• The Hitler - Stalin Pact:

discussion of the Non - Aggression Treaty and the Secret Protocols

Jeffrey de Pourestier,

DepartJ1lent of History, McGiIl University, Montreal

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of arts.

(c) 1992, J. de Fourestier

(

j

Abbreviated title for the (student number 8616062):

thesü;

,)f

Jeffr t_':'

dt~

F,ltd"'.:t t.'t'

( AESTRACT thesis re-examines the Non Aggression Treaty of 1\\.f~U3t 1939 arr i ved at bet\>leen Germany and the Union of Soviet :;r.,~ial ist Republics in light of the changes which occur.1;"ed in Iï;,j'. . tern Europe sirIce 1989. It is basE;d on a systematic analysis () f pr imary and se:~ondary source mater ials. l t is demonstrated IhaL, contrary to the popular viewpoint, the Soviet Union played h central raIe in the events leading up to the treaty and the (-,q~breal·~ of World War Two. Stalin' s efforts to draw Germany into on agre'::,men t and i ts consequences are discussed. This

RESUME Cette thèse re-examine la traité de non aggression d'août 1939 faite entre l"Allemag~e et l"Union des républiques s,)cialistes soviétiques dp-rls la lumière des évenements paru en Europe orientale depuis 1989. Elle est basée sur une analyse syst0matique des matériaux primaires et secondaires. Il est montré que, con~rairement au point de vue populaire, l"Union soviètique a joué un rôle central dans les événements qui pr~c~dais la signature de la traité et le déclenchement de la d~uxièm8 guerre mondiale. Les efforts de Stalin de faire un Be I~ord avec l -Allemagne et s,~s retombés sont discutés.

(,

1

And so lies in the very fact of the conclusion of an alliance with Ru'\sla for the next war. Its outcome would be the end of Ger .any.

Adolf Hitler Lannsberg 1924 1

1

Melll KamPf, p. 749

th~

plan

1

ï tH' yrar IlJWJ,

m.c

tl1\'

polltH.. ,tl '1truLture~

th\.:

Yl',l1

1X4};, will be remembered a~ a period of revolution and great change in Be~ides

of Europe.

being the bi~entennial of the French revolution, it was

of tl;e f()rtlt.~th anniversary of the two Germanie'l, the fiftieth ann:versary of the signing

01 thr Ilttlcr-Staltn Pact and the ,>tart of the Second World War. It was most signîficant as the

year rn '.vhiLh ail the

~lructure!'

lllllavdkd. The evcnt:-. of

thi~

and consequence:-. of the Hitler-Stalin Pact were ta come

tumultuou,> year culmmated in the Paris Treaty on Security in

Etu opr :-.i!!l1l'(\ on Novcrnber 10, 1990, a httle more than a year aiter the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Ill'it ovcr a Illonth after Gemlun reunificutlOn, and days after the signing of the GermanPoli-.h Treaty on the Oder-Ncl'\'\e frontier. The 1!lller-Slalin Pact

IS

a common reference for the more mundane sounding "Treaty of Non-

Aggrl''i'l1011 Bctwl'cn Germany anef the Union of Soviet Sociah'it Republics". It is also referred to il'l thr Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact in honour of the two foreign ministers who signed the al:tual document,. The 1irst mentioned title better hL'

dl-'lll'i~ed

the true nature of the agreements that will

in the adJoinillg text

There ha'l bL'l'1i diffiL'u1ty and fl'ady availabliity of Ollile of

refIect~

GH~at

tran'\nipt~

ea~e

in reviewing the subjel:t matter undcr discussion. The

of the treaty and secret protocols

publi~hed

by the Stationary

Blitain in \lJ56 made initial work very straightforward. Soviet recognition of

Ihl'''l' 'lame docul11cnt~ was initlully a :-.ignificant ob'itacle. When the preliminary research for this thl''\i:-, began, one wa, obltged to review arguments and determine how to \egitmlate the secret jOIlJ\t" i\ now in IIght of the final Soviet position no longer a proper definition of their v. (Illcful; in particular that of the central Soviet government set up by Ml.khail C1orhachcv. It i.., thi'i commis'iion 's report that recognized the secret protocols. Debate as te the valHlilY of the (ferman documents is now completely unnecessary. It makes the cnticism of val lom texh that unimagined by the partIcipants. To understand how the treaty came into existence the plOce~s

of negotiations will bc rcconstructed in order to establish not only what were the intended

tl'sults but, abo, \Vhat .

fïr~t

and

mo~t

the~e

negotiations indicate about the motiv;!tions of both parties .

signifiL'ant of the treaty 's

pll'cipitateci the Second World War.

effect~

was the redivision of Poland whieh, in turn,

In addition the fate of the Baltic states, Finland, (lnd

Rumania would be dlrectly :lffected. When the Treaty and the protocols were signed the leaders of the two state'\ mu!'>t have considered the potential consequences of the agreements. lndeed, it is ironie that the Treaty and protocois remain in effeet to this day. Even though President GOI bachcv

dedared the protol'ols illegal in 1989 the struggle for sovereignty in the Baltic states

and the MoldaviJn S.S.R. proved the 1939 agreements were far from dead. The Soviet-Union, for its part. did not formally repudiate the tenns of the treaty and the attached protocols after the i

19·11 attack. If anything it had the terms of the Treaty and protocols reaffrrmed in discussion

1

8

over the postwar

mUjJ

of Europe \Vith Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Ali of this

when the Soviet publication A'~~llmellt)' i Fakty admitted

10

l'h~\Ilgl'd

the legitimacy of the secret protol'ol

of August 29, 1939 attached to the original treaty stating that it "in no \Vay renerts tht'

\\'1\1

nf

the Soviet people who beur no responsibility for secret and criminal plots cnnduded by the Stalinist leadership.//9 Germany, which violated the tenm of the treaty when it attad,ed the Soviet-Union, did formally repudiate the treaty but not the secret protocols. Why Germany kl'pt the protocols secret after hostilities with the Soviet-Union broke out is it:-.el f an intercsting question. The Non-Aggression Treaty, the attaLhed secret protocol, and the subsequent linked trcatiL's and protocols \Vere not forgeries or the invention of some mlsguided individual as had becn the official Soviet position up until 1989. While some of the original documents no longer cxist 1fl the copies that remain are valid. The hurried nature in which they were prepm cd contI ihuted

10

the need for subsequent agreements and protocols in order to makc the ncccssal y adjustmcnts. Thus, one

mu~t

consider the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treuty of August 23, IlJ3lJ as a

continuous, somewhat organic Il , treaty completed January 10, 1941. Despite many noble words, the reversai of the Soviet position çreated a dilcmma for Ihe Soviet govemment. With growing nationalistiç fervour in the Baltie government renounce the protocols' effect? If they did,

thi~

~tatcs

cOllld the Soviet

would de facto return Europe tn

roughly where it was in August of 1931J or, at worst, lead to a total çullapsc of the Soviet Union. Not only would the Saltie states regain their independence but the

Poli~h

Ukraine und Pohsh

Russia might be claimed by Poland, Moldavia by Rumania, and Kurelia by Finland. '2

9

As quoted

In

the Montreal Gazette. 14.8.1989.

Onginals may still eXlst in the Soviet UnIOn but tlus IS speculative. Copies werc found at thc end of Soviet archive whlch matched the Gt!rman microfilm copies. See: Der Sptegel, No. 3, 1991, p.p 104-112. 10

\IJ!{I)

in a

Il Organic, in the sense that the treaty was in a constant .. tate of reVl)lOn from 1939-1941. 12 On the eve of the 50th anmvcrsary of the slgnmg of the treaty a C()mml~"lon of the LlIhumllan parilalllcllt dcclarcd Moscow's annexatlon of Llthuama and the Baltlc ~tates invahd bccau .. e "Stalim has been restored, but LIthuam3. Latvla and Estoma sull have not rcacqUlrcd thclr lndepcndcncc." Tlm reprc\l!utcd a dlfCCI challenge to the consequences of the Hlùer-Stalm Pact. Afler a report by Bill Keller of the Ncw York Tune"" (illZl'((e. 23,August,1989.

Second but no Jess important, the Treaty and its consequences contributed to understanding

't

the /argcr, more pervasive qua/ity of modern European political history: namely the east-west c!lvi ... IOIl.

Many names have been given to this division: Cold War, Iron Curtain, Nato and

W tht; flr.,t sign that a rapprochement was in the offing,48 something Germany had resisted

dt:.,pite nUITIcrou., Soviet

advance~.

Il i., during thi., period that the Munich Conference took place followed by the occupation of

tlH; Suc!t:wnlancl (Septcmber,193H). This conference was crucial in pushing Hitler and Stalin togcther.

hi~

Stalin for

part wa') 1eft out of the Great-Power discussions and was now

intcrnationally i'iolated. While Hitler may have been jubilant over his success aIl indications were that any further aggressive action by Germany would not be taken lightly. If he were to again~t

movc

Czcchoslovakia or Poland he would need sorne arrangement ta keep the Soviets

out of any conflagration. The economic pressures and demands for natural resources to supply both miJuary and political demands were placing Germany in the position that a new

undero.,tanding with the Soviet Union had to be concluded.49 It should be remembered that when lIitler came to power 46.5% of the Soviet Union's imports came from Germany. Within a few years this had droppecl to less than 9%. In 1938 German imports were worth only around 50

millIOn Rcichsmark."o

By the first quarter of 1939 this amount had decreased 6 million

Rcidl~tnark.

The tune hac! bccome opportune for a further Soviet gesture. While aIl others had been rcjectcd Stalin persisted and he was saon to discover that the adage "if at fust you don't succeed, try, tr)' Jgaill"

wa~ ta

finally bear fruit. On January Il, 1939 the Soviet Ambassador Merekalov

met Emil Widll of the Reich Foreign Mini~try's economic policy clcpartment. Besicles a request 10

Icvivc credit talks Merekalov stated that it was his hope (and by the very fact he undertook

this iniuative, Stalin 's too) that a "new era in German-Soviet" relations coulcl be brought ahout. ~I The~c remJrh went much further th an what was foreseen when Ribbentrop had sent

Kali

SchnulTl~

ta talk with Soviet trade official Skossyrev juS! before Christmas conceming

olltslanding cconomÎl: intcrests. Merekalov wished ta see talks begin immediately in Moscow.

411 4'}

Iblt

of Communists, yet bath the Soviet Union and Germany had similar motivations fOI rapprochement. In scnne respect'> the posiuons of the two

:-,tate~

mirrorcd each other. Ilitier

summed up the German Reich' s pOSItion: Russia remaïns that which it is - Germany remains, will remalfl, that which it 1s, Something about which both regimes are, however, dear; Neither the Russian regime nor the German regime wish to sacrifice a single man for the interests of the We~tern democracÎes. The le~~on of four War years

S9 This quotal1on 15 trom Hitlcr's second book which wa~ not pubh,>hed unttllt was ul,>covcrcu alter the war. Till'> parucular remark was not, therefore, public record. Howcver, Hitler made nurnCrfJU
Gennan

19\

Till" 1" 111 sl1.lrp conlrasllo the Anglo-French delegatlOn which was in Moscow for military talks. IbId•• p.77

ÙnCUI11Cllls.

Vol. VII. p.77

48

representative of the Gennan Govemment with plenipotentiary powers (i.e. \VIth Hitler's full approval).

Ambassador von der Schulenburg stated thut he would send a

memorandum later. Considering the lateness of the hour he most certainly

11100e

deslf(~d

detailL'd

a few hmn s

sleep before he sent his secret memorandum later that day. In it he detailed the discussions. Molotov believed Germany would be inc1ined to agree to the points he had raised hrcuuse of a report the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Rome had sent outlining a conversation with the ltalian Foreign Minister Ciano. Molotov wanted to know if it was true. Schulenburg leplied that Ciano's comments were certainly derived from the Italian Ambassador in tlle Soviet Union. Rosso's own deductions were "only partly correct." The German government was

UWUIC

of the

Soviet government's desire for improved German-Soviet relations and "had naturally considered how such an improvement could be brought about." (He had just read to Molotov Ribbentrop's thoughts in this regard and re-stated them.)192 Later that afternoon (at 4: 10 p.m.) Ribbentrop sent his reactions to von der Sdllllenburg's report of the early morning with further instructions. The message was received in Moscow at 1:00 a.m. on the morning of August 17. It asked von der Schulenburg ta again meet wilh

Molotov to reply to queries from the previous meeting. Ribbentrop statcd that the issues raiscd by Molotov were in "accordance with German desires." He went on to accept ail Soviet requests adding that if the Soviets desired a nun-aggression pact it should be valid for 25 years. Furthermore, he indicated that Germany was detemlined not ta endure

Poli~h

provocation

"indefinitely." Hitler therefore desired a "rapid clarification" of Soviet intent vis-cl-vis GermanSoviet relations. Ribbentrop ended the message mentioning his desire to travel to the week or the week following. 193

Mo~cow

within

Also on August 17 von Weizsticker was informed of statements by Astakhov and another Soviet diplomat (Press Attaché Smunov) that the Soviet Government had the intention of protracting hs negotiation with the Western Powers. It was noted that it was IIkcly that this

191

IbId.,

193 Ibid.,

p.8~

p.84f

49

,

information

(

WH\

deliberately "leaked" to a German informant. l94 This, plus the faet that the

pace of German-Soviet negotiations was quickening, indicated that the Soviets did not desire rapprochement with the Western Powers, and aiso wished the Gennan government to be aware of thil,. A sllb~e4uent news repOIt by an American newspaper confumed most of the above but it 4uoted Smirnov as saying that the Soviet Union regarded negotiations "as a kind of safcgllard".II)~

ThiS is how the idea that the Soviet Union made agreements with Germany to

protctated for the first time the Reich's and the Soviet Union's friendship adding they would rejcl.-t uny thrrr! power interference.

This was directed against France and England.

Suh,>eqllently, however, only Germany faced French and British troops. In total two secret and olle confidential protm;ol" were signed along with the Friendship Treaty. AlI are directly linked to the origmal treaty and protOl;ol of August 23.

It is worth nothing that the second secret

protncol of Septembcl 23 stated that both Germany and the Soviet Union wou Id suppress any " Poli"h agItation" .1Z4 The consequences of this agreement on Polish citizens and military (from Ihe concentratIOn camps to the Katyn massacre) attest to weight this particular protocoi carried.

Tite following day the new borders were published in the V olkischer Beobachter. A circular of the German forcign ministry declared any differences conceming Poland had been eliminated "forever".12~ Germany sucœeded in undoing the last remnants of the Versailles Treaty. The rump Polish General government was a Polish state under total Gf'rman occupation and control

with ils capital muvcd to Krakow. The Soviet Union had no intI·' symholic

Pl)li~h

statc. It absorbed ail conquered (Le. "liberated' 1

und Ukramian S.S.R. 's.

Unlike Germany the U.S.S.R. did not

~st

in establishing an even

!Titor into the Byelorussian f.:'Ir}

itself confronted with

declarations of war from France or Great Britain. The new border was fixed by an additional pIOtocol on October 4. The Soviet Union, while not committing to send troops to baule other than in Poland, did agree to eonperatc with Germany. In late September the Soviet government promised to facilitate German transIt traffie through the Soviet Union and insure Soviet deliveries of oi1. 326 A week

.IN

G~r\11al1 dllcuments. VIU. p.p.164-166

.\l.~ Ihld. p.175

(

"h-

Ihl.L. p.161\

•

78

1

later Molotov proposed Teriberka as the site for repair fadlities of Geml.lll ships and submarines. 327 By the end of Oetober the Soviet Government agreed to aBn\\' fOrl'l&1l ra\\ materials ta be shipped ta Germany via ports on the Black Sea with the provision tlw

OpCl atinn"

were "properly eamouflaged".328 The requirement for secrecy shows that the lJ S S.R. h.ld IlU quaI ms about sllpporting Germany's war uims but it wunted to maintain the im:l!!c of a peau'ful nonwbelligerent, thereby again avoiding being denounced as an aggressor statl'. One month later, at the end of November, the Soviet

leader~hip

(Stalin) declded

lt

\Vas tlllle

to fulfil its designs as outlined in the secret protocol of August 23. The Red Army crossed the Finnish frontier. Finland put up strong resistance but once defeated '.vas only requilcd ln giw up those territories which would form the Karelian S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. was cll'cled l'mm thl' league of Nations for its attack but despite much supportive rhetorÎl: no counuy declarl'd war on the V.S.S.R. On May 10, 1940, the sowcalled "Sitzkrieg" caine to an end with open wmfare between Gennany and France. This occupied German troops on the western front and drew them away from the East. The Soviet Union used this situation in their drive for rcdrl''''iI1ll'Ilt. In midJune, before the fall of Fr:mce, the Red Army occupied first Lithuania then Latvla and Three days after the fall of France the Red Anny occupied

Be~sarabJa

E~tonia.

and North Bukovina

III

northern Rumania. With this it had taken ail the territories as per thc secret protocol of Augu:-.t 23. ln short order the Baltic republics became S.S.R. 's and northcrn Rumarua becamc the Moldavian S.S.R. In no instance was the Soviet Union declared war upon or madc accountahlc. The final amendment of the August 23 agreements came on January 10, 1Y41. Stallll had maintained control of one piece of Polish territory originally ceded to Germany. After a long drawn out negotiation and in an al;110St anticlimactic fashion Germany rcnounced it .. daim

III

exchange for 31.5 million Reichsmark. 329 Because the U.S.S.R. proved so difficult on rc\cnting this territory and for other reasons beyond the scope of this discussion, relations bctwccn Gennany and the U.S.S.R. began to deteriorate.

327

IbId, p.213

328

Ibid, p.358

329 05teurc,.,a, p.452

7lJ

June 22, Gcrmany attacked the Soviet Union and the Pact was officially dead. The Pact made \.

the Soviet U nioI1 a grcat power and the war the Pact precipitated eliminated a main rival.

Zhigniew

Br7czJl1~ki

states,

The litanie war waged belween Hitler's Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Russia ha:-. made many forget that the struggle between them was a fratricidal war 330 betwccn two strands of a common faith.

(

JJil

Allalll~"I. p.p.6.7. s~~ a)so: Und .. ff.

80

..

1

CONCLUSION

Stalin fully understood the significance of the agreement he had signcd and understood that, as he put it, "Hitler wants to trick us, but 1 think we 'vc gotten the better of him." He said then and there that the document wc signed would giw us Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia and Finland. The fate of thase states wou Id be up to our discretion. Nikita Khru~hL-hcv III The historical evidence supports the conclusion of a draft repart n2 rcached by SovIet historians in 1989 that the Treaty as weIl as the first secret protocal (which diviclcd ElIIopc) were Soviet initiatives. The final report of the commission on the Pact still maintains that the Pact was the result of German initiative333 • Yet the evidence presented in this discussion beurs the opposite conclusion and supports the findings of the draft report. This is a rcvelsal of the traditional premise that the initial palitieal advances were made by Germany towards the U.S.S R. It is likely that this misinterpretation of the actual chain of events can be traced to Amcrican misinterpretation of information leaked by Hans von Herwarth and the general disbelief of the British and French Governments in such a scenario occurring 334 • It is not difficult ta analyze why the Soviet Government before 1989 never set the record straight. Stalin had gO[1e to grcat lengths to avoid the image of being the belligerent and central fi~~ureJ35. White Stalin was posthumously disgraced, the system he put in place required that ail responsibility fall solely on Nazi Germany. The U.S.S.R. was therefore able to maintain the fabe image that it was only interested in peace, collective security, and that its primary goal was

331

tu

Khrushchev, p.46

332 Accordmg to the draf! specIal commlltce report. The final report refules SovIet responsiblllly. SI!C; Matériaux du deu>.ième congrès des députés du peuple de l'U.R.S.S. 333

Ibid., p.l7ff.

334 Hans von Herwarth havmg hoped that his informatIOn would rcach We~lcrn leaders liUncntcd Ihal his CassiUlIlra caUs had not been believed.", Letter from von Herwanh la Ihe author dateG 2 ApnL 1990.

335 Gorbachev's dec1aratlOn in the Kremlm on 24 December, 1989 confirms Ihl~ argumenl. Matértaux du deuxlI'1ne congrès des dépurés du peuple de l' V.R.S S., p 30

XI

• it~e1f again~t

prep.lre

l

Fasdst Hitlerist aggression. When Germany finally did attack the Soviet

IJlIilH} on June 22, JY41, it did much to obscure the central role of the V.S.S.R. in the events that

led

10

the outhrcak of the Second World War. It also contributed to furthering the belief amongst

the \Vc . . tcrn Powcrs that the Soviet Union had in faet becn set up and victinùzed by its agrc.:t.:mcnh with Gcnnany. This, as we have seen, is untrue, yet at the time it was believed by the

Wc~tcrn

leaders of the day and this is what is significant.

Nothtng in the Treaty itself defines it as anything other than a standard non-aggression a/rangcment or ncutrality convention. Furmermore, it was apparently based on several other such arr allgcmcnts bctwecn the Soviet Union and the Baltic States. 336 The implication is that the mocleI for the aLtual text of the Treaty was a Soviet one. The Treaty defined the military Ilcutrality of the signatory states in the event of a military conflagration.

As published, t:le

Trcaly fell within the th en parameters of international law, but it is complicated by the attachment of a secret protocol. In this respect the conclusions of the Soviet commission on the Pact are

WIfCCt. 3ll

There I.:un be no question that the Treaty as it was written in 1939 is illegal

under present considerations of internationallaw. The secret protocoI of August 23, 1939 was a covert belligerent act. Bath parties were fuUy aware of this. Amendments made to the secret protocol reinforce this view. 338 First and foremost this is true because secret agreements are not acceptable under present tieuty-m.king practices. B'lt in 1939, it was a common practice. What makes the treaty illegal under accepted international law at the time is the process of ratification. It was unethicul to ratify a treaty after it was made valid upon signature. Such ratificatit"l was a purely theatrical gesture. In addition, as the Soviet Union required that the NOIl-Aggres"iion Treaty be linkecl with a special

~";ret

protocol, inlernationallaw would have

rcquired the protocol's ratification as well, as it was not a separate entity. It remains then that, despite the trappings of statecraft and being signed by two foreign ministers, the Non-Aggression Treaty and the initial secret protocol were nothing more than a personal agreement or

336 MO.\('(JII'

(

Nt'lI's. August 20, 1989, p.B

337

s~~; Mllrt'flOul du dl'1mème cOIJ,~rès des dép/ltés du peI/pie de l'UR.S.S., p.24.

3.\8

Gcnnan documents. Vol. VIII. p.l66

82

understanding between Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. The fact they were the

undl~p\lll'd

dictators of their respective states gave the agreements the force of law wilhin the Il ll'Spl'l'Ii\l' states but it could not make them legal under international law. The namc Hltlcr-Slalm PaL'1 i... therefore appropriate. There was a definite similarity between the leaders of Germany and Ihe Soviet

lll1lon.

BOlh

Hitler and Stalin were autocratie leaders and anti-Scmitic to varying degrct's. Bllth Wl'Il' nationalists and highly suspidous of others. They also shared a common dislike for Pnland's "Government of Colonels .. 339 and the Western democracÏes.

These provcd to be impOitant

factors in the German-Soviet rapprochement. The premise of Ivan Mais\"'y that the pal'!

wa~

nothing unusual and in line with "the traditional policy of the Soviet Union to plll into praclILt' the Leninist principle of peaceful co-existenœ" 140 is a complete misreprescnt.ltion of the tlue nature of the pact. There could nevel' have been any daubt by Hitler or Stalin that the pact. including the secret protocol added at Stalin' s behest, would lead 10 war against Poland or at least infringe on Ille sovereignty of a number of other states, and possibly prcdpItate a Sel:ond Worhl War. As an American Anny report states, the agreements of August 23 exploded ail hopcs of peace. 341 In and of itself the Pact changes little with respect to German war guilt. Being the

in~trumcnt

which made the Polish War possible (universally accepted as the outbrcak of Worltf War Il), the

V.S.S.R. also carries a heavy burden of responsibility for causing the conditions Icading to the outbreak of war. If anything, Soviet diplomacy managrd to take advantage of the ineptitude of some of the German leadership so that it could mitigat;. the appearance of its own governmcnt' s guilt. The German attack on the V.S.S.R. in 1941 only helped them in this. The later image of the Red Army as an army of liberation in Eastern Europe is stained by Stalin' s duplicity. In fact, Stalin was informed of Hitler's maye against Poland be/ore the outbreak of hostilitics on

339

Maisky. p.129

340

Ibid .• p.245

341

Kennl!dy, p.44

H3

September l, 1931J by Germany.342 The main cuu ... e ... for Gennan-Soviet rapprochement was comman dislike for Poland, the quest

for territorial aggrandizement and the desire to consolidate security interests. For both Germany and the U.S S.Itward to crcatc a line that became known as the "Iron Curtain". Both spheres continued to CXI'-tt a\ tacltly rel.Ognized political realities since Molotov and Rjbbentrop affixed their signatures tn the Secret PI n!oLOI in Augu,>t 1939 to the official end of the cold war in 1990. There is likely no ntlier agreement of

~uch

an odious nature that has proven to be as tenacious as the

undeNandlll!! that wa,> reached between two of the world's mast sinister dictators. The struggles for indcpcIHkncc that persisted in the Baltie republics and in Moldavia underscore this. A~

t'rom

for the scrie,> of documents whkh make up the Pact, their validity has now been removed qlle~tlon

hy both parties to the original agreements. Had their validity been publicly

acccpted whcn they were discovered, after they were secretly spared from destruction, in 1945, they may hkely have altcred generul Western pen.:epuons of the day. It is greatly possible that this is prcciscly why the American authorities chose to suppress the documents following their di~covery"1-1 and why the Soviet Union was allowed to diseredit them. 345

The saddcst consequence of the Pact was the forced subjugation, deportation of millions of people, and the annexation of the three Baltil.: Republics and the northern territories of Rumania. ln the case of Rurnania, it is only an irony of history that the annexed territories were spared the horrors of the Ceaucescu regime. As for the Baltie Republics, their quest for independenee restcd on the rCJcction of the Pact by the Soviet Union. The problem Gorbachev faced was that a retufIl to pic-August 11J31J borders would give the Baltic States back their independence. It would also Icquire a settlement of the territory seized from Poland. This would invalve part of the ByciOi ussian and Ukrainian Republics. The Vilnius area would have ta be settled with respect to Lithuania and Poland. Karelia might have ta be returned to Finland and Bukovina-Bessarabia (i.e. Moldavia) wou Id likely need to be retumed to Rumania. The inflamed nationalist

Mol

(

lI.S. Gllvcmment documents. 1945. Vol.

m. p.p. 1108. 1109 .

.~..s The SO\'I\:I aulhllflllcS :ûter World War II thcreby destroyed Ernst von Weizs1icker's testimony at the Nuremberg Tnah-. Tlm t.ICI further ù.unagcs certmn aspects of these mals lhemselves.

86

sentiments may prove to be yet another legacy of the Pact. Lastly the Pact and its consequences have shawn what governments. both \Vith and withollt structural checks and balances are capable of. It also shows to what degree disinformation l'an be created and perpetuated. It is this which is the lesson the historian and the student of history must take to heart when studying the Pact. The final relevance of the Pact still is incompkte. Both Molotov and Ribbentrop are dead but the Pact still detennines the fate of large numbers nI' Eastern Europeans. However, the Soviet Union managed to maintain its gains achicwd through the agreements made in August 1939 as its spoils for becommg a member of the Cil and Alliance. Nothing short of the collapse of the Soviet empire would or could apparently change this.

X7

• APPENDIX

(

88

LINKED TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

1939 1) 19 August a) Credit Agreement Between the German Reich and the Unioll of Soviet Socialist Republics b) Confidential Protoco/ (giving more favorable terms than in the actual Trcaty) c) Final Protocol ail the German-Soviet Negotiatiofls ail Trade muJ Credit afAugust

19,1939 2) 23 August a) Treaty of Non-Agression Between Gemumy (Jill} the Union of Soviet Sol'Ïa/ist Republics b) Secret Additional Protocol (defining spheres of influem;e) 3) 28 September a) German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty b) Confidential Protocol (providing for exchange of nationals) c) Secret AdditionaL Protoco/ (adjusting 2b and giving Lithuania to the U.S.S.R) d) Secret Additional Protocol (agreeing to joint suppression of Polish agitation) e) Declaration of September 28, 1939, by the Governmellt of the German Reich (lll(i the Government of the V.S.SR. (affirming peace should be restOlcd) 4) 4 Detober Supplementary ProtocoL Between Germany alld the Unio/l of Soviet Socialist RepubLics (delineation new boundary in Poland)

1941 5) 10 January Supplementary Protocol Between Germany and the Union of Soviet SoL'Ïali.'l1 RepubLics (agreeing to payment to Germany for disputed Polish territory)

1939

1940 1941

J--i-----t---\5

19."",9.

23.J\ uS·

29 Sept.

4. Oct.

10.1an.

89

1

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS

(

23 Aug. Deleg Germany Gau-;, Friedrich • Gottfriethen, 11 Hcwel, Walter • von 1krwarthfvon Bittenfeld] Hans["Johnny"] llilger, Gustav • Hitler, Adolf Hotïmann, Heinrich • Kleist, Pctcr • Klbtflng, Ernst August335 • Kordt, Erich Laux, Helmut • (von) RIbbentrop, Joachim • Schliep, Martm Schmid, Walter Schmidt, Paul Karl • Schmidt, Paul Otto • Schnurrc, Julius von der Schulcnburg, Friedrich Werner • Schulze, Rlchard • von Seef, [ ) von Tippelsklrch, Werner von Walther, Gebhard von WClzsàcker. Ernst Wiehl, Emil Woermann, Ernst

(Embassy)

lJ.S.S.R.

(Embassy)

Astakhov. Georgi Baballll. Evgeny Mcrckalov, Alexei Mikoyan, Anastas M. l'vloln(ov, Vlyachcslav M. Pavlov. Vladimir N. Potcmkin, Vladimir P. Shapl1shnikov. Boris S. Shkvalzev. Alexander Stalll1, Joseph W.

(

23 Aug. Deleg

(Berlin) X X X

X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

(Moscow)

X X

X X

• • •

• •

X X X X X

X

3.\5 Hom III Moscow, 20 June. 1876. Kellig, p.l78

90

"......... ",,""..n-

t!> :: P:1~:me.sc.. ~o H.. ~'7

"" .. -rs

" Dd',,"

.. YI,."I. CHale"

...

D P,,,.. !.

s.."

,, ,

,

1

,

1

, ,1

Frontiers as of 1 September 1939

,1

"

Spheres of intercst betwecn the U.S.S.R. and Germany

Stamps issued by the U.S.S.R. to commemorate the "liberation" of the Eastern half of Poland bearing the date when the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier.

91

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary References

- Akten zur Deut