Did the French revolution matter? The impact of civil and fiscal reform on the rural land market in the Southern Low Countries, 1710-1812. Pieter De Reu and Nicolas De Vijlder – Economy, Ecology and Demography research group Department of History, G hent University Work in progress - please do not quote July 2013

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Abstract In this paper we investigate to what extent the French invasion of the Austrian Netherlands in 1795, and the resulting legal reforms, impacted on the rural land market. This study centres on the parish of Eke, a community near Ghent, for which we collected a continuous series of land sales records stretching from 1710 to 1812. Our analysis is threefold. First, we assessed the level of the market’s equilibrium (e.g. price level and yearly turnover) before, during and after the French occupation. Secondly, we highlighted the changing geographical origin of propertybuyers; from local residents to inhabitants of nearby cities and towns. Finally, we used a hedonic regression analysis to evaluate the price formation for single plots of land throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In the short term a rupture in the market equilibrium arose, as an immediate consequence of the installation of a new fiscal-military state, a flawing mortgage system and the lack of a land-registration system. Over a period of 3 to 5 years however, activity on the land market picked up as both the value and transferred acreage increased. We showed that the institutional changes had both a direct and indirect effect. On the one hand, the introduction of the Code Civile caused for the disappearance of the premium for freehold land, and thus a lower overall price level. On the other hand, these new institutions created a more transparent land market in the property’s intrinsic qualities accounted for a larger amount of the observed price differences.

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Introduction 'Dans nos grandes familles il s'est conservé quelque chose de l'esprit d'économie, d'ordre et de

prévoyance, qui animait la vieille Flandre et en même temps quelque chose de l'esprit lent et progressif d'agrandissement territorial de la féodalité; elles s'arrangent pour doubler leur avoir en vingt-cinq années de mariage, et pour laisser ainsi à chacun de leurs quatre enfants une fortune égale à celle de père et mère, lorsqu'ils se sont mariés; c'est par là qu'elles retardent le morcellement et la décadence (dont Dieu les préserve), vers lesquels les poussent le partage égal du code civil et le mouvement matériel de notre société.' In 1837 opinion maker and old retainer of the Belgian government Joseph Ferdinand Toussaint wrote a remarkable open letter to the central fiscal administration.1 He addressed Charles Joseph Faider, general director of the mammoth administration levying real estate transaction taxes: the undisputed queens of taxation at that time. Influenced by American agrarianism, like fellow utopian socialists, Toussaint feared the fragmentation and ever growing scarcity of land (for the small Flemish farmers) and the diminution of a ‘land bond’ in present-day economy. In his ‘épître d’économie politique’ he attacked the greedy behavior of modern industry and (urban) nobility, shaping the free-market economy. But above all, he warned about the fiscal and administrative institutions that made the land market even more irresistible to speculator behavior. In Toussaint’s mindset these institutions, established during and after the French revolution, severely ruptured the age-old peasant land market (insofar it ever existed).2 Yet up to this date, no long-term analysis of the rural land market in the Southern Low Countries has been carried out. However, role of the French revolution on long-term economic growth has since long generated considerable interest amongst economists and historians alike. The farreaching reforms that were instilled in France, as well as in neighbouring countries had profound effects on these societies. Urban guilds were abolished, as were the remaining traces of feudalism. While the rigid feudal system that governed rural societies during the middle ages had largely disappeared in North-western Europe by the sixteenth century, both the aristocracy and the clergy still had substantial prerogatives in both economic and judicial matters. Hence, the decomposition of their entitlements in the aftermath of the French Revolution had profound effects on these communities. A uniform legal system was established, creating equality before the law amongst the populace and making way with the complex entanglement of property rights of the previous centuries. Consequently, by the start of the nineteenth century, a largely new regulatory framework was in place. Over the past decades, there has been substantial literature on the pivotal role of the French revolution of the economic, social and legal development of continental Europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. On the one hand, several authors have highlighted that the French Revolution and the reforms it brought with in society had positive effects on economic growth in the long run.3 Most recently, an elaborate macro-economic analysis showed that the events of 1789 and the consecutive occupation of large parts of Europe during the following decades had positives effects on economic growth in the long run.4 However, other scholars have stressed the highly disruptive effects on both the political and economical level as being impediments to economic growth.5 This paper focuses on the rural land market in the Southern Low Countries, and attempts to assess the if and how the rural land market was affected by the reconfiguration of the institutional framework. First, a birds-eye view of the institutional changes during the period VANHAUTE, 1996: 105 there: TOUSSAINT, 1837: 514. See for example Sheilagh Ogilvie or Bas van Bavel on the existence of a advanced rural land market in seventeenthcentury North-Western Europe. OGILVIE 2001; VAN BAVEL 2008. 3 MOKYR 1990; ROSENTHAL, 1994 4 ACEMOGLU et al., 2010 5 LANDES, 1969; BLANNING, 1986. 1 2

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under consideration is provided. This is followed by a thorough analysis of the land market, in which we highlight the geographical mobility of the market participants, give an summary of some general trends in market activity and disentangle the price formation on the land market. Finally, some preliminary conclusions are given.

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Context 1. Land rights, land markets and their institutions in Flanders Historical evidence shows that large parts of Western Europe possessed secure property rights from the Middle Ages onwards. In England for example, land markets for freehold land truly came into existence after legal reforms in the 1170s and 1180s during the reign of Henry II. 6 Two elements brought along by the legal reforms were especially significant. First, an increased alienability by tenants enabled the emergence of land markets. Second, as a consequence of the reforms, land could be used as a security for loans. This resulted in an increased liquidity of land as an economic resource. A similar overnight transformation of the legal system did not take place in Continental Europe. The evolution towards secure property rights was fragmented, mirroring the scattered political and institutional contexts. In general terms, common law became established in France and the Low Countries somewhere during the thirteenth and fourteenth century. Key elements in this evolution were the gradual disappearance of the feudal system, the amelioration of the social and judicial position of the peasantry after the Black Death and the gradual urbanization. 7 By the end of the Middle Ages however, property rights were institutionalized within larger legal frameworks throughout North-Western Europe. Land became a ‘commodity’. Likewise, both land and credit could be transferred through respectively land and credit markets.8 Ancien Régime sale deeds were frequently officialized by either notaries, Aldermen benches or the manorial court. In densely populated areas, such as certain regions of the Southern Low Countries, official surveyors were even set out to trace the exact boundaries of each plot. This depended however on the formal initiatives of local lords. In the case of the parish of Eke (cf. infra) private contract sales – in which buyer and seller vouched for the transaction themselves – appeared in front of the local justice. Those were the majority of the transactions. But the contracts could still – if thought to be necessary – ‘pass’ by notary or Aldermen bench hands. Public sales (i.e. real estate auctions) were the exclusive domain of the notary or Aldermen bench.9 These traditions in Eke are a mere example of land market transactions customs. For real estate transactions always fell victim to regional particularism. Hence, a universal system of land title registration was absent at regional, let alone the national level. In the Southern Countries, the Austrian administration developed some strategies – state strategies which didn’t ask for a large infrastructural power – towards the land market economy.10 The central government decided on March 19th 1777 to dispose the confiscated Jesuit immovable, after the banishment of the religious order by pope Clement XIV. The sales helped funding the nation’s debts. And at the end of the century, physiocratic ideas drove remaining common land into private hands. Yet: Collective forest and land was for a long time absent in the village of Eke, and its eighteenth-century land registers didn’t list Jesuit goods.11 Furthermore, property rights themselves were far from perfect as well. First of all, since different rights over land coexisted next to each other, property rights were never exclusive. It could very well be that several people could claim to own rights established on the same piece of land. The monarch could give a domain in fief to his vassal, who could then exploit part of it as copyhold. The copyholder could turn manage the land as it was his exclusive property. Without the lord’s consent, he could sell, mortgage or lease out the plot as he pleased. Since there was no 6

PALMER, 1985: 7-10; CAMPBELL, 2009: 79-106

7 VAN DEN BERG, 1988: 17-19; HOWELL, 2010: 42-59; VERHULST, 1958:241-259 8 VAN BAVEL & HOYLE, 2010 9 WIEME,

2005 YERNAULT, 2011: 83-84 11 COPPIETERS, 1991: 270-274 10

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central registration or publication office, land could be remortgaged several times, increasing the possibility of over-indebtedness and defaults. To sum up, the limited regulatory framework, absent registration and publication offices and the entanglement of, albeit mutually exclusive, rights increased information cost dramatically. This severely impacted the proper working of the land and credit market during the Ancien Régime. Consequently, land market participants were overwhelmingly locals or their relatives, since only they had sufficient knowledge to estimate the net worth of a piece of land.12 Therefore, urban (speculator) investments were often made with the support of a local ‘procurator’.13 Similarly, credit in rural areas remained limited to informal networks of relatives, neighbors or the local nobility. The formal annexation of the Southern Low Countries to the French Republic in 1795 came with a redefinition of property rights. With a total subversion of civil society, a new ‘social pact’ was agreed upon and property rights were institutionalized between civilian (for instance the inhabitants of Eke) and state. The central state guaranteed and protected individual, land rights, and the individual paid his occurring and periodical land taxes. This pact was e.g. formalized in the 1789 ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen’ and the following Constitutions of the French governments. The French parliament gave birth to a set of fiscal and administrative laws. Needless to say that these innovations brought along a profound reconfiguration of the institutional framework. Soon after the invasion of the French, the former prerogatives of the nobility and the church in the Southern Countries were abolished. This was almost immediately followed by the state’s acquisition of Austrian and religious belongings, such as buildings, lands and forests. France set up a hierarchic patrimonial service, in which state officials did no more than to search through local Ancien Régime archives in order to find feudal titles and evidences of immovable ownership. Many ‘discoveries’ brought abandoned real estate to the central state’s domain. The selling of nationalized lands and buildings was a lucrative business for a state constantly balancing on the edge of bankruptcy (the bulk of auctions did not occur until 1797), and it lasted for more than a decade.14 We will make no allowance for these first sales of nationalized goods of clergy and nobility in Eke, because the sales were not incorporated in the capitalist land market we want to study.15 It was the provincial authority – as an intermediate structure between state and tax office – who regulated the sales in capital Ghent. This ‘activation’ of nationalized goods simply had to make easy money for the central state. Moreover, looking at the eager buyers, the clientele carried out specific goals other than the demands on the private land market.16 Nevertheless, we do take stock of these buildings and lands, when the tax office itself acts as a regular participant (buyer or seller) on the Eke land market – or when earlier nationalized goods came back as ‘normal’ immovable in the land market economy. To round off with some figures: ecclesiastic institutions hold 3,4 percent of the property in Eke in 1762, as this surface was diminished to 1,1 percent after the Belgian independence of 1830 – when however 3,3 percent of the land was already bought by religious individuals, having no privileges to other land market visitors).17

DAVID, 1971: 272-279 LIS & SOLY, 1980 14 Since 1823, the Dutch government could vote the establishment of the infamous ‘Amortisatiesyndicaat’. This syndicate had as the most important duty to feed the national treasury with the ‘activation’ of nationalized goods – without a through control of the parliament. By the sales of lands and buildings for the greater part laying in the former Southern Low Countries, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands could pay off the huge national debts of the former Dutch Republic. 15 LAMBERT, 1969 16 State archives at Beveren, fund Scheldedepartement, nr. D-5000 & D-5001: alphabetical tables of the sales of nationalized clergy property. 17 COPPIETERS, 1991: 270-274 12 13

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The French Revolution gave rise to new notary acts and civil law, especially after the codification of the Napoleonic administration in the spring of 1804. The Napoleon Code of 1804 immediately shaped the civil and fiscal framework in which the economy could shell – it was a model of economic law, also in the Southern Low Countries. The Code itself incorporated far-reaching civil liberties – perhaps to conceal the lack of political freedom at that time?18 Real estate transactions could only be officialized by mediation of a public notary, they were never submitted to private contract sales. Private contracts could only be provided, when a real estate sale agreement was made. It was the notary’s accountability to draw up the transaction contract according to the state’s guidelines, as he was the intermediary between land market clientele and the fiscal state. This responsibility went even further (cf. infra). The state providing individual property rights added an elevated fiscal barrier, yet levying now the whole rural and urban society. A periodical (annual) real estate tax was developed, in which the fiscal margins of the individual property were uniformly and consistently pruned away to the national treasury. This annual tax again was influenced by physiocratic doctrine: the property tax was given a major role in the state’s fiscal revenue and the weight of the taxation definitely lay on (agrarian) land. But with a non-existent general cadaster, the formation of land registers and the tax recovery fell under – surprisingly – local authority’s accountability. Therefore, the municipalities made abundant use of the Ancien Régime land registers and land use registers on the one hand side, and the most recent Austrian tax rolls.19 The first local attempts - following national guidelines - began from November 1802 onwards. But only when state officials conducted the surveying and valuating of plots at the end of 1807 instructed by Napoleon, a new central cadastral survey could secure a correct property inventory. These cadastral operations were crossed by regime shifts (Dutch rule and Belgian independence), what made the establishment of a general and up-to-date cadaster and of a network of land survey offices in 1834/1835. Soon afterwards, the commercialization of that cadaster began. Several tax officials for instance made individual and convenient Eke cadasters, which everyone could buy. The first attempt in the 1840s to duplicate land and property title registers lacked success, by the absence of proprietor lists. The latter endeavor in 1860 was a popular try. More important in terms of fiscal revenue and of land market economy, was the registration of real estate transactions. Numerous land registry offices were raised, each with a given territory. These taxation offices worked very adequate and efficiently since their inception in 1796.20 Local state officials made the registration of property mutation, by writing an abstract of every notary deed. Therefore, they enforced a percentage on the value of every sold arable land, meadow, forest, house, farm, etc. Only when the registration tax was paid, the real estate transactions counted as official and legal. It was the notary’s accountability to bring every single deed to the land registry office, within a couple of days. Making the property changes publicity and judicial proof – which gave birth to new property titles–, was another crucial task of the fiscal administration. Therefore, mortgage law registry offices secured mortgages and property evidence and stood for a formal registration of the land market transactions in the public domain. These offices were established even before the land registry offices arose, in the summer of 1795. Yet, the early mortgage law system experienced some initial organizational problems. Within this flawing system during the first years, the publicity (which made that lands and buildings could be called one’s property) was not obliged nor was it generalized. Proprietors or people with a mortgage claim could declare their real estate property ‘known’ by visiting the public notary themselves. Following this, the notary sent a declaration to the mortgage law office. 21 This practice caused short-term failures. 22 A YERNAULT, 2011: 94 DE REU, 2013a 20 DE REU, 2011 21 DE REU, 2011: 317-318 22 GARAUD, 1959 18 19

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reinstitution of the mortgage law system was established in 1799 (in full force since 1800). The new mortgage law was not perfect, yet the gathered information was reliable and the publicity of property was ensured. This system was completed around 1852. Table 1: Important institutional changes before and after the French Revolution. Period

Event

Austrian Netherlands 1777

* Sale of nationalized Jesuit property

18th c.

* Transformation of common land into private land

French Republic 1795

* Annexation of the Southern Low countries to France, since the 30th of November 1796, French laws immediately became in force. * Establishment of land registry offices (operational since the Spring of 1796) * Establishment of (flawing and imperfect) mortgage law registry offices * Redefinition of property rights

1797

* Sale of nationalized goods

1800

* Establishment of mortgage law registry offices

1804

* Introduction of the Civil Code

1808 et seq.

* Toilsome establishment of a general cadaster: a dynamic inventory of all national plots Thus: shift from land use taxation to land property taxation

The Netherlands 1814-1815 1823

* Union with the Netherlands * Establishment of the ‘Amortisatiesyndicaat’, activation of nationalized goods

Belgium 1830

* Independence of Belgium (pursue from 1830 to 1839)

1834

* Establishment of a general, more correct and up-to-date cadaster

1840s

* Commercialization of the Eke cadaster (low success)

1850s

* Adaptation of fiscal law: death duty taxes and mortgage (law) taxes

1860

* Commercialization of the Eke cadaster (greater success)

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2. Presenting the case study- the Flemish village of Eke Eke is a small town embracing the river Scheldt, in the countryside surrounding the county and provincial capital city Ghent. It is part of the historic region the Scheldeveld, being a part of nowadays East-Flanders.23 Under Austrian hegemony, it laid at the borders of the Oudburg chatelaine in the renowned County of Flanders. The landscape consequently always was susceptible of both urban and rural influence. The seigniory of Eke consisted of the parish of Eke and a small district called ‘Splete van Eke’ in present-day Nazareth. We only take the land market economy of the parish into account (see: Sources). This parish became an independent locality from 1800 onwards. Since 1977, the town of Eke is a part of the larger village of Nazareth. Map 1: Eke (-Nazareth) within the administrative arrondissement of Ghent in the proivince of East-Flanders

Eke was a true patchwork of different types of terrain. The larger part of the village was occupied by arable land. Between 1762 and 1834 these agrarian lands were even expanded, in an attempt to gear-up the food supply to the population growth.24 Between 1710 and 1795, the population had almost doubled from roughly 800 to 1,500 inhabitants. This number reached 1,950 after the Belgian Independence. Especially meadows and even built-on plots (5-10 percent) had to make way for cultivated grounds. The meadows (25 percent) could be found in the dominant alluvial area of Eke.25 Forest was very scarce since centuries (4-6 percent). The land market had 927 plots of land at its disposal in 1762. According to the cadaster of 1834, the plots had increased to 1788 parcels, pointing towards an increasing morcellization of property. In both reference years, 90-95 percent of these plots were in private circulation. With a zoom in on the land market behavior in Flemish countryside under Austrian hegemony and in modern time, we will take the pulse of a changing civil society.

23

VAN DEN ABEELE, 1972.

24 VAN SCHANDEVYL, 1986; COPPIETERS, 1991: 61-62. 25 WIEME, 2005.

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Research results This paper focuses on impact on the rural land market of the changing institutional context in the Southern Low Countries between the end of the Ancien Régime and the foundation of the Belgian state in 1831. As we’ve thoroughly illustrated in the previous paragraph, the institutional framework of the rural land market was considerably altered during the two decades between the start of the French revolution and the formation of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815. The alteration of the institutional environment significantly changed ‘the rules of the game’ that had previously governed the rural land market for well over four hundred years. Thus, we hypothesise that these changes had both a qualitative and quantitative impact. For example, disappearance of feudal rights and the creation of a unified land-registry office could cause an increase the participation of urban property buyers and at the same time alter the price formation on the land market (qualitative and quantitative impact respectively). Since this duality should accordingly be reflected in our research strategy, we opted to split up our argument in a quantitative and a qualitative section. In the former, elements such as the yearly turnover, average transferred plot size and the geographical origin of buyers will be looked upon in more detail. In the latter, a hedonic price regression will be constructed in order to uncover the structural determinants of the price of land, assess long-term trends in price formation and evaluate the impact of the aforementioned institutional changes during the period 1790-1810 hereon. 1. Land market transactions Did new institutions make a stronger free market economy? Having a first look at the number of immovable transactions, it is difficult to answer this question. The amount of proprietors stayed the same between 1762 and 1834.26 On average, there was a real estate sale every month since the French Revolution. Only a few sales per year more than on the Eke land market under Austrian rule. Furthermore, there seems to be no significant changes in the number of transactions, because of the relatively smallness of the Eke land market. The annual balance sheet however shows a marked difference (see Graph 1). Graph 1: Number of real estate sales in Eke(five year moving average)

26

COPPIETERS, 1991: 264

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A few patterns prove the socio-economic position in which the land market transactions of Eke took place. Graph 1 shows the apparent recovery from French devastations at the beginning of the eighteenth century. There also was a normalization of the land market commerce after the turmoil of the Austrian Succession. Despite the flying start the land registry office made, we did not find real estate sales for 1796, and only one transaction in the Spring of 1797. Yet every crisis has its opportunists. Is it possible that François Claus and François Rekenaere, both inhabitants of Eke, were the only brave ones to close a deal in the first revolutionary years? This was the time in which the use of ‘assignats’ paralyzed economic behavior. Many people thought that old laws were rescinded, and the fear of losing newly gained property during the nationalization of lands and buildings lashed out.27 In fact many purchases were postponed to avoid French taxes.28 As a result of the rigid occupation policy and the numerous disturbances, there was a dropping notary activity until the turn of the century – afore the perpetuation of the regime and the temporary peace in Europe provided a revival.29 Yet, it is not unthinkable that some transactions slipped to the fiscal net. Having a further look at the long eighteenth century, we notice a clear tendency towards a more intensive land market activity. With this, bigger investments were made (see Table 2), even if we take the historic inflation of the currency into account. However the plot sizes that passed into other hands certainly were not bigger than before the French Revolution. Eke land market visitors paid more for smaller plots. This is also evident in the ‘yearly turnover’ (the ratio between sold area and total land market surface): The brief heights of the turnovers in the beginning of the eighteenth century were rarely reached again. The end of 1726 marked an astonishing 7,18 percent of the marketed Eke territory. The French period knew strong fluctuations between 0,05 and 2,35 percent (with an average of 0,92 percent). 2. Geographical mobility on the land market On the Flemish land market economy there was a free and capitalist trade, with great mobility, as Wieme already pointed out.30 An important determinant of such a free land market, was the absence of a so-called ‘family-land bond’. The purpose of a sale was not to keep the real estate in hands of the family, but to gain the best profit. In eighteenth century, not even 5 percent of all immovable transactions were concluded intra familia. This is not a significant parameter in our evaluation. So can we find evidence of an even greater mobility caused by the establishment of republican institutions? Looking at the origin of sellers and buyers, the preliminary results are quite stunning (see Table 2). According to the Belgian cadaster, 41,5 percent of the plots in Eke were in hands of city-dwellers from neighboring Ghent and not even 40 percent was owned by inhabitants. Since the revolutionary years, one sale out of three or four was sealed by foreigners. This indicator of urban speculator behavior is emphasized by the fact that of almost half of the real estate deals there was either an external buyer or seller.31 A remarkable difference with the Ancien Régime land market.32 Graph 2 shows the percentage of buying and selling by nonresidents during the last years of our early modern reference years, in contrast with the percentages of the French period.

RAPPORT, 2002 VERHAEGEN, 1935 vol. 2: 187-190, 502 29 STEVENS, 1994: 192-196 30 WIEME, 2005. 31 DE KEZEL, 1988 32 DE VIJLDER 2012; DE VIJLDER 2013. 27 28

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Graph 2: Buying and selling of non-residents on Eke's rural land market (in relation to the number of transactions)

Table 2: Eke's land market- key figures 1710-1812

1710-1788

1797-1812

Average yearly number

9,4

9

11,4

Average transferred plot size (in hectares)

1,48

1,56

1,52

Transactions

Prices volumes (in franks) Average yearly price

1780,91

1462,1

3335,13

Average yearly price per hectare

1,37

1,47

0,92

Yearly turnover (percentages)

1,37

1,47

0,92

Sellers, non-resident of Eke

26,4

20,3

50

Buyers, non-resident of Eke

23,4

18,9

41,2

Sellers and buyers, non residents of Eke

9,8

5,1

28,0

Origin of participants (percentages)

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3. Assessing the impact of institutional change For the third and final part of our analysis, a straightforward multivariate hedonic OLS regression will be used to assess whether the price formation on the land market altered in due time and to what extent theses changes were influenced by development of new institutions from 1794 onwards. Since inherent qualities of different plots of land could vary widely, calculating average prices per hectare directly from the sale deeds, in order to construct a price index across time would be nonsensical. A statistical solution to this problem is a hedonic price analysis. This technique, created by Andrew Court, has its origins in Detroit’s automotive industry in the 1930‘s. During the twenties and thirties, car prices rose steeply. Contrary to the general accepted fact that this was due to oligopolistic behaviour, Court showed through hedonic price analysis that it was due to newly offered options that cars became more expensive.33 Since it inception, hedonic regression has increasingly become the standard for deriving real estate prices.34 In recent decades, the statistical technique has for example been used to estimate the effects of pollution on housing prices.35 On historical datasets however, it’s use on has been relatively limited. David Ryden and Russel Menard used this technique for their study on the eighteenth-century colonial land market of South Carolina.36 Herein they showed that local differences in price variation were driven purely by differences in the expectations of future economic growth. Especially in the ‘Low-country’ region, which harboured the ideal prerequisites for a plantation-driven economy, prices for land soared.37 In an earlier paper, we similarly showed that regional differences in both economic growth and future net-yields were key-drivers for land prices in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Flanders and Brabant.38 For the contemporary period, research on price formation for agricultural land is abundant. Here, findings similarly point towards expected future cash flows as being the prime mover in prices for agricultural land.39 As mentioned earlier, most land sales in the Low Countries were officialized in aldermens registers by the start of the sixteenth century. The detail that was contained within sale deeds improved significantly as time progressed. By the start of the eighteenth century, elements that were included range from the size of the property, the type of land transferred and whether or not it was leased out (and to whom) to the specific location within the parish and the origin of both the seller and the buyer. When in 1797 the aldermens benches were dissolved in favour of the newly formed registration offices, a similar amount of detail was jotted down in their accounts. Consequently, for the approximately 890 transactions registered between 1710 and 1812, several variables were collected (see table 1). Whereas Ryden and Russel had to settle for just one dummy (improved or not) to define relation to the intrinsic quality of the transferred plot (due to archival problems) 40, our source material gave enough detail. Consequently a differentiation could be made between several types of land (arable, meadows, woodland, farmyard) and whether or not it had a building on it. Although the price per hectare is the depended variable, we opted add the surface of the plot separately in the regression as well, since the obtained coefficient will provide us with some sort of indication as to the price differentiation between smaller and larger plots. We furthermore collected data on the current use of the plot (whether it was leased out), the place the sale deed was registered and the origin of both the buyer and the seller. Furthermore, a distinction between several types 33 BERNDT 1991 34 GATZLAFF and LING 1994, CASSEL and MENDELSOHN 1985, and KASK and MAANI 1992. 35 MICHAEL, BOYLE and BOUCHARD, 2000 and KANEMOTO, 1988. 36 RYDEN and MENARD 2005 37 RYDEN and MENARD 2005 38 DE VIJLDER 2012. 39 XU, MITTELHAMMER and BARKLEY, 1993 and READY and ABDALLA, 2005. 40 RYDEN and MENARD 2005: 614-615. Did the French revolution matter?

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of land sales was made, ranging from public sales, successions and forced sales to private sales (which became prohibited by 1796 but remained to come up in the sales registers for several years after this date.

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Table 3: Collected variables Variable name

Variable

Operationalization

Price_fr_ha

Price in Belgian francs per hectare

Continuous variable, calculated natural log

Farm_D

Was plot improved with a farm?

Dummy variable

Farmyard_D

Was plot identified as farmyard?

Dummy variable

Meadow_D

Was plot identified as meadow?

Dummy variable

Woodland_D

Was plot identified as woodland?

Dummy variable

Arable_D

Was plot identified as arable land?

Dummy variable, base value

Surface

Surface of the plot in hectares

Continuous variable, calculated natural log

Leased

Was plot leased out?

Dummy variable

B_tenant

Was the plot bought by the former tenant?

Dummy variable

B_origin

Origin of the buyer

Dummy variable (Other than Eke equals 1)

S_origin

Origin of the seller

Dummy variable (other than Eke equals 1)

S_rec_eke

Was the sale registered in Eke?

Dummy variable (other than Eke equals 1)

Priv_sale

Private sale/deed

Dummy variable

Succession_sale

Sale as part of a succession

Dummy variable

Forced_sale

Court-ordered/forced sale

Dummy variable

Normal_sale

‘Normal’/ public sale

Dummy variable, base value

Inhab_eke

Number of inhabitants Eke

Continuous variable, calculated natural log

D1710-D1812

Time dummies, per decennium

Dummy variable, D1810 is base value

jan_d - dec_d

Month dummies

Dummy variable, January is base value

Rye_p

Price for 100 kg of rye in Belgian francs.

Continuous variable, calculated natural log

Rye_p-1

Price of 100 kg of rye in Belgian francs in year Continuous variable, calculated natural prior to sale. log

y_t_value

Yearly turnover, in value

Continuous variable, calculated natural log

y_t_acreage

Yearly turnover, in acreage

Continuous variable, calculated natural log

Rye_yield_hl_ha

Average yield of rye in hectolitres per hectare. Continuous variable.

Nat_d_1793

Nationalisation of ecclesiastical goods

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Dummy variable

15

Annex_dummy_1795

Annexation with France

Dummy variable

Regis_dummy_1796

Foundation of registration office

Dummy variable

Morg_dummy_1800

Implementation of new mortgage laws.

Dummy variable

Civil_code_dummy_1804

Implementation of civil code

Dummy variable

Land_reg_dummy_1810

Land registration dummy.

Dummy variable

We furthermore controlled for the number of inhabitants within the parish of Eke, general price movements (using the price of rye) and the fluctuating variations in grain yields. Similarly, both the yearly turnover of the land market in both value and acreage were controlled for, as well seasonal variation. In both cases, we opted to use rye in favour of wheat, since throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 79 per cent of the arable land used for grain cultivation, was sown with rye.41 Finally, several dummies were inserted for to account for the institutional changes between the 1793 and 1810. Of most continuous variables the natural log was calculated, to ensure that normality assumptions of both the dependent and independent variables were met. Whereas Ryden and Menard used the natural log of the selling price of an individual land sale as the dependent variable, we used the natural log of the price per square metre as the dependent variable. For interpretational purposes the only difference this makes is that their estimated coefficients had to be either ≧0 and ≦1 to be inelastic and ≥1 to be elastic. On our model on the contrary, the coefficient has to be either negative to be inelastic or positive to be elastic.

As can be seen in the formula above, the natural log of the average price per hectare of a plot of land was expressed as a function a series of qualities of that plot (a summation of several Xi’s ) and the decennium in which the sale took place (Dt). Since their are to few observations per single year (9-10 on average), we opted to use one dummy for every two-year period. Both beta's and gamma’s are the unknown coefficients that will be estimated in the model. Furthermore, α and ɛ are respectively the constant and the error term. The final estimates this aforementioned model calculates will yield the net weight that each independent variable contributes to the land price. Furthermore, since the natural log was calculated of each continuous variable, these estimates will express the elasticity between the dependent and independent continuous variable. Finally, this regression will also provide our hedonic price index. This will be obtained by multiplying the natural antilog of each estimated gamma-coefficient by 100.42 Several hypotheses can be tested using the above-mentioned model. As we already noted, previous research has shown that prices for rural land were highly correlated with expected future cash flows. Land with a high net-yield or on more which demanding crops could be sown or cattle could be grazed, were in general more expensive. As a consequence, we expect a positive relationship between the type of land and the price per square hectare in the parish of 41 42

VANDENBROECKE 1972. The reference category will by 100 since gamma equals 0 and (e^0)*100=100.

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Eke. In other words, we expect meadows to be more expensive than plain arable land and less so for woodland. Applying the same logic, one could suppose that farmyards would similarly a positive coefficient. However, it is well known that in (inland) Flanders, agriculture relied heavily on a high degree of labour input arable land.43 Hence the likelihood of a price differentiation between farmyards and arable land (due to the limited difference in yields) is not very likely. The main research question in this paper however, is how and to what extent the French revolution and the successive institutional rearrangements had an impact on the way prices were formed on the land market. Currently, our dataset is still incomplete for some years, especially 1790-1796. Consequently, we’d like to stress that the following hypothesis are by no means final, nor are the regression results concerning them. Nonetheless, we’ve tried to construct some preliminary hypotheses in order to distil some general trends and stylized facts. From 1793 onwards, a massive nationalisation of both and Austrian nobility and ecclesiastical property took place. However, we expect that the effect of these evolutions remained limited. As mentioned earlier, these nationalisations and the subsequent sell-off on seized goods took place through distinctly different channels (e.g. not local markets but more centralized), for a noticeably different public, hence creating two segmented markets. The following years, roughly between 1796 and 1804, a host of new legislative initiatives were started. In April 1796, a new properly run registration office was founded in the nearby Deinze. Four years later, a new mortgage system was founded. It was disconnected from the judicial system and the registration of new mortgages was no longer the responsibility of the tax official but came under the auspices of the local notary. Four years later, during the summer of 1804, the maze of local and regional rules laws and privileges were abandoned and replaced by uniform set of laws, the Code Civil. This had caused the former privileges of the nobility and the church on land to finally belong to the past. At the same time, property rights became better define (simply put, only one person/legal entity could claim the full ownership of a piece of land). However, the consequences of this reconfiguration of the judicial framework for the price formation are rather ambiguous. One the one hand, these changes could entice the urban population to make additional investments in the rural land market and thus drive up land prices. On the other hand, through the aforementioned changes in legislative framework, the age-old distinction between copyhold and freehold disappeared. This could result in lower price levels for freehold land, since a) the reason for the premium over copyhold land had disappeared and b) the supply had increased. The biggest change however, is to be expected around 1810. Around this period, the land cadastre became fully operational. Consequently, the base on which property taxes were levied shifted definitely from land use to land ownership. This made buying land for investment purposes less desirable. Therefore, a negative relationship between the dummy land_reg_1810 and the price per hectare is to be expected. The table on the following pages present the main results of our regression analysis. Our most basic model (M1), only comprised of several elements to specify the type of real estate, succeeds at explaining more than 58 per cent of the variation in the price per hectare of the sold plots. Variation in prices is as expected for a large part determined by the (future) economic value of the sold property. For example, whether or not a farm building was built on a plot of land would increase the price instantaneously with 60 per cent.44 Meadows were similarly priced 60 % more expensive than plain arable land. Woodland on the contrary, was some 25 % cheaper. Note furthermore a slightly positive demand elasticity of the price per hectare (the positive an highly significant coefficient of the variable Inhab_eke). Finally, our basic model also shows a negative and inelastic relationship between the price per hectare and the total surface of the plot. An increase in the size of the property consequently leads to a reduction in it’s the price per hectare. 43 44

THOEN and DEJONGH 1999. Calculated as:

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This negative relationship highlights the buyers’ preference for smaller plots.45 The second model (M2), which focuses specifically on how prices behave as market activity grows, yields roughly the same results for our basic explanatory variables. It furthermore shows that as the total amount of property that changed hands increased, and hence supply increased, the average price per hectare declined just over a quarter. 46 Reversely, as the value of the sales rose, and thus the quality of the plots increased, a positive spill over effect was created and the average price per hectare has higher. Whereas the previous models have highlighted the effects of either intrinsic qualities of the transferred plots or market activity, models three and four (M3-M4) delve deeper into the judicial context and socio-economic background of both buyers and sellers. In the previous paragraphs, we’ve noted that a significant amount of both buyers and sellers originated from outside the parish of Eke. Within these “outsiders” two groups can be distinguished. Either they were well-off farmers and craftsmen from surrounding villages or they were burghers form the nearby Ghent. The demand for arable land, as a type of investment, from non-farming individuals had an enormous impact on the rural land market. As we’ve noted earlier, the institutional uniformisation in the aftermath of the French Invasion had led to a surge in the number of urban property buyers (graph 2). Accordingly, those plots that were already leased out were particularly prized (average price per hectare +27%). Please note that those higher prices for leased plots can not be explained through a tenant-buy-out-channel (in which tenants who bought the plot from their former landlord would be inclined to buy at an above average price since they had already invested time, money and labour in the upkeep and productivity of the plot), since the variable B_tenant is insignificant. In model four, the impact of investors from outside Eke is somewhat nuanced. It is clear that investors clearly had an impact on the general price level, but that does not imply that the price paid by non-residents of Eke was significantly higher (B_origin is insignificant). It seems as if although this specific group of buyers were not residing in Eke, they could estimate the value of property fairly accurately. However, only when the official deeds were registered in another jurisdiction than that of the Aldermen’s bench of Eke for the period up to 1796 and the registration offices in Deinze hereafter, significantly higher prices per hectare were achieved. The renewed interest of urban investors in rural real estate from the final decade of the 18th century onwards was linked to the aforementioned new institutional context. The question still remains however as to the impact of these changes on the price-formation of the land market itself. Models five and six present some of our preliminary findings heron, respectively without and with time-dummies. As one can see in table four, we had to eliminate several dummies (Nat_d_1793, Annex_dummy 1795 and Regis_dummy_1796) out of our regression due to a lack of data points for this period (a problem we hope to alleviate as soon as possible). Nonetheless, some interesting results come forward out of M5 and M6. Only the direct impact of the institutional changes of 1804 garnered significant coefficients. The reinstatement of the mortgage law and corresponding registration offices had no significant coefficients in model 5. The introduction from the Civil Code, however, had a clear and significant negative effect, causing a 28 % drop in land prices. Apparently the disappearance of the distinction between freehold and leasehold caused for a significant drop in the premium that had to be paid for freehold land. Moreover, these findings findings are robust since the addition of time-dummies (M6) does not affect the significance nor the magnitude of the coefficient. The institutional changes not only moved land prices directly, they had an indirect impact as well. The addition of both Civil_code_dummy_1804 and Morg_dummy_1800 significantly altered the magnitude of the coefficients of other explanatory variables as well (see for example the coefficient of Farm_D). As a result, one could argue that these newfound institutions created better-functioning land markets, or in any case created environments in which intrinsic qualities of the property Obviously this preference is a direct consequence of the dire socio-economic situation of the Flemish countryside at the end of the Ancien Régime, whereby many peasant families had to come by with a only limited amount of land. 46 Contra-intuitively, the correlation between ln_y_t_value and y_t_acreage is limited (0,2587). Consequently, the risk for collinearity is limited. 45

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accounted for a larger impact on the price per hectare than before. Some word of caution however is necessary. As for now, we have only collected a limited amount of data for the period 1797-1812 (approximately 180 sale deeds). In the near future, the scope of our analysis will be broadened in both time (collecting data up to 1835) and space (by adding two additional casestudies).

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Table 4: Regression results47 Lnprice_fr_ha R2

M1 M2 M3 M4 0,582 0,597 0,589 0,600 F( 8, 733) = F( 10, 731) = F( 10, 731) = F( 14, 727) = 127,32 108,11 104,66 77,66 7,344 3,344 7,330 7,089 0,470 0,430 0,486 0,411 (3,86)*** (3,58)*** (4,02)*** (3,26)*** 0,181 0,229 0,150 0,266 -1,410 (1,81)** (-1,17) (1,98)** 0,489 0,453 0,486 0,480 (5,99)** (5,63)*** (-0,6)*** (5,91)*** -0,289 -0,262 -0,273 -0,281 (-2,47)** (-2,28)** (-2,35)** (-2,44)** Base value Base value Base value Base value

M5 0,620 F( 21, 720) =55,82 2,924 0,547 (4,08)*** 0,109 (0,75) 0,442 (5,53)*** -0,265 (-2,33)** Base value

M6 0,634 F( 40, 701) =30,31 2,648 0,565 (4,17)*** 0,090 (0,61) 0,436 (5,41)*** -0,240 (-2,09)** Base value

-0,446 (-17,410)*** 0,003 (16,96)*** 0,069 -0,520 -1,380 (-2,5)**

-0,470 (-18,01)*** 0,002 (7,51)*** 0,045 (0,33) -0,425 (-0,69) 0,192 (2,83)*** -0,153 (-1,18) 0,073 (1,03) -0,026 (-0,37) 0,288 (2,81)*** -0,067 (-1,00) 0,161 (0,75) -0,450 (-3,34)*** Base value

-0,474 (-17,91)*** 0,000 (-0,41) 0,115 (0,76) 0,167 (0,24) 0,202 (2,9)*** -0,151 (-1,15) 0,073 (1,03) -0,045 (-0,64) 0,249 (2,37)** -0,042 (-0,62) 0,128 (0,59) -0,402 (-2,94)*** Base value

0,310 (4,77)*** -0,168 (-2,56)** Omitted Omitted Omitted 0,077 (0,4)

0,304 (4,18)*** -0,157 (-2,23)** Omitted Omitted Omitted 1,473 (2,35)**

Civil_code_dummy_180 4

-0,356

-0,421

(-1,83)** -0,123 (-0,69)

(-2,09)**

Land_reg_dummy_1810

F-statistic Constant Farm_D (coefficient) t-value Farmyard_D Meadow_D Woodland_D Arable_D Surface Inhab_eke Rye_p Rye_yield_hl_ha

-0,447 (-17,39)*** 0,002 (6,97)*** -0,030 (-0,23) -0,452 (-0,79)

Leased B_tenant B_origin

S_rec_eke Priv_sale Succession_sale Forced_sale Normal_sale

y_t_acreage

-0,465 (-18,05)*** 0,003 (16,22)*** 0,026 (0,2) -1,246 (-2,28)**

0,076 (1,07) -0,012 (-0,18) 0,355 (3,46)*** -0,099 (-1,53) 0,119 (0,57) -0,511 (-3,79)*** Base value

S_origin

y_t_value

-0,458 (-17,78)*** 0,003 (17,43)*** 0,103 (-0,79) -1,460 (-2,66)** 0,246 (3,58)*** -0,117 (-0,88)

0,316 (4,97)*** -0,179 (-2,75)**

Nat_d_1793 Annex_dummy_1795 Regis_dummy_1796 Morg_dummy_1800

De1710 De1720 De1730

47

***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 99, 95 and 90 per cent respectively.

0,053 (0,29) 0,300 (1,38) 0,342 (1,48)

De1740

De1810

0,390 (1,62) 0,7382178 (2,57)*** 1,083 (2,74)*** 1,152 (2,37)** 1,222 (2,64)*** 0,170 (0,93) Base value

jan_d

Base value

feb_d

0,176 (1,43) 0,009 (0,07) 0,102 (0,83) -0,005 (-0,04) 0,004 (0,03) 0,162 (1,28) 0,278 (1,4) 0,165 (1,27) -0,100 (-0,81) 0,126 (1,08) -0,009 (-0,07)

De1750 De1760 De1770 De1780 De1790_1800

maa_d apr_d mei_d jun_d jul_d aug_d sep_d okt_d nov_d dec_d

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Conclusion In this paper we investigated to what extent the French invasion of the Austrian Netherlands in 1795 and the resulting legal reforms altered the rural land market? Did the reconfiguration of the institutional framework open the door to even more speculative behaviour, as was stated by Toussaint? Or were these new institutions merely window-dressing and could no real changes be observed? In this paper we showed that from 1777 onwards a host of new institutions (either directly or indirectly connected to the land market) were created. Some were straight off successful, others needed some tweaking before they could take effect. The parish of Eke, a community near Ghent, served as a case study. We collected a nearly continuous series of land sales, from 1710 to 1812, on which we preformed a threefold analysis. First, we assessed the level of the market’s equilibrium (eg. price level and yearly turnover) before, during and after the French occupation. Secondly, we highlighted the changing geographical origin of property-buyers; from local residents to inhabitants of nearby cities and towns. Finally, we used a hedonic regression analysis to evaluate the price formation for single plots of land throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. We are well aware that some remarks are in order. At this moment, our dataset is arguably far from complete. The earliest institutional rearrangements fell out of the scope of this analysis, since the data for the period 1789-1795 still has to be collected. The accounts of the registry office furthermore present an inexplicable hiatus for the period 1796-june 1797. In addition, a more in-depth approach as to the behaviour of market participants is desirable. While the main purpose of this paper was to test our explanatory model, some preliminary conclusions can be presented. In the short term a rupture in the market equilibrium arose, as an immediate consequence of the installation of a new fiscal-military state, a flawing mortgage system and the lack of a land-registration system. Over a period of 3 to 5 years however, activity on the land market picked up as both the value and transferred acreage increased. We showed that the institutional changes had both a direct and indirect effect. On the one hand, the introduction of the Code Civile caused for the disappearance of the premium for freehold land, and thus a lower overall price level. On the other hand, these new institutions created a more transparent land market in the property’s intrinsic qualities accounted for a larger amount of the observed price differences.

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Appendix: A note on sources Due to some heuristic problems, recent economic history research in this field mainly focuses on qualitative or fractured archival sources (e.g. SUTHERLAND, 2002). Our aim is to span this significant and roaring period in time by means of a thoroughly quantitative approach. A renewed, long term analysis can provide insights in economic behavior of market participants and a rural society as a whole during a period or social and political turmoil. Choosing a case study The present-day Belgian municipalities were given territorial and administrative autonomy and importance after the abolition of the (larger) French cantonal municipalities in 1800. Lots of village boundaries and surfaces had shifted or changed since the Austrian Ancien Régime. To construct a meaningful, significant record linkage inquiry between two datasets, we had to find two series of land market transaction of a village that underwent no border changes. Eke was a perfect match (VAN SCHANDEVYL, 1986, 36), and by measuring a surface of 955,78 hectares it was a suitable case study to hold grip on the multitude of transactions and land market actors (DEJONGH, 1996, 6-8).48 Quantitative sources for a record linkage We used some static structure analyses of Eke as a well-funded, qualitative framework to become acquainted with our case study community, of which we can regard the thesis of Coppieters as a classic example (COPPIETERS, 1991). This regrettably is one of the few comprehensive socio-economic studies, comparing the two institutional epochs to another. We continued building on the clever retrogressive trajectory analysis of Wieme, who studied the dynamics of the eighteenth-century Eke land market transactions (WIEME, 2005; on the different methodology approaches, see DE REU, 2013b). In order to conduct a record linkage of two different regimes, crossing a century and a half of land market transactions, researchers can merely depend on modern statutory writings and nowadays fiscal documents. The first are obvious, classic records; the second are – surprisingly – scientifically untouched. Regarding the modern time sources, we explored the so-called ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (legal transactions) in the local Aldermen bench logbooks: In this paper we relied on a complete set of fifteen registers (for the period 1710-1787) and three sheaves of papers (for the period 17871795). Every contract concerning the transaction of buildings and grounds laying in the respective village of Eke should have been registered (SOLY, 1974; DAMBRUYNE, 1988). According to the Flemish formal and customary laws (GODDING, 1987: passim), we make claim that these real estate transaction sources are exhaustive. Since land transactions only make up a relatively small percentage of the total number of transactions, vastly outnumbered by rent transactions, the registers are a real challenge to scientific examination (DE VIJLDER, 2012, 14). But in this way legal contracts of the local Aldermen bench provide serial archival sources of the Austrian period in Flanders (eighteenth century). Yet, with an ‘Ancien Régime’-based or even non-existing cadaster, available and adequate sources for the first half of the nineteenth century were scarce until now. The sources of the newly archived federal tax offices render assistance. From their inception in the early months of 1796 the numerous land registry offices had to generate taxes consistently – French rule was

In this regard, we should mention a fairly large Eke enclave “the Splete van Eke” which was located in present-day Nazareth (DE POTTER & BROECKAERT, 1864: 3) and measured well over 210 hectares. We could filter the data of the enclave out of the Ancien Régime dataset. 48

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after all, at least the first years, a military occupation in need for money (RAPPORT, 2002). The entries for the Eke region started at March 3rd 1796. The voluminous registers of the land registry office of Deinze hold a continuity in information about land property transactions in Eke (and a dozen other surrounding villages) until March 1808. From April 1808 onwards the land registry office of Kruishoutem handled all registration of land and building exchange in Eke. This is the ideal source to study (DE REU, 2013c), much more favorable than for instance the notary deeds. Because at least for the first years of French rule, there were no executing public notaries in Eke. And above all: every seller and buyer had a free choice to visit a notary they wanted – even if this was at the other side of the country. Consequently the notary information is not compiled geographically (so a notary in Eke never overlooked the whole Eke land market). We however did not use the registrations themselves, just the extensive syntheses in the alphabetic tables of the tax office of Kruishoutem (DE REU, 2011: 264-267). When the land registry of Kruishoutem was operational, the employees instantly copied the first twelve years of immovable transactions of seventeen villages (of which was Eke) registered in Deinze. Through this we could rely on 44 alphabetic registers – and 1 register we used as a checking document – in which we gathered all Eke real estate sales and purchases. Quantitative variables In order to construct our record linkage dataset and to intercept exogenous influences in our data comparison, we of course needed more parameters. We had to set off price fluctuations by referencing the different prices per acre to the prices of bread grains. We used the Ghent rye prices (JACKS, 2004; JACKS, 2005), since the village of Eke was part to the market catchment area of the city of Ghent (RONSIJN, 2011: 137). We also had to hold pace with demographic evolution. Population numbers were adopted from already published figures (DE BOCK, 1980: annex Eke; COPPIETERS, 1991: 190-192; VRIELINCK, 2000: 1690-1693). The prices were converted to franks, and we choose the metrics system for all area measures.

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Sources State archives Ghent Seigniory, manorial court and parish of Eke  53: sheats of paper ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1786-1788)  54: sheats of paper ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1789-1792)  55: sheats of paper ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1793-1795)  57: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1714-1717)  58: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1718-1722)  59: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1723-1728)  60: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1728-1733)  61: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1733-1741)  62: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1741-1747)  63: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1747-1753)  64: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1753-1763)  65: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1763-1766)  66: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1767-1771)  67: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1772-1775)  68: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1775-1779)  69: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1779-1784)  70: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1783-1787)  152: register ‘wettelijke passeringen’ (1706-1714) State archives Beveren Fund Scheldedepartement  D-5000: alphabetical tables of the sales of nationalized clergy property  D-5001: alphabetical tables of the sales of nationalized clergy property Fund Land registry office Kruishoutem  18: alphabetical table form 1/9 (1827 Jan. 1 - 1829 May 1)  19: alphabetical table form 1/10 (1828 Aug. 8 - 1829 Dec. 31)  20: alphabetical table form 1/11 (1829 April 9 - 1830 Dec. 31)  21: alphabetical table form 1/12 (1830 April 1 - 1831 Dec. 31)  22: alphabetical table form 1/13 (1830 Sept. 6 - 1832 Dec. 31)  23: alphabetical table form 1/14 (1833)  24: alphabetical table form 1/15 (1832 July 2 - 1834 June 30)  25: alphabetical table form 1/16 (1833 Feb. 26 - 1835 Oct. 31)  26: alphabetical table form 1/17 (1835 Jan. 1 - 1837 Aug. 5)  27: alphabetical table form 1/18 (1837 Feb. 27 - 1838 June 26)  28: alphabetical table form 1/19 (1837 Dec. 11 - 1839 Nov. 6)  29: alphabetical table form 1/20 (1839)  30: alphabetical table form 1/21 (1839 Oct. 21 - 1841 March 23)  31: alphabetical table form 1/22 (1840 Oct. 3 - 1841 Dec. 28)  32: alphabetical table form 1/23 (1841 June 23 - 1842 June 28)  33: alphabetical table form 1/24 (1842 July 1 - 1843 March 24)  34: alphabetical table form 1/25 (1843 Jan. 5 - 1843 Dec. 28)  35: alphabetical table form 1/26 (1844 Jan. 5 - 1844 Dec. 24)  36: alphabetical table form 1/27 (1844 Oct. 24 - 1846 Aug. 3)  37: alphabetical table form 1/28 (1845 Jan. 24 - 1846 Nov. 5)  38: alphabetical table form 1/29 (1846 July 8 - 1847 June 21)  39: alphabetical table form 1/30 (1847 Feb. 11 - 1848 April 25)  40: alphabetical table form 1/31 (1848 Feb. 24 - 1849 May 31)  41: alphabetical table form 1/32 (1849 April 19 - 1850 Aug. 3) Did the French revolution matter?

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                    

42: alphabetical table form 1/33 (1850 Jan. 14 - 1851 Dec. 1) 43: alphabetical table form 1/34 (1851 March 31 - 1853 June 27) 44: alphabetical table form 1/35 (1853 Feb. 26 - 1854 June 12) 45: alphabetical table form 1/36 (1854 April 1 - 1855 June 26) 46: alphabetical table form 1/37 (1854 Nov. 27 - 1855 Dec. 1) 47: alphabetical table form 1/38 (1855 Oct. 6 - 1856 Oct. 30) 48: alphabetical table form 1/39 (1856 April 21 - 1857 Nov. 21) 49: alphabetical table form 1/40 (1856 Nov. 21 - 1858 March 3) 50: alphabetical table form 1/41 (1857 Nov. 12 - 1858 Oct. 31) 51: alphabetical table form 1/42 (1858 March 6 - 1859 April 6) 52: alphabetical table form 1/43 (1858 Oct. 28 - 1859 Nov. 28) 53: alphabetical table form 1/44 (1859 Feb. 14 - 1860 Nov. 2) 54: alphabetical table form 2/1 (1796 April 21 - 1811 Feb. 13) 55: alphabetical table form 2/2 (1809 April 10 - 1813 Jan. 20) 56: alphabetical table form 2/3 (1811 Dec. 14 - 1817 Dec. 23) 57: alphabetical table form 2/4 (1817 April 2 - 1821 Jan. 1) 58: alphabetical table form 2/5 (1818 Aug. 13 - 1822 June 3) 59: alphabetical table form 2/6 (1820 June 7 - 1825 March 21) 60: alphabetical table form 2/7 (1823 June 12 - 1827 Feb. 21) 61: alphabetical table form 2/8 (1826 July 1 - 1827 Dec. 27) 62: alphabetical table form 2/9 (1827 March 16 - 1829 June 9)

Dataset land market transaction in the Eke region (1710-1779)  WIEME T. (2005), De rurale immobiliënmarkt in Vlaanderen (18de eeuw). Casus: Heerlijkheid Eke, Ghent, unpublished master thesis (Ghent University History Department). Datasets grain prices on the Ghent market  JACKS D. (2004), Market Integration in the North and Baltic Seas, 1500-1800, in Journal of European Economic History, vol. 33-3, p. 285-329.  JACKS D. (2005), Intra- and International Commodity Market Integration in the Atlantic Economy, 1800-1913, in Explorations in Economic History, vol. 42-3, p. 381-413.

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