Psychology of Women Quarterly, 27 (2003), 17–30. Blackwell Publishing. Printed in the USA. C 2003 Division 35, American Psychological Association. 0361-6843/03 Copyright 

DO YOU SEE WHAT I SEE? EFFECTS OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS ON AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN’S ATTRIBUTIONS TO PREJUDICE Kimberly R. King California State University at Los Angeles

This study examined the effects of three types of group consciousness among African American women (ethnic, feminist, and womanist) on prejudice attributions and appraised personal significance (centrality) of a negative intergroup event. African American female college students (N = 123) imagined themselves in an audiotaped scenario in which they overheard two European American male classmates make negative evaluations of them. The scenario provided no cause for the negative evaluations and no references to race or gender. Multiple regression analyses revealed that higher ethnic and womanist consciousness were related to increased prejudice attributions and greater centrality appraisals ( p < .05), while feminism had no effect. Results suggest that womanist consciousness may be more relevant than traditional feminist consciousness in predicting African American women’s perceptions of prejudice.

African American women’s joint membership in two low status social groups, African Americans and women, makes them vulnerable to experiences with prejudice and discrimination. In socially stratified societies, such as the United States, members of relatively low status groups are subject to institutional discrimination, such as inadequate educational and career opportunities, as well as discriminatory interpersonal experiences with higher status group members. For example, among those who have achieved advanced professional degrees, African American men earn 79% and African American women earn 60% of the average salary earned by European American men holding the same degrees in the same job categories (Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995). At the bottom of the social class hierarchy, while African Americans make up about 12% of the U.S. population, they make up 26% of Americans living in poverty, compared to European Americans who are 82% of the population but only 67% of the impoverished (U.S. This research was supported by a 1994 Grants-In-Aid Award from the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and research grants from the Institute of American Cultures and the Graduate Division, both at the University of California, Los Angeles. Special thanks to Drs. Hector Myers, Diane Fujino, Nancy Henley, Sandra Graham, and Jim Sidanius for their contributions to the dissertation research that led to this manuscript. Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Kimberly R. King, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Psychology Department, California State University at Los Angeles, 5151 State University Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90032. E-mail: [email protected]

Bureau of the Census, 1996). Thus, while 7.5% of European Americans live below the poverty line, 22% of African Americans do (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000). The situation is most harsh for women of color: African American and Latina single mothers are most likely (both about 34%) to be impoverished (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000). In addition to indices of institutional discrimination, social science research has documented the persistence of prejudiced attitudes, stereotypes, and interpersonal discrimination directed toward members of lower status groups, such as African Americans and women, by members of higher status groups, such as European Americans and men (e.g., Campbell, 1971; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Feagin, 1991; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Hartsough & Fontana, 1970; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Kastenbaum, 1991; Werner & LaRussa, 1985; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Interestingly, the majority of this research focuses on the prejudices of higher status group members (e.g., European Americans and men) toward lower status group members (e.g., people of color and women), while few studies examine the effects on targets/victims of prejudice. Notable exceptions include studies conducted by Dion and colleagues in the 1970s which identified several negative affective responses in targets/victims, including anger, depression, fear, and anxiety (Dion, 1975; Dion, Earn, & Yee, 1978). In recent years, an increasing amount of research has examined the perceptions and experiences of oppressed group members as targets of prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Broman, 1997; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Essed, 1991; Fischer & Shaw, 1999; Landrine 17

18 & Klonoff, 1996; Thompson, 1996). Yet, many questions remain. For example, “Do low status group members differ in the extent to which they perceive prejudice?” and “What factors influence individual differences in the perception of prejudicial treatment?” The current study attempts to address these questions as they relate to African American women. The experience of prejudice targets with multiple oppressed group memberships, such as women of color, has seldom been explored empirically. Instead, constructs of race, ethnicity, and gender have most often been studied as separate entities (Reid & Comas-Diaz, 1990). In explanation of this, Reid and Comas-Diaz (1990) suggest that psychological researchers have traditionally examined only one trait at a time in an attempt to obtain clearly interpretable results. Yet, for individuals whose identities are shaped by simultaneous membership in two (or more) oppressed groups, the neat separation of ethnicity and gender is a false dichotomy. African American women, for example, are simultaneously members of oppressed racial and gender groups and may experience unique interactive forms of race and gender prejudice, in addition to racism and sexism. An interactive approach to the study of race and gender (and other sources of group identity) has been called for by several researchers (Ransford & Miller, 1983; Reid & ComasDiaz, 1990; Reynolds & Pope, 1991; Shorter-Gooden & Washington, 1996; Smith & Stewart, 1983) and is the approach of the current study. A small body of published empirical work has examined both race and gender discrimination among women of color (Kane, 1992; Krieger, 1990; Landrine, Klonoff, Alcaraz, Scott, & Wilkins, 1995; Lykes, 1983; Miller, 1988). In an interview study of older (ages 61–93 years) African American women, Lykes (1983) found that, of the women who reported life problems containing experiences of discrimination, 54% identified problems that were due solely to racial discrimination, while the remaining 46% reported both race-related and gender-related experiences of discrimination. Miller (1988) surveyed 159 African American female college students who reported little direct exposure to racist or sexist experiences, yet the feelings reported in response to scenarios describing racist and sexist events were strong and negative. In addition, the affective responses toward racial discrimination were found to be stronger than toward sexist discrimination. In a study that included a community sample of both African American and European American women, Krieger (1990) found that women from both racial groups reported equal amounts of gender discrimination in their lives, while African American women reported far more racial discrimination than European American women (who reported close to none). Krieger also found that the experiences of racism and sexism were related for African American women; those who reported racial discrimination were very likely to also report gender discrimination, and those who reported no racial discrimination were

KING likely to report no gender discrimination. In a study of perceptions of gender inequality, Kane (1992) found that African American women, African American men, and European American women were more critical of the amount of gender inequality in society than were European American men, and the three former groups did not differ significantly from one another. Taken together, this research suggests that experiences of both racial and gender prejudice are important in African American women’s lives. In conceptualizing research on African American women, it seems helpful to consider the multiple hierarchy stratification approach proposed by Jeffries and Ransford (1980) and Ransford and Miller (1983). This approach asserts that individuals occupy different positions on the four separate social hierarchies of class, ethnicity, gender, and age and that the distribution of power, privilege, and prestige occurs according to one’s position in multiple social hierarchies. Jeffries and Ransford (1980) coined the term “ethgender” to refer to the unique social space created by the intersection of specific ethnic and gender statuses. African American women occupy subordinate positions in the social hierarchies of ethnicity and gender. As such, it is reasonable to propose that African American women are targets of a unique type of “ethgender prejudice,” due to their position at the intersection of African American ethnicity and female gender, as well as discrimination that might be described more singularly as racist or sexist. Landrine et al. (1995) provided empirical support for Jeffries and Ransford’s (1980) Multiple JeopardyAdvantage hypothesis, which suggests that an individual’s personal outcomes can only accurately be accounted for by taking into account the intersection of the individual’s various status dimensions (e.g., ethgender). According to the Florida state salary data analyzed by Landrine et al. (1995), African American women and Latina women earned significantly less than European American women and European American men, controlling for education and job category. Previous research by Landrine (1985) also supports the unique effects of multiple oppressed group status, finding that White participants identified specific stereotypes of African American women that differed from stereotypes of White women and that were further differentiated according to high and low socioeconomic class. These studies seem to support the existence of ethgender prejudice. The goal of the present research is to increase the scientific understanding of the process by which African American women perceive negative treatment from outgroup members by examining the role of individual differences in group consciousness. Groups in a socially stratified society, particularly subordinate groups that experience considerable discrimination, are likely to form a group consciousness about their group’s position in society (Durant & Sparrow, 1997; Frazier, 1957; Gurin & Townsend, 1986).

Do You See What I See? The construct of group consciousness among oppressed or subordinate group members has been described as having several components: identification with one’s group; feelings of group pride; a sense of collective discontent over the group’s relative lack of power and resources; a rejection of the legitimacy of the stratification system by which one’s group is disfavored; and the belief that collective action is required to realize the group’s interests (Brown, 1931; Durant & Sparrow, 1997; Gurin, Miller, & Gurin, 1980; Gurin & Townsend, 1986). This definition of group consciousness is used in the current study to examine consciousness about one’s ethnic, gender, and ethgender groups. Group consciousness varies among individual group members and thus may be associated with individual differences in behavior and the interpretation of events. The current study examines the role of group consciousness as a cognitive schema that may influence perceptions of prejudice toward one’s group. Research indicates that strong biases operate to support our schemas and that we often perceive events as more consistent with our schemas than may be justified (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; White, Brockett, & Overstreet, 1993; White & Carlston, 1983). For people who have a strong ethnic and gender consciousness, issues of race/ethnicity and gender are highly cognitively accessible and may be relied upon to interpret the world. Thus, higher group consciousness may be associated with increased awareness and perceptions of prejudice toward one’s group. It is further proposed that, among those with multiple oppressed group memberships, individuals will be more likely to perceive prejudice in domains in which they have strong group consciousness than in those in which they have weaker group consciousness. Strong consciousness is also expected to be associated with rating the negative treatment by outgroup members as more personally significant. Results of several studies support an association of group consciousness with perceptions of prejudice, but have examined sexism and racism separately. For example, Landrine and Klonoff (1996) found that African Americans who were immersed in African American culture reported significantly more recent and lifetime racist events and appraised these events as more stressful than did African Americans who were more acculturated to mainstream European American culture. Similarly, Green (1979) found that feminist women were more likely than nonfeminist women to introduce themes of sexism and to use a feminist vocabulary in stories written in response to pictures of women in various situations. Further support of the relationship between consciousness and prejudice perceptions was provided by Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O’Connell and Whalen (1989), who found that stronger identification with lesbians, as a group, was related to greater self-report of both personal and group discrimination. Similarly, Mazer and Percival (1989) found that feminist ideology was related to defining a greater number of sexualized behaviors as sex-

19 ual harassment, a lower tolerance of sexual harassment, and higher ratings of seriousness for harassment behaviors. In a recent vignette study, Brown and Johnson (1999) found that the higher the ethnic consciousness of African American college students the less likely they were to blame an African American employee fired from a predominantly European American firm and the more punitive they rated the firm. This limited evidence suggests that group consciousness is related to perceptions of intergroup relations. The current study examines the influence of ethnic, feminist, and womanist consciousness on African American women’s perceptions of racism, sexism, and ethgender prejudice. The constructs of ethnic/racial identity and consciousness1 and feminist identity and consciousness2 have both been described and measured in the social science literature, while womanism has not. Womanist consciousness, or womanism, is defined as the integration of ethnic and feminist consciousnesses among women of color. An 1851 speech made by Sojourner Truth, the antiracism/antisexism activist and former slave, conveys the important interaction between race and gender in African American women’s lives. According to a newspaper report of her speech at an early Women’s Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio, Sojourner said, “I am a woman’s rights. I have as much muscle as any man, and can do as much work as any man. I have plowed and reaped and husked and chopped and mowed, and can any man do more than that? . . . I can carry as much as any man, and can eat as much too, if I can get it” (Robinson, 1851, as quoted in Harris, 1999). Yet, despite the work of Sojourner Truth and other African American women advocates for the liberation of both women and African Americans, including Maria Stewart, Mary McLeod Bethune, Ida B. Wells, Zora Neal Hurston, Barbara Smith, bell hooks, and Angela Davis, the perspectives of women of color have not always been considered in feminist theory and movements. Some African American women have criticized traditional feminist movements for emphasizing issues that are relevant to middle- and upper-class European American women, such as the right to have a career outside of the home or be elected to political office, while neglecting issues of importance to women of color, such as racial and economic equality, quality public education, and welfare rights (Davis, 1981; Hacker, 1975; hooks, 1981; Joseph & Lewis, 1981; La Rue, 1976). A further barrier to women of color’s involvement in feminism has been the racism and classism sometimes expressed by European American feminists (Davis, 1981; Giddings, 1984; hooks, 1984; 1989). Unfortunately, the history of the women’s movement includes instances of overt racism toward African Americans. For example, the well-known suffragists, Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, strategically lobbied for European American women to gain the right to vote rather than African American men using racist rationales and excluding African American women altogether (Giddings, 1984).

20 Another barrier to some African American women’s involvement in feminism is the perception of feminism as antimale. An antimale stance conflicts with many African American women’s commitment to work with and for African American men to improve the condition of their (our) entire community (Hacker, 1975). Thus, many African American women prefer not to identify as feminists (see Kimmel & Garko, 1995). In recent years, it has been found that fewer young European American and other women identify as feminists, perhaps due to negative and inaccurate stereotypes of feminists (Liss, Hoffner, & Crawford, 2000; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Despite criticisms, research has found that African American women are highly supportive of the goals and ideology of feminism and prefer egalitarian gender roles, perhaps even more than European American women (Dugger, 1988; Kane, 1992; Hunter & Sellers, 1998; Martin & Nagayama Hall, 1992; Reid, 1988). Feminist scholars of color have argued that women of color who develop a feminist consciousness often develop a consciousness as a woman of color that integrates their feminist and ethnic consciousness. They suggest that an interactive approach would yield a more accurate understanding of the experiences of women of color (Collins, 2000; Fujino & King, 1994; hooks, 1984; Reid & Comas-Diaz, 1990; Smith & Stewart, 1983). In response to women of color’s commitment to women’s issues along with their concurrent critiques of mainstream feminism, the term “womanism” was coined by Alice Walker (1983) and has been expanded upon by other authors (e.g., Banks-Wallace, 2000; Collins, 2000; Davis, 1981; Fujino & King, 1994; hooks, 1984; 1989; Reid & Comas-Diaz, 1990). Womanist consciousness, sometimes referred to as multicultural feminism or Black, Chicana, or Asian feminism, refers to gender consciousness among women of color, for whom the intersection of race and gender is used as the basis for construing experiences (Collins, 2000; Fujino & King, 1994). Core themes of womanism include: the empowerment of all women, men, and children; the struggles against sexism, racism, and classism, and the importance of recognizing their interactive effects, particularly in the lives of women of color; and, the conviction that a woman should not have to choose among different aspects of her identity. The Current Study: The Role of Group Consciousness in Predicting Perceptions of Prejudice The current study examines the contributions of individual differences in group consciousness to African American women’s perceptions of prejudice. Although women may have membership in numerous oppressed groups (e.g., ethnic, class, religion, sexuality, etc.), the scope of this study is limited to the exploration of three types of group consciousness: (a) ethnic consciousness, (b) feminist consciousness, and (c) womanist consciousness (i.e., the integration of eth-

KING nic and feminist consciousness). This is the first published study to empirically examine womanist consciousness, as currently defined as the integration of ethnic and gender consciousnesses (Fujino & King, 1994). I hypothesize that, under conditions of attributional ambiguity, individual differences in group consciousness type and strength will be associated with differences in perceptions of an unfavorable experience with dominant outgroup members. “Attributional ambiguity” describes the absence of a clear causal explanation for a behavior or event (Crocker et al., 1991). In situations characterized by attributional ambiguity, individual differences are likely to influence perceptions of the situation, with each person attributing causality according to her most cognitively accessible schema or schemas (Crocker & Major, 1989). In their seminal work on stress and coping, Lazarus and Folkman (1984) similarly assert that, “whenever there is ambiguity, person factors shape the understanding of the situation, thereby making the interpretation of the situation more a function of the person than of objective constraints” (p. 104). It is also predicted that stronger group consciousness will be associated with higher ratings of personal significance or centrality of the negative intergroup situation. Appraisals of greater centrality of potentially stressful events have been found to relate to poor psychological outcomes, such as stress, physical complaints, and decreased self-esteem (Gruen, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988; King, 1998; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993) and thus have implications for mental and physical health. Individual differences in perception may be particularly important in understanding the effects of current-day prejudice on oppressed group members, since recent research suggests that attributional ambiguity is likely to characterize modern experiences with prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). Although the majority of today’s research participants are unlikely to report blatant prejudicial beliefs, such as the innate intellectual inferiority of African Americans or opposition to women having careers outside the home, researchers have suggested that covert and subtle forms of racism, sexism, and other types of prejudice remain common (Benokraitis, 1997; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Sears, 1988; Swann, Langlois, & Gilbert, 1999; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). Terms such as, “everyday,” “modern,” and “symbolic” racism and sexism have been used to characterize the more covert and often ambiguous forms of prejudice that are common today (Essed, 1991; McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew, 1988; Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991; Sears, 1988; Swim et al., 1995). For example, recent attacks on affirmative action policies designed to achieve equality for disadvantaged groups and increasing numbers of discrimination lawsuits being filed by men and European Americans may be expressions of this modern form of prejudice (Swim et al., 1995). African American women, who are often viewed as having two affirmative action “advantages” arising from their membership in two socially disadvantaged groups (i.e., African

Do You See What I See? Americans and women), may be particularly targeted by this modern expression of prejudice (Bell, 1992; Romero & Garza, 1986). Interestingly, the prejudice that African American women unfairly benefit from affirmative action exists despite the fact that European American women have actually been the greatest beneficiaries of affirmative action policies, according to labor research (Bell, 1992; Nkomo & Cox, 1989). It seems important to clarify that the approach of the current study emphasizes individual differences in social perception as a means of better understanding the process of experiencing prejudice but does not support the proposition that members of low status groups are motivated to perceive more prejudice than is objectively accurate in order to protect their self-esteem (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1991). A few studies have found that members of stigmatized groups who are given reason to attribute the negative treatment they receive from dominant group members to prejudice, experience less negative self-esteem and depressed affect than those who receive the same negative treatment but are not given prejudice as a likely reason (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1991; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997). Yet, it is possible that the protection of self-esteem and depressed affect are fortunate side effects of, rather than motivating factors for, perceiving prejudice. Indeed, past research has documented that the perception of prejudicial treatment results in unpleasant and painful feelings, such as anger, depression, fear, and anxiety in African Americans and women (Armstead, Lawler, Gorden, Cross, & Gibbons, 1989; Dion, 1975; Crocker et al., 1991; Klonoff & Landrine, 1996; Sutherland & Harrell, 1986). Thus, it seems likely that members of oppressed groups would be motivated not to perceive prejudice in order to protect against negative affective states. The frequently found “minimization of personal discrimination” demonstrates the tendency of low status group members to state that, while their group, as a whole, is likely to experience discrimination, they, personally, have experienced little (Crosby et al., 1989; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). Recent research has also found that minority group members actually tend to minimize attributions to discrimination to protect their self-esteem (Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997). For African American women, experiences with European American men allow for the fullest exploration of the hypotheses due to their simultaneous membership in both the highest status gender and ethnic groups. Participants completed self-report measures of ethnic, feminist, and womanist consciousness and were asked to imagine themselves in a scenario in which they were evaluated unfavorably by two European American male classmates. No causal explanation for the evaluation was provided in order to create attributional ambiguity. Participants rated a number of possible causal attributions for the evaluation, including ethnic, sex, or ethgender prejudice, the partici-

21 pants’ personal qualities, or personal qualities of the other students, for their contribution to the negative evaluation as well as the centrality of the experience. The following specific hypotheses will be tested: 1. Ethnic consciousness will be associated with increased causal attributions to race/ethnic prejudice. 2. Feminist consciousness will be associated with increased causal attributions to gender prejudice. 3. Womanist consciousness will be associated with increased causal attributions to ethgender prejudice. 4. Each type of consciousness will be positively associated with ratings of centrality of the negative intergroup situation. METHOD Participants The participants were 123 African American undergraduate women at a large West Coast public university. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 50 years old (M = 20), with 73% falling between ages 18 and 20. Similar numbers of students from each academic year participated (30% first year, 27% sophomore, 30% junior, and 24% senior). While a variety of socioeconomic class backgrounds were represented, the majority of the students fell in the middle to upper-middle class range, based on family income and parents’ education. The median family income was $50,000–$69,000 a year. Almost 70% of participants’ parents had at least some college education, with 23% having a bachelor’s degree and 15% having a graduate degree. Participants were recruited through phone calls to students randomly selected from a list of African American female undergraduates (stratified by academic year) obtained from the University Registrar. Potential participants were called at their home by a graduate or undergraduate researcher and offered $15 for their participation. Students were told that they were selected because they were students at the University and were not told that only African American women were included. This deception was utilized to avoid participant biases regarding ethnic and gender issues, an important methodological improvement on past studies of African Americans where recruitment efforts have often emphasized the racial nature of the study. When participants are recruited through African American organizations, churches, or Black Studies courses, it is likely that the result is a sample biased toward strong African American ethnic consciousness and primed to notice racial issues. Apparatus and Materials A tape recorder was used to play an audiotaped scenario for the participants. In the scenario, the participant is assigned to a small group by a professor to complete a major class assignment. She arrives early to class one day and

22 overhears her partners having a conversation in which they give negative evaluations of her as a partner for the group assignment. The classmates in the audiotaped scenario were played by two European American male actors who followed a script written for this study. The scenario provided no causal information to explain the negative evaluations by the classmates, and no references were made to race or gender. The data were collected as part of a larger study on identity, stress, and discrimination. The measures used for the current study are presented below. Measures Demographics. A series of questions included on the consciousness questionnaire asked the participants’ age, year in school, parents’ education, and family income. Ethnic consciousness. To measure ethnic group consciousness, a subset of items from the Ethnic Identity Orientation Measure (EIOM; King, 1993) was used. The EIOM is a 60-item self-administered questionnaire that assesses five qualitatively different subtypes of ethnic identity orientation among ethnic minority group members: Separatist reflects a strong positive identification with one’s own group and mistrust and denigration of White culture and society; Radical reflects an awareness of systematic oppression against one’s group and the need for societal change, but with no anti-White sentiment; Inclusive, reflects a positive identification with one’s own ethnic group as well as an acceptance and respect for Whites and other ethnic groups; Mainstream reflects an identification with White American culture, a desire for assimilation, and a rejection or denigration of one’s own ethnic group; and Colorblind reflects a denial of the significance of race and a desire to ignore one’s own and others’ ethnic group membership. The EIOM is a multiethnic measure designed to be used with various ethnic minority groups, and was developed with two multiethnic samples of African American, Asian American, and Latino community college students (King & Fujino, 1994). For the current study, a 39-item unidimensional version of the EIOM (EIOM-U; King, 1998) was used to make the scale comparable to the unidimensional measures of feminist and womanist consciousness. The EIOM-U includes statements that reflect positive and negative (reversescored) attitudes toward being African American, feelings of closeness and similarity to other African American people, and perceptions of ethnic group membership as a salient identity dimension. Sample items include: I like to wear clothing and/or hairstyles that express my African/African American identity; I seldom think about racial and ethnic issues; and I feel a strong responsibility to help the African American community. The EIOM-U excludes EIOM items that express attitudes toward Whites in order to limit it to attitudes about African Americans and their position in society. Participants indicated the

KING extent of their agreement with each item using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Internal consistency for the EIOM-U in the current study was high (Cronbach’s alpha = .91, M = 4.89, SD = .82). Feminist consciousness. To measure feminist consciousness, 25 items from five subscales of the Short Version of the Feminist Perspectives Scale (FPS3; Spalding & Henley, 1997) was used. The FPS (Henley, Meng, O’Brian, McCarthy, & Sockloskie, 1998) was created to measure a broad spectrum of feminist beliefs, rather than the limited focus on liberal feminism that characterizes most existing scales. The FPS3 produces scores on the following scales: (a) the Feminism Total Scale, called the “Femscore” measures overall degree of feminist attitudes (and includes items from all five feminist perspectives); (b) five subtypes of feminist perspectives: Liberal, Radical, Socialist, Women of Color, and Cultural; (c) a measure of conservative views toward feminist issues; and (d) a measure of self-reported feminist behavior (e.g., I use “she” rather than “he” generically, that is, to refer to an unknown person). In two development studies of samples of 100 college students, the following Cronbach’s alphas were found for the total Femscore-Short Version, .87 and .85 and the Conservative subscale, .68 and .71 (Spalding & Henley, 1997). The items included on the feminist consciousness scale used in the current study were from four of the five feminist subscales (Liberal, Radical, Socialist, and Cultural), as well as the Conservative subscale (reverse scored). Participants indicated the extent of their agreement with each item using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). High scores on this measure reflect an awareness of the lower status of women in comparison to men and a desire to create more fair and positive gender relations. Sample items include: A man’s first responsibility is to obtain economic success, while his wife should care for the family’s needs; The government is responsible for making sure that all women receive an equal chance at education and employment; and, Romantic love brainwashes women and forms the basis for their subordination. The fifth FPS3 feminist subscale, Women of Color, was omitted because its items considerably overlap with the content of the Womanist Consciousness Scale, described below. The internal consistency of the scale used in this study was good (Cronbach’s alpha = .79, M = 4.22, SD = .68). Womanist consciousness. To assess the degree to which a woman of color has integrated her ethnic and feminist consciousness, rates this integration as important to her identity, and expresses a concern with improving the status of her ethgender group, the Womanist Consciousness Scale (WCS; King & Fujino, 1994) was used. This 14item questionnaire is designed to measure the degree to which women of color hold their ethnic and feminist consciousnesses as equally important and inseparable aspects of themselves. Sample items include: African American

Do You See What I See? women need to get together and work on our common problems related to race and gender oppression; It is really clear to me how the combination of my gender and my ethnicity affect my life experiences; and, Though I want to fight for gender equality, I notice that feminists often ignore how gender issues affect African American women. Responses are given on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Administration to a multiethnic (African American, Asian American, and Mexican American) sample of 335 female community college students found good reliability (alpha = .80). Evidence for validity was found in correlations with measures of ethnic and feminist consciousness and with participants’ rating of the importance of their ethnicity and gender to their self-definition (King & Fujino, 1994). Internal consistency for the current sample was high (alpha = .86, M = 5.23, SD = .88). Causal attributions. A series of nine closed-ended questions assessed participants’ attributions for the opinions of them expressed by the students in the scenario. Participants rated each item for its contribution to the opinions (1 = not at all to 7 = completely). Attribution subscales were created to increase the reliability of the attribution measures. The subscales categories, items (in parentheses), and internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) are as follows: (a) Internal Nonprejudice Attributions (your personality, your mood, your abilities; alpha = .83); (b) External Nonprejudice Attributions (the two students’ personalities, the two students’ moods, the two students’ abilities; the two students’ friendship with each other; alpha = .62); (c) Ethnic Prejudice Attributions (the two students’ prejudice against African Americans, you being an African American, the two students’ racism; M = 4.9, SD = 1.77, alpha = .96); (d) Gender Prejudice Attributions (the two students’ prejudice against women, you being a woman, the two students’ sexism; M = 5.15, SD = 1.58, alpha = .94); and (e) Ethgender Prejudice Attributions (the two students’ prejudice against African American women, you being an African American woman, the two students’ combined racism and sexism; M = 4.92, SD = 1.73, alpha = .94). With the exception of the external nonprejudice attributions subscale, all subscales demonstrated good to excellent reliability, as measured by internal consistency. For the current study, only prejudice attributions were examined. Centrality appraisal. A self-report scale of 12 items was used to assess the participants’ ratings of the importance or personal relevance of the issues involved in the simulated situation, including two questions assessing motivational relevance adapted from Smith et al. (1993), three questions from the centrality subscale of Peacock and Wong’s Stress Appraisal Measure (1990), and seven items designed for the current study. Items consisted of questions for participants about “thoughts regarding the experience you just had of overhearing the two students discussing you.” Sam-

23 ple items are: How important to me is what happened in this situation? How concerned am I about the issues involved in this situation? And How much personal meaning does this experience have for me? Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Cronbach’s alpha for the centrality scale was .92; M = 4.45, SD = 1.33. For all the above measures, scores were computed by taking the mean of the responses to the items on each scale. Thus, scores for each variable could range from 1 to 7. Manipulation checks. Five questions were included at the end of the Response Questionnaire to assess whether the audiotaped simulation successfully conveyed the intended information to participants. The following questions were used: (a) Did the two students specifically mention your race when discussing you? (Yes or No); (b) Did the two students specifically mention your sex/gender when discussing you? (Yes or No); (c) During the study, to what extent did you actually imagine yourself in the situation described? (from 1 = not at all to 7 = completely); and (d) two open-ended questions asking the race and sex of the two student partners in the audiotaped scenario. Procedure Data collection was completed in two phases, the order of which was counterbalanced to control for order effects. In one phase, participants completed the consciousness measures. In the other, they were presented with a scenario and completed the measures of attributions and centrality. Participants completed each phase of the study individually with an African American female experimenter (either an undergraduate or graduate student). Completion of consciousness measures. Each participant completed a questionnaire packet containing the consciousness measures in a Psychology Department laboratory. Before administration of the questionnaire, the participant was told that the study was about students’ views about social issues and asked to read and sign a consent form. Audiotaped scenario and response questionnaire. Each participant was greeted by an experimenter, told that the experiment examines “student judgments about other students,” and asked to read and sign a consent form. Experimenters were blind to the group consciousness scores of participants. The participant was told that she would listen to an audiotape describing a situation in which she would be asked to imagine herself. The response questionnaire (including the attribution and centrality measures) was placed directly in front of the participant, turned upside down. The participant was told to complete the questionnaire when

24

KING

instructed to do so in the audiotape. The experimenter then turned on the tape recorder and left the room. Debriefing. After completing the response questionnaire, participants were debriefed. The experimenter ensured that each participant understood that the students speaking on the audiotape were actors and that the opinions expressed did not represent the reactions of any actual persons to them. Participants were encouraged to express their reactions to the study. RESULTS Bivariate correlations among the research variables show that womanist consciousness was positively associated with both ethnic (r = .27) and feminist (r = .44) consciousness ( p < .01). Feminist and ethnic consciousnesses were not significantly related. The three types of prejudice were highly correlated with one another (r’s range from .61 to .84). Thus, women who made attributions to one kind of prejudice were also likely to perceive the other types of prejudice. To assess whether the audiotaped simulation successfully created the intended attributionally ambiguous negative intergroup event, analyses of participants’ responses to manipulation check questions were conducted. The participants indicated a high level of involvement in the audiotaped simulation, with 80% reporting they had imagined themselves in the situation “very much” to “completely.” Regarding the manipulation of attributional ambiguity, only two participants inaccurately reported that the students on the audiotape had specifically mentioned her race, while 36% inaccurately reported that they had specifically mentioned her sex/gender (perhaps due to the students’ use of the pronoun, “she,” as considered in the Discussion). All participants correctly identified the two students in the scenario as males. The majority also identified both of the students’ ethnicities as White/European American, as intended in the design of the scenario. However, a small number, specifically, 36 participants (about 30%), reported that they were unsure of the ethnic background of at least one of the male characters. Another eight participants reported one of the character’s ethnicity as being “either White or Asian,” and five stated that one of the characters was Asian. Five reported that one of the characters was some other ethnicity. Relationships Between Group Consciousness Domains and Prejudice Attributions Bivariate correlations indicated that womanist consciousness was significantly correlated with ethnic (r = .30), gender (r = .33), and ethgender (r = .40) attributions, whereas ethnic consciousness was correlated with ethnic (r = .36) and ethgender (r = .32) attributions; feminist consciousness was not correlated with any of the prejudice attributions. To test the hypothesis that the domain of group consciousness

(i.e., ethnic, feminist, or womanist) would be related to the type of prejudice attribution made (ethnic prejudice, gender prejudice, or ethgender prejudice, respectively), three hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed, one to predict each type of prejudice attribution. Bivariate correlations were calculated between the demographic variables (i.e., age, year in school, family income, mother’s education, and father’s education) and the prejudice attribution variables to determine whether demographic variables should be controlled before entering the consciousness variables into the regression equation. Only year in school was significantly correlated with ethnic prejudice (r = .24, p = .01) and marginally with ethgender prejudice (r = .18; p = .06). Year in school was entered in the first step of the regression equations for these two types of prejudice. Next, ethnic consciousness and feminist consciousness were each entered on a separate step in order to evaluate the individual contributions of each in predicting attributions. Womanist consciousness was entered in the final step to examine whether it explained additional variance in the outcome variables beyond the contributions of ethnic and feminist consciousness. In general, the results of the regression analyses provide support for the hypotheses. Ethnic consciousness was the only consciousness domain related to perceiving ethnic prejudice as the cause of the negative evaluation from the European American male students. Year in school was positively related to attributions to ethnic prejudice in the first step (R2 = .06, Beta = .25, p < .05), but ceased to be significant in the second step when ethnic consciousness was included in the equation (R2 = .07, Beta = .27, p < .05). The final regression equation accounted for 17% of the variance in attributions to racism, with ethnic consciousness having the only significant regression coefficient (Beta = .24, p < .05). Thus, students with higher ethnic consciousness were likely to make greater attributions to racism. Contrary to the hypothesis, feminist consciousness was not related to perceiving sexism. Only womanist consciousness was significantly related to increased attributions to sexism (R2 = .12, Beta = .31, p < .05). In predicting ethgender prejudice attributions, as predicted, womanist consciousness was the only significant consciousness domain when all consciousness domains were considered together. Year in school was positively related to attributions to ethgender prejudice in the first step (R2 Change = .04, Beta = .20, p < .05), but was not significant in the second step, when ethnic consciousness was included (R2 Change = .05, Beta = .24, p < .05). When womanist consciousness was entered, it accounted for an additional 7% of the variance in ethgender prejudice attributions. The complete equation accounted for 19% of the variance, with womanist consciousness having the only significant regression coefficient. Students with higher womanist consciousness were likely to make greater attributions to ethgender prejudice.

Do You See What I See? Effects of Group Consciousness Domains on Centrality Appraisal Bivariate correlations were examined to test the hypothesis that stronger group consciousness, no matter what the domain (i.e., ethnic, feminist, or womanist), would be related to increased centrality appraisals of the negative intergroup event. Results indicate that all three domains of group consciousness were significantly correlated with centrality (for ethnic consciousness, r = .23, r = .25 for feminist consciousness, r = .46 for womanist consciousness, p < .05). This supports the hypothesis that stronger consciousness on all three domains would be related to appraising the negative intergroup situation as touching on personally significant values and concerns. Next, because women of color are theorized to possess group consciousness on the three domains of ethnic, feminist, and womanist, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the relative contributions of the three domains of group consciousness in explaining levels of centrality appraisals of the negative intergroup event. Bivariate correlations revealed that the demographic variables were not related to centrality; thus, they were not included in the regression equation. Ethnic consciousness was entered first, followed by feminist consciousness, followed by womanist consciousness. Womanist and ethnic, but not feminist, consciousness, were significantly related to increased centrality appraisals, with the final equation accounting for 22% of the variance. Ethnic consciousness accounted for 9% of the variance in centrality (Beta = .19), whereas womanist consciousness accounted for an additional 8% of the variance (Beta = .33). DISCUSSION The current study provides evidence that African American women’s experiences as targets of discrimination can be better understood by examining individual differences in sociopolitical consciousness related to their ethnic and ethgender group memberships. Based on analyses of the responses of African American women undergraduates to an audiotaped scenario in which they heard two European American male classmates make negative comments about them, stronger ethnic and ethgender consciousnesses were both related to increased prejudice attributions and increased ratings of the centrality of the negative intergroup event. It seems that, under conditions of attributional ambiguity, not all African American women see the discrimination they face in the same way. Since modern prejudice is more likely to be expressed covertly rather than overtly (Essed, 1991; McConahay, 1986), potentially discriminatory experiences characterized by attributional ambiguity are likely to be common in African American women’s lives. This ambiguity requires low status group members to make their own determinations about the reason for unpleasant inter-

25 actions with dominant group members. Group consciousness may be used to make such determinations. Results of the current study suggest that ethnic and womanist consciousness function as schemas that shape African American women’s interpretation of ambiguous intergroup interactions. Ethnic consciousness was associated with perceiving ethnic-based prejudice, whereas womanist consciousness was related to perceiving both ethgender prejudice and gender-based prejudice in the negative intergroup situation. Contrary to my hypothesis, feminist consciousness was unrelated to sexism or any prejudice attributions. This is not to say that the African American women in this sample did not perceive sexism as contributing to the negative evaluation by the European American male students. On the contrary, as a group, participants rated sexism, racism, and ethgender discrimination as relatively equal contributing factors to the negative evaluation (Racism M = 4.90; Sexism M = 5.15; Ethgender Prejudice M = 4.92). Thus, although sexism was found to be a relevant attribution, feminist consciousness was unrelated to this attribution. These results suggest that the concept of womanist consciousness may be a better measure of gender consciousness among African American women than feminist consciousness. Our finding of a significant relationship between womanist, but not feminist, consciousness and attributions to gender prejudice provides empirical support for the longstanding theoretical assertion by feminist scholars of color that women of color do not conceptualize their (our) gender status independently of ethnic status (Collins, 2000; ComasDiaz, 1991; Davis, 1981; Fujino, King, Chang, Quiroz, & Walters, 1994; Hacker, 1975; hooks, 1981, 1984; LaRue, 1976). In a relevant qualitative study, Shorter-Gooden and Washington (1996) found that African American female community college students identified race as the most central part of their identity and gender as also important, but less salient. Feminist approaches to gender that fail to address ethnicity or feminist discussions of “men” and “women” in universal terms dismiss power and status differences related to race and class that are obvious and important to women of color (hooks, 1984). Indeed, many current conceptualizations of feminism do integrate the importance of fighting race, class, and gender oppression (hooks, 1984, 2000; McIntosh, 1988; Social Justice Group, 2000; Wing, 2001). Such approaches seem to appeal to women of color and are necessary for an inclusive feminism. As hypothesized, ethnic and womanist consciousness were also related to cognitive appraisals of the centrality of the negative intergroup event. The stronger an African American woman’s ethnic and womanist consciousness, the more central or personally relevant she appraised the event to be. This suggests that group consciousness functions as a schema that can help determine how meaningful a negative intergroup situation is perceived by African American women. Persons high in group consciousness are likely to have thought considerably about the social realities of

26 women and people of color. They are therefore likely to be aware of the existence of societal prejudice, both subtle and overt, and seem more likely to perceive it in negative intergroup interactions. When they notice this prejudice, results of the current study suggest that they judge the event as personally significant. Centrality has been identified in the stress and coping literature as an important cognitive factor influencing the stressfulness of an event (Gruen et al., 1988; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Smith et al., 1993). Central stressors have greater psychological salience because they are related to important patterns of one’s personal beliefs and commitments and are more important in predicting health outcomes than other stressors (Gruen et al., 1988; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Smith et al., 1993). My results suggest that persons high in ethnic and womanist consciousness may experience increased stress related to their increased awareness of discrimination and inequality. Limited past research has found an association between racial identity attitudes and increased minority status stress. King (1991) found that African American college students who either expressed separatist (pro-Black/antiWhite) racial identity attitudes or were alienated from both African Americans and Whites were likely to experience greater minority status stress associated with being a minority on campus. Similarly, Thomspon, Anderson, and Bakeman (2000), found that both pro-Black/anti-White and pro-White/anti-Black racial identity attitudes were related to increased acculturative stress in African American college students. Perhaps the relationship between consciousness and stress is mediated by perceptions of prejudice. The current study suggests that ethnic and womanist consciousnesses make one more aware of prejudice and more likely to rate negative outgroup experiences as highly central. Past research has found associations between stress and both perceptions of prejudice (Armstead et al., 1989; Dion, 1975; Crocker et al., 1991; Sutherland & Harrell, 1986) and centrality (Gruen et al., 1988; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Smith et al., 1993). Does this mean high consciousness is bad for your health? Although an association between increased stress and decreased health has been identified, several factors, such as coping and social support, are important moderators of this relationship (Frese, 1999; Smith, Smoll, & Ptacek, 1990; Wohlgemuth & Betz, 1991). Thus, the relationships among group consciousness, awareness of discrimination, stress, and long-term psychological outcomes should be carefully explored. Research may find that persons with high consciousness use effective discrimination coping methods and/or have supportive social networks that decrease the damage of stressful events. For example, women high in ethnic, feminist, and womanist consciousness may be involved in organizations, activities, and relationships with similar-minded people that protect against discrimination-related stress. In support of this, Klonis, Endo, Crosby, and Worell (1997) found that women

KING professors who self-labeled as feminists reported that their feminist identity helps them cope with discrimination. The potential coping strengths associated with group consciousness should be explored in future research. The current study limited itself to the interaction of only two group memberships, race and gender, and did not examine other important oppressed group identities, most notably, socioeconomic class. This is a limitation. Mainstream feminism has been criticized for its minimal consideration of class, disability, and sexual orientation, as well as race. More research on consciousness related to multiple group memberships is needed. The complexities of multivariate research limited the number of consciousness domains explored in this study. Perhaps asking participants to identify their own most central group memberships and measuring consciousness on those domains would be the most valid method of exploring multiple consciousnesses. Methodological Issues The current study used an audiotaped simulation method to study African American women’s perceptions. Past studies provide evidence of the validity of simulation research in evoking psychological responses that are similar to observed real-life responses (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995), and the participants in the current study reported very high levels of involvement in the simulated scenario. However, the simulation, which asked participants to think and feel as if they were in the scenario, is not directly comparable to real-life situations the participants might find themselves in. Future researchers must balance the ethical problems of inducing experiences of discrimination with increasing the validity of the research situation. The manipulation check revealed two limitations of the scenario. First, about one-third of the participants inaccurately reported that the male characters in the scenario had specifically mentioned her sex. This suggests an increased salience of sex that may have been caused by the scenario characters’ frequent use of the pronoun, “she,” in referring to their partner. Future research should eliminate the use of gendered pronouns in the scenario. Second, despite the narrator’s descriptions of the two characters as “a tall blond guy with glasses” and “a short guy with light brown hair” in attempt to manipulate European male identity, a small minority of participants identified one of the characters as being other than European American. Although this compromises our confidence that the reactions of the participants are to the feedback from two European American men, the participants’ perceptions may provide information regarding the experiences of African American students on a multiethnic campus, such as the one where the current study took place. Of the 35,558 students at this university, 5.8% are African American, 30.5% are Asian American, 40.1% are European American, 3.8% are Filipino, and 10.5% are Mexican American (UCLA Office of Academic Planning and Budget, 2002). Interestingly, a small number

Do You See What I See? of participants (n = 8) identified one of the characters as being Asian. This raises questions about African American women’s perceptions of intergroup interactions with Asian males on campus. It is clearly not realistic to limit the study of racial prejudice to relations between African Americans and Whites, particularly in a highly multiethnic context, where relations between many different ethnic groups may be infused with stereotypes and prejudice. Conclusion The current study was one of the first to empirically examine the relationship between group consciousness and perceptions of group-based discrimination among persons with simultaneous membership in multiple oppressed groups. Results suggest that ethnic and womanist consciousness are important individual difference variables among African American women that help determine how they perceive attributionally ambiguous negative experiences with European American males. Findings also highlight the importance among African American women of integrating ethnicity into definitions of feminism and points to the relevance of ethgender prejudice in their lives. Future studies might use the current simulation method to explore prejudice attributions in different ethgender populations, varying the group memberships of the characters in the scenario. Initial submission: August 10, 2001 Initial acceptance: April 15, 2002 Final acceptance: May 20, 2002

NOTES 1. For social science discussions of ethnic identity and consciousness, see Cross, 1971; Gurin, Miller, & Gurin, 1980; Helms, 1990; Phelps, Taylor, & Gerard, 2001; Phinney, 1990, 1992; Smith, 1991; Sodowsky, Kwan, & Pannu, 1995; Spencer & Markstrom-Adams, 1990. 2. For social science discussions of feminist identity and consciousness, see Bargad & Hyde, 1991; Breinlinger & Kelly, 1994; Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Cole, Zucker, & Ostrove, 1998; Downing & Roush, 1985; Gurin, Miller, & Gurin, 1980; Gurin & Townsend, 1986; Henderson-King & Stewart, 1997.

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