e c ts

( Hinchcli f fe 1 9 76 : 1 1 ) .

In the course o f inve stigations into the se proj ects ,

a numbe r o f supp leme nt ary analy s e s wa s made o f vi llage agri cul tural

121

potential and capaci ty to bene f i t from the propo sed la rge s cale deve lopments .

The se repo rted that the lik elihood o f sign i fi cant

advantage from copper mi ni ng , even for the Mi n people in the immediate vi c i nity, was ve ry sma l l ( Re ndel

&

Partner s 1 9 7 5 : 1 1- 16 ) , and that the

population o f the Vanimo-Pua l timber area was in sufficient to deve lop the de fore s ted area . Fo r the border peopl e , who had been i nunda ted for a decade by consultations and o f f i c i a l reque sts for coope ration , backed by promi s e s of enormous returns at an ever-re ceding future date , hope s o f de ve lopment from timber or mi nera l s were we ari ng thin .

Vi l la ge r s

such a s the Ki lime r i , who had lea sed thei r timber ten yea rs earlier when the matte r wa s o f fi c i a l ly regarded a s ' urge nt ' , were parti cularly di sgruntled .

Unde r the cont ract timbe r l ea se land could not be cleared

for commercial purpo s e s , mos t of the land not lease d was marginal or not sui table for cash cropp ing , and the purcha sing powe r of the s i x­ monthly i ntere s t payments , whi ch when divided up va ried be tween 1 0 � 1 and $ 1 per re cipi ant , had dec l ined mark ed ly . As wi th the cordon

sanitaire , i nadequa te e xp l anations and we ak r ationa li zations severe ly damage d the gove rnment ' s credibi l i ty in the area . I n 1 9 7 5 - 7 6 I ndone s i an move s i n East Timor brought a revival o f governmental conc e rn for borde r deve lopment .

A t the in sti gation o f

the secretari e s o f the Prime Mi ni s te r ' s Department and the Depa rbment o f De fence duri ng a vi s i t to the a rea , and wi th the suppo rt of Sir John Gui s e , a new set o f ' bo rder deve lopment proposa l s ' was drawn up . Thi s document , whi ch purpo rted to ' repre sen t the vi ews o f a l l sectors o f the bo rder communi ty ' large ly

(We s t S epik Provi nce 1 9 7 6 : 1 ) but whi ch wa s

the work o f one expatria te admin i strator , concentrated ma inly

on upgradi ng the borde r stations and on improvi ng admini stra tive condi tions and capac i ty .

I n e s sence i t was a repeti tion and extens ion

o f the 1 9 6 0 s deve lopme nt p rogramme .

As with the earlier programme , the

e lements of it whi ch were imp leme nted ove r the next few years had li ttle po si tive impac t or spread for border vi llager s . Though the dearth o f adequa te time ser ies data renders any

attempt to a s s e s s dynami c p roce s s e s on the bo rder large ly subj e c tive ,

1

The background o f the p ropo sed multi mi l l ion do lla r deve lopme nt o f one o f Papua New Guinea ' s large st timber re source s i s gi ven in He rlihy 1 9 7 6 .

122

there are some s i gn s that cond i tions for bo rder vi l lagers are deteriorati ng .

The de c l ine in employmen t opportun i t i e s and cash

i ncome s , e spe c i a l ly marked since 1 9 7 4- 7 5 , brought a re duc tion o f modern s uppl ement s to subsi stence .

Mo s t Ki limeri househo lds in 1 9 7 6 were using

worn uten si ls which had been brough t back in the 1 9 5 0 s a nd 1 9 6 0 s by ret urned ·labourers , and we re unab le to replace i tems such a s axe s and saucepans wh ich previously had been regarded as bone ( e s sentia l ) . Unwi l l ing or unable to re turn to a rduous tradit iona l methods o f manufacture for such i tems a s sa lt , many simply di s conti nued their use . The range o f foods tuffs regularly consumed a l so appears for va rious rea sons to have dimi ni shed .

In Ki l imeri the mo st common morning and

evening mea l con s i sted of boi led sago and tulip

( the flavour some and -

for a l e af - re l ative ly nutr i tious Gne twn gnemon tips ) �

One vi l lage ,

whi ch used to consume surp l us garden produce i t cul tiva ted fo r sale to a nearby boardi ng school , ceased consumption o f the in troduc ed c rops when the boarding schoo l became a day school and i t s market c ol l apsed .

Anothe r group j o ined the S even th Day Adventi s t Church ,

r e l i nqui shed mo st of i ts hunter-gatherer pro tei n sources and re fused to a s s i s t i n communal p ig hunt s , whi ch i n the absence o f cultiva ted die tary alternative s margina li zed thei r own diet and to a l e s ser exte nt al te re d the communa l balance .

Wi th the dec l i ne in othe r c a sh earning

opport un i ti e s many vi l lagers re ta i ned a greater proportion o f saleable bush produc ts such a s game , wi ldfowl eggs and sago grubs fo r ma rket or for the gi ft exchange s wi th town contacts whereby they obtained c loth and a few other coveted t rade goo ds .

As the costs of educa tion a nd

the s tandard requi red for regular wage emp loyme nt ro se , i ntere st in primary and vocationa l education dec l i ne d and s choo ls reported a drop in atte ndanc e .

In 1 9 7 6 31 per cent of Ki lime r i adults intervi ewed ha d

received some ba s i c educa tion , but only 2 7 per cent of the i r chi ldren . Seve nty-seven per cent of s choo l age chi ldren at the time o f the survey were not attendi ng s chool and only three vi l l agers in the sample area had compl eted primary educa tion .

Of those who had some s choo ling mo st

chi ldren , like the i r parent s , h ad dropped ou t by Gra de 3 despi te the improvement to prima ry fac i l i ti e s in the area .

Adu lt employmen t hi stori e s

showed a marked reduction i n the range and duration o f out side experi ence s i nc e the mi d 1 9 6 0 s , wh ich was ma tched by a de c l i ne in out s i de contac ts and in the i n forma l a c c e s s to i n fo rmation and modern oppor tuni t ies tha t they had provi ded .

123

Conc lusion The recurrent di l emma for governmen t in deve lopmen t o f the bo rde r a re a , as i t s pa st a t tempts have demons trated , is tha t programme s whi ch have been considered admi ni s trative ly feasible have been handi capped b y s i t uationa l constraint s , whi le a broad attack on border unde rdeve lopmen t wo uld be a hi gh co s t ,

low re turn and long term operation .

To upgrade gove rnment servi c e s and standards o f l i ving on the border rrerely to a standard comparable wi th the P apua New Gui nea ave rage would in i t se l f be expens ive in terms o f monetary re source s , s ta ff quantity and cal ibre , and po s s ib le po l i ti ca l repercu s s ions from othe r areas .

To

continue to di ve r t re sourc e s inde f ini te ly to the maintenanc e o f such leve l s , when the per capi ta cos ts of doing so a re i n flated vi s -a-vi s othe r areas by di s tance , low population densi t i e s and di fficult terra in , i s not likely to be economical ly or poli t i ca l ly feasible .

The provi ncial

governme n t experiment ha s a lre ady indicated tha t the more a dva nced regions are not prepared to s ubsidi ze

the l e s s deve loped a rea s to the

extent tha t wo uld be requi red , and ne i the r the We s tern nor the Sandaun P rovince s have the capac i ty to moun t a campa i gn o f such magni tude wi thout a s s i s tance . Nonethe l e s s , a s far as the S andaun Province i s concerned , the pre s ent Soma re gove rnment is in a better po s i tion to in tervene than wa s the first ( 1 9 7 2 - 7 7 ) Somare gove rnment .

In 1 9 7 2 four of the five

We st Sep ik parl iamentarians , p rompted by the wi de spread fear tha t I ndependence would be d i sadvan tageous to the provinc e , al igned themse lve s wi th the oppo s i tion Uni ted Party .

On several occasions the i r parliame ntary

game smanship antagoni zed coa li tion member s and reduced the gove rnment ' s s cope fo r a concerted a t t ack on deve lopment problems in the ir e l e c tora te s . The cons equent lacuna at na tiona l po l i ti ca l level , and the irrrp ui ssance of the loc a l counc i l s , l e f t border deve lopmen t for five years to pub l i c servants who on the who le were profes siona l ly a n d loc a tiona l ly in ­ At the 1 9 7 7 e l e c tions experi enced and i l l -equipped to tack l e the problem . 1 representative t urnover wa s 1 0 0 per cent . The three la rge s t e le c torates

1

Thi s re fers to the membe r s who repre sented the We st Sepik in the 1 9 7 2 7 7 Assembly . The ext e nt o f ac tua l change in e le c toral support wi thi n each e l ectorate i s di f fi cult to a s s e s s , as e l e ctora l boundaries in the borde r area have been re drawn between every elec tion to da te . Th i s ha s a l so limi ted the abi l i ty o f border vi l lagers to pre ss the i r c a s e con s i s tently i n the na tiona l pol i ti ca l a rena .

124

voted Pangu a n d the two bo rder repre sentative s cro s sed the f loor to 1 Though the lack o f Pangu in the Oppo s i tion re shuf f le o f early 1 9 7 8 . de velopme nt o n the border i s s ti l l re flec ted i n the re lat ive ly weak parli ame n ta ry representation whi ch handi cappe d the area in earlier ho use s , the new po li tical a l l ia nce give s reason to hope for the first time that · nat ional and border i ntere s ts can be reconci led constructive ly .

1

Post-Courier 2 1 Ma rch 1 9 7 8 .

APPENDI X I A GREEME NT B E TWEE N THE

GOVERNME NT

OF AUS TRAL IA

OF

B E HALF

OWN B E HA LF AND ON

ITS

( AC T I NG ON

THE

GOVERNMENT OF

PAP UA NEW GU I NEA ) AND

THE

GOVERNMENT OF

I NDONE S IA

C ONCE RN I NG ADM I N I S TRAT IVE

B ORD E R

ARRANGEME NTS AS

TO

THE

BORDER B E TWEEN

PAPUA NEW GU I NEA AND

I NDONE S IA

THE GOVERNMENT OF AUS TRALIA ( on i ts own beha l f and on beha l f o f the GOVERNMENT O F PAPUA NEW GUINEA ) and the GOVERNMENT OF INDONES IA ,

Reca l ling the Agre ement be twe en the Australi an and I ndone s i an Gove rnments date d the twel fth day o f February 1 9 7 3 which , among o ther th ings , demarcate s mo re p re c i s e ly in ce rtain re spects the land bo undari e s on the i s l and of New Guine a ( I rian ) and de l imi ts terr i tori a l s e a boundari e s o f f the northe rn and southe rn coasts o f that i s land

Recognizing the need to prote ct the tradi tional r i ghts and c u s toms o f peop le l i vi ng in proximi ty to the borde r cons ti tuted by tho s e bo undari e s

Recognising a lso the spi ri t o f co-ope ration , unde rstanding and goodwi l l that a l re ady pre vai l s wi th re gard t o the admi n i s tration o f the borde r and bo rde r a reas and the e xi s ting a rrangements betwe en Gove rnments for liai son and other purpos e s i n re lation the reto

Recognising a lso the desi rabi li ty o f fur the r fo s te ring co-operation , goodwi l l and unde r s tandi ng and further s tre ngthening and improving e xi s ting arrangements and to thi s e nd of formulating a broad frame ­ work within whi ch the borde r and bo rde r are a s sha l l be admini stered

in the future

126

Having in mind P apua New Guinea be c omi ng an i ndepe ndent nation Recognising a lso tha t un ti l independence the borde r arrangeme n ts in re lation to the Pap ua New Guinea s i de o f the borde r wi l l be carried i n to e ffect by the Gove rnme nt o f Pap ua New Guinea wi th the unde r­ s tanding that a fte r i ndependence Aus tral ia sha l l cease to be re sponsible i n re sp ect o f such arrangements .

As good nei ghbour s and in a spi ri t

o f friend ship and co-operation HA VE AGREED as fol lows :

Artic le 1 Fo r the purpose o f thi s Agre ement the border area on each s i de of the bo rde r sha l l be tho se a re a s not i fied by le tter s and shown approximate ly on maps to be e xchanged on or be fo re the date of the e xchange o f i n st ruments of rati f i cation of thi s Agreeme n t .

The

bo rde r areas may be var ied f rom time to time by an e xchange of le t te r s a n d map s a fter mutual cons ul tation s .

Artic le 2 Li ai son Arrangements The e s tabl i shme nt o f lia i son on mat te r s re lating to the border is ful l ac cep te d . Arrangeme n ts should be made for re gulati n g the function s and wo r k ing p ro cedur e s for e ach leve l of l i a i son . 2.

Un ti l o the rwi se mutua l ly arrange d , e xi sti ng liai son a rrange ­

men ts sha l l continue and liai son mee tings sha l l be he ld : ( a ) by senior o f f i c i a l s o f the Gove rnme nt of P apua New Guinea and o f the P rovi n c i a l Gove rnment o f I r i an Jaya when reque s ted by ei ther Gove rnme nt on reasonable no ti c e , and a t least once a year , to review and deve lop borde r co-operation ; (b ) by o f fi c i a l s o f We st S epik and We ste rn Di stri c t s and the Jayap ura , Jayawi j aya and Merauke Kabupatens at regular i nte rval s but at least e very two mon ths ; and ( c ) by o ffi c i a l s of the s ub-di stricts and k ecamatans concerned at re gular inte rva l s but at l e a s t every two months , the loca tion to be locally de c i de d . 3.

The main pm:po ses o f the l i ai son arrangements sha l l be :

( a ) to e xchange in formation on a l l deve lopments in the borde r areas which are o f mutua l i ntere st to the Governments ; (b )

to devi s e , amend or e s tabl i sh arrangeme n t s to faci li tate the p ractical ope ra tion , parti c ularly at local and di s tri c t

127

leve l s , o f t h e provi sions o f thi s Agre ement ;

and

( c ) to e n sure that Gove rnments a re kep t i n formed o f deve lopments of s i gni f i cance relating to the border areas and tha t the i r attention i s drawn to any ma tter s whi ch may requi re consul tation i n ac co rdance wi th thi s Agre ement .

Artic l� 3 Border Cro s s i ng for Tradi tiona l and Cus tomary Purpo ses 1.

The tradi tional and c us tomary prac ti c e s o f the peop l e s , who

re s i de i n a bo rde r area and are c i ti zen s o f the coun try concerned , of c ro s s i ng the borde r for tradi tional activi tie s such a s so c i a l contacts and ceremon i e s i nc luding marri age , ga rdening and other land usage , co l l e c ting , hunti ng , fi shi ng and othe r usage o f wate r s , and traditiona l barte r trade are re cogni sed and sha l l conti nue to be re spected . 2.

S uch border cro s sings based on tradition and custom sha l l be

subj e c t to spe c i a l a rrangements , and normal inuni gra tion and othe r requi rements sha l l not app ly . 3.

The spe c i a l a rrangements sha l l be formulated on the principle

that s uch cro s s i ngs sha ll be only temporary i n character and no t for the purpo se o f se ttleme nt .

Artic le 4 Cros s Border Ri gh ts to Land and Wa ter The tradi tional r i ghts en j oyed by the citi zens o f one coun try , who re s i de i n i ts bo rde r are a , i n relation to land in the border area o f the other country and for purpo s e s such as fi shi ng and othe r usage o f the seas or wate rs in or in the vi c i n i ty o f the bo rder area of the othe r country , sha l l be respected and the other country sha l l permi t them to exerci se tho s e ri ght s on the same condi tions as app ly to i ts own ci ti zens .

The se r ights sha l l be exerci sed by the persons

conce rne d wi thout settling p e rmanently on tha t si de of the border un l e s s s uch persons obtai n pe rmi s sion to enter the other country for reside nce i n accordance wi th the immi gration laws and procedure s of that coun try .

12 8

Artic le 5

S et tl ement It sha ll be an agre ed obj e c tive to di scourage the construc tion of vi l lage s o r other permanent hous i ng wi thi n a two k i l ometer zone on each s i de of the bo rde r .

Article 6 Borde r Cros s ing Othe r Than For Tradi tional a nd Customary Purpo s e s 1.

The c ro s sing o f the borde r b y persons n o t comin g wi thi n

Arti c l e 3 above i s to tak e place through des i gnated poin ts of en try and in accordance wi th the norma l laws and regulati ons re lating to e ntry . 2.

I n fo rmation sha l l be e xchanged wi th re spect to the mi gration

laws and po l i c i e s operat i ng on each s ide of the border to mai n tain more e f fective control of the bo rder area s . 3.

Pe rsons who c ro s s the borde r other than in a ccordance wi th

the pract i c e s recognised by Arti c le 3 above or the no rma l laws and regul ations re la ti ng to entry sha l l be treated as i l lega l immi grants . 4.

I n admi ni s tering i ts laws and po l i c i e s relating to the entry

of persons i n to i ts te rri tory acro s s the border , e ach Gove rnmen t sha l l a c t i n a sp iri t o f frie ndship and good nei ghbourline s s bearing i n mind re l evant princip l e s o f international law and e s tabli shed i nter­ national prac ti ce s and the importance o f di scouragi ng the use o f bo rde r cro s s ing for the purpo se o f evading j ustice and the u s e o f i ts terri tory in a manner i ncons i s ten t wi th the pre amble or any provi sion o f thi s Ag! e ement .

Each Governme n t shal l a l so tak e into a ccount ,

where appropriate , the de sirabi l i ty o f exchanging in formation and holding consultations wi th the othe r .

Artic le 7 S e c uri ty 1.

I n a spiri t o f goodwi l l and mutual understanding and so a s to

maintain and strengthen the good n e i ghbourly and fri endly relations a l re ady e xi s ti ng , the Governments on e i ther s i de o f the border agree to conti nue to co -ope rate wi th one another in order to prevent the

129

u s e o f the i r respec tive terr i tori e s i n or i n the vi c i n i ty o f thei r re spe ctive border areas for ho sti le activi ti e s aga in st the o the r . To thi s end , each Gove rnme nt sha l l mai ntain i ts own procedure s o f noti fication a n d control . 2.

The Gove rnments sha l l keep e ach othe r i n forme d and whe re

appropri ate con sul t a s to deve lopme nts in or in the vi c i nity o f the i r re spe c tive borde r area s , which a r e re levant to the ir s ecuri ty .

Artic le 8 Border Trade The Governments agre e to e xcha nge in formation concerning cro s s ­ borde r trade a n d when appropriate to consult in re lation the reto .

Artic le 9 Citi zenship The de s i rabi l i ty is recogni sed of having a regular exchange of re levant i n formation regarding laws and regulations on nationa li ty and c i ti zenship and each Gove rnment agree s , i f so reque s ted , to have consultations on any p roblem be i ng encoun te red in re lation the reto .

Artic le 1 0 Quaran ti ne 1.

The co -opera tion a lready e xi sting in the field o f health and

quaranti ne , inc luding mutua l vi s i ts of o f f i c i a l s and exchange o f i n formation and pe riodi cal reports , sha l l b e co ntinued and deve lope d . 2.

I n the case o f an outbreak or spread o f an epidemi c in a border

area , quaran tine and health re stri ctions on moveme nt acro s s the border may be impo sed , notwi ths tand i ng Arti c l e 3 above .

Artic le 1 1 Navi gationa l Fa ci l i ti e s i n Boundary Wate r s Arrangements sha l l b e made a s appropriate in orde r to fa c i l i ta te navigation o f tra f f i c in mai n waterway s i n boundary water s ,

the " F ly Ri ve r Bulge " .

e spe c i a l ly

130

Arti c le 1 2

Pol l ution The Gove rnme nts agree that when mi ning , i ndustri a l , fore stry , agri c ul tural or othe r pro j e c t s are being carried out i n the re spec tive borde r a re a s the neces sary pre cautiona ry me a s ure s sha l l be taken to preven t $eri ous po l l uti on o f r i ve r s f lowing acro s s the border .

The re

shal l be consul tations , i f so reque s ted , on mea s ure s to preven t po l l utio n , ari s i ng from s uch a c ti vi ti e s , o f rive rs on the o ther s i de o f the borde r . Article 1 3

Con s ultations and Revi ew 1.

The Go ve rnments sha l l , i f so reque sted , con s ult on the implemen tation ,

ope ration and scope o f thi s Agreeme nt . 2.

Thi s Agre ement sha l l be revi ewed upon the e xp i ration o f five

years from the date o f exchange o f the in s trumen t s o f rati f i c ation . Artic le 1 4

S i gnature and Ra ti fi cation 1.

Thi s Agreeme nt i s sub j e c t to rati fication in a cco rdance wi th

the consti tutional requi rements of e ach country , and sha l l en te r in to force on the day on whi ch the ins truments o f rati f i ca tion are e xchange d . 2.

I t i s unde r s tood that the concurrence o f the Governmen t o f

Papua New Guinea in thi s Agreement i s a condi tion ther eof and such concurre nce is evi denced by the s i gning of thi s Agreement on i ts beha l f by Maori Ki ki , Mi n i s te r for De fence and Fore i gn Re lations o f Papua New Guinea .

A P P E ND I X

II

WE S T PAP UA NA T I ONAL I SM : AN

I NS I DE V I EW

" No ri ght anywhere exi s ts to hand people about from sovere i gn ty to sovereignty a s i f they we re property . " Woodrow Wi l so n , 2 8 th Pre s ident o f Un i te d S ta te s o f Ame ri ca , l l th Februa ry 1 9 1 8 . 1.

I n troduc tion A numbe r of s c i en ti s t s who have been for tunate or lucky

enough to be a l lowed to e n ter tha t sacred backyard of Indone s i a , a mini -s iberia o f the P a c i f i c c a lle d I r i an Jaya , have pre sented qui te impre s s ive reports on the i r f ind i ngs .

The se might be the mos t up to

da te informa tion wr i tten about We s t New Guinea eve r - s i nc e the area was sealed o f f from the free world in 1 96 3 .

Wi th a bureaucratic

admi ni s tration a nd suspi cious a rmy s ta f f i n o f fice plus secre t pol i ce keeping an eye on vi si tor s ' ac tivi ti e s , I gue s s the coopera tion tha t the se s c i enti s ts re ceived in I rian Jaya mi ght go a s far a s looking a t partly propaganda repor ts and observi ng the general li fe in the coun try . I do appre c i a te the i r repo r ts and in thi s paper I pre fer no t to cha llenge thei r fi nd i ng s but to rai se some more cri tical points in regard to the topi c "Papua Nationa l i sm " whi ch wa s a l so me n tioned in the above quoted reports . One more point I would l ik e to make i s tha t the fore i gne r s , Indone sians , Dutch , Aus tra l i ans and Ameri cans a l ike , seem to adop t the a tti tude o f knowing the si tua tion be tter than we do � who we are and wha t we want for our future .

Even they te ll us

I f we di sagre e wi th them

they c laim tha t we are s ti l l primi tive , we are communi s ts or subversive s . Where e l se in today ' s wo rld would the dic tum be accep ted tha t a people we re too primi tive even to be fre e ? 2.

The roo ts o f the An ti - I ndone s i a sentiment There wa s almo s t no thi ng wri tten in the modern li tera ture about

our relationship wi th Indone s i a be fore the Europeans came to thi s part o f the world .

But from s tor i e s pa s s ed on from genera tion to genera tion

we do know tha t our people were tre a ted as s l ave s by the Asi ans .

The

general image of I ndone s i ans , buried deep in the mi nds o f our people

132

for centuri e s , wa s that they we re untrus tworthy peopl e .

amberi ( a B iak word ) .

We ca l l them

The image behind amberi wa s " for e i gners who

can ta lk extra swe e t but have bad p lans in mi nd . "

When the mi s s ionari e s

c ame in the 1 8 th century and the Dutch Co loni a l Admi ni s tra tion two cen turie s later , they brought wi th them Indone s i an teacher s , c l e rk s , pol i ce and c arpenters who aga in like the i r anc e s tor s mi s treated our people .

Such punishments like for c i ng people to drink their own uri ne

a nd bloody beatings were part of the so cal l ed educa tion to c i vi l i ze the "primi ti ve Papuans . " 3.

They wer e in fac t the f i r s t co loni a l i sts .

The roo ts o f the c l a im The who le di spute ove r We s t New Gui nea i s based on terri torial

c laims made by I ndone s i a on the one hand and the Dutch c l a im of In h i s

l e ga l i ty and the rights o f the Papua peop le o n the o ther hand . book ti tled

Perdjuangan Irian Barat a tas dasar Prok lamasi * Pro fe s sor

Mohamed Yamin o f I ndone s i a tri e d to put forward a s many arguments a s po s s ible to ma te ri a l i s e I ndone sia ' s c laim tha t the who le New Gui nea i s l and wa s part o f Modj opai t ' s Empi re s ince the 8 th c entury . give n to thi s i s land wa s D j angi .

The name

On page 2 4 he wen t on say i ng tha t

in the years o f 7 04 , 7 1 6 a nd 7 2 4 Dj angi gi r l s were o f fe re d to Palace s of Cai s ars in China .

He wa s too care ful to avoid men tioning tha t the se

gi r l s w e re i n fac t par t o f the thousands o f s l ave s sold t o As i a by the I ndone s i ans .

The o ther c l a im made by I ndone s i a wa s tha t because We s t

New Gui nea wa s coloni sed b y the Dutch , i t should b e inc luded in the Republ i c of I ndone sia pro c la imed i n 1 9 4 5 . The Dutch howeve r would no t accep t thi s .

As the coloni sers they

knew very well tha t We s t New Gui nea was never inc luded e f fec tively in the ma chinery o f the Ea st I ndi a Company .

Wha t i s more , We s t New

Guinea was e xc l uded in the Proclamation Ac t a nnounced by the I ndone sian l eaders in 1945

(Naskah Persiapan Undang Dasar 1 94 5 , page 204 by Pro f .

Moh . Yami n* * ) . More convi nc i ngly , the We st New Guinea people do no t

*

Buki ttinggi and Dj aka r ta :

Nusantara .

Se cond edi tion , 1 9 5 6 .

* * Vol . 1 . D j aka r ta : Ja j asan Prapa n t j a 1 9 5 9 .

See a l so pp 1 9 1 - 4 .

133

want to become pa r t o f I ndone s i a ( " Pol i ti ca l Awakening i n We s t New Guinea " ,

*

page 5 8 , by P . N . van der Veur ) .

Wi th the impo s s ible

demand from the I ndone s ian side , the Dutch propo sed that the ma t ter should be taken up wi th the I n terna tiona l Court o f Jus ti c e , tha t was in 1 9 5 2 , but I ndone s ia refused to coopera te . The Dutch could be r i ght in wanting to pro tec t the i r Papuan intere s ts but Indone s i a regarded the co lon ia l pre sence in We s t New Gui nea as a seri ous threat to the newly created repub l i c .

Even some

o f our l eader s had que s tioned Dutch de termi na tion to pro te c t our r ights , espec i a l ly whe n Dutch

coloni s ts were a l lowed to se ttl e in We s t New

Gui ne a . 4.

The po l i tical awakening Po l i tical a c ti vi ti e s in We s t New Gui nea could be tra ced as far

back as 1 9 4 2 .

Long be fore the Amer icans arrived a group of leade r s

in Biak , among them a lad y b y the name Anganetha Menufandu , proc laimed tha t the whole of We s t New Gui nea should be l iberated from the Japane se oppre s sor . Thi s revo l t ended up wi th hundreds o f live s lo s t and the leaders thems e lve s had the i r heads chopped o ff . Irrane di a te ly a fter the war in 1 9 4 5 ano ther group ca l l ed the People ' s Voice Movement wa s founded in B iak and demanded a ha l f independe n t Country , up to 2 5 years under USA rule .

The Dutch , hop ing

tha t they wo uld re s ume control ove r I ndon e s i a , i gnored thi s demand , whi ch made the group become more radi cal .

The anti-amberi campaign led

by the Ka i si epo bro thers i n 1 94 6 from the above group had a good re sponse and spr ead qui ckly throughout the country .

Everywhere people

demanded the i r o wn loc a l teacher s , kiap s , po l i c e , carpenters e tc . The Dutch did replace I ndone s ians wi th Dutch or Papuan officer s a nd recrui ted more loca l s to be tra ined for the se posi tion s .

The recrui ts

from a l l over the country who we re undergoing tra ining in Ho l landi a fe lt s trong and uni ted and used thi s good oppor tuni ty to put on a b i gge r show .

They sent Frans Kai s i epo to the Ma lino con ference near

Makasar as repres enta ti ve of We st New Gui nea peop le to te ll Dutch and

*

Pacific Affairs 36 ( 1 ) , Spring 1 96 3 .

134

I ndone s i a tha t the We s t New Gui nea Peop l e would have nothing to d o wi th the I ndone s i an Republic .

He a l so reque s ted the Dutch Governmen t a t

thi s conference to rule We s t New Guinea separa tely from I ndone s ia .

He

wa s the one who a l so sugge s ted the name ! RYAN ( not I RIAN ) to rep lace Papua or We s t New Guine a . Mo s t leaders we re sa ti s fi e d wi th the se deve lopments and wan ted to cooperate wi th the Dutch , but a few , unders tandably from the Peop l e ' s Vo ice Movement , demanded tha t the Dutch too should go . not to lerate thi s of c ourse and put them in j a i l .

The Dutch would

Soon they found

themse lve s i so lated and forced to j o i n I ndone sia in thei r s truggle to throw the Dutch out of We s t New Gui nea .

I t wa s c lear then , tha t there

wa s two vi ews deve loped among the se two fac tions s i nce 1 9 4 6 . (1)

The f i r s t group , whi c h didn ' t wan t a ny thing to do wi th I ndone s i a and were wi l l i ng to cooper a te wi th Dutch , wa s led by N . Jouwe and M . Kai s i epo .

(2)

The second group , which re j ec ted by the Dutch # saw I ndone sia a s a po tenti a l par tner to ge t the Dutch out of We s t New Guine a , wa s led by L . Rumkorem , M . I ndey and s . Papare .

Regardle s s of the se di f ference s , the two groups had one ob j ec tive in �.onunon :

"A free Papuan State , wi th the same r i ghts as any s ta te

in the wor l d . "

Some leader s from the s econd group fled

the coun try

and conti nued on the i r f i ght toge ther wi th I'ndone s i a . Othe r known organi sa tions wer e the young I ryan Moveme nt founded i n Sorong in 1 9 4 9 , and two years la ter the New Guinea Uni ty Moveme n t i n Manokwari . wa s formed .

About the same time the Pro te s tant Labour Organi zation I n 1 9 5 6 the Prote s tant Churche s 1 whi ch ra n mo s t o f the

s choo l s and ma in ta ined an admi ni stration ne two rk throughout the country we re re cogn i z ed as an independent organi zation known as Geredja Kristen

Indji li or Evange l i c a l Chri stian Church .

The runni ng of thi s nationa l

organi zation ti l l today ha s proved tha t Papuan peop l e c a n •· t b e down grade d from Dutch or I ndone sia n admi ni stra tors . The first po l i tical par ty , cal led the P eople ' s Democratic Party , was fo unded i n 1 95 7 .

The Party ' s p l a t form wa s for gre a te r autonomy under

135

Dutch supervi sion , leading t o proposed uni ty wi th Papua New Gui nea in a Melane s i an F ederation .

Dur i ng thi s time the Dutch a n d the Aus tra l ia n

Governments were enco uraging c lo se r coopera tion between the two terr i tor i e s . in 1 9 6 0 .

The new era o f i ncreas ing pol i ti c a l awarene s s s tarted

Some more pol i ti c a l parties wer e formed , all dema nding

deve lopmen t a nd future s e l f -government or independenc e . The c l imax of Papua Na tional i sm could be seen in 1 96 1 .

The

re sponse to the e l ec tions for the We s t New Gui nea Counc i l was great : 2 2 out of 28 seats were he ld by Papuans . They se lec ted nationa l symbo l s , a flag and coa t of arms , and a national anthem , a nd put to use the name of the co untry a nd the peopl e . The entire popula tion wa s proud of these na tiona l symbo l s .

The t e n yea r s deve lopment plan proposed by the

Government ( the origina l plan wa s from the Na tiona l Par ty ) wa s accep ted by a l l par ti e s a nd the people .

Everybody knew tha t by the year 1 9 7 0

We s t Papua would become i ndependent a nd people wer e prepar ed to work hard towards tha t goa l .

However I ndones i a on the o ther ha nd wa s

wa tching a l l the s e deve lopments wi th di scontent , a nd c lung to her ambi tious terr i torial c l a ims .

Thus ther e was no other a lterna tive tha n

an i nva s ion to s top the crea tion o f a w e s t Papua Na tion . The fighting between Dutch a nd the I ndone sia n for c e s erupted in Ja nuary 1 96 2 and conti nued on for severa l mo nths unti l the USA per suadep the Dutch to s i gn a hand -over a greement , known a s New York Agreement , wi th I ndone sia i n August 1 96 2 , over the heads o f our people . Thi s s udden change d idn 1· t give much time for our l eader s and par ti e s to cons ider the i r stand .

A sma l l mi s s ion to severa l African

countr i e s had created a good impac t but wa s a lready too late .

The

pol itical l eader s spl i t into two groups , one group dec ided to leave the country and the other group remained .

Whether s taying or l eaving ,

everybody 1 s hope wa s tha t i n 1 9 6 9 wi th the help of U . N . we would be on our own agai n . 5.

Can Papua Na tiona l i sm S urvive ? The depar ti ng Dutch o f f i c ia l s had a sked the same que stion i n

1 96 2 ,

" Can Papua Na tiona l i sm S urvive ? "

Probably unaware of thi s concern ,

136

J une Ver rier had dug o u t an answer to i t . 197 5 :

I n her report ( " I rian Jaya

The We s t New Guinea Que s tion Pha s e Three " * ) she indic a ted tha t

there wa s a young pa s s iona te 1 9 6 9 generation , future looki ng and more rea l i stic than the 19 6 2 genera tion .

Havi ng exper ienc ed thi s proce s s

my s e l f I would l ike t o a dd tha t the 1 9 6 9 gener a tion wa s compr i s ed o f two fac tions mentioned ear lier i n thi s paper . B e i ng bra i nwa shed by the ir pol i ti c a l agi ta tors the or dinary I ndone s i an men and soldiers be l i eved that the We s t New Gui nea people rea l ly needed I ndonesia t o l ibera te them from the Dutch coloni a l i s t s . We felt sorry for them ;

they wer e being foo l i sh to sacr i fi c e themse lve s

for thei r Genera ls , no t for We s t New Guinea . a s l ibera tor s ,

They regarded themse lves

they came i n force so proud hop i ng tha t they would be

welcomed wi th flowers a nd free ho sp i ta l i ty .

Wha t they found wa s di smay , " Look

r e j ection a nd ho s ti l i ty . I can s ti l l recall the u sua l go s s ips :

at them or , here they come or , wa tchout for the ba ndi ts wi th their guns . " Angry wi th thi s si tua tion the I ndone s ia n s conduc ted terror a c ti vi ti e s wh ich were in l ine wi th D j aka r ta ' s po l i cy to force the popula tion to submi t to their direc tive rules a nd a ccept the ir guided democracy .

There wa s loo ting , i ntimi da tion , raping , s tea l i ng , beat ings ,

tor ture and a rbi trary arre s ts o f the c ivi l i ans . prese rve j ust ic e ;

There wa s no law to

even re ligion wa s a s ta te a ffa i r .

A l l pol i ti c a l

a c tivi ty wa s banned , heavy pre s s a nd news me dia cen sor ship impo sed , a nd prohibi tion of trave l soon became common in the coun try .

They made

re solutions and s ta tements one a f ter another to condemn and a sk for the wi thdrawa l of the 1969 p lebi s c i te a nd forced our leader s to agree to th i s . D j aka rta a nnounced to the wor ld tha t the We s t New Gui nea peop l e had a l ready dec i ded to rema i n wi th I ndonesia , a nd tha t ther e fore the pl ebi s c i te i n 1969 wa s not nec e s s ary . For the population who once enj oyed democratic freedom , peace and j ustice , thi s new type o f government i s j us t a " HELL " .

De sp i te

a l l the s e d i f f i culti e s our underground organi sa tions and leader s secretly smugg led reports of th e rea l s i tua ti o n to our l eaders ove r s e a s and the Uni ted Na tions i n New York . *

New Guinea 10 { 2 ) , Augus t 1 9 7 5 .

The common ta ctic wa s ,

" let the

137

I ndone s ians have the doub t , and w e wi l l come back i n 196 9 . "

Previou s ly

pro -I ndone s i an l eader s l ike E . Bonay ( The f i r s t Governor appointed by I ndonesia 196 3 ) , Mo s e s Weror and Cem Iba

( now in PNG ) , Lu c a s Rurnkorem , Mar ti n Indey

( now in PNG ) , had turned bi tterly a ga in s t Indone s i a .

Thi s

made I ndone s i a come to re a l i ze tha t , whe ther Pro or Anti , a l l the Papuans are the same and should receive the same puni shments , e i ther exi l ed to o ther provi nc e s , j a i l ed or sho t ( from a n

I ndone s ian document

i n 1966 , s i gne d by Dr s . S ud j oko , head o f Po l i c e in D j a j apura ) .

I ndo ne s i a

knew for s ure , a c cordi ng t o the above men tioned document , tha t a free e l e c tion i n 1969 would turn aga i n s t I ndone sia .

The only solution wa s

using forc e . Beli eving in Human Righ ts , Democracy and the New York Agreement , our l eaders s tra tegy wa s ,

" not usi ng viol ence '' , and they repor ted a l l

the truth about I ndone s i a ' s mi sdeeds to the U . N . and the wor ld s o tha t True

i n 1969 , the wor ld mi ght accuse I ndone s ia and vo te agai n s t her .

there wa s sporadic fighting in sever a l place s around the country since 1 9 6 5 but thi s wa s not coordina ted a s a nationa l campa i gn under one s i ng le command .

The na ti ona l i s ts w e r e primar i ly direc ted

towards libe ration ,

but hoped to achieve this by forc i ng I ndone sia and the wor l d to seriously consider our r i ghts , guaranteed in the New York Agreement .

Our peop l e

a l so s trongly bel ieved tha t Aus tra l ia a nd the Dutch defini tely would not l e t us be crushed by I ndone s i a .

Wi th thi s fai th the Aus tra lian

securi ty officers placed a long the border were a lway s fed wi th up to da te informa ti on . Our f i r s t pla � ned demons tra tion on the 2 4 th August 1968

to

we lcome

the Un i ted Na tion ' s repre se nta tive Dr Fernandes Orti z Sanz , wa s crushed , the leader Mr Torey wa s e liminated , and o ther s were j a i l ed by the Indone s ians .

Howe ver we came back aga in a rme d wi th banners to see

Dr . Fe rnande s Orti z Sanz off to the U . N . i n 1 9 6 9 .

Despi te the str i c t

secur i ty mea s ure s , on the e a r l y morning o f Apr i l l l th , 1969 the U . N . repre s entative wa s pres ented wi th a peti tion a t hi s home by a crowd

o f more than 2000 demo n s tr a to r s .

I ndone s i a used a rmored cars to crush

this demons tra tion a f ter it had met wi th the U . N . representa tive . The so-c a l led a c t of free cho ic e came and ended wi th much publi c i ty and cri ti c i sm the wor ld over .

Wi th a l l the fac ts repor ted by the U . N .

138

representa tive and many observer s our peop l e were hoping tha t U . N . Genera l Assembly wo uld condemn I ndonesia .

Our hopes were high tha t

Aus tra l ia , the Dut ch a nd African Na tions would lead the o f f i c i a l pro te s t . A number o f African countri e s d id but were be a ten in the vo ting .

Ano ther

hard blow wa s tha t Austra lia had no t supported our de legation of two men ( now livi ng in PNG )

se nt to the

U .N.

through PNG .

The U . N . de c i s ion i n favour o f Indone s i a wa s the harde s t blow and one tha t our people wi l l never forge t . we re guns reaching

I n tha t very mome n t i f there

everybo dy , re l i gious l eaders , me n , wome n , young

and o l d could have de c lared an open war aga i n s t wha t they be l i eve i s SATAN .

They c r i ti c a l ly gue s tione d , the va lue o f the ir re ligious be l i e f s

i n j u s ti c e , human rights , democracy a nd mutua l under s tanding .

Hopefully

some of our leaders o ver s ea s , e n j oying more freedom than we do , would have come up wi th a more constructive so lution , but they haven ' t done better e i th er .

S lowly we come back to our sense of rea l i ty .

We have

to s i t down and eva l ua te everything and thi nk of other po s s ibi l i ti e s o r al te rna tive s . c lear : 6.

An answer mus t be found anyhow , but one thing i s

w e wi ll neve r give up .

A new s truggle for the Libera tion of We st Papua . I f the reader ha s fo l lowed me correc tly , I d id me ntion tha t our

people have done every thing pos s ible as fai thful Chri s tians to avoid vio l ence and wi l l d o so wi th much sacri f ic e . lo s t ;

Thousands o f live s we re

a ve ry few died in fighting but the re s t we re murdere d in cold

b lood by the ruling Colonia li sts .

Tha t wa s the pr ice o f honouri ng

human rights a nd j ustice , the price of our good wi l l and unde rstanding to seek a peace ful solution ( the s ame road tha t Sir Maori Kiki is now unde rtak i ng ) , but the re sult wa s too painful .

I do not be li eve tha t

the peop l e a re foo l i sh enough t o repea t th is bi tter experi ence a l l ove r aga i n .

Armed struggle wi l l be more likely the choic e o f the peop le

for the next s tart . All i s no t los t .

One good thing we d i s covered in 1 9 6 9 wa s the

s trength of Papua Nationa l i sm and deep fee ling of uni ty . Suspi c ious

139

atti tude s toward s di f ferent organ i s a tions have vani shed .

I wa s move d

to he ar the fo l lowi ng s ta tement made b y Mr X , a we ll known pro­ Indone sian leader , when he addre s sed his group ca lled SRIWA to give ful l support to the Apr i l 1 1 , 1 96 9 demons tration : " For a long time we have be en hated as tra i tors by our own bro the r s , j us t because we choo se a s truggle d i f fe rent from wha t they bel i eve i s right . Now the time has come for u s to show them that we have been f i ghting fo r the same end . " The 1 9 6 9 gene ration wa s the machine and ma i n sour ce o f in forma tion , supplied to the group s operati ng ove r sea s .

The f i r s t group was known

as Na tional Libera tion Counc i l , led by Nicolas Jouwe , a known po l i ti ca l leader s i nce 1 9 4 5 .

The second group , cal led the Hi gh Cour t of the

Chambe r o f the Repre senta tive o f We s t Papua , is led by M . W . Ka i s iepo , founder of the People ' s Vo i c e Movemen t i n 1 9 4 5 and o f the Peopl e ' s Demo c ra ti c Party i n 1 9 5 7 , and a l so a known po l i ti ca l leader . The 1 9 6 9 genera tion expected the l ead ers o f the 19 6 2 generation to re j ec t the un j us t result of " ac t o f free cho i c e " by proc la imi ng a We s t Papuan s ta te b efore the opening o f U . N . Genera l A s s embly , but no thi ng happened . Rea l i s i ng thi s fai lure , the 1 9 6 9 generation took ful l re sponsibi l i ty by formi ng a Provincial Government a nd made Z . Rumkorem , an army o ffi cer , the Pre s iden t . The o ff i c i a l pro c l ama tion wa s announced on July 1 , 1 9 7 1 , j us t Soon a f ter , the Provi siona l

b efore the I ndone s i an Na tiona l e l ections .

Governme nt e s tabl i shed an I n fo rma tion O f f i c e on the African continent i n the coun try o f. S e ne ga l , a long s tanding suppor ter of We st Papua .

If

the · P rovi s i ona l Gove rnment i s provi ding the nece s sary leader ship to a liberation s truggle , there i s no doubt tha t everybody wi l l fo llow . Take the ce ntra l h i ghlands revo l t in 1 96 9 e xample .

( a f ter the e le c tions )

I n very short no ti c e , thousands o f tribe sme n were ready to

fol low the i r l eader to battle .

The people have been wai ti ng for thi s mome nt for

for a long time .

Pac i fi c People ' s Action Front May 1 9 76 .

for

(PNG S e c tion )

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New Guinea 1 ( 4 ) .

Verrier , J . R . , 1 9 7 6 . A us tra lia, Papua New Guinea and the West New Guinea Question 1 94 9 - 1 9 6 9 . Ph . D . the si s , Department of Po l i ti c s , Mona sh Uni ver s i ty . Wa l lace , A . R . , 18 6 9 .

The Ma lay Archipe lago . London :

Macmi l la n .

We s t Sep ik Provi nc e , 1 9 7 6 . Border Deve lopment Propo sa l s . We st Sepik Provinc ial Office 4 Mimeo . Whi ttaker , J . L . , Ga sh , N . G . , Hockey , J . F . a nd Lacey , R . J . , 1 9 7 5 . Documents and Readings in New Guinea Hi story . Mi lton : Jaca randa .

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CONTRIBUTORS Associate edi tor , Sydney Morning Hera ld.

Pete r Ha s ti ngs . J . M . He rl ihy .

Ph . D . scho lar , Departmen t o f Human Geography , Re se arch

School of Pac i fic S tud i e s , Aus tra l ian Na t iona l Uni ver s i ty � He ad o f Department o f Po l i t i cal and Soc ial Cha nge ,

J . A . C . Mack i e .

Research S chool o f Pac i fi c Studi e s , Aus tra l ian Na t i ona l Univer s i ty . R . J . May , S enior f e l low . Depar tme nt o f Po li tical and Soc ial Cha nge , Re sea rch Schoo l of Pac i f i c S tudie s , Aus tralian Na t iona l Univer s i ty . Re x Mortime r .

As soc ia te profe s sor , Depa rtmen t o f Gove rnment , Unive rs i ty

o f Sydney . Kwas i Nyamekye .

Le c turer , Depar tment of Po l i ti c a l a nd Admi n i s trative

S tudi e s , Univer s i ty o f Papua New Gui nea . Ra lph

R.

Premda s .

S enior lecture r , Department o f Po l i ti c a l a nd

Admi ni s trative S tudi e s , Uni versi ty o f Papua New Gui nea . J . R . V . Pre s cot t .

Reader , Depar tment of Geography , Univer s i ty o f

Me lbourne .

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