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Rising Local Identity and Opposition to Globalization in Taiwan and Hong Kong: a comparison of the Sunflower Movement and the Umbrella Movement ISA Asia-Pacific Conference 2016, Hong Kong April 25, 2016

Syaru Shirley Lin The Chinese University of Hong Kong [email protected]

ABSTRACT Recent years have seen an increasing number of protests in both Taiwan and Hong Kong. While the details of the protests have varied, they have reflected a discontent with the rapid pace of integration with China, itself a facet of China’s globalization, and the consolidation of powerful local identities and a weakening of previous identifications with China. Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement in March 2014 protested against further economic liberalization with China, specifically the passage of a Services Trade Agreement. Soon after, Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement in September 2014 sought to persuade Beijing to modify its formula for nominating and electing Hong Kong’s chief executive in 2017 and to air grievances arising from economic integration with mainland China. The Taiwan government yielded to the students’ demands to delay the passage of the trade pact and to draft a mechanism to monitor future negotiations with China, while both Hong Kong and Beijing adamantly refused to amend the electoral proposal. The two governments responded to the students differently because of societal, institutional and external factors. An examination of these factors provides both explanations of the outcomes of the student movements and forecasts about government-societal relations in both regions.

In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, a new generation of youth is emerging that feels disenfranchised and increasingly bitter. In a 2015 poll measuring problems in four Chinese polities – China, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan – Hong Kong and Taiwan were the worst in terms of “generational mistrust.”1 With economic integration with China deepening in both places, the younger generation feels disconnected from its elders and is characterized by a strong sense of local identity. This strong sense of local identity is related to its commitment to a distinctive set of economic, political and social values. Opposing policies they believe threaten their values, youths in both places are engaging in social and political activism, Their high degree of dissatisfaction with existing political structures and the rise of local identity in both regions are both attributable to greater social and economic integration with China, which has been associated with greater inequality and loss of job opportunity especially for the young. In response, Beijing has used both soft and hard strategies to push back the youngsters and their supporters, but these strategies have backfired. In 2014, young people, particularly students, led the Sunflower Movement (SM) in Taiwan and the Umbrella Movement (UM) in Hong Kong, and organized social protests that clashed with government authorities on other issues, including textbook changes and education reforms viewed as promoting Chinese identity and costly infrastructure projects intended to facilitate integration with China. . This anti-establishment culture among the young of anti-establishment is intense and dynamic and has at times become violent. In addition to engaging in social protests, the younger generation has also become actively involved in electoral politics in order to bring about policy change. In the last two years, young activists have organized new political parties, competed for political office, and have launched movements supporting non-traditional candidates that will surely affect the future of both regions. This article examines polls, surveys and primary material to understand these new trends in Hong Kong and Taiwan and to examine their implications for government-societal relations. Rise of Local Identity in Hong Kong and Taiwan Young people in both regions exhibit a distinctly more local sense of identity than the elder generations. There are many ways to measure identity, but in both places, the longest and most consistent set of the data measure selfidentification. For the last two decades, polls and surveys have been tracking whether people in both regions identify themselves as “Chinese,” or adopt an alternative local identity. In addition to self-identification, one’s preference for the region’s political structure and status can also reflect one’s identity. In Hong Kong, support for the “one country two systems” (OCTS) arrangement between Hong Kong and Beijing reflects an identity more favorable to being “Chinese.” Similarly, in Taiwan, support for unification with China is often associated with a “Chinese” identity.2 For the residents of Hong Kong, there was always a sense of local identity during the British colonial era between 1846 to 1997. People living in Hong Kong took pride in being part of a more advanced and free society compared to China, and in speaking Cantonese, rather than Mandarin.3 But both the British and Chinese governments sought to depoliticize the city and avoided mobilizing strong national sentiment in order to maintain stability. This local identity, therefore, was primarily social and cultural and not politically charged.

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Since the handover, a local identity has steadily grown. By comparison, a primarily Chinese identity sometimes gains strength as a result of specific events, such as the Olympics, but does not appear to grow more appealing over time. In December 2015, more than eighteen years after the handover to Beijing, the longest time-data survey conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong (POP) found that nearly 68 percent still saw themselves as having primarily a Hong Kong identity, either a “Hong Konger in China” or simply a “Hong Konger.” This was an increase from the 60 percent in 1997. Only 31 percent called themselves a “Chinese in Hong Kong” or a “Chinese,” a decline from 39 percent in 1997, and a big drop from the peak of 52 percent during the 2008 Olympics. Among the younger generation, the change in identity is even more notable. Despite increasingly China-focused education since 1997, 86 percent of people under 29 years old identified themselves as having primarily a Hong Kong identity. Only 13 percent of the young people identified themselves as primarily Chinese, down from 32 percent in 1997 (see Figure 1).4 Among the younger generation, those who claim to be exclusively “Hong Kongers” (56 percent) outnumber those who claim to be exclusively “Chinese” (8 percent) by seven times. In 1997, this ratio was merely three to one. A 2016 study by the Hong Kong Government’s Central Policy Unit (CPU) focusing on young people showed that 84% of the people between age 15-35 felt exclusively “Hong Konger” rather than either “Chinese” or “both Chinese and Hong Konger.”5 These results have been corroborated by several other university surveys and polls.6 FIGURE 1 ​

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)

Ethnic Identity – Hongkonger (per poll, by age group) (8/1997 - 12/2015) 18 - 29

30+ Overall

80 %

Percentage

70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 %

3-7/12/2015 15-18/6/2015 10-16/12/2014 6-12/6/2014 9-12/12/2013 10-13/6/2013 14-17/12/2012 13-20/6/2012 12-20/12/2011 21-22/6/2011 13-16/12/2010 9-13/6/2010 8-11/12/2009 8-13/6/2009 9-12/12/2008 11-13/6/2008 11-14/12/2007 8-12/6/2007 6-12/12/2006 13-15/6/2006 9-14/12/2005 6-8/6/2005 6-9/12/2004 7-11/6/2004 10-14/12/2003 13-18/6/2003 1-4/3/2003 13-18/12/2002 2-5/9/2002 4-5/6/2002 12-13/3/2002 7-9/12/2001 13-21/9/2001 1-5/6/2001 22/3-2/4/2001 4-12/12/2000 21-25/9/2000 7-8/6/2000 6-7/4/2000 1-2/2/2000 13-15/12/1999 26-27/10/1999 6/8/1999 8/6/1999 15/4/1999 8-9/2/1999 21/12/1998 29/9/1998 14/8/1998 22-24/6/1998 3-4/6/1998 8-9/12/1997 28-29/10/1997 23-24/9/1997 26-27/8/1997

Date of survey

Source: POP, December 2015. Furthermore, as it relates to support for OCTS, POP surveys show that the percentage of people lacking confidence in OCTS has grown from 18 percent in 2

1997 to 50 percent in 2016, with the rise more prominent in the last decade.7 Compared to the elder generations, young people are much more dissatisfied with the Central Government and with the implementation of OCTS. When asked if they were satisfied with the way the Central Government implements the OCTS in Hong Kong, 45 percent of respondents aged 15 to 24 and 46 percent of respondents aged 25 to 39 said they were “dissatisfied” compared with 22 percent of respondents 60 or above and 31 percent of respondents 40-59.8 In the latest CPU survey, when asked about their views on OCTS, 71 percent of the respondents preferred to maintain a distance from the mainland compared with 27 percent who wanted to strengthen the tie.9 When asked about trust in the Central Government and the Hong Kong Government, the trend appears to be the same. According to polls by both POP and CPU, more than twice as many young respondents mistrust the Central Government and the Hong Kong Government compared to the older respondents.10 Furthermore, a majority of these younger generations believes that Hong Kong should be much more autonomous than at present, a larger proportion than the elder generations.11 In sum, whether measured by self-identification, or trust in OCTS, or desire for autonomy from the mainland, young Hong Kongers are distinctly more focused on Hong Kong as their community, rather than China as a nation, and more dissatisfied with the local establishment, and more mistrustful of the central Chinese government. Younger Taiwanese also demonstrate a more local identity than the rest of the Taiwanese society, which as a whole has also embraced Taiwanese identity in a dramatic fashion since Taiwan democratized. After fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, the Taiwanese after 1949 were subjected to the Nationalist propaganda with the explicit goal of creating a Chinese identity in order to maintain support for its ultimate goal of national unification. After the lifting of martial law in 1987 and eventual full democratization, Taiwanese began a prolonged and open discussion over what constituted their national identity, critically examining the legacy of the Nationalist-imposed Chinese identity. While the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) alternately led the government and tried to revise the narrative of national identity each time, the majority of Taiwanese steadily moved toward a more “Taiwanese” identity. This consolidated identity has become defined less in terms of ethnicity and more by the community’s civic values and democratic institutions.12 In a December 2015 poll conducted by the Election Study Center of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University (ESC), those who believed they are exclusively Taiwanese reached 60% in June 2015, and those who believed they are both Taiwanese and Chinese reached 33%. Those who believe they are in some sense “Taiwanese” therefore totaled 93% (see Figure 2).13

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FIGURE 2

Source: ESC, December 2015. This dramatic shift away from a “Chinese” identity to a full or partial “local” identity is more intense among the younger generation, just as in Hong Kong. Polls affiliated with either the KMT or the DPP, the two dominant political parties, show the same trend. A survey in December 2014 by Taiwan Brain Trust, associated with the DPP, showed that only 2 percent of people aged 20-29 identified themselves as “Chinese,” compared with nearly 93 percent who said they were “Taiwanese,” when forced to choose between the two.14 Similarly, a February 2016 poll by United Daily News, supportive of the KMT, revealed that 85 percent of people age 20-29 associated themselves with an exclusively “Taiwanese” identity, a record-high for its polls.15 In terms of preference for unification or independence (known as futurenational-status, or FNS), the December 2015 ESC polls showed that general support among Taiwanese for immediate or eventual unification had dwindled to 10 percent, less than half of the support level in 1994. Those who preferred autonomy, either the status quo or immediate or eventual independence had risen steadily from 24 percent to 90 percent.16 In terms of adopting Hong Kong’s model of OCTS, the Taiwanese are equally skeptical. Polls in the last twenty years have repeatedly shown low acceptance rates for unification, the “one China” principle, or OCTS.17 Again, young people showed a much higher level of support for Taiwan independence than the general population. In the February 2016 poll by United Daily News, 54% of the 20-29 age group supported immediate or eventual independence compared to 36% for the entire poll.18 In order to analyze the similarities and differences between the two regions’ rising local identities, the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Taiwan’s Academia Sinica conducted a joint “China Impact” study in April and May of 2013. Using a common questionnaire, the team found a high correlation between age and local identity in both regions.19 The report’s conclusion was that young 4

people in both regions do not think of China as an enemy and are open-minded about their relationship with the mainland, but they have a firm sense of a local identity. In essence, their attitude is not “anti-Chinese” but just “non-Chinese” and either Hong Konger or Taiwanese.20 Changing Set of Values and Interests This sense of a commitment to a somewhat different set of values than the elder generation underscores the generational shift. For a majority of Hong Kong residents, the rule of law has traditionally been the most important political value, whereas democracy has not been a core value because many have been skeptical that it would be beneficial to the city. The generation under 30, however, have come to value freedom and democracy more than rule of law.21 Furthermore, the 2015 CPU study shows that they care most about maintaining order, protecting freedom of speech, and moving toward a more humane society, much more than maintaining a high rate of economic growth, which was ranked lowest among the eight core values being surveyed.22 Similarly, young Taiwanese also have different concerns than elder generations. When asked to score the importance of the problems facing Taiwan, all age groups agreed that developing Taiwan’s economy was the leading issue for the president-elect Tsai Ing-wen. However, 2029 and 30-39 age groups saw issues relating to stagnant real wages, shortages of affordable housingand economic inequality as being much more serious than the elder generations.23 In both regions, the younger generations were skeptical of existing political elites, with much lower support for C. Y. Leung and pro-Beijing political parties in Hong Kong, and much lower support for the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan than the elder generations.24 In addition to assigning a different set of priorities to economic, political and social values, the younger generations also want to pursue a broader range of interests, including environmental sustainability, international recognition and creating a “just” society.25 Causes of Changes in Identity and Values This changing sense of identity, and the different prioritization of economic, political and social values came along with further economic integration with China in both Taiwan and Hong Kong and have deepeconomic, political and social roots. With increasing tourists pouring into Hong Kong and Taiwan and record-number of visits from these regions to China, strong negative reactions have developed over time. In the case of Hong Kong, tourists and immigrants settling down in Hong Kong have put pressure on the city’s limited resources including housing, healthcare and school placement from kindergarten to university. Parallel goods traders trying to smuggle baby formula and medicine from Hong Kong across the border have created shortages and chaos in the city. The super wealthy Chinese, on the other hand, drive up the real estate price making young people even more concerned about their inability to ever have proper housing. The more Hong Kongers visit China, the more aware they are of the problems in mainland China, from human rights and food safety to problems in Chinese educational system.26 Young people, specifically, have reacted more negatively than the older generations. Regarding the policy to allow mainland tourists to Hong Kong, 57 percent believe visitors harm Hong Kong whereas only 29 percent think they benefit Hong Kong.27 In Taiwan, the tourists have similarly 5

put pressure on Taiwan’s environment and way of life. A recent scandal where major cooking oil brands were found to have been adulterated with tainted lard oil was linked to a Taiwanese business group based in China only deepened the perception that unscrupulous businesses in China were allowed to endanger the public, condoned and abetted by the KMT-led government.28 Beijing’s increasing international assertiveness may also have contributed to this trend. Although Hong Kong and Taiwan benefitted in terms of employment as a result of Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), both preferential trade agreements with the mainland, the gains of liberalization have not been perceived to be evenly or fairly distributed. Inequality in both regions widened in recent years and a large portion of society see that the economic gains from becoming more integrated with China is benefitting the business elites and real estate companies. Young people, in particular, feel that their prospects for jobs and college placements are being hurt by integration. Polls have corroborated that the negative consequences of economic integration have widened the national identity gap. In a 2013 poll, nearly three times as many young people “disagree” with strengthening economic ties with China as the oldest respondents, and even more young people oppose strengthening cultural ties with China.29 The Hong KongTaiwan “China Impact” joint project highlights how local identity is closely correlated to perceptions of the loss of economic prospects as integration with China has deepened.30 This sense of generational injustice is part of a global trend.31 The older and younger generations have had different experiences and expectations. Older Americans and Europeans, like Asians, have enjoyed a middle-class lifestyle with good job prospects, rising incomes, and readily available credit to purchase housing that will appreciate in value. Today, young people around the world generally feel that their ability to do better than their parents is low, with job insecurity, stagnant incomes, poor housing prospects in a world laden with social injustice.32 This feeling is particularly strong in Hong Kong and Taiwan where the elites who do business with and pander to China seem to gain all the benefits as the Beijing seeks to promote more “buy-in” through economic liberalization and greater integration. Those without the connections to the elites have cards stacked up against them, and when things go wrong, no one seems accountable for the problems. The massive inequities including social, economic and political problems and the low trust in governments and elites have deep rooted causes among the youths. Working hard or doing everything right do not seem to guarantee any kind of security or reward, and the younger generations perceive that many members of the older generation simply do not understand or sympathize with their plight. Wave of Protests Led by Younger Generations With a commitment to a set of fundamental values and interests quite different than that of the elder generations, young people, especially university and high school students, have become socially and politically active, voicing their dissatisfaction with the establishment. In 2014, students led the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, and gained substantial public support, especially among young professionals.

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Some of the leaders of both the SM and the UM expressed strong “antiChina” sentiments. Young Taiwanese opposed further economic integration with China, specifically, the ratification of a cross-Strait agreement on trade and services, which was part of a follow-on agreement of the ECFA. The ECFA generated controversy even after it was adopted in 2010, but the agreement on liberalizing trade in services would become a focus among students who saw it as another example whereby the KMT administration and president Ma Ying-jeou reached disadvantageous agreements with Beijing over his two terms. Signed in June 2013, the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (STA) opened 64 sectors for Chinese direction investment and for employment of Chinese professionals in Taiwan. Predictions were prevalent that the STA would exacerbate the problems of rising unemployment and inequality.33 Moreover, it was widely known that President Ma wanted to avoid submitting the agreement for approval to the Legislative Yuan, let alone a line-by-line legislative review. But public opposition to the STA and particularly the process with which it was negotiated made KMT leaders reconsider the ratification process and agree to submit the agreement to legislative review. After rushing through several public hearings, the KMT tried to use its majority in the Legislative Yuan to force the passage of the agreement on March 17, 2014 after a floor “debate” lasting thirty seconds. The following day, hundreds of students protested outside of the Legislative Yuan and occupied the building for 24 days, resulting in the most protracted protest in Taiwan’s history. The protestors were predominantly young people including professionals and representatives of a wide range of civic organizations, with the majority believed to be college students, primarily from the five leading universities especially after several universities cancelled classes during the protests.34 The students narrowed down their demands in the first few days, focusing on the request that the government be more transparent in its negotiation with Beijing, rather than negotiating in secret like in the case of the STA. The students also further demanded delaying the ratification of the STA until the legislature could pass a monitoring mechanism to oversee future bilateral negotiations with China. On the thirteenth day, half a million people joined the students in a one-day protest march. Although Premier Jiang Yi-huah met with the students and President Ma pleaded with them to go home, a compromise was only made after Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, who was at odds with President Ma, came to the protest site to listen to the students’ grievances and agreed to have the legislature consider a monitoring framework before any further deliberation on the STA. The Executive Yuan then drafted a supervisory framework, along with other civic organizations and legislators who also proposed their own version, and sent it to the Legislative Yuan for consideration, where it continues to be under debate to this day. The students agreed that that their demands had been met, and ended their protest after 24 days. Only a few months later in Hong Kong, young people also led a political and social movement to oppose the government’s proposals for electoral reforms in Hong Kong. By way of background, since 1997 when Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule, Hong Kong has been governed according to a Basic Law drafted by Chinese officials with select representation of Hong Kong elites on the basis of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. The Basic Law affirmed that the Chief Executive (CE) and members of the legislature (Legco or Legislative Council) would eventually be elected by universal suffrage. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) then confirmed that both the CE and the 7

Legco would be chosen by universal suffrage in 2017, although how the CE candidates would be nominated remained to be resolved.35 Beijing repeatedly made clear that only “patriotic” candidates could be nominated and implied that Beijing retained the right to veto the outcome of an election if the winning candidate was unacceptable. These messages created mistrust and anger among Hong Kong people especially the youths, who came to believe that Beijing never intended to allow an open and competitive nomination system. This was further evidenced by the government’s public consultations on the the new system for nominating and electing the CE in 2017, as required by law. Throughout the consultations in 2013, pan-democratic groups and leaders proposed the civic nomination of candidates rather than restricting the selection of candidates to a narrowly-based nominating committee, but in the government’s report on the consultation such demands were hardly mentioned.36 On August 31, 2014, the NPCSC released its decision on electoral reform, making clear that the nominating committee would be formed similar to the previous election committee, and would place only two or three candidates on the ballot, and that its decision was final. Many Hong Kong people came to the conclusion that Beijing had no intention of allowing genuine democracy in Hong Kong. Following the in the footstep of the 2013 “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” protest led by academics from several universities to push for democratic and economic reforms, a group of students led by the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism, which had already planned a sit-in on October 1, 2014, decided to boycott classes and start their protests right after the August 31 NPCSC White Paper was released. On September 26, they stormed the Civic Square outside the Legco building. Their protest soon drew a large number of other young people, expanding the protest area to the Admiralty district, then Causeway Bay, and later, Mongkok, occupying the busiest commercial areas of Hong Kong. According to one estimate, 85 percent of the protestors were under 40 and a majority of them were professionals or self-employed individuals.37 During the 79-day protest, the government reacted indecisively. In the initial days, the police sprayed tear gas at the students and forcibly removed them as well, leading to the students opening yellow umbrellas to protect themselves, hence the term “umbrella movement.” A televised debate between the student leaders and the Chief Secretary Carrie Lam was eventually held, but no compromise was offered by the government. The protest continued for nearly three months when progovernment groups obtained court injunctions against the protests and the police forcibly cleared the three protest sites.38 A second round of consultation on the election reforms was carried out and a report issued, but it still did not fully reflect the range of views of the Hong Kong people.39 Then the final reform bill, which was based on the NPCSC guidelines, came to a Legco vote. It was voted down, which means that, unless there is a last-minute compromise, there will be no direct election of the CE in 2017. Unlike in Taiwan, the Hong Kong government did not give in to any of the students’ demands. Instead, in the months after the UM, the Hong Kong government adopted punitive measures to intimidate students and their supporters in order to prevent any further protests. This high-handed pressure was extended to university faculty and administrators who appeared to be sympathetic or supportive of the demonstrators. The leading example was Johannes Chan, the

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former law school dean of the University of Hong Kong who was was nominated for vice provost by a university search committee but then voted down by a board filled with pro-government appointees. Hong Kong as a whole also seemed to be mixed in its view of this protest, which greatly disrupted the activities of the busiest commercial areas of the city. As a result of the inconvenience caused by the protests, support for the demonstrators did not grow during the protest, as it had in Taiwan.40 While support fluctuated during the protests, it never exceeded 38 percent. Opposition was always higher, at 34 to 46 percent.41 HKU polls showed that a majority of the public opposed the UM. As the protest dragged out, many people simply wanted the demonstrations to end.42 While there was some division by class, the city was much more polarized by age.43 In fact, both business elites, who supported political stability and economic integration with China, and the working class, many of whom were involved in pro-Beijing networks at the grass roots were skeptical of or simply opposed to the UM. Hong Kong young people viewed the older generations to be dismissive of their protest and their aspirations. They found the older generations to be “uncompromising… with a huge discrepancy in values and worldviews.”44 While young people showed concern about Hong Kong, they were being told they should focus on the “nation.” Many young people felt that they were being ignored, stonewalled and disrespected by government officials. They saw themselves as different than the older generations because they cared about the city, they were concerned with its political future and structure, and were willing to use their knowledge of technology to make their opinions heard. By comparison, some Taiwanese students were also charged with trespassing for their roles in the protests, but such charges were dismissed by the new incoming DPP administration in 2016.45 Furthermore, Taiwanese students seem to have gained the respect of the public during the protest rather than widening the generational gap as in Hong Kong. Initially objecting to the illegal occupation of a government building, the general public became more sympathetic with the student demands that the government to be more responsive and transparent. By the sixth day of the protest, public support had increased to 51 percent and a majority agreed with the students that the STA should be subject to legislative review.46 At the end of the protest, public fatigue set in just as it had in Hong Kong, but 65 percent of the public believed that the SM had been good for Taiwan’s democratic development.47 There are many other examples of the young generations supporting social and political causes in both places. In Hong Kong, students have led demonstrations against relocating the Star Ferry and constructing the GuangzhouHong Kong High Speed Rail Link just as Taiwanese students have led demonstrations against nuclear power construction and the monopolization of media by pro-China businesses. But a common cause which stands out in igniting the passion of young in both places is education. In 2012, students united parents, teachers and civic organizations to oppose the Hong Kong government’s proposal to introduce “moral and national education” for primary and secondary schools throughout Hong Kong. The leading organization, Scholarism, was formed by secondary school students who went on to lead the UM. Protests lasted several months culminating in the occupation of government headquarters in September 2012 and the government eventually backed down from making the curriculum

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mandatory.48 Similarly, changes in school curriculums and textbooks have always drawn passionate public reactions in Taiwan. The most recent textbook revisions by the government in Taipei in July 2015 were perceived by students to whitewash the authoritarian history of Taiwan under the KMT and to make history more Sino-centric. After a two-day sit in, high school students occupied the Ministry of Education and stormed the minister’s office. 33 persons including 24 students – 11 of them under the age of 18 – were arrested. Students from more than 150 schools called on the Ministry to withdraw the proposed changes, especially what they perceived as “China-centric” amendments.49 Partially in response to these protests, the new DPP administration has already passed an amendment to the Senior High School Education Act to set up a committee with experts, teachers and student representatives to approve the new curriculum for the 12-year national education system to commence in 2018. Dissatisfaction with the Elites The high degree of dissatisfaction with existing political structures has its roots in economic woes perceived by the younger generations as constituting generational injustice.50 These economic concerns may be regarded as instrumental problems that can be ameliorated with good government policy. However, there are also fundamental value differences which are not simply based on economic interests. These consummatory values are more difficult to negotiate because they are related to one’s deeper sense of community and identity. To be sure, globalization and integration with China are perceived to have caused problems of economic inequality and environmental damage, which can be regarded as important instrumental issues. But these immediate and tangible concerns are intertwined with threats to more deeply held consummatory values espoused by younger generations, such as democracy, freedom of speech and social justice. In the case of Hong Kong, because identity is fractured, initially instrumental debates over specific economic policies can be extremely intense when the issues become a proxy for consummatory values. The most expensive railway project per kilometer in the world, the Guangzhou-Hong Kong High Speed Rail Link is one such example.51 While the initial debate before the 2010 passage of the massive budget of HK$65 billion centered on the value of the project to Hong Kong and the need to relocate villagers from the railroad’s right of way, the 2016 debate over whether to approve costly overruns of nearly HK$20 billion became much more heated because it raised the issue of whether there should be joint immigration offices (known as “co-location”) with Chinese border officials serving inside Hong Kong, which critics view as an infringement of Hong Kong’s autonomy. Furthermore, because the project will facilitate access by mainland Chinese to Hong Kong, it is also perceived as causing the gradual erosion of Hong Kong values and promoting the “mainlandization” of Hong Kong society, thus raising questions of consummatory values. Opposition to co-location has only intensified after several booksellers in Hong Kong disappeared, with the prevailing belief that they were abducted and taken to the mainland by Chinese security officers operating in Hong Kong. This has renewed skepticism about whether OCTS has been compromised.52 While Taiwanese have consolidated their identity, this does not always make their debates over cross-Strait policies less controversial. When identities

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are consolidated, the alternatives being proposed may be less extreme and the considerations more instrumental, but the controversy can be just as intense. The STA made identity a salient issue again because the content of the agreement and the procedures by which it was negotiated have been perceived to threaten the very sense of community Taiwanese cherished. With the liberalization of investments by mainland China, there may be more Chinese professionals working in Taiwan and small and medium businesses may be replaced by Chinese state-owned enterprises. In both the case of the High Speed Rail Link and the STA, the legislative approvals were seen to have been forced by the executive branches administrations in both regions. In Hong Kong, the government forced through the passage of the supplementary budget for the High Speed Rail Link in the Finance Committee and clashes broke out among legislative members. Similarly, the STA was passed within seconds simply because the KMT had a majority in the legislature. Acknowledging widespread opposition most notably among young people, however, the government has delayed the ratification until a monitoring framework is approved. Active Political Participation The legislative processes in both regions have dismayed and angered younger generations as because of the lack of accountability of their governments. With a heightened dissatisfaction with the establishment, young people have not only staged demonstrations and protests, they have joined civic organizations and become politically active. Although the younger generations are generally sympathetic to the liberal political parties and leaders, they are not entirely satisfied with these established anti-government actors, either. In both the SM and the UM, the young protestors did not completely embrace older generations who were supportive of their causes. This is most evident in the recent elections where young people have created new political parties and competed for political office, rather than simply joining established anti-government forces. In Taiwan, the first important sign of the growing political role of the younger generations and supporters of the SM emerged during the November 2014 local elections, which included voting for the mayors of the island’s six largest cities and all municipalities. Tied to the STA and viewed as championing economic integration with China for the benefit of a small elite, the ruling party barely held on to 6 out of 22 municipalities, and lost the most important post, the mayoralty of Taipei, to an independent Ko Wen-je, viewed as an outsider and reformer. Very supportive of the SM and close to the DPP, Ko ran as an independent and gained a majority of votes from the younger generation.53 His campaign fundraised and organized through an extensive network of student and young professional volunteers in a city that was traditionally a KMT-stronghold. In the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections, the “awakened youth” is credited to have brought DPP’s Tsai to eventual victory, because they were fiercely opposed to the KMT administration.54 However, for the legislative election, SM participants formed new parties, most notably the New Power Party (NPP) which won five legislative seats, an unprecedented and surprising win in a very costly and competitive process. In short, while DPP won a majority of the votes for the presidency and the legislature, young and inexperienced candidates were able to make a successful entry into the political process. Although the NPP 11

is aligned with the DPP, the DPP is being warned that it must engage with the younger generation and focus on a policy to narrow economic inequality, generate job opportunities and promote wage growth.55 The younger generations are pressuring the mainstream leaders in both parties to reevaluate the priorities of Taiwanese society and forced them to become more responsive to their demands, especially with regards to strengthening public consultation in reaching policy consensus. The Hong Kong government is similarly confronting the continued opposition of the younger generation toward the establishment. But it does not seem to be able to incorporate such grievances and resolve the political crisis of declining legitimacy and political stability.56 The division between the executive and legislative branches has widened with pan-democratic legislators resorting to filibustering and other procedural tactics to block all government initiatives. The November 2015 district council polls had a record turnout of 47% which indicated to some that the city has become more politicized. And rather than supporting the existing pro-democratic parties, young people have decided to elect their own “umbrella soldiers” or protestors-turned-politicians. Despite lack of resources and name recognition, seven young candidates unseated established pro-democracy veterans.57 Some of the older generations, on the other hand, have turned up to vote, with the explicit goal of keeping Occupy candidates out.58 The city seems more divided than ever before. In the February 2016 by-election for a legislative seat for the New Territories East constituency, young people once again showed that their votes mattered. Viewed as a bellwether for the upcoming November 2016 Legco elections, the 34-year-old pro-democracy civic party candidate Alvin Yeung won the seat but the most surprising show was an independence-advocate Edward Leung came in third and won more 66,000 votes, which surprised even the most optimistic estimates. Representing the newly formed localist party, Hong Kong Indigenous, which supposedly was behind a February 2016 riot in Mongkok, Leung is a 24-year-old political novice with a radical ideology.59 This indicated there is strong demand for an alternative other than the existing pro-government or pro-democracy parties, especially among the younger generations.60 The government was alarmed at the low support for their candidate despite the government’s heavy-handed approach to censor the opposition candidates but the established pro-democracy parties are also being warned that they are not paying attention to the younger voters’ demand and aspirations. Implications for Future Government-Societal Relations Although the policy outcomes have been very different in Taiwan and Hong Kong, a generational change in leadership has occurred in both places as seen through a string of protests and political engagement. A younger generation is eager to assert social, economic and political identities that are distinct both from that of older generations and certainly apart from the identity desired by Beijing.61 Socially, they want to preserve their freedom of expression. Economically, they question the need to prioritize growth over equality and fairness. Politically, they want to reform failing existing institutions including political leadership and parties. Students in both regions have now turned their energy toward engaging in politics including running for office, volunteering in election campaigns of politicians or simply becoming active citizens.

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Even though both regions appear to experience more polarization and gridlock, the difference in institutional design means that Taiwan may be better able to respond to the demands of younger generations than Hong Kong. Through elections, young Taiwanese have already voted in the first female president in Asia who did not come from a family with political legacy. Within Taiwan’s democratic structure, Tsai will have to respond to the youths who supported her, especially since the DPP controls both the legislature and the executive branch. With the emergence of young political leaders who gained power on their own right, the DPP will have to heed the young people’s input on policy especially as it relates to China. Hong Kong, on the other hand, does not have institutions that can mediate between the government and the society and enjoys less and less autonomy from Beijing. With continuing political stalemate and episodic protests, such as the 2016 New Year’s Day Mongkok clash between police and young people in Mongkok, the SAR government seems reluctant to engage with the younger generation. The proliferation of local groups including radical organizations advocating independence especially in universities has made the government more determined to stonewall young people and sideline dissent by denigrating young leaders who are critical of the Hong Kong or Central governments This will only further the social divide between the young and the old and weaken the ability of the government to successfully implement any policy as young people perceive their fundamental identity and values to be undermined. In both regions, the younger generation has shown that it has a different vision of the future for their community, perhaps a more just, humane, socially mobile and environmentally sustainable one than the elder generations, which still appear more concerned with maintaining economic growth and political stability. Young Hong Kongers and Taiwanese have shown their commitment to their value system through their social and political engagement, and have thereby become a rising important force in the political landscape. While democratic institutions in Taiwan may facilitate more timely responses by the government to the demands of the younger generation as compared with Hong Kong, young people in both places are striving to find solutions to the problems they find most pressing with a sense of urgency that may be surprising to complacent officials and leaders. Understanding that the future is going to be increasingly charted by the young, leaders in both Hong and Taiwan must understand the origins of such discontent and find ways to address it before they themselves become obsolete.

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Global Views Survey Research Center (GVSRC) polls, December 1, 2015, http://gvsrc.com/dispPageBox/GVSRCCP.aspx?ddsPageID=POPULAR&. 2 Syaru Shirley Lin, “Bridging the Chinese National Identity Gap: Alternative Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan,” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., “Asia’s Slipper Slope: Triangular Tensions, Identity Gaps, Conflicting Regionalism, and Diplomatic Impasse toward North Korea,” Joint US-Korea Academic Studies 25 (2014), pp. 113-134. 3 Eric Kit-wai Ma, Desiring Hong Kong, Consuming South China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), pp. 163-86.

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4

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong (POP), “People’s Ethnic Identity,” Dec. 22, 2015 and August 26-27, 1997， http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/index.html. 5 Central Policy Unit (CPU), The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, “A Study on Hong Kong Youth’s Perceptions of the Mainland,” conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong, February 2016. 6 See surveys conducted by Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (CCPOS), the Chinese University of Hong Kong, “Hong Kong Public Opinion and Political Development” and the Transition Project, Baptist University. 7 POP, “People’s Confidence in ‘One Country, Two Systems’,” March 14-18, 2016, https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/trust/conocts/index.html. 8 CCPOS, “Hong Kong Public Opinion and Political Development,” July 14-21, 2015, http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/research/taskforce-en.html. 9 CPU, “A Study on Hong Kong Youth’s Perceptions of the Mainland.” 10 CCPOS, “Hong Kong Public Opinion,” July 14-21, 2015; surveys dated August 2015, to be found in CPU, “A Study on Hong Kong Youth’s Perceptions of the Mainland.” 11 CCPOS, “Hong Kong Public Opinion,” July 14-21, 2015, 12 Syaru Shirley Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma: Contested National Identities and Multiple Interests in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy (Stanford University Press, 2016). 13 Election Study Center (ESC), National Chengchi University, “Important Political Attitude Trend Distribution,” December 2015, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?class=203. 14 Loa Lok-sin, “Support for Taiwanese Independence, Identity: Think Tank Poll,” Taipei Times, February 5, 2015; Taiwan Brain Trust, “Press Release for Polls on 2016 Elections,” December 29, 2014, http://www.braintrust.tw/article_detail/2034. 15 United Daily News, March 14, 2016, https://video.udn.com/news/456145. 16 ESC, “Important Political Attitude Trend Distribution.” 17 There is no time-series data tracking support level for OCTS, but see for example, C.H. Shaw, “The ‘One-Country, Two-System’ Model and Its Applicability to Taiwan: A Study of Opinion Polls in Taiwan,” Modern China Studies, Issue 4 (2009). 18 United Daily News, March 14, 2016, https://video.udn.com/news/456145, 19 Mau-kuei Chang, Stephen Wing-kai Chiu and Po-san Wan, “Economic Integration and Political Integration: a comparative study of Taiwan and Hong Kong,” paper prepared for Taiwanese Sociological Association Annual Meeting at Taiwan Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, November 30, 2013, p. 10. 20 Thung-hong Lin, “China Impact on Government Performance: A Comparative Study of Taiwan and Hong Kong,” paper prepared for Taiwanese Sociological Association Annual Meeting at Taiwan Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, Nov. 30, 2013; Shelley Rigger 2006, “Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics and ‘Taiwan Nationalism,’” Policy Studies 26 (Washington DC: EastWest Center Policy Study, 2006), p. 57. 21 Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, “CUHK Releases Survey Findings on View on Hong Kong’s Core Values,” October 30, 2014, http://www.cpr.cuhk.edu.hk/en/press_detail.php?id=1915.

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CPU, “Social Attitude of the Youth Population in Hong Kong: A Follow-up Study,” conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong, March 2015. 23 TVBS polls, January 26-27, 2016, http://www.tvbs.com.tw/other/poll-center/. 24 TVBS polls, August 11, 2015; CPU, “Social Attitude of the Youth Population in Hong Kong.” 25 Chan Chang-chuan, “Dawn of a New Era of Activism and Protests,” Taipei Times, May 14, 2014; Siegfried Sin, “The Source of Hong Kong Youth’s Frustration,” South China Morning Post, December 12, 2014, 26 Syaru Shirley Lin, “Bridging the Chinese National Identity Gap.” 27 CPU, “A Study on Hong Kong Youth’s Perceptions of the Mainland.” 28 Tim Ferry, “How Safe is Taiwan’s Oil?” TOPICS, February 6, 2015, http://topics.amcham.com.tw/2015/02/taiwan-food-safety/. 29 This refers to a 2013 poll, which can be found in CPU, “A Study on Hong Kong Youth’s Perceptions of the Mainland,” p. 11. 30 Mau-kuei Chang, Stephen Wing-kai Chiu, and Po-san Wan, “Economic Integration and Political Integration.” 31 Joseph Stiglitz, March 16, 2016, Project Syndicate, “The New Generation Gap.” 32 Tara Bahrampour, “Young People Now More Likely to Live with Parents than Partners,” Washington Post, May 24, 2016; Shiv Malik, “The Dependent Generation: Half Young European Adults Live With Their Parents,” The Guardian, March 24, 2014; Tom de Castella, “Have Young People Never Had It So Bad?” BBC News Magazine; Patrick Low, “Why Hong Kong’s Youth Can No Longer Expect To Be Richer Than Their Parents,” South China Morning Post, March 16, 2016. 33 JoAnn Fan, “The Economics of the Cross-Strait Services Agreement,” The Diplomat, April 18, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-economics-of-thecross-strait-services-agreement/. 34 Shiyin Rung Pan, “Changing Civil Society and National Identity After the Sunflower Movement,” Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 202 (2015), pp. 460-461. 35 National People’s Congress, “Decision Of The Standing Committee Of The National People's Congress On Issues Relating To The Methods For Selecting The Chief Executive Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region And For Forming The Legislative Council Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region In The Year 2012 And On Issues Relating To Universal Suffrage (Adopted By The Standing Committee Of The Tenth National People's Congress At Its Thirty-First Session On 29 December 2007),” http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/26/content_1473392.htm. 36 Albert H. Y. Chen, “The Law and Politics of Constitutional Reform and Democratization in Hong Kong,” University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper, No. 2014/035 (September 30, 2014). 37 Sebastian Veg, “Legalistic and Utopian: Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement,” New Left Review, Vol. 92 (March/April 2015), p. 62. Over half of the protestors were college graduates or higher compared to 16 percent in the general population. 38 Jermain T.M. Lam, “Political Decay in Hong Kong After Occupy Central Movement,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2015), pp. 99121. 39 Critics accused Beijing of violating its commitments under international law. The U.S. Senate also held hearings with testimonies urging the U.S. government

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to take action and support the demand of the protestors for more democracy. Alvin Y.H. Cheung, “Road to Nowhere: Hong Kong’s Democratization and China’s Obligations Under Public International Law,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 465-545. U.S. Senate, the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating the Impact of the “Umbrella Movement,” Hearing, 113th Congress, 2nd Session, December 3, 2014. 40 Surveys during the UM demonstrate the varying level of support for the protest by age and level of education. CCPOS, “Hong Kong Public Opinion and Political Development,” September-December 2014 surveys. 41 Ibid. 42 POP, “POPCON Surveys on Occupy Movement,” November 17-18, 2014, https://popcon.hkupop.hku.hk/popcon_v1/index_proposedQuestResult.php. 43 CCPOS, “Hong Kong Public Opinion,” September-December 2014. 44 Siegfried Sin, “The Source of Hong Kong Youth’s Frustration,” South China Morning Post, December 12, 2014, 45 Stacy Hsu and Abraham Gerber, “Cabinet Drops Charges Against Students,” Taipei Times, May 24, 2016. http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201605235014-1.aspx. 46 TVBS Poll Center, March 24, 2014 47 TVBS Poll Center, April 7-8, 2014. 48 Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “The Protests and Beyond,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 2 (April 2015), pp. 111-121. 49 J. Michael Cole, “Taiwanese Students Occupy Education Ministry Over Textbook Controversy,” The Diplomat, July 24, 2015. 50 Richard Wong, “Why Hong Kong’s Youth Anger Has Parallels with German History,” South China Morning Post, March 22, 2016. 51 For an understanding of the history of protest against the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Express Rail Link, see Beverly Yau and Jennifer Kowk, “Youth Activism Heats Up,” Verity 114 (March 2010) and Stephen W.K. Chiu and Hang Li, “Contentious Politics in Two Villages: Anti-High-Speed-Rail Campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan,” Hong Kong Institute of Asia- Pacific Studies Occasional Paper No. 230 (2014). 52 “the Authorities, Here and in Beijing, Owe Us Straight Answers on the Missing Booksellers,” South China Morning Post, June 20, 2016. 53 TVBS Poll Center, November 27, 2014. 54 Alison Hsiao, “Elections: DPP to Control Legislative Yuan,” Taipei Times, January 17, 2016. 55 Shannon, Tiezzi, “Taiwan’s ‘New Era’ and the Legislative Yuan,” The Diplomat, May 28, 2016. 56 Jermaine T.M. Lam, “Political Decay in Hong Kong After Occupy Central Movement,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 42, Issue 2 (2015), pp. 99121. 57 “Hong Kong District Council Elections: the top 4 surprises and what they mean to the future of politics in the city,” South China Morning Post, November 22, 2015. 58 “Some Hong Kong Voters Back Occupy Candidates, Others Say Vote Them Out,” South China Morning Post, November 22, 2015.

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Jeffie Lam, “Civic Party Wins New Territories East By-election, But Edward Leung Comes A Respectable Third,” South China Morning Post, February 29, 2016. 60 “A Growing Political Force in Hong Kong: the Localists,” LA Times, April 29, 2016; Derek Ye, “The Struggle that Unites Hong Kong and Taiwan,” Taipei Times, April 5, 2016. 61 Michael Forsythe and Austin Ramzy, “China Finds Its Global Ambitions Humbled in Its Own Backyard,” New York Times, May 18, 2016.

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